^ 


I'PliX^-^J 


LIBRARY 

1     SAN  d;ego 
V / 


lo. 


^  ^t^'""' 


i^V 


v\a(..( 


lU^  ■ 


2)F 
Mi 


(7  ... 


/ 


Vu<I-'t- 


^z/CX^ 


(^x'^^^T^ii^'^^:!^^^  i 


A  HISTORY  OF  GREECE 


A 

HISTORY  OF  GREECE 


FROM   THE   EARLIEST   TIMES   TO   THE 
DEATH  OF  ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT 


\    1  y      BY 


C.  W.  C.  OMAN,  M.A.,  F.S.A, 

Fellow  of  All  Souls'  College., 
and  Lecturer  at  New  College,  Oxford 


GIXTH    EDITION 


IVith  Ma^s  and  P.'ans 


NEW   YORK 
LONGMANS,    GREEN,    &    C 

LONDON,  AND    BOMBAY 

1898 
All  rights  reserved 


PREFACE  TO  THE   SECOND  EDITION 

A  Second  Edition  of  this  book  being  required  within 
eighteen  months  of  the  appearance  of  the  first,  the  author 
is  enabled  to  make  certain  alterations  and  additions, 
which  appear  necessary  or  at  any  rate  advisable. 

The  most  important  changes  are  due  to  the  discovery 
of  the  Aristotelian  IIoXtTeta  twv  ^KOrjvaiwv.  The  inform- 
ation derived  from  it  imposes  on  the  author  the  task  of 
rewriting  a  considerable  number  of  the  pages  dealing 
with  the  history  of  Athens.  Whether  produced  under 
the  immediate  superintendence  of  Aristotle  or  not, 
the  work  is  at  any  rate  a  genuine  production  of  the  end 
of  the  fourth  century,  and  all  its  statements  deserve 
consideration.  Some  of  them  indeed  cannot  be  accepted 
— for  example,  the  story  of  Themistocles'  intrigues  against 
the  Areopagus  is  quite  impossible.  In  other  cases  the 
new  book  directly  contradicts  an  authority  who  was 
contemporary  with  the  events  lie  narrates ;  as  in  the 
details  which  it  gives  about  the  constitiition  of  the  "Four 
Hundred"  in  411  B.C.,  where  Thucydides  is  hopelessly 
at  variance  with  it.  In  such  instances  the  atithor  has 
followed  thfe  contemporary  rather  than  the  IIoXiTeta.  But 
in  most  of  its  pages  the  new  book  gives  us  information 
that  can  be  accepted,  and  the  author  has  incorj)orated, 
with  due  caution,  as  much  of  it  as  he  could  contrive. 


vi  Preface. 

Many  sclioolraaster-friencis  have  joined  in  urging  tliat 
the  book  should  be  continued  down  to  the  death  of 
Alexander  the  Great.  Though  holding  the  date  he 
originally  chose — the  death  of  Philip  in  836  p.c. — to  be  a 
more  logical  dividing-point,  the  author  has  taken  their 
advice,  and  added  a  chapter  dealing  with  the  Macedonian 
conquest  of  Asia. 

A  word  of  thanks  must  be  given  to  many  correspondents 
— some  known  to  the  author,  some  strangers  to  him, — 
who  have  written  to  make  suggestions,  and  to  point  out 
errors  in  the  first  edition.  Most  of  them  will  note  that 
their  advice  has  been  taken  into  consideration,  and  all 
■will  understand  that  it  was  duly  appreciated. 

Most  especially  must  the  author  acknowledge  his 
indebtedness  to  his  friend,  ]\[r.  J.  Wells,  Fellow  of 
Wadham  College,  for  the  careful  revision  of  the  whole 
work  which  he  was  good  enough  to  undertake.  His 
suggestions  and  corrections  have  materially  added  to  the 
Bccuracy  of  the  book. 

Oxford,  Jixhj,  1891. 

PREFACE   TO   THE  FOURTH  EDITION 

Two  more  Editions  having  been  required  duiing  the 
present  year,  the  author  takes  the  opportunity  of 
making  a  few  more  corrections. 

The  most  important  is  the  elision  of  the  supposed 
political — as  opposed  to  legislative — reforms  of  Draco. 
The  consensus  of  opinion  among  historians  that  the 
IIoAtTfia  is  here  misleading  seems  conclusive.    . 

Several  minor  corrections  are  due  to  the  kind  offices 
of  correspondents  in  England  and  America,  who  have 
pointed  out  misprints  or  contradictions. 

Oxford,  December,  1892. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    The  Geography  of  Greece 1 

ir.    The  Origins  of  the  Greek  Nationality I'j 

III.  The  Homekic  Poems,  and  the  Greeks  of  the  Heroic 

Age 29 

IV.  The  Religion  of  the  Ancient  Greeks  :    Olympia 

AND  DELPm 39 

V.    The  Great  Migrations i7 

VI,    The  Greek  Colonies  in  Asia 52 

VII.    The  Dorians  in  Peloponnesus— the  Legislation  op 

Lycurgus CO 

VIII.    The  Establishment  of  the  Spartan  Supremacy  in 

Peloponnesus 73 

IX.    The  Age  of  Colonization SI 

X.    The  Age  of  the  Tyrants 94 

XI.    The  Early  History  of  Attica 101 

XII.    Solon  and  Peisistratus 10<> 

XIII.  The  Greeks  OF  Asia,  and  the  Lydian  Monarchy  ..  ,  119 

XIV.  Rise    of    the    Achaemenian    Empire  —  Cyrus    and 

Darius  —  Commencement   of  the  Per.sian   Wars, 

549-520  B  c , 124 

XV,    Darius  and  the  Greeks— The  Ionian  Revolt 138 

XVI.    Events  in  Greece  after  the  Fall  of  the  Peisis- 
tratidae  —  The    Constitution    op    Cleisthenes, 

510-509  B.c 148 

XVII.    Events  in  European  Greece  down  to  the  Battle 

of  Marathon.  509-490  b.c > . .  1G3 


vni 


Contents. 


CirAl'TICre  PAGE 

XVIII.    FuoM  THE  Battle  of  Marathon  to  the  Invasion 

OF  Xerxes,  490-480  b.c 175 

XIX.     The  Invasion   of   Xerxes  —  Thermopylae  and 

Artemisium 192 

XX.     The  Invasion  op  Xekxes— Salamis  and  Plataea    208 
XXI.     The  Greeks  of  Italy  and  Sicily  down  to  the 

end  of  the  Tyranny  at  Syracuse,  600-465  b.c.    228 
XXII.    Events  in  Asia  Minor  and  Greece,  479-4GG  b.c. 

—  Origin  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos 2H6 

XXIII.    The    Building    up    of    the  Athenian   Empire, 

471-458  B.c 247 

XXIVo    Athens  at  the  Height    of    her    Power,  458- 

445  b.c 257 

XXV.     The  Years  of  Peace,  445-432  b.c — Pericles  and 

THE  Athenian  Empire 2G8 

XXVI.    The  Outbreak  op  the  Peloionnesian  War  and 

ITS  Causes,  435-432  b.c 280 

XXVII.    The  Early  Years  of  the  Peloponnesian  War 

DOWN  TO  the  Death  of  Pericles,  431-429  b.c.    293 
XXVIII.     FuoM  THE  Death  op  Pericles  to  the  Fall  of 

Plataea,  429-427  b.c 300 

XX rX.     Sphacteria  AND  Deltum,  427-424  b.c 320 

XXX.    Brasidas  in  Thrace— The  Peace  of  Nicias,  424- 

421  B.c 335 

XXXI.     The  Years  of  the  Truce,  421-416  b.c 342 

XXXII.     The   Expedition  of  the  Athenians   to    Sicily, 

415-413  B.c 351 

XXXIII.  The  Decline  of  the  Power  of  Athens,   down 

to   the   Fall   of  the   Four  Hundred,   413- 

411  B.c 374 

XXXIV.  The  Fall  of  Athens,  411-404  b.c. — End  of  the 

Peloponnesian  War 389 

XXXV.    Sparta  supreme  in  Greece,  401-396  b.c 407 

XXXVI.     Attempts  to  overthrow  the    Spartan  Supre- 
macy, 395-387  B.c 425 

XXXVIl-    The  Geeeks  of  the  West,  413-338  b.c 437 


Contents.  ix 

CIIAPTEP.  PAGE 

XXXVIir.     The   Last    Years   of  the  Si'aktan   Hegsmowy, 

387-379  B.c o 450 

XXXIX.     The  Uprising  OF  Thebes,  379-371  B.c loS 

XL.    Thebes  predominant  in.  Greece,  371-362  b.c.  . .  4G9 
XLI.    From  the  Peace  of  362  b.c.  to  Philip's  First 

Invasion  of  Greece,  362-352  b.c 487 

XLII.    Philip  and  Demosthene.s,  352-344  b.c 499 

XLIIL    The  End  of  Grecian  Freedom,  314-338  b.c.    , .  508 

XLIV.    Alexander  the  Great,  336-323  b.c 521 

Tables  :  Kings  of  Sparta 517 

Kings  of  Persia  548 


LIST  OF  MAPS   AND  PLANS, 

PAGE 

ASIA  IN  600  B.c 128 

Asia  in  510  B.C.,  showing  the  Satkapies  of  Darius  ........  1.37 

Battle  of  Marathon  , . » , o c . .  178 

Plan  of  the  Pass  of  Thermopylae ,  200 

Plan  of  Salamis , 214 

The  Three  Positions  of  the  Greek  army  before  the  Battle 

of  Plataea 0. 223 

The  Athenian  Empire,  circa  445  b.c,  with  its  Divisions  as 

shown  in  the  Tribute  Lists , . . . . , , .  275 

Pylos  and  Sphacteria r ...... , „ 324 

The  Siege  op  Syracuse ,...., c . . .  ^  359 

Battle  of  Leuctra  .... .  = c 4G7 

Battle  of  Mantinea 484 

Greece  in  the  Fifth  Century  before  Christ  ..  .At  end  of  hook. 
Chief  Sites  op  Greek  Colonization „ 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   GEOGEAPHY   OF  GKEECE. 

When  we  can  first  discern  through  the  mists  of  antiquity  the  race 
who  called  themselves  Hellenes — though  we,  following  the  ancient 
Romans,  know  them  better  as  Greeks — we  find  them  dwelling  in 
the  southern  region  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  That  they  must  at 
some  remote  date  have  wandered  into  that  land  from  Asia  we  may 
surmise,  but  cannot  prove. 

There  is  a  great  mountain  range,  which  under  many  names  forms 
the  backbone  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  Starting  from  the  Alps, 
it  runs  from  north  to  south,  forming  the  watershed  between  the 
streams  which  flow  west  into  the  Adriatic,  and  those  which  run 
north-east  or  south-east  to  seek  the  Danube  or  the  Aegean.  Of  this 
great  chain  the  southernmost  link  is  a  range  called  PIndus.  From 
the  broad  square  tract  which  forms  the  bulk  of  the  peninsula 
this  range  of  Pindus  strikes  out  boldly  into  the  Mediterranean,  and 
with  its  spurs  and  dependent  ranges  forms  a  great  mountainous 
mass  projecting  for  more  than  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles  from  its 
base,  and  almost  touching  the  thirty-sixth  degree  of  latitude  with 
its  southernmost  cape. 

It  is  this  southern  extension  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  which  has 
been  since  the  earliest  dawn  of  history  the  home  of  the  Hellenic 
race.  Here  alone  could  the  Greek  claim  that  he  was  the  first 
inhabitant  of  the  land,  the  true  child  of  the  soil.  His  cities  were 
built  on  every  shore  from  Gaul  to  Colchis,  but  in  all  lands  save 
this  he  was  a  stranger  and  a  sojourner,  maintaining  a  precarious 
hold  on  a  fortified  haven  or  a  strip  of  coastland  won  from  some 
earlier  possessor. 

The  Hellenic  Peninsula— if  we  may  so  name  the  southern  pro- 

B 


2  21ie  Geography  of  Greece. 

jection  of  the  Balkan  region — is  not  large.  It  is  about  equal  to 
Size  of  Scotland  in  size,*  and  may  be  aptly  compared  to  that 
Greece.  country  in  many  other  things  than  mere  extent. 
Both  are  almost  entirely  surrounded  by  the  sea ;  both  possess  a 
wildly  irregular  coast-line,  seamed  with  countless  bays  and  inlets  ; 
both  are  fringed  by  a  widespreading  chain  of  islands  great  and 
small ;  both  own  a  soil  not  over-fertile  for  the  greater  part  of  its 
surface ;  and  above  all,  both  are  pre-eminently  mountain-lands.  In 
Greece,  as  in  Scotland,  it  is  almost  impossible  to  get  out  of  sight 
of  the  hills ;  no  spot  in  the  whole  land  is  more  than  fifteen  miles 
from  some  considerable  range.  The  three  plains  of  any  size  which 
it  contains  do  not  together  form  one-sixth  of  its  surface. 

The  mountains  of  Greece,  then,  give  the  land  its  special  character. 
They  are  not  remarkable  for  their  great  height — Olympus,  the 
The  Greek  loftiest  summit,  falls  short  of  ten  thousand  feet — but 
mountains,  ^-^q  peculiarly  wild,  rugged,  and  barren.  The  sharp 
bare  limestone  peaks  and  ridges  stand  out  with  surprising  distinct- 
ness in  the  bright  dry  atmosphere  of  the  South.  Their  summits 
do  not  reach  the  region  of  perpetual  snow,  nor  are  their  outlines 
softened  by  forests ;  all  is  clear-cut  and  hard.  Moreover,  there 
is  so  much  sheer  cliff  and  impassable  ravine  in  their  structure 
that  they  constitute  much  more  effective  barriers  between  valley 
and  valley  than  might  be  inferred  from  their  mere  height,  which 
generally  ranges  between  three  thousand  and  seven  thousand  feet 
above  the  sea.  The  paths  from  one  district  to  another  are  few 
and  difficult,  winding  at  the  bottom  of  beetling  crags  or  climbing 
precipitous  gorges  in  their  tortuous  course.  Hence  each  tribe  was 
well  protected  from  its  neighbours  ;  the  points  at  which  it  could  be 
assailed  were  well  known,  and  could  in  most  cases  be  obstructed 
with  ease,  and  firmly  held  by  a  handful  of  resolute  men.  Greece 
was  framed  by  Nature  for  the  home  of  small  independent  com- 
munities. 

Not  the  least  characteristic  feature  of  the  Greek  mountains  is 
their  chaotic  complexity.  There  is  no  general  system  or  order  in 
their  course ;  sometimes  they  remind  us  of  the  ribs  starting  from 

*  Scotland  contains  29,800  square  miles  ;  the  modern  kingdom  of  Greece, 
including  the  Cyclades  and  Thessal)-,  24,900 ;  Southern  Albania,  the  old 
Epirus,  makes  up  some  4000  or  5000  more. 


Motmtains  and  Rivers.  3 

a  backbone,  sometimes  of  the  diverging  arms  of  a  star-fish,  some- 
times of  the  complicated  meshes  of  a  spider's  web.  Ranges  turn 
sharply  at  right  angles  to  themselves,  or  divide  into  parallel  chains, 
only  to  meet  again ;  bold  ridges,  whose  height  promises  a  long 
course,  end  suddenly  in  a  sea-beaten  cliff.  Deep,  narrow,  unexpected 
gorges,  torn  open  by  some  convulsion  of  nature,  sunder  apparently 
continuous  lines  of  crest.  At  one  point  an  upland  valley  is  lost  in 
some  recess  of  the  hills,  with  no  natural  outlet  for  its  waters ;  at 
another  an  arm  of  the  sea  comes  creeping  up  a  tortuous  cleft  far 
into  the  heart  of  the  mountains.  Everything  is  present  except 
system,  order,  and  regularity. 

Although  the  summits  of  the  mountains  of  Greece  are  invariably 
bare  and  bleak,  their  spurs  and  slopes  were  in  ancient  days  not 
entirely  destitute  of  forest  tracts.  In  Northern  Greece  extensive 
woods  of  ash,  beech,  and  pine  were  to  be  found  on  the  sides  of 
Pelion  and  Parnassus,  and,  in  the  Peloponnesus,  Arcadia  was 
renowned  for  its  widespreading  oak-groves.  But  on  the  whole  the 
land  was  not  abundantly  timbered ;  it  had  no  broad,  untrodden 
stretches  of  tangled  woodland  such  as  formed  the  primitive  boun- 
daries of  Germany  or  England — its  wildness  was  always  the  wildness 
of  the  cliff,  and  not  of  the  forest. 

'  The  character  of  the  mountains  of  a  country  determines  that  of 
its  rivers.  Gentle  slopes  and  wide  plains  produce  broad  navigable 
streams  ;  rocks  and  ravines  breed  unmanageable  x^e  rivers  of 
torrents.  The  course  of  the  rivers  of  Greece  is  so  Greece, 
short,  and  their  descent  to  the  sea  from  the  hills  so  rapid,  that 
not  one  of  them  can  bear  a  boat.  But  if  incapable  of  use  they  are 
not  incapable  of  mischief;  swollen  with  the  winter  rains,  they 
become  broad  dangerous  floods  which  sweep  away  all  that  impedes 
their  passage  to  the  sea,  and  often  spread  destruction  through  the 
cultivated  land  along  their  lower  course.  The  Greeks  represented 
the  gods  of  their  rivers  as  mixed  shapes,  with  the  body  of  a  bull  and 
the  head  of  a  man ;  the  meaning  is  not  difficult  to  seize — the  figure 
combines  the  headlong  rush  and  brute-strength  of  the  animal  with 
that  almost  human  ingenuity  for  mischief  which  a  stream  in  flood 
displays.  Four  or  five  rivers  in  Greece  possess  a  course  of  some 
length,  and  bear  a  considerable  volume  of  water  to  the  sea  through 
all  the  seasons  of  the  year.     Largest  of  these  was  the  Acbelous,  the 


4  The  Geography  of  Greece. 

king  of  Grecian  waters,  wliicli  hurries  for  more  than  a  hundred  miles 
through  the  gloomy  gorges  of  Epirus  and  Aetolia,  and  ends  its 
obscure  course  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  Corinthian  Gulf.  Smaller 
but  more  famous  were  Peneus,  which  drains  Thessaly,  the  one  great 
Grecian  plain ;  and  Alj^heus,  the  sole  river  which  succeeds  in  forcing 
its  way  out  of  the  mountain  barriers  of  Arcadia,  and  reaching  the 
Ionian  Sea.  The  other  streams  of  Greece,  though  famous  enough 
in  story,  are  little  better  than  winter  torrents ;  for  one  half  of  the 
year  they  rush  tumultuously  down  to  the  sea ;  for  the  other  half 
they  show  a  narrow  thread  of  water  barely  connecting  a  chain  of 
isolated  pools,  or  even  shrink  away  altogether  and  disappear.  The 
bed  of  a  dried-up  river  has  always  been  during  the  summer  months 
the  most  obvious,  and  often  the  only,  road  for  the  Greek  wayfarer. 

The  lakes  of  Greece  are  almost  without  exception  the  result  of 
the  accumulation  of  water  in  upland  valleys  without  any  natural 
The  lakes  of  exit  for  drainage.  The  Lake  of  Pambotis  in  Epirus, 
Greece.  ti;,a,t  of  Copai's  in  Boeotia,  and  that  of  Stymphalus  in 
Arcadia,  are  all  fair  examples  of  this.  There  would  be  no  limit 
to  the  increase  of  their  extent  were  it  not  for  the  existence  of 
a  phenomenon  common  in  all  limestone  countries.  The  water, 
unable  to  find  its  way  above  ground,  pierces  itself  a  subterranean 
passage,  a  "  swallow,"  which  the  Greeks  called  fidpaepou  or  evav\os, 
and  reappears  in  some  lower  valley.  If  the  "  swallow  "  is  choked, 
the  lake  increases  and  inundates  the  whole  valley.  If  it  is 
naturally  or  artificially  enlarged,  the  sheet  of  water  may  dry  up 
entirely.  The  ancient  kings  of  Orchomenus  turned  the  large  lake 
Copai's  into  grassy  meadows  by  cutting  a  tunnel  four  miles  long 
into  the  Euboean  Strait;  a  few  centuries  of  neglect,  however, 
choked  the  issue,  and  reproduced  a  broad  expanse  of  marsh  which 
exists  till  this  day. 

What  Greece  lacks  in  navigable  rivers  is  more  than  compensated 
for  by  her  numerous  gulfs.     These  arms  of  the  sea  run  up  into  the 

The  Greek    heart  of  the  land,  and  make  almost  every  district 

sea-coast,  readily  accessible  from  the  water.  The  Corinthian 
Gulf  is  but  the  largest  example  of  a  long  series  of  land-locked 
inlets  which  jDcnetrate  Greece  from  all  sides ;  so  deeply  is  the  coast 
indented  that  even  the  inmost  recesses  of  Thessaly  or  Arcadia  are 
not  more  than  forty  miles  from  the  nearest  sea.     The  depth  of 


Climate  of  Greece.  5 

her  bays  and  gulfs  produces  the  surprising  result  that  Greece 
has  as  many  miles  of  sea-coast  as  Spain  and  Portugal,  though  its 
superficial  area  is  only  one-tenth  of  that  of  the  Iberian  Peninsula. 

As  a  land  of  mountain  and  shore,  Greece  possesses  a  more 
temperate  climate  than  might  have  been  expected  from  her  southern 
latitude.  The  greater  part  of  the  surface  is  upland,  tjj^g  cumate 
where  the  summer  heat  is  appreciably  moderated  by  ^^  Greece, 
the  elevation.  Moreover,  the  sea-breeze  penetrates  almost  evcr}^' 
where  to  cool  and  refresh.  So  it  comes  to  pass  that  'J'hessaly, 
for  example,  though  further  south  than  Naples,  has  a  climate  no 
warmer  than  that  of  Lombardy  ;  and  that  the  southernmost 
plains  of  Messenia  are  the  only  part  of  the  country  where  anything 
approaching  semi-tropical  vegetation  can  be  found.  The  temperature 
of  Greece  was  probably  even  milder  in  ancient  days  than  now,  for 
the  hand  of  man  has  cleared  away  the  forest  tracts  which  once 
equalized  the  rainfall  and  saved  the  land  from  drought.  The 
Greek  held  that  the  excellence  of  his  climate  quite  compensated 
for  the  richness  of  soil  which  was  denied  to  his  home  by  nature, 
and  pointed  out  Hellas  as  owning  the  happy  mean  between  the  cold 
of  the  North  and  the  heat  of  the  South. 

Greece  may  be  divided  into  three  main  parts,  each  separated  from 
the  others  by  an  isthmus.  The  first  includes  Thessaly  and  Epirus, 
the  lands  which  lie  between  the  northern  boundary        „  . 

•'  Main 

of  the  country,  and  the  Malian  and  Ambracian  gulfs    divisions  of 
— two  land-locked  sheets  of  water  which  cut  into  the 
peninsula  at  the  thirty-ninth  degree  of  latitude,  and  reduce  its 
breadth  to  sixty-five  miles. 

To  the  south  of  these  inlets  Greece  broadens  out  again  into  its 
middle  region,  the  district  to  which  the  late  geographers  some- 
times restricted  the  name  of  "  Hellas,"  opposing  it  alike  to 
Peloponnesus  and  to  the  Northern  lands.  This  tract  contains  the 
countries  of  Acarnania,  Aetolia,  Doris,  Locris,  Phocis,  Boeotia, 
Attica,  and  Megaris. 

Lastly,  beyond  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth  lies  the  disconnected 
mass  of  Peloponnesus,  a  mountainous  peninsula  only  joined  to 
Central  Greece  by  a  low-lying  spit  of  land  three  miles  and  a  half 
across. 

The  northern  third  of  Greece  is  divided  into  two  widely  dis-^ 


6  The  Geography  of  Greece. 

similar  halves  by  tho  great  range  of  Pindus.  Westward  lies  Epims, 
a  land  never  fully  recognized  as  Greek,  for  the  inhab- 
itants were  alien  in  race  and  language,  though  in  the 
course  of  time  they  took  upon  themselves  a  varnish  of  Hellenic 
culture  and  civilization.  It  is  composed  of  a  number  of  mountain 
valleys,  some  running  parallel  with  Pindus,  some  at  right  angles 
to  it,  according  as  the  spurs  of  the  great  range  strike  south  or 
west.  The  northern  half  of  its  coast  is  sheer  cliff,  where  the 
Ceraunian  Mountains  run  close  by  the  seaside  ;  further  south  the 
shore  is  less  impracticable,  and  shows  a  narrow  coast-plain  and  one 
or  two  fair  harbours.  Epirus  was  divided  between  three  kindred 
tribes — the  Chaonians,  Thesprotians,  and  Molossians.  The  last- 
named  occupied  the  inland  valleys  under  the  w^estern  slope  of 
Pindus;  the  Chaonians  and  Thesprotians  shared  the  coast — the 
former  holding  the  more  rugged  northern  tract,  the  latter  the 
smaller  and  southern  half  of  the  shore-lands.  Epirus  only  con- 
tains one  place  of  importance,  the  ancient  oracular  seat  of  Dodona. 
Here,  in  a  secluded  upland  valley  among  the  bills  of  the  Molossian 
territory,  the  priestesses  of  Zeus  dwelt  in  their  oak-groves,  and 
gave  responses  to  inquirers  from  all  parts  of  Greece.  Opposite 
Epirus  lies  the  long  and  rugged  island  of  Corcyra,  whose  ridge 
runs  parallel  with  the  coast  of  the  mainland,  and  looks  like  one 
more  Epirot  mountain  range  parted  from  its  fellows  by  the  inter- 
vention of  a  narrow  arm  of  the  sea. 

Thessaly,  the  land  east  of  Pindus,  is  very  different  in  character 
from  Epirus.  It  is  not  divided  by  mountain  ranges,  but  sur- 
rounded by  them,  forming  a  single  great  plain  shut  in 
on  every  side  by  hills.  To  the  north  it  is  separated 
from  Macedonia  by  the  Cambunian  Mountains — a  chain  which  runs 
out  at  right  angles  from  Pindus,  and  culminates  near  the  sea  in 
Olympus,  the  highest  of  Greek  mountains,  on  whose  cloud-capped 
summit  primaeval  tradition  placed  the  inaccessible  abodes  of 
the  gods.  The  southern  shoulder  of  Olympus  turns  south  and 
almost  touches  the  Magnesian  range,  the  eastern  wall  of  Thessaly, 
whose  highest  summit — Mount  Ossa — faces  Olj^mpus  across  the 
narrow  gorge  of  Tempe.  Legends  told  how  the  mountains  had 
once  formed  a  continuous  barrier,  and  how  Poseidon  had  split  Ossa 
asunder  from  Olympus  by  a  blow  of  his  trident,  and  opened  an 


Thessaly.  7 

outlet  for  the  laud-locked  waters  of  Thessaly  into  the  Aegean. 
Tempe  forms  a  picturesque  defile  four  miles  and  a  half  long,  buried 
in  foliage  and  bordered  by  rampart-like  walls  of  grey  limestone. 
Through  its  midst  runs  the  Peneus,  a  vigorous  stream  even  in  the 
heat  of  summer,  for  it  receives  the  drainage  of  the  whole  Thessalian 
plain.  Southward  from  Ossa,  the  Magnesian  hills  run  hard  by  the 
sea,  rising  into  a  secondary  peak  in  the  well-wooded  Pelion,  and 
ending  in  the  surf-beaten  promontory  of  Sepias.  A  chain  of  islands 
— Sciathos,  Icos,  and  several  more — carry  the  general  direction  of 
the  range  out  into  the  open  sea. 

Southward  Thessaly  is  bounded  by  Othrys — "  the  Brow,"  as  its 
name  betokens — a  ridge  five  thousand  feet  high,  which  runs  out  at 
right  angles  from  Pindus,  much  in  the  same  way  as  the  Cambuuian 
chain  does  m  the  north.  It  ajiproaches  to  within  two  miles  of  the 
southern  point  of  the  Magnesian  range,  and  is  then  broken  by  a 
strait,  the  outlet  of  the  Gulf  of  Pagasae.  This  great  land-locked 
sheet  of  water  lies  along  the  western  base  of  Pelion,  and  reaches  far 
inland  up  to  lolcos,  the  oldest  haven  of  Thessaly,  where  the  famous 
ship  "  Argo  "  was  said  to  have  been  built.  The  region  to  the  west  of 
the  gulf  formed  the  district  of  Phthiotis,  one  of  the 
earRest  seats  of  Grecian  life,  the  home  of  Hellen,  the 
mythical  founder  of  the  Hellenic  name,  and  Achilles,  the  hero  of 
the  war  of  Troy.  It  is  separated  from  the  Thessalian  plain  by  a 
minor  range  of  hills,'  through  which  the  Enipeus  alone  finds  its 
way  northward  to  join  the  Peneus ;  the  other  streams  of  Phthiotis 
seek  the  Pagasaean  Gulf. 

Shut  in  by  its  four  mountain  walls,  Thessaly  forms  a  little  world 
apart.  Its  fertile  slopes  and  green  water-meadows  were  studded  by 
more  than  twenty  cities  small  and  great,  whose  relations  with  each 
other  form  one  of  the  most  obscure  chapters  of  Greek  history. 
Three  places  deserve  mention  as  more  important  than  their  neigh- 
bours— Pharsalus,  in  the  southern  angle  of  the  plain  ;  Pherae,  which 
lies  at  the  foot  of  the  hills  which  separate  Thessaly  from  Phthiotis 
and  the  Pagasaean  Gulf;  and  Larissa,  the  largest  town  of  all,  which 
commands  the  middle  course  of  the  Peneus,  the  choicest  land  of 
the  whole  country. 

Thessaly  was  even  more  celebrated  for  its  pastures  than  its  ccrn- 
'  Narthacius  and  Titanus. 


8  The  Geography  of  Greece. 

fields.  The  'cattle  which  fed  in  its  water-meadows  were  highly 
esteemed ;  but  still  more  so  were  its  horses,  which  gave  mounts  to 
the  famous  Thessalian  cavalry,  the  one  really  important  force  of 
horsemen  that  Greece  could  put  into  the  field.  The  only  drawback 
to  which  the  country  is  subject  is  the  liability  of  its  lower  parts  to 
inundation.  After  the  winter  storms  the  Peneus  cannot  carry  off 
the  rainfall  fast  enough,  and  a  long  backwater,  covering  many  square 
miles,  forms  itself  in  the  lowland  below  the  spurs  of  Ossa.  When 
the  rains  have  ceased,  the  flood  shrinks  back  into  the  two  deepest 
hollows  of  the  plain,  and  forms  the  lakes  of  Boebe  and  Nessonis, 
which  gradually  decrease  till  they  are  replenished  again  in  winter 
by  the  next  inundation. 

•  South  of  Othrys,  we  come  to  the  second  great  section  of  Greece — 
the  lands  which  lie  between  the  Malian  and  Ambracian  gulfs  to  the 
north,  and  those  of  Aegina  and  Corinth  to  the  south. 

After  sending  off  Othrys  eastward,  the  great  range  of  Pindus  loses 
the  comparatively  simple  character  which  it  has  up  to  that  point 
preserved.  It  no  longer  continues  a  single  chain,  but  breaks  up  into 
a  quantity  of  diverging  ridges.  A  mountain-mass  called  Tj'-phrestus 
is  the  centre  from  which  these  spurs  start.  To  the  south-west 
it  sends  out  two  ranges  whose  complexities  form  the 
rugged  land  of  Aetolia,  a  district  so  far  from  the  high- 
ways of  civilization  that  its  inhabitants  always  remained  two  or 
three  hundred  years  behind  the  rest  of  the  Greek  races  in  their 
development.  As  late  as  the  Persian  wars  there  were  still  Aetolian 
tribes  who  lived  entirely  by  rapine,  always  went  armed,  and 
ate  their  meat  raw.  The  lower  course  of  the  Achelous — the  Epirot 
river  of  which  we  have  before  spoken — divides  Aetolia  from  Acar- 
nania,  another  highland  country,  but  one  less  wild  and  remote 
than  its  neighbour.  Its  coast  presents  many  havens, 
notably  the  great  Gulf  of  Ambracia,  a  land-locked  sea, 
not  unlike  the  Pagasaean  Gulf  of  Thessaly.  It  is  approached  by  a 
narrow  strait  a  mile  broad,  almost  blocked  by  the  promontory  of 
A.ctium;  then  it  broadens  out  and  runs  inland  for  twenty  miles 
between  Acarnania  and  Epirus.  At  its  end  lay  Argos,  the  city  of 
the  Amphilochi,  a  tribe  closely  akin  to  the  Acarnanians ;  a  few 
miles  from  its  northern  shore  stood  the  more  important  town  of 
Ambracia,  a  Corinthian  colony,  whose  inhabitants  had  driven  the 


Mountains  of  Central  Greece.  9 

Epii'ots  out  of  the  southernmost  angle  of  their  land.  The  coast  of 
Acarnania  is  fringed  with  islands ;  4hose  at  its  southern  end,  the 
Echinades,  are  gradually  being  absorbed  by  the  mud-flats  deposited 
by  the  Achelous,  which  brings  down  vast  quantities  of  silt  from  its 
upper  course,  and  builds  up  islands  opposite  its  mouth.  Further 
out  to  sea  lie  Leucas,  Ithaca,  and  Cephallenia,  three  The  western 
rocky  crests  of  a  submerged  mountain  chain.  Of  islands, 
these  Leucas,  "  the  White  Island,"  a  tract  of  grey  limestone  cliffs, 
v/as  once  united  by  a  sandspit  to  the  Acarnanian  mainland,  but  a 
canal  cut  across  the  neck  turned  it  from  a  peninsula  into  an  island. 
Ithaca,  a  narrow  and  rugged  mountain-top,  is  only  famous  as  the 
home  of  the  much-wandering  Odysseus.  Cephallenia,  the  largest 
of  the  three  islands,  faces  the  mouth  of  the  Gulf  of  Corinth;  it 
was  broad  enough  to  contain  four  cities,  and  possessed  some  fertile 
patches  on  its  coast. 

The  mountain  ranges  which  run  eastward  from  Typhrestus  are 
somewhat  less  chaotic  in  their  structure  than  those  which  go 
towards  Aetolia  and  the  west.  Two  main  chains  can  be  dis- 
tinguished. The  flrst  is  formed  by  Oeta  and  the  heights  which 
continue  it.  These  mountains  run  close  to  the  shore  of  the  Malian 
Gulf  and  the  Straits  of  Euboea.  Oeta  forms  the  western  part  of  the 
range,  and  contains  the  highest  peaks.  In  the  scanty  space  left 
between  its  declivities  and  the  opposite  slopes  of  -phe  sper- 
Othrys  lies  the  valley  of  the  Spercheius,  along  whose  ciieius  vaUey. 
upper  course  dwelt  the  Aenianes,  while  the  Malians  occupied  the 
narrow  coast-plain  at  its  mouth.  Eastward  of  Malis  the  cliffs  of 
Mount  Callidromus,  a  shoulder  of  Oeta,  come  right  down  to  the 
water's  edge,  so  that  there  was  only  room  for  a  single  waggon  to 
pass  in  the  road  which  lies  between  the  sea  and  the  overhanging 

rocks.    This  forms  the  culminating  point  of  the  defile 

Thermopylae. 

along  the  coast  known  as  the  Pass  of  Thermopylae, 
and  is  famous  for  all  time  as  the  spot  which  Leonidas  and  his 
Spartans  held  for  so  long  against  the  overwhelming  hosts  of  Persia. 
After  Thermopylae,  the  mountains  retire  a  few  miles  from  the 
coast ;  they  are  now  no  longer  known  as  Oeta,  but  bear  the  names 
first  of  Cnemis,  then  of  Ptoum,  then  of  Messapium.  After  the 
last-named  height,  they  sink  down  to  insignificance  opposite  to 
Chalcis  and  the  narrows  of  the  Euripus.     The  land  between  this 


TO  The  Geography  of  Greece. 

mountain  range  and  the  Euboean  Strait  was  held  by  the  Locrians, 
known  sometimes  as  Hypocnemidian,  from  the  moun- 
tain Cnemis  under  which  they  dwelt,  sometimes  as 
Opuntian,  from  the  name  of  their  chief  town.^  The  qualifying 
epithet  was  necessary  to  distinguish  them  from  their  kindred,  the 
Ozolian  Locrians,  who  lived  further  to  the  south  on  the  shores  of 
the  Corinthian  Gulf. 

Parallel  on  the  whole  to  Oeta  and  its  daughter  ranges  lies  the 
other  great  mountain-system  of  Central  Greece.  This  is  the  chain 
of  which  Parnassus,  Helicon,  and  Cithaeron  are  the  three  chiet 
links.  It  runs  along  the  shore  of  the  Corinthian  Gulf,  to  which, 
however,  it  never  approaches  so  closely  as  does  Oeta  to  the  Gulf  of 
Malls.  By  far  the  most  important  height  in  this  range  is  Par- 
nassus, a  great  mountain  mass,  rising  to  eight  thousand  feet  above 
the  sea,  whose  buttresses  spread  far  out  on  every  side,  and  make 
an  almost  impassable  barrier  between  Phocis,  the  land  to  its  east, 
and  Ozolian  Locris,  the  country  which  faces  its  western  slopes. 
Parnassus   is  the  most  central  peak  in  Greece ;  the 

Mount  ^  ' 

Parnassus  view  from  its  summit  is  by  far  the  widest  that  can  be 
^"^  e  p  .  Qijt^^j^ji^g(3^  jj^  i(^Q  whole  country,  embracing  as  it  does 
everything  that  lies  between  Thessaly  and  Arcadia,  the  mouth  of 
the  Corinthian  Gulf  and  the  southern  heights  of  Attica.  Tn  one 
of  the  recesses  of  the  southern  face  of  Parnassus  lay  the  site  of 
the  great  oracle  of  Delphi,  the  spot  which  the  Greeks  regarded  as 
the  centre  of  the  whole  world  (6fj.^a\hs  yr/s).  The  sanctity  of  the 
place  gathered  round  a  mysterious  cave,  overhung  by  beetling 
rocks  and  with  a  rugged  gorge  at  its  feet.  Here  dwelt  the  power 
of  Apollo,  and  here  the  richest,  if  not  the  most  magnificent,  temple 
of  Greece  rose  in  his  honour. 

From   Parnassus  the  Phocian  hills  run  eastward  till  they  rise 

again  into  the  height  of  Helicon,  a  mountain  less  vast  and  rugged 

than  Parnassus,  though  it  attains  the  respectable  height  of  5700 

The  Boeotian  f^et.     Helicon  was  noted  for  the  pleasant  groves  and 

mountains,    springs  which  diversify  its   eastern   slopes,  and    its 

green  recesses  were  fabled  to  be  the  favourite  haunt  of  the  Muses. 

'  Geographers  have  erred  in  distinguishing  the  Locrians  into  separate 
tribes  of  Hypocnemidians  and  Opuntians,  The  names  were  used  indiffer- 
ently for  the  same  people. 


PJiocis  and  Boeotia.  ii 

The  spurs  which  Helicon  sends  out  rise  on  the  east  into  the 
ridge  of  Cithaeron,  a  long  line  of  crest  which  continues  the  general 
direction  of  the  chain  of  which  it  forms  part,  but  no  longer  runs 
along  the  side  of  the  Gulf  of  Corinth  ;  striking  inland,  it  forms  the 
boundary  between  Attica  to  the  south  and  Boeotia  to  the  north. 

Pent  in  between  Oeta,  Cnemis,  and  Ptoum  on  the  one  side,  and 
Parnassus,  Helicon,  and  Cithaeron  on  the  other,  lies  the  second 
largest  plain  of  Greece.  It  is  composed  of  the  valleys  of  the 
rivers  Cephissus  and  Asopus,  and  runs  from  north-west  to  south- 
east, with  a  length  of  some  thirty  miles,  and  a  breadth  that  varies 
from  two  to  ten.  The  Cephissus  valley  was  held  by  three  different 
races.  At  its  source  among  the  roots  of  Oeta  dwelt  the  littie 
tribe  of  the  Dorians  in  their  four  villages.  Its  central 
course  flowed  through  the  land  of  the  Phocians,  whose 
towns  studded  the  slopes  on  either  side  of  its  banks.     Phocis  also 

included   the  rugged   country   to  the    south  of  the 

°°  •'  .  Phocis. 

Cephissus   valley,  taking   in  Delphi   and   the  spurs 

of  Parnassus,  and  reaching  to  the  Corinthian  Gulf.  But  its  heart 
and  strength  lay  in  the  Cephissus  valley,  the  only  part  of  its 
territory  which  was  fertile  enough  to  support  a  considerable  popuk' 
tion.  After  leaving  the  land  of  the  Phocians,  the  Cephissus  valley 
is  contracted  for  a  moment  by  spurs  which  run  south  from  Cnemis. 
In  the  narrowest  part  of  its  course,  where  it  is  no  more  than  two 
miles  broad  and  almost  deserves  the  name  of  a  pass,  lies  Chaeronea, 
the  first  town  in  Boeotia ;  it  is  almost  as  truly  the  gate  of  Central 
Greece  as  Thermopylae,  and  has  always  formed  the  natural  spot 
at  which  an  invader  coming  from  the  north  has  been  resisted. 
Behind  Chaeronea  lies  the  great  Boeotian  plain,  divided  boeotia 
between  the  basins  of  the  Cephissus  and  the  Asopus. 
It  is  a  fertile  region,  whose  soil  consists  of  a  rich  mould,  and  pro- 
duces the  most  abundant  crops  in  Greece.  Boeotia  could  almost 
compete  with  Thessaly  in  the  number  and  size  of  its  cities,  of 
which  seven  of  larger  and  seven  of  smaller  size  ^  formed  the  national 
league,  a  body  whose  union  contrasts  strongly  enough  with  the 
discord  that  always  prevailed  among  the  Thessalians.     Therefore 

•  These  were  Thebes,  Orchomenus,  Thespiae,  Tanagra,  IlaliarLus, 
Coronea,  and  Lebadea,  aud  the  smaller  towns  of  Copae,  Pharae,  Mvcalessus, 
Acraephium,  Anthedon,  Chaeronea,  and  Plalaea. 


12  The  Geography  of  Greece. 

the  Boeotian  League  was  generally  powerful,  the  Tliessalians  nearly 
always  weak.  Orchomenus  dominates  in  the  valley  of  the 
Cephissus,  Thebes  in  that  of  the  Asopus  ;  in  early  times  the  former 
was  the  most  important  town  in  the  country ;  but  from  the  seventh 
century  B.C.  Thebes  exerted  a  marked  predominance  over  all  her 
neighbours. 

The  Asopus  succeeds  in  reaching  the  sea,  but  the  Cephissus  and 
all  the  other  minor  rivers  of  Boeotia  fall  into  Lake  Copai^,  a  broo.d 
swamjiy  exi^anse  of  water,  possessing  no  natural  outlet  save  some 
subterranean  "swallows"  which  communicate  with  the  Eubcean 
Strait.  In  spite  of  the  labours  of  the  early  kings  of  Orchomenrj, 
who  for  a  while  drained  the  swamp  by  artificial  tunnels,  Copais 
was  the  bane  of  Boeotia.  Not  only  did  it  inundate  the  meadows 
of  Haliartus  and  Orchomenus,  but  its  marshy  exhalations  made 
the  air  of  the  whole  plain  thick  and  heavy.  In  summer  the  climate 
was  sultry  and  sweltering,  for  the  surrounding  mountains  penned 
in  the  warm  vapours  from  the  lake ;  in  winter  the  fogs  and  mists 
lay  low  on  the  surface  of  the  land,  kept  off  the  sun,  and  caused  a 
degree  of  cold  unknown  in  neighbouring  districts.  The  inhabitants 
of  the  breezy  upland  of  Attica  held,  probably  not  without  reason, 
that  the  oppressive  climate  of  Boeotia  made  those  who  dwelt  in  it 
dull,  heavy,  and  stupid.  Nevertheless,  the  land  produced  Hesiod, 
second  only  to  Homer  among  early  poets,  Pindar,  the  greatest  of 
lyric  poets,  and  Epaminondas,  the  noblest  patriot  of  Greece. 

The  ranges  of  Cithaeron  and  Parnes,  which  are  practically  con- 
tinuous, extend  right  across  the  peninsula  from  sea  to  sea,  running 
due  east  and  west.  From  their  western  end  projects  a  bold  mountain 
mass  named  Gereneia,  which  forms  the  sole  barrier  between  the 
Gulf  of  Corinth  and  that  of  Aegina,  and  stands  out  towards 
the  isthmus,  and  the  Peloponnese.  At  its  southern  end  Gereneia 
sinks  suddenly  down  from  five  thousand  feet  to  the  sea-level,  and 
looks  across  to  Oneium,  the  nearest  Peloponnesian  height,  which 
faces  it  at  a  distance  of  about  six  miles.  Between  them  lies  the 
low  spit  of  land,  three  miles  and  a  half  broad,  which  forms 
the  actual  Isthmus  of  Corinth.  On  each  side  of  Gereneia  there  is 
just  room  for  a  road  to  crawl  between  the  hills  and  the  sea  :  thes3 
two  paths,  the  one  overhanging  the  Corinthian,  the  other  the 
Aeginetan  Gulf,  meet  at  the  isthmus, 


Attica.  13 

From  the  base  formed  by  the  line  of  Cithaeron  and  Parnes  a 

triangular  tract  of  mountain  land  runs  due  south  into  the  sea.     Its 

western  side  is  washed  by  the  gulf  of  Ae3;iaa,  its 

Attica, 
eastern  by  the  Aegean.    This  is  the  district  of  Attica,^ 

"  the  shore-land,"  the  most  famous  though  not  the  most  favoured 
of  the  regions  of  Greece.  Its  backbone  is  formed  by  the  ranges  of 
Pentelicus  and  Hymettus,  but  a  quantity  of  minor  heights  cross 
it  in  all  directions.  Attica  is  mainly  composed  of  sloping  uplands, 
with  a  thin  ungrateful  soil  and  a  great  deficiency  of  water.  All 
its  streams,  with  one  exception,  shrink  away  and  disai3pear  in  the 
summer.  But  the  air  is  dry,  fresh,  and  breezy,  and  the  country 
includes  two  coast-plains  whose  fertility  almost  redeems  the  barren- 
ness of  the  highlands.  These  are  the  Thriasian  plain  in  the 
western  corner  of  the  land,  and  the  jjlain  of  Athens  which  lies 
around  the  capital,  and  is  watered  by  Cephissus,  the  one  perennial 
river  of  Attica. 

The  little  country  of  Megaris,  named  from  Megara,  its  one  town, 
is  practically  a  part  of  Attica :  it  was  severed  from  the  rest  by  a 
political  and  not  a  natural  boundary ;  it  consisted  of 
that  portion  of  the  slopes  of  Cithaeron  and  Gereneia        ^e*"s. 
which  was  detached  from  Attica  by  the  Dorian  invasions  of  the 
tenth  century  b.c. 

Before  proceeding  to  describe  Peloponnesus,  it  is  necessary  to 
mention  the  great  island  of  Euboea,  which  lies  like  a  breakwater  in 
front  of  Locris,  Boeotia,  and  Attica,  separating  them 
from  the  open  Aegean.  The  island  is  formed  by  a 
great  mountain  ridge,  which  prolongs  the  range  of  Othrj'^s  beyond 
the  waters  of  the  Straits  of  Artemisium.  Euboea  presents  to  that 
sea  an  unbroken  line  of  iron-bound  crags  without  a  single  harbour ; 
but  its  inner  face  has  a  very  different  character,  containing  some 
fertile  coast-plains,  and  affording  safe  anchorage  in  numerous  bays. 
It  was  on  this  sheltered  western  side  of  the  island  that  Chalcis  and 
Eretria,  two  flourishing  commercial  cities  famed  for  their  activity 
in  colonizing,  w-ere  situated.  Opposite  Chalcis  was  the  Euripus, 
a  narrow  passage  where  the  width  of  the  Euboean  Strait  shrinks 
down  to  forty  yards,  and  could  be  spanned  by  a  bridge  thrown  out 
from  the  Boeotian  mainland. 

'  From  uKT.';,  broken  shore. 


14  TJie  Geography  of  Greece, 

Peloponnesus,  whicli  the  geograplicr  Strabo  happily  described  as 
"  the  citadel  of  Greece,"  the  innermost  and  strongest  of  the  suc- 
cessive lines  of  defence  which  the  Hellenic  lands  p)resent  to  an 
invader,  is  very  distinct  in  character  from  the  lands  to  its  norlli. 
The  barrier  which  the  Gulfs  of  Corinth  and  Aegina  interpose  be- 
tween it  and  central  Greece  corresponds  to  an  entire  change  in  the 
mountain  system  of  the  country.     The  isthmus  which 

Corinthian  joius  it  to  Mcgaris  is  not  a  link  connecting  the  main 
isthmus,  j-aages  of  the  two  districts  ;  it  is  a  mere  spit  of  flat  land 
not  rising  to  more  than  two  hundred  feet  above  sea-level  at  its 
highest  point.  Hence  it  has  been  from  the  earliest  days  the  ambition 
of  engineers  to  bridge  this  neck  by  a  ship-portage  or  to  pierce  it  by 
a  canal. 

The  two  chief  mountain  chains  which  give  Peloponnesus  its 

shape  run  at  right  angles  to  each  other.     The  first  lies  close  to 

its  northern  coast,  and  forms  the  boundary  between 

The 

mountains  of  Achaia  ou  the  shore  and  Arcadia  in  the  upland.     The 
Peloponnesus,  i^^gggj  ^-^^^^  ^f  ^i^jg  ^^^^^  jg  i5;nowu  as  Erymanthus, 

but  its  highest  point  was  Cyllene,  which  rises  to  7700  feet.  No 
common  name  exists  for  the  whole  chain,  which  we  may,  however, 
call  the  mountains  of  Northern  Arcadia.  High  up  on  the  southern 
declivity  of  one  of  its  crests  was  the  only  important  waterfall  of 
Greece,  the  mysterious  Styx.  Plunging  from  an  inaccessible  cliff 
into  an  equally  inaccessible  chasm,  it  was  regarded  with  wonder 
and  awe  by  the  Greeks,  who  fabled  that  it  fell  straight  into  the 
underworld,  and  became  the  river  of  Hades.  Starting  from  the  centre 
of  the  North  Arcadian  Eange  and  running  at  right  angles  to  it,  north 
and  south,  was  the  second  great  mountain  chain  of  Peloponnesus. 
This  forms  the  watershed  between  the  rivers  which  flow  west  to 
the  Ionian  Sea,  and  those  which  run  east  to  the  Aegean  or  lose 
themselves  in  the  limestone  clefts  of  the  Arcadian  plateau.  The 
range  is  known  as  Maenalus  in  its  central,  and  Taygetus  in  its 
southern,  course.  The  culminating  peak  of  Taygetus  is  the  highest 
summit  of  Peloponnesus  ;  it  slightly  surpasses  Cyllene,  and  reaches 
7900  feet.  This  range  runs  far  out  into  the  sea,  and  its  final  preci- 
pice, the  rocky  promontory  of  Taenarum,  forms  the  southernmost 
point  of  Peloponnesus. 

All  along  its  course  the  chain  of  Maenalus  and   Taygetus  is 


Mountains  of  Peloponnesus,  15 

accomjmuied  by  a  parallel  rauge  not  much  inferior  to  it  in  impor- 
tance, which  faces  it  at  a  distance  varying  from  ten  to  fifteen  miles 
to  the  east.  The  dominating  heights  of  this  range  are  Parthenium 
and  Paruon,  of  which  the  latter  reaches  6400  feet.  Like  Taygetus, 
this  mountain  throws  out  a  long  headland  into  the  sea,  the  point  of 
which  was  Cape  Malea,  whose  gusty  cliffs  were  long  the  terror  oi 
Greek  seamen. 

Three  cross  ranges  join  the  range  of  Maenalus  and  Taygetus  to 
that  of  Parthenium  and  Parnon  at  three  different  points.  Each  of 
these  cuts  off  a  highland  valley,  between  the  main  chains,  from  its 
natural  exit  to  the  sea.  Hence  are  formed  the  isolated  upland 
hollows  of  Pheneus,  Stymphalus,  and  Mantinea,  whose  only  drain- 
age is  by  "  swallows"  which  discharge  their  waters  on  to  the  slope 
above  the  Aegean. 

Peloponnesus  falls  into  seven  main  divisions.  The  first  of  these, 
starting  from  the  north-east,  is  the  district  just  within  the  isthmus, 
where  the  hills  are  still  low,  and  are  only  commencing  to  rise  up 
towards  the  great  chain  of  Northern  Arcadia.  Corinth, 
a  town  perched  on  a  height  just  within  the  isthmus, 
gives  its  name  to  the  hilly  country  around  its  base ;  a  few  miles 
further  to  the  west,  Sicyon  and  its  territory  occupy  the  valley  of 
the  little  river  Asopus.'  The  slopes  above  Corinthia  and  Sicyonia 
were  owned  by  two  yet  smaller  states,  the  cities  of  Phlius  and 
Cleonae,  each  occupying  a  mere  hollow  in  the  hills. 

Southward  of  Phlius  and  Cleonae,  a  mountain  range  running  east 
and  west  forms  the  boundary  of  Argolis.  This  country  falls  into 
two  parts :  round  the  town  of  Argos,  a  few  miles 
inland  from  the  Aegean,  lies  a  small  coast-jDlain 
forming  the  territory  of  that  place.  East  of  this  tract  a  bold 
peninsula  runs  out  into  the  sea,  broad  enough  to  hold  three 
considerable  cities,  Epidaurus,  Troezen,  and  Hermione,  which  were 
generally  independent  of  Argos  and  maintained  a  vigorous  life  of 
their  own.  Over  against  Epidaurus,  a  few  miles  out  in  the  Saronic 
Gulf,  lay  Aegina,  a  rugged  island,  but  long  the  abode  of  a  race  of 
bold  and  enterprising  seamen  who  made  their  narrow  home  well- 
nigh  the  greatest  of  the  commercial  marts  of  Greece. 

South  of  Argolis  lay  Laconia,  a  region  completely  bisected  by 
•  To  be  carefully  distinguished  from  its  Boeotian  namesake. 


1 6  The  Geography  of  Greece. 

the  range  of  Pamon  and  dominated  by  that  of  Taygetus.  The 
land  between  Parnon  and  the  sea  is  rough  hillside, 
barely  fit  for  habitation;  but  the  valley  between 
Parnon  and  Taygetus,  the  basin  of  the  Eurotas,  the  "  hollow  Lace- 
daemon"  of  Homer,  is  of  a  very  different  character.  It  abounds 
in  rich  corn-land  and  plantations  of  vines  and  mulberries,  and  is 
well-nigh  the  most  fertile  region  of  Peloponnesus.  Spreading  over 
four  low  mounds  in  the  middle  of  the  plain,  lay  the  straggling  and 
unfortified  town  of  Sparta,  before  whose  citizens  the  rest  of  the 
inhabitants  of  Laconia  bowed  in  subjection. 

The  lofty  and  well-wooded  spurs  of  Taygetus  divide  Laconia 
from  Messenia,  the  south-western  angle  of  Peloponnesus.  Like 
Laconia,  it  consists  of  a  rocky  coast-land  and  a  central 
plain.  The  valley  of  the  Pamisus,  the  river  of 
Messenia,  is  even  more  fertile  than  that  of  the  Eurotas ;  facing  full 
to  the  south,  it  bears  trees  and  fruits  of  an  almost  tropical  character, 
such  as  no  other  part  of  Greece  can  rear  to  maturity.  Above  it 
rises  the  peak  of  Ithome,  the  citadel  of  Messenia.  The  moun- 
tainous seaboard  of  the  country  is  mainly  notable  as  possessing 
the  only  good  port  of  the  western  coast  of  Peloponnesus,  the  land- 
locked bay  of  Pylos,  famous  in  the  Peloponnesian  war,  and  yet 
more  famous  in  our  own  century  for  the  sea-fight  of  Navarino. 

A  little  river  called  the  Neda  divides  Messenia  from  the  triple 
region  known  as  Elis.  This  land  consists,  firstly,  of  Triphylia,  the 
district  between  the  Neda  and  the  Alpheus,  a  tract 
into  which  the  hills  of  Arcadia  run  out  westward, 
and  which  served  as  a  refuge  to  the  broken  remnants  of  several 
tribes  who  had  lost  their  original  homes.  Secondly,  of  Pisatis,  the 
plain  along  the  northern  bank  of  the  Alpheus,  a  fertile  region 
which  contained  the  great  national  sanctuary  of  Olympia.  Thirdly, 
of  Elis  proper,  the  western  slopes  of  Mount  Erymanthus  and  its 
offshoot  Pholoe,  a  land  of  flocks  and  herds,  whose  inhabitants  lived 
in  scattered  villages,  ignorant  of  the  city  life  which  was  habitual 
in  Greece.  The  Eleians  at  an  early  date  conquered  their  neigh- 
l)ours  of  the  Pisatis  and  Triphylia,  and  in  spite  of  many  revolts  held 
them  in  constant  subjection.  The  coa«t  of  Elis  is  a  long  and  almost 
harbourless  stretch  of  sand-hill  and  lagoon,  a  fact  which  explains 
why   a  people  possessing   many  miles  of  seaboard  never  became 


Arcadia.  17 

seamen.  Twelve  miles  from  its  westernmost  cape  lies  Zac3mthus, 
a  considerable  it^land  whose  mountains  prolong  the  chain  which 
Lad  started  in  Leucas  and  Cephallenia. 

North-east  of  Elis,  and  running  eastward  as  far  as  the  boundaries 
of  Sicyon,  lay  Achaia,  pressed  in  between  the  Corinthian  Gulf  and 
the  mountains  of  Northern  Arcadia.  It  was  com- 
posed of  a  number  of  small  coast-plains,  each 
containing  its  own  town.  Offshoots  of  the  great  range  to  the  south 
cut  off  valley  from  valley,  so  that  communication  was  easier  by  sea 
than  by  land.  Nevertheless,  the  Achaians  were  a  united  people; 
they  weie  bound  together  by  an  ancient  league,  and  did  not  in- 
dulge  in  the  internecine  wars  too  common  in  other  parts  of  Greece. 

The  only  Pelopounesian  district  remaining  to  be  described  is 
Arcadia.  This  region  forms  the  centre  of  the  peninsula,  and  is  the 
only  part  of  it  which  does  not  own  an  outlet  to  the 
sea.  Arcadia  falls  into  two  halves.  Its  eastern  side 
is  composed  of  the  three  upland  hollows,  pent  in  between  the 
ranges  of  Maenalus  and  Parthenium,  of  which  we  have  already 
spoken  in  describing  the  mountain  system  of  Peloponnesus.  Of 
these  isolated  valleys  the  southernmost  is  by  far  the  most  im- 
portaut:  it  contained  the  twin  cities  of  Mantinea  and  Tegea, 
famous  throughout  Greek  history  for  their  bitter  quarrels  and 
constant  warfare ;  they  were  by  far  the  largest  and  most  civilized 
of  the  Arcadian  states.  The  western  half  of  Arcadia  consists  of  a 
number  of  valleys  drained  by  the  tributaries  of  the  Alpheus,  the 
largest  river  of  Peloponnesus.  These  streams,  sej)arated  from  each 
other  by  a  multitude  of  small  ranges  in  their  upper  course,  run 
together  from  all  sides  to  meet  at  Heraea,  the  westernmost  Arcadian 
town,  whose  territory  overlooks  the  plain  of  Olympia.  The  land 
drained  by  them  forms  a  rough  hilly  platoau,  about  tv/o  thousand 
feet  above  sea-level,  intersected  by  wooded  hills  in  all  directions. 
Here  dwelt  a  number  of  small  tribes,  some  of  which  had  built 
themselves  towns,  while  others  lived  scattered  in  isolated  villages. 
All  were  equally  jealous  of  their  independence,  and  impatient  of 
any  closer  union  with  their  neighbours.  They  were  by  far  the 
poorest  and  least  civilized  of  the  inhabitants  of  Pelojoonnesus,  and 
from  an  early  date  are  found  leaving  their  mountain  homes  in 
bands,  to  serve  as  mercenary  soldiers  in  more  favoured  countries. 

c 


1 8  The  Geography  of  Greece. 

Facing  the  eastern  coast  of  Greece,  a  multitude  of  islands  rise 
from  the  Aegean.  They  are  the  mountain-tops  of  two  lost  ranges, 
which  once  prolonged  the  Euboeaa  and  Attic  hills  out  into  the 
open  sea.  Andros,  Tenos,  and  Myconos  are  isolated  continuations 
of  Euboea  ;  Ceos,  Cythnos,  and  Seriphos  are  links  starting  from  the 
Attic  promontory  of  Sunium.  A  little  furlher  south  the  twc 
chains  become  confused,  and  meet  in  Naxos  and  Paros,  the  most 
important  islands  of  the  whole  group.  The  Greeks  called  this 
The        archipelago  the  Cyclades,  conceiving  of  them  as  lying 

cyciades.  j^  ^  circle  around  Delos,  an  island-sanctuary  only 
less  famous  than  Delphi  as  a  home  of  Apollo.  South  of  the 
Cyclades  lay  the  Sporades,  "  the  scattered  ones,"  composed  of 
the  volcanic  islands  of  Melos,  Thera,  and  Cimolos,  with  the  more 
distant  Astypalea  and  Carpathus.  Sporades  and  Cyclades  alike 
are  "  mountain-tops  afloat  at  sea ;  "  each  of  them  has  its  peak  rising 
to  two  thousand  or  three  thousand  feet  in  height,  and  sinking  down 
into  the  water  in  more  or  less  steep  slopes.  All  the  islands  were 
devoted  to  the  culture  of  the  vine,  and  well-nigh  all  possessed  safe 
harbours  to  tempt  the  cautious  mariner  of  early  times  to  push  on 
from  point  to  point  till  he  found  himself  in  Asia. 

Last  of  all  Greek  lauds  we  reach  the  long  island  of  Crete.     It 

lies  across  the  mouth  of  tlie  Aegean  like  a  great  breakwater,  Avith 

one  face  looking  out  on  Cyrene  and  Africa,  while  the 
Crote.  °  •'  ' 

other  fronts  toward  the  Cyclades.     It  is  a  true  Greek 

land  in  its  geographical  character ;  mountains  starting  from  the 

central  peak  of  Ida  cut  it  up  into  countless  valleys,  where  more 

than   forty  independent   towns   found   space   to  exist.     Political 

union  was  never  established  among  them  except  perhaps  in  the 

prehistoric  empire  of  Minos ;  they  were  always  occupied  in  ignoble 

civil  wars,  and  when  Cretans  arc  heard  of  outside  their  own  island 

during  historical  times,  it  is  always  in  the  character  of  mercenaries, 

and  generally  in  that  of  traitors  to  their  emj^loyer. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THK   ORIGINS   OF  THE   GREEK   XATIOXALITY. 

There  was  once  a  time  when  Greece,  mainland  and  island,  plain 
and  mountain,  was  peopled  by  a  multitude  of  small  uncivilized 
tribes,  who  lived  in  a  state  of  constant  war  and  jhe  first 
anarchy.  They  had  dwelt  there  for  long  ages,  and  mtabitants. 
no  tradition  survived  to  tell  from  whence  they  had  come.  But 
everything  leads  us  to  believe  that  they  had  passed  into  the  land 
from  the  east  and  the  north-east,  some  of  them  by  pressing 
forward  along  the  Hellespont  and  the  coast  of  the  Aegean,  others 
by  coasting  from  island  to  island  through  the  archipelago  which 
connects  the  harbours  of  Asia  Minor  with  those  of  Greece, — a  way 
so  easy  as  to  tempt  even  the  most  unskilful  and  unenterprising  of 
seafarers  to  westward  exploration,  for  the  whole  space  of  water 
can  be  traversed  without  losing  sight  of  land  for  an  hour.  Of  the 
life  of  these  primitive  inhabitants  we  know  but  little,  either  from 
tradition  or  from  the  traces  which  they  left  behind  them  above 
or  below  the  ground.  They  were  possessed  of  flocks  and  herds; 
they  tilled  the  earth  in  some  primitive  fashion ;  they  were  acquainted 
with  the  use  of  certain  of  the  metals,  notably  copper  and  gold, 
and  had  mastered  the  rudiments  of  navigation.  But,  living  in  an 
endless  state  of  war  with  each  other,  they  knew  nothing  of  trade 
by  sea  or  land.  Their  villages  were  built  inland,  because  the 
dweller  on  the  coast  was  always  exposed  to  the  piratical  incursions 
of  his  neighbours.  Inland,  too,  in  positions  carefully  chosen  tor  their 
strength,  on  isolated  hills  or  rock-girt  plateaus,  rose  the  citadels  of 
the  tribes,  surrounded  by  rude  but  massive  walls  of  unhewn  stone, 
piled  up  without  the  aid  of  mortar.  Their  religion  consisted  in 
the  worship  of  the  supreme  power  of  the  heavens — a  god  without  a 


20  The  Origins  of  the  Greek  Nationality. 

name,  whom  they  adored  at  altars  erected  on  the  highest  hills. 
Temples  or  images  they  had  not  thought  of  framing,  though  some- 
times the  presence  of  the  divinity  was  typified  by  a  massive  stone 
or  a  sacred  tree.  The  crowd  of  divinities  who  in  after-days  divided 
the  rule  of  the  world  with  Zeus,  the  great  god  of  the  firmament, 
were  as  yet  unknown. 

Such  a  state  of  society  can  remain  long  without  development. 
The  ceaseless  wars  in  which  the  tribes  were  engaged  prevented  the 
accumulation  of  permanent  wealth,  the  source  of  all  civilization. 
The  land,  especially  the  more  fertile  districts,  was  continually 
passing  from  tribe  to  tribe  by  the  chance  of  war ;  the  herds  of 
sheep  and  oxen  were  always  at  the  mercy  of  a  successful  foray. 
Therefore  men  lived  rudely  and  sparingly,  because  they  had  no 
temptation  and  no  opportunity  to  gather  round  them  any  store 
of  wealth.  Long  ages  had  probably  elapsed  since  the  arrival  of 
the  primitive  inhabitants  of  Greece,  before  any  tendency  to  the 
evolution  of  a  nationality  or  the  growth  of  civilization  became 
evident.  Later  still  came  the  time  when  the  name  of  Hellene 
became  known  and  accepted,  and  when  Hellenic  civilization  began 
to  develop  into  a  form  unlike  anything  that  had  gone  before  it — 
the  unique  and  unparalleled  product  of  the  most  gifted  nation  that 
the  world  has  ever  seen. 

In  the  dim  epoch  to  which  the  earliest  memories  or  imaginings 
of  the  Greeks  carry  us  back,  we  learn  that  the  Pelasgi  were 
ThePeiaseic  Occupying  the  land.  The  name  of  that  mysterious 
^&®-  people  is  found  not  only  in  the  Hellenic  districts  of 
Europe,  but  spread  far  and  wide  in  Italy  and  Asia  Minor.  The 
myths  in  which  the  Greek  embodied  his  conceptions  of  ancient 
history  make  Pelasgus,  the  eponymous  hero  of  the  race,  now  a  king 
of  Argos,  now  a  dweller  in  Thessaly ;  but  Attica  and  Arcadia  also 
claimed  a  Pelasgic  ancestry,  and  the  coast-land  on  the  Hellespont 
and  the  islands  of  the  north-eastern  Aegean  were  full  of  Pelasgic 
traditions :  even  the  Messapians  and  Oenotrians  of  Southern  Italy 
were  ascribed  to  the  same  kinship.  So  widely  scattered  is  the 
name,  so  different  were  the  tribes  of  historic  days  to  whom  a  Pelasgic 
origin  was  attributed,  that  it  is  safer  on  the  whole  to  believe  that 
the  name  represents  an  epoch  rather  than  a  nationality.  The 
Pelasgian  is  the  dimly  remembered  predecessor  whose  existence 


The  Pelasgic  Age.  21 

was  brought  home  to  the  Greek  by  the  barrows  and  hill-altars 
which  dotted  his  land,  by  the  cyclopean  walls  of  prehistoric 
citadels  and  the  unintelligible  names  of  ancient  sites.  If  he  was 
akin  to  them,  he  hardly  knew.  The  most  clear-sighted  of  Greek 
historians  held  that  his  ancestors  were  a  certain  section  of  the 
Pelasgi,  who  had  develoi^ed  into  a  separate  nationality  by  falling 
imder  a  special  set  of  influences,  which  we  call  Hellenic  because 
tradition  associated  them  with  the  name  of  Hellen  the  Thessalian 
and  his  sons.  But  if  this  was  so,  it  is  strange  that  Athenian 
legends  speak  of  a  time  when  the  Ionian  and  the  Pelasgian 
dwelt  together  in  Attica,  occupying  the  same  land  but  sharply 
divided  by  racial  differences.  Moreover,  the  scattered  fragments 
of  races  witli  whom  the  Pelasgian  name  lingered  as  late  as  the 
fifth  century,  the  islanders  of  Lemnos  and  Imbros,  the  Crestonians 
on  the  coast  of  Macedon,  the  hillmen  of  the  Hellespontine  Olympus, 
were  distinctly  "  Barbarians ; "  their  language  and  customs  were 
unintelligible  to  the  Greek,  and  yet  they  had  been  dwelling  beside 
liim  for  centuries,  and  experienced  the  influence  of  continual  con- 
tact with  him.  They  differed  from  the  Hellene  not  as  a  civilized 
and  an  uncivilized  member  of  the  same  nation  differ — not  as  an 
Athenian  differed  from  an  AetoUan,  for  example — but  wholly  and 
entirely,  as  much  as  did  a  Theban  from  a  Lydian, 

Taking  "  Pelasgian,"  therefore,  to  cover  in  a  vague  way  all  the 
races  which  dwelt  in  prehistoric  days  in  the  Aegean  lands,  we 
must  conclude  that  those  tribes  with  whom  the  name  lingered 
longest  were  not  necessarily  allied  in  blood  to  the  whole  of  the 
primitive  population  of  Greece.  They  rather  survived  as  a  separate 
people,  because  they  were  the  least  akiu  to  the  newly  developing 
nationality  of  the  Hellenes  of  all  the  early  inhabitants  of  the 
land.  How  many  and  various  these  inhabitants  were  it  is  easy 
to  see,  yet  by  far  the  larger  number  of  them  finally  amalgamated 
into  a  single  nationality. 

Although  in  many  parts  of  Greece  the  local  legends  claimed 
that  the  ancestor  of  the  tribe  was  no  stranger  coming  from  afar, 
but  "  autochthonous,"  sprung  from  the  land  itself,  the  child  of  one 
of  the  gods  by  some  nymph  of  the  neighbouring  spring  or  mountain, 
yet  the  majority  of  them  bear  witness  to  the  existence  of  the 
time  when  the  population  was  not  fixed  to  the  soil,  and  when  an 


22  The  Orighis  of  the  Greek  Nationality. 

eddying  stream  of  different  tribes  was  constantly  in  motion 
throughout  the  Aegean  countries.     Some  of  the  restless  clans 

Mixture  of  were  of  races  which  we  must  recognize  as  distinctly 
races.  "Barbarians;"  tales  reach  us  of  days  when  the 
Thracian  dwelt  in  Phocis,^  and  the  Carian  built  cities  for  himself 
in  the  Megarid.  Others  were  of  less  decidedly  alien  character, 
such  as  the  much-wandering  Leleges,  who,  though  they  dwelt 
on  both  sides  of  the  sea,  and  are  found  united  with  the  Phrygians 
in  Asia,  are  in  the  West  reckoned  akin  to  races  who  were  accepted 
as  the  ancestors  of  undoubted  Greeks,  Others,  again,  such  as  the 
Minyae  and  Teleboans,  afterwards  disappear  from  sight  by  being 
absorbed  into  later  tribal  unions,  but  were  clearly  of  Hellenic 
stock.  Comparatively  few  were  the  clans  who,  like  the  Arcadians, 
could  claim  that  their  ancestors  had  dwelt  on  from  time  immemorial, 
tilling  the  same  valleys  and  worshipping  the  same  gods  from 
Pelasgic  days  down  to  the  clearly  known  times  of  the  sixth 
century. 

As  yet  the  great  names  of  the  historic  races  of  Greece  do  not 
appear,  for  none  of  the  units  of  later  Hellenic  life  had  been  formed. 
We  hear  notliing  of  Dorian  or  Aeolian,  Ionian  or  Achaian,  Some, 
indeed,  of  the  tribes  Avere  nearer  akin  than  others,  but  they  had 
not  as  yet  evolved  any  common  names  to  distinguish  between 
their  different  groups.  When  all  were  strange  and  hostile,  shades 
of  distinction  passed  as  unimportant.  There  was  no  vestige  as 
yet  of  the  feeling  which  afterwards  drew  sucli  a  clear  line  between 
"  Hellene "  and  "  Barbarian,"  and  the  ancestors  of  the  various 
Greek  tribes  mixed  as  much  or  as  little  with  the  alien  as  with 
each  other. 

Among  this  chaos  of  contending  tribes  there  at  last  arose, 
according  to  the  most  accepted  legends,  a  great  family  of  rulers 

HeUenand  ^^"^  unifiers — the  children  of  Hellen  the  Thessalian. 
his  sons,  ffj^g  Greek  mind  loved  to  personify  periods  and 
movements  in  concrete  human  form,  therefore  the  first  steps  taken 
out  of  the  dim  Pelasgic  anarchy  are  ascribed  to  a  single  prince,  the 
founder  of  the  Hellenic  name ;  and  the  groups  of  kindred  clans 
which  at  last  began  to  draw  together  are  said  to  have  been  called 
from  his  descendants,  Aeolus  and  Dorus,  Ion  and  Achaeus. 
J  See  Thuc.  ii.  29,  §  3. 


The  Sons  of  Hellen.  23 

Similarly  a  still  more  transparently  my-thical  son  of  Hellen,  the 
hero  Amphictyou,  was  said  to  have  been  the  first  to  teach  tribe 
to  dwell  peacefully  by  tribe,  by  instituting  "  Amphictyouies," 
associations  of  neighbouring  clans  for  trade  and  mutual  protection. 
The  names  of  the  four  mythical  descendants  of  Hellen  of  whom 
legend  has  most  to  tell  deserve  especial  notice.  Ion  seems  to 
typify  the  union  of  the  maritime  tribes  who  had  come  by  sea 
from  Asia  Minor,  and  who,  though  they  dwelt  beside  many  alien 
races,  Carians  Tyrrhenians  and  others,  may  be  roughly  defined  as 
occupying  the  islands  and  the  coast-land  of  Greece.  Dorus  is  the 
representative  of  the  tribes  of  the  northern  mountains — the  latest 
comers  among  the  wandering  races — who  were  still  dwelling  in 
the  uplands  of  Macedon  and  Epirus.  Achaeus  and  Aeolus  were 
the  supposed  types  of  the  bulk  of  the  Hellenic  race,  who  dwelt 
scattered  up  and  down  the  peninsula  from  Thessaly  to  Taenarum  ; 
but  of  the  two  the  sons  of  Achaeus  are  represented  as  the  more 
warlike  and  enterprising  :  they  build  up  the  first  iwwerful  states, 
and  undertake  the  first  great  national  expedition  of  Hellas.  The 
name  of  Aeolus  covers  a  vast  number  of  obscure  Pelasgic  tribes  ; 
all,  in  fact,  of  the  later  dwellers  in  Greece  who  were  neither  Ionian, 
Dorian,  nor  Achaean  claimed  Aeolus  as  their  progenitor,  and  he 
was  ascribed  as  father  to  races  as  distinct  as  the  Thessalian  and 
the  Aetolian,  the  Phocian  and  the  Boeotian.  All  the  more  back- 
ward and  uncivilized  Hellenic  tribes  were  said  to  bs  of  his  kin, 
though  with  them  were  joined  some  of  the  most  famous  clans, 
the  primitive  inhabitants  of  Corinth  and  Orchomenus,  Messene 
and  Sparta. 

No  less  important  than  the  legends  which  tell  of  the  foundation 
of  tribal  unity  by  the  native-born  sons  of  Hellen,  are  another  cycle 
of  tales  which  deal  with  foreign  heroes  who  passed  into  Greece 
from  the  East.  Argos,  Athens,  and  Thebes,  the  three  proudest 
cities  of  the  land,  all  ascribed  their  foundation  to  Oriental  princes. 

To  the  valley  of  the  Inachus,  one  of  the  oldest  seats  of  popula- 
tion in  the  Peloponnese,  where  a  Pelasgic  tribe  had  built  their 
citadel  Larissa  on  the  height  above  the  coast-plain, 
came  Danaus,  the  founder  of  the  Achaian  state  of 
Argos.     Legend  made  him  an  Egyptian,  but  knowing  as  we  do 
that  the    natives  of  Egypt  never  settled   abroad, .  we  must  con- 


iJ4  ^/'^  Origins  of  ilic  Greek  Nationality. 

elude  that  his  myth  typifies  Phoeuiciaa  rather  than  E^^yptian 
settlement ;  and  as  he  is  said  to  have  been  akin  to  Belus  the 
Sidonian  and  Ninus  the  Assyrian,  it  is  evident  that  his  influence 
has  no  distinctly  Egyptian  character.  The  kings  who  descended 
from  Danaus  were  said  to  have  made  Argos  the  centre  of  civiliza- 
tion for  the  Peloponnese :  one  of  them  taught  the  rude  tribes  the 
use  of  the  horse  and  chariot ;  another  brought  from  the  East  the 
first  masons  who  taught  the  Achaian  Pelasgi  the  use  of  hewn 
stone.  When  the  house  of  Danaus  split  up  into  hostile  families, 
the  heads  of  different  sections  built  for  themselves  the  hill-towns 
of  Tiryns  and  Mycenae,  the  last  of  which  was  to  be  even  greater 
than  Argos  in  the  heroic  age  which  is  reflected  in  the  poems  of 
Homer, 

Quite  distinct  from  the  cycle  of  legends  which  deal  with  the 
house  of  Danaus  is  another  group,  which  tells  of  Cecrops,  the 
founder  of  Athens.  Once  upon  a  time  Attica  was 
sparsely  inhabited  by  tribas  of  very  diS'erent  race. 
Cranao-Pelasgi,  who  afterwards  recognized  themselves  as  being 
Hellenes  of  Ionic  kin,  were  mixed  with  other  tribes  of  apparently 
barbarian  blood.  Cecrops,  who,  like  Danaus,  is  called  an  Egyptian, 
appeared  among  them  and  fixed  his  abode  on  the  altar-shaped  rock 
which  rises  from  the  plain  above  the  Phaleric  Bay,  and  was  after- 
wards known  as  the  Acropolis  of  Athens.  His  descendants  built 
up  a  power  which  soon  took  the  lead  among  the  petty  tribes  of 
Attica,  though  long  generations  elapsed  before  it  succeeded  in 
absorbing  them  all.  This  foreign  race  of  princes  taught  their 
Pelasgic  subjects  to  worship  Poseidon  and  Atlicne.  The  god  gave 
Attica  the  horse,  and  the  goddess  planted  the  olive-tree,  whose 
cultivation  was  the  first  source  of  wealth  for  Athens.  The  Cecro- 
pidae  received  Ion  into  their  house,  so  that,  in  the  words  of 
Herodotus,  "  the  Athenians  became  lonians,"  and,  like  the  Achaians 
of  Argos,  ceased  to  be  mere  Pelasgi  governed  by  foreign  princes. 
Finally,  they  subdued  or  expelled  their  barbarian  neighbourp, 
and  at  last  a  king  arose  who  united  all  the  twelve  tribes  of 
Attica  into  a  single  state,  with  Athens  at  its  head.  This  king 
was  Theseus,  the  last  of  the  great  mythical  line  of  Cecroj^s — a 
personage  who  approaches  so  near  the  bounds  of  real  history,  that 
the  Athenians  of  after-days  fixed  upon  him  as  the  true  founder  of 


The  PJioenicians  in  Greece,  25 

their  city,  and  worshipped  him  as  a  far  more  truly  national  hero 
than  Cecrops  and  his  misty  line  of  descendants. 

In  the  plains  of  Boeotia  another  cycle  of  legends  was  told  about 
a  stranger  from  the  East  who  became  the  founder  of  a  great  city. 
Cadmus  the  Phoenician,  wandering  in  search  of  his 

,  „  ,,...,  ,  Cadmus. 

lost  sister  Europa,  came  under  divme  guidance  to  the 
spring  of  Dirce  and  the  Aonian  meadow,  and  built  there  a  town 
long  famous  as  Thebes.  He  instructed  his  neighbours  in  the  art 
of  mining,  and  taught  them  how  to  read  and  write,  whence  it  came 
to  pass  that  the  earliest  alphabet  of  the  Greeks  was  known  as  "  the 
Cadmean  letters."  Cadmus  was  the  ancestor  of  a  royal  race  cele- 
brated for  the  misfortunes  which  dogged  them  for  generation  after 
generation.  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  their  troubles,  and  thougli 
Thebes  was  more  than  once  taken  and  sacked  by  a  foreign  foe,  the 
house  of  Cadmus  held  their  own  till  that  great  convulsion  when 
all  the  lowlands  of  Greece  changed  masters  at  the  period  of  the 
immigration  of  the  Dorians. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  a  germ  of  truth  lies  at  the  bottom 
of  all  these  legends  about  Eastern  heroes  who  settled  in  Greece. 
In  them  is  enshrined  the  fact  that  the  barbarous  inhabitants  of 
the  land  learnt  the  rudiments  of  civilization  from  intercourse 
with  the  Phoenicians,  the  great  nation  of  traders  T^e 
whose  vessels  were  already  coasting  around  the  Pboemcians. 
Aegean  at  the  earliest  moment  when  the  mists  of  antiquity  begin 
to  lift.  Pushing  on  by  Cyprus  and  Asia  Minor  to  the  Cyclades 
and  the  Grecian  mainland,  this  enterprising  race  searched  out 
every  bay  and  mountain  for  their  natural  products.  On  the 
coasts  of  Laconia  and  Crete  they  dredged  up  the  shell-fish  which 
gave  them  the  much-prized  purple  dye.  In  Thasos  they  discovered 
silver,  and  turned  up  whole  mountains  from  top  to  bottom  by  their 
mining  operations.  Where  the  land  had  no  mineral  riches  to 
develop,  they  opened  up  trade  with  the  inhabitants,  and  exchanged 
the  fine  fabrics  of  Eastern  looms  and  the  highly  wrought  metal 
work  of  the  Levant  for  corn  and  slaves  and  timber,  and  such  other 
commodities  as  the  rude  natives  could  produce.  To  facilitate 
their  traffic  they  built  fortified  factories  on  well-placed  islands  and 
promontories.  They  did  not  usually  penetrate  far  from  the  coast, 
but  the  legends  of  the  foundation  of  Thebes  seem  to  show  at  least 


26  The  Origins  of  the  Greek  Nationality. 

one  case  in  wbich  the  Phoenician  trader  pushed  boldly  inland,  and 
built  his  settlement  twelve  or  fifteen  miles  from  the  sea.  On  the 
coast-line,  however,  the  names  of  Phoenician  trading-posts  are  found 
in  every  district ;  the  eastern  shore  of  Greece  is  more  thickly  sown 
with  them  than  the  western,  but  even  in  distant  Epirus  and  at  the 
furthest  recess  of  the  Gulf  of  Corinth  we  find  conclusive  proofs  of 
the  presence  of  these  ubiquitous  merchants.  The  strongest  settle- 
ments of  the  Phoenicians  were  always  on  the  islands.  Crete  was 
particularly  haunted  by  them ;  the  names  of  its  towns,  of  Itanus, 
Leben,  and  Aradus,  betray  their  Eastern  origin  at  the  first  glance. 
Cythera,  too,  the  island  which  lay  opposite  Laconia,  and  formed 
the  centre  of  the  purple-fishery,  was  entirely  in  their  hands.  So 
was  Melos  in  the  Sporades,  and  Thasos  in  the  northernmost  bay  of 
the  Aegean. 

The  goods  which  the  Phoenician  brought  to  Greece  were  ere 
long  copied  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  land,  so  far  as  their  ability 

Influence     Served  them.     Tiie  jewellery  of  gold  and  silver,  the 
of  the        bronze  utensils  and  armour,  the  painted   vases  and 

Phoenicians  '  ^ 

on  the  Greeks,  terra-cotta  figures  which  the  primitive  Greek  pro- 
cured from  the  Sidonian  merchant,  served  him  as  models  for  his 
earliest  manufactures.  Phoenicia  had  borrowed  her  art  from 
Egypt ;  Greece,  therefore,  borrowed  from  Egypt  at  second  hand,  but 
the  Egyptian  influence  is  quite  traceable.  Many  centuries  were  to 
elapse  before  the  borrowers  succeeded  in  ridding  themselves  of  the 
stiff  and  conventional  style  which  they  had  copied  from  the  work 
of  their  instructors. 

It  was  not  only  in  the  field  of  arts  and  handicrafts  that  the 
Phoenicians  left   their   impress  on  Greece.     The  religion  of  the 

Phoenician  Country  bears  distinct  traces  of  Phoenician  influence, 
deities.  r^'bg  primitive  worship  of  the  Pelasgi,  with  its  rude 
cult  of  nature-powers,  or  sacred  stocks  and  stones,  was  ready  to  bear 
any  amount  of  modification  and  addition.  To  the  vague  native 
deities  the  Phoenicians  added  Aphrodite  and  Heracles — the  goddess 
of  fertility  and  reproduction,  and  the  god  of  laborious  endeavour. 
Aphrodite  is  a  modification  of  the  Eastern  Ashtaroth,  Heracles  of 
Melcarth.  Greek  fable  told  how  the  goddess  rose  from  the  sea 
opposite  the  Phoenician  island  of  Cythera,  and  how  the  god  was 
born  in  the  Phoenician  town  of  Thebes.   Ashtaroth  was  worshipped 


Early  Connecliofi  of  the  Greeks  ivith  Egypt.         27 

in  the  East  with  grossly  licentious  rites,  and  the  trace  of  her  sensual 
character  was  never  eliminated  from  the  Greek  goddess,  who  was 
ever  the  patroness  of  lust  rather  than  of  love.  Melcarth,  the  city- 
god  of  Tyre,  a  deity  who  was  worshipped  as  an  inventor  and 
civilizer,  was  turned  by  the  Greeks  into  an  ever-toiling  hero,  who 
purged  the  land  from  wild  beasts  and  robbers,  and  wrought  mighty 
works  of  drainage  or  road-making. 

How  long  the  Phoenicians  were  able  to  keep  the  whole  of  the 
sea-going  trade  of  the  Aegean  in  their  own  hands  we  cannot  tell. 
But  certainly  as  early  as  the  thirteenth  century  B.C.  ^  tGr  ek 
tlie  Greeks  were  beginning  to  take  to  the  water.  The  maritime 
earliest  trace  of  them  which  we  find  in  any  authentic  ^^^^ 
history  comes  from  a  monument  of  the  Egyptian  king  Menephthah, 
a  Pharaoh  of  the  eighteenth  dynasty,  which  tells  how  the  piratical 
fleets  of  the  Akaioushi  (Achaians)  and  Turshena  (Tyrrheno-Pelasgi) 
harried  the  coast  of  the  Delta.  The  next  mention  of  them  is  from 
a  similar  monument  of  Rameses  III.,  which  speaks  of  incursions  by 
sea  of  the  Danaau  (Danai)  and  Teucrians.'  We  must  suppose  that 
after  some  centuries  of  sole  possession  in  the  Aegean  the  Phoe- 
nicians had  first  of  all  to  submit  to  rivalry  from  Greek  shipping, 
and  then  to  see  themselves  entirely  driven  out  of  Greek  waters. 
In  the  day  of  Homer  their  vessels  were  still  well  known  on  the 
Hellenic  coasts,  but  by  the  end  of  the  eighth  century  they  had 
ceased  to  visit  the  Aegean,  and  had  to  confine  themselves  to  their 
native  Levant  and  to  the  waters  of  Italy  and  Spain,  where  their 
great  colony  of  Carthage  secured  them  a  long  monopoly  of  commerce. 

Whether  any  other  foreign  influence  than  that  of  the  Phoenicians 
affected  the  early  inhabitants  of  the  Hellenic  peninsula,  it  is  hard 
to  say.     The  vast  Cyclopean  walls  and  domed  vaults       other 
of  the  prehistoric  cities  of  Greece,  such  as  Mycenae,  influences  ki 
or  Tiryns,  or  Orchomenus,  seem  due  to  an  influence       Greece, 
which  was  neither  Phoenician  nor  yet  of  native  bii  th.     Many  of 
the  objects  which  are  dug  up  in  the  ruins  of  those  places  are 
equally  difBcult  to  explain.    Possibly  they  may  be  traced  to  some 
independent  centre  of  civilization  in  Asia  Minor  with  which  the 

•  !Much  has  been  written  to  prove  that  these  peoples  were  not  the 
Achaeans  and  Danai  of  Greece,  but  the  balance  lies  in  favour  of  the 
identification. 


28  The  Origins  of  the  Greek  N'ationality. 

early  Hellenes  were  in  contact.  It  is  suggestive  to  note  that  the 
legends  of  the  Argives  told  of  a  race  of  princes  from  Phrygia  who 
appeared  among  them  long  after  the  first  coming  of  the  house  of 
Danaus,  and  established  a  powerful  kingdom.  Pelops  was  the 
progenitor  of  this  family,  whose  capital  was  not  the  old  town  of 
Argos,  but  a  newer  foundation,  Mycenae,  built  further  inland  on 
the  slopes  of  Mount  Argeia.  From  Pelops,  we  are  assured,  the 
peninsula  which  had  previously  no  common  name  was  called 
Peloponnesus.  His  grandson  Agamemnon  established  a  predomi- 
nance over  all  the  neighbouring  princes,  and  was  powerful  enough 
to  combine  all  Greece  for  the  famous  expedition  against  Troy. 
Whether  the  legend  of  this  great  family  points  to  any  real  con- 
nection between  the  Hellenes  and  Plirygia,  it  is  impossible  to 
determine.  This  much  is  certain,  that  when  Mycenae  was  excavated 
in  our  own  generation,  its  soil  waj  found  to  be  full  of  the  relics  of 
a  primitive  race,  whose  connection  with  the  Greeks  of  historic  times 
is  hardly  to  be  traced.  Equally  hard  is  it  to  say  whether  the 
obscure  empire  of  the  Hittites  in  Asia  Minor  and  Syria  had  or  had 
not  any  influence  on  the  art,  or  culture,  or  religion  of  the  inhabitants 
of  Greece.  Further  researches  may  clear  up  the  subject,  but  at 
present  it  is  unwise  to  formulate  any  aiithoritativo  statement 
concerning  it. 


CHAPTER   III. 

THE   HOMERIC   POEMS,   AND   THE   GREEKS  OF   THE   HEROIC    AGE. 

Long  before  the  authentic  history  of  the  Hellenes  begins,  we  can 
catch  glimpses  of  their  manner  of  life  from  the  evidence  of  monu- 
ments and  excavations,  from  ancient  customs  which  survived  into 
later  times,  and — though  here  the  greatest  caution  must  be  used — 
from  their  inexhaustible  store  of  myths  and  legends.  But  the 
twilight  glimmer  which  these  researches  shed  upon  the  prehistoric 
age  in  Greece  is  sheer  darkness  compared  with  the  flood  of  light 
which  is  thrown  upon  it  by  the  immortal  works  which  pass  under 
the  name  of  Homer. 

The  Iliad  and  the  Odyssey  are  a  pair  of  lengthy  epic  poems, 
which  deal  with  two  episodes  in  a  great  war.  The  Greek  princes, 
we  read,  were  once  gathered  together  by  Agamemnon     _.    ^,.  ^ 

'  °  o  J       o  Tlig  Iliad 

King  of  Mycenae,  the  greatest  sovereign  in  the  land,  to  and  the 
aid  him  in  an  expedition  to  Asia,  Paris,  sou  of  Priam  yssey. 
the  Teucrian,  had  stolen  Helen,  the  wife  of  Agamemnon's  brother 
Menelaus,  and  borne  her  off  to  his  father's  city  of  Troy.  The 
Greeks  accordingly  sailed  to  punish  the  seducer,  and  beleaguered 
Troy  for  ten  long  years.  But  it  is  not  the  whole  of  the  war  with 
which  the  Iliad  deals.  "Achilles,  a  prince  of  Phthiotis,  was  the 
bravest  and  most  beautiful  of  the  whole  Greek  host,  but  he  was 
proud  and  headstrong,  and  was  drawn  into  a  bitter  quarrel  with 
King  Agamemnon.  He  retired  from  the  battle,  and  sat  sullenly 
brooding  in  his  tent  till  the  Greeks  were  driven  back  to  the  water's 
edge,  and  his  own  bosom  friend  Patroclus  had  been  killed  by  the 
Trojan  prince  Hector.  Then  Achilles  arose  in  wrath,  hunted 
down  and  slew  Hector,  and  shut  up  the  Trojans  within  the  walls 


30  The  Homeric  Poems. 

of  their  city."  Such  is  the  plot  of  the  Iliad ;  for,  though  abound- 
ing ia  digressions,  it  takes  the  wrath  of  Achilles  as  its  main  subject, 
and  it  ends  when  that  wrath  has  been  dissipated.  Similarly,  the 
Odyssey  tells  how,  when  Troy  had  been  taken,  Odysseus  of  Ithaca 
King  of  the  Cephallenians  was  driven  from  his  home-course  by 
storms,  wandered  for  years  lost  in  the  waste  of  waters,  but  returned 
at  last  to  reclaim  his  kingdom,  and  save  his  wife  from  the  horde  of 
suitors  who  had  laid  claim  to  her  hand. 

For  the  last  century  critics  have  been  disputing  whether  there 

was  ever  an  individual  named  Homer;  whether  the  Iliad  and  the 

The  Homeric  Odyssey  are  the  work  of  the  same  author ;  whether 

question.  gj^Q}^  of  these  pocms  might  not  itself  be  broken  up  into 
separate  and  independent  lays ;  whether  the  poems  were  written  in 
Asia  or  in  Europe ;  whether  their  date  lies  as  early  as  the  fourteenth 
century  before  Christ,  or  as  late  as  the  sixth;  whether  editors  and 
commentators  have  tampered  much  or  little  with  their  text.  With 
these  questions  we  need  not  trouble  ourselves  to  deal  at  length. 
The  internal  evidence  of  the  poems  tells  on  the  whole  in  favour 
of  regarding  them  as  unities,  not  as  patchwork  compositions  of 
varying  date.  Small  inconsistencies  may  here  and  there  be  pointed 
out  between  two  books  of  the  Iliad,  or  between  the  Iliad  and  the 
Odyssey ;  but  the  results  in  that  direction  of  the  assiduous  research 
of  three  generations  of  critics  are  ludicrously  scanty.  Probably 
additions  have  been  made  to  the  original  bulk  of  the  poems,  but 
they  were  certainly  not  built  up  by  a  dozen  different  poets,  of 
various  shades  of  intelligence  and  taste,  writing  separate  lays  which 
were  then  pieced  together. 

We  are  bound  to  confess  that  we  have  no  authentic  traditions 
concerning  the  biography  of  Homer ;  nevertheless,  it  is  quite  rational 

Date  of  the    ^'^  ^^'"'^'^  *'^^^*'  ^  single  author  of  transcendent  genius 

Homeric  composed  the  Iliad  and  the  Odyssey.  We  may  con- 
cede that  the  poems  were  not  committed  to  writing 
until  a  very  late  date  ;  yet,  remembering  the  portentous  powers  of 
memory  of  the  "  rhapsodist "  in  days  ere  writing  existed,  we  need 
not  therefore  believe  that  interpolations  and  gaps  are  to  be  found 
in  every  section  of  the  two  works.  Corruptions  of  the  text  may 
exist,  but  it  is  not  necessary  for  that  reason  to  give  up  the  whole 
of  the  poems  as  valuable  authority  for  the  prehistoric  age.     But 


Date  of  the  Homeric  Poems.  31 

it  is  most  important  to  arrive  at  some  notion  of  the  date  of  their 
composition.  Before  we  can  use  tliem  as  authorities  for  the  life 
of  early  Greece,  we  must  indicate  the  reasons  which  tell  in  favour 
of  their  extreme  antiquity.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  demonstrate 
that  they  were  in  existence  in  the  sixth  century,  though  one 
modern  critic^  at  least  was  prepared  to  put  them  down  to  the 
age  of  Pericles  and  the  Athenian  supremacy  I  It  is  more  to  the 
point  to  state  that  a  succession  of  other  poems,  obviously  written 
as  supplements  and  continuations  of  the  Iliad  and  Odyssey,  were 
already  current  by  the  end  of  the  seventh  century.  These 
works,  known  as  the  "  Cyclic  "  poems,  because  they  rounded  off  the 
tale  of  Troy  into  a  perfect  whole  (KvKXoi),  were  very  different  in 
character  from  their  prototypes.  They  have  unfortunately  been 
lost  without  excejition,  so  that  we  cannot  minutely  examine  their 
contents,  but  enough  is  known  of  them  to  show  that  they  were 
deliberately  written  to  bridge  the  period  between  the  Iliad  and 
the  Odyssey,  and  to  provide  a  suitable  preface  and  epilogue  to 
them.  Greek  literary  tradition  placed  Lesches  and  Arctinus  and 
the  other  "  Cyclic "  authors  between  800  B.C.  and  650  b.c.  ;  but 
though  the  dates  are  very  probably  correct,  we  have  no  means  of 
corroborating  them.  Still,  whenever  the  Cyclic  poems  weie  written, 
we  know  that  their  authors  had  already  the  Iliad  and  the  Odyssey 
before  them  as  established  standards  and  models. 

The  internal  evidence  is,  after  all,  the  one  safe  criterion  for 
assigning  a  date  to  the  Iliad  and  the  Odyssey.  The  authentic  stage 
of  Greek  history  commences  with  the  conquest  of  internal  evi- 
Peloponnesus  by  the  Dorians,  and  the  colonization  dence  for  date, 
of  the  coasts  of  Asia  by  Ionian  and  Aeolian  settlers.  Of  neither  of 
these  all-important  series  of  events  is  there  the  slightest  trace  in 
Homer.  Of  course,  we  cannot  venture  to  take  it  for  granted  that  he 
would  have  dwelt  upon  them  largely,  if  he  had  lived  and  written 
after  they  had  happened.  But  we  may  safely  say  that  he  would 
have  betrayed  himself  by  some  casvial  allusions  which  implied  a 
knowledge  of  them.  An  unsophisticated  bard,  singing  to  an 
uncritical  audience  in  a  primitive  time,  could  not  possess  such  a 
keen  historical  and  archaeological  sense  as  to  avoid  all  anachron- 
isms.    Vergil,  a  learned  and  careful  author  in  a  literary  age,  con- 

'  See  the  preface  to  Dr.  Paley's  "  Iliad." 


32  The  Homeric  Poems. 

tiriually  indulged  ia  them.  The  Greek  tragedians,  though  using 
the  form  of  composition  where  it  is  most  important  to  preserve 
accuracy  of  surroundings,  were  constantly  betraying  their  modern 
knowledge.^  Is  it  possible  that  Homer  alone  should  have  been 
preserved  from  this  failing?  Could  he  have  reconstructed  from 
tradition  the  political  geography  of  a  Greece  which  had  long  passed 
away,  and  was  replaced  in  his  own  day  by  an  utterly  different 
arrangement  of  tribes  and  cities  ?  "  The  Homeric  map  of  Greece," 
as  has  been  happily  observed,^  "  is  so  different  from  the  map  of  the 
country  at  any  later  time,  that  it  is  inconceivable  that  it  should 
have  been  invented  at  any  later  time."  If  Mycenae,  for  example, 
had  not  been  a  very  important  town  in  prehistoric  days,  nothing 
that  ever  happened  in  tangible  times  would  have  induced  an  author 
to  describe  it  as  a  seat  of  empire.  Who  in  any  century  after  chro- 
nology begins  would  have  had  occasion  to  use  the  names  Dorian 
and  Ionian  only  once  each  in  forty-eight  long  books,  while  he 
spoke  of  Achaians  seven  hundred  and  fourteen  limes?  Who,  in 
describing  the  incidents  of  war  in  the  Troad,  could  have  refrained 
from  all  indications  of  the  fact  that  in  his  own  day  the  Troad  was 
to  become  Greek  territory — the  one  event  in  its  history  that  would 
have  interested  his  hearers  above  any  other  ?  Yet,  in  spite  of  this 
silence,  it  is  now  a  common  thing  to  say  that  the  Homeric  poems 
were  written  to  encourage  chiefs  who  claimed  a  descent  from  Aga- 
memnon to  persevere  in  a  war  against  the  Trojans  of  a  later  age. 
It  is  hard,  therefore,  to  believe  that  the  Iliad  and  OJyssey  were 
written  at  any  date  after  the  great  migrations  of  the  eleventh 
century.  Yet  already,  when  the  poet  was  writing,  the  war  of  Troy 
was  ancient  history,  which  he  might  freely  adorn  with  the  flowers 
of  his  imagination.  He  does  not  write  as  a  contemporary,  but  as  a 
distant  spectator.  In  his  own  day,  as  he  complains,  a  degenerate 
race  had  not  a  tithe  of  the  strength  of  the  ancestors  whose  deeds  he 
celebrated.  If  there  ever  was  a  siege  of  Troy,  then  we  neeJ  not  go 
to  Homer  for  its  details.     All  is  too  unreal  in  those  poems,  where 

1  Take  as  obvious  examples  Sophocles,  Oed.  Col.,  605,  which  makes 
Peloponnesus  alreadj'  Dorian  a  generation  before  the  Trojan  war  ;  or  Euri- 
pides, Ale,  285,  -which  puts  Thessalians  in  the  Peneus  valley  at  a  still 
earlier  date. 

2  By  Professor  Freeman,  in  his  "Historical  Gcograph}'." 


The  Homeric  States.  33 

the  gods  walk  the  earth  in  mortal  form,  and  a  single  hero  can  put 
to  flight  a  whole  army. 

The  real  and  unique  value  of  the  Homeric  poems  lies  in  the 
picture  of  the  social  life  of  Greece  whicli  they  jjlace  before  us.  The 
picture  may  be  somewhat  idealized,  but  we  cannot  doubt  that  it 
fairly  reproduces  the  general  characteristics  of  the  age  which  preceded 
the  Dorian  migration.  For  the  j)oet  of  a  primitive  age,  though  he 
may  frame  from  his  imagination  both  his  plot  and  his  characters, 
cannot  falsify  the  social  atmosphere  in  which  they  move.  If 
we  strip  from  them  their  purely  magical  and  supernatural  episodes, 
romances  of  the  heroic  cast  such  as  the  "  Morte  Arthur,"  or  the 
"  Nibelungenlicd,"  or  the  "  Chanson  de  Eoland,"  are  valuable 
authority  for  both  the  thought  and  the  customs  of  the  days  in 
which  their  authors  lived ;  they  may  idealize  the  contemporary 
morals  and  manners,  but  they  do  not  contradict  them.  So  is  it 
with  Homer  :  he  painted  the  state  of  society  which  was  natural 
and  habitual  to  his  hearers,  though  he  may  have  drawn  his  indi- 
vidual characters  to  a  more  heroic  scale  than  the  men  of  his  own 
day  could  attain. 

In  Homer's  day,  then,  Greece  was  occupied  by  a  number  of  tribes 
who  recognized  each  other  as  kinsmen,  though  they  had  not  yet 
found  any  distinctive  national  title  for  themselves. 
The  name  "  Hellene  "  was  as  yet  only  applied  to  the  nationauty  in 
inhabitants  of  Phthiotis,  and  was  not  employed  to  omer. 
describe  the  whole  Greek  race ;  there  is,  too,  no  correlative  word 
"  barbarian  "  to  express  that  which  is  not  Hellenic.  The  con- 
federate Greeks,  if  mentioned  together,  are  usually  called  Achaians, 
from  the  name  of  their  most  celebrated  tribe  ;  much  less  frequently 
they  are  called  Argeians  and  Danai — words  properly  apj^licable  only 
to  the  contingent  of  King  Agamemnon.  It  will  be  noticed  that 
Achaian  and  Danaan  are  precisely  the  names  applied  to  the  Greek 
invaders  of  the  Delta  by  the  Egyptian  monuments 

The  most  distinguished  states  in  Homer's  poems  may  be  briefl> 
mentioned.  Agamemuon,  the  grandson  of  Pelops,  was  the  greatest 
sovereign,  and  possessed  an  undisputed  pre-eminence  among  his 
fellows.  lie  ruled  Argolis,  but  dwelt  not  at  Argos  but  at  "wealthy 
Mycenae,"  a  newer  city  on  the  hills  above  the  Argive  Plain.  All 
Northern  and  Eastern  Peloponnesus  more  or  less  clearly  acknow- 


34  The  Greeks  of  the  Heroic  Age. 

lodged  him  as  suzerain.  Chief  among  his  vassals  was  Diomedes, 
who  ruled  the  old  town  of  Argos  and  the  small  district  immediately 
around  it.  Menelaus,  Agamemnon's  brother  and  second  self,  held 
a  realm  composed  of  Laconia  and  Eastern  Messeuia.  Nestor 
of  Pylos  ruled  the  Caucones,  whose  state  embraced  Western  Mes- 
senia  and  Southern  Elis.  Northern  Eiis  formed  the  far  less  impor- 
tant and  celebrated  kingdom  of  the  Epeians.  Beyond  the  isthmus 
the  most  distinguished  state  was  Phthiotis,  ruled  by  Achilles,  the 
hero  of  the  Iliad.  The  Cadmeians  of  Thebes  and  the  Minyae  of 
Orchomenus  had  also  a  prominent  position ;  so  had  the  Cephallenians 
of  the  Western  Islands,  whose  king  was  Odysseus  of  Ithaca.  On 
the  other  hand,  some  of  the  greatest  Greek  states  of  later  days 
take  a  very  inferior  part  in  the  Iliad  :  Corinth  and  Athens  are 
especially  unimportant.  Megara,  Larissa,  Delphi,  Olympia,  are 
apparently  as  yet  non-existent  places.  The  Cyclades  are  not  in 
Greek  hands;  but  Crete  and  Ehodes  contain  a  wholly  or  partially 
Greek  population,  and  form  the  outposts  of  the  race.  We  need 
not,  of  course,  take  seriously  the  names  and  individualities  of  the 
kings  of  the  Iliad;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  good  reason  to 
believe  that  their  states  represent  the  existing  realities  of  Homer's 
day. 

I  The  Homeric  kingdoms  were  "  patriarchal  monarchies  with  well- 
deBned  prerogatives,"  as  Thucydides  happily  observes.'  The  kingly 
The  Homeric  house  was  always  believed  to  descend  more  or  less 
kiag-  remotely  from  the  gods,  and  to  derive  its  power  from 
the  gift  of  Heaven.  So  Homer  sings  of  the  royal  sceptre,  the 
symbol  of  Agamemnon's  sovereignty  :  "  Hephaestus  wrought  it 
for  Zeus,  and  Zeus  gave  it  to  his  messenger  Hermes,  to  deliver 
to  Pelops  the  tamer  of  steeds,  and  Pelops  again  gave  it  to  Atreus 
the  shepherd  of  the  people,  but  Atreus  dying  left  it  to  Thyestes 
rich  in  flocks ;  and  from  Thyestes,  again,  it  passed  to  be  borne 
by  Agamemnon,  that  he  might  rule  over  many  islands  and  all 
Argos."  The  kingly  power  was  not  strictly  hereditary  as  in  a 
modern  state ;  it  passed  from  father  to  son  when  there  was  an  heir 
of  full  age  and  approved  worth  to  succeed  to  the  throne.  But  if  a 
king  at  his  death  left  only  infant  children,  or  if  the  natural  inheritor 
was  notoriously  incompetent,  the  succession  might  pass  to  a  brother 

*  n«Tp(/caJ  ^9,<T\.\C(}.\,  47ri  p>jTO?j  Yepoci.— -Thuc,  i.  13. 


The  Homeric  King.  35 

or  any  other  near  relative.  And,  again,  if  a  king  lived  to  sucli  a 
great  old  age  that  he  could  not  any  longer  discharge  his  functions, 
he  would  often  surrender  them  to  his  heir  during  his  own  lifetime ; 
if  he  did  not,  there  was  a  considerable  chance  of  his  being  despoiled 
of  them  iu  consequence  of  popular  discontent. 

The  king  received  from  the  tribe  a  royal  palace,  an  ample 
share  of  public  land,  and  certain  fixed  dues  and  payments.  These 
went  with  the  office,  and  were  kept  distinct  from  the  ancestral 
property  of  the  royal  family.  His  functions  fell  into  three  heads — 
he  was  leader,  priest,  and  judge.  As  leader,  he  headed  the  host  of 
the  tribe  on  all  important  expeditions;  a  king  who  shirked  fighting 
would  not  have  been  tolerated  for  a  moment.  Arrayed  in  brazen 
armour,  he  rode  out  before  his  army  in  a  light  war-chariot,  driven 
by  a  chosen  squire.  His  nobles  attended  him  in  similar  guise,  while 
all  the  freemen  of  the  land  followed  on  foot,  armed  as  each  could 
provide  himself.  Cavalry  was  as  yet  unknown— a  feature  equally 
observable  on  the  monuments  of  contemporary  Egypt,  and  a  clear 
mark  of  the  early  date  of  the  Homeric  poems. 

As  judge,  the  king  sat  in  the  market-place  with  the  elders  around 
him,  and  heard  all  the  cases  which  his  people  brought  before  him. 
He  gave  decision,  not  in  accordance  with  law,  for  laws  did  not  yet 
exist,  but  following  the  acknowledged  principles  of  right  and 
equity.  Each  suitor  spoke  on  his  own  behalf,  and  brought  forward 
his  witnesses ;  the  elders  delivered  their  opinions,  and  then  the 
king  rose,  sceptre  in  hand,  and  gave  sentence. 

As  priest,  the  king  was  the  natural  intermediary  between  his 
people  and  Heaven.  He  embodied  the  unity  of  the  tribe,  and  offered 
sacrifice  in  its  behalf  as  being  its  representative.  Other  priests 
existed,  but  there  was  no  priestly  caste,  and  they  took  part  like 
other  men  in  the  ordinary  business  of  peace  and  war.  They  were 
attached  to  the  services  of  particular  deities,  and  presided  at  the 
temple  or  sacred  glebe  of  their  patron. 

The  king  kept  no  great  state ;  his  personal  attendants  were  few, 
and  no  gorgeous  trappings  distinguished  him  from  his  nobility. 
He  might  be  seen  supervising  the  labours  of  the  harvest-field, 
perhaps  even  turning  his  own  hand  to  a  task  of  carpentry  or  smith- 
craft ;  for  manual  dexterity  was  as  esteemed  among  the  Greeks  of 
Homer  as  it  was  amoni'  our  own  Norse  ancestors.     The  degrada- 


36  The  Greeks  of  the  Heroic  Age. 

tion  of  the  artisan  was  the  development  of  a  later  age.  As  the 
kiug  might  be  his  own  bailiff,  so  might  his  wife  be  seen  acting  as 
the  housekeeper  of  the  palace,  bearing  rule  over  the  linen-closet  and 
larder.  One  of  the  most  charming  episodes  of  the  Odyssey  intro- 
duces us  to  a  princess  engaged  in  the  homely  task  of  superintending 
her  maids  wlule  they  wash  the  soiled  clothes  of  the  palace.  Yet  the 
dignity  of  the  royal  house  did  not  suffer  in  the  least  from  the  way 
in  which  it  shared  in  the  toil  of  its  dependents. 

Next  below  the  king  in  the  Homeric  stata  were  the  nobility, 
who  are  often  called  ySoo-iA^es,  "  princes,"  just  as  was  their  sove- 
The  Homeric  reign.  They  were  composed  of  the  younger  branches 
nobles.  ^f  ^j-^g  j-Qyal  house  and  of  the  great  landowners  of  the 
tribe.  The  kiug  summoned  them  to  take  counsel  with  him  before 
any  event  of  national  importance  ;  but,  though  he  listened  to  their 
advice,  he  was  not  necessarily  bound  to  follow  it.  Still  a  wise 
prince,  seeing  how  all  his  power  rested  on  the  general  loyalty  of 
his  subjects,  and  not  on  his  own  personal  strength  and  resources, 
would  be  very  chary  of  running  counter  to  his  nobility.  When 
the  king  and  his  BoulS  of  chiefs  had  come  to  a  decision,  the 
whole  body  of  freemen  were  summoned  to  the  market-place ;  the 
nobles  declared  their  views,  and  the  king  promulgated  his  decree. 
The  crowd  might  manifest  its  approval  by  shouts,  or  its  discontent 
by  silence ;  but  no  other  political  privilege  was  in  its  power. 

The  main  body  of  freemen  was  composed  of  small  landowners, 
tilling  their  own  farms;  but  there  was  already  a  landless  class, 
Thetes,  who  worked  for  hire  on  the  estates  of  others. 
The  bard,  the  seer,  and  the  physician  formed  a  profes- 
sional class,  with  an  established  position,  and  moved  about  freely 
from  state  to  state.  The  wayfarer  was  entitled  to  fair  treatment 
and  hospitality  ;  the  suppliant  was  harboured  and  j^rotected — to 
maltreat  him  was  one  of  the  blackest  crimes  in  the  eyes  of  gods 
and  men.  Public  amusements  were  simple  and  healthy;  promi- 
nent among  them  appear  already  the  athletic  sports  which  were 
the  delight  of  historic  Greece.  Slavery  was  known,  and  the  kings 
and  cobles  possessed  a  certain  number  of  slaves  captured  in  war  or 
bought  from  foreign  countries ;  but  they  were  not  many,  nor  was 
society  as  yet  debauched  by  the  evils  that  beset  a  slave-holding 
state.     The  class  itself  seems  to  have  been  well  treated,  and  the 


Homeric  Morality.  37 

most  affectionate  relations  are  often  found  existing  between  master 
and  slave. 

To  complete  the  general  picture  of  the  state  of  societj',  it  remains 
to  state  that  in  domestic  life  the  family  had  become  the  base  of 
organization.  Monogamy  was  universal.  It  is  only  among  Trojans 
and  other  aliens  that  polygamy  can  be  found.  A  high  ideal  of  female 
virtue  had  been  formed ;  and  the  wives  and  sisters  of  the  heroes 
come  far  more  prominently  forward,  are  encompassed  with  greater 
respect,  and  play  a  larger  part  in  life  than  did  the  secluded  women 
of  historic  Greece. 

In  spite  of  the  way  in  which  all  ranks  in  society  share  in  the 
same  toils  and  pleasures,  a  strong  aristocratic  tone  pervades 
the  Homeric  atmosphere.  It  appears  in  the  importance  attached 
to  high  birth,  in  the  manner  in  which  a  single  armed  noble  can 
drive  whole  crowds  of  common  folk  before  him  in  battle,  in  the 
dislike  felt  to  the  interference  of  the  masses  in  politics.  Tliersltes, 
the  one  demagogue  of  the  Iliad,  is  represented  as  a  mean  and 
despicable  creature,  and  soundly  thrashed  as  a  reward  for  his 
impertinence.  But  Homer  no  doubt  sang  for  the  banquets  of  the 
noble  and  wealthy. 

In  contemplating  the  many  pleasing  features  of  the  prehistoric 
age  in  Greece,  we  must  not  forget  that  all  its  society  was  pervaded 
with  the  feeling  that  might  was  right.     The  plunder  ^^^ 

of  weaker  neighbours  was  the  habitual  employment  character  of 
of  the  noblest  chiefs.  We  hear  of  gross  brutalities  eage. 
in  the  treatment  of  the  widow  and  the  orphan  even  iu  the  highest 
families.  The  king's  prerogative  was  often  used  for  the  purpose 
of  selfish  plunder.  Piracy  was  so  habitual  that  it  was  no  insult 
to  ask  a  seafaring  stranger  whether  he  was  a  pirate  or  a 
merchant.  Homicide  was  frequent,  and  un resented  save  by  the 
kin  of  the  slain,  and  they  were  usually  to  be  propitiated  by  a  fine 
paid  as  the  price  of  blood.  Quarter  was  seldom  given  in  war,  and 
the  bodies  of  slain  enemies  were  mishandled  with  every  degrading 
form  of  insult.  Human  sacrifices,  if  not  frequent,  were  not  unknown. 
It  was  only  a  limited  number  of  crimes,  such  as  ill  treatment  of  a 
suppliant,  gross  perjury,  or  the  murder  of  a  very  near  relative,  that 
were  held  to  be  really  offensive  to  the  gods. 

It  was,  then.no  golden  age  that  Homer  painted,  but  th--'  idealized 


38  The  Greeks  of  t/ie  Heroic  Age. 

picture  of  the  actual  political  and  social  life  of  his  own  day. 
Its  exact  date  it  does  not  concern  us  to  determine;  suffice  it  to 
say  that  it  was  long  previous  to  tlie  composition  of  any  of  the 
other  existing  literary  monuments  of  the  Hellenic  race.  The 
Iliad  and  the  Odyssey  are  as  far  removed  from  later  works  by 
their  antique  methods  of  thought  and  expression,  as  they  arc  by 
their  superior  excellence. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

TIIK   RELIGION   OF   THE   ANCIENT   GREEKS:   OLTMPIA   AND   DELrill. 

Homer  and  Hesiod — a  poet  of  a  much  later  age,  and  a  much  less 
lofty  flight — are  credited  with  having  collected  and  codified  in 
their  works  the  religious  system  of  the  Hellenes.  "  It  was  they," 
writes  Herodotus,  "  who  settled  the  relationships  of  the  gods  to 
each  other,  and  fixed  their  names,  and  defined  their  attributes  and 
occupations,  and  described  their  visible  form.s :  all  was  vague 
before."  By  this  we  are  to  understand  that,  in  the  fifth  century, 
men  held  that  Homer  and  Hesiod  had  formed  the  standard  collec- 
tions of  myths  and  legends  concerning  the  gods,  to  which  divergent 
local  beliefs  were  afterwards  assimilated.  la  all  probability  there 
is  much  truth  in  this  view. 

The  inhabitants  of  Greece  in  the  Pelasgic  age,  as  Herodotus 
continues,  were  accustomed  to  offer  sacrifice  on  hill-tops  to  tho 
god  of  the  sky,  whom  after-generations  called  Zeus ;  primitive 
they  also  believed  in  many  vague  nature-divinities  reiig-ion. 
for  whom  they  had  no  individual  names,  though  they  called  them 
0eo\,  or  "  ordainers."  Whether  such  a  state  of  pure  nature- worship 
ever  existed  we  have  no  real  evidence,  for  it  is  certain  that  the 
Greek  religion,  when  first  we  catch  a  glimpse  of  it,  was  already  a 
medley  of  many  divergent  elements.  There  were  in  it,  it  is  true, 
abundant  traces  of  nature-worship,  but  many  other  systems  were 
fused  with  it.  Some  of  these  were  low  forms  of  fetish-worsbip ; 
we  find  stocks  and  stones  adored,  or  sacred  trees  and  aerolites  that 
fell  from  heaven.  The  cult  of  deified  ancestors  also  prevailed. 
Moreover,  as  early  as  research  can  penetrate,  a  strong  foreign 
element,  borrowed  from  the  Phoeniciaas,  was  already  incorporated 


4©  2'he  Religion  of  the  Greeks. 

with  the  misty  creed  of  Greece;  not  improtahly  other  nations  too 
have,  unknown  to  us,  left  their  mark  upon  it. 

The  widest  divergences  existed  between  the  worship  of  the 
different  tribes.  Sometimes  they  knew  the  same  god  by  different 
Diversity  of  i^^'^'^^^^j  ^'^  others  they  gave  the  same  name  to  two 
erods.  tribal  deities  whose  characters  were  really  distinct. 
The  horse-headed  Demeter  of  Phigaleia  had  little  to  do  with  the 
wheat-crowned  Demeter  of  Eleusis  ;  the  Zeus  of  Arcadia  had  very 
different  attributes  from  the  Zeus  of  Crete ;  Dionysus  the  wine- 
god,  and  Dionysus  the  god  of  the  under-world,  were  once  distinct 
enough ;  Poseidon  the  patron  of  the  lonians,  who  presided  over  the 
sea,  had  nothing  in  common  save  the  name  with  the  Poseidon  of 
Mantinea,  who  shook  the  world  with  his  earthquakes.  The  more 
we  inquire  into  local  legends,  the  more  do  we  find  one  deity 
assuming  the  shape  and  attributes  which  Homer,  and  literary 
tradition  following  him,  have  attributed  to  another.  Moreover,  in 
importing  foreign  gods,  the  Greeks  were  often  quite  reckless 
in  identifying  the  new-comer  with  one  of  their  own  divinities. 
When,  for  example,  they  came  across  the  great  nature -goddess 
of  Asia  Minor,  it  appeared  to  be  a  mere  matter  of  chance  whether 
they  called  her  Hera,  or  Artemis,  or  Aphrodite.  Familiar  as  we 
are  with  "  Diana  of  the  Ephesiaus,"  we  can  never  cease  to  wonder 
at  the  curious  accident  that  identified  Artemis,  the  virgin  huntress 
of  Arcadia,  with  the  many-breasted  "  Mother  of  all  things  "  whom 
Asia  worshipped. 

The  superficial  assimilation  of  the  tribal  gods  must  have  been 
one  of  the  first  consequences  of  the  growing  feeling  of  nationality 
among  the  primitive  peoples  of  Greece.  How  it  came  to  pass  that 
the  Arcadian  learnt  to  call  his  patroness  "  Despoina,"  by  the  name 
of  his  neighbour's  deity  Demeter;  how  the  Epidaurian  came  to 
identify  his  local  Auxesia  with  Persephone ;  how  the  Cretan 
acknowledged  that  the  Britomartis  whom  he  worshipped  was  the 
same  as  Artemis ; — we  cannot  trace  in  detail.  But  the  fusion  and 
identification  of  the  local  divinities  into  a  limited  number  of  clear, 
definite  divine  figures,  certainly  took  place. 

By  the  time  of  Homer  the  personal  identities  of  the  various  gods 
were  growing  clearer,  and  his  poems  enshrined  a  version  of  their 
characters  and  relatioris  with  each  other  which  became  the  accepted 


The  Olympian  Deities.  41 

mythological  standard  for  future  ages.  Even  in  Homer's  poems 
the  personalities  of  the  gods  are  still  not  entirely  worked  out ;  but 
Hesiod  filled  up  Homer's  gaps  in  a  lengthy  "  Thcogony,"  which  gave 
a  genealogical  table  of  the  divinities,  and  summed  up  the  whole 
origin  of  the  universe. 

Of  course,  neither  Homer  nor   Hesiod  was  in  any  sense  the 
inventor  of  the  mythology  of  the  Greeks.     They  merely  codified 
the  creations  of  the  national  spirit.     Out  of  a  mass  of        ^  cter's- 
hcterogeneous  beliefs,  some  of  them  childish,  some  tics  of  Greek 
hideous,  some  immoral,  the  Greek  mind  built  up  the      ^^  i&ion. 
beautiful   structure  of   the  Olympian  religion.      The  anthropo- 
morphism which  saw  a  god  or  a  goddess  in  every  grove  and  stream 
and  hill,  the  gross  worship  of  stocks  and  stones,  the  cruel  and 
licentious  cults  borrowed  from  the  Phoenician,  the  orgies  of  Phrygia, 
were  all  shaped  into  a  beautiful,  if  complex,  whole  by  the  genius 
of  the  Hellenic  race. 

The  gods  as  we  find  them  in  Homer  and  his  successors  form  a 
polity  modelled  to  the  similitude  of  an  earthly  kingdom.  Zeus  is 
their  father  and  lord,  who  exercises  over  his  brethren  rj-j^g  Olympian 
and  offsj^ring  the  same  sort  of  predominance  that  a  divinities, 
mortal  ruler  enjoyed  among  his  nobles.  He  summons  the  gods  to 
council,  and  promulgates  his  decrees  in  their  assembly  just  as 
Agamemnon  did  among  the  princes  of  the  host  before  Troy.  Like 
the  great  ones  of  earth,  the  gods  enjoy  the  banquet  and  the  wine- 
cup,  the  song  and  dance.  Though  they  are  immortal,  and  possessed 
of  superhuman  beauty  power  and  knowledge,  they  are  but  "  men 
writ  large,"  with  all  men's  passions,  evil  as  well  as  good,  reflected 
in  them.  They  are  liable  to  jealousy,  lust,  and  anger ;  they  stoop 
to  deceit  and  fraud.  In  short,  they  are  copies  on  a  vast  scale  of 
the  Greeks  who  worshipped  them.  The  gods  of  a  primitive  nation 
always  reflect  the  national  character.  The  peculiar  feature  of  the 
Greek  mind,  which  expressed  itself  in  the  national  mythology,  was 
the  love  of  beautiful  and  noble  forms.  Egypt  and  Assyria  might 
worship  strange  allegorical  shapes,  half-man,  half-beast ;  the 
savages  of  the  North  might  adore  demons  and  hobgoblins  ;  but 
the  Greek  set  himself  to  reverence  the  perfection  of  human  beauty. 

In  Homer's  time  the  Greek  religion  was  still  in  that  primitive 
stage  where  frankly  immoral  conduct  can  be  attributed  to  the  gods 


42  The  Religion  of  the  Greeks. 

without  their  worshippers  being  shocked.  After-age?,  when  ethics 
had  been  developed,  were  ashamed  of  the  actions  of  their  deities, 
and  explained  or  allegorized  them  away.  Yet  already  in  the 
Iliad  and  the  Odyssey  we  can  trace  the  beginning  of  the  connection 
between  religion  and  morality.  Perjury,  parricide,  oppression  of 
the  stranger,  rejection  of  the  suppliant,  move  the  wrath  of  the 
gods,  or  of  some  dim  power  behind  the  gods,  which  hates  evil  and 
makes  for  good. 

The  two  characteristically  Hellenic  divinities  in  the  Olympian 

circle  were  Athena  and  Apollo.      They  are  not  nature-powers,  but 

impersonations  in  the  most  beautiful  human  forms  of 

At  ena.  ^^  perfection  of  human  nature.  Athena  represents 
the  triumph  of  intellect  over  chaos.  She  is  the  warrior-goddess, 
■who  slays  the  earth-born  giants  who  strove  to  overturn  creation. 
She  is  the  patroness  of  the  arts  and  handicrafts  which  rescue 
mankind  from  savagery,  and  surround  it  with  comeliness  and 
comfort ;  she  taught  the  husbandman  to  plant  the  olive,  and  the 
weaver  to  ply  the  shuttle.  As  the  protector  of  city -life,  she  fosters 
the  arts  of  eloquence  and  good  counsel.  Unlike  the  majority  of 
the  heavenly  host,  who  bear  about  them  the  stain  of  Phoenician 
licence  or  aboriginal  grossness,  Athena  is  severely  pure  and  chaste ; 
she  is  intellect  tmraoved  by  fleshly  lust,  the  perfection  of  serene 
unclouded  wisdom. 

Apollo  represents  another  side  of  idealized  human  nature — the 
moral  and  emotional,  as  opposed  to  the  intellectual.  He  is  the 
patron  of  music  and  poetry,  the  arts  which  raise  and 
ApoUo.  inspire  tiie  soul;  he  has  the  gift  of  prophecy,  the 
intuitive  vision  into  the  future  which  comes  to  the  inspired  mind. 
His  votaries  are  not  guided  by  keen  intellectual  insight,  as  are  the 
favourites  of  Athena,  but  by  a  divine  afflatus  which  carries  them 
out  of  themselves,  and  iills  them  with  superhuman  knowledge. 
Above  all,  he  is  the  god  of  purification ;  he  has  the  power  of  healing 
body  and  mind.  Not  only  can  he  ward  off  disease,  but  he  can 
cleanse  the  conscience- stricken  suppliant  from  pollution  and 
blood-guiltiness,  and  send  him  home  purified.  As  the  prophet,  the 
healer,  the  inspired  singer,  he  represents  those  aspects  of  perfected 
humanity  which  are  omitted  in  the  purely  intellectual  excellence 
of  Athena. 


Olyinpia.  43 

The  presence  of  the  gods  followed  tlie  Greek  wTierevcr  lie  went. 
Not  only  were  the  rivers  and  mountains  and  forests  among  which 
he  dwelt  haunted  each  by  its  particular  deity,  but  the  occupations 
of  daily  life  were  carried  out  under  the  supervision  of  the  gods. 
To  sow  or  reap,  to  build  or  to  set  sail,  to  commence  a  campaign  or 
a  banquet,  without  having  first  propitiated  by  sacrifice  or  libation 
the  proper  divinity,  would  have  been  both  impious  and  unlucky. 
A  religious  sanction  was  required  for  the  pleasures  and  relaxations 
no  less  than  for  the  toils  and  duties  of  life.  Hence  it  came  to  pass 
that  such  public  amusements  as  theatrical  representations  and 
gymnastic  contests,  which  in  modern  days  have  no  religious  con- 
nection whatever,  were  in  Greece  under  the  direct  patronage  of 
the  gods.  The  Greek  tragedy  was  the  development  of  the  choral 
dances  and  recitations  which  accompanied  the  worship  of  Dionysus ; 
the  Greek  games  were  established  to  commemorate  some  achieve- 
ment of  a  god  or  hero  in  ancient  days. 

Of  these  games — one  of  the  most  characteristic  features  of  the 
life  of  Greece — a  short  account  must  be  given.  It  was  deeply  im- 
pressed on  the  Hellenic  mind  that  the  display  of  the  The  games  of 
strength  and  beauty  of  the  human  frame  in  the  Greece, 
service  of  the  gods  was  eminently  pleasing  to  Heaven.  Hence 
came  the  institution  of  gymnastic  contests  in  the  honour  of  various 
divinities.  Poseidon  was  propitiated  by  the  Isthmian  Games  at 
Corinth,  Apollo  by  the  Pythian  at  Delphi.  But  the  greatest  of 
the  contests  of  Greece  was  that  which  was  held  in  honour  of  the 
Olympian  Zeus,  the  supreme  national  deity,  on  the 
banks  of  the  Alpheus,  by  the  sandy  shore  of  Eiis.  ympia. 
At  first  the  stadium  of  Olympia  only  witnessed  foot-races,  in  which 
the  youth  of  Elis  and  Pisatis  met  to  run  over  a  course  of  about  two 
hundred  yards,  and  to  contend  for  a  simple  crown  of  wild  olive. 
But  gradually  the  festival  became  more  widely  known ;  competitors 
— first  from  other  districts  of  Peloponnesus,  then  from  the  whole 
Greek  world, — began  to  appear,  and  the  number  and  variety  of  the 
games  were  increased,  till  they  included  all  kinds  of  running,  wrest- 
ling, boxing,  leaping,  quoit  and  spear  play,  and  contests  for  the 
horseman  and  the  charioteer.  From  the  year  776  b.c.  the  names 
and  fatherland  of  the  victors  were  carefully  preserved  in  official 
lists,  and  at  last  the  dates  of  the  Olympic  festivals  became  the 


44  The  Religion  of  the  Greeks. 

favourito  basis  for  the  calculation  of  historical  dates.  The  games 
were  held  in  every  fifth  year,  so  that  the  "  Olympiad  "  comprised  a 
space  of  forty-eight  months.  The  imit  of  time  was  inconveniently 
large,  but  as  there  was  no  other  common  Hellenic  era  by  which 
all  Greeks  could  calculate  dates,  the  "  Olympiad "  was  almost 
imiversally  accepted,  and  the  year  776  B.C.  forms  the  first  date  in 
historical  chronology.  The  victor  only  received  from  the  judges 
a  wreath  cut  from  the  sacred  olive-grove  of  Zeus  on  the  Altis,  but 
his  native  state  always  hastened  to  load  him  with  prizes,  honours, 
and  immunities ;  the  man  who  had  won  the  foot-race  or  the 
chariot-race  at  the  great  contest  was  a  considerably  more  important 
person  at  home  than  most  of  the  magistrates. 

It  is  most  characteristic  of  the  Hellenic  nation  to  find  that  this 
festival  was  held  so  important  that  a  sacred  armistice  between 
states  that  were  at  war  was  established  during  the  month  of  the 
games.  This  suspension  of  arms  (or  "  truce  of  God,"  as  the  Middle 
Ages  would  have  called  it)  permitted  all  Greeks  alike  to  appear 
as  competitors.  The  territory  of  Elis  itself  was  held  peculiarly 
sacred  during  the  holy  month,  and  any  armed  force  which  entered 
it  incurred  the  guilt  of  gross  sacrilege.  Nothing  offended  Greek 
feeling  more  than  the  two  or  three  armed  attempts  to  interfere  with 
the  games  which  are  to  be  found  in  historical  times. 

The  oracles  of  Greece  formed  a  less  peculiar  and  unique  produc- 
tion of  the  bent  of  the  national  character  than  did  the  games. 
Other  peoples  have  very  frequently  sought  to  gain  a 
knowledge  of  the  future  by  sacrifice  and  divination, 
by  casting  lots,  or  inquiring  of  priests  and  seers.  Yet  the  Greek 
oracles  are  well  worth  notice  as  illustrating  the  development  of  the 
Greek  mind.  "  They  drew  their  origin,"  as  has  been  very  happily 
said,^  "  from  that  belief  in  the  existence  of  disembodied  spirits 
around  us  which  almost  all  races  share.  Afterwards,  closely  con- 
nected both  with  the  idea  of  supernatural  possession  and  the  name 
of  Apollo,  they  exhibit  a  singular  fusion  of  nature-worship  with 
sorcery.  Then  as  the  non-moral  and  naturalistic  conception  of  the 
deity  yields  to  the  moral  conception  of  him  as  an  idealized  man, 
the  oracles  reflect  the  change,  and  the  Delphian  god  becomes  in 
a  certain  sense  the  conscience  of  Greece."  It  would  seom  that 
'  Seo  Myers's  "Classical  Studies,"  p,  8. 


Delphi,  45 

at  first  the  Hellene  sought  to  gain  access  to  the  gods  by  seeking 
them  in  some  wild  and  awesome  spot  far  in  the  depths  of  the 
forests  or  the  bosom  of  the  mountains.  Zeus  at  Dodona  gave 
men  answers  by  the  sound  of  the  wind  that  moaned  through  his 
oak-groves.  At  Lebadeia  the  inquirer  descended  into  a  long  sub- 
terranean cave;  by  the  river  of  Acheron  he  went  down  into  a 
gloomy  gorge  to  consult  the  oracle  of  departed  souls ;  at  Delos  he 
stood  by  a  volcanic  cleft  in  the  mountain-side. 

Delphi,  as  much  without  a  peer  among  the  oracles  of  Greece  as  was 
Olympia  among  its  homes  of  athletic  contest,  may  serve  as  the  per- 
fected type  of  them  all.  It  lies  among  barren  and  lonely 
hills  in  the  fulds  of  Parnassus,  shut  in  by  an  amphi- 
theatre of  rocks.  The  power  of  the  god  centred  in  a  cave  in  the  cliff, 
where  a  mephitic  vapour  arose  from  a  chasm  and  intoxicattd  those 
who  breathed  it.  Seated  on  her  tripod  above  the  cleft,  the  priestess 
of  Apollo  drank  in  inspiration,  and  chanted  wild  and  whirling  words 
which  were  instinct  with  prophecy.  Her  saymgs  were  taken  dovrn, 
and  delivered,  generally  in  hexameter  verses,  to  the  supphants  for 
whom  she  was  making  inquiry.  At  first  men  came  to  Delphi  for 
predictions  alone,  but  ere  long  they  came  also  for  advice  on  every 
occupation  of  human  life.  The  temple,  which  was  built  in  front  of 
the  cave,  became  rich  with  the  offerings  of  votaries  from  every 
Grecian  tribe,  and  even  from  the  barbarian  kings  of  foreign  lands. 
Statesmen  came  to  consult  Apollo  about  their  political  schemes ; 
both  Lycurgus  and  Solon  are  said  to  have  received  his  approval. 
Ambassadors  took  advice  as  to  weighty  matters  of  peace  and  war. 
Above  all,  the  colonist  came  to  seek  from  the  oracle  a  functions  of 
direction  as  to  the  land  to  which  his  migration  would  *^®  oracle, 
most  profitably  be  directed.  Some  of  the  noblest  cities  of  the  Greek 
world,  Cyrene  and  Byzantium  for  example,  had  their  sites  fixed  by 
the  guidance  of  Apollo,  "  the  god  of  ways."  That  the  prophecies 
were  often  useful  and  intelligent,  we  may  well  believe.  The  priests 
had  an  unrivalled  knowledge  of  men  and  lands,  gained  by  constant 
converse  with  travellers  from  every  known  shore.  But  when  the 
problem  was  hard,  Apollo  often  took  refuge  in  sounding  platitudes  or 
obscure  riddles.  Every  one  has  heard  of  the  dishonest  evasions  in 
which  the  god  indulged  in  the  cases  of  Croesus  and  Pyrrhus. 

But  the  moral  utterances  of  the  oracle  were,  perhaps,  its  most 


46  The  Religion  of  the  Greeks. 

noteworthy  sayings.  They  mark  the  growth  in  Greece  of  the 
instinctive  distinction  between  right  and  wrong,  and  show  how 
Apollo,  the  god  of  light  and  purification,  represented  the  highest 
aspect  of  contemporary  thought.  Typical  of  them  all  is  the 
striking  story  of  Glaucus  the  Spartan.  He  consulted  the  god 
whether  he  might  safely  deny  to  the  heirs  of  a  deceased  friend  tke 
gold  with  which  the  dead  man  had  entrusted  him.  Apollo  re- 
plied that  "  if  he  swore  falsely,  he  would  be  able  to  retain  the 
money  ;  but  that  an  awful  vengeance  awaited  the  perjurer  and  all 
his  line."  Glaucus  then  besought  the  god  to  pardon  his  inquiry  ; 
but  the  priestess  cried  out  that  "  it  was  as  wicked  to  have 
tempted  Apollo  with  such  a  question  as  it  would  have  been  to 
have  retained  the  gold."  The  wish  was  punished  like  a  deed, 
and  Glaucus  with  all  his  race  came  to  an  evil  end.  Other  answers 
of  the  oracle  might  be  quoted  inculcating  mercifulness  to  the 
conquered,  respect  for  the  life  of  slaves,  the  strict  fulfilment  of 
treaties,  obedience  to  parents,  the  granting  of  compensation  to  the 
weak  when  they  have  been  injured,  and  other  moral  obligations, 
whose  recognition  marks  the  progress  of  a  nation's  moral  being. 
It  is  sad,  however,  to  think  that  the  oracle  which  could  at  one 
moment  make  itself  the  mouthpiece  of  the  highest  and  best 
thoughts  of  the  age,  might  at  the  next  sink  to  the  use  of  paltry 
evasions  and  senseless  jingles,  and  send  the  inquirer  away  with 
a  riddle  which  was  worse  than  no  answer  at  all. 

But  the  inconsistencies  of  the  oracle  are  not  uncharacteristic  of 
the  whole  of  the  Hellenic  religious  system.  If  that  religion  often 
succeeded  in  inspiring  noble  and  beautiful  ideas,  it  might  as  often 
be  found  lapsing  into  mere  childishness  or  crude  immorality. 


CHAPTER  T. 

THE   GKEAT   MIGRATIONS. 

If  there  is  any  point  in  the  annala  of  Greece  at  which  we  can 
draw  the  line  between  the  days  of  myth  and  legend  and  the 
beginnings  of  authentic  history,  it  is  at  the  moment  of  the  great 
migrations.  Just  as  the  irruption  of  the  Teutonic  tribes  into  the 
Roman  empire  in  the  fifth  century  after  Christ  marks  the  com- 
mencement of  an  entirely  new  era  in  modern  Europe,  so  does  the 
invasion  of  Southern  and  Central  Greece  by  the  Dorians,  and  the 
other  tribes  whom  they  set  in  motion,  form  the  first  landmark  in  a 
new  period  of  Hellenic  history. 

Before  these  migrations  we  are  still  in  an  atmosphere  which  we 
cannot  recognize  as  that  of  the  historical  Greece  that  we  know. 
The  states  have  different  boundaries,  some  of  the  most  famous 
cities  have  not  yet  been  founded,  tribes  who  are  destined  to  vanish 
occupy  prominent  places  in  the  land,  royal  houses  of  a  foreign 
stock  are  established  everywhere,  the  distinction  between  Hellene 
and  Barbarian  is  yet  unknown.  We  cannot  realize  a  Greece  where 
Athens  is  not  yet  counted  as  a  great  city,  while  Mycenae  is  a 
seat  of  empire;  where  the  Achaian  element  is  everywhere  pre- 
dominant, and  the  Dorian  element  is  as  yet  unknown. 

When,  however,  the  migrations  are  ended,  we  at  once  find  our- 
selves in  a  land  which  we  recognize  as  the  Greece  of  history.  The 
tribes  have  settled  into  the  districts  which  are  to  be  their  per- 
manent abodes,  and  have  assumed  their  distinctive  characters. 
The  old  royal  houses  of  mythical  descent  have  passed  away ;  both 
socially  and  politically  the  Hellenes  are  fast  developing  into  a 
people  whom  we  recognize  as  the  ancestors  of  the  men  of  the  great 
fifth  and  fourth  centuries. 


48  The  Great  Migrations 

The  original  impetus  vvliich  set  the  Greek  tribes  in  motion  came 
from  the  uortli,  and  tlie  wliole  movement  rolled  southward  and 
The  Thessa-  eastward.  It  started  with  the  invasion  of  the  valley 
lian  invasion,  of  the  Peneus  by  the  Thessalians,  a  warlike  but 
hitherto  obscure  tribe,  who  had  dwelt  about  Dodona  in  the 
uplands  of  Epirus.  They  crossed  the  passes  of  Pindus,  and 
flooded  down  into  the  great  plain  to  which  they  were  to  give 
their  name.  The  tribes  which  had  previously  held  it  were  either 
crushed  and  enslaved,  or  pushed  forward  into  Central  Greece  by 
the  wave  of  invasion.  Two  of  the  displaced  races  found  new 
homes  for  themselves  by  conquest.  The  Arnaeans,  who  had 
dwelt  in  the  southern  lowlands  along  the  courses  of  Apidanus  and 
Enipeus,  came  through  Thermopylae,  pushed  the  Locrians  aside 
to  right  and  left,  and  descended  into  the  valley  of  the 
"Cephissus,  where  they  subdued  the  Minyae  of  Or- 
chomenus,  and  then,  passing  south,  utterly  expelled  the  Cadmeians 
of  Thebes.  The  plain  country  which  they  had  conquered  recaived 
a  single  name.  Boeotia  became  the  common  title  of  the  basins  of 
the  Cephissus  and  the  Asopus,  which  had  previously  been  in  the 
hands  of  distinct  races.  Two  generations  later  the  Boeotians  en- 
deavoured to  cross  Cithaeron,  and  add  Attica  to  their  conquests; 
but  their  king  Xanthus  fell  in  single  combat  with  Melauthus, 
who  fought  in  behalf  of  Athens,  and  his  host  gave  up  the  enter- 
prise. In  their  new  country  the  Boeotians  retained  their  national 
unity  under  the  form  of  a  league,  in  which  no  one  city  had 
authority  over  another,  though  in  process  of  time  Thebes  grew 
so  much  greater  than  her  neighbours  that  she  exercised  a  marked 
preponderance  over  the  other  thirteen  members  of  the  confedera- 
tion. Orchomenus,  whose  Minyan  inhabitants  had  been  subdued 
but  not  exterminated  by  the  invaders,  remained  dependent  on  the 
league  without  being  at  first  amalgamated  with  it. 

A  second   tribe    who  were   expelled   by   the  irruption  of  the 

Thessalians  were  the  Dorians,  a  race  whose  name  is  hardly  heard 

in  Homer,  and  whose  early  history  had  been  obscure 
Til©  Doridiis. 

and  insignificant.     They  had   till  now  dwelt   along 

the   eastern   slope  of  Pindus.     Swept  on   by  the  invaders,  they 

crossed  Mount  Othrys,  and  dwelt  for  a  time  in  the  valley  of  the 

Spcrcheius  and  on  the  shoulders  of  Oeta.     But  the  land  was  too 


The  Doiians  conquer  Peloponnesus.  49 

narrow  for  them,  and,  after  a  generation  had  passed,  the  bulk  of 
the  natioij  moved  southward  to  seek  a  wider  home,  while  a  small 
fraction  only  remained  in  the  valleys  of  Oeta.  Legends  tell  us 
that  their  first  advance  was  made  by  tha  Isthmus  of  Corinth,  and 
was  repulsed  by  the  allied  states  of  Peloponnesus,  Ilyllus  the 
Dorian  leader  falling  in  single  combat  by  the  hand  of  Echemus, 
King  of  Tcgea.  But  the  grandsons  of  Hyllus  resumed  his  enter- 
prise, and  met  with  greater  success. 

Their  invasion  was  made,  as  we  are  told,  in  conjunction  v/ith 
their  neighbours  the  Aetolians,  and  took  the  Aetolian  port  of 
Naupactus  as  its  base.  Pushing  across  the  narrow  strait  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Corinthian  Gulf,  the  allied  hordes  landed  in  Pelo- 
ponnesus, and  forced  their  way  down  the  level  country  on  its 
western  coast,  then  the  land  of  the  Epeians,  but  afterwards  to  be 
known  as  Ells  and  Pisatis.  This  the  Aetolians  took  as  their 
share,  while  the  Dorians  pressed  further  south  and  east,  and 
conquered  at  one  blow  Mcssenia,  Laconia,  and  Argolis,  destroying 
the  Ciiuconian  kingdom  of  Pylos  and  the  Achaian  states  of  Sparta 
and  Argos. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  legends  of  the  Dorians  pressed 
into  a  single  generation  the  conquests  of  a  long  series  of  years. 
When  they  told  how  Temcnus,  Aristodemus,  and  xhe  Dorians  in 
Cresphontes,  the  three  grandsons  of  Hyllus,  drew  lots  Peloponnesus, 
for  the  Pelopounesian  lands,  and  gained  respectively  Argos,  Lace- 
daemon,  and  Messenia  as  their  shares,  they  were  simply  disguising 
the  fact  that  three  Dorian  war-bands  at  one  time  or  another  got 
j)Ossession  of  those  districts.  It  is  highly  probable  that  Messenia 
was  the  first  seized  of  the  three  regions,  and  Argos  the  latest,  for 
tradition  spoke  of  the  resistance  of  that  great  city  as  having  lasted 
so  long  that  King  Temenus  died  before  his  allotted  portion  was 
subdued ,  but  of  the  details  or  dates  of  the  Dorian  conquests  we 
know  absolutely  nothing. 

Of  the  tribes  whom  the  Dorians  supplanted,  some  remained  in 
the  land  as  subjects  to  their  newly  found  masters,  while  others  took 
ship  and  fled  over  sea.  The  stoutest-hearted  of  the  Achaians  of 
Argoli>:,  under  Tisamenus,  a  grandson  of  Agamemnon,  retired 
northward  when  the  contest  became  hopeless,  and  threw  themselves 
on  the  coast  cities  of  the  Corinthian  Gulf,  where  up  to  this  time 


5©  The  Great  Migrations. 

the  Ionic  tribe  of  the  Aegialeans  had  dwelt.  Tlie  louians  were 
worsted,  and  fled  for  refuge  to  their  kindred  in  Attica,  while  the 
conquerors  created  a  new  Achaia  between  the  Arcadian  Mountains 
and  the  sea,  and  dwelt  in  the  twelve  cities  which  their  predecessors 
had  built. 

The  rugged  mountains  of  Arcadia  were  the  only  part  of  Pelo- 
ponnesus which  were  to  escape  a  change  of  masters  resulting  from 
the  Dorian  invasion.  A  generation  after  the  fall  of  Argos,  new  war- 
bands  thirsting  for  land  pushed  on  to  the  north  and  east,  led.  by- 
descendants  of  Temenus.  The  Ionic  towns  of  Sicyon  and  Phlius, 
Epidaurus  and  Troezen,  all  fell  before  them.  Even  the  inaccessible 
Acropolis  which  protected  the  Aeolian  settlement  of  Corinth  could 
not  preserve  it  from  the  hands  of  the  enterprising  Alute?.  Nor  was 
it  long  before  the  conquerors  pressed  on  from  Corinth  beyond  the 
isthmus,  and  attacked  Attica.  Foiled  in  their  endeavour  to  subdue 
the  land,  they  at  least  succeeded  in  tearing  from  it  its  western 
districts,  where  the  town  of  Megara  was  made  the  capital  of  a  new 
Dorian  state,  and  served  for  many  generations  to  curb  the  power 
of  Athens.  From  Epidaurus  a  short  voyage  of  fifteen  miles  took 
the  Dorians  to  Aegiua,  where  they  formed  a  settlement  which,  first 
as  a  vassal  to  Epidaurus,  and  then  as  an  independent  community, 
enjoyed  a  high  degree  of  commercial  prosperity. 

It  is  not  the  least  curious  feature  of  the  Dorian  invasion  that  the 
leaders  of  the  victorious  tribe,  who,  like  most  other  royal  houses, 
The  Dorians  claimed  to  descend  from  the  gods  and  boasted  that 
and  their  kings.  JJeracles  was  their  ancestor,  should  have  asserted  that 
they  were  not  Dorians  by  race,  but  Achaians.  Whether  the  rude 
northern  invaders  were  in  truth  guided  by  princes  of  a  ditferent 
blood  and  higher  civilization  than  themselves,  it  is  impossible  to 
say.  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  names  of  the  three  Dorian 
tribes  found  in  every  state,  the  Hylleis,  Pamphyli,  and  Dymanes, 
point  to  the  mixed  origin  of  the  invading  horde.  If  the  "  Pamphyli," 
as  their  name  would  seem  to  indicate,  were  a  "  mixed  multitude," 
who  followed  the  Dorian  banner,  and  the  "  Hylleis  " — who  derived 
their  name  from  Hyllus,  the  first  Heracleid  king — were  the  personal 
retainers  of  Achaian  chiefs  who  had  placed  themselves  at  the  head 
of  the  invasion,  then  the  pure  Dorian  element  among  the  invaders 
must  have  been  much  more  slight  than  is  generally  imagined. 


Effects  of  the  Dorian   Conquest.  5  t 

In  all  probability  the  Dorian  invasion  was  to  a  considerable 
extent  a  check  in  the  history  of  tlie  development  of  Greek  civiliza- 
tion, a  supplanting  of  a  richer  and  more  cultured  by  a  poorer  and 
wilder  race.  The  ruins  of  the  prehistoric  cities,  which  were 
replaced  by  new  Dorian  foundations,  point  to  a  state  of  wealth 
to  which  the  country  did  not  again  attain  for  manj'  generations. 
The  ornaments  and  tools  which  are  found  among  their  debris  are 
HO  different  from  those  used  in  historic  Greece,  that  we  should 
hardly  have  suspected  that  their  inhabitants  were  of  the  Hellenic 
stock,  if  the  voice  of  tradition  had  not  indicated  IMycenae,  Tiryus, 
and  Orchoraenus  as  among  the  earliest  centres  of  Hellenic  wealth 
and  power.  When  they  were  destroyed,  much  civilization  perished 
wnth  them.  On  the  other  hand,  the  invasion  brouglit  about  an 
increase  in  vigour  and  moral  earnestness.  The  Dorians  throughout 
their  history  were  the  sturdiest  and  most  manly  of  the  Greeks. 
The  god  to  whose  worship  they  were  especially  devoted  was  Apollo, 
the  purest,  the  noblest,  the  most  Hellenic  member  of  the  Olympian 
flimily.  By  their  peculiar  reverence  for  this  noble  conception  of 
divinity,  the  Dorians  marked  themselves  out  as  the  most  moral  of 
the  Greeks. 


CHAPTER  VL 

TIIK   GREEK   COLONIES   IX   ASIA. 

The  stir  and  movement  which  were  caused  by  the  intrusion  of 
Dorians  and  Aetolians.  Thessalians  and  Boeotians,  into  their  new 
homes  were  destined  to  make  their  effects  felt  far  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  Hellenic  peninsula.  There  was  now  a  vast  body 
of  displaced  population  seeking  a  new  home  ;  every  mountain  and 
promontory  was  crowded  with  broken  remnants  of  the  worsted 
tribes,  who  had  escaped  being  reduced  to  serfdom,  and  had  taken 
refuge  in  the  remoter  corners  of  the  laud.  In  many  cases  tlie 
conquerors  had  allowed  the  conquered  to  depart  under  a  treaty  ; 
in  others  a  tribe  had  fled  before  the  storm,  and  taken  refuge  with 
those  of  its  kinsmen  who  were  still  unsubdued.  Everywhere  there 
were  to  be  found  masses  of  population  which  had  been  cut  loose 
from  their  moorings,  and  were  ready  to  drift  in  any  direction  to 
which  the  current  of  the  times  might  bear  them. 

Gradually  this  heterogeneous  crowd  began  to  show  a  tendency 
to  move  eastward  by  sea.  The  North  was  held  by  wild  and  hardy 
races  with  whom  they  did  not  dare  to  measure  themselves ;  the 
West  was  a  mysterious  waste  of  waters  known  only  to  the  Phoenician, 
But  to  the  East  lay  Asia  Minor — a  land  with  which  the  ecaigrants 
had  a  considerable  acquaintance,  whose  tribes  they  had  met  both 
in  war  and  in  commerce,  and  whose  fertility,  as  they  knew,  exceeded 
by  far  that  of  their  own  mountainous  land. 

That  the  inhabitants  of  the  Hellenic  peninsula  had  for  long  ages 
been  in  constant  intercourse  with  the  people  of  the  opposite  shore 
we  can  be  certain.  When  the  Achaians  ravaged  the  Egyptian 
Delta  in  the  thirteenth  century,  their  vessels  were  accompanied  by 
those  of  Lycians  and  other  tribes  from  the  south-west  pf  Asia 


The  Races  of  Asia  Minor.  53 

Minor,  When  the  Danai  aiBicted  the  subjects  ot  Rameses  III., 
they  brought  with  them  Teucrians  and  Dardanians  from  the 
Troad.  The  poems  of  Homer  preserve  some  dim  memory  of  a 
hostile  contact  with  these  same  Teucrians  in  days  long  before  the 
Hellenes  dreamed  of  settling  in  Asia.  When  once  they  had  mastered 
the  art  of  navigation,  and  discovered  the  natural  bridge  which  the 
Cyclades  form  between  the  two  continents,  it  would  have  been 
strange  indeed  if  the  Greeks  had  refrained  from  constant  visits  to 
the  opiDosite  coast. 

Asia  Minor  consists  of  a  great  central  plateau  with  a  fertile  coast- 
plain  lying  below  it,  and  forming,  as  has  been  happily  said,  "  a 

fringe  of  u  diflerent  material  woven  on  to  the  garment." 

rn,  •  1         1  ,       .  .     1.,      /-,  1       1     i-  Asia  Minor. 

Ihis  seaboard  on  the  Aegean  is,  like  Greece,  a  land  01 

gulfs  and  harbours  and  promontories,  but  it  possesses  a  succession 
of  rich  plains  and  valleys  to  which  the  more  rugged  Western  land 
can  afford  no  parallel.  At  the  moment  of  the  coming  of  the 
Greeks,  most  of  the  plateau  was  part  of  the  widespreading  posses- 
sions of  the  Hittites,  while  the  shore  was  held  by  a  number  of 
tribes  of  very  varying  blood.  The  Teucrians  and  Phrygians  lay  to 
the  north  in  the  direction  ot  the  Hellespont ;  the  Lycians  were  in 
the  extreme  south  ;  the  Carians  and  the  minor  tribe  of  the  Lelegcs 
dwelt  between  the  others,  in  the  valleys  of  the  Maeander,  Hermus, 
and  Cayster,  and  on  the  islands  which  lie  in  front  of  them.  These 
tribes  possessed  a  civilization  of  their  own,  different  in  character 
bi'.tnot  very  different  in  degree  from  that  of  the  Greeks,  rolygainy 
prevailed  among  some  of  the  races,  polyandry  in  others, — both 
practices  abhorrent  to  Greek  custom.  Most  of  the  peoples  wor- 
shipped as  their  supreme  deity  a  great  nature-goddess,  mother  and 
nourlsher  of  all  living  things,  whom  the  Greeks  called  Artemis  (as 
at  Ephesus),  or  Hera  (as  at  Samos),  or  Aphrodite  (as  at  Cnidus), 
though,  in  truth,  she  had  nothing  to  do  with  any  of  those  Hellenic 
divinities.  The  Teucrians  or  Carians  did  not  seem  to  the  Hellenes 
utterly  alien  and  savage,  as  did  a  Thracian  or  a  Scythian,  or  pos- 
sessed of  siuh  an  utterly  different  civilization  as  to  bo  incompre- 
hensible, as  did  an  Egyptian.  They  were  perhaps  not  very  dis- 
tant kinsmen,  and  were  certainly  near  enough  to  mix  readily  with 
the  Greek  and  adopt  much  of  his  civilization. 

It  was,  accordingly,  on  th^se  of  their  neighbours  with  whose  land 


54  The  Greek  Colonies  in  Asia. 

they  were  best  acquainted,  and  whose  strength  and  weakness  they 
were  best  able  to  gauge,  that  the  expelled  tribes  of  Thessaly  and 
Boeotia,  Ionia  and  Achaia,  determined  to  throw  themselves.  Three 
main  streams  of  invasion  can  be  traced,  each  drawing  the  greater 
part  of  its  resources  from  a  different  group  of  peoples. 

The  first  is  that  pursued  by  the  emigrants,  who  called  them- 
selves by  the  general  name  of  Aeolians.  Their  main  body  was 
The  Aeolian  composed  of  raccs  escaping  from  the  northern  parts  of 
migration.  Gj-ecce,  of  Magnetes  and  Minyae  who  fled  from  the 
Thessalians,  and  of  Orchomenians  Cadmeians  and  Locrians,  who 
had  been  displaced  by  the  Boeotians.  But  mixed  with  these  were 
Achaians,  who  had  been  driven  out  of  Peloponnesus  by  the  Dorian 
invasion,  and  were  led  by  chiefs  who  claimed  to  be  the  descendants 
of  Agamemnon.  Not  impossibly  the  name  Aeolian,  "  the  varie- 
gated," was  first  invented  to  express  the  mixed  character  of  this 
multitude,  and  only  afterwards  aiiplicd  as  a  common  name  to  the 
original  peoples  who  had  sent  forth  the  emigrants — races  who  had 
previously  had  little  to  do  with  each  other.  The  port  which 
tradition  pointed  out  as  the  starting-point  of  the  Aeolian  adven- 
turers was  Aulis,  hard  by  the  Euripus  in  the  Euboean  Strait. 
Hence  it  came  to  pass  that  Boeotia  was  vaguely  spokea  of  as  the 
mother-country  of  the  Aeolis  in  Asia  Minor,  where  the  emigrants 
settled. 

The  point  at  which  the  first  pioneers  of  this  exodus  made  their 
descent  was  the  great  and  fertile  island  of  Lesbos.  They  drove 
out  from  it  an  early  race  vaguely  called  Pelasgic,  i.e.  aboriginal, 
and  founded  on  its  shores  five  flourishing  towns,  of  which  the  chief 
was  Mitylene.  These  places  were  themselves  ere  long  the  parents 
of  new  settlements  on  the  mainland.  Another  band,  largely  com- 
posed of  Locrians,  but  led  by  Cleues  and  Malaus  who  are  called 
jmnces  of  the  house  of  Agamemnon,  landed  in  Mysia,  at  the  estuary 
of  the  Caicus,  and  seized  a  native  town,  whose  name  they  turned  to 
Cyme.  This  place  became  the  largest  continental  settlement  of  the 
Aeolians,  and  was  reckoned  second  only  to  Mitylene  among  their 
cities.  Gradually,  as  new  settlers  came  flocking  in,  town  after  town 
was  founded,  till  the  coast  opposite  Lesbos  was  fringed  by  a  con- 
tinuous belt  of  Aeolian  states.  Further  to  the  north,  in  the  Troad, 
the  adventurers  who  lauded  at  Assos  and  Antandrus  had  haider 


The  Ionic  Migration.  55 

work  to  win  themselves  a  territory,  and  were  forced  to  maintain  a 
loDg  and  doubtful  war  with  the  warlike  Teucrians  or  Dardanians, 
before  they  could  settle  down  in  peace.  At  last  the  natives  were 
driven  up  into  the  recesses  of  Ida,  and  the  coast-land  remained  to 
the  Greeks.  Altogether,  between  the  mouth  ot  the  Hellespont  and 
the  Bay  of  Smyrna,  the  Aeolians  founded  more  than  thirty  cities. 
None  of  them,  however,  save  Mitylene  and  Cyme,  became  places  of 
any  great  importance.  They  lay  close  together  all  along  the  shore, 
with  the  exception  of  the  single  town  of  Magnesia,  which  the 
exiled  Magnetes  of  Thessaly  built  at  a  distance  of  thirty  miles  from 
the  sea  some  way  up  the  valley  of  the  Hermus. 

Another  stream  of  emigration,  starting  from  a  different  base, 
affected  the  Carian  and  Lelegian  lands  to  the  south  of  Aeolis.  In 
this  district  the  invaders  were  mainly  lonians,  the  The  Ionian 
tribes  who  had  been  expelled  from  the  north  coast  of  mieration. 
Peloponnesus  by  the  Achaians,  and  from  Epidaurus  Troezen  and 
Phlius  by  the  Dorians.  These  exiles  had  taken  refuge  with  their 
kindred  in  Attica,  but  that  barren  peninsula  could  not  long  support 
them.  To  Attica,  too,  had  wandered  broken  remnants  of  other 
tribes — Cadmeians  Euboeaus  and  Phocians  from  the  north,  and 
Pylians  from  Peloponnesus.  Some  of  these  strangers  stayed  in  the 
peninsula,  and  the  Pylian  house  of  Melanthus  even  became  kings 
at  Athens  when  the  descendants  of  Theseus  died  out.  But  the 
large  majority  joined  in  the  migration,  and  were  merged  among  their 
Ionian  comrades.  Their  leaders  were  sometimes  Athenian  princes, 
sometimes  exiled  chiefs  from  Peloponnesus.  The  Ionic  migration 
differed  from  the  Aeolian  by  being  more  military  and  less  national. 
The  invaders  did  not,  we  are  told,  bring  wife  and  child  with  them, 
but  were  rather  bands  of  adventurers  unencumbered  with  useless 
mouths.  Hence  we  find  them,  after  the  first  moment  of  struggle, 
taking  wives  from  the  conquered,  and  mixing  freely  with  the 
Carians  and  Leleges  whom  they  found  on  the  spot.  "  Those  who 
say  that  they  started  from  the  Prytaneiura  of  Athens,  and  claim  to 
have  the  purest  blood  of  all  lonians,"  says  Herodotus,  "  ignore  the 
fact  that  their  ancestors  took  to  wives  the  Carian  women  whose 
fathers  they  had  slain."  There  was,  therefore,  from  the  first  a 
large  Asiatic  and  non-Hellenic  element  in  the  blood  of  the  Ionian 
colonists  of  Asia — an  element  which  had  a  large  share  in  making 


56  The  Greek  Colonies  in  Asia. 

them  the  least  tenacious  and  most  luxurious  of  the  Greeks.  The 
Aeolian  invaders  of  Mysia  and  the  Troad  had  on  their  way  to  cross 
the  Aegean  at  the  point  where  it  is  least  thickly  studded  with 
islands.  The  lonians  who  started  from  Attica,  on  the  other  hand, 
found  their  path  lying  through  the  midst  of  the  Cyclades.  Many 
of  the  emigrants  halted  by  the  way  and  settled  down  on  these 
islands,  where  they  must  have  found  a  scattered  Ionian  population 
already  existing,  mixed,  it  would  appear,  with  Carians,  Cretans,  and 
Leleges.  The  new-comers  so  far  modified  and  influenced  the  popu- 
lation, that  for  the  future  nearly  all  the  islands  named  chiefs  of 
the  migration  as  their  oekists,  and  looked  to  Attica  as  their  mother- 
country. 

Wave  after  wave  of  Ionic  adventurers  swept  on  by  the  Cyclades 
to  the  spacious  islands  of  Chios  and  Samos,  the  broad  peninsula  of 
Mimas,  and  the  fertile  valleys  of  the  Cayster  and  the  Maeauder. 
To  Phocaea  in  the  north,  hard  by  the  Aeolian  Cyme,  the  Athenian 
Philogenes  led  a  mixed  band  in  which  Phocians  predominated. 
Further  south,  Chios  was  occupied  by  settlers  who  were  mainly  of 
Euboean  race ;  Amphiclus  of  Histiaea,  who  was  their  commander, 
after  defeating  the  Carians  and  Leleges  of  the  island,  allowed  them 
to  quit  it  under  an  oath  never  to  return.  In  Samos  Procles,  who 
led  the  exiled  lonians  of  Epidaurus,  was  yet  more  merciful  to  the 
natives,  and  incorporated  them  with  his  followers  as  a  single  com- 
munity. Neleus,  son  of  the  Athenian  King  Codrus,  who  seized  the 
territory  at  the  mouth  of  the  Maeander,  was  more  ruthless,  and 
slew  off  all  the  Carians  who  dwelt  about  his  city  of  Miletus,  whence 
it  was  said  that  the  Milesians  were  less  tainted  with  aboriginal 
blood  than  the  other  lonians.  At  Ephesus,  however,  which  held 
in  the  valley  of  the  Cayster  the  same  predominant  position  that 
Miletus  enjoyed  in  that  of  the  Maeander,  a  Greek  town  founded  by 
the  Codrid  Androckis  rose  side  by  side  with  an  ancient  Carian 
settlement,  that  centred  round  the  temple  of  the  great  nature-goddess 
whom  the  Ionian  new-comers  chose  to  call  Artemis.  After  a  time, 
the  Hellenes  and  the  aborigines  blended  into  one  community. 
Between  Phocaea  on  the  north  and  Miletus  on  the  south  there 
The  Ionian  g^ew  up,  in  the  course  of  a  few  generations,  a  con- 
cities,  tinuous  chain  of  ten  Ionian  cities ;  the  island  states 
of  Chios  and  Samos  made  their  total  number  twelve.     In  spite  of 


The  Dorian  Colonies  in  Asia.  57 

tteir  difference  in  origin  and  population,  they  were  sufficiently 
akin  to  unite  for  the  common  worship  of  the  Ionian  Poseidon  at 
a  sanctuary  on  Mount  Mycale,  which  they  called  the  Pauionium. 
After  a  time,  religious  union  led  to  a  certain  political  connection, 
and  a  loose  confederacy  was  formed,  whose  delegates  met  at  the 
Panionium  to  discuss  their  common  affairs.  But  far  into  the  fifth 
century  the  ethnic  difference  between  the  several  towns  was  shown 
by  the  fact  that  four  distinct  dialects  were  still  spoken  in  Ionia.' 
It  was  not  only  the  conquered  races  of  Greece  that  were  to  take 
part  in  the  great  movement  toward  Asia.  After  a  time,  the  con- 
querors too  found  themselves  under  the  same  impulse,  The  Dorian 
and  began  to  push  across  the  Aegean.  The  Dorians  niigration. 
of   Peloponnesus,   overflowing    from   their   new   home,   sent   out 

several  swarms  of  colonists.     Their  largest  band  made 

-  Crete, 

for  Crete,  where,  if  legends  can  be   trusted,  Jlinos 

had   long  ago  built  up  a  powerful  state.      But   the  island  was 

peopled  by  various  races  without  cohesion,  a  Dorian  element  was 

already  to  be  found  in  a  corner  of  the  island,  and  no  common 

resibtance  was  offered.     The  new  emigrants  reduced  to  villeinage 

the    other  races  ot    the   island,    Achaians   Carians  and    possibly 

Phoenicians,  and  organized  themselves  under  a  strict  discipline  as 

a  military  aristocracy  among  a  people  of  serfs. 

Melos    and   Thera   among   the    Sporades   were    colonized    by 

Dorians  from  Laconia,  mixed  with  their  subjects  from  the  same 

land,  whom  they  brought  with  them  and  o.draitted  ^j^^  j)Qj.j^jjgin 

to  a  shc-e  in  the  colony.     Further  to  the  east  the   Asia  Minor. 

spacious    Rhodes — equalled   in   size  by   Lesbos   only  among   the 

Asiatic   islands— was  occupied   by  three  groups  of  settlers  from 

Argos,  who  built  the  towns  of  Lindus,  lalysus,  and  Cameirus.     In 

the  south-western  corner  of  Caria,  where  two  long  peninsulas  jut  out 

into  the  sea,  the  Laconians  founded  Cnidus,  and  the  Troezetiians 

Ilalicarnassus.     Finally,  the  large  island  of   Cos,   which  lies  off 

the  peninsula  of  Halicarnassus,  was  also  settled  by  emigrants  from 

Troezen.     The  people  of  Cos  Cnidus  and  Halicarnassus,  together 

with  those  of  the  three  towns  of  Rhodes,  formed  a  Doric  "  Hexa- 

•  One  was  peculiar  to  Samos  ;  one  was  spoken  at  Chios  and  Erytbrae ; 
a  third  at  Epbesus,  Colophon,  Lebedus,  Teos,  Clazomenae  and  Phocaca ; 
a  fourth  at  Miletus,  Myus,  and  Priene. 


SS  The  Greek  Colonies  in  Asia. 

polls,"  who  joined  in  a  common  worship  ot  Apollo  at  Cape  Tri- 
opium.     The  power  and  organization  of  their  league  was  a  faint 

reflection  of  that  of  the  far  more  important  Ionian  confederacy 
which  united  to  reverence  Poseidon  at  the  Panionium.  The  Hexa- 
Ijolis,  together  with  a  few  neighbouring  Dorian  settlements  of 
smaller  importance,  Myndus  Nisyrus  and  others,  was  often  called 
Doris,  just  as  the  larger  groups  of  colonies  to  the  north  were 
respectively  known  as  Ionia  and  Acolis. 

What  was  the  exact  date  of  the  establishment  of  the  eastern- 
most group  of  Greek  colonies,  those  which  were  founded  in  Cyprus, 

The  Greeks  in  it  is  hard  to  say.  Tradition  ascribed  their  settlement 
Cyprus.  f^j  ^jjg  heroes  of  the  Trojan  War ;  but  we  may  safely 
conclude  that  Cyprus  was  not  approached  by  the  Greeks  till 
the  nearer  lauds  in  Asia  Minor  had  already  been  seized.  That 
the  emigration  to  Cyprus,  howevei',  was  at  an  early  date  may  be 
judged  from  the  fact  that  the  Cypriot  Greeks  are  found  using  a 
more  primitive  form  of  writing,  borrowed  from  the  East,  than  any 
other  brancli  of  the  Hellenic  race.  While  every  other  tribe  used 
the  "  Cadmeian  alphabet,"  the  Cypriots  employed  an  archaic  and 
complicated  syllabary ;  it  is  hard  to  see  why  they  adopted  it  rather 
than  the  much  more  convenient  Phoenician  symbols  which  the 
majority  of  their  countrymen  knew.  We  are,  at  any  rate,  certain 
that  the  Greeks  were  thoroughly  rooted  down  in  Cyprus  long  before 
the  eighth  century  before  Christ,  as  the  Assyrian  conquerors  of  the 
island  in  that  age  name  several  Greek  kings  among  their  vassals. 
The  chief  Greek  colonies  of  the  island  were  Salamis,  Paphos,  and 
Curium,  which  maintained  a  constant  struggle  for  supremacy  with 
the  older  Phoenician  towns  of  Amathus,  Citium,  Golgos,  and 
Tamassus.  The  founders  of  the  Greek  towns  were  of  very  various 
descent.  We  hear  of  Achaians,  under  Teucer  of  Salamis  the  brother 
of  the  hero  Ajax,  cf  Argives,  Laconians,  and  even  of  Arcadians 
from  the  inland  of  Peloponnesus.  The  mixture  of  races  would 
certainly  seem  to  point  to  the  period  of  the  colonization  of  Cyprus 
as  being  the  same  as  that  of  Asia  Minor,  for  at  a  later  date  some 
of  these  races  had  entirely  ceased  to  go  on  maritime  expeditious. 

The  period,  then,  which  covered  the  migration  of  nations  in  the 
Hellenic  peninsula,  and  the  colonization  of  the  Asiatic  shores,  is 
difficult  to  determine  with  accuracy.     That  the  movements  lasted 


Date  of  the  Migrations.  59 

tlirough  a  considerable  number  of  generations  we  may  be  certain. 
But  the  genealogies  which  the  later  Greeks  constructed  and  used 
as  a  basis  of  calculation  for  the  dates  of  this  period  are  quite 
worthless,  and  any  deductions  drawn  from  them  are  useless  for 
chronology.  If  any  limits  must  be  given  for  the  length  of  the 
age  of  migration,  it  may  perhaps  be  said  that  the  period  between 
1100  and  950  n.c.  must  have  seen  the  greater  part  of  the  wander- 
ings of  the  Greeli  races. 


CHAPTER   VIL 

THE   DORIANS   IN   PELOPONNESUS — THE    LEGISLATION    OF   LYCURGU3, 

For  more  than  three  hundred  years  after  the  probable  era  ot  ttie 
Dorian  migration  the  history  of  Peloponnesus  is  obscure,  and  its 
chronology  vague  and  inaccurate.  The  Greeks  themselves  did  not 
pretend  to  give  exact  dates  till  the  first  Olympiad  (770  B.C.),  and 
even  after  this  great  uncertainty  exists,  and  we  cannot  be  said  to 
be  moving  in  a  really  clear  and  historical  atmosphere  till  the  com- 
mencement of  the  sixth  century.  For  the  first  two  centuries  our 
only  landmarks  are  the  lists  of  Spartan,  Argive,  Messenian,  and 
Oorinthian  kings,  most  of  whom  are  mere  names  to  us,  while 
others  have  connected  with  them  stories  that  are  utterly  impos- 
sible. Still,  royal  genealogies  are  undoubtedly  the  first  things  that 
a  nation  commits  to  memory,  and,  in  default  of  written  history,  are 
not  without  their  value. 

Of  the  three  greater  Dorian  states  which  were  established  in 
Peloponnesus  by  the   Heracleid  chiefs  who  led  the  invasion,  that 

The  Argive    ^f  Argos  was  for  a  long  time  the  most  important. 

alliance.  Including  its  dependent  states,  it  may  be  defined  as 
holding  the  whole  eastern  coast  of  the  peninsula.  The  descend- 
ants of  Temenus  held  as  their  own  domain  the  coast-plain  of 
the  Inachus  and  the  slopes  above  it.  Here  they  would  seem  to 
have  admitted  pirt  of  the  old  Achaian  inhabitants  to  a  share  in 
the  citizenship,  for  besides  the  three  Dorian  tribes  of  Hylleis, 
Pamphyli,  and  Dymanes,  the  Argives  were  divided  into  a  fourth 
called  Hyrnethians,  who  seem  to  represent  the  Achaian  element. 
Outside  the  immediate  territory  of  the  city  of  Argos  were  other 
communities  both  Dorian  and  non-Dorian,  which  acknowledged  the 
supremacy  of  their  greater  neighbour.    Of  these  some  were  actually 


circ.  675B.CJ  Pheidou  of  Argos.  6x 

vassal  states  closely  bound  to  Argos  as  to  a  mistress.  Such  were 
the  AchaiaQs  of  the  little  town  of  Onieae  and  the  lonians  of 
Cynuria,  who  inhabited  that  rocky  strij?  of  coast,  between  Mount 
Parnon  and  the  sea,  which  runs  down  as  far  as  Cape  Malea  and 
even  includes  the  island  of  Cythera.  Less  closely  connected  were 
the  new  Dorian  states  of  Epidaurus,  Troczen,  Phlius,  Cleonae,  and 
Sicyon,  whose  conquerors  had  started  from  Argos,  and  were  bound 
to  pay  a  certain  deference  to  their  mother-city  The  once-famous 
Achaian  town  of  Mycenae  prolonged  an  obscure  existence  on  its 
hillside  under  the  same  conditions. 

The  first  nine  kings  of  Argos  are  mere  names  to  us.  All  that  has 
come  down  to  us  concerning  them  is  a  series  of  dim  legends  about 
their  wars  with  their  kinsmen  of  Sparta,  which 
sound  like  a  reflection  back  into  an  early  age  of  the 
real  wars  of  the  sixth  and  seventh  centuries.  The  first  Argive 
sovereign  who  is  more  than  a  name  to  us  is  King  Pheidon,  of  whose 
deeds  many  tales  are  related.  He  succeeded  to  a  kingly  power 
which  had  become  weakened,  owing  to  the  encroachments  of  the 
Dorian  oligarchy  on  the  rights  and  prerogatives  of  the  crown.  But 
by  armed  force  lie  put  down  this  oligarchy,  and  freed  himself  from 
all  constitutional  restraints.  Then  he  turned  to  enlarge  the  bounds 
of  the  empire  of  Argos;  not  only  did  he  reduce  Sicyon  and  his 
other  Dorian  neighbours  to  a  closer  dependence,  but  he  added  to 
his  client  states  the  important  towns  of  Corinth  and  Aegina,  which 
had  already  become  the  greatest  marts  and  seaports  of  Southern 
Greece.  He  is  even  credited  with  the  design  of  reducing  the  whole 
Peloponnesus  to  vassalage ;  he  repressed  the  Spartans,  and,  marching 
into  the  west  of  the  peninsula,  aided  the  Pisatans,  who  were  in  revolt 
against  Elis,  and  supported  them  in  their  claim  to  celebrate  the 
Olympic  games,  of  which  we  now  find  the  first  authentic  mention. 
Pheidon  was,  moreover,  a  legisktor ;  he  fixed  a  new  standard  of 
weights  and  measures,  which  was  almost  universally  accepted 
among  the  Dorian  and  Aeolian  states  of  Greece,  and  had  coined  for 
him  by  his  Aeginetan  vassals  the  first  silver  money  which  was  ever 
known  west  of  the  Aegean.  He  consecrated,  we  are  told,  in  the 
temple  of  Hera  at  Argos,  samples  of  the  rude  currency  of  long  silver 
nails  which  his  round  obols  and  drachmae  superseded.  Pheidon 
died  in  battle,  having  first,  however,  seen  his  scheme  of  empire  frus- 


62  The  Dorians  in  Peloponnesus.  075  e.g.- 

trated.  Untler  his  son  the  royal  power  was  at  once  brought  back 
to  its  old  insignificance,  though  Argive  sovereigns  continued  to  rule 
in  name  down  to  the  sixth,  perhaps  even  to  the  fifth,  century. 
The  sole  permanent  result  of  the  great  king's  reign  was  to  break 
down  the  Dorian  oligarchy  at  Argos,  so  that  democracy  became 
possible  in  that  state  before  it  was  established  in  other  Dorian 
communities. 

When  so  much  is  known  of  Phoidon,  it  is  strange  to  realize  lliat 
his  date  is  uncertain.  While  the  received  text  of  Pausanias^  tells 
us  that  the  Olympic  games  which  he  assisted  the  Pisatans  to  cele- 
brate were  the  eighth  since  the  commencement  of  those  contests 
(i.e.  those  of  748  B.C.),  there  are  other  facts  which  seem  to  bring 
Pheidon's  date  much  lower,  and  it  is  on  the  whole  probable  that  his 
real  date  was  about  675-665  b.c.  When  the  reign  of  a  king  whose 
name  was  the  most  celebrated  of  his  age  cannot  be  fixed  within  a 
hundred  years,  regular  history  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  begun 

While  Argos  was  holding  the  primacy  in  the  Peloponncse,  her 
sister  states  of  Mcssenia  and  Laconia  were  going  through  two  oppo- 
site courses  of  development,  which  brought  them  first  into  rivalry 
and  then  into  a  life-and-death  struggle. 

In  Messene,  as  in  Argos,  the  Dorian  conquerors  had  not  alto- 
gether expatriated  or  extermined  the  earlier  inhabitants  of  the  land. 
Legends  speak  of  Cresphontes,  the  brother  of  Temenus 
and  first  Dorian  king  of  Messenia,  as  having  granted 
full  citizenship  in  his  new  state  to  those  of  the  Pylian  Caucones 
and  the  Achaians  who  did  not  emigrate,  and  as  having  married, 
not  one  of  his  own  race,  but  the  daughter  of  a  neighbouring  prince 
of  Arcadia.  His  anti-national  tendencies  provoked  the  Dorians  to 
revolt  and  murder  their  king ;  but  his  son  Aepytus  revenged  his 
father,  slew  Polyphontes  the  leader  of  the  rebels,  and  brought  back 
peace  to  the  land.  Under  the  rule  of  Aepytus  and  his  line,  Dorian 
Caucon  and  Achaean  became  thoroughly  fused,  and  Llcssenia, 
though  ruled  by  a  Heracleid  family,  retained  few  of  the  charac- 
teristics of  a  Dorian  state. 

'  It  is  probable  that  the  text  of  Pausanias  has  been  corrupted,  and  that 
Pheidon's  Olympiad  was  the  twenty-eighth  not  the  eighth — 668,  not  748 
B.C.  This  view  is  corroborated  especiallj-  b}'  the  recorded  fact  of  his 
striking  mone}^ ;  for  the  internal  evidence  of  the  Greek  coinage  seems  to 
fix  about  680-650,  as  the  date  of  the  earliest  Acginetan  staters. 


6G5  B.C.  Early  History  of  Sparta.         '  6^ 

In  Laconia  the  condition  of  things  was  entirely  different.  Tlie 
band  of  Dorian  invaders  that  had  settled  round  Sparta  in  the  Eurotas 
vallej'-  was  weak,  and  the  territory  v.hich  it  had  seized 
was  narrow,  bounded  to  the  north  by  the  Arcadian 
hills,  and  to  the  south  by  the  Achaian  fortress  of  Amyclae,  which 
stood  only  three  miles  from  the  capital  of  the  invaders,  and  com- 
pletely blocked  their  way  down  the  valley  of  the  Eurotas,  just  as 
Fidenae,  in  a  later  day,  blocked  the  Eomans  from  tlie  valley  of  the 
Tiber.  The  Dorians  of  Sparta  enjoyed  the  constitutional  anomaly 
of  having  two  kings  to  reign  over  them.  Two  royal  houses,  calling 
themselves  Agidae  and  EuryiDontidae  respectively,  were  seated 
together  on  the  throne,  and  from  the  first  date  of  their  appearance 
distracted  the  state  by  their  quarrels.  The  Spartans  said  that 
Aristodemus,  the  original  leader  ot  their  horde,  had  died,  leaving 
twin  sons,  and  that  an  oracle  had  bidden  them  "  to  take  both  as 
kings,  but  to  give  greater  honour  to  the  elder."  Modern  historians*, 
discontented  with  the  legend,  have  tried  to  prove — with  very  doubt- 
fid  success — that  the  coexistence  of  two  royal  houses  represented 
the  amalgamation  of  the  conquering  Dorian  with  the  conquered 
Achaian,  or  of  two  separate  Dorian  bands  settled  one  in  the  valley 
of  the  Eurotas,  and  the  other  in  that  of  the  Oenus.  It  may  be  so, 
but  proof  is  impossible  ;  the  double  kingship  must  be  taken  as  an 
accepted  fact,  whose  explanation  is  beyond  our  power. 

The  very  weakness  and  isolation  of  the  Dorians  of  Sparta 
account  for  the  fact  that  they  retained  their  national  identity  to  a 
far  greater  degree  than  their  brethren  of  Argos  and   .^.       .^     ^ 

o  o  o  Diversity  of 

Messene.  They  were  not  strong  or  numerous  enough  the  Dorian 
to  conquer  and  incorporate  their  neighbours,  but  were 
compelled  to  fight  hard  with  them  for  every  foot  of  land  they  won. 
Just  as  the  Angles  and  Saxons  in  Britain  retained  their  language 
and  their  customs  because  they  could  not  sweep  over  the  whole 
island  and  subdue  its  inhabitants,  but  had  to  push  forward  slowlj', 
rooting  out  the  Britons ;  so  the  Spartans  remained  uninfluenced  by 
the  older  people  of  Laconia.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Argives  and 
Messenians  in  Greece,  just  like  the  Franks  and  Lombards  in  modern 
Europe,  were  strong  enough  to  win  a  broad  realm  at  a  single  blow, 
and  were  ere  long  either  absorbed  or  at  least  largely  influenced  by 
the  preponderating  mass  of  subjects  whom  they  suddenly  acquired. 


64  The  Dorians  in  Peloponnesus.  leoo  b.cj. 

All  authorities  agree  in  describing  the  state  of  early  Sparta  as  one 
of  weakness  and  anarchy.  Her  dominion  did  not  extend ;  her  two 
royal  houses  were  incessantly  at  variance ;  her  wars  both  with  her 
Dorian  neighbours  of  Argolis  and  with  the  Arcadians  on  her 
northern  frontier  were  usually  disastrous ;  her  people  were  discon- 
tented. Such  was  the  condition  of  things  when  her  great  legislator 
Lycurgus  appeared,  to  rescue  her  from  herself,  and  send  her  forth 
armed  for  the  conquest  of  the  whole  Peloponnese. 

Of  the  existence  of  Lycurgus  we  need  have  no  doubt,  though 

modern  writers  have  reduced  him,  in  common  with  most  other 

great  men  of  early  history,  to  the  inevitable  sun- 
Ijycurgus.  ,        tt    i    i  i  /»    1  ,   , 

myth.     He  belonged  to  one  of  the  two  royal  houses, 

and  in  all  probability  lived  about  the  year  800  b.c.     We  need  not 

accept,  unless  we  choose,  the  legends  which  tell  how  he  was  the 

younger  son  of  King  Eunomus  of  the  Eurypontid  line ;  how  he 

exiled  himself  from  Sparta  in  order  to  avoid  the  suspicion  that 

he  would  usurp  the  throne  of  his  infant  nephew  Charilaiis ;  how 

he  travelled  in  Greece,  in  Asia,  in  Egypt,  and  perhaps  yet  further 

afiekl,  and  finally  returned,  full  of  wisdom  and  experience,  when 

Charilaiis  had  grown  up  to  manhood,  only  to  find  the  state  in  a 

wors3  plight  than  ever.     The  kings  were  quarrelling  with  each 

other,  and  at  the  same  time  striving  to  cast  off  constitutional  checks 

and  rule  despotically.    Charilaiis  is  even  called  one  of  the  "tyrants" 

of  Greece.      Meanwhile  a  disastrous   war   was  proceeding,    the 

Arcadians   of  Tegea  had  just   inflicted   on    Sparta  the  greatest 

defeat  she  ever  knew,  taken   one  of  her  kings  prisoner,  and  set 

hundreds  of  Spartan  captives  to  work  as  slaves  on  their  upland 

farms. 

In  this  emergency  the  Lacedaemonians,  we  are  told,  were  ready 
to  accept  any  sacrifice  necessary  to  preserve  their  state.  Their 
eyes  turned  to  Lycurgus,  and  when  he  came  out  into  the  market- 
place, followed  by  twenty-eight  of  the  wisest  and  noblest  of  the 
citizens,  and  laid  his  schemes  before  the  people,  they  met  with 
high  approval.  The  legend  adds  that,  after  a  time  of  violent 
opposition  by  the  minority,  which  resulted  in  brawls  and  riots, 
during  one  of  which  the  legislator  had  his  eye  struck  out,  the  new 
code  was  accepted. 

What  the  institutions  of  Lycurgus  did  and  did  not  include  it 


The  "  Rheira  "  of  Lycurgus.  65 

is  difficult  to  define  with  accuracy.     But  some  general  results  can 
be  obtained  by  carefully  excising;  from  the  reports 

/  ,,    ■,  The  Constitu- 

or  posterity  those  so-called  parts  of  his  legislation  tionof 
for  which  we  know  that  he  cannot  possibly  have  been  y^urgus. 
responsible.  That  he  did  not,  for  example,  forbid  the  committing 
of  his  laws  to  writing  or  the  use  of  coined  money  we  may  be 
certain ;  neither  written  codes  nor  current  cash  were  known  for 
more  than  a  century  after  the  latest  possible  date  at  which  he  can 
be  placed.  Nor  can  he  have  legislated  about  Helots,  for  the  serf 
problem  did  not  come  before  Sparta  so  long  as  she  was  a  small  jjoor 
state,  penned  in  the  valley  of  the  Upper  Eurotas.  Neither  did  he 
invent  the  Ephoralty,  which  first  appears  during  the  Messenian 
wars,  nor  institute  an  equal  division  of  property.  But  legend 
loves  to  pile  all  the  details  of  an  early  constitution  on  to  a  single 
legislator;  and,  in  crediting  Lycurgus  with  every  distinctive  usage 
of  the  Spartan  state-system,  the  Greeks  were  but  illustrating  the 
game  tendency  that  made  our  own  ancestors  say  that  King  Alfred 
invented  trial  by  jury,  or  divided  England  into  shires. 

The  constitution  of  Lycurgus  was  primarily  intended  to  define 
the  position  of  the  different  parts  of  the  state.  Sparta — like  all 
Greek  states  of  the  Homeric  age — possessed  kings,  r^ j^g  Rhetra  of 
a  council  of  nobles,  and  an  assembly  of  freemen.  But  i-ycureua. 
it  would  seen^  that  the  nobles  were  now  trying  to  dejirive  the 
kings  of  their  prerogatives,  while  the  kings  were  endeavouring  to 
get  rid  of  all  constitutional  control.  Meanwhile  the  general 
assembly  ot  freemen  may  have  begun  to  assert  a  claim  to  some- 
tliing  more  than  a  right  to  acquiesce  in  all  that  was  laid  before  it. 
Lycurgus  bade  the  Spartans,  in  the  curt  language  of  his  "  Rhetra," 
"build  a  temple  to  Zeus  Hellanius  and  Athena  Hellania;  arrange 
the  people  in  tribes  and  in  obes,  thirty  in  number ;  establish  a 
Gerousia,  including  the  two  kings ;  and  summon  the  people  from 
time  to  time  to  an  assembly  between  Babyca  and  the  Cuacion ; 
the  people  shall  have  the  determining  voice,"  '  What  was  the 
exact  political  meaning  of  the  particular  worship  to  be  paid  to 
Zeus  and  Athena  we  do  not  know ;  perhaps  the  Dorian  Apollo  had 
till  then  been  the  sole  god  of  the  state.     But  the  other  clauses  of  • 

1  For  a  good  commentary  on  this,  see  E.  Abbott's  "  History  of  Greece," 
i,  200. 


66  The  Dorians  in  Fdoponnesus. 

the  Ilhotia  are  clearer.  The  ancient  polity  is  to  be  systematized  : 
the  Boule  of  nobles  is  to  be  transformed  into  an  elected  senate  of 
thirty  elders,  among  whom  the  kings  are  always  to  find  a  place ; 
the  assembly  of  freemen  is  to  have  a  real  part  in  the  conduct  of 
affairs,  and  to  give  a  decisive  vote  when  the  Gerousia  is  divided. 
The  general  tendency  of  the  laws,  therefore,  would  be  to  suppress  the 
unruliness  of  the  aristocratic  council  of  nobles  by  cutting  down  its 
numbers  and  restricting  it  to  elderly  men ;  while  the  kings,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  mulcted  of  their  power  of  promulgating  laws  on 
their  own  authority,  and  incorporated  as  individual  members  of 
the  Gerousia.  The  people  are  to  be  indulged  with  a  share  in  the 
constitution,  though  probably  they  were  only  given  enough  to 
serve  as  a  salve  for  discontent,  and  not  enough  to  enable  them 
to  interfere  to  any  effect  in  politics  ;  no  one  ever  accused  Lycurgus 
of  being  a  democrat.  What  were  the  alterations  made  by  the  new 
ordinances  in  the  tribes  we  cannot  say  ;  at  any  rate,  the  old  Hylleis, 
Pamphyli,  and  Dymanes  were  not  abolished.  The  obes,  again,  are 
mysterious — whether  they  were  grouped  by  families  or  by  localities 
is  unknown  ;  we  can  only  say  that  they  were  subdivisions  of  which 
ten  went  to  each  tribe. 

The  Gerousia  consisted  of  thirty  elders,  one  for  each  obe.  The 
kings  were  ex-ojjficio  members,  apparently  representing  the  obes  to 
which  their  families  belonged.  The  other  Gerontes 
'  were  elective;  they  held  their  seats  for  life,  but  as  no 
one  was  eligible  for  the  post  till  his  sixtieth  year,  the  average 
tenure  of  office  cannot  have  been  very  long.  Like  the  old  council 
of  nobles,  which  they  replaced,  they  acted  as  assessors  to  the  kings 
in  the  discussion  of  all  public  affairs.  But  they  had  this  advantage 
over  their  predecessors,  that  the  king's  voice  only  counted  as  one  of 
their  own,  and  was  no  longer  omnipotent,  for  everything  was  now 
decided  by  numerical  majority 

The  assembly  of  freemen,  which  was  known  at  Sparta  as  the 
Apella,  was  composed  of  all  citizens  of  thirty  years  of  age  and 
over.  It  met  between  the  bridge  of  Babj^ca  and  the 
Cnacion,  the  ravine  of  the  Oenus,  once  a  month.  As 
the  old  Homeric  Agora  had  only  been  able  to  shout  its  assent  or 
dissent,  so  the  Spartan  assembly,  though  given  a  real  part  in  the 
constitution,  could  only  vote  by  acclamation.     The  uncertain'.y  of 


The  Kingship  at  Sparta,  67 

this  method  of  decision  niust  have  thrown  much  power  into  tlie 
hands  of  the  presiding  official,  especially  when  such  business  as 
the  election  of  one  of  the  Gerontes  or  other  magistrates  from 
among  several  candidates  was  in  hand.  As  Aristotle  observes,  "  the 
plan  was  too  childish."  We  are  even  assured  that  at  some  elections 
the  matter  was  settled  by  shutting  up  the  returning  officer  in  a 
room  out  of  sight  of  the  assembly,  and  compelling  him  to  decide 
which  of  the  shouts  that  he  heard  without  was  loudest !  But  this 
device  must  surely  have  been  invented  by  a  sarcastic  neighbour. 
Before  the  assembly,  too,  were  laid  the  subjects  of  debate  approved 
by  the  Gerousia ;  declarations  of  war,  treaties  of  alliance,  deposi- 
tions of  kings,  and  all  such  weighty  matters  were  to  be  within  its 
cognizance.  No  one  could  speak  in  it  without  the  invitation  of 
the  presiding  officer — a  feature,  it  is  to  be  remarked,  which  was  also 
to  be  found  in  the  Eoman  Comitia.  In  historic  times  the  ephors 
presided,  but  in  Lycurgus's  day  the  kings  and  Gerontes  must 
have  convened  the  meeting,  as  they  would  have  done  with  the 
Homeric  Agora. 

The  privileges  which  the  new  constitution  left  to  the  kings  are 
shortly  summed  up  by  Herodotus.  In  peace  they  had  the  highest 
seat,  and  a  double  portion  at  all  feasts,  sacrifices,  and 

The  kings. 

banquets.  Public  rations  of  corn  and  wine  were  issued 
to  them  twice  a  month,  and  for  meat  they  might  claim  the  chine 
of  every  animal  sacrificed  in  the  city.  Its  hide  was  also  their 
perquisite.  They  were  hereditary  priests  of  Zeus  Lacedaemonius 
the  god  of  the  land,  and  Zeus  Uranius  the  god  of  heaven.  They 
were  charged  with  choosing  envoys  to  consult  the  oracles  (Pythii), 
and  with  appointing  consuls  (Trpd^evoi)  for  foi'eign  states.  They 
had  also  the  right  of  giving  away  the  hands  of  orphan  heiresses, 
and  of  sanctioning  the  adoption  of  sons  by  the  childless.  In  war- 
time they  were  perpetual  commanders-in-chief.  When  the  army 
went  forth,  they  marched  out  first,  and  on  its  return  they  entered 
the  city  last.  A  hundred  chosen  warriors  guarded  their  persons. 
They  might  direct  their  expeditions  against  any  foe  they  chose, 
and  the  Spartan  who  strove  to  turn  their  purpose  was  held  accursed. 
When  in  the  field  they  might  requisition  sheep  and  cattle  according 
to  their  good  pleasure.  At  their  death,  adds  Herodotus,  "  women 
go  round  the  city  rattling  on  a  cauldron,  and,  when  the  sound  is 


68  The  Dorians  in  Peloponnesus. 

heard,  two  persons  in  every  house,  a  male  and  a  female,  put  on 
mourning  apparel,  and  cut  off  their  hair.  Horsemen  take  the 
tidings  round  Laconia,  and,  on  the  day  of  the  funeral,  a  vast 
multitude  of  the  subjects  and  serfs  of  the  Spartans  come  flocking 
in  to  join  the  townsfolk  in  the  wailings  which  accompany  the 
procession." 

A  Spartan  king,  then,  was  left  by  the  Lycurgean  legislation  a 
position  of  honorary  distinction  in  the  state,  a  high  priesthood,  and 
the  command  of  the  army  in  time  of  war.  He  had  become  a  great 
hereditary  state  official,  and  ceased  to  be  a  sovereign. 

If  these  constitutional  reforms  had  comprised  the  whole  work  of 
Lycurgus,  it  is  probable  that  we  should  not  have  heard  very  much 
of  Si^arta  in  coming  years.  A  limited  monarchy  and  quasi-rejire- 
sentative  government  are  excellent  things  in  themselves,  and  bring 
vast  relief  to  a  people  who  have  been  suffering  under  anarchy  ;  but 
they  do  not  suffice  to  found  a  great  and  victorious  military  state. 
It  was  his  social  rather  than  his  political  legislation  which  made 
Lycurgus  a  legislator  unique  of  his  kind. 

The  Spartans  were  a  poor  and  rough  people,  maintaiijing,  among 
hostile  neighbours,  a  constant  armed  struggle  for  existence.  To 
survive  they  had  to  be  continually  prepared  to  fight  superior  forces 
at  a  moment's  notice ;  for  their  enemies  dwelt  at  their  very  doors, 
and  no  point  in  the  land  was  a  day's  march  from  the  border. 
Lycurgus  determined  to  secure  them  victory  by  sacrificing  every 
public  and  j^rivate  end  in  the  state  to  the  one  object  of  making  his 
countrymen  irresistible  in  battle.  To  do  this  he  turned  the  whole 
social  system  of  the  state  into  a  hateful  and  relentless  military 
machine,  which  seized  on  the  citizen  body  and  soul  in  early  boy- 
hood, lield  him  enmeshed  all  his  life,  and  only  let  him  loose  when 
he  was  no  longer  fit  to  bear  arms.  This  machine  was  the  famous 
Spartan  ajoiyf},  or  training  and  discipline,  of  which  he  was  the 
perfecter,  if  not  the  inventor. 

Lycurgus  was  fortunate  in  having  to  do  with  a  very  primitive 
and  uncivilized   people.     No   race   which   had   stored    up    much 

The  Spartan  material  wealth  or  mental  culture  would  have  con- 

training.     sented  for  a  moment  to  adopt  his  system.     But  the 

Sjiartans  were  a  rude,  perhaps  almost  a  savage,  people.     AVe  find 

surviving  among  them  practices  which  mark  a  very  low  grade  in 


The  Spartan  Training,  69 

civilization — tlie  form  of  marriage  wliich  consists  in  the  fiction  of 
capturing  tlie  bride  by  force  from  her  parents,  the  separation  of  the 
sexes  at  meals,  the  hateful  practice  of  polyandry.  Even  after  their 
advance  into  Peloponnesus,  the  Dorians  were  only  just  beginning  to 
come  within  the  radius  of  civilization.  It  is  a  sufficient  comment 
on  the  Lycurgean  training  to  say  that  the  nearest  parallel  to  it  in 
history  is  that  strange  military  discipline  which  King  Cliaka  intro- 
duced among  the  Zulus  in  our  own  times. 

The  moment  a  Spartan  was  born,  the  state  began  to  take  cogni- 
zance  of  him.     The   infant  was  carried  before   the   elders,  who 
decided  on  his  fate:  if  healthy,  he  was  given  back  to  his  parents  to 
be  reared ;  if  weakly,  he  was  taken  away  and  cast  out  on  Taygetus, 
to  perish  by  exposure.     At  the  age  of  seven  the  boys  were  removed 
from  the  homes  of  their  parents,  and  placed  in  the  public  training- 
house,  where  they  began  to  undergo  the  series  of  toils  which  were 
to  make  up  their  lives.     They  w'ent   barefoot,  and  were  allowed 
only  a  single  garment  winter  and  summer;    at  night  they  were 
compelled  to  sleep  on  beds  of  rushes,  which  they  gathered  with  their 
own  hands  from  the  bed  of  the  Eurotas.     They  had  to  cook  and 
cater  for  themselves:    the  ration  allowed   them  was  deliberately 
made  small  and  unappetizing,  in  order  that  they  might    be  en- 
couraged to  add  to  it  by  hunting  or  even  by  theft,    Yfe  are  assured 
that  it  was  habitual  for  the  boj's  to  eke  out  their  meals  by  spoil 
from   neighbouring    gardens    and    larders,   and    that    they  were 
punished  when  caught,  "not  for  the  stealing,  but  the  clumsiness 
in  being  found  out."     Any  symptoms  of  weakness  or  complaining 
were  treated  as  the  severest  of  offences ;  Stoic  insensibility  to  pain 
was  inculcated  by  continual  floggings,  tortures,  and  privations,  till 
the  most  incredible  callousness  was  produced.   Every  one  has  heard 
of  the  omnivorous  youth  who  stole  a  young  fox  for  dinner  and  hid  it 
under  his  shirt,  and  how,  when  detained  in  comi^any,  he  allowed  the 
beast  to  tear  open  his  stomach  rather  than  to  escape  and  betray  him. 
The  training  of  the  Spartan  boy  was  almost  entirely  confined  to 
gymnastic  and  military  exercises.     Choral   music   was   the   only 
refining  influence  of  any  kind  which  came  within  his  observation. 
The   central   incident   of  his  year's  life  was  the  festival    of  the 
Gymnopaidia,  when  he  contested  with  his  peers  in  exercises  of 
music,  dancing,  running,  and  wrestling. 


70  The  .Dorians  ui  Peloponnesus, 

At  eighteen  the  Spartan  lad  was  called  a  Melleiren  (MeAAeip?)!') ; 
at  twenty  he  became  au  Eircn  (ElfpTjy),  or  young  man,  and  left  the 
Social  institu-  trainiug-house  for  the  barrack.  He  was  now  drafted 
tions.  off  into  one  of  the  public  messes,  which  formed  a 
l^eculiar  feature  of  Spartan  life.  These  messes  i^virtTnia)  were 
formed  of  fifteen  men  each,  new  members  being  coopted  when  a 
vacancy  occurred.  They  were  held  in  public,  and  consisted  of  fixed 
rations ;  for  no  citizen  till  he  reached  the  age  of  sixty  might  take 
his  meals  at  home,  and  custom  dictated  the  uniformity  of  viands. 
Each  member  was  responsible  for  sending  in  his  share  of  the  food 
month  by  month;  the  meals  consisted  mainly  of  barley-meal, 
clieese,  figs,  and  the  unpalatable  "  black  broth  "  which  was  con- 
sidered the  characteristic  dish  of  Laconia.  Meat  was  only  tasted 
on  days  of  sacrifice. 

The  girls  of  Sparta  received  a  training  similar  in  kind  to,  but  less 
severe  than,  that  of  the  boys.  They  were  not  taken  from  their 
mothers,  but  were  formed  into  classes,  and  set  to  compete  in  run- 
ning, wrestling,  and  other  gymnastic  exercises,  so  that  their  bodies 
might  be  fortified  by  exercise.  Though  they  stripped  for  the 
contest,  their  sports  were  freely  witnessed  by  the  men.  As  might 
have  been  expected,  this  training  bred  a  race  of  buxom,  coarse- 
minded  hoydens.  If  the  wives  and  daughters  of  the  Spartans  rose 
far  above  the  secluded  women  of  the  rest  of  Greece,  not  only  in 
physical  beauty  and  vigour,  but  in  courage  and  ability,  they  were,  on 
the  other  hand,  utterly  destitute  of  all  modesty  and  womanly  feeling. 

A  man  at  thirty,  a  woman  at  twenty,  were  expected  to  marry, 

and  grave  political  disabilities  were  inflicted  on  the  Spartan  who 

did  not  enter  wedlock,  and  take  his  share  in  rearing 

■  ami  y  i  e.    ^^-j^jj^jj.gj^  ^^j.  ^-j^^  state.     Marriage,  however,  did  not 

end  the  man's  barrack-life ;  he  still  dwelt  for  some  time  apart  from 
his  wife,  and  only  visited  her  by  stealth  when  his  presence  was  not 
required  at  the  Syssitia,  the  drill-ground,  or  the  gymnasium.  It 
was  only  after  many  months  that  he  was  allowed  to  set  up  a  house 
of  his  own,  and  remove  his  wife  to  it ;  even  then  he  was  not  freed 
from  his  attendance  at  the  public  mealn.  Spartan  wedlock  was  a 
duty  owed  to  the  state  rather  than  a  voluntary  union,  and  it  is  not 
to  be  wondered  at  if  the  sanctity  of  the  marriage  tie  was  lightly 
regarded. 


The  Spartan  Military  System.  71 

All  these  unnatural  restrictions  on  the  freedom  of  the  individual 
were  diiected  to  the  sole  end  of  turning  him  into  a  good  soldier, 
hard  in  body,  callous  in  mind.  Undoubtedly  they 
had  the  desired  effect.  As  a  sarcastic  contemporary  miutai-y 
once  remarked,  "  The  Spartan's  life  was  made  so  un-  ^^^  ^'^' 
pleasant  for  him,  that  it  was  no  wonder  that  he  threw  it  away 
without  regret  in  battle."  But  the  victories  of  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians were  due  not  less  to  their  organization  than  to  their  unflinch- 
ing courage.  While  the  hosts  of  the  other  Greek  states  went  out 
to  war  in  untrained  masses,  and  took  their  orders  from  a  single 
herald,  who  bawled  out  the  commander-in-chief's  directions,  the 
Spartans  had  a  well-arranged  system  of  drill  and  a  whole  hierarchy 
of  officers.  The  army  was  divided  into  bodies  known  as  the  mora 
and  the  lochos,  corresponding  to  our  battalions  and  companies,  and 
was  commanded  by  a  series  of  officers,  ranging  down  from  the 
l^olemarch,  or  colonel  who  commanded  a  mora,  to  the  enomotarch, 
who  was  a  sergeant  with  tweuty-five  men  under  him.^  The 
commands  which  were  given  by  the  king  were  passed  down  by  the 
polemarchs  and  other  officers  with  such  order  and  rapidity,  that 
a  Spartan  army  could  manoeuvre  with  a  sj^eed  and  accuracy  that 
no  other  Greek  force  could  approach.  This,  as  much  as  their 
courage,  explains  their  constant  successes. 

Life  was  deliberately  made  more  pleasant  for  a  Spartan  when  he 
took  the  field;  his  rations  were  improved,  his  disciplme  somewhat 
relaxed;  even  jests  and  jokes  were  encouraged  around  the  camp- 
fire.  Everything  was  done  to  make  him  look  on  war-time  as  a 
relief  from  the  horrors  of  peace. 

Such  were  the  chief  features  in  the  legislation  of  Lycurgus.  It 
is  probable  that  the  training  received  many  developments  after  his 
death;  and  it  is  certain  that,  in  spite  of  Greek  belief  to  the 
contrary,  his  constitutional  scheme  suffered  many  alterations  in 
later  years.  The  chief  of  these  came  from  the  introduction  of  the 
Ephoralty,  an  office  unknown  to  his  political  system. 
The  Ephors  came  into  being  during  the  period  of  the 
Messenian  wars,  largely — as  we  read— in  consequence  of  the 
continual  absence  of  the  kings  in  the  field.     As  their  name  shows, 

'  There  were  several  divisions  belovi'  the  lochos,  for  which  we  cannot 
supply  exact  modern  equivalents. 


t^  Tiie  Dorians  in  PcIopGnnesus. 

they  were  primarily  iatcuded  to  act  as  overseers  or  police-magis- 
trates, but  they  soon  became  the  irresponsible  ministers  of  the 
state.  They  were  five  in  number,  and  were  elected  by  the  ApcUa 
for  the  term  of  one  year.  During  that  period  they  were  the 
executive  of  the  community ;  they  received  foreign  embassies,  and 
became  the  convening  officers  and  presidents  of  the  assembly, 
dealing  with  that  body  as  freely  as  did  the  Homan  tribunes  with 
the  Comitia.  On  their  own  iniriative,  without  the  sanction  of 
either  Gerousia  or  Apella,  they  could  arrest  and  bring  to  trial 
any  one  whom  they  chose,  without  respect  of  persons.  Even  the 
kings  were  subject  to  their  arbitrary  power ;  they  threw  Cleomenes 
into  prison,  and  bade  Anaxandridas  divorce  his  wife.  In  historical 
times,  two  of  them  accompanied  the  king  when  he  went  out  to  war, 
so  that  his  authority  was  constantly  under  their  supervision,  and 
became  at  last  almost  nominal.  Hence  it  may  be  said  that  Sparta 
had  two  kings  and  five  irresponsible  despots.  Owing  to  the 
ridiculous  form  of  voting  in  the  Apella,  the  ephors  could  practi- 
cally return  whomsoever  they  chose  to  act  as  their  successors  in  the 
ensuing  year,  and  thus  secured— except  under  very  exceptional 
circumstances — the  continuation  of  their  own  line  of  policy. 

It  is  now  time  to  see  how  the  machinery  which  Lycurgiis  con- 
Btructed  proceeded  to  work  after  his  /^leath. 


CHAPTER  Vlir. 

THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPARTAN  SPPREMACY  IN  PELOPONNESUS, 

Armed  and  organized  by  the  legislation  of  Lycui'guSj  the  Sp.irtans 

went  forth  conquering  and  to  conquer.     Before  the  death  of  Chari- 

laiis,  the  king  whoso  reign  covers  the  period  of  reform, 

^  °  ^  Spartan 

they  had  already  fallen  upon  and  subdued  the  weak    conquest  of 

Arcadian  tribes  who  dwelt  about  the  sources  of  the 
Eurotas,  in  the  district  of  Aegys.  A  few  years  later  King  Teleclus 
succeeded  in  taking  Amyclae,  the  Achaian  town  at  the  very  gates 
of  Sparta,  which  had  blocked  the  progress  of  Dorian  conquest  down 
the  valley  of  the  Eurotas.  Within  the  next  fifty  years  all  the 
dwellers  in  Laconia,  save  the  Cynurians  of  the  eastern  coast,  had 
become  the  subjects  of  Sparta.  From  the  mountain  borders  of 
Tegea  down  to  the  southernmost  points  of  Taonarum  and  Malea, 
all  was  now  hers. 

For  reasons  to  us  unknown,  the  conquerors  dealt  out  very 
different  measures  to  the  various  districts  which  they  subdued. 
While  some  were  only  reduced  to  vassalage  and  retained  their  local 
customs  and  certain  rights  of  self-government,  others  were  utterly 
crushed  and  spoiled.  The  inhabitants  of  the  more  perioeciand 
favoured  places  became  "  Perioeci,"  those  who  "dwelt  Helots, 
around  "  the  central  D-jrian  community  of  Sparta.  Those  of  the 
less  fortunate  communities  were  reduced  to  the  condition  of 
"  Helots,"  a  title  which  the  Spartans  derived  from  Helos,  the  name 
of  a  city  close  by  the  sea-const  which  withstood  them  stubbornly, 
and  had  to  take  the  consequences  of  its  obstinacy.  By  these  con- 
quests the  Spartans  b:came  masters  of  a  district  so  large  that  they 
themselves  formed  only  a  small  fi  action  of  its  population.  The 
Perioeci  seem  to  have  been  about  thrice  as  numerous  as  their 
Dorian  lords ;  the  Helots  formed  an  even  larger  body. 


74  The  Spartan  Supremacy  in  Peloponnesus.    1743  b.c- 

The  condition  of  the  Peiioeci  was  very  tolerable.     Their  only 
obligations  were  to  pay  a  fixed  tribute,  and  to  send  a  contingent  of 
heavy-armed  troops  to  the  Spartan  army.     Hcuce  they  remained 
loyal  to  their  suzerain  in  well-nigh  all  the  crises  of  her  history. 
With  the  Helots  it  was  otherwise  ;  they  were  reduced  to  a  condi- 
tion of  absolute  serfdom,  and  tied  down  to  the  soil.     Their  land 
was  portioned  out  among  Spartan  proprietors,  who  dwelt  in   the 
capital,  undergoing  their  barrack-life,  and  received  a  fixed  portion 
of  the  produce  of  the  land.     Though  the  individual  Spartan  could 
not  sell  into  slavery  the  Helot  who  farmed  his  estate,  the  Spartan 
community  could  do  anything  that   it  chose  with   its  serf.     The 
ephors  could  slay  Helots  without  trial ;  and  we  are  even  told  that 
a  secret  police,  called  the  Crypteia,  existed,  whose  sole  purpose 
was  to  go  through  the  land,  privately  making  away  with  any  Helot 
whose  open  discontent  or  great  influence  with  his  neighbours  made 
him  an  object  of  suspicion  to  the  government.     The  Helots  were 
not  kept  continually  under  the  eyes  of  their  master?,  nor  were  they 
ground  down  to  starvation  point  by  exorbitant  rents;    but  they 
were  so  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  the  most  arbitrary  caprices  of  their 
rulers,  and  so  utterly  destitute  of  all  political  rights,  that  their  life 
was  spent  in  constant  fear  and  dread.     Not  unnaturally  they  hated 
the  Spartans  with  the  bitterest  hatred,  and  were  always  ready  to 
revolt  when  a  fair  chance  offered.     Nevertheless,  their  masters  so 
much  despised  their  resentment  that  they  armed  them  in  times  of 
war,  and  took  them  into  the  field  to  act  as  light  troops.     Nor  do 
we  hear  of  any  occasion  on  which  the  Helots  deserted  the  Lacedae- 
monian standard  on  the  actual  field  of  battle. 
/     The  conquest  of  Laconia  was  hardly  completed  before  the  Spar- 
/    The  Messenian  ^aus  fell  to  blows  with  their  neighbours  to  the  west — 
wars.        tiie  mixed  race  of  Dorians,  Caucones,  and  Achaians, 
who  dwelt  beyond  the  range  of  Mount  Taygetus  in  the  fertile 
valley  of  Messenia.     Some  stories  say  that  the  war  arose  from  the 
cattle-liftiug  which  always  prevails  on   the   frontier-line   of  two 
primitive  tribes.     Others  say  that  the  origin  of  it  was  the  slaying 
of  the  Spartan  king  Teleclus  in  a  sudden  brawl  within  the  temple 
of  Artemis  Limnatis, — a  border-shrioe  where  Laconian  and  Messe- 
nian met  with  equal  rights  of  sacrifice. 

The  Messenian  wars  extended  over  a  period  of  some  ninety 


723  B.C.]  Tlie  First  Mcsscnian   War.  75 

years,  though  a  long  interval  breaks  the  continuity  between  the  two 
struggles.  The  first  war  seems  to  have  begun  about  743  B.C.,  the 
second  ended  about  G45  B.C. 

AVe  are  unfortunately  destitute  of  any  continuous  narrative  of 
this  period  which  commands  any  credit  whatever.  Authorities  for 
The  only  contemporary  records  of  any  kind  which  the  period, 
have  survived  are  the  fragments  of  the  Spartan  poet  Tyrtaeus,'  in 
which  he  exhorts  his  countrymen  to  persevere  in  the  second  Messe- 
nian  war,  encouraging  them  to  emulate  the  deeds  which  "their 
fathers'  fathers "'  had  wrought  in  the  first  struggle.  Tiie  details  of 
the  history  of  the  period  which  Pausanias  collected  from  the  annalist 
Myron  and  the  epic  poet  Rhianus  are  quite  valueless.  Those 
authors  Jived  in  the  third  century  B.C.,  separated  by  five  hundred 
years  from  the  events  they  described,  and  were  hopelessly  contra- 
dictory as  to  their  facts.  Myron,  for  example,  placed  in  the  times 
of  the  first  war  Aristomenes,  the  great  national  hero  of  Messenia, 
while  Ehianus  insisted  that  his  exploits  were  performed  in  the 
second  war,  which  was  divided  from  the  first  by  not  less  than  fifty 
years  !  It  is  obvious  that  Rhianus  used  to  the  full  the  licence  of 
the  poet,  while  Myron  cannot  have  had  anything  better  to  guide 
him  than  Messenran  folk-tales,  for  the  Spartans  never  wrote  the 
history  of  their  wars.  We  may  imagine,  as  a  parallel,  what  sort  of 
a  history  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  conquest  of  Britain  could  be  written 
if  we  had  to  depend  entirely  on  Geoffrey  of  Monmouth  and  the 
legends  of  King  Arthur.  According  to  the  tale  which  has  come 
down  to  us,  the  Messenians  did  all  the  deeds  of  daring,  while  the 
Spartans  were  nevertheless  victorious — a  manifest  impossibility  ! 

If  we  can  extract  any  truth  from  the  legends,  the  Spartans  began 
the  war  by  pushing  across  the  ridge  of  Taygetus,  and  seizing  the 
fortress  of  Amphea  on  the  Messenian  side,  which  they  FirstMessenian 
employed  as  their  base  of  operations.  From  this  point  "*^^'^' 
they  harried  the  open  country,  and  kept  the  towns  of  the  Messe- 
nians in  a  chronic  state  of  blockade.  After  two  indecisive  battles, 
the  Messenians  abandoned  their  minor  fortresses  and  concentrated 
themselves  on  the  central  post  of  Mount  Ithomc,  the  strongest 
citadel  as  well  as  the  holiest  sanctuary  in  their  land.     Meanwhile 

'  The  tradition  which  makes  Tyrtaeus  an  Athenian  settled  in  Sparta  is 
probably  valueless. 


7  6  The  Spartan  Snprcinacy  in  Peloponnesus,     ©ea  b.c- 

the  plain  of  the  Pamisus  was  abandoned  to  the  ravages  of  the 
enemy.  Although  the  cliffs  and  walls  of  Ithome  were  strong,  the 
party  that  was  continually  upon  the  defensive,  and  never  took 
the  initiative  in  the  war,  was  bound  to  grow  weaker  and  weaker. 
It  was  in  vain  that  the  Messenian  leader  Aristodemus  offered  up  his 
daughter  as  a  human  sacrifice  to  secure  the  favour  of  Zeus  Itho- 
mates,  the  national  god  of  Messene.  War  and  famine  thinned  the 
ranks  of  his  followers ;  and  after  holding  out  in  his  fastness  for 
twelve  years,  Aristodemus  slew  himself  in  despair.  Shortly  after 
Ithome  fell,  and  the  Messenian  resistance  collapsed  (723  B.C.). 

After  the  termination  of  the  war,  the  majority  of  the  noble 
families  of  Messenia  went  into  exile,  some  joining  in  the  coloniza- 
tion of  the  town  of  Rhegium  in  Italy,  while  others  retired  to  Ionia. 
The  bulk  of  the  population  remained  behind,  and  became  counted 
among  the  Perioeci  of  Sparta,  though  they  seem  to  have  had  much 
more  unfavourable  terms  granted  to  them  than  most  of  that  class, 
being  compelled  to  pay  half  the  produce  of  their  lands  as  rent  to 
the  conquerors. 

Two  constitutional  crises  occurred  in  Sparta  in  consequence  of 

the  first  Messenian  war.     The  continual  absence  of  the  kings  in 

the  field  led  to  a  block  in  public   business,  wdiich 

Changes  in  ^  ' 

Spartan  con-  was  only  ended  by  the  appointment  of  the  Ephors, 
to  supply  the  state  with  official  heads  in  the  place  of 
the  distant  monarchs.  When  the  war  ended,  the  Heraclidae  were 
unable  to  do  away  with  the  Ephoralty,  and  the  new  "  overseers  " 
retained  their  power.  The  wife  of  King  Theopompus  taunted  him 
with  leaving  the  royal  prerogative  to  his  children  less  than  he  had 
received  it,  but  he  is  said  to  have  replied  that  "  it  would  be  the 
more  lasting  for  being  the  more  limited."  The  second  trouble  arose 
from  the  fact  that  the  constant  thinning  of  the  ranks  of  the  Spartan 
youth  by  the  long-continued  campaigns  led  to  the  marriage  of  many 
women,  who  could  find  no  husband  of  equal  rank,  with  members 
of  the  class  of  the  Perioeci.  The  Spartans,  when  the  war  was  over, 
refused  to  recognize  the  oftspring  of  such  unions  as  legitimate,  and 
The  branded  them  with  the  name  of  "  Partheniae,"   or 

Partiaemae.  fcastards.  The  youug  men  were  numerous  enough 
to  unite  under  one  Phalanthus  in  a  conspiracy  to  overthrow  the 
constitution  of  Lycurgus.     Their  plot  was  discovered  in  time  to 


645  E.0.1  Second  Messcnian    War.  jy 

prevent  its  outbreak,  tjut  instead  of  taking  a  blocdy  vengeance  on 
their  half-brothers,  the  Spartans  compelled  them  to  leave  Laconia 
in  a  body.  They  sought  Italy  under  the  direction  of  the  Delphic 
oracle,  and  Phalanthus  became  the  founder  of  the  great  and  wealthy 
city  of  Tareutum  (708  B.C.), 

'J'he  possession  of  Messenia  brought  Sparta  into  contact  with  the 
afiairs  of  the  Western  Peloponnese.  She  is  found  ere  long  allied 
with  Elis,  and  therefore  as  the  enemy  of  the  Pisatans,  who  were 
constantly  striving  to  preserve  their  autonomy  against  the  Eleians. 
Sparta  also  began  to  encroach  on  Western  Arcadia,  and  got  posses- 
sion of  Phigaleia,  the  southern  border-town  of  that  country.  She 
seems  to  have  been  involved  at  the  same  time  in  struggles  with 
Tegea  and  other  Arcadian  states. 

But  the  next  important  crisis  in  the  history  of  the  Spartans  came 
about  when  Pheidon  of  Argos  strove  to  extend  his  supremacy  over 
the  whole  Peloponnesus  (probably  circ.  675-660  b.c).  We  first 
hear  of  this  struggle  between  Argos  and  Sparta  when,  in  669  B.C., 
the  Lacedaemonian  army  was  utterly  beaten  at  Hysiae  during  an 
attempt  to  invade  Argolis.  The  next  year,  if  our  date  for  Pheidon 
can  be  trusted,  the  Argive  army  appeared  in  the  Western  Pelo- 
ponnese, and  assisted  the  Pisatans  to  celebrate  the  Olympic  games, 
having  first  defeated  the  allied  Spartans  and  Eleians  in  battle. 

It  must  have  been  about  the  same  moment  that  the  Spartans 
were  startled  by  a  desperate  rising  of  their  vassals  in  Messenia. 
The  fact  that  Lacedaemon  was  engaged  in  an  unsuc-  second  Mes 
cessfiil  war  aroused  the  mountaineers  of  the  northern  eenianwar. 
border,  and  soon  all  the  country  was  up  in  arms.  The  Messenians 
found  a  leader  in  Aristomenes,  a  young  hero  of  whom  the  most 
impossible  exploits — all  borrowed  from  the  epic  of  Ehianus — are 
recounted.  He  slew,  we  read,  three  hundred  enemies  with  his  own 
hand ;  he  visited  Sparta  by  night,  and  hung  up  a  shield  in  the 
temple  of  Athena  by  way  of  bravado ;  he  was  thrice  taken  prisoner, 
but  always  escaped  ;  once  he  was  even  thrown  into  the  "  Ceadas," 
or  pit  of  execution  at  Sparta,  but  escaped  uninjured,  and  found  his 
way  out  by  a  subterranean  cleft  in  the  rocks. 

This  second  Messenian  war  seemed  for  several  years  likely  to 
result  in  the  liberation  of  the  land.  The  Lacedaemonians  were 
oppressed  with  many  enemies,  for  besides  the  Messenians  they  had 


78  The  Spartan  Supremacy  in  Peloponnesus,     leso  e.g.. 

to  figlifc  Argos  and  her  subject  states,  together  with  a  league  of 
Arcadian  tribes  under  Aristocrates,  King  of  Orchoinenus.  As  allies 
they  could  only  count  on  the  Corinthians,  who  were  anxious  to 
throw  off  the  hegemony  of  Argos,  and  the  Eleiaus,'  who  are 
invariably  found  on  the  opposite  side  from  their  neighbours  of  Pisa. 
It  is,  therefore,  not  surprising  that  Sparta  suffered  heavily ;  she  saw 
the  valley  of  the  Eurotas  itself  ravageil,  and  suffered  at  least  one 
great  defeat  in  the  open  field.  But  the  institutions  of  Lycurgus 
were  strong  enough  to  stand  the  strain ;  beaten  but  unconquered 
the  Spartans  doggedly  held  on  till  the  tide  turned.  At  their 
darkest  hour  they  were  put  in  good  heart  by  the  poems  of  Tyrtaeus, 
who  sang  how  the  spirit  of  loyalty  and  military  honour  must 
finally  triumph  over  the  fitful  energy  of  revolted  serfs  and  the 
disunion  of  jealous  allies.  At  last  the  league  against  Sparta  broke 
up.  Pheidon  of  Argos  fell  in  battle ;  Aristocrates  the  Arcadian 
betrayed  his  allies,  and  caused  their  decisive  defeat  by  withdrawing 
his  troops  in  the  midst  of  the  conflict ;  Aristomenes  was  driven 
into  the  hill-fortress  of  Eira,  just  as  Aristodemus  in  the  earlier 
war  had  been  pent  up  on  Ithome.  It  was  to  no  purpose  that  he 
maintained  himself  therein,  and  pushed  his  raids  far  afield  when 
the  blockade  grew  slack.  After  eleven  years  of  resistance,  the  death, 
agony  of  the  Messenian  nation  came  to  its  close.  The  Lacedae- 
monians forced  their  way  into  Eira  by  escalade,  and  the  remains  of 
its  garrison  were  lucky  in  obtaining  a  safe  conduct  to  retire  from 
the  land.  Legend  ascribed  the  fall  of  the  fortress  to  treachery; 
but  the  conquered  race  always  consoles  itself  with  some  such  cry, 
and  it  is  evident  that  Eira  had  long  been  doomed.  Aristomenes 
wandered  away  to  Rhodes,  and  died  there  ;  many  of  his  chiefs  found 
new  homes  in  Arcadia;  but  the  bulk  of  the  nation  were  degraded 
to  the  position  of  Helots,  and  lay  prostrate  at  the  feet  of  Sparta 
for  two  hundred  years,  ere  it  could  nerve  itself  to  another  movement 
{circ.  645  B.C.). 

The  last  echoes  of  the  Messenian  war  did  not  die  out  till  a  few 
years  later.  The  Arcadians,  who  had  stoned  their  treachero\is  king 
Aristocrates,  and  abolished  the  kingship  of  his  house,  joined  the 
Pisatans  in  a  last  attempt  at  resistance.  In  644  B.C.  they  even 
seized  Olympia,  ami  celebrated  the  games  in  defiance  of  Elis  and 
»  See  Grote,  ii.  434,  note  3, 


BOO  B.C.I  Sfnfggics  with  Argos.  79 

Sparta,  but  shortly  after  their  enemies  fell  upon  tlietn  with  crushing 
force.  The  Pisataus  became  the  vassals  of  Elis,  a  position  which 
they  retained  for  half  a  century,  till  a  revolt  in  581  B.C.  gave  their 
masters  an  excuse  lor  utterly  destroying  the  city. 

Sparta  now  turned  on  Arcadia  and  Argolis.  The  history  of  the 
century  which  follows  the  second  Messenian  war  is  in  Peloponnesus 
merely  the  tale  of  the  subjugation  of  the  whole  of  the  strugg-ie  with 
peninsula  by  the  continual  encroachments  of  the  Argos. 
Lacedaemonians.  The  successes  of  Sparta  were  not,  however, 
followed  any  longer  by  the  extension  of  the  limits  of  Lacouia. 
The  victors  contented  themselves  with  reducing  the  vanquished  to 
the  condition  of  subject-allies,  bound  to  follow  their  standard  in 
war.  With  their  internal  affairs  they  hardly  ever  interfered,  and 
therefore  the  hegemony  of  Sparta  was  a  comparatively  light  burden;, 
and  might  even  be  said  not  to  disturb  the  desire  for  "  autonomy  " 
which  reigned  in  every  Greek  breast. 

Tegea  bore  the  first  brunt  of  the  Spartan  attack ;  its  desperate 
resistance  won  favourable  terms  for  its  citizens,  who,  on  submission, 
were  restored  to  full  control  of  their  local  affairs.  Tegea  served  as 
c  base  of  attack  equally  against  Central  Arcadia  and  Argolis.  Of 
the  gradual  subjugation  of  the  Arcadians  we  have  few  details, 
but  the  history  of  the  struggle  with  Argos  is  better  known. 
That  state  had  been  terribly  enfeebled  by  the  death  of  Pheidon, 
Corinth  had  completely  established  its  independence ;  and  Sicyoa 
had  also  fallen  away  from  the  Argive  empire,  and,  under  the  tyrants 
of  the  house  of  Orthagoras,  was  rising  to  power  and  importance. 
Even  Epidaurus,  in  the  very  peninsula  of  Argolis,  had  become 
completely  autonomous  before  the  end  of  the  seventh  century. 
Argos  was  therefore  overweighted  in  the  contest  with  Sparta,  yet 
she  held  out  vigorously,  and  did  not  finally  lose  her  hold  op 
Cynuria,  the  land  along  the  Laconian  coast,  till  as  late  as  547  b.c 
In  that  year  was  fought  the  famous  battle  of  the  six  hundred 
champions,  the  prize  being  the  district  of  Thyrea,  the  last  external 
possession  of  Argos.  Legend  declares  that  the  conflict  was  so 
fierce  and  bloody  that  only  two  Argives  and  one  Spartan  survived. 
The  Argives  hastened  home  to  carry  the  news  ot  their  supposed 
victory,  for  they  had  overlooked  their  sole  surviving  enemy. 
Othryades  the  Spartan  stayed  on  the  battle-field,    and  set  up  a 


8o  The  Spa?ia?i  StiJ>remacy  in  Peloponnesus. 

trophy  of  the  arms  of  slain  Argives.  Each  nation,  therefore,  con- 
sidered itself  victorious,  and  the  dispute  was  only  settled  by  a 
general  engagement,  in  which  the  Lacedaemonians  won  the  day. 
Othryades  slew  himself  on  the  battle-field,  disdaining  to  appear  in 
Sparta  as  the  only  one  of  her  three  hundred  champions  who  had 
escaped  the  chances  of  war.  Henceforth  Cynuria  was  entirely  ia 
the  hands  of  Sparta ;  Argos  was  too  maimed  to  be  able  to  stir  fur 
another  whole  generation. 

The  influence  which  would  seem  to  have  retarded  the  complete 
conquest  of  Peloponnesus  by  Sparta  in  the  first  halt  of  the  sixth 
century  was  the  alliance  of  the  towns  of  its  northern  parts  in  an 
anti-Dorian  league.  Between  660  and  650  b.c.  Corinth  and  Sicyou 
experienced  revolts  which  cast  out  the  ruling  Dorian  oligarchy, 
and  placed  tyrants  of  Ionian  race  on  the  throne.  1'hese  two 
houses,  the  Cypselidae  and  the  Orthagoridae,  as  they  were  called 
from  the  names  of  their  founders,  were  strongly  anti-Spartan  in  their 
policy.  It  was  not  till  they  were  overthrown,  the  Corinthian  family 
in  583  B.C.  and  the  Sicyonian  about  560  B.C.,  that  Sparta  became 
as  supreme  in  Northern  Peloponnesus  as  she  was  already  in  its 
southern  and  central  portions.  Corinth  and  Sicyon,  their  tyrants 
expelled,  joined  the  Laconian  alliance,  and  became  some  of  its 
firmest  supporters.  Argos  alone,  now  reduced  to  a  small  state  in 
the  plain  of  the  Inachus,  held  aloof  in  sulky  discontent,  biding 
her  time.  All  the  rest  of  the  peninsula  acknowledged  the  hegemony 
of  Sparta. 

Such,  after  two  centuries  of  constant  war,  were  the  fruits  of  the 
legislation  of  Lycurgus.  A  body  of  Spartans,  never  more  than 
ten  thousand  strong,  had  succeeded  in  reducing  to  their  vassalage 
the  whole  of  the  states  of  Pelo^wnncsus. 


CHAPTER   IX. 

THE    AGE   OF   COLONIZATION. 

The  ciglith  and  seventh  centuries,  tlie  period  wliicli  saw  Sparta 
lay  the  foundation  of  her  supremacy  in  Peloponnesus,  witnessed  in 
the  greater  part  of  Greece  a  revival  of  those  niigra-  causes  of 
tory  impulses  which  had  first  made  themselves  felt  migration, 
at  the  time  of  the  Dorian  invasion,  But  the  cause  of  the  move- 
ment was  now  changed;  it  was  not  external  pressure,  but  internal 
expansion,  that  sent  the  emigrants  afield.  The  patriarchal  con- 
stitution of  the  prehistoric  Greek  states  had  never  recovered  the 
blow  which  was  dealt  it  by  the  widespread  transference  of  popu- 
lations in  the  eleventh  century.  The  gradual  decay  of  monarchy 
and  rise  of  oligarchy  was  the  main  feature  of  the  centuries  which 
immediately  followed  the  great  migrations.  The  misgovernment 
of  which  the  oligarchies  were  usually  guilty  made  life  at  home 
intolerable  for  men  of  siiirit,  and  set  them  dreaming  of  escape  to 
a  freer  atmosphere.  Men  of  wealth  who  were  excluded  from  a 
share  in  the  government  of  the  state  by  their  mean  birth,  and  men 
of  family  who  were  kept  back  by  their  poverty,  were  alike  ready 
to  depart.  The  lower  classes  were  no  less  eager  to  escape  from 
misgovernment  and  oppression.  But  this  disposition  of  feeling 
might  have  found  its  vent  in  mere  civil  broils,  if  the  time  had  not 
been  propitious  for  emigration. 

Not  only  were  the  Greeks  gradually  becoming  more  adventurous 
seamen,  but  the  Phoenicians,  the  rivals  who  had  long  divided 
with  them  the  trade  of  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,     ^    ,.       , 

'      Decline  or 

were  now  receiving  a  series  of  blows  at  home  which    Phoenician 
enfeebled  their  resisting   power  further  afield.     The 
ninth  century  saw  the  extension  of  the  Assyrian  empire  across 
the  Euphrates,  which  brought  it  into  hostile  contact  with  Phoc- 

Q 


82  The  Age  of  Colonizatioti.  rsoo  b.c- 

nicia.  The  eiglith  century  was  a  time  of  continued  trouble  for  the 
great  seaports.  Aradus  was caiitured  by  Tiglath-Pileser  in  742  B.C., 
after  a  siege  of  three  years.  Shalraaneser  V.  compelled  Tyre  by 
force  to  resume  a  homage  which  she  had  endeavoured  to  cast  off. 
Both  Tyre  and  Sidon  were  constantly  revolting,  and  as  constantly 
being  reduced  to  pay  tribute,  during  the  reigns  of  Sargon  and 
Sennacherib  (726-681  B.C.).  The  latter  town  was  sacked  and  almost 
completely  destroyed  by  Esarhaddon  in  680  B.C.  All  these  wars 
weakened  the  grasp  of  the  Phoenicians  on  the  great  trade  routes 
which  they  had  so  long  shared  with  the  Greek,  and  by  the  seventh 
century  they  had  been  completely  driven  out  of  the  Aegean  and 
the  Ionian  Sea. 

The  first  Greek  cities  on  which  the  impulse  towards  emigration 
fell  were  the  two  Ionic  seaports  of  Chalcis  and  Eretria.    Both 

_  ,    .     .      were  situated    in  well-protected    harbours    on   the 

Colonies  in  '■ 

chaioidice,    Euboean   Strait ;    Chalcis  lay  on   the   Euripus,    and 

looked  north ;  Eretria,  separated  from  Clialcis  by 
twelve  miles  of  fertile  plain,  looked  south  towards  the  Cyclades. 
The  colonial  energy  of  both  these  towns  was  stimulated  by  oli- 
garchies founded  on  wealth,  for  the  Ionic  states  seem  generally  to 
have  drifted  into  the  hands  of  a  plutociacy,  while  in  the  rest  of 
Greece  the  oligarchies  rested  on  birth.  The  point  towards  which 
the  first  swarm  of  emigrants  from  Chalcis  and  Eretria  directed 
themselves  was  the  north-western  angle  of  the  Aegean.  Here  a 
bold  peninsula  runs  out  from  the  mainland  of  Macedonia,  and 
divides  into  three  long  headlands  which  stretch  far  into  the  sea. 
The  region  had  the  same  mixture  of  promontory  and  gulf,  mountain 
and  shore-plain,  which  prevails  in  Greece  itself.  Moreover,  its 
rocks  were  rich  in  silver  ore,  and  the  Euboeans  (who  had  long  been 
working  copper-mines  in  their  own  island)  were  both  eager  and 
able  to  turn  it  to  account. 

Within  the  first  fifty  years  of  the  eighth  century  Chalcis  ana 
Eretria  had  planted  more  than  thirty  towns  along  the  three  head- 
lands of  Chalcidice,  as  the  peninsula  was  ere  long  called  from  the 
Chalcidians  who  formed  the  larger  half  of  the  settlers.  Some  of 
these  places  were  mere  mining  settlements,  but  others  grew  into 
important  towns  with  considerable  stretches  of  territory.  Such 
a  place  was  the  Eretrian  colony  of  Mende  on  Pallene — the  western- 


750  B.C.]  Colonies  in  the  Northern  Aegean.  83 

most  and  least  mountainous  of  the  three  headlands — a  town  long 
famous  for  its  rich  vineyards.  Of  the  colonies  of  Chalcis  Torone 
and  Sermyle  were  the  largest.  Speaking  roughly,  it  may  be  said 
that  the  Eretrians  gravitated  towards  the  western  part  of  Chal- 
cidice,  while  the  towns  founded  from  Chalcis  occupied  its  central 
and  eastern  regions.  Many  of  the  original  inhabitants  were 
"Pelasgic,"  and  seem  to  have  amalgamated  very  easily  with  the 
Greek  settlers.  After  the  Euboeans  had  for  some  time  been 
established  in  Chalcidice,  colonies  from  other  places  came  to  extend 
the  area  of  settlement;  the  Ionic  islanders  of  Andros  planted 
towns  on  the  Thracian  coast,  north-east  of  Mount  Athos;  the 
Doric  Corinthians  established  the  important  city  of  Potidaea, 
northward  of  the  Eretrian  settlements  in  Paliene. 

While  Chalcis  and  Eretria  were  acting  as  pioneers  to  the  Greeks 
of  Europe,  Miletus  was  playing  the  same  part  for  those  of  Asia. 
A  few  centuries  had  sufliced  to  develope  the  settle- 
ments which  the  lonians  had  planted  on  the  Lydian 
and  Carian  shore  into  great  and  flouiishing  cities,  fit  to  be  them- 
selves the  mothers  of  many  colonies.     Miletus,  the  port  at   the 
mouth  of  the  Maeander,  took  the  lead  in  maritime  extension.     The 
city  had  lost  its  royal  line  in  the  early  part  of  the  eighth  century,  and 
fallen  into  the  hands  of  a  plutocracy.     The  race  for  wealth  became 
the  sole  occupation  of  its  citizens,  and  a  sea-going  life  was   the 
easiest  course  to  arrive  at  the  goal.     So  numerous  did  the  Milesian 
sea-traders  become,  that  they  formed  a  party  in  the  state  known  as 
the  Aeinautae,  "  the  men  never  off  the  water."     The  first  energy 
of  the  Milesians  was  turned  to  the  north-eas4;  angle  of  the  Aegean, 
as  that  of  the  Euboeans  had  been  to  the  north-west.     Pushing 
beyond  the  Aeolic  settlements  in  the  Troad,  they  endeavoured  to 
seize  the  Hellespont  and  the  route  towards  the  Black  Sea.     The 
Phoenicians  were  already  in  possession;  their  factory  ^jjeujiesians 
of  Lampsacus  commanded  the  passage  into  the  Sea  ^^i  *^®  ^"^''^®- 
of  Marmora,    and    their  vessels   had    sought    out   the    furthest, 
recesses  of  Paphlagonia  and  Colchis.     There  must  have  been  a 
struggle  in  the  straits  for  the  monopoly  of  trade,  but      cyzicus. 
its  details   have  not  come  down  to  us.    The  base      '^     '  ' 
from  which  the  Milesians  operated  was  their  first  settlement  Cyzicus, 
a  town  placed  on  the  neck  of  a  peninsula  which  runs  out  into 


^4  The  Age  of  Colonization.  i70o  b.c- 

the  Propontis.  When  once  firmly  established  witliin  the  Helles- 
pont, tliey  proceeded  to  spread  far  and  wide  to  the  north  and 
east.  The  mysterious  sea  which  had  only  been  known  as  Axeinos, 
"  the  inhospitable,"  and  whose  shores  legend  had  peopled  with 
wonders  and  perils,  was  ere  long  fringed  with  Greek  factories,  and 
changed  its  name  to  "  Euxeinos,"  as  its  harbours  became  known.  It 
would  seem  to  have  been  the  inexhaustible  wealth  of  the  fisheries 
of  the  Black  Sea  which  first  tempted  the  Greeks  forward ;  but 
other  and  not  less  valuable  sources  of  wealth  were  soon  discovered. 
The  mountainous  southern  shore  of  the  Euxine  was  rich  in  timber, 
iron,  copper,  and  red-lead.  The  flat  northern  shore  was  a  vast 
corn-land,  whose  breadth  surprised  even  lonians  accustomed  to  the 
fertile  valley  of  the  Maeander,  Gold  was  to  be  found  in  Colchis, 
and  also  came  down  a  trade  route  from  the  Urals,  which  ended  on 
the  shores  of  the  "  Maeotic  Lake,"  which  we  know  as  the  Sea  of 
Azov.  Between  the  middle  of  the  eighth  century  and  the  end  of 
the  seventh  the  Euxine  had  become  a  Milesian  sea.  On  the  most 
Sinope,  circ.  projecting  headland  of  Paphlagonia  the  rich  colony  of 

720 B.C.  Sinope^  had  supplanted  an  old  Asiatic  settlement, 
and  become  the  mart  of  Northern  Asia  Minor.  To  right  and  left 
other  Milesian  factories  formed  an  unbroken  chain  between  the 
Bosphorus  and  Colchis.  Less  than  a  century  after  her  own  foun- 
dation, Sinope  was  able  to  plant,  on  a  table-shaped  rock  far  to  the 
east,  her  flourishing  daughter-town  of  Trapezus  (Trebizond),  des- 
tined in  ages  then  far  distant  to  supplant  her  as  the  centre  of  the 
trade  of  the  Euxine. 

Settlement  was  harder  on  the  western  shore,  among  the  bar- 
barous Thracians,  than  it  had  been  in  Asia.  But  it  began  in 
Odessus,  circ.  ^^  seventh  century,  and  after  a  time  a  "  Pentapolis  " 
600  B.C.  of  five  allied  towns — Odes?us,  Callatis,  Tomi,  Apol- 
lonia,  and  Mesembria— rose  between  the  mouth  of  the  Danube  and 
the  entrance  of  the  Bosphorus.  Of  these  places  the  first  four  were 
colonies  of  Miletus. 

Beyond  the  Danube  to  the  north  the  Greek  explorer  found  the 
plains  of  Southern  Eussia  held  by  the  nomadic  tribes  of  the 
Scythians — a  race  whc  dwelt  in  tents  and  waggons,  and  wandered 

1  The  dates  usuallj'giren  for  the  foundation  of  Sinope  and  Trapezus  are 
obviously  too  earlj'.    T)^ey  must  be  considerably  posterior  to  Cj-zicus. 


600  BC]  The  Greeks  in  the  Euxine.  85 

at  large  on  the  steppes  with  their  flocks  and  herds,  without  pos' 
sessiog  any  fixed  abode.  They  made  no  objection  to  the  settle- 
ment of  the  new-comers  on  their  shores,  for  they  had  enough  and 
to  spare  of  land,  and  had  never  thought  of  utilizing  the  bays  and 
lagoons  of  their  coast.  In  return  for  metal-work,  clotb,  linen, 
and  wine,  they  sold  to  the  settlers  the  hides  of  their  oxen,  and  the 
gold  and  furs  which  came  to  them  from  the  tribes  of  the  far  Nortli, 
Nor  did  they  object  when  the  Greeks  took  to  tilling  the  soil,  and 
made  the  lower  valleys  of  the  Dnieper  and  Bug  the  great  wheat- 
field  of  the  world.  Some  of  the  Scythians  were  even  influenced  by 
their  visitors  enough  to  make  them  turn  their  attention  to  hus- 
bandry. The  chief  towns  in  their  land  were  Olbia, 
near  tlie  mouth  of  the  Borysthenes  (Dnieper),  Panti-  045  b.o. 
capaeum,  on  the  strait  which  joins  the  Euxine  and  Panticapaeum, 
the  Maeotic  lake,  and  Tannis,  the  last  outpost  of 
Greek  civilization,  which  lay  far  off  to  the  north-east,  at  the 
estuary  of  the  Don.     All  these  were  colonies  of  Miletus. 

Where  the  Milesians  worked  on  a  grand  scale,  other  Ionic  states 
followed  with  more  timid  steps.  Phocaea  was  the  only  town 
which  sent  a  colony  to  the  Euxine,  and  her  settle- 

Various 

ment  of  Amisus  was  not  founded  till  566  b.c.  But  colonies  in 
in  the  north-eastern  Aegean  and  on  the  Propontis  Thrace, 
several  important  places  were  established  by  the  neighbours  of 
Miletus.  Perinthus,  on  the  Thracian  coast  of  the  Propontis,  was 
settled  by  Samos.  The  larger  and  richer  town  of  Abdera,  hard  by 
the  mouth  of  the  Nestus,  was  founded  by  Clazomenae.  Maronea, 
also  in  Thrace  but  further  east,  was  a  Chian  colony.  The  islanders 
of  Paros  seized  the  great  Phoenician  stronghold  of  Thasos,  and 
established  a  flourishing  state  on  the  resources  of  its  silver-mines. 

But  it  was  the  Dorian  state  of  Megara,  in  European  Greece, 
which  most  nearly  approached  the  achievements  of  Miletus.  The 
misrule  of  the  oligarchy  of  birth,  which  governed  ^^e  Megarian 
the  town  in  the  seventh  century,  seems  to  have  been  colonies, 
the  fruitful  source  of  emigration.  Megarians  founded  Astacus  and 
Chalcedon,  in  Bithyuia,  and  a  little  later  seized  the 

''  Chalcedon  and 

all-important  haven  of  Byzantium  on  the  Bosphorus,    Byzantium 

— a  spot  so  pointed  out  by  nature  as  the  site  for  a 

great  town,  that  the  Delphic  oracle  bade  the  settlers  "  build  opposite 


86  Ihe  Age  of  Colonization.  [735  b.c- 

the  city  of  the  blind."     This  saying  was  a  reflection  on  the  discern- 
ment of  their  brethren,  who  had  preferred  to  occupy  the  far  less 
eligible  site  of  Chalcedon,  on  the  opposite  shore.     Some  years  later 
the  Megarians  found  their  way  from  Byzantium  into  the  Euxine, 
and  built  Mesembiia,  iu  Thrace,  and  Heraclea-Chersonesus,  in  the 
Tauric  Chersonese  (Crimea) — a  town  which,  twenty-five  centuries 
later,  was  to  be  famous  as   Sebastopol.     A  second  Heraclea,  on 
the  Bithynian  coast  of  the  Euxine,  was  also  a  flourishing  Megarian 
colony. 
While  the  Aegean  and  the  Euxine  were  gradually  being  sur- 
coioniesin    rounded  with   a  ring  of  Hellenic  cities,  a  not  less 
the  West,     important    movement   of    colonization    was    taking 
place  in  the  West,  along  the  shores  of  the  Ionian  Sea. 

At  how  early  a  date  the  Greeks  had  begun  to  visit  Italy  and 
Sicily,  it  is  hard  to  say.  Even  in  the  Odj'ssey  there  seems  to  be 
some  dim  knowledge  of  lands  to  the  West,  and  tradition  claimed, 
that  Cumae  in  Campania,  the  first  Greek  town  iu  Italj'',  was 
founded  so  far  back  as  the  eleventh  century.  This  date  is  prob- 
ably erroneous,  for  no  other  city  can  show  an  origin  extending 
beyond  the  middle  of  the  eighth  century.  At  the  same  time, 
Cumae  was  undoubtedly  founded  earlier  than  any  other  city 
beyond  the  Ionian  Sea,  and  may  have  existed  by  the  year  800  b.c. 
Chalcisand  Eretria  were  the  pioneers  of  exploration  in  the  West 
just  as  they  had  been  iu  Thrace.  Seeking  for  opportunities  of 
trade,  their  vessels  coasted  round  Malea  and  Tacna- 

The  dial- 

cidians  in  the  rum,  and  up  the  western  coast  of  Greece.  The 
^^^*'  foundation  of  Corcyra,  on  its  island  opposite  Ej)irus, 
by  an  Eretrian  colony,  is  the  first  landmark  in  this  chapter  of 
history.  To  cross  from  Corcyra  to  the  lapygian  promontory,  tlie 
heel  of  Italy,  is  only  a  matter  of  a  few  hours,  and  then  the  course 
lies  clear  along  the  Calabrian  coast. 

Italy  and  Sicily,  at  the  moment  of  their  discovery,  were  mainly 
occupied  by  a  number  of  tribes — Messapians  and  Oenotrians, 
Sicels  and  Sicanians — whom  the  Greeks,  vaguely  recognizing  a 
distant  kinship  with  themselve.«,  called  "  Pelasgic."  But  the 
remoter  regions  of  both  countries  were  held  by  more  alien  races. 
The  Phoenicians  of  Carthage  possessed  the  western  extremitj'  of 
Sicily;    the  mysterious  people  who  called  themselves  Kasoiia  — 


700  B.C.I  Colonies  in  Italy  and  Sicily.  87 

though  the  Greeks  knew  them  as  "Tyrrheui,"  and  the  Eomans  as 
"Etruscans" — were  to  be  found  in  Northern  and  part  of  Central 
Italy. 

The  Italian  and  Sicilian  coasts  must  have  been  well  known  to 
the  Greeks   before   they   ventured   to  settle  on   them.     It  was 
probably  the  result  of  an  extensive  comparison  of  sites  that  the 
Chalcidians  planted  Cumae  on  the  most  favoured  spot  of  Italy,  the 
Bay  of  Naples.     But  Cumae  long  remained  isolated  in  the  north ; 
the  earliest  groups  of  cities  were   established  not  on  the  Cam- 
panian  but  the  Oenotrian  and  Sicilian  shores.       The  first  place 
whose  foundation-date  has  come  down  to  us  is  Naxos      Naxos, 
in  Sicily,  a  city  set  between  the  slopes  of   Mount      735  b.c. 
Aetna  and   the   sea.      Here  Theocles  of  Chalcis,   the  pioneer  of 
all  settlers  in  Sicily,  set  up  the  altar  of  "  Apollo  the  Guider  "  in 
735  B.C.     In  the  very  next  year,  Archias  of  Corinth^  an  aristocrat 
exiled  for  an  outrage  by  the  oligarchy  of  his  native  place,  dis- 
covered a  splendid  harbour  fifty  miles  south  of  Naxos,  and  laid 
on  the  island  of  Ortygia  the  foundations  of  the  great     Syracuse, 
Dorian   city   of   Syracuse.      Before    ten   years   were      734  B.C. 
l^assed,  the  space  between  Syracuse  and  Naxos  had  been  filled  by 
tlie    foundation  of  the  Chalcidian   towns  of  Catana      catana, 
and  Leontmi,  and  the  Megarian  settlement  of  Me-     '^|°ncie'' 
gara  Hyblaea.     Next  the  best  harbour  of  the  Sicilian  729-728  b.c. 
Strait  was  occupied  by  Chalcidians  and  Cumaeans,  and  became 
the  port  of  Zancle,  better  known  in  later  days  as  Messene. 

Meanwhile  another  group  of  colonies  in  Oenotria  was  arising. 
Its  central  points  were  the  sister  cities  of  Sybaris  and  Croton, 
both  founded  by  Achaian  emigrants  from  the  north    „  ^    . 

•'  °  Sybaris  and 

of  Peloponnesus.  We  know  nothing  of  th-e  causes  croton, 
which  set  these  Achaians  wandering,  nor  did  their  '  " 
country,  either  before  or  after,  display  any  similar  taste  for 
colonization.  But  Sybaris  in  the  rich  lowlands  of  the  Cratliis,  and 
Croton  on  the  breezy  Laciuian  promontory,  were  alike  the  settling- 
places  of  strong  swarms  of  Achaians.  They  grew  and  flourished, 
reduced  to  vassalage  the  Oenotrian  tribes  of  the  inland,  and  estab- 
lished little  empires  which  stretched  right  across  the  instep  of 
Italy,  from  the  Ionian  to  the  Tyrrhenian  Sea.  Sybaris  planted 
on   the  western  waters    Laiis  and  Poseidouia  opposite  her  own 


88  The  Age  of  Colonization. 

Iiosition  on  the  easteru  sea;  Croton,  in  a  similar  way,  settled  Teiiua 
and  Temcsa. 

Of  the  other  colonies  of  Italy,  Tarentum  owed  its  origin  to  the 

sedition  of  the  Partheniae  at  Sparta,  as  we  have  already  had  to 

Tarentum,    relate.      Locri,  called  Epizephyrii  to  distinguish  it 

708  B.C.     from  its  mother-country,  was  the  fruit  of  a  similar 

700B c      '^^^'^  discord  among  the  Locrians  of  Central  Greece. 
Bheeium,     Tiheglum,  the  town  which   faced  Zancle  across  the 

715  B.C.  -waters  of  the  Sicilian  Strait,  drew  the  bulk  of  its 
population  from  the  Messenian  exiles  who  fled  abroad  after  the  fall 
of  Iihome  and  the  death  of  Aristoderaus.  All  three  were  large 
and  flourishing  towns,  but  Tarentum  so  far  exceeded  the  others 
as  to  rival  Sybaris,  and  became  after  her  fall  the  first  Greek 
city  of  Italy,  Besides  the  places  we  have  mentioned,  many  other 
Greek  colonies  studded  the  Oenotrian  and  Calabrian  coasts,  so  that 
the  whole  district  gradually  acquired  ihe  name  of  '■'  Greater  Greece  " 
('H  jueyaATj  'EAXoy,  Magna  Graecia). 

Meanwhile  the  Greek  colonics  in  Sicily  were  advancing  west- 
ward, both  on  the  northern  and  the  southern  coasts  of  the  islan  1. 
Dorians  from  Rhodes  settled  Gela,  Dorians  from  Megara  Selinus, 
on  the  shore  which  fronts  towards  Africa;  while  the  Chalcidians 
of  Zancle  established  Himera  on  the  central  point  of  the  coast 
which  looks  out  on  Italy.  Syracuse,  a  century  after  her  own 
foundation,  planted  Camarina  at  the  southern  angle  of  the  island, 
and  Gela  shortly  after  founded  Acragas  (Agrigentum),  which  ere 
long  eclipsed  its  mother-city,  and  became  the  second  place  in 
Sicily.  By  the  sixth  century  a  continuous  line  of  Greek  colonies 
encircled  the  island,  except  at  its  western  corner,  where  the 
Carthaginian  strongholds  of  Lilybaeum  and  Drepanum  and  the 
native  town  of  Segesta  maintained  their  independence.  The  Sicels 
of  Eastern  and  the  Sicanians  of  Western  Sicily  became  the  vassals 
of  the  new-comers,  just  as  their  Oenotrian  kinsmen  in  Italy  had 
fallen  a  prey  to  the  Sybarites  and  Crotoniates.  Syracuse  alone 
ruled  over  several  Sicel  tribes,  and  extended  her  influence  far  into 
the  interior  of  the  island.^ 

'  Dates  of  tlie  Greek  colonies  of  Sicily  not  given  .above :  Gela,  G90 
B.C.  ;  Himera,  648  B.C.;  Selinus,  G28  B.C.  ;  Cam.arina,  599  B.C.;  Acragas, 
580  B.o. 


600 B.C.]  The  riwcaeans  in  the    West.  89 

Both  the  Italiot  and  Siccliot  ^  Greeks  owed  the  wealth  which 
they  soon  accumulated  to  the  raw  produce  of  the  virgin  lands  they 
cccupied,  rather  than  to  commercial  or  manufacturing  activity. 
The  corn  of  ^letapontum,  the  wool  of  the  flocks  of  Sybaris,  the 
timber  and  pitch  of  Croton,  the  oil  of  Acragas,  the  horses  of 
Syracuse,  the  fisheries  of  Tarentum,  became  famous  throughout 
the  Greek  world  for  the  mighty  fortunes  that  they  bred — fortunes 
so  large  that  the  millionaires  of  the  West  surpassed  the  wildest 
dreams  of  the  plutocratic  oligarchs  of  the  mother-country.  Sybaris 
for  example  was,  at  the  height  of  her  career,  probably  the  largest 
Greek  city  in  the  world,  and  the  tasteless  luxury  of  her  wealthier 
classes  kept  the  inhabitants  of  the  older  lauds  supplied  with  a 
never-ending  series  of  good  stories.  Miletus  was  the  only  town 
to  the  East  that  could  vie  in  size  or  prosperity  with  the  Western 
colonies ;  Argos  and  Athens,  Thebes  and  Sicyon,  would  have 
ajipeared  povert3'-stricken  in  comparison  with  them. 

Two  groups  of  colonies  in  the  West  which  lay  outside  Italy  and 
Sicily  deserve  mention.  The  first  was  the  sole  creation  of  the 
Phocaeans  of  Ionia.     Instead  of  turning  their  main„^    „^ 

°  The  Phocaeans 

attention  to  their  own  seas,  these  enterprising  traders    at  MassiUa, 

600  B  C 

sought  out  the  far  West.  Braving  the  competition  of 
the  Phoenician  and  the  Etiuscan,  they  felt  their  way  along  the  coast 
of  Europe  even  to  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar.  Their  trade  with 
Tartessus,  the  port  of  Southern  Spain,  and  with  the  Celts  who  dwelt 
about  the  Ehone,  brought  them  great  wealth.  About  the  year 
600  B.C.  they  resolved  to  furnish  themselves  with  a  secure  half- 
way house  to  Spain,  and  built  the  town  of  Massilia  just  beyond  the 
most  easterly  of  the  mouths  of  the  PJione.  After  many  struggles 
with  the  natives,  the  place  was  firmly  established,  and  became  the 
centre  of  a  number  of  smaller  factories  on  the  coasts  of  Catalonia 
and  Provence,  of  which  Emporiae  was  the  most  important. 

The  second  line  of  colonies  which  deserves  record  was  as  purely 
the  creation  of  Corinth  as  those  of  Gaul  were  of  Phocaea.  Corinth 
had  occasionallj^  planted  colonies  both  in  the  Aegean  and  in  Sicily  ; 
Potidaea  and  Syracuse  have  already  been  cited.      But  the  great 

'  Note  the  distinction  between  'l-aAos  or  2ik6A.Jis,  a  barbarian  native  of 
Italy  or  Sicily,  and  'iroXicirTjj  and  5i'cfAJ:oTrjs,  a  Greek  colonist  settled 
therein. 


90  The  Age  of  Colonization.  teso  b.c- 

fiuld  of  her  energy  was  the  north-western  coast  of  Greece,  and 

The         the  Illyrian  shore  opposite  Italy.     Here,  both  while 

Corinthians  m    j^    remained  an  oligarchy  and  when  the  olio;archy 

North-Western  o  j  o  J 

Greece.        had  fallen  before  the  tyrant  Cypselus,  her  settlements 

continued  to  increase.     At  Corcyra  the  earlier  Eretrian  colony  was 

.  swamped  by  the  incoming,  in  708  B.C.,  of  a  swarm 

at  Corcyra,    of  Corinthians  under  the  exiled  oligarch  Chersicrates. 

Along  the  coast  of  Acarnania  a  line  of  fortified  ports 

drove  the  natives  up  into  the  hills.     These  towns — the  only  Greek 

colonies  whose  site  was  taken  by  force  from  another  Greek  tribe, 

though  a  barbarous   one — were   Sollium,   Alyzia,   Astacus,  and 

Anactorium.      Leucas,  the  island   off  the  coast,  was  also  taken 

Acarnanian  ^"^^^  ^^^  Acamanians  and  received  a  Corinthian  popu- 

coionies.     lation.    Similarly,  the  southernmost  district  of  Epiriis 

was  conquered  and  became  the  territory  of  Ambracia.     Finally, 

Corinth  and  Corcyra  joined  to  plant  further  north,  in  Illyria,  the 

towns  of  ApoUonia  and  Epidamnus. 

While  her  Acarnanian  colonies  always  kept  up  a  close  alliance 

with  Corinth,  and  followed  her  political  leading,  Corcyra  from  the 

first  took  an  opposite  course.     Perhaps  the  Euboean 

Rivalry  of  .       ,  ,     .  i    i     •  .  ■ 

Corinth  and  element  in  her  population  suceeded  in  estrangmg 
Corcyra.  ^^^  Corinthian  from  its  allegiance.  At  any  rate, 
within  forty  years  of  her  foundation  Corcyra  sot  herself  up  as  a  rival 
for  the  Illyrian  and  Italian  trade  of  Corinth,  and  engaged  in  war 
with  the  mother-city.  The  first  naval  battle  known  to  Greek 
historians  was  fought  between  Corinth  and  Corcyra  in  664  B.C. 
After  maintaining  her  independence  for  the  best  part  of  a  century, 
Corcyra  was  conquered  by  the  tyrant  Periander,  but  after  his 
death  she  shook  off  the  Corinthian  yoke  for  ever,  and  remained 
the  bitter  and  mischievous  enemy  of  the  older  city. 

Only  one  more  sphere  of  Greek  colonial  activity  remains  to  be 
mentioned— the  northern  coast  of  Africa.  The  legends  which  tell 
Cyrene  ^^^w  Libya  was  quite  unknown  as  late  as  the  seventh 
633  B.C.  century  are  foolish  inventions,  for  the  Achaians  of 
prehistoric  days  had  already  met  the  Libyans  as  allies  in  an 
attack  on  Egypt.  But  the  dread  of  Phoenician  rivalry  kept  the 
Greeks  from  settlement  till  about  the  middle  of  the  seventh 
century.      Then  the  Dorian  islanders  of  Thera  in  the  Cyclades, 


550  B.C.]  The  Greeks  in  Libya  and  Egypt  91 

strengthened  by  Peloponnesian  exiles,  sailed  across  to  the  land 
opposite  Crete,  and,  after  many  trials  and  privations,  succeeded 
in  fulfilling  a  decree  of  the  Delphian  Apollo,  which  bade  them 
"establish  a  city  in  Libya  rich  in  fleeces."  Cyrene  was  the  fruit 
of  their  expedition.  Here  the  emigrants  mixed  more  freely  with 
the  people  of  the  land  than  in  any  other  Greek  settlement. 
Aristoteles,  the  Theraean  leader,  was  taken  as  king  by  the  Libyans 
of  the  district,  and  received  the  royal  name  of  Battus.  His  family 
intermarried  with  the  natives,  and  his  comrades  followed  their 
example,  so  that  the  blood  of  the  whole  community  grew  to  be 
but  half  Hellenic,  Cyrene  became  the  mother-city  of  Barca  and 
Euesperides — towns  rather  more  to  the  west.  For  two  centuries 
she  continued  to  flouri.sh  under  kings  who,  from  father  to  son, 
alternately  bore  the  native  name  of  Battus  and  the  Greek  name 
of  Arcesilaiis.  She  grew  rich  on  her  flocks  and  herds,  her  corn- 
fields and  her  export  of  silphium,  a  medicinal  drug  found  in  no 
other  part  of  the  Hellenic  world. 

Egypt  had  been  known  to  the  Greeks  long  before  Greek  history 
begins.  Achaian  pirate  raids  on  the  Delta  we  have  already 
mentioned,  and  their  echoes  are  heard  in  the  Homeric  The  Greeks 
poems.  But  trade  with  Egypt  was  not  established  ^^^^-ypt. 
for  many  centuries.  The  Egyptians  were  the  Japanese  of  the 
ancient  world,  and  kept  their  kingdom  absolutely  sealed  against 
Western  merchants.  Only  the  Phoenicians  were  allowed  to  trade 
to  the  mouths  of  the  Nile.  It  was  not  till  the  downfall  of  Egyptian 
greatness,  when  the  empire  of  the  Pharaohs  had  sunk  into  a 
cluster  of  principalities  sometimes  subject  to  and  sometimes  free 
from  the  supremacy  of  the  kings  of  Aethiopia  and  Assyria,  that 
the  Milesians  ventured  to  approach  the  Delta  and  open  a  precarious 
trade  with  the  natives.  No  safe  traiflc  was  possible  till  the 
Pharaohs  of  the  twenty-sixth  dynasty  reunited  Egypt,  and,  favoured 
by  the  decline  of  Assyria,  made  her  once  more  a  strong  kingdom. 
Psammetichus,  first  of  these  Sai'te  Pharaohs,  had  raised  himself 
to  empire  by  the  use  of  mercenaries  hired  from  among  the  lonians 
and  Cariaus.  He  retained  them  about  his  person,  and  allowed 
their  countrymen  free  access  to  a  mart  near  the  Canopic  channel  of 
the  Nile.  The  Milesians  and  other  traders  from  Greek  Asia  flocked 
in  crowds  to  the  new  emporium,  which   they  named   Naucratis. 


92  The  Age  of  Colonization.  tesoB.a 

Ere  long  it  grew  into  a  Qourishing  Hellenic  town,  and  served 
Naucratis,  ^^  ^  starting-point  for  numerous  explorers,  who 
circ.  650B.C.  -R'andered  over  Ejypt,  and  brought  back  such  reports 
of  her  immemorial  antiquity  and  countless  monuments  as  com- 
pletely puzzled  the  Greeks,  who  had  no  conception  of  any  history 
that  ran  back  more  than  some  five  or  six  hundred  years.  Indeed, 
Egypt  so  impressed  the  Greek  mind  that  it  imbibed  a  notion  \\i\i 
everything  ancient  must  owe  its  origin  to  that  country— a  belief 
■which  caused  much  confusion  in  the  historical  ideas  of  later 
days. 

It  is  necessary  to  remember  that  a  Greek  colony  was  by  no  means 

similar  to  the  colonies  of  our  own  days.     The  Greek  emigrants 

formed  new  states  of  their  own,  which  owed  nothing 

Character  of  .  ° 

Greek  except  a  ulial  respect  and  certam  honorary  dues  to 
CO  omes.  ^^  mother-city.  Instances  to  the  contrary  are  very 
rare.  Corinth  alone  seems  to  liave  retained  some  authority  over  her 
colonies ;  she  used  even  to  send  out  annual  magistrates  to  Potidaea, 
while  her  Acarnanian  settlements  were  bound  to  her  by  a  strict 
commercial  league.  But  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases  a  senti- 
mental tie  alone  connected  the  parent  state  with  her  offspring. 
The  political  development  of  the  colony  was  often  on  very  different 
lines  from  that  which  the  mother-country  would  have  dictated; 
nor  was  this  unnatural,  for  it  was  the  classes  which  were  discon- 
tented at  home  that  set  out  to  find  new  abodes.  From  this  fact, 
too,  it  resulted  that  the  constitutions  of  the  colonics  were  often 
unstable;  there  were  no  old  local  traditions  to  keep  men  steady, 
while  the  population  was  often  composed  of  discordant  elements, 
and  always  contained  a  very  large  proportion  of  men  of  stirring 
and  adventurous  dispositions.  Hence  the  greatness  of  the  colonies 
was  brilliant  rather  than  solid,  and  their  power  was  liable  to 
sudden  changes  from  vigour  to  absolute  collapse.  Wealth  was 
so  exclusively  their  aim  that  the  rigid  political  discipline,  which 
formed  the  character  of  the  citizen  in  the  states  of  old  Greece, 
was  allowed  to  disappear.  Individual  interest  became  far  more 
powerful  in  proportion  to  patriotic  impulses  than  in  the  mother- 
country. 

"Wc  have  already  mentioned  i:i  an  earlier  chapter  the  prominent 


The  Colonies  and  i]ie  DelpJiic  Oracle.  93 

part  taken  by  the  oracle  of  Delphi  in  colonization.     It  was  always 
customary  for  the  oekist,  or  offical  leader  of  a  swarm  „^       ,     . 

''  '  The  colonies 

of  settlers,  to  ask  for  guidance  from  Apollo  the  god  and  the 
of  ways,  as  to  the  best  situation  for  the  town  he  in-  °^^^  ^^' 
tended  to  found.  Sometimes  the  answer  given  was  vague,  but,  as 
a  rule,  the  advice  of  Apollo  was  shrewd  and  practical.  No  doubt 
the  Delphic  priesthood  had  unrivalled  opportunities  for  acquiring 
geographical  information  from  the  countless  pilgrims  from  all  parts 
with  whom  they  came  in  contact.  Probably,  then,  the  would-be 
settlers  were  merely  dealing  with  a  well-trained  emigration  agency 
where  they  thought  they  were  consulting  an  infallible  prophet. 
Yet  still  the  discrimination  which  the  oracle  showed  in  recommend- 
ing sites  for  colonization  was  so  great,  that  we  cannot  wonder  that 
it  acquired  thereby  a  high  reputation.  Inspiration  was  in  this  case 
only  the  perfection  of  penetration  and  common  sense,  and  it  was 
the  practical  wisdom  of  the  priesthood  which  won  them  a  position 
of  importance  in  all  Hellenic  lands  such  as  they  could  not  have 
acquired  in  any  other  way 


(  CHAPTER  X. 

THE    AGE   OF   THE   TYRANTS. 

In  the  seventh  and  sixth  centuries  before  Ciirist  nearly  all  the 
Hellenic  states  went  through  a  period  of  internal  disorder  and 
strife,  one  of  whose  symptoms  was  the  widespread  emigration 
which  has  been  described  in  the  last  chapter.  The  phenomena  of 
violent  change  and  revolution  are  found  no  less  in  the  colonial 
states  of  Asia  Minor  and  Sicily  than  in  the  older  cities  of  European 
Greece.  The  causes  were  not  quite  similar  in  the  colonies  and 
their  mother-countries,  but  the  symptoms  were  the  same.  Every- 
where old  constitutional  forms  were  disappearing,  and  before  the 
state  could  attain  to  a  stable  form  of  government  several  genera- 
tions spent  themselves  in  sedition  and  civil  war.  In  most  cases  the 
period  of  disorder  culminated  in  the  establishment  of  a  "  Tyranny," 
that  is,  in  the  seizure  of  power  by  an  unconstitutional  and  despotic 
sovereign. 

The  name  "  Tyrant  "  in  Greece  was  applied  solely  with  reference 

to  the  way  in  which  a  ruler  gained  his  position,  not  the  way  in 

^  which  he  used  it.     It  does  not  imply  gross  personal 

Meaning  of  f  j   o  r 

the  word  depravity  or  political  misrule;  indeed,  many  of  the 
s^an  .  ,j  tyrants  "  were  men  abounding  in  good  qualities, 
who  used  their  power  to  the  advantage  of  their  country.  The 
word  simply  implies  that  the  ruler  enjoyed  an  uncontrolled  despotic 
power,  not  acquired  by  constitutional  means.  In  the  strictest  sense 
of  the  word,  a  king  who  did  away  with  all  checks  on  his  personal 
power,  and  ruled  autocratically,  became  a  "  tyrant ;  "  and  thus  we 
find  Pheidon  of  Argos  given  the  name,  though  he  was  a  legitimate 
monarch  of  the  old  stock  of  the  Heraclidae.  So  also  a  dictator 
chosen  by  the  people  in  time  of  stress,  and  entrusted  with  absolute 


Causes  of  the  Rise  of  Tyraiaiies.  95 

power,  might  be  styled  "  tyrant,"  though  he  owed  his  elevation  to 
the  will  of  the  state  itself;  such  was  the  case  with  Pittacus  of 
Mitylene.  In  these  instances  it  was  the  abnonnal  method  in  which 
the  power  was  acquired,  and  its  unlimited  extent,  which  won  for  its 
holder  his  unenviable  name.  But  in  the  majority  of  cases  the 
tyrant  was  one  who  had  no  rights,  either  by  hereditary  succession 
or  by  election,  to  the  position  which  he  occupied.  Sometimes  he 
was  a  military  adventurer ;  sometimes  an  ambitious  aristocrat;  still 
more  frequently  was  he  the  champion  and  leader  of  the  proletariate 
ground  down  by  an  oppressive  oligarchy.  But  whatever  was  the 
origin  of  his  authority,  or  the  manner  in  which  he  used  it,  the 
name  clung  to  him  if  only  his  position  was  unconstitulional  and 
his  power  unchecked, 

A  certain  uniformity  can  be  traced  in  the  political  history  of 
most  Greek  states,  after  they  had  got  rid  of  their  old  patriarchal 
kings.  In  the  majority  of  cases  the  royal  power  passed  ^jge  of 
into  the  hands  of  an  oligarchy  of  birtli.  Sometimes  oligarchies, 
the  direct  line  of  the  old  heroic  house  died  out;  and,  instead  of 
choosing  one  of  their  own  number  to  take  the  sceptre,  the  princes 
and  chiefs,  who  had  formed  the  council  and  restricted  the  authority 
of  the  late  king,  divided  the  power  among  themselves,  and  trans 
mitted  it  to  their  heirs;  so  that  the  rights  and  privileges  formerly 
possessed  by  the  monarch  became  the  property  of  a  limited  number 
of  great  families.  In  other  cases  the  kingly  line  continued  to  exist, 
but  its  head  was  gradually  stripped  of  all  his  power  and  preroga- 
tives by  the  great  families,  and  became  a  mere  puppet  in  the  hands 
of  the  oligarchy,  only  useful  as  officially  representing  the  people  in 
religious  ceremonies  or  state  pageants.  "  Kings"  of  this  kind,  who 
were  little  better  than  priests  or  public  pensioners,  existed  in  some 
cases  down  to  the  fifth  century. 

The  close  oligarchic  rings  of  noble  families,  among  whom  the 
royal  power  came  to  be  divided,  seldom  succeeded  in  maintaining 
themselves  for  many  generations.     Their  government    „ 
was  usually  oppressive  and  ill-managed,  and  their   mentofthe 
feuds  with  each  other  never-ending.    They  could  never    °"^"*^ 
gain  for  themselves  the  respect  and  reverence  which  had  apper- 
tained to  the  old  ])atriarchal  kings.      The   monarchy  had  in  its 
favour  its  immemorial  antiquity ;    when  it  was  replaced  by  oil- 


96  Tlu  Age  of  tJie    Tyrants.  [656  B.C., 

garcliy,  the  new  government  had  no  traditions  on  wliicli  to  rely, 
and  stood  or  fell  on  its  own  merits.  These  were  usually  small 
enough,  and,  for  the  bulk  of  the  citizens,  the  extinction  of  the 
royal  house  was  an  unmitigated  misfortune.  The  great  families 
are,  in  the  traditions  of  every  state,  accused  of  overweening  arro- 
gance, open  maladministration  of  justice,  and  lawless  violence  in 
dealing  with  their  inferiors.  The  old  kings  had  had  every  interest 
in  holding  the  balance  straight  between  the  various  classes  of  their 
subjects ;  their  successors,  on  the  other  hand,  ruled  entirely  for  the 
advantage  of  a  small  section  of  the  population,  and  showed  the 
most  cynical  disregard  for  the  rights  of  the  remainder.  The 
oppressive  character  of  their  rule  was,  of  course,  even  more  marked 
than  usual  in  those  cities  where  the  ruling  classes  were  different  in 
blood  from  the  main  body  of  the  people,  such,  for  example,  as 
those  states  of  Northern  Peloponnesus  in  which  a  Dorian  aristo- 
cracy domineered  over  an  Achaian  or  Ionian  populace.  But  even 
where  a  race-hatred  did  not  embitter  the  situation,  the  relations 
between  the  rulers  and  the  ruled  were  always  unsatisfactory. 

A  fair  example  of  the  history  of  a  Greek  state  in  its  progress 
from  kingship  to  tyranny  through  oligarchy  and  civil  strife  is  pre- 
Thetsnrants  sented  by  Corinth.  That  city  had,  like  so  many  of 
ofcorintii.  j.|-|g  Peloponnesian  states,  been  conquered  by  a  band 
of  Dorians,  who  elid  not  expel  the  former  Aeolic  inhabitants,  but 
merely  reduced  them  to  a  state  of  inferiority.  The  descendants  of 
King  Aletes,  the  Heracleid  prince  who  had  led  the  invaders,  held  the 
throne  for  some  centuries ;  but  about  the  year  750  B.C.  the  reigning 
sovereign  was  deposed  by  an  oligarchic  conspiracy.  Two  hundred 
Dorian  families,  all  of  whom  claimed  a  descent  from  Bacchis — one 
of  the  earlier  kings  of  the  house  of  Aletes — seized  and  kej^t  posses- 
sion of  the  government  of  the  state.  They  continued  to  hold  the 
reins  of  power  for  about  t-'nety  years^a  period  of  perpetual  strife 
and  unrest.  Body  after  body  of  the  Corinthians  sought  refuge  front 
the  misgovernment  of  the  Bacchiadae  by  departing  to  found  distant 
colonies.  Corcyra  and  Syracuse,  for  example,  each  owed  its  origitl 
to  an  emigration  led  by  a  prominent  citizen  who  had  quarrelled 
with  the  oligarchs.  The  state  was  fast  lajsing  into  anarchy  when  a 
final  explosion  of  popular  wrath  broke  the  power  of  the  oppressive 
caste.    It  was  led  by  one  Cypselus,  a  Bacchiad  on  his  mother's  side, 


585  B.C.  The  Tyrants  cf  Corinth.  97 

tliough  his  father  Eetion  was  one  of  the  unprivileged  multitude. 
His  mixed  descent  of  course  excluded  him  from  poli-  cypseius. 
tical  life,  hut  he  had  enough  of  the  blood  of  the  Bac-  655-925  b.c. 
chiadae  in  his  veins  to  make  him  resent  ibis  disability.  Accord- 
ingly he  took  advantage  of  the  seething  discontent  of  the  city  to 
place  himself  at  the  head  of  the  populace  and  overthrow  the 
Bacchiadae  by  force.  For  thirty  years  he  reigned  as  "  tyrant  "  of 
Corinth,  basing  his  power  on  his  popularity  with  the  multitude, 
and  not  even  keeping  an  armed  force  at  his  back  to  guard  against 
revolts,  so  firm  was  his  position.  Against  the  remains  of  the 
oligarchy  he  was  stern  and  relentless,  slaying  some,  banishing 
many,  and  heavily  taxing  all.  But  with  the  bulk  of  the  people 
the  relief  of  being  delivered  from  anarchy  made  him  not  unpopular, 
his  autocratic  government  being  far  better  than  no  government  at 
all.  If  the  contributions  which  hg  levied  from  the  state  were  large, 
the  use  which  he  made  of  them— especially  the  magnificent  offer- 
ings which  he  presented  to  the  Delphian  Apollo— was  not  much 
to  be  blamed ;  and  the  splendour  of  his  court  reflected  glory  on  the 
city.  Cypseius  died  on  the  throne,  and  was  succeeded  by  his  son 
Periander,  who  developed  all  the  evil  sides  of  his  periander. 
father's  character,  but  otherwis3  only  resembled  him  ^^s-sss  b.c. 
in  the  masterful  activity  of  his  nature.  Born  in  the  purple,  and 
remembering  nothing  of  the  popular  origin  of  his  father's  power, 
he  showed  himself  a  hard  master  to  the  Corinthians.  He  built 
himself  a  fortress-palace  on  the  Acropolis,  and  surrounded  himself 
with  a  body  of  foreign  mercenaries,  for  whose  support  he  levied 
vast  sums  from  the  citizens.  But  his  interference  with  the  private 
fife  of  his  subjects  was  the  worst  point  of  his  rule.  Misrule  of 
He  set  himself  to  isolate  man  from  man  by  breaking  Periander. 
up  all  opportunities  for  intercourse.  He  closed  the  Gymnasium 
to  prevent  the  young  men  from  meeting,  and  prohibited  the  public 
banquets  which  Dorian  custom  had  made  one  of  the  most  promi- 
nent features  of  city  life.  His  spies  were  always  abroad,  seeking  to 
discover  the  elements  of  possible  combinations  against  him ;  and 
when  any  citizen  made  himself  too  prominent  in  wealth  or  popu- 
larit}'-,  he  was  driven  into  exile  or  slain  without  trial  by  the  tyrant. 
A  legend  told  how  Periander  had  learnt  this  policy  from  a  brother 
despot,  Thrasybiilus  of  Miletus.     Soon  after  his  accession,  it  was 

u 


98  The  Age  of  the  Tyrants. 

said,  lie  sent  to  ask  tlie  advice  of  the  Milesian  as  to  the  best  way 
to  conduct  his  government.  Thrasybulus  sent  no  verbal  answer, 
but  led  the  Corinthian  messenger  to  a  patch  of  corn,  and  then 
walked  round  it,  cutting  down  with  his  staff  any  ears  that  stood 
above  the  rest  of  the  crop.  His  action  was  duly  reported  to 
Periander,  who  took  the  hint  to  heart,  and  carried  it  out  by  relent- 
lessly destroying  any  man  whose  property  or  personal  influence 
raised  him  above  bis  fellows,  and  made  him  a  possible  leader  of 
revolt.  These  murders,  and  the  occasional  freaks  01  spiteful  insult 
towards  the  whole  body  of  citizens  in  which  he  indulged,  made 
Periander  the  best-hated  man  in  Greece.  His  private  life  was 
miserable:  he  was  the  author  of  his  wife's  death,  and  lived  at 
enmity  with  his  only  surviving  son,  who  died  before  him,  so  that 
the  tyranny  passed  at  his  death  to  a  nephew.  Yet  the  lavish 
magnificence  of  his  court,  the  crowd  of  poets  and  artists  whom 
he  maintained,  his  firm  hand  and  subtle  policy,  won  him  a  great 
name  among  the  sovereigns  of  his  time.  The  curt  sayings  which 
embodied  bis  views  of  life  even  caused  him  to  be  reckoned  among 
the  "Seven  Sages"  of  Greece.  He  conquered  Ej^idaurus  and  Aegina, 
recovered  Corcyra,  and  reigned  for  forty  years  m  unbroken  power. 
But  the  main  result  of  his  life  had  been  to  make  tyranny  impos- 
sible for  the  future  at  Corinth.  Periander's  arbitrary  violence,  his 
oppressive  taxation,  and  still  more  his  insulting  contempt  for  his 
subjects,  were  remembered  for  centuries,  and  made  the  Coriutliians 
steady  enemies  of  tyrants  for  ever.     His  nephew  and 

tyranny  at    successor  Psammetichus  hardly  held  the  sceptre  for 

a  year,  and  fell  by  the  daggers  of  conspirators  at  ihe 

moment  that  he  was  attacked  by  the  Spartans,  who  were  received 

as  liberators,  and  won  the  eternal  gratitude  and  alliance  of  Corinth 

by  doing  away  with  the  last  traces  ot  the  rule  of  the  Cypselidae. 

The  sloryof  the  rise  and  fall  of  this  house  of  tj^ants  is  eminently 
typical  of  the  time;  all  over  Greece  similar  events  were  taking 

„         .       place.     In  town  after  town  a  popular  leader  delivered 

Tyrannies     ^  ^    '■ 

never        the  people  from  an  oppressive  oligarchy,  made  him- 

^^^^       '    self  sole  ruler,  and  left  power  to  descendants  who 

abused  it,  and  ere  long  were  driven  from  their  thrones  by  the  same 

force  which  had  created  them.     In  many  cases  the  tyrants  lost 

their  authority  in  the  second  generation ;  in  a  few  a  single  life 


Effects  of  Tyranny.  99 

sufficed  to  show  all  the  vicissitudes  of  rise,  prosperity,  and  fall. 
Sicyon  was  the  only  town  where  the  tyranny  lasted  for  more  than 
a  century,  and  where  the  sceptre  was  handed  from  father  to  son  for 
four  generations.  But  at  Sicyon  the  circumstances  were  peculiarly 
favourable  to  the  tyrants.  The  house  of  Orthagoras  (6G0-560  B.C.), 
represented  a  national  rising  of  louians  against  Dorians,  and 
moreover  its  members  were  men  of  moderation  as  well  as  of 
ability,  and  committed  none  of  the  atrocities  which  disgraced  the 
tyrants  of  most  cities.  Yet  even  they  fell  at  last,  and  left  no 
adherents  behind  them.  At  Megara  the  history  of  the  one  tyrant 
Theagenes  sums  up  all  the  changes  which  took  three  generations 
at  Corinth  and  four  at  Sicyon  to  work  themselves  out.  At  Athens 
the  Peisistratidae  ruled  for  two  generations ;  at  Syracuse  the  three 
sons  of  Deinomenes  occupied  only  twenty  years.  At  no  place  was 
anything  approaching  to  a  permanent  dynasty  founded. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  democratic  leaders  were  the  only 
men  who  ever  aspired  to  tyranny.  Phalaris  of  Agrigentum,  perhaps 
the  most  cruel  of  all  his  class,  was  an  oligarch,  who  had  taken 
advantage  of  his  tenure  of  office  as  magistrate,  and  seized  the  supreme 
power.  Aristodemus  of  Cumae  was  a  successful  general,  who  had 
saved  his  state  from  an  Etruscan  invasion.  Pheidon  of  Argos, 
as  we  have  already  mentioned,  was  an  hereditary  king,  who 
cast  off  the  limits  of  constitutional  authority,  and  made  himself 
absolute.  Still,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  tyranny  was  the  way 
from  oligarchy  to  democracy,  the  inevitable  penalty  Tyranny  a 
which  a  state  had  to  pay  for  ridding  itself  from  the       stage  in 

^  •'  °  political 

evils  of  government  by  the  great  families.  Con-  development, 
sidered  in  this  light,  the  tyranny  was  not  an  unmitigated  evil.  It 
crushed  the  pride  and  ended  the  reckless  feuds  of  the  oligarchs,  and 
taught  them  to  live  with  their  fellow-citizens  as  equals,  even 
though  the  equality  only  consisted  in  servitude  to  the  same  tyrant. 
A  state  which  had  once  gone  through  the  stage  of  tyranny  never 
Ml  back  again  into  the  worse  forms  of  family  oligarchy 

If  we  proceed  to  inquire  into  the  internal  administration  of  the 
tyrants,  we  find  that  their  government  had  many  favourable  points. 
It  was  the  stock  complaint  of  the  dispossessed  oligarchy  pojjcy  of  the 
that  the  tyrant  was  a  lavish  spender  of  money ;  but  the      tyrants, 
objects  on  which  the  money  was  laid  out  were  usually  great  public 


I  oo  The  Age  of  the  Tyrdnts. 

works  of  high  advantage  to  the  state.  'J'he  real  key  to  the  des[:ot's 
financial  policy  was  Ihat  he  strove  to  keep  the  poorer  classes  quiet, 
by  finding  them  employment  on  works  for  which  the  price  was 
paid  by  the  rich — a  scheme  not  unknown  to  statesmen  of  our  own 
da}\  It  may  be  noticed  that  the  tyrants  were  the  first  to  lend 
public  patronage  to  art  and  letters,  and  that  their  reigns  were 
everywhere  a  period  of  rapid  intellectual  development. 

Abroad  they  distinguished  themselves  by  the  close  relations  with 
foreign  powers  into  which  they  entered.  Periander  was  the  close 
ally  of  the  King  of  Lydia;  and  his  successor's  Egyptian  name' 
seems  to  point  to  an  equally  intimate  connection  and  alliance 
with  the  Sa'ite  Pharaohs.  Polyciates  of  Samos  was  bound  by  an 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  Amasis  of  Egypt.  Miltiades 
of  the  Thracian  Chersonese  married  into  the  royal  house  of  the 
neighbouring  barbarian  tribe.  Pcisistratus  "  strengthened  himself 
by  men  and  money  drawn  from  the  lands  by  the  Strymon,"  that 
is,  by  Thracian  mercenaries  and  gold.  'J'he  tyrants,  in  short, 
taught  their  subjects  to  enter  into  more  friendly  relationship 
with  "  the  barbarian  "  than  had  formerly  been  esteemed  possible. 
The  main  result  of  this  connection  was  an  immediate  increase  in 
the  facilities  for  the  expansion  of  commerce. 

All  the  accounts  of  the  tyrants  which  have  come  down  to  us  are 
coloured  by  the  hatred  which  the  dispossessed  di^archies  bore 
them.  The  tales  of  their  enormities  should  therefore  be  received 
with  the  greatest  caution.  There  is  no  doubt  that  they  numbered 
many  cruel  and  unscrupulous  men  among  them ;  but  when  we 
remember  the  evils  from  which  they  delivered  the  mass  of  their 
countrymen,  it  does  not  seem  too  much  to  say  that  a  perpetual 
freedom  from  the  worse  horrors  of  oligarchy  was  cheaply  bought 
at  the  price  of  forty  or  fifty  years  of  rule  by  a  tyiant. 
*  Psammetichus. 


CHAPTER  XL 

THE    EARLY    HISTOUY    OF    ATTICA. 

The  g.eatness  of  Athens  in  historical  times  has  produced  an 
imi)ression  that  in  early  daj's  also  she  must  have  been  a  consider- 
able state.  In  real  fact,  however,  the  reverse  would  seem  to  have 
been  the  case .  down  to  the  sixth  century  Athens  was  a  city  of 
very  fccond-rate  importance,  and  her  history  was  obscure  and 
uninteresting.  It  has  only  been  rescued  from  oblivion  because  the 
brilliancy  of  her  after-career  led  men  to  trace  back  as  far  as  possible 
the  origins  of  her  success. 

That  Attica  was,  at  the  epoch  of  the  Boeotian  and  Dorian 
m'grations,  flooded  by  fugitives  both  from  the  north  and  the 
Peloponnesus,  we  have  already  related.  But  the  bulk  of  the  refugees 
passed  on  to  Asia,  and  built  up  the  cities  of  Ionia,  "When  the 
emigrants  had  departed,  Attica  relapsed  into  her  previous  obscurit}' ; 
tlie  only  trace  of  the  stirring  times  of  the  Ionic  migration  which 
remained  was  the  fact  that  many  of  the  great  Athenian  families 
of  later  days  drew  their  origin  from  one  or  other  of  the  exiled 
races  that  had  sojourned  in  the  land.  It  is  not  impossible  that 
the  full  Hellenization  of  the  "  Pelasgic  "  tribes  of  Attica  runs  no 
farther  back  than  the  time  of  the  migrations,  and  that  the  legend 
which  tuld  how  the  Athenian  kings  "received  Ion  into  their 
family  "  merely  means  that  the  influx  of  lonians  from  Peloponnesus 
absorbed  the  Atticans  into  the  Hellenic  nationality. 

When  the  swarms  of  emigrants  cleared  off,  and  Athens  is  again 
discernible,  the  crown  had  jsassed  from  the  old  royal  house  of  the 
Cecropidae  to  a  family  of  exiles  from  Peloponnesus. 
Melanthus,   a  Caucon    from    Pylos,   had   fought   in  monarchy  at 
single  combat— so  legend  tells— with  Xanthus    the      ■^*^®'^- 
King  of  the  Boeotians,  when  Attica  was  invaded  from  the  north. 


I02  The  Early  History  of  Attica.  170ob.c.' 

and  slain  his  enemy.  Thynioetas,  the  aged  and  childless  King  of 
Athens,  made  the  champion  heir  to  his  throne,  as  a  mark  of  the 
gratitude  of  the  nation.  A  generation  later  the  Dorian  invasion, 
which  liad  overwhelmed  Corinth  and  torn  away  Mcgara  from  the 
Attic  dominion,  swept  up  to  the  very  gates  of  Athens.  An  oracle 
declared  that  the  city  would  never  fall  if  its  ruler  perished  by 
the  hand  of  the  invaders ;  therefore  King  Codrus  disguised  himself 
as  a  peasant,  set  out  for  the  Dorian  camp,  struck  down  the  first 
man  he  met,  and  was  himself  slain  by  the  second.  The  invasion 
failed,  and  the  Athenians  reverenced  ever  after  the  memory  of 
their  patriot  king  with  peculiar  veneration.  But  his  son  and 
successor,  Medon,  did  not  succeed  to  the  full  powers  of  his  father. 
Henceforth  the  royal  authority  was  limited  by  the  creation  of  two 
new  officers,  the  Archon  and  the  Polemarch,  one  of  whom  took 
over  much  of  the  king's  civil  duty,  while  the  other  acted  as 
commander-in-chief. 

For  twelve  generations  the  Codridae  retained  the  titular  kingship 
for  life  ;  but  in  752  B.C.,  as  we  are  told,  this  tenure  was  abolished, 
and  the  Archon  was  made  official  head  of  the  state ;  the  king — now 
elected  every  ten  years  from  among  the  members  of  the  royal  house 
■ — and  the  polemarch  took  rank  after  him. 

Be  this  as  it  maj^,  we  find  that  in  the  eighth  century  Attica  had 
drifted  into  the  same  stage  of  constitutional  development  as  the 
majority  of  other  Greek  states.  The  supreme  magistracies  were  at 
first  confined  to  those  families  only  which  claimed  to  descend  from 
Codrus  ;  but  about  710  B.C.  these  houses  had  to  take  into  partner- 
ship all  the  Attic  nobilitj',  and  the  three  great  offices  were  opened 
to  every  member  of  the  class  of  "  Eupatridae."  When,  thirty 
years  later,  six  junior  archons  were  added,  and  the  board  of  nine 
colleagues  began  to  be  elected  annually,  the  Athenian  constitution 
assumed  the  characteristics  of  the  ordinary  oligarchy. 

Oligarchy  at  Athens  showed  all  the  features  which  marked  its 
rule  elscAvhere.  Misgovernment  was  miiversal,  the  administration 
of  justice  fell  into  contempt,  the  non-noble  freeman  was  excluded 
from  all  share  in  the  administration  of  the  state,  and  was  continually 
exposed  to  the  lawlessness  and  insolence  of  the  more  reckless 
members  of  the  governing  caste. 

When  Attic  history  becomes  clear  and  continuous,  somewhere 


600  B.C.]  Oligarchy  at  Athens.  103 

about  the  middle  of  the  seventh  century,  we  find  the  government 
composed  of  the  nine  officers,  all  now  called  "  archons,"  and  of  a 
council  called  the  "  Areopagus,"  from  the  place  (*Apetos  Ttdyos,  the 
Hill  of  Ares)  at  which  it  met.  This  council  was  exclusively 
Eupatrid  in  its  composition,  and  included  all  ex-archons.  It  chose, 
and  exercised  constant  control  over,  the  annual  archons— for  an 
oligarchy  never  trusts  its  magistrates— and  was  also  the  supreme 
judicial  court  for  homicide.'  Of  the  board  of  archons,  the  chief, 
now  called  Avclion  Eponymus  CApx^"  eirwru/ios),  gave  his  name  to 
the  year,  and  exercised  an  honorary  presidency  in  the  state ; 
the  second,  or  King-Arclwn  f'Bao-iA.eus),  discharged  the  ancient 
functions  of  the  monarch  as  religious  head  and  representative  of  the 
state  ;  the  third,  or  Pohmarch,  was  minister  of  war  and  commander- 
in-chief;  the  remaining  six  junior  archons  were  called  Thesmothdae, 
and  were  charged  with  the  administration  of  the  different  branches 
of  justice, — everything  but  homicide  was  within  their  competence. 

Below  the  Eupatridae  lay  the  bulk  of  the  population,  divided 
from  very  early  times  into  Geomori  and  Demiurgi,  or  husband- 
men and  artisans — a  rough  distinction,  which  had  The  factions 
come  to  have  little  meaning  in  later  days.  The  real  °^  Attica, 
division  by  the  seventh  century  had  come  to  be  local,  and  everj'- 
thing  turned  on  the  feelings  of  Uie  parties  known  as  Pedias,  Diacria, 
and  Paralia — the  Plain,  the  Upland,  and  the  Shore.  The  men 
of  the  Plain  were  the  rich  Eupatrid  lando'miers  who  occupied  the 
lowlands  of  the  two  fertile  tracts  of  Attica,  the  Thriasian  and 
Athenian  Plains.  The  "  Shore,"  the  coast-slip  of  Western  Attica, 
was  the  dwelling  of  a  population  supported  partly  by  fishing  and 
partly  by  commerce,  who  formed  a  class  intermediate  between 
the  aristocratic  landowners  and  the  Diacrians  of  Northern  and 
Eastern  Attica.  These  Uplanders  occupied  the  arid  hills  of  the 
interior ;  they  were  mostly  shepherds  and  herdsmen,  and  formed 
the  rudest  and  poorest  class  in  the  country.^ 

The  first  recorded  outbreak  of  troubles  in  Attica  belongs  to  the 
third  quarter  of  the  seventh  century. 

>  It  has  been  much  debated  whether  the  Areojia-iis  represented  the 
primitive  council  of  chitfs  ;  probably  it  did. 

2  Those  who  wish  to  study  the  dry  and  obscure  question  of  the  exact 
meaning  of  the  Naucraries,  Trittyes,  Phratry-S  and  other  primitive  Attic 
divisions  of  the  people,  are  referred  to  purely  constitutional  histories. 


104  The  Early  History  of  Attica. 

Cylun  was  a  noble  of  great  wealth  and  distinction.     lie  had  heeir^ 
a  victor  at  the  Olympic  games,  and  boasted  of  a  nimacrous  troop  of 
J  friends  and  dependents.    Moreover,  he  had  married 

of  cyion.  the  daughter  of  Theagenes,  tja-ant  of  Megara,  and  had 
the  career  of  his  father-in-law  constantly  before  his 
eyes.  Counting  on  the  weakness  of  the  oligarchic  government,  and 
the  universality  of  public  discontent  with  it,  Cylon  determined  on  a 
bold  attempt  to  make  himself  tyrant  of  Athens.  On  a  concerted 
day  his  friends  were  joined  by  a  band  of  mercenaries  from  Megara,,i*f^ 
and  seized  the  Acropolis.  But  he  had  not  troubled  himself  to 
ensure  the  goodwill  of  the  populace,  and  the  majority  looked  on 
while  he  and  his  faction  were  blockaded  in  the  citadel  by  all  the 
forces  that  the  government  could  muster.  The  chief  conspirator  ^ 
escaped  by  night,  but  his  followers  were  ere  long  starved  out. 
They  sat  down  as  suppliants  at  the  altar  of  Athena,  and  threw 
open  the  gates  to  the  besiegers.  Megacles,  the  archon  in  command, 
induced  them  to  quit  their  sanctuary  by  a  promise  that  their  lives 
should  be  spared ;  but  the  moment  that  they  had  left  the  Acropolis 
he  caused  them  to  be  put  to  death.  Hence  a  deep  stain  of 
sacrilege  and  perjury  was  held  to  attach  to  Megacles  and  his 
descendants,  the  house  of  the  Alcmaeonidae.  Again  and  again  in 
later  times  the  cry  was  raised  that  the  "  family  under  the  curse  ]| 
ought  to  be  expelled  from  Athens. 

After  Cylon's  failure  the  strugi^le  between  the  oligarchy  of 
Eupatridae  and  the  nation  that  it  oppressed  grew  yet  more  bitter. 
Two  main  sources  of  trouble  existed :  the  people,  like  the  Roman 
plebeians  of  the  following  century,  were  in  a  chronic  state  of 
poverty  and  distress,  owing  to  misgovernment  as  much  as  to  bad 
seasons;  moreover,  they  were  driven  to  despair  by  the  arbitrary 
and  unequal  incidence  of  punishments.  No  one  could  ever  foresee 
the  end  of  a  suit,  for  the  archons  varied  the  judgments  at  pleasure. 
Hence  there  was  a  universal  cry  for  the  publication  of  laws  which 
should  fix  some  proportion  between  the  offence  and  the  penalty. 
The  demand  of  the  citizens  was  at  last  met  by  the  nobles  con- 
senting to  give  way,  and  the  Archon  Draco  in  621  b.c.  published 
a  written  code  of  laws.  An  Athenian  of  a  later  day  exclaimed  that 
"  the  laws  of  Draco  seemed  to  have  been  written  with  blood  rather 
than  with  ink,"    It  is  highly  probable  that  the  aristocracy  chose  tq 


612B0]  The  Laws  of  Draco.  105 

leave  themselves  a  power  of  applying  very  severe  punishments,  and 
stated  the  penalty  of  each  offence  at  its  possible  maximum  ;  hut  wq 
need  not  believe  the  legends  which  assert  that  Draco  affixed  the 
punishment  of  death  to  almost  every  crime.  The  one  fragment, 
indeed,  of  his  legislation  which  has  come  down  to  us  deals  with  a 
mitigation  of  the  law  of  murder,  and  provides  that  involuntary 
homicides  should  not  be  treated  as  outlaws  liable  to  be  slain  by 
every  one  who  met  them,  but  be  placed  under  the  protection  of  the 
state  till  they  could  make  compensation  to  the  family  of  the  slain 


man 


Whatever  was  the  exact  bearing  of  the  legislation  of  Draco,  it 
proved  a  very  inadequate  palliative  for  the  evils  which  were 
troubling  the  state.  Within  a  few  years  of  its  promulgation  matters 
were  as  bad  as  ever.^ 

'  If  a  liomioide  kept  away  from  ninrkcts  and  games  and  festivals,  jind 
yet  was  sought  out  and  slain  by  tbe  kinsmen  of  his  victim,  the  men  who 
blew  him  were  to  be  hcM  themselves  guiltj'  of  murder. 

'  The  details  given  in  the  'sQnvaiwv  noXiTc/a  about  some  alleged  [lolitical 
reforms  of  Draco,  over  and  above  his  laws-  seem  untrustworthy. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

SOLON  AND   PEISISTRATUS. 

A  FEW  years  after  the  legislation  of  Draco  Ave  find  Athens  engaged 

in  a  long  and  doubtful  war  with  Megara.     The  civil  discords,  which 

,  the  new  laws  had  proved  quite  insufficient  to  allay, 

Megara.  circ  were  aggravated  by  the  miseries  of  a  disastrous  and 

ill-conducted  war.     The  weakness   of  the  Athenian 

oligarchy  is  shown  plainly  enough  by  the  fact  that  they  were  quite 

unable  to  cope  with  the  smaller  state  to  the  west.    Even  Salamis, 

the  island  which  lies  full  in  view  of  Athens,  and  is  divided  by  less 

than  a  mile  of  water  from  the  Attic  shore,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 

]\Iegarians ;  for  Athens  had  as  yet  no  ships  to  put  in  line  against 

the   flourishing  navy   which  had  planted   the  many  colonies   of 

Megara. 

It  was  during  a  critical  period  of  the  Megarinn  war  that  the 
name  of  Solon  is  first  heard.     He  was  a  Eupatrid  by  birth,  a  man 
of  high  personal  integrity  and  attractive  character, 
who  had  won  from  the  people  a  respect  which  they 
paid  to  few  of  his  caste.     He  was  a  practised  orator  and  a  poet: 
his  stirring  verses  played  at  Athens  the  same  part  that  the  war- 
songs  of  Tyrtaeus  had  played  at  Sparta,  and  induced  his  despond- 
ing fellow-citizens  to  persevere  in  an  apparently  hopeless  contest. 
"  Eather  would  I  be,"  he  sang,  "  a  man  of  Pholegandros  or  Sicinos ' 
than  an  Athenian,  if  I  am  to  be  pointed  at  as  one  of  those  who 
abandoned  Salamis  to  the  enemy."     The  sarcasm  told,  and  the 
war  was  continued.     Solon  himself  was  put  at  the  head  of  an 
expedition  which  ran  the  blockade  of  the  Salaminian  Strait,  hastily 
landed  on  the  island,  and  succeeded  in  driving  out  the  Megarian 
*  Obscure  islands  in  the  Cyclades. 


594  B.C.]  Solon.  107 

garrison.  He  even  carried  the  Athenian  arms  up  to  the  very  gates 
of  the  hostile  city,  and  seized  for  a  moment  its  harbour  of  Nisaca. 
The  war  had  still  many  vicii-situdes,  and  Athens  was  ere  long 
reduced  to  the  defensive  again  ;  hut  her  citizens  never  forgot  the 
exploits  of  the  soldier-poet,  and  continued  to  regard  him  as  the 
one  possible  saviour  of  the  community.  Probably  he  might  have 
become  tyrant  of  Attica  had  he  wished,  but  he  was  a  loj'al 
servant  of  the  state,  and  had  no  personal  ambition. 

After  some  years  the  war  with  Megara  was  ended  by  the  arbi- 
tration of  Sparta,  and  Athens  retained  permanent  possession  of 
Salamis.  We  need  not  attach  any  importance  to  the  legend  which 
states  that  Solon  influenced  the  Lacedaemonians  in  favour  of 
Athens  by  quoting  to  them  a  line  which  he  interpolated  in  the 
Iliad,  to  the  effect  that  Ajax  of  Salamis  ranged  his  ships  on  the 
Trojan  beach  beside  those  of  Athens.  The  argument  would 
have  been  worthless,  and  Solon  was  not  a  forger.  A  little  later 
Solon  acquired  favourable  notice  throughout  Greece  for  the  piomi- 
nent  part  which  he  took  in  behalf  of  the  Delphic  oracle  against 
its  oppressors.  The  Phocians  of  Crissa  and  Cirrha  had  been 
molesting  the  pilgrims  who  came  to  make  inquiry  of  Apollo. 
Solon  took  up  the  cause  of  the  injured,  preached  a  crusade  against 
the  wrong-doers,  and,  in  conjunction  with  Cleisthenes,  tyrant  of 
Sicyon,  succeeded  in  subduing  the  guilty  towns,  which  received 
destruction  as  the  reward  of  their  sacrilege. 

About  595  B.C.  the  internal  troubles  of  Athens,  which  had  beeu 
growing  worse  since  the  time  of  Cylon's  conspiracy,   came  to  a 
head.       The    particular     grievance    which     brought      ^hedebt 
matters  to  a  crisis  was   the  question  of  the  law  of   question  at 

Athens. 

debt.  A  series  of  years  of  war  and  bad  harvests  had 
brought  down  to  a  condition  of  abject  misery  the  poorer  agricultural 
class  in  Attica,  who  cultivated  the  farms  of  the  Eupatridae  as  servile 
tenant-farmers,  paying  to  the  landowner  a  rent  of  one-sixth  of  their 
produce,  a  tenure  which  won  them  the  name  of  'EKTrj/xopoi.  These 
unfortunate  "villeins,"  as  thej' would  In  ve  been  called  in  mediaeval 
Europe,  were  deeply  sunk  in  arrears  of  debt  to  their  landlords,  and  by 
the  legislation  of  Draco  were  liable  to  be  sold  as  slaves  if  they  failed 
in  due  payment,  for  the  creditor's  only  security  was  the  bodies  of  his 
debtor  and  his  wife  and  children,     Attica  was  threatened  with  the 


io8  Solon  and  Peisistratus.  [504bc. 

total  extinction  of  her  poorer  classes ;  the  Megarlan  v/ar  seems 
to  have  rendered  the  situation  desperate,  and  every  day  the 
bankrupt  debtor  might  be  seen  dragged  off  in  chains  to  be 
exposed  in  the  slave-markets  of  Lydia  or  Egypt.  Either 
the  ruin  of  the  state  or  a  bloody  revolution  was  obviously  at 
hand. 

Scared  at  the  results  of  their  own  usurious  greed,  the  Eupatrids 
were  induced  to  entrust  power  to  Solon,  as  the  one  man  whose 
integrity  was  acknowledged  both  by  rich  and  poor,  and  who  could 
still  stave  off  a  collision.  In  591  B.C.,  if  our  chronology  is  correct, 
Solon  was  elected  archon,  and  entrusted  with  the  duty  of  drafting 
a  new  constitution  for  the  city. 

The  first  part  of  Solon's  legislation  was  directed  to  the  practical 

end  of  alleviating  the  miserable  condition   of  the   debtors.     He 

forbade  the  lending  of  money  on  the  security  of  the 

Seisachtheia,  borrower's  person,  and  cancelled   not  only  loans  so 

contracted,  but  all  outstanding  debts  of  every  kind; 

a  desperate  measure  which  only  dire  need  could  excuse.     It  would 

seem  that  he  even  removed  the  feudal  rent  of  one-sixth  whicL  the 

'EKTrjuopot  had  paid,  and  thereby  turned  them   from  villeins  into 

freeholders  owning  the  land  they  tilled.     The  state  renounced  all 

sums  owing  to  it  from  the  poorer  citizens,  whether  due  as  arrears 

of  taxes  or  as  fines.     These  measures  brought  about  a  perceptible 

improvement    in  the    condition   of   the    community;    the   newly 

manumitted  debtors  swelled  the  roll  of  citizens,  and  the  growth  of 

prosperity  supplied  some  ground  for  hoping  that  a  crisis  of  the  same 

kind  would  not  recur  again. 

Another  innovation  of  Solon's  was  destined  to  improve  the 
economic  condition  of  Athens  in  a  much  more  indirect  fashion. 
Solon  and  the  The  city  had  down  to  this  time  been  using  money 
coinage.  struck  on  the  Pheidonian  standard,  such  as  circulated 
in  Peloponnesus  or  Boeotia.  Solon  made  a  sweeping  change  by 
striking  coins  based,  not  on  this  standard,  but  on  that  known  as 
the  Euboic,  which  was  employed  in  the  great  commercial  cities 
of  C'.alcis  and  Eretria.  This  made  the  currency  of  Athens  inter- 
changeable with  that  of  her  wealthy  Ionic  neighbours,  though  it 
somewhat  complicated  exchanges  with  Aegina  or  Thebes.  Both 
politically  and  commercially  this  was  an  excellent  move.     The     tj 


694  B.C.]  The  Soloniaii   C/assts:  109 

new  inone}',  of  which  the  drachma  weighed  only  sixty-seven  grains 
and  a  half,  was  coined  into  tetradrachms,  while  the  old,  whose  unit 
had  weighed  about  ninety-five  grains,  had  never  possessed  a  higher 
multiple  than  the  didrachm. 

The  constitutional  reforms  of  Solon  are  even  more  important 
than  his  economical  legislation.  They  were  the  starling-point  of 
all  political  liberty  in  Athens,  and  their  importance  ^he  constitu- 
was  so  impressed  on  the  citizens  of  later  years  that  tionofSoion. 
all  early  laws  were  put  down  to  him,  just  as  all  Spartan  regulations 
came  to  be  ascribed  to  Lycurgns.  Solon  was  a  man  of  just  and 
liberal  soul,  and  a  sincere  friend  of  the  people ;  but  he  was  also 
a  noble,  with  a  rooted  dislike  to  democratic  methods  of  govern- 
ment. His  aim  was  to  construct  a  constitution  which  should  give 
the  proletariate  an  ultimate  control  over  the  administration  of 
public  affairs,  without  allowing  them  the  power  to  interfere  in 
matters  of  detail.  The  nobles  were  no  longer  to  govern  at  their 
own  good  will  and  for  their  own  benefit;  but  they — reinforced  by 
the  richest  of  the  non-noble  classess — were  to  continue  to  administer 
the  state,  under  due  control  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole 
community. 

Even  before  Solon's  time  the  division  of  the  people  into  classes 
arranged  according  to  their  wealth  had  perhaps  been  known.  Pos- 
sibly it  may  have  been  employed  as  early  as  Draco's  time,  for  purposes 
of  taxation  only,  but  Solon  determined  to  use  the  system  as  a  political 
instead  of  a  merely  economic  institution.  He  abolished  all  the 
privileges  of  birth  which  the  Eupatridae  had  enjoyed,  The  four 
substituted  a  "  timocracy  "  for  an  "  aristocracy,"  and  classes, 
made  wealth,  not  birth,  the  test  of  eligibility  for  ofiice.  The  first  of 
the  four  Solonian  classes  was  called  that  of  the  Pentekosiomedimnl, 
and  included,  as  its  name  shows,  all  citizens  whose  annual  income 
from  land  was  equivalent  to  five  hundred  medimni  of  corn,  or 
exceeded  that  amount.  The  second  class,  that  of  the  Hippeis,  or 
knights,  comprised  every  one  whose  income  ranged  between  five 
hundred  and  three  hundred  medimni.  The  third  class,  the  Zeugltae 
("owners  of  a  yoke  of  oxen"),  included  those  whose  income  was 
more  than  a  hundred  and  fifty  medimni,  and  less  than  three 
hundred.  Finally,  the  fourth  class,  or  Thetes,  was  composed  of  all 
whose  income  fell  short  of  a  hundred  and  fifty  medimni.     Landed 


110  Solon  and  Pelsisiraius.  (594  e.g. 

property  only  was  assessed,  not  commercial  gains  or  hoarded 
wealth,  so  that  to  qualify  for  the  three  higher  classes  a  merchant 
or  artisan  had  to  invest  in  a  smaller  or  larger  plot  of  land. 

This  arrangement  placed  the  majority  of  the  Eupatridae  in  the 
first  two  classes,  while  the  bulk  of  the  yeomen  of  Attica  fell  into 
the  ranks  of  the  Zeugitae,  and  the  artisans  were  nearly  all  Thetes. 
But  a  fair  proportion  of  wealthy  merchants  who  had  bought  land, 
and  a  certain  number  of  rich  yeomen,  were  mixed  among  the 
Pentekosiomedimni  and  Hippeis,  while  a  few  ruined  Enpatrid?}  we 
may  suppose,  sank  to  the  status  of  the  Thetes. 

When  Solon,  therefore,  restricted  the  archonship  to  those  who 
were  Pentekosiomedimni,  he  practically  left  the  supreme  magistracy 
of  the  state  in  the  hands  of  the  nobles.  To  other  minor  offices  the 
Hippeis  and  Zeugitae  were  eligible,  but  the  Thetes  were  excluded 
altogether  from  the  public  service ;  as  a  compensation,  they  were 
also  excluded  from  all  taxation.  In  time  of  war  they  were  to  serve 
as  light  troops,  while  the  Zeugitae  fought  as  heavy-armed  infantry 
and  the  Hippeis  as  horsemen. 

The  constitutional  reforms  of  Solon  had  as  their  main  aim  a 
rearrangement  of  the  relations  of  the  Archons  and  the  Areopagus 
Avith  the  Senate  and  public  assembly,  so  that  each  was  to  have  its 
share  in  the  guidance  of  the  state.  The  archons  retained  their  old 
functions,  but  were  in  future  to  be  elected  by  an  ingenious  mixture 
of  selection  and  chance.  The  four  tribes  each  chose  ten  candidates, 
and  from  these  forty  men  the  nine  archons  were  chosen  by  lot. 
This  system  was  probably  intended  to  obviate  an  attempt  to  intro- 
duce party  government :  it  would  be  most  unlikely  that  all  the 
successful  candidates  would  be  of  the  same  political  faction.  The 
archons  at  the  end  of  their  year  of  office  were  to  pass  a  public 
examination  [(vOvvn),  at  which  they  were  made  responsible  before 
the  assembly  for  all  their  acts  during  their  tenure  of  power. 

The  Areopagus  ceded  many  of  its  functions  to  a  Council  or  Senate 
of  Four  Hundred,  composed  of  a  hundred  members  chosen  from 
each  of  the  four  tribes  into  which  the  Athenians  (like  other  Ionic 
Tiie  communities)  were  divided.     This    Senate  or  Boule 

Eouie.  iqq\.  qv^j.  r^ii  tijg  more  clearly  political  duties  of  the 
Areopagus,  such  as  preparing  measures  to  be  put  before  the 
assembly,  or  receiving  embassies. 


694:B.ai  The  Areopagus.  in 

We  may  perhaps  compare  Solon's  Boule  to  the  Roman  Senate, 
while  the  Areopagus,  as  reformed  by  him,  may  bo  likened  to  the 
Roman  Censorship.     It  was  to  undertake  the  moral  ^j^^ 

supervision  of  the  state :  on  its  own  initiative  and  Areopagus, 
without  incurring  any  responsibility  it  might  inquire  into  the  public 
or  private  life  of  any  citizen,  and  inflict  fines  and  forfeitures  on  him 
if  it  considered  his  conduct  obnoxious.  Profligacy,  insolence,  and 
idleness  were  punished  by  the  Areopagus,  no  less  than  crimes  which 
fell  under  the  letter  of  the  law.  In  addition  to  this  wide  censorial 
power,  it  had  the  function  of  trying  all  cases  of  intentional  homicide 
• — a  charge  which  it  had  exercised  from  time  immemorial,  ever 
since  (so  Attic  tradition  ran)  Ares  had  been  indicted  before  it  for 
slaying  Halirrhothius,  the  son  of  Poseidon.  The  court  was  recruited 
from  ex-archons,  as  in  earlier  days,  and  therefore  remained  a 
centre  of  Eupatrid  influence,  for  the  majority  of  the  archons  were 
still  cliosen  from  the  old  houses.  It  was,  no  doubt,  intended  to 
curb  all  citizens  who  showed  any  signs  of  practising  demagogic  arts, 
or  aimed  at  establishing  a  tyranny. 

The  Ecdesia,  or  public  assembly  of  Athens,  was  hitherto  nothing 
more  than  a  survival  of  the  Homeric  Agora,  a  body  convened  to 
hear  the  promulgation  of  such  decrees  as  the  archons  ^he 
and  the  oligarchy  chose  to  publish.  Solon  made  it  Ecciesia. 
powerful.  The  most  important  function  that  it  received,  "  the 
measure  by  which  it  is  agi-eed  that  the  democracy  got  its  main 
power," — in  the  words  of  Aristotle — was  the  right  of  trying  all 
magistrates,  and  of  investigating  their  actions  at  the  end  of  their 
year  of  office.  Thus  it  was  secured  that  the  archons  should  owe 
their  power  to  the  people,  and  be  kept  in  view  of  their  responsibility 
to  their  constituents  all  through  their  tenure  of  office.  The  assembly 
was  also,  as  we  must  conclude,  entrusted  with  the  supreme  decision 
in  such  matters  as  treaties  or  declarations  of  war,  and  gave  a  final 
vote  in  favour  of  or  against  such  measures  as  the  Boule  put  before 
it.  This  was  as  far  as  Solon  wished  to  go  in  democratizing  the  con- 
stitution ;  he  had  no  intention  of  handing  over  either  administrative 
or  legislative  business  to  the  Ecclesia. 

To  sum  up  the  constitution  of  Solon,  we  may  say  that  the  state 
was  to  be  administered  by  such  of  the  Eupatridae  as  the  people 
thought  worthy ;  that  its  moral  supervision  was  entrusted  to  the 


112  So/i'ii  and  Peisisiratus.  ife:oB.C.- 

Arcopngus;  tliat  the  Boiilc  guided  its  foreign  and  domcHtic  policy, 
while  the  Ecchsia  exercised  an  effective  but  indirect  control  over 
the  whole  of  the  machinery  of  government.  The  legislator  him- 
self claimed  that  "he  gave  the  people  so  much  power  as  was 
sufficient,  neither  defrauding  them  nor  awa-.ding  them  more  thaj 
was  their  share;  while  as  for  those  who  had  wealth  and  position, 
he  was  careful  that  they  should  suffer  no  wrong.  Both  classes 
were  protected,  and  neither  was  allowed  to  molest  the  other," 

Besides  the  constitutional  enactments,  a  large  number  of  l.nvs 
of  all  kinds  were  to  be  found  in  the  legislation  of  Solon.  They 
MisceUaneous  '"^riged  ovcr  all  provinces  of  life,  and  to  a  great 
laws  of  Solon,  extent  did  away  with  the  previous  code  of  Draco.  A 
fjw  of  them  are  worth  mention.  He  first  gave  the  right  of  disposing 
cf  property  by  will  to  citizens  destitute  of  children  :  previously  their 
kinsmen  inherited  everything,  and  the  owner  could  not  divert  his 
property  from  them.  He  relaxed  the  harshness  of  the  control 
which  old  usage  had  given  to  the  father  over  his  sons ;  he  forbade 
arbitrary  disinheritance;  and  even  enacted  that  a  father  who  had 
not  taught  his  son  some  useful  trade  had  no  claim  to  be  mainlained 
bj'-  that  son  when  he  arrived  at  old  age.  A  number  of  sumptuary 
law^s  directed  the  attention  of  the  Areopagus  against  luxury. 
Trade  was  favoured  by  the  permission  given  to  foreigners  to  take 
up  the  citizenship,  after  solemnly  disavowing  allegiance  to  their  old 
country,  and  swearing  fealty  to  Athens.  But  perhaps  the  most 
noteworthy  clause  in  the  whole  logislalion  was  that  which  imposed 
disfranchisement  on  the  citizen  who,  in  a  time  of  civil  strife,  did  n''t 
take  one  side  or  the  other.  Scion  feared  that  the  existence  of  a 
body  of  timid  and  cautious  neutrals  would  be  fiital  to  public 
si)irit,  and  favour  the  growth  of  that  apathy  which  makes  tyrannies 
possible. 

The  laws  of  Solon  were  inscribed  on  wooden  pyramids,  called 
Kurheis^  some  of  them  threc-s'ded,  some  four-sided,  and  all  about 
the  height  of  a  man.  They  stood  on  the  Acropolis  till  the  Persian 
wars,  when  they  were  removed  for  safety  to  Salamis.  Afterwards 
they  were  placed  in  the  Prytaneum,  and  fragments  of  them  were 
still  on  view  in  the  time  of  Plutarch  (a.d.  120). 

Many  legends  grew  up  around  the  later  life  of  Solon.  We  are 
told  that  he  exiled   himself  for  ten  j'ears,  in  order  to  avoid  tl.e 


570  B.C.]  Travels  of  Solo fi.  T13 

importuuities  of  those  who  urged  him  to  supplement  his  legislation 
with  further  clauses.  His  travels  took  hira  far  afield  soion's 
— to  Cyprus,  Egypt,  and  Asia  Minor.  Everywhere  travels, 
that  he  went  tales  grew  up  to  illustrate  his  profound  wisdom  and 
practical  ability.  In  Cyprus  he  fixed  the  site  of  the  flouiishing 
city  of  Soli.  In  Lydia  it  was  fabled  that  he  visited  King  Croesus, 
and  viewed  unmoved  all  the  splendours  of  an  Oriental  court.  Then, 
when  his  host  asked  him  who  was  the  happiest  man  in  the  world, 
expecting  to  hear  himself  named,  Solon  first  mentioned  a  worthy 
but  obscure  citizen  of  Athens,  who  had  fallen  gloriously  in  battle, 
and  then  two  young  Argives  who  had  met  their  death  in  the  per- 
formance of  an  act  of  filial  piety.  Croesus  was  offended  at  the 
moment,  but  learnt  by  bitter  experience  "to  call  no  man  happy 
till  he  was  dead."  Unfortunately,  the  legend  of  the  interview  is 
rendered  quite  impossible  by  the  dates:  it  is  merely  one  of  the 
moral  apologues  with  which  the  Greeks  loved  to  illustrate  the 
instability  of  mortal  happiness. 

Then  Solon  returned  to  his  native  city,  he  had  the  disappoint- 
ment of  discovering  that  his  constitution,  in  spite  of  its  fairness 
and  its  ingenious  system  of  checks  on  the  various  Renewal  of 
members  of  the  administration,  had  not  sufficed  to  "'^^^  strife, 
reduce  the  state  to  order.  The  local  factions  of  the  Plain  the 
Shore  and  the  Upland  were  still  engaged  in  political  strife.  As 
early  as  582  B.C.  an  archon  named  Damasias  illegal!}^  prolonge(^  his 
office  over  a  second  year,  and  had  to  be  deposed  by  armed  force. 
The  populace,  having  once  got  a  taste  of  power  in  the  new 
privilege  of  impeaching  magistrates,  was  eager  to  extend  its  rights. 
The  Eupatridae  were  still  yearning  after  the  old  days  of  oligarch}'. 
The  commercial  classes  found  that  the  exclusion  of  all  property 
except  land  from  the  assessment  which  settled  the  status  of  citizens, 
hindered  them  from  taking  the  part  in  public  affairs  which  they 
regarded  as  their  due.  No  one  was  enthusiastic  in  defence  of  the 
Solonian  constitution,  for  it  satisfied  no  one. 

While  the  Eupatridae  of  the  Plain  were  headed  by  Lycurgus  and 
Miltiades,  a  kinsman  of  the  Corinthian  tyrants,  the  merchants  of 
tlie  Shore  found  a  leader  in  Megacles  the  Alcmaeom'd,  grandson 
of  that  Megacles  who  had  murdered  the  adherents  of  Cylon.  The 
poor   men  of  the  Upland   had  placed  themselves  under  a  young 

I 


114  Solon  and  Peisistratus.  reeoB.c- 

and  energetic  leader,  one  of  those  men  of  oligarchic  birth  who  in 
every  Greek  city  were  found  ready  to  desert  their  class  and  take 
up  the  career  of  a  demagogue.  It  must  have  added  to  Solon's 
grief  to  find  that  this  adventurer  was  his  own  kinsman,  Peisistratus 
the  son  of  Hijipocrates.  The  last  years  of  the  legislator  were 
spent  in  unavailing  warnings  to  the  democracy  of  Atliens  that 
Ihey  were  "  treading  in  the  footsteps  of  the  fox,"  and  preparing  the 
way  for  a  tyranny  by  attaching  themselves  to  the  train  of  tlie 
ambitious  young  man. 

Solon's  denunciations  of  demagogic  arts  were  quite  useless. 
When  Peisistratus  persuaded  the  people  that  his  life  had  been 
attempted  by  assassins  hired  by  the  men  of  the  Plain, 
Peisistratus.  the  assembly  voted  him  a  body-guard  of  fifty  club- 
men, in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  Boule.  The 
club-men  were  ere  long  armed  with  deadlier  weapons,  their  num- 
bers increased,  and  one  morning  Athens  woke  to  find  them  in 
occupation  of  the  Acropolis.  It  was  just  seventy-two  yeai's  since  the 
similar  attempt  of  Cylon ;  but  the  times  had  changed  :  unlike  Cylon, 
Peisistratus  had  a  strong  following  among  the  people,  while  his 
adversaries  were  divided  into  two  hostile  camps.  Megacles  left 
Athens  :  Miltiades  accepted  the  offer  of  a  barbarian  tiibe  in  Thrace, 
who  wanted  an  experienced  leader  in  war,  and  departed  to  take 
over  the  sovereignty  of  the  Thracian  Chersonese.  Peisistratus 
became  tyrant  of  Athens  without  opposition,  and  when  Solon,  in 
558  B.C.  died,  full  of  years  and  honours,  he  died  as  the  subject  of 
a  despotic  monarch.  The  last  months  of  his  life  were  not  em- 
bittered by  oppression,  for  his  kinsman  treated  him  with  every 
mark  of  respect ;  but  the  old  man  shut  himself  up  in  his  house, 
and  refused  to  be  comforted.  The  work  of  his  life  seemed  to  have 
been  entirely  wasted. 

Peisistratus  showed  himself  an  able  and  moderate  ruler :  he  did 
everything  in  his  power  to  promote  the  material  welfare  of  the 
Vi  i  situd  3  P^*^'^'^''  classes,  who  had  rendered  his  rise  possible,  and 
in  the  life  of  did  not  slay  or  banish  the  rich.  This  mildness 
encouraged  the  men  of  the  Shore  and  Plain  to  combine 
to  dethrone  him;  the  exiled  Megacles  and  the  Eupatrid  Lycurgus 
headed  a  rising,  and  the  tyrant  was  driven  out.  But  the  Athenian 
factions  were  not  yet  taught  wisdom  \    the   merchants   and   the 


527  B.C.]  The  TyraJiny  of  Peisistratus.  115 

nobles  could  not  learn  to  work  together,  and  Megacles,  enraged  with 
Lycurgn.s,  entered  into  treasonahle  negotiations  with  the  ex-tyrant. 
To  spite  the  Plain,  the  Shore  consented  to  join  the  Upland,  This 
ensured  the  return  of  Peisistratus.  The  manner  of  it  requires  a 
word  of  notice,  as  one  of  the  most  characteristic  and  extraordinary 
events  of  the  age.  Megacles  found  a  tall  and  stately  woman  named 
Phya,  arrayed  her  in  armour,  and  conducted  her  to  the  city  in  a 
chariot,  giving  out  that  Athena,  the  tutelary  goddess  of  the  city, 
had  appeared  in  person  to  command  the  restoration  of  Peisistratus  ! 
The  people  obeyed,  the  gates  were  thrown  open,  and  the  tyrant  was 
once  more  master  of  Athens.  If  this  tale  is  true,  the  Athenians, 
as  Herodotus  remarks,  instead  of  being  the  wisest  of  the  Greeks, 
deserved  a  prize  for  credulous  simplicity.  For  six  j^ears  Megacles 
and  Peisistratus  held  together,  and  the  alliance  was  cemented  by 
the  tyrant's  marriage  to  the  Alcmaeonid's  daughter.  But  at  last 
they  quarrelled,  and  Megacles  once  more  led  over  his  followers  to 
join  the  men  of  the  Plain.  After  a  short  struggle,  Peisistratus  was 
for  the  second  time  expelled  from  Attica.  He  retired  to  Thrace, 
gathered  men  and  money  there,  and  waited  for  the  factions  of 
Athens  to  give  him  a  third  opportunity  for  action. 

For  no  less  than  ten  years  he  watched  for  the  times  to  become 
ripe,  keeping  up  communications  with  his  party  in  the  Upland  of 
Attica,  and  looking  out  for  men  likely  to  aid  him  in  an  expedition. 
At  last  (535  b.c.)  he  landed  in  Attica  at  the  head  of  his  own 
following,  strengthened  by  a  band  of  Argive  mercenaries  and  by  a 
body  of  Xaxian  exiles  under  Lygdamis,  once  tyrant  of  that  island. 
The  Athenian  army  marched  on  Marathon,  where  Peisistratus  had 
landed.  They  faced  the  invaders  at  Pallene,  and  a  battle  appeared 
imminent,  but  the  tyrant  at  first  avoided  an  action.  When, 
however,  the  Athenians  had  broken  their  ranks,  and  retired  to  take 
their  midday  meal,  Peisistratus  unexpectedly  fell  upon  them,  and 
routed  them  without  trouble  and  almost  without  slaughter.  His 
sons  rode  after  the  fugitives,  and  shouted  to  them  that  all  who 
dispersed  homewards  should  be  granted  an  amnesty;  after  this 
the  leaders  of  the  citizens  found  themselves  so  deserted  by  their 
followers  that  no  further  resistance  could  be  offered.  The  tyrant 
re-entered  the  city  without  having  to  strike  a  second  blow. 

During  his  third  reign  Peisistratus  showed  himself  a  more  strict 


ii6  Solon  and  Pdsistraius.  iestb.c. 

and  cautious,  but  hardly  a  more  02")presive,  ruler  than  in  his  previous 
The  rule  of  tenures  of  power.  He  kept  up  the  forms  ot  tlie 
Peisistratus.  Solonian  Constitution,  though  he  always  took  care  to 
have  some  one  of  his  own  family  at  the  head  of  the  board  of 
archons.  An  income-tax  of  5  per  cent,  was  the  only  extra- 
ordinary burden  which  he  imposed  upon  the  people,  and  the 
proceeds  of  this  were  used  to  strengthen  and  adorn  the  city,  and 
not  to  pile  up  a  private  treasure  or  support  private  luxury.  The 
support  which  he  gave  to  the  state  religion  was  jjarticularly  marked; 
he  increased  the  splendour  of  the  Panathenaea,  the  festival  of  the 
tutelary  goddess  of  the  city ;  he  instituted  a  new  feast  in  honour  of 
Dionysus  ;  and  he  commenced  a  temple  to  the  Olympian  Zeus  on 
such  a  grand  scale  that  it  was  never  completed  till  the  reign 
of  the  Eoman  Emperor  Hadrian,  six  hundred  and  seventy  years 
after.  He  gathered  literary  men  from  all  parts  about  his  court, 
though  the  legend  that  he  employed  them  to  collate  and  edit  the 
text  of  Homer  is  probably  Avithout  foundation.  His  foreign  policy 
was  one  of  peace ;  he  strengthened  himself  by  alliances  with  the 
houses  of  tyrants  which  still  survived  in  Greece  and  Asia  Minor, 
but  at  the  same  time  courted  the  favour  of  Sparta,  the  implacable 
enemy  of  tyranny  in  Peloponnesus. 

Peisistratus  died  in  peace  thirty-three  years  after  his  first,  and 

eight  years  after  his  last,  seizure  of  Athens.     He  was  succeeded 

by  his  sons  Hippias  and  Hipparchus,  who  ruled  in 

Hipparchus   great  harmony,  unlike   most   brother-kings.      They 

^'  ■      persevered  for  some  years  in  the  benevolent  despotism 

of  their  father,  and  only  left  his  steps  in  foreign  policy,  where 

they  followed  a  bolder  line.     The  town  of  Plataea,  having  left  the 

piataea.     Boeotian  league   on  account  of  a  feud  with  Thebes, 

519  B.C.      craved  the  protection   of  Athens,   and    obtained   it, 

though  this  alliance  involved  the  Peisistratidao  in  a  war  with  their 

northern  neighbours.      They  carried  it  to  a  victorious  end,  and 

seemed  likely  to   reign   long   and  successfully.     But  ere  long  a 

catastrophe  occurred  to  change  the  course  of  Athenian  history. 

Hipparchus  was  thoroughly  immoral  in  his  private  life ;  he  was 
foiled  in  a  disreputable  love-flffair  which  concerned  the  honour  of 
a  noble  family,  and  revenged  himself  by  a  public  insult.  Harmodius 
the  Gephyrean,  the  victim  of  the  tyrant's  anger,  was  driven  to  a 


514  B.C. :i  Haiiiwdms  and  Aristogcifon.  117 

reckless  revenge,  and  organized  a  conspiracy  against  the  lives  of  the 
brother-despots.  He  and  his  fi-iend  Aristogeiton  joined  Harojodius 
with  a  few  others  to  fall  on  the  Peisistratidae  at  Arisu>3eiion, 
the  festival  of  the  Panathenaea.  Owing  to  a  mis-  si^^.c. 
conception  they  made  their  onslaught  too  soon,  and  struck  down 
Hipparchus  before  Hippias  had  arrived  on  the  scene.  The  guards 
slew  Ilarmodius  on  the  spot ;  the  rest  were  caught  and  executed. 
Aristogeiton  sufiered  fearfully  before  his  death,  as  Hippias  tried  in 
vain  to  wring  from  him  by  torture  the  names  of  all  involved  in  the 
conspiracy.  This  reckless  act  of  private  vengeance  was  the  in- 
direct cause  of  the  overthrow  of  tyranny  at  Athens,  and  for  that 
reason  the  names  of  Harmodius  and  Aristogeiton  were  held  in 
rather  undeserved  veneration  at  Athens  down  to  the  latest  days 
of  the  republic. 

Maddened  by  his  brother's  death,  and  his  own  narrow  escape 
from  assassination,  Hippias  changed  his  whole  sj'stem  of  govern- 
ment. He  crowded  the  city  with  mercenaries,  began  to  make 
away  with  every  one  that  he  suspected  of  discontent,  raised  arbitrary 
taxes,  and  commenced  a  series  of  petty  vexations  which  drove  the 
Athenians  to  desperation.  This  led  to  an  open  rising  ;  cieisthenea 
Cleisthenes  the  Alcmaeonid,  son  of  Megacles  the  old  at  Delphi, 
leader  of  the  faction  of  the  Shore,  returned  from  exile,  and  headed  an 
abortive  rebellion.  It  was  crushed  by  the  tyrant's  mercenaries,  but 
Cleisthenes  then  set  diplomacy  to  work.  He  was  in  high  favour 
at  Delphi,  where  he  had  won  the  gratitude  of  the  priesthood  by  the 
munificent  liberality  with  which  he  had  restored  the  great  temple 
after  a  disastrous  fire.  Instigated  by  him,  the  Delphic  priestess 
would  give  no  answer  when  the  state  of  Sparta  sent  to  inquire  of 
Apollo,  except  that  "  Athens  ought  to  be  liberated."  A  series  of 
such  replies  screwed  the  superstitious  Spartans  up  to  the  necessary 
pitch  of  reverent  obedience.  Disregarding  their  old  friendship  with 
Peisistratus,  they  invaded  Attica.  They  were  beaten  in  the  first 
engagement  by  a  desperate  charge  of  the  tyrant's  Thessalian 
cavalry.  Then  their  vigorous  and  able  king  Cleomenes  was  sent 
to  take  the  command ;  he  defeated  Hippias,  and  shut  him  up  in 
the  city.  The  Acropolis  would  have  stood  a  long  siege,  but  fortune 
interfered  to  crush  the  tyrant.  His  children  were  captured  by  the 
Spartans  as  they  were  being  secretly  conveyed  out  of  Attica,  and  to 


1 1 8  Solon  and  Feisis/ratus.  rsio  b.c. 

preserve  their  lives  Hippias  consented  to  surrender  the  citadel  if  he 
^  „   ,       and  his  were  allowed  a  safe  conduct  to  Asia.   The 

Fall  of 

Hippias,  Spartans  consented,  and  in  the  seventeenth  year  of  his 
511  B.C.  reig,;!  the  tyrant  evacuated  Athens,  and  sailed  away 
with  his  family  and  his  mercenaries,  to  seek  refuge  at  Sigeum  in  the 
Troad,  a  small  town  which  Peisistratus,  foreseeing  some  such  catas- 
trophe, had  got  into  his  hands  many  years  before.  Here  he  settled 
down,  paid  homage  to  the  Persian  king  as  overlord,  and  awaited  the 
return  of  better  days,  much  as  his  father  had  done  at  Eretria  forty 
years  before.  Meanwhile  at  Athens  the  republic  was  restored, 
and  a  new  era  began. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

TUE   GREEKS   OF    ASIA,   AND   THE    LYDIAX    MONARCHY. 

Down  to  the  commencement,  of  the  seventh  century  the  Greeks  of 
Asia  had  pursued  their  career  of  expansion  without  meeting  with 
affy  dangers  from  the  inland.  In  the  north  the  Aeolians  had 
driven  the  Teucrians  and  Mysians  away  from  the  coast.  In  the 
south  the  lonians  and  Carians  had  arrived  at  a  modus  vivendi,  and 
were  often  to  ho  found  joining  together  in  expeditions  such  as  that 
which,  in  656  B.C.,  placed  Psammetichus  on  the  throne  of  Egypt. 
In  the  centre,  filling  the  upper  valleys  of  the  Hermus  and  Cayster, 
lay  the  kingdom  of  Lydia,  the  westernmost  extension  of  the  old 
empire  of  the  Hittites,  governed  by  a  race  of  princes  whose  origin 
the  Greeks  ascribed  to  some  Asiatic  god  whom  they  identified  with 
Heracles.  For  many  generations  these  kings  seem  to  have  had  no 
hostile  relations  with  their  Greek  neighbours  on  the  coast,  and 
were  content  to  serve  as  middlemen  in  the  great  line  of  commerce, 
which  ran  through  their  capital  of  Sardis,  and  connected  Ephesus 
and  Miletus  with  the  Euphrates  and  Assyria. 

The  Asiatic  Greeks  went  through  much  the  same  constitutional 
developments  as  their  European  brethren,  with  the  exception  that 
their   olisrarchies   were  usually  founded    on  wealth  _,        ...... 

o  •'  _  _  Cnaracter:stic3 

rather  than  birth,  as  was  inevitable  in  cities  where  of  the  Asiatic 
the  population  had  from  the  first  been  much  mixed. 
Tyrants  appeared,  in  Asia  no  less  than  Europe,  to  sweep  away 
the  monopoly  of  the  oligarchs,  and  when  history  becomes  con- 
tinuous in  the  seventh  century,  we  find  the  states  of  Ionia  and 
Aeolis  governed  some  by  still-surviving  oligarchies,  some  by 
tyrants,  some  by  democracies  which  had  risen  when  tyrants 
had   been   swept   away.     The   universal   opinion   of  Greece  pro- 


120  The  Greeks  of  Asia,  and  the  Lydian  Alonarchy.  1700  bc.- 

nounced  the  lonians  and  their  nci;4iboui-s  to  be  the  best  merchants 
but  the  worst  soldiers  of  the  Plellenic  world.  Their  feats  of 
exploration  and  their  activity  in  colonizing  were  unrivalled,  but 
they  did  not  pass  as  good  fighting  men.  Their  European  brethren 
accused  them  of  indolence  and  luxury,  and  asserted  that  the  soft- 
ness and  languor  of  the  climate  of  Asia,  and  the  admixture  of 
Oriental  blood  which  had  resulted  from  the  Carian  marriages  of 
the  early  settlers,  had  combined  to  v/eaken  and  demoralize  them. 
Civilization  and  luxury  developed  among  them  long  before  they 
reached  Greece.  The  arts  of  music  and  lyric  poetry  were  especially 
their  own  ;  the  Lesbian  poetess  Sappho  sang  of  love  in  passionate 
tones  which  no  other  Hellenic  poet  could  ever  equal;  her  country- 
man Alcaeus  was  equally  celebrated  for  his  praises  of  wine  and 
beauty,  and  for  his  political  poems.  Anacreon  of  Teos  was  a  mere 
jovial  voluptuary,  a  bad  specimen  of  the  worst  Ionian  type,  but 
made  himself  a  great  name  by  his  songs.  It  was  in  Asia  Minor 
also  that  philosophy — the  product  of  a  self-conscious  civilization 
which  too  often  marks  the  decay  of  civic  virtue — made  its 
earliest  appearance  among  the  Greeks.  It  took  at  first  the  com- 
paratively harmless  form  of  inquiry  into  the  phenomena  of  nature, 
and  speculations  as  to  the  physical  basis  of  life  and  creation  ; 
which  some  philosophers  sought  in  the  primary  principle  of  air, 
others  in  that  of  fire,  others  again  in  that  of  water.  Thales  of 
Miletus  (circ.  G40-550  b.c.)  was  the  best  known  of  the  early 
philosophers  ;  in  spite  of  his  speculative  bent,  he  was  a  man  of 
great  practical  ability,  and  worked  out  a  plan  for  the  federation  of 
the  Greek  cities  of  Asia,  which  would  have  saved  them  many  a 
disaster  if  it  had  been  carried  out.  There  would  appear  to  have 
been  less  political  intercourse  between  the  Greeks  of  Asia  and  those 
of  Europe  than  might  have  been  expected,  when  we  remember  the 
The lieiantine  narrowness  of  the  Aegean.  The  chief  occasion  on 
war,  700  B.C.  ^yj^jgj^  ^j^gy  ^^^  found  in  contact  was  the  Lelantine  war 
(circ.  700  B.C.).  This  was  nominally  a  struggle  to  settle  whether 
Chalcis  or  Eretria  should  own  the  plain  of  Lelas,  which  lay 
between  their  walls.  But  in  real  fact  it  was  a  commercial  war 
between  two  bands  of  allied  states  who  were  bound  together  by 
their  trade  interests.  Eretria  was  aided  by  Miletus,  Chalcis  by 
Samos,  and  the  war  raged  over  the  Asiatic  as  well  as  the  European 


660  B.C.]  Gys^^  of  Lydiii.  1 2 1 

shore  of  the  Aegean.^  In  the  West  Chalcis  would  seem  to  have 
had  the  better  of  her  neighbour,  but  in  Asia  Samos  was  never  able 
to  shake  the  commercial  predominance  of  ^Miletus. 

About  the  j'car  685  B.C.,  the  psriod  during  which  the  Asiatic 
Greeks  had  been  able  to  carry  out  their  great  schemes  of  coloniza- 
tion, and  to  fight  out  their  civil  broils  undisturbed  by  interference 
from  without,  suddenly  came  to  an  end.  The  new  factor  intro- 
duced into  their  history  was  the  aggressive  policy  of  the  kings  of 
Lydia. 

Gyges,  a  noble  of  the  house  of  the  Mermnadae,  afier  slaying  his 
master  Candaules,  the  last  of  the  old  royal  line,  had  usurped  the 
throne  of  Lydia.  He  at  once  abandoned  the  peaceful 
policy  of  his  predecessors,  and  set  to  work  to  attack  LycUa, 
the  Greek  cities  of  the  coast.  The  Lydians  were 
a  bold  warlike  race,  the  best  horsemen  of  Asia,  and  the  lonians 
could  offer  them  no  resistance  in  the  field.  The  war  became  one 
of  sieges ;  Gyges  took  Colophon,  though  he  failed  before  Smyrna 
and  Miletus.  In  the  midst  of  his  career  he  was  summoned  home 
by  a  crisis  which  frcjed  the  lonians  from  fear  for  another  generation. 
A  wild  race  from  the  north,  the  Cimmerians,  had  been  pushed  into 
Asia  Minor  by  pressure  from  yet  more  unknown  tribes  in  their 
rear.  They  swept  over  the  land,  burning  and  devastating  all 
before  them.  The  Greek  city  of  Sinope  and  the  native  monarchy 
of  Phrygia  were  completely  destroyed  by  them.  Gyges,  in  spite  of 
his  energy,  only  succeeded  in  saving  his  kingdom  by  becoming  the 
vassal  of  Assurbanipal,  King  of  Assyria.  This  protection  was 
withdrawn  when  he  revolted  a  few  years  later,  and  the  Cimmerians 
almost  made  an  end  of  Lydia.  Gyges  was  slain  in  battle,  the 
valley  of  the  Herraus  harried,  and  Sardis,  save  its  citadel,  taken 
by  the  barbarians  in  660  b  c. 

Ardys,  the  successor  of  Gyges,  was  many  years  on  the  tlirone 
before  he  could  get  free  from  the  Cimmerians.  When  this  danger 
was  over,  he  renewed  his  father's  policy  of  attacking  the  Greeks, 
and  captured  Priene.  Bnt  again  the  inroads  of  the  barbarians 
came  to  the  rescue  of  the  lonians;  about  627  B.C.  another  Cim- 
merian invasion,  whose  westernmost  foray  resulted  in  the  sack  of 

•  It  seems  probable  that  the  two  alliances  wero  (1)  Chalcis,  Samos, 
Thessaly,  Corinth  ;  (2)  Eretria.  Miletus,  Aegina.     Details  arc  wanting. 


122  The  Greeks  of  Asia  ^  and  the  Lydian  Monafchy.    [632  B.C.- 

the  wealthy  Aeolian  town  of  Magnesia,  called  Ardys  off  to  defend 
the  limits  of  his  own  kingdom. 

The  successors  of  Ardys,  his  son  Sadyattes  (622-610  B.C.),  and 
his  grandson  Alyattes  (610-568  B.C.),  continued  the  traditional 
Warsofiiydia  policy  of  their  race  by  attacking  the  Greek  cities, 
and  Miletus,  more  especially  Miletus,  the  great  stronghold  and 
bulwark  of  Ionia.  The  Milesians  were  easily  beaten  in  the  field, 
but  their  walls  opposed  an  impassable  barrier  to  the  Lydian  cavalry. 
Alyattes  resolved,  we  are  told,  to  starve  the  town  into  subraissioD. 
Every  midsummer,  when  corn  and  fruit  began  to  ripen,  he  marched 
into  the  Milesian  territory,  and  beat  down  the  corn  and  felled 
the  trees  to  the  sound  of  military  music.  After  several  years  of 
assiduous  raiding,  he  had  occasion  to  send  an  embassy  mto  Miletus. 
The  envoys  found  the  Milesians  feasting  and  traffickmg  as  if  the 
ruin  of  their  country-side  was  a  perfectly  indifferent  occurrence. 
A  seaport  town  can  never  be  starved  out  by  an  enemy  who  is 
destitute  of  a  fleet,  and  this  fact  Alyattes  now  realized.  He  made 
peace  with  Miletus,  and  turned  to  less  hopeless  enterprises.  The 
Greek  town  of  Smyrna  fell  into  his  hands,  but  his  great  conquests 
lay  inland,  where  he  subdued  Phrygia,  Bithynia,  and  all  the  lands 
up  to  the  river  Halys.  Here  he  met  the  equally  aggressive  armies 
of  the  Medes,  and,  after  a  drawn  battle  with  King  Cyaxares,  made 
a  peace  which  laid  down  the  Halys  as  the  boundary  between  the 
two  empires.  Alyattes  died  in  568  B.C.,  and  was  buried  in  a  great 
barrow  which  he  had  caused  his  subjects  to  pile  up  on  the  Plain  of 
Sardis  during  the  last  years  of  his  life. 

Croesus,  the  son  and  successor  of  Alyattes,  was  by  far  the  most 
powerful  of  the  race  of  the  Mermnadae.     His  enteriDrises  against 

Croesus,  t^i*^  coast-land  were  crowned  with  a  degree  of  success 
568-546  B.C.  which  had  never  been  granted  to  his  ancestors. 
Ephesus,  the  second  town  of  Ionia,  fell  into  his  hands  in  the  very 
commencement  of  his  reign,  and  as  the  various  states  were  too 
jealous  to  unite  in  a  league  against  him,  one  after  the  other  was 
compelled  to  do  him  homage.  Miletus,  which  had  so  successfully 
resisted  his  father,  had  now  sunk  into  a  state  of  decay  consequent 
on  wild  civil  strife.  It  had  just  got  rid  of  a  tyrant,  Thrasybulus, 
the  friend  and  adviser  of  Periander  (see  p.  97).  To  celebrate  their 
freedom,  the   Milesians   fell  to  blows  with  each  other,  and  the 


046  B.C.]  Croesus.  123 

proletariate  vied  with  the  oligarchs  in  deeds  whose  Oriental  atrocity 
shocked  the  whole  Greek  world.  The  inob  beat  the  children  of 
the  rich  to  death  with  flails  on  threshing-floors ;  their  opponents 
replied  by  burning  their  prisoners  alive  in  pitch-coats.  No  help 
was  found  in  Miletus  to  sustain  the  other  states,  and  one  after 
another  the  Ionic  and  Aeolic  cities  of  the  mainland  submitted  to 
Croeeus,  and  began  to  pay  him  tribute.  The  king  even  dreamed 
for  a  moment  of  building  ships,  and  of  attacking  Chios,  Lesbos, 
and  the  other  islands  off  the  coast. 

This  idea  he  had  to  abandon  in  face  of  the  strong  fleets  of  the 
island  states,  and  the  entire  ignorance  of  naval  matters  which  his 
own  warriors  displayed.  But  on  the  mainland  he  was  undisputedly 
supreme  from  the  Hellespont  to  the  Halys.  The  tributes  of  the 
states;  that  owned  him  as  overlord,  and  the  commercial  profits  which 
flowed  into  Sardis,  now  that  the  great  trade-route  between  Asia 
and  the  West  was  entirely  in  Lj^dian  hands,  made  Croesus  wealthy 
beyond  the  wildest  dreams  of  Greek  avarice.  A  whole  cycle  of 
legends  illustrate  his  boundless  resources  and  overweening  self-con- 
fidence, among  them  the  well-known  tale  of  his  interview  with 
Solon,  which  we  have  had  to  relate  elsewhere. 

Croesus  was  no  stolid  Oriental,  but  a  great  admirer  and  patron  of 
Greek  civilization.  He  was  particularly  well  known  for  his  devo- 
tion to  the  Greek  god  Apollo,  whose  temples  at  Branchidae  near 
Miletus,  and  at  Delphi  in  distant  Phocis,  he  crowded  with  gifts  of 
astonishing  magnificence.  He  gladly  received  Greeks  at  his  court, 
and  went  out  of  his  way  to  do  favours  to  the  more  important  states 
across  the  Aegean ;  Sparta,  in  particular,  he  bound  to  his  alliance 
by  a  munificent  gift  of  gold. 

But  while  Croesus  ajopeared  to  be  at  the  height  of  wealth  and 
power,  a  cloud  was  arising  in  the  East  which  portended  ruin  alike 
to  him  and  to  his  Hellenic  subjects. 


CHAPTER   XIV. 

RISE   OF   THE   ACIIAEMEXIAN   EMPIRE  —  CYKIJS    AND    DARIUS  —  COM- 
MENCEMENT  OF   THE   PERSIAN   WARS,   549-520  B.C. 

The  century  wliicli  lay  between  the  years  G20  and  520  b.c.  was 
fraught  with  changes  of  a  more  rapid  and  sweeping  kind  than  had 
ever  before  been  known  in  the  East — changes,  too,  which  were  to 
have  a  direct  influence  on  the  history  of  Greece,  such  as  no  previous 
events  in  Asia  had  ever  exercised.  That  century  saw  the  ruin  of 
five  great  empires — those  of  Assyria,  Media,  Babylon,  Lydia,  and 
Ejypt — and  the  rise  of  a  sixth,  which  absorbed  not  only  all  lands 
that  had  obeyed  the  kings  whom  it  supplanted,  but  vast  additional 
tracts  to  east  and  west,  regions  which  owe  their  first  appearance  in 
history  to  this  conquest.  Finally  the  new  monarchy  came  into 
collision  with  the  Greeks.  Backed  by  the  forces  of  all  nations 
which  dwelt  between  the  Indus  and  the  Aegean,  the  "  Great  King  " 
of  the  East  marched  on  to  deal  with  the  Hellenes  of  Europe  as  his 
predecessors  had  dealt  with  the  Ht-llenes  of  Asia.  But  in  the  Strait 
of  Salamis  and  on  the  plains  of  Plataea  his  projects  came  to  wreck. 
Greece  was  saved,  and  with  Greece  the  future  of  European  civiliza- 
tion. The  West  repelled  the  invading  East  so  thoroughly  that  for 
eleven  hundred  years  no  Oriental  conqueror  again  approached  the 
Hellespont  to  threaten  the  Balkan  Peninsula  with  annexation  to  an 
Asiatic  realm.' 

The  one  considerable  Oriental  power  with  which  the  Greeks 
down  to  the  sixth  century  had  any  prolonged  contact  was,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  the  kingdom  of  L3  dia.     Behind  that  state  lay 

'  Battle  of  Salamis,  480  B.C.  ;  siege  of  Constantinople  by  Chosroes  of 
Persia,  (i'20  a.d. 


circ.  610 B.C.]  Fall  of  N'uievch.  125 

tbe  great  empire  of  Assyria,  which  for  three  hundred  years  had 
formed  by  far  the  strongest  power  in  Asia.  With  the  Assyrian 
kings  the  Greeks  had  not  many  direct  rehitions ;  the  chief  occasion 
on  which  they  had  touched  Hellenic  history  was  when,  in  708  B.C., 
the  conqueror  Sargon  had  received  the  homage  of  the  Greek  princes 
of  Cyprus.  But  though  it  was  only  the  outlying  cities  of  that 
island  which  experienced  the  weight  of  the  hand  of  the  kings  of 
Nineveh,  yet  the  power  and  wealth  of  Assyria  were  well  known  to 
the  Greek.  Wild  tales  of  the  all-conquering  *'  Ninus  "  *  and  the 
luxurious  and  overweening  "  Sardanapalus "  have  been  preserved 
to  attest  the  impression  which  the  kings  of  Asshur  left  on  the 
mmds  of  their  Hellenic  contemporaries.  At  last,  in  ^ 
the  fourth  quarter  of  the  seventh  century,  the  doom  Nmeveh, 
of  Nineveh  came.  A  long  series  of  successful  or  ' 
partially  successful  revolts  began  to  strip  Assyiia  of  her  outlying 
provinces,  and  to  wear  down  the  strength  of  her  armies.  Revolted 
vassals  joined  with  wild  tribes  from  the  north  to  attack  the 
failing  monarchy,  and  Nineveh  collapsed  under  the  weiglit  of 
their  onset.  The  details  are  lost ;  we  only  know  of  the  Greek 
legends  which  tell  how  the  last  king  of  Assyria,  when  his  enemies 
had  burst  within  the  wall,  collected  his  treasures  and  his  gods, 
his  wives  and  his  sons,  on  a  vast  pyre  in  the  court  of  his  palace, 
and  gave  himself  and  them  to  the  flames,  to  balk  the  victors  of 
their  spoil.  Of  an  Oriental  despot,  mad  with  rage  and  despair, 
such  a  tale  need  not  be  false ;  but,  be  it  false  or  true,  we  know 
that  in  some  not  less  dreadful  scene  of  blood  and  fire  the  Assyrian 
monarchy  passed  away. 

Two  princes  had  led  the  attack  on  Nineveh,  and  profited  by  its 
fall.  Nabopolassar,  the  rebel  viceroy  of  Babylon,  annexed  the 
southern  and  western  dominions  of  Assyria.  Cyaxares,  King  of  the 
Medes,  seized  the  northern  and  eastern  provinces.  Of  Nabopolassar 
and  his  more  famous  son,  Nebuchadnezzar,  we  need  not  speak  at 
length.  Their  victories  and  conquests  in  Syria,  Elam,  and  Egypt 
have  no  bearing  on  our  history. 

AVith  the  Medes  it  is  otherwise.     They  were  a  new  race  ana  a 

*  "Ninus  "  is  an  eponj'mous  hero  manufactured  for  the  Ninevites  on  the 
ordinan'  Greek  system.     "  Sardanapalus  "  is  a  corruption  of  the  real  name 

Assur-baiii-jal. 


[2  6  Cyrus  a>id  Darius. 


[610  B.C- 


new  kingdom,  but  they  are  important  to  uS  as  being  the  real 
The  Medes  founders  of  tliat  empire — "  Persian "  as  we  call  it, 
and  Persians,  though  the  earlier  Greeks  knew  it  better  as  "  Median  " 
— which  came  into  such  violent  contact  with  the  Hellenes.  The 
Medes  were  a  portion  of  that  great  body  of  Aryan  tribes  which 
migrated  from  the  north-east,  out  of  the  land  which  was  then 
known  as  Bactria,  towards  the  borders  of  the  Assyrian  kingdom. 
Various  allied  clans  of  this  race  scattered  themselves  over  the  whole 
of  the  great  table-land  of  Iran,  from  the  Caspian  to  the  Indian 
Ocean.  In  some  districts  they  drove  out  the  previous  inhabitants — 
Turanian  tribes  of  low  civilization — in  others  they  dwelt  among 
them ;  in  others,  again,  they  mixed  with  them.  The  most  southern 
section  of  these  invaders  were  the  tribes  of  the  Persians,  over  whom 
reigned  a  house  descended  from  a  certain  unknown  king  Achaemenes. 
The  more  northern  clans  were  the  Medes,  who  had  dwelt  apart 
in  weakness  and  disunion  till  Cyaxares,  in  the  third  quarter  of  the 
seventh  century,  united  them  into  a  compact  monarchy.  The 
Medes  were  much  more  mixed  with  the  previous  inhabitants  of 
the  land  than  were  the  Persians,  and  had  adopted  in  a  large 
measure  the  customs  and  religion  of  their  jiredecessors.  The 
Persians,  a  more  vigorous  but  ruder  and  less  numerous  race,  kept 
themselves  free  from  such  intermixture  in  their  mountainous  homes 
on  the  coast  of  the  Erythraean  Sea.  They  were  a  poor  and  hardy 
race,  rough  leather-clad  shepherds  and  ploughmen,  who  dwelt  in  a 
land  which  seemed  scanty  and  rugged  to  the  richer  inhabitants  of 
the  plains.  The  ten  tribes  which  composed  the  nation  dwelt 
apart,  only  connected  by  a  loose  subjection  to  the  house  of  the 
Achaemenidae,  and  by  the  national  religion  which  they  had  brought 
with  them  from  Bactria. 

"While  the  common  ancestors  of  Medes  and  Persians  were  still 
dwelling  by  the  Oxus,  they  had  adopted  a  religion  called  Zoro- 
Their  astrianism,  from  the  name  of  Zoroaster  the  great  sage 
religion.  ^^^-^^  preacher  who  is  said  to  have  converted  his  country- 
men to  it.  This  faith  is  a  "  dualistic  "  system,  which  refers  all  the 
changes  of  the  world,  moral  and  physical,  to  the  constant  and  unend- 
ing struggle  of  two  opposing  deities.  Ormuzd,  "  the  spirit  of  wisdom 
and  light,  the  very  great  and  very  good,  the  lord  of  perfection  and 
activity,  of  intelligence,  growth,  and  beauty,"  was  the  creator  of  the 


049 B.C.]  The  Median  Empire.  127 

universe,  and  endeavours  to  rule  it  with  wisdom  and  benevolence. 
But  his  efforts  are  being  continually  hampered  by  the  evil  god  Ahri- 
man,  "  the  spirit  of  darkness  and  malice,  of  crime,  sin,  and  ugliness." 
The  whole  life  of  a  pious  Persian  was  a  crusade  against  Ahriman  and 
all  his  works,  and  an  endeavour  to  work  out  the  purpose  of  Ormuzd, 
to  whom  sacrifice  was  made,  not  in  temples  or  shrines,  but  on 
lofty  heights,  where  a  sacred  fire  was  kept  ever  burning  in  honour 
of  the  god  of  light.  The  Medes  had  perverted  Zoroastrianism, 
by  endeavouring  to  conciliate  Ahriman  and  his  angels  rather 
than  to  help  Ormuzd ;  and  their  religion  had  thus  become  a 
kind  of  "devil-worship,"  in  which  their  priests,  the  Magians, 
pretended  to  ward  off  the  spirits  of  evil  by  sacrifices  and  incan- 
tations. 

The  empire  which  Cyaxares  the  Mede  had  founded  after  the 
fall  of  Nineveh,  stretched  from  the  confines  of  Bactria  to  the 
Lydian  frontier  on  the  Halys,  where  it  had  been  fixed  since 
the  indecisive  struggle  with  King  Alyattes.  Both  Cyaxares  and 
his  contemporary  Nebuchadnezzar,  the  great  King  of  Babylon,  had 
long  been  dead  when  a  new  conqueror  arose  to  shatter  both  their 
empires.  Between  Babylonia  and  Persia  lay  the  land  of  Elam, 
which  had  long  been  a  vassal  state  to  its  Western  neighbour.  But 
after  the  death  of  Nebuchadnezzar  it  had  apparently  fallen  into 
subjection  to  the  Medes,  under  Ast3^ages,  the  successor  of  Cyaxares. 
Elam  was  now  ruled  by  a  prince  of  the  house  of  the  Achaemenidae, 
not  sprung  from  the  same  line  as  reigned  in  Persia,  but  from  a 
family  which  claimed  cousinship  with  the  older  branch,  and  must 
have  migrated  into  Elam  from  Persia  a  few  generations  back. 
Cyrus,  "  son  of  Cambyses,  son  of  Cyrus,  son  of  Te'ispes,  son  of 
Achacmenes,  of  the  ancient  seed-royal,"  now  dwelt  at  Susa,  and 
reigned  as  a  vassal  of  Astyages  the  Mede. 

So  many  legends  have  grown  up  around  the  name  of  Cyrus  that 
it  is  disappointing  to  remember  how  little  is  really  known  of  him. 
The  Greeks  believed  that  he  was  the  grandchild  of  Astyages  the 
Mede,  by  a  daughter  who  had  been  married  to  a  Persian  of  middle 
rank,  in  order  to  avert  a  prophecy  that  threatened  harm  to  the 
Median  king  from  an  over-powerful  grandson.  But  we  know  that 
Cambyses,  the  father  of  Cyrus,  was  a  reigning  king,  and  have  no 
proof  that  any  relationship  existed  between  Cyrus  and  Astyages. 


128 


Cy/us  and  Darius. 


ICOO  B.C. 


649 B.C.]  The  Rise  of  Cyrus  129 

In  549  B.C.  Media  and  Babj-lon  were  at  war,  when  the  King  of 
Elam  suddenly  attacked  his  suzerain  from  the  rear.  Astyages  was 
defeated  in  battle,  after  which  his  array  revolted,  put  Kiseofcyrus 
their  master  in  bonds,  and  delivered  him  up  to  Cyrus.  S49B.o. 
Apparently  the  fact  that  the  conqueior  was  an  Aryan  of  the  royal 
blood,  and  of  a  race  nearly  allied  to  themselves,  inclined  the  Medcs 
to  submission.  They  became  the  followers  rather  than  the  subjects 
of  Cyrus,  and  the  transference  of  the  seat  of  empire  from  Median 
Ecbatana  to  Elamite  Susa  was  well-nigh  the  only  mark  of  the 
change  which  had  taken  place.  The  Greeks  saw  so  little  difference 
that  they  continued  to  call  the  great  Asiastic  power  Median,  as 
though  Astyages  had  still  been  ou  the  throne. 

After  his  first  victory  Cyrus  received  homage  from  the  vassal 
kings  who  had  served  the  Mede,  including  his  own  relatives  in 
Persia.  Then  he  turned  against  nations  whom  the  Mede  had 
left  unconquered.  For  twenty  years  he  was  continually  passing 
from  west  to  east  and  from  east  to  west  in  his  career  of  conquest, 
and  seldom  did  he  fail  to  add  to  his  empire  the  district  against 
which  he  marched. 

The  dangerous  power  which  Cyrus  had  built  up  brought  about 
an  alliance  between  the  three  states  who  were  most  likely  to  suffer 
from  his  growing  strength,     Croesus  of  Lydia  ioined 

'^  °        .     "  J  J  War  of  Cyrus 

to  himself  Nabonadius  of  Babylon   and  Amasis  of  andcroesus, 
Egypt,  who  in  a  common  fear  suspended  the  incessant  '  * 

wars  which  had  raged  between  their  empires  since  the  fall  of 
Nineveh,  Besides  his  two  royal  confederates,  Croesus  is  said  to 
have  hoped  to  enlist  the  Spartans  in  his  cause,  as  he  was  their  good 
friend  and  ally.  But  Avhether  it  be  true  or  not  that  he  reckoned 
on  Greek  troops  to  aid  his  army,  it  is  certain  that  he  went  to  war 
buoj'ed  up  by  promises  of  victory  from  Greek  oracles.  His  lavish 
gifts  of  massive  gold  ingots  and  vessels  remained  long  after  at 
Delphi,  to  show  the  honour  in  which  he  held  the  gods  of  the  West, 
and  the  importance  which  he  attached  to  their  advice.  Apollo,  we 
are  told,  answered,  when  consulted  by  the  Lydian  ambassadors, 
that  "  Croesus,  if  he  crossed  the  Halys,  would  destroy  a  great 
empire."  Forgetting  that  the  cautiously  worded  oracle  would 
apply  to  his  own  realm  as  much  as  to  that  of  Cyrus,  the  Lydiau 
king  declared  war,  and  invaded  Cappadocia  at  the  head  of  tho 

K 


130  Cyrus  and  Darius.  [546  b.c. 

forces  of  the  Lydians  and  all  the  tribes  suhjoct  to  him  l>ct\veen  tho 
Halys  and  the  Aegean  (546  B.C.). 

Tiie  dominions  of  Cyrus  stretched  westward  so  as  to  cut  off 
Babylon  from  Lydia,  and  he  was  thus  able  to  prevent  his  two 
chief  enemies  from  joining.  The  Egyptians  were  too  far  oft"  to  be 
promptly  on  the  scene,  and  Croesus  alone  had  to  face  the  brunt  of 
the  contest.  Neglecting  Nabonadius  for  the  moment,  Cyrus  threw 
himself  on  the  Lydians.  In  the  Cappadocian  district  of  Pteria 
the  two  armies  fought  a  bloody  but  indecisive  combat,  which  re- 
called the  similar  engagement  when  Cyaxares  and  Alyattes  had  met 
on  the  same  spot  some  sixty  years  earlier.  The  troops  of  Cyrus 
retired  a  few  miles  after  the  battle,  and  Croesus,  who  had  sufiered 
too  heavily  to  pursue  them,  concluded  that  the  campaign  was  over. 
Accordingly  he  dismissed  his  allies  and  marched  home,  determined 
to  raise  a  larger  army  before  committing  himself  again  to  the 
chances  of  war.  But  Cyrus,  though  checked,  was  not  beaten.  When 
he  heard  of  the  break-up  of  the  Lydian  armament,  he  turned  on 
his  way  and  followed  hard  on  the  steps  of  Croesus.  So  rapidly 
did  he  pursue,  that  his  enemy  was  compelled  to  turn  to  fight  in 
front  of  his  capital,  the  strong  fortress  of  Sardis,  long  ere  the 
dispersed  contingents  could  rejoin  him.  Croesus,  crushed  by 
numbers,  was  routed  and  compelled  to  shut  himself  up  in  Sardis, 
which  fell  quite  unexpectedly  before  a  sudden  assault,  only  fourteen 
Fau  of  Croesus,  ^''^js  ^^^^''^  the  siege  had  commenced.     Greek  legend 

546  B.C.  ]jad  much  to  say  of  the  fate  of  Croesus ;  it  told 
how  the  victor  condemned  him  to  death  by  fire,  and  how,  as  the 
flames  began  to  mount,  Cyrus  reflected  on  the  vicissitudes  of 
human  fortune,  and  repented  of  his  cruel  orders.  When  no  human 
intervention  could  have  stayed  the  fire,  Apollo,  it  was  said,  in- 
terfered to  save  the  man  who  had  so  richly  endowed  his  temple  at 
Delphi,  and  a  miraculous  shower  of  rain  extinguished  the  blazing 
pyre,  and  enabled  Cyrus  to  show  a  tardy  clemency  towards  his 
prisoner. 

The  spectacle  of  a  powerful  and  wealthy  state  dashed  down  in 
the  midst  of  its  glory  profoundly  affected  the  mind  of  the  Greeks. 
No  such  catastrophe  had  previously  taken  place  so  closely  before 
their  eyes,  or  ended  with  such  dramatic  suddenness.  Their  theory 
of  Nemesis,  the  inevitable  retribution  which  follows  on  pride  and 


544  B.C.]  The  Persians  conquer  Ionia.  131 

over-prosperity,  found  in  Croesus  a  striking  illustration.  A 
hundred  tales  were  framed  to  show  how  his  self-confidence,  his 
wealth  and  courage  liberality  and  ambition,  contrasted  with  his 
sudden  and  complete  fall.  Thus  the  outlines  of  his  real  character 
and  the  details  of  his  real  fate,  come  down  to  us  blurred  and 
exaggerated,  though  still  recognizable,  through  the  haze  of  legend 
which  surrounded  him. 

The  vanishing  of  the  Lydian  empire  brought  the  Greeks  of  Ionia 
and  Aeolis  into  direct  relations  with  Cyrus.  The  Milesians  at 
once  did  homage  to  him,  accepting  the  same  semi-  conquest  of 
independent  position  which  they  had  already  enjoyed  p'ersians.^ 
under  Croesus.  1'he  other  states  of  the  coast  made  546-544  b.c. 
,a  stand,  and  endeavoured  to  win  back  their  freedom.  Although 
the  Lacedaemonians  refused  them  help,  they  found  allies  in  the 
warlike  Carians  and  Lycians,  and  in  Pactyas,  a  Lydian  chief  who 
endeavoured  to  rouse  his  newly  conquered  countrymen  to  revolt. 
Cyrus,  who  was  set  on  greater  projects  than  the  subjection  of  a 
few  rebellious  towns,  turned  off  to  subdue  his  Eastern  enemies,  and 
left  behind  him  ah  army,  under  a  Median  noble  named  Mazares, 
to  complete  the  conquest  of  Asia  Minor.  This  chief  put  down  the 
Lydiau  revolt,  and  then  moving  against  the  lonians  captured  and 
sacked  Priene,  and  wasted  the  whole  plain  of  the  Maeander.  At 
this  juncture  he  died,  and  was  succeeded  by  Harpagus,  another 
Mede,  who  had  played  a  great  part  in  the  deposition  of  Astyages, 
and  was  much  trusted  by  Cyrus.  Ilarjiagus  besieged  Phocaea  and 
Teos,  whose  inhabitants,  when  their  position  began  to  grow 
desperate,  escaped  by  sea,  and  betook  themselves  to  distant  sliores 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  Great  King's  arm.  The  Teians  migrated 
to  Abdera  in  Thrace,  which  ere  long  became  the  largest  town  on 
the  north  shore  of  the  Aegean.  The  Phocaeans,  sailing  into  the 
far  West,  landed  at  Alalia,  a  harbour  in  Corsica,  and  endeavoured 
to  deal  with  that  island  as  their  Ionic  kinsmen,  two  hundred  years 
before,  had  dealt  with  Sicily.  But  Alalia  was  not  to  be  to  Corsica 
what  Naxos  had  been  to  the  larger  island.  After  a  hopeless  struggle 
of  five  years  with  the  united  navies  of  Carthage  and  Etruria,  the 
Phocaeans  were  constrained  to  abandon  their  new  settlement. 
Some  of  them  sailed  north  to  join  the  old  Phocaean  colony  of 
Massilia   in   Gaul,  which    grew  largely  in   importance    from    this 


132  Cyrus  and  Darius.  [544 b.o. 

sudden  increase  of  i^opulation.     The  rest  founded  the  new  town 
of  Hyele  (Velin)  on  the  Lucanian  coast,  south  of  Poseidonia. 

The  remaining  Greek  cities  of  Asia  showed  no  such  desperate 
determination  to  avoid  the  Persian  yoke.  After  a  certain  amount 
of  ill-combined  resistance,  they  opened  their  gates  to  Harpagus. 
The  islanders  were  no  less  impressed  with  the  futility  of  further 
resistance  than  the  inhabitants  of  the  mainland,  and  Lesbos  and 
Chios,  as  well  as  Ephesus  and  Smyrna,  acknowledged  Cyrus  as 
their  suzerain.  Polycrates,  tyrant  of  Samos,  alone  maintained  his 
independence ;  he  owned  the  largest  navy  on  the  eastern  shore 
of  the  Aegean,  and  as  the  Persian  king  had  not  yet  become 
master  of  a  fleet,  hoped  to  retain  his  island  and  his  "  thalassocracy  " 
undisturbed.  His  independence  was  no  great  benefit  to  Hellas, 
for  his  piratical  galleys  kept  the  whole  eastern  Aegean  in  awe, 
and  had  succeeded  to  the  old  maritime  predominance  of  Miletus. 
Polycrates  lived  and  flourished  by  plunder.  He  was  wont  to  say 
that  "  he  made  a  rule  to  rob  every  one  alike,  because  he  found  that 
his  friends  were  more  grateful  on  getting  their  stolen  wealth  back, 
than  they  ever  would  have  been  if  it  had  remained  undisturbed  in 
their  possession." 

Harpagus  did  not  impose  onerous  terms  on  the  Greeks  of  Asia. 
They  were  bound  to  pay  an  annual  tribute,  and  to  supply  armed 
contingents  when  the  king  called  for  them,  but  the  internal 
governments  of  their  cities  were  left  unmolested.  The  state  where 
a  tyrant  ruled  remained  under  that  tyrant's  power ;  democracies 
were  still  democratic,  and  oligarchies  no  less  oligarchic  than  in 
the  days  of  full  autonomy. 

Aided  by  Ionian   and  Aeolian   troops,  Harpagus    subdued   the 

Greeks  of  Doris,  and  their  barbarian  neighbours  the   peoples  of 

Caria  and   Lycia.      Meanwhile   Cyrus   himself    was 

Babylon,     pushing  his  fortunes  in  Upper  Asia,  and  in  a  series 

538  B.C.      ^^  campaigns  brought  his  frontier  up  to  India  and 

the  borders  of  the  great  central  plateau  of  the  Pamir.     He  even 

penetrated  to  the  far  north-east,  and  subdued  many  of  the  wild 

Sacae,  who  dwelt  in  the  extreme  limits  of  Tartary.     lu  538  B.C. 

he  turned  back  again  to  deliver  an  attack  on  Babylon.     Crossing 

the  Tigris,  he  defeated  King  Nabonadius  in  a  pitched  battle ;  a  few 

days   later   Sippara,   the   second   town  in   the  kingdom,  fell   by 


529  B.C.]  Death  of  Cyrus.  133 

treachery.  Then  Babylon  itself  yielded  without  fighting,  and  its 
empire  was  at  an  end.  The  king,  who  fled  with  the  remnant  of 
his  army,  was  pursued  and  taken  prisoner,  and  Cyrus  reigned  wilh 
undisputed  authority  in  Chaldaea,  Mesopotamia,  and  Syria. 

It  might  now  have  appeared  natural  for  Cyrus  to  turn  Lis  arms 
against  Egypt,  the  last  surviving  power  of  those  which  had  allied 
themselves  against  him  in  546  B.C.  But  of  such  an  endeavour  wo 
hear  nothing.  On  the  contrary,  the  remaining  nine  years  of 
Cyrus's  life  and  reign  would  seem  to  have  been  comparatively 
peaceful.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  he  continued  to  extend  his 
borders  eastward,  and  occupied  the  upper  valley  of  the  Indus,  and 
wide  tracts  beyond  the  river  Oxus,  in  the  region  of  Sogdiana  and 
Chorasmia.  At  last,  in  529  B.C.,  he  led  an  attack  on  Death  of  Gyrus, 
the  Massagetae,  a  nomad  tribe  who  dwelt  beyond  529  b.c. 
Sogdiana,  in  what  is  now  the  south  of  Siberia.  While  engaged  in 
battle  with  this  race  the  old  king  was  slain.  His  army  turned 
back  and  brought  his  body  to  be  buried  at  Pasargadae,  among  tlie 
sepulchres  of  the  royal  house  of  Achaemenes. 

Cyrus  was  a  favourable  example  of  a  great  Oriental  conqueror. 
That  he  was  brave,  persevering,  and  full  of  resource,  is  evident ; 
it  is  even  more  to  his  credit  that  we  find  connected  with  his  name 
none  of  those  wholesale  acts  of  cruelty  and  massacre  which  mark 
the  career  of  a  Nebuchadnezzar  or  an  Attila.  But  he  would  seem 
to  have  been  more  of  a  general  than  an  administrator.  He  could 
form  the  motley  tribes  of  Asia  into  a  conquering  army,  but  he 
made  no  attempt  to  bind  them  into  an  organized  empire.  Accord- 
ingly disruptive  tendencies  lurked  in  every  province,  which  only 
awaited  the  removal  of  the  master's  hand  to  display  themselves  in 
full  vigour.  Cyrus,  like  his  Median  kinsmen,  had  not  remained 
faithful  to  the  ancient  faith  of  his  race;  he  was  not  a  whole- 
hearted worshipper  of  Orrauzd,  but  had  learnt  from  his  Elamite 
subjects  to  worship  other  gods,  and  notably  Merodach,  the  patron 
of  Babylon,  in  whose  honour  he  was  ever  zealous. 

Cyrus  was  succeeded  by  his  son  Cambyses,  a  cruel  and  reckless 
but  strong-handed  tyrant,  Avhose  rule  contmsted  most  cambyses  cou- 
uufavourably  with  that  of  his  father.     His  reign  of  quers  Egypt, 

526  B  C. 

eight  years  (529-521  b.c.)  is  mainly  memorable  for 

the  conquest  of  Egypt  and  its  dependencies.    Phoenicia  and  Cyprus 


134  Cyrus  and  Darius.  [SseB.c. 

submitted  to  him  when  he  marched  against  Amasis,  the  Egyptian 
king.  He  was  therefore  able  to  bring  up  a  strong  fleet  of  Phoeni- 
cian, Cypriot,  and  Ionian  vessels  to  aid  his  land  armj'.  In  a  decisive 
battle  at  Pelusium  he  overthrew  Psammetichus  II.,  who  had  just 
succeeded  his  father  Amasis.  Many  thousands  of  Greek  mercenaries 
had  been  serving  in  the  ranks  of  the  Egyptians,  and  the  fact  that 
they  had  proved  utterly  unable  to  resist  the  troops  of  Cambyses 
made  a  deep  and  discouraging  impression  on  the  mind  of  the 
Hellenes  of  Europe,  who  feared  ere  long  to  suffer  the  fate  of  their 
Asiatic  brethren.  Egypt  needed  no  second  blow,  and  its  subjection 
was  followed  by  that  of  the  Libyans  and  their  neighbours  the 
Greek  colonists  of  Gyrene  and  Barca. 

Cambyses  tarried  long  in  Egypt,  winning  an  unenviable  reputa- 
tion. He  may  have  conciliated  the  Egyptians  to  a  certain  extent 
by  the  enthusiastic  worship  which  he  gave  their  gods,  for  his 
predilection  towards  polytheism  was  no  less  marked  than  that  of 
his  father  had  been.^  But  among  his  own  subjects  he  grew  to  be 
hated  more  and  more.  He  wasted  his  soldiery  in  distant  expeditions 
of  the  maddest  character,  while  his  savage  and  suspicious  treatment 
of  his  nobles  and  courtiers,  whose  lives  he  was  continually  taking  on 
the  pretext  of  imaginary  treasons,  filled  his  palace  with  enemies. 

C}TUS  had  left  a  son  named  Bardes,"  a  whole-brother  to  Cambyses, 
ivho  was  regarded  with  hatred  by  the  young  king.  Before  starting 
on  his  Egyptian  expedition  Cambyses  had  his  brother  secretly 
slain.  This  was  not  generally  known,  and  an  ambitious  Magian 
priest  named  Gomates,  who  chanced  to  resemble  the  murdered 
prince,  resolved  to  take  advantage  of  the  secret  crime.  Knowing 
that  Cambyses  was  generally  detested,  he  gave  himself  out  to  be 

Death  of     *^^  missing  Bardes,  and  claimed  the  throne.    A  general 

Cambyses,    rising  in  his  favour  took  place  in  Persia  Media  and  all 

the  neighbouring  provinces.     Cambyses  started  off  to 

suppress  it,  but  while  passing  through  Syria  was  so  discouraged  at 

the  universality  of  the  revolt  that  he  committed  suicide  (521  B.C.). 

The  Magian  impostor  now  reigned  for  a  few  months  under  the 
name  of  Bardes.  But  his  suspicious  behaviour,  and  the  anxiety 
with  which  he  proceeded  to  seek  out  and  slay  all  who  had  known 

'  All  the  stories  about  Cambyses's  crusade  against  the  Egyptian  gods 
seem  to  be  mere  inventions.  -  The  Greeks  called  him  Smerdia. 


613B.C.;  The  Early    Years  of  Darius.  135 

the  prince  whom  he  personated,  provoked  remark.  Then  Darius, 
son  of  Hystaspes,  a  prince  of  the  royal  house  of  Persia,  with  only 
six  followers  to  back  him,  sought  out  the  impostor,  and  slew  him  in 
the  fort  of  Sichtachotes,  by  a  sudden  attack  in  the  night-time. 

Darius  was  not  of  that  branch  of  the  house  of  Achaemenes 
which  had  ruled  in  Elam,  and  had  produced  Cyrus  and  Cambyses. 
His  progenitors  had  borne  sway  in  Persia  Proper,  and  Darius, 
had  been  distmct  for  three  generations  from  the  521-485  B.C. 
Elamite  branch  of  the  family.  It  was  not  unnatural,  therefore, 
that  the  subjects  of  Cambyses  refused  to  see  in  Darius  their  late 
master's  heir.  The  whole  empire  broke  up  in  hopeless  anarchy. 
Babylon  and  Media  asserted  their  independence  under  princes 
who  claimed  to  represent  the  lines  of  ISTabouadius  and  Cyaxares. 
Armenia,  Parthia,  Sarangia,  and  well-nigh  all  the  x^rovinces  ot 
the  East,  followed  their  example.  Where  a  native  rebellion  did 
not  occur,  the  governors  showed  signs  of  wishing  to  make  them- 
selves as  little  dependent  as  possible  on  the  central  power.  But 
Darius  was  a  man  of  genius — a  greater  than  Cyrus  himself ;  for 
in  the  East  it  has  always  been  far  more  easy  to  build  up  a 
new  empire  than  to  reconstruct  an  old  one  which  has  gone  to 
pieces.  By  ceaseless  activity  and  long-continued  struggles,  he  suc- 
ceeded in  crushing  the  eight  pretenders  who  had  dismembered 
the  eastern  provinces,  and  in  removing  or  destroying  the  dis- 
obedient satraps  Among  Darius's  victims  of  the  second  class 
was  Oroetes,  governor  of  Lydia,  who  had  during  the  anarchy 
played  a  foul  trick  on  Polycrates,  the  tyrant  of  Samos.  Polycrates 
was  a  keen  lover  of  money,  and  held  no  act  mean  and  undignified 
which  filled  his  treasury.  Oroetes  sent  word  to  him  that  he  was 
about  to  fly  from  the  wrath  of  his  master,  and  besought  him  to 
take  his  money  and  himself  across  to  safety  in  Samos.  When 
Polycrates  came  to  meet  the  supposed  wealthy  fugitive  on  the 
shore  of  the  mainland,  he  was  kidnapped,  taken  inland,  and  cruci- 
fied. Thus  ignominiously  ended  the  man  whose  fleet  swayed  the 
Aegean,  who  had  repelled  the  Lacedaemonians,  preserved  his 
independence  from  Cyrus,  and  won  a  reputation  for  wealth  second 
only  to  that  of  Croesus  himself  (?  520  b.c). 

His  realm  once  mastered,  Darius  set  tD  work  to  reorganize  it 
(516  B.C.).    As  recast  by  him,  it  can  now  for  the  first  time  be  called 


136  Cyrus  and  Darius.  [510  b.c. 

with  accuracy  the  "  Persian  Empire,"  for  his  predecessors  had  not 
been  kings  of  Persia,  nor  had  they  professed  the  national  faith  of 
that  country.  Darius  was  not  only  hereditary  chief  of  Persia,  but 
also  a  zealous  Zoroastrian,  and  a  fanatical  foe  to  the  debased  and 
heretical  creed  of  the  Medes  and  their  Magi.  He  called  it  "  the 
Lie,"  and  traced  all  the  evils  through  which  the  empire  had  passed 
to  its  prevalence.  "  All  that  I  have  done,"  he  wrote,  "  I  have 
done  by  the  help  of  Ormuzd;  and  Ormuzd  brought  me  help 
because  I  was  not  heretical,  nor  a  believer  in  tbe  Lie,  nor  a  tyrant." 
But  although  he  broke  with  the  religious  traditions  of  Lis  prede- 
cessors and  recast  their  administrative  system,  Darius  was  in  every 
true  sense  their  heir.  He  continued  to  make  Susa,  the  Elamite 
home  of  Cyrus,  his  capital,  and  did  not  remove  his  seat  to  his 
native  Persepolis  or  Pasargadae. 

The  system  on  which  Darius  reorganized  his  empire  was  that  of 

satrajDies.     Instead  of  allowing  his  dominions  to  remain  a  hetero- 

The         geneous  mass  of  vassal  states  and  fully  subjected  dis- 

satrapies.  tricts,  he  distributed  the  whole  into  twenty-three 
provinces,  each  govei'ned  by  a  satiap,  or  civil  governor,  a  military 
commander,  and  a  royal  secretary.  The  satrap  had  full  authority 
in  all  things  save  the  disposition  of  the  troops  in  his  territory,  the 
one  privilege  which  could  have  rendered  him  a  dangerous  subject. 
The  general  received  his  orders  from  the  king,  but  had  to  look  for 
the  pay  and  maintenance  of  his  troops  to  the  satrap.  The  secretary 
was  specially  charged  with  the  duty  of  informing  the  king  of  the 
conduct  of  his  two  colleagues,  and  all  the  orders  of  the  satrap 
had  to  pass  through  his  hands.  The  three  rival  powers  created 
a  balance  which  left  all  things  ultimatelj^  depending  on  the  king, 
if  only  the  king  had  the  industry  and  mental  grasp  required  to 
keep  the  system  in  order.  The  vassal  states  of  the  empire  were 
now  placed  directly  under  the  satrap,  and  though  they  retained  their 
internal  institutions,  were  comj^elled  to  obey  him  with  as  much 
punctuality  as  if  he  had  been  the  king  himself.  Lender  Darius's 
new  system  the  empire  began  to  flourish  in  an  unexampled 
manner ;  his  care  was  especially  rewarded  by  the  rapid  increase  of 
his  revenue — a  fact  which  so  pleased  liim  that  the  Persians  ob- 
served that  "  Cyrus  had  the  soul  of  a  father,  Cambyses  that  of  a 
master,  Darius  that  of  a  shopkeeper." 


The  Satrapies  of  Darius. 


137 


CHAPTER  XV. 

DARIUS   AND   THE   GREKKS — THE   lOKIAN   REVOLT. 

When  Dcarius  had  reorganized  his  empire  and  estaUished  peace 
and  quietness  within  it,  he  showed  himself  no  less  enamoured  of 
the  delights  of  foreign  conquest  than  his  predecessors.  North  and 
south  of  his  dominions  lay  only  deserts  and  steppes,  or  tracts  of 
sea.  But  to  the  east  and  west  were  lands  worth  conquering. 
Darius's  first  foreign  expeditions  were  pushed  in  the  direction  of 
India ;  he  not  only  subdued  the  whole  "  land  of  the  five  rivers," 
which  we  now  call  the  Punjaub,  but  built  a  fleet  on  the  Upper 
Indus,  and  sent  it  down  to  the  mouth  of  that  river,  and  along  the 
shores  of  the  Erythraean  Sea  and  the  coast  of  Arabia,  right  round 
to  Suez.  His  admiral,  the  Greek  Scylax  of  Caryanda,  wrote  an 
account  of  this  adventurous  voyage. 

In  about  510  B.C.,  however,  Darius  turned  his  attention  to  the 
west,  and  the  Greeks  of  Hellas  heard  with  terror  that  an  expedition 
.     .       was  preparing  to  cross  the  water  into  Europe.    Samos, 
scythia,      the  last  independent  Greek  island  off  the  coast  of  Asia, 
circ.  512B.C.  ^^^  already  fallen  into  Darius's  hands,  the  tyrant 
Maeandrius,  who  had  succeeded  the  murdered  Polycrates,  being  in 
no  condition  to  withstand  the  Persian  attack.     But,  on  first  cross- 
ing the  Bosphorus,   Darius  set  himself  a  more  unprofitable  task 
than  the  conquest  of  Hellas.      After  receiving  the  homage  of  the 
Greek  towns  of  the  coast  and  the  numerous  Thracian   tribes  in 
the  valley  of  the  Hebrus,  the  king  did  not  proceed  westward  in  the 
direction  of  Macedon  and  Thessaly,  but  set  his  face  towards  the 
wild  north.     He  crossed  the  Balkans  and  arrived  at  the  Danube. 
There  he  moored  his  fleet,  which  had  followed  him  up  the  coast, 
in  the  form  of  a  bridge  of  boats,  and  threw  his  army  across  it  into 


Circ.  612B.C.]  Darius  i?i  Scythia.  139 

the  inelaacholy  treeless  waste  of  the  South  Russian  steppes.  The 
Scythians  were  the  foe  at  whom  he  struck,  moved,  it  is  said,  by 
a  fanciful  desire  to  pay  off  on  them  the  insult  of  invasion  which 
they  had  inflicted  on  Asia  in  the  reign  of  Cyaxares  the  Mede. 
The  nomad  horsemen  of  the  steppes  made  no  attempt  to  with- 
stand the  great  king  in  tattle.  They  drove  off  their  herds  into 
the  interior,  and  dogged  the  steps  of  the  Persian  army  without 
attacking  it.  For  more  than  two  months  Darius  marched  through 
a  desolate  land,  seeking  an  enemy  who  was  always  in  sight  but 
never  in  reach.  At  last  it  was  evident  that  nothing  could  be 
done  against  the  Scythians ;  the  provisions  were  well-nigh  spent, 
the  strength  of  men  and  animals  was  giving  out,  and  Darius  gave 
the  signal  for  retreat.  The  Scythians  turned  and  followed  hard  on 
him,  picking  up  all  his  stragglers,  and  many  sick  whom  he  had  to 
abandon  on  the  way  for  want  of  transport.  Thus  the  king  returned 
to  the  Danube  without  any  great  disaster  such  as  has  attended 
other  invaders  of  the  Russian  plain,  but  disgusted  with  an  utterly 
fruitless  and  abortive  expedition. 

It  was  well  for  Darius  that  he  found  his  fleet,  with  its  stores  of 
provisions  and  material,  where  he  had  left  it.  When  his  absence 
had  been  so  long  protracted,  many  of  the  Greek  jj^itjades  and 
captains  of  the  armament  schemed  to  abandon  their  *^^  bridgo. 
post,  and  draw  off  the  fleet  to  their  homes.  For  Darius,  of  whom 
they  had  no  news,  might,  for  all  they  knew,  have  perished  in  the 
waste;  and  if  not,  that  consummation  might  yet  befall  him  if  he 
were  abandoned,  bridgeless  and  foodless,  on  the  further  bank  of 
the  impassable  river.  Miltiades  the  Athenian,  tyrant  of  the 
Thracian  Chersonese, — who  was  one  of  the  new  vassals  acquired  by 
Darius  since  he  crossed  the  Hellespont, — was  set  on  sailing  away; 
and  he  would  have  led  off  the  whole  fleet  with  him,  had  he  not 
been  resisted  by  Histiaeus,  tyrant  of  Miletus,  who  pointed  out  to 
the  rulers  of  the  Ionian  towns  that  their  interest  was  bound  up 
with  that  of  their  master,  since  the  fall  of  the  Persian  rule  would 
infallibly  be  followed  by  a  democratic  revolution  in  every  Greek 
town.  The  bridge,  therefore,  was  preserved,  and  by  its  means 
Darius  and  his  army  came  safely  back  into  Thrace.  As  was  not 
unnatural,  the  king  took  Histiaeus  into  high  favour,  and  made  him 
one  of  his  council.     But  when  he  showed  such  esteem  for  him  that 


140       Darius  and  the  Greeks — The  Ionian  HeVolL  {bidB.c. 

he  insisted  on  the  Greek  remaining  permanently  with  the  court 
and  dwelling  at  Susa,  far  from  his  Milesian  home,  Histiaeus  was 
anything  rather  than  contented,  and  set  his  wits  to  work  to  find 
some  device  for  getting  himself  sent  down  to  Ionia. 

When  he  returned  home  after  the  Scythian  expedition,  Darius 
left  Megabazus  with  eighty  thousand  men  in  Thrace,  to  complete 
the  conquest  of  that  country,  and  to  push  the  Persian  border  as  far 
westward  as  he  could.  The  general  proved  equal  to  the  task  ;  he 
took  Perinthus  and  several  other  Greek  towns  which  refused  to 
open  their  gates,  subdued  the  Thracians  of  the  coast,  and  the 
Paeonians  of  the  lower  Strymon  valley,  and  reached  the  frontier  of 
Macedon.  Amyntas,  king  of  that  country,  made  no  endeavour  to 
preserve  his  freedom  by  force  of  arms.  Ho  did  homage  to  the 
King  of  Persia,  by  sending  him  the  symbolical  gifts  of  earth  and 
water,  A  tribute  was  imposed  on  Macedon,  and  by  its  submission 
the  Achaemeniau  empire  was  brought  to  the  borders  of  'I'hessaly, 
the  frontier  state  of  Greece  Proper.  It  seemed  as  if  the  next 
campaign  must  commence  with  an  invasion  of  Hellas,  and  so 
successful  had  the  Persian  arms  been  in  their  attacks  on  Greek 
states,  that  no  one  was  free  from  the  fear  that  invasion  must 
necessarily  mean  conquest.  But  this  wos  not  to  be :  nearly  a 
quarter  of  a  century  more  was  to  elapse  before  the  hosts  of  the 
Great  King  forced  the  passes  of  Terape  and  descended  into  the 
Thessalian  Plain. 

While  Megabazus  was  threatening  the  Greeks  of  the  mainland, 

Artaphernes,  satrap  of  Lydia,  was  carrying  out  another  expedition 

„,    „     .        ac;ainst  the  Greeks  of  the  islands.    Sedition  was  raging 

The  Persians     °  00 

at  Naxos.  at  the  time  in  Naxos,  the  largest  and  most  fertile  and 
populous  of  the  Cyclades.  Aristagoras — cousin  and 
son-in-law  of  the  expatriated  Histiaeus — who  now  ruled  at  Miletus 
as  regent  for  his  kinsman,  thought  to  gain  credit  with  his  Persian 
masters  by  winning  the  island  for  them.  He  persuaded  Darius 
to  authorize  an  expedition  against  Naxos,  and  received  command 
of  a  fleet  of  two  hundred  vessels  to  effect  the  conquest.  But 
Artaphernes,  out  of  distrust  of  the  Milesian,  procured  that 
Megabates,  a  Persian  noble,  should  be  given  him  as  second-in- 
command.  This  man,  like  Aristagoras  himself,  was  of  a  fiery 
temper,  and  a  hot  dispute  broke  out  between  the  two  admirals 


BOO  B.C.]  Outbreak  of  the  Ionian  Revolt.  141 

concerning  a  private  matter,  ere  yet  the  fleet  had  sailed.     Megabates, 

who  had  the   worst  of  it,    revenged   himself  by  sending   secret 

intelligence  of  the  expedition  to  Naxos,  and  when  the  fleet  arrived 

it  found  the  city  so  well  garrisoned  and  stored  that  it  could  effect 

nothing.     Aristagoras  had  staked  all  his  credit  at  Sardis  and  Susa 

on  the  success  of  the  expedition,  and  had  rendered  himself  liable 

for  large  debts  in  equipping  it.     He  was  at  his  wits'  end,  and  ready 

to  adopt  any  desperate  measure,  when  he  received  a  message  from 

Histiaeus,  who  implored  him  to  use  any  means  which  would  lead 

to  his  own  recall,  even  if  it  must  be  by  raising  revolt  in  Ionia, 

Of  this  message  a  quaint  tale  is  told.     It  is  said  that  Histiaeus 

had  so  great  a  fear  that  spies  would  discover  any  letter  which  he 

sent  down  to  his  cousin,  that   he  had   the   incriminating  words 

tattooed  on  the  shaven  head  of  a  confidential  slave,  and  sent  him 

down  to  Miletus,  when  his  hair  had  grown  again,  with  the  verbal 

message  that  his  head  required  shaviug. 

The  private  interests  of  these  two  despots  fell  in  with  the  bent  of 

popular  feeling,  which,  as  in  all  Greek  states  at  all  times,  was  set 

on  the  assertion  of  autonomy.   The  tyrant  had  been  the     „ 

■^  •'  Revolt  m 

element  in  the  state  which  represented  acquiescence  lonia, 
in  the  Persian  rule,  and  when  he  declared  for  revolt 
Miletus  followed  him.  Aristagoras  did  more  than  revolt :  he 
declared  that  he  laid  down  his  despotic  power,  and  received  back 
from  the  people  a  commission  as  a  constitutional  magistrate.  Then 
he  led  a  crusade  against  the  tyrants  all  down  the  Ionic  coast :  in 
every  town  when  the  Milesians  appeared,  a  revolution  ensued,  and 
the  local  ruler  was  slain  or  banished.  Internal  freedom  as  well  as 
external  was  proclaimed,  and  the  revolt  for  the  moment  promised 
well.  Of  the  Greeks  of  Asia,  hardly  a  town,  from  Byzantium  to 
the  Lycian  border,  refused  to  proclaim  war  on  Persia.  Nor  was 
this  the  full  measure  of  success  obtained  by  Aristagoras  in  the 
tirst  moments  of  his  activity.  He  went  over  in  person  to  the 
western  shore  of  the  Aegean,  and  began  to  stir  up  the  states  ot 
old  Greece.  In  Sparta  he  obtained  no  success,  for  Spartan  ideas 
were  well-nigh  bounded  by  the  limits  of  Peloponnesus,  and  the  one 
expedition  the  Lacedaemonians  had  sent  out  by  sea,  that  directed 
against  Polycrates  of  Samos,  had  not  been  so  fortunate  as  to  encourage 
them  to  repeat  the  experiment.    King  Cleomcnes  told  the  Milesian 


142     Darius  and  the  Greeks — The  Ionian  Revolt   [499  b.o. 

that  "  he  was  mad  to  propose  that  Sparta  should  attack  a  monarch 
whose  residence  lay  at  Susa,  three  months'  journey  from  the  sea," 
and  bade  him  depart  home.  But  the  rising  maritime  state  of 
Ionian  blood,  which  men  already  esteemed  the  second  power  in 
Greece,  gave  Aristagoras  a  very  different  reception.  Touched  by 
an  appeal  from  the  daughter-cities  to  the  mother-city  of  tho 
The  Athenians  •'■oni'iii    I'^ce,    desirous   too  of   keeping  the   Persian 

aid  Ionia,  employed  far  from  their  gates,  and  willing  to  prove 
the  efficiency  of  their  newly  formed  navy,  the  Athenians  readily 
listened  to  the  ex-tyrant,  and  granted  him  a  fleet  of  twenty  ships. 
To  these  the  Eretrians  added  five  more,  moved  by  their  old  fellow- 
ship in  arras  with  Miletus,  which  had  endured  since  the  remote 
days  of  the  great  Lelantine  war. 

The  moment  that  this  squadron  arrived  at  Ephesus,  the  troops 

it  carried  were  joined  by  the  levies  of  the  neighbouring  towns,  and 

„    ,    ^      executed  a  sudden  and  daring  attack  on  Sardis,  the 
Sack  of  "  ' 

Sardis,  residence  of  the  satrap  of  Lydia,  and  the  centre  of 
Persian  influence  in  Asia  Minor.  The  Greeks  drove 
Artaphernes  into  the  citadel,  and  sacked  and  burnt  the  town.  This 
proved  a  fatal  mistake.  The  blow  told  more  on  the  Lydians  than 
on  their  Persian  masters.  Enraged  at  the  plunder  of  their  chief 
city,  and  especially  by  the  burning  of  the  great  temple  of  Cybele, 
the  holiest  sanctuary  of  the  land,  the  provincials  rose  in  arms  and 
joined  Artaphernes.  When  tho  Greeks  commenced  their  retreat  to 
the  sea,  the  whole  country-side  set  on  them,  and  a  running  fight 
ensued,  in  which  the  invaders  had  greatly  the  worse.  Their  army 
reached  its  ships  in  a  very  maltreated  condition,  and  afterwards 
dispersed,  while  the  Athenians  and  Eretrians  returned  home  in  a 
state  of  great  discouragement  (499  B.C.).  The  chief  result  of  the 
sack  of  Sardis  was  disastrous :  it  moved  the  court  of  Susa  to 
energetic  action.  Darius  redoubled  his  armaments,  and  vowed 
vengeance  not  only  on  his  revolted  subjects,  but  on  the  rash 
states  beyond  the  Aegean,  who  had  called  down  his  wrath  by 
interfering  in  the  affairs  of  Asia.  For  the  moment,  howevei-, 
before  the  full  meaning  of  the  events  was  known,  the  tidings 
that  the  capital  of  the  Lydian  satrapy  had  been  destroyed  told 
in  favour  of  the  lonians.  They  were  now  joined  by  most  of 
the  Carian  tribes,  and   by  all  the  cities  of  Cyprus,    Greek  and 


497B.0A  Disasters  of  the  Greeks.  143 

barbarian,  with  the  single  exception  of  the  Phoenician  colony  of 
Amathus. 

Darius  now  called  out  against  the  rebels  not  only  the  disiDOsable 
troops  of  all  the  western  satrapies,  but  the  full  naval  force  of  his 
Phoenician  and  Cilician  vassals.  Fleet  and  army  together  fell 
first  on  Cyprus,  the  most  isolated  and  outlying  of  the  revolted 
districts.  By  sea  the  lonians  andCypriots  defeated  the  Phoenician 
squadron ;  but  the  land  force,  which  the  beaten  fleet  had  previously 
thrown  on  shore,  completely  crushed  the  Cypriot  army,  and  the 
victory  was  followed  by  the  submission  of  the  island. 

Then  the  Persians  pressed  on  against  the  original  authors  of  the 
revolt.  Three  great  armies  came  down  from  the  central  plateau 
of  Asia  Minor,  and  began  to  harry  the  coast-land.  The  Persians 
One  sacked  city  after  city  along  the  Hellespont  and  invade  lonia. 
Propontis ;  the  second  marched  from  Sardis  against  the  midmost 
towns  of  the  Greek  confederacy,  and  took  Cyme  and  Clazomenae, 
while  most  of  the  lonians  looked  on  in  helplessness,  afraid  to 
venture  an  another  land  campaign ;  the  tiiiid  entered  Caria,  but 
after  two  victories  was  annihilated  by  the  Carians  and  Milesians 
at  the  battle  of  Pedasus.  In  spite  of  this  isolated  success,  Aris- 
tagoras  now  lost  heart,  and  despaired  of  the  enterprise  he  had  so 
lightly  begun.  He  called  together  the  Milesians,  and  proposed  to 
them  to  emigrate  in  a  body,  as  their  kinsmen  of  Teos  and  Phocaea 
had  done  forty  years  before.  They  refused,  but  the  ex-tyrant  was 
so  set  on  saving  his  own  neck,  that  he  got  together  his  personal 
adherents  and  retainers,  and  deserted  his  country.  Sailing  to  the 
Thracian  coast  with  the  intention  of  establishing  a  new  settlement, 
just  as  the  Teians  had  done  at  the  neighbouring  Abdcra,  he  landed 
at  Myrcinus,  and  was  promptly  cut  off  with  all  his  followers  by 
the  savage  tribe  of  the  Edonians,  on  whose  territory  he  had 
trespassed  (497  b.c). 

Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  when  Histiaeus,  the  original 
instigator  of  the  revolt,  at  last  appeared  in  Ionia.  His  influence 
with  Darius  had  not  proved  so  omnipotent  as  he  had  supposed,  nor 
had  the  great  king  sent  him  down  to  stay  the  movement  of  insur- 
rection the  moment  it  broke  out.  Three  weary  years  had  passed, 
and  the  backbone  of  the  rebellion  had  been  broken  when  Darius  at 
last  found  some  business  for  him  at  Sardis.     He  arrived  there  only 


144      Darius  and  tJie  Greeks — The  Ionian  Revolt.  [496  b.c. 

to  be  taunted  witli  Lis  schemes  and  their  failure  by  the  satr.ip 
Artaphernes.  "  You  stitched  this  shoe,"  said  the  Persian,  referring 
to  the  revolt,  "  and  Aristagoras  only  put  it  on."  Alarmed  at  the 
Persian's  knowledge  of  his  plans,  Histiaeus  escaped  to  Chios  and 
joined  the  rebels.  He  found  himself  deeply  suspected  as  an  ex- 
tyrant,  and  a  confidant  of  the  king.  No  city  offered  to  place  him 
in  the  position  of  command  for  which  he  had  hoped.  The  Chians 
imprisoned  him  for  a  time.  Miletus  refused  to  admit  her  old  master 
within  her  walls,  and  he  considered  himself  lucky  when  at  last  the 
Lesbians  gave  him  eight  ships,  and  allowed  him  to  sail  for  the 
Hellespont,  with  a  commission  to  reorganize  the  revolt  in  the  towns 
which  had  gone  back  to  their  allegiance.  Instead  of  doing  so  he 
stationed  liimself  at  Byzantium,  and  levied  extortionate  tolls  on 
the  merchant-ships  which  passed  through  the  Bosphorus,  without 
making  any  vigorous  attempt  to  attack  the  Persian^. 

Meanwhile  the  end  of  the  war  drew  near.  Neglecting  the 
smaller  towns,  Artaphernes  drew  together  all  his  land  forces  for  an 
attack  on  INIiletus,  the  heart  of  Ionia.  At  the  same 
time  a  great  Phoenician  fleet  rounded  the  Triopiaa 
Cape,  and  cast  anchor  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  Maeander.  From 
the  nine  towns  which  yet  kept  up  their  hearts  and  hoped  against 
hope  for  the  retention  of  their  autonomy,  the  lonians  and  Aeolians 
mustered  for  the  final  conflict,  till  at  the  little  island  of  Lade,  ia 
front  of  Miletus,  three  hundred  and  fifty-three  triremes  lay  moored 
to  face  the  six  hundred  vessels  of  the  barbarians.  It  is  greatly  to 
the  discredit  of  the  Athenians  that  not  a  single  ship  of  theirs 
appeared  to  aid  their  kinsmen  and  allies  in  their  death-struggle. 

The  confederate  states  placed  their  fleet  under  a  single  admiral,  a 
certain  Dionysius,  one  of  the  few  straggling  survivors  -of  the  popu- 
lation of  Phocaea  who  had  drifted  back  to  their  old 
The  battle  of  ,  .      .      .^  .  . 

Lade.  homc  and  set  up  an  insignificant  town  among  its  ruins. 
496  B.C.  jjg  ^^^^  ^^  excellent  captain,  and  kept  his  men  well 
to  their  duty,  till  his  vigilance  and  strict  discipline  provoked  the 
listless  lonians.  They  refused  any  longer  to  obey  a  man  who  had 
no  strong  squadron  of  the  ships  of  his  own  city  at  his  back,  and, 
as  the  Persians  delayed  their  attack  day  after  day,  fell  into  a 
perilous  carelessness  and  security.  At  last  the  enemy  came  down 
upon  them,  and  they  hastily  formed  a  line  of  battle  to  meet  him. 


495  B.C.]  Fall  of  Miletus.  145 

The  honour  of  the  day  was  very  unequally  distributed.  The 
Samians  fled  at  a  very  early  hour,  with  a  precipitancy  that  sug- 
gested treachery  rather  than  cowardice.  The  Lesbians  gave  way 
no  long  time  after.  The  Chians,  however,  maintained  the  fight 
after  their  untrustworthy  allies  and  all  the  rest  of  the  fleet  had 
abandoned  the  fray,  and  only  succumbed  after  the  larger  number 
of  their  own  ships  had  been  sunk  or  taken  (496  B.C.). 

The  battle  of  Lade  was  decisive  in  its  results.  The  wreck  of  the 
defeated  fleet  dispersed,  and  each  city  had  to  await  its  doom  with- 
out deriving  aid  from  its  allies.     Miletus  was  the  first 

Sack  ot 

to  fall :  Artaphernes  sat  down  before  it,  and  took  it      MUetus, 
after  a  protracted  siege.     He  burnt  the  city  and  re-  '  ' 

duced  its  inhabitants  to  slavery ;  so  thoroughly  was  the  work  done, 
that  Miletus  never  appears  again  as  possessing  anything  like  its 
former  importance.  The  pre-eminence  among  the  Ionian  towns  fell 
to  Ephesus,  which  had  disarmed  the  wrath  of  Persia  by  a  prompt 
and  tame  submission.  The  fiiU  of  Miletus  caused  bitter  grief  and 
self-reproach  at  Athens.  AVhen  the  people  realized  that  thej'  had 
allowed  their  best  allies  against  the  Persian  to  perish  unaided,  they 
could  not  restrain  their  sorrow  and  shame.  Next  year  the  tragic 
poet  Phrynichus  exhibited  on  the  stage  a  play  called  "  The 
taking  of  Miletus"  (MiXtitov  aAoxru).  At  its  production  the  whole 
theatre  was  plunged  in  tears,  and  the  author  was  fined  a  thousand 
drachmae  for  recalling  the  unwelcome  subject. 

After  Miletus  had  succumbed,  the  turns  of  Samos,  Chios,  and 
Mitylene  arrived.  Each  was  subdued  after  more  or  less  resistance. 
Their  fates,  though  hard,  were  not  so  crushing  as  that  of  Miletus. 
Heavy  fines  were  laid  on  them,  and  many  of  their  inhabitants 
were  deported  to  Asia,  but  no  wholesale  ruin  or  massacre  ensued. 
Internal  freedom  was  allowed  to  remain,  and  it  was  noted  that  the 
Persians,  discontented  with  the  way  in  which  the  Ionian  tyrants 
bad  failed  to  be  a  support  to  their  masters,  showed  themselves  moro 
favourable  to  democracy  than  could  have  been  expected.  Last  of 
all,  the  few  scattered  towns  on  the  Propontis  which  still  held  out 
were  subdued  one  by  one.  In  that  part  of  the  world  End  of  the 
Ilistiaeus  had  for  the  last  two  years  been  leading  a  "^*'■• 
precarious  and  piratical  existence,  a  plague  to  Greeks  no  less  than 
Persians.     He  now  fell  into  the  hands  of  Artaphernes  diu-ing  an 

L 


146     Darius  and  the  Greeks — T/ie  Ionian  Ra^olt.  t494P.o^ 

insignificant  skirmish  near  Atarneus,  and  was  promptly  impaled  by 
his  captor,  much  to  the  displeasure  of  Darius,  who  still  cherished  a 
feeling  of  gratitude  to  the  preserver  of  the  bridge  on  the  Danube 
(494  B.C.).  With  the  exception  of  a  few  fugitives  who  fled  to  the 
West,  all  the  king's  subjects  had  now  fallen  or  returned  to  their 
allegiance. 

The  great  Ionian  revolt  was  now  at  an  end,  after  six  years  of 
desultory  warfare.  Its  course  had  brought  three  facts  into  promi- 
nence.    The  first  was  the  incapacity  of  Greek  states 

Causes  of  .  , 

the  failure  of  for  combination  into  a  close  federal  alliance.  The 
the  rising.  jgg^^Q^gjgg  'between  city  and  city,  and  the  narrow 
patriotism  which  made  men  comparatively  indifferent  to  the  fate 
of  the  Hellenic  race  provided  their  own  town  was  flourishing,  were 
sufficient  to  prevent  any  efficacious  common  action  in  war.  A 
Greek  alliance,  in  short,  could  only  be  kept  together  by  the  power 
of  some  one  state  overawing  the  rest,  as  was  afterwards  the  case 
during  the  existence  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos.  And  even  when 
such  a  consummation  had  arrived,  the  desire  for  complete  local 
autonomy  was  so  keen  that  all  the  weaker  members  of  a  federation 
would  be  secretly  longing  for  its  disruption,  in  order  to  free  them- 
selves from  the  hegemony  of  the  leading  state.  The  second  cha- 
racteristic of  the  Ionian  revolt  was  the  slow  and  inefficient  working 
of  the  military  machinery  of  the  Persian  empire.  To  subdue  the 
revolted  towns  of  a  single  satrapy  six  years  of  war  had  been 
required.  Unless  the  king  himself  were  present  in  person,  to 
compel  all  his  satraps  and  commanders  to  act  promptly  and  in 
loyal  combination,  there  was  a  tendency  to  slackness  and  spas- 
modic effort  on  the  part  of  the  Persian  officers  in  Asia.  Thirdly, 
the  prompt  conclusion  of  the  war  after  the  battle  of  Lade  proved 
that  a  fleet  was  more  important  than  an  army  in  attacking  the 
Greek  world.  When  the  command  of  the  sea  had  passed  to  the 
barbarian,  and  each  state  on  its  island  or  peninsula  was  cut  off 
from  communication  with  its  fellows,  a  complete  collapse  of  resist- 
ance followed.  We  shall  see  all  these  tendencies  illustrated  again, 
though  with  a  difierent  relative  importance,  in  the  greater  struggle 
between  Persia  and  the  Greeks  of  Europe  which  began  a  few  years 
after  the  end  of  the  Ionian  revolt. 

The  share  which  Athens  and  Eretria  had  taken  in  the  sack  of 


492  3.0.]  Mardonius  in  Thrace.  147 

Savdis  had  not  escaped  the  memory  of  Darius,  When  his  revolted 
subjects  were  once  subdued,  he  was  determined  that  there  should  be 
no  delay  in  punishing  the  more  distant  enemy.  A  legend,  which  is 
true  in  the  spirit  if  not  in  the  letter,  tells  us  how  the  great  king 
bade  his  cup-bearer  to  repeat  to  him  thrice  at  every  banquet  the 
words,  "Master,  remember  the  Athenians,"  lest  the  insult  wrought 
at  Sardis  should  ever  vanish  from  his  mind. 

The  year  after  the  end  of  the  revolt  was  devoted  to  the  prepara- 
tion of  an  expedition  to  chastise  the  objects  of  Darius's  enmity.  In 
492  B.C.  Mardonius  came  down  from  Susa  to  take  the  command. 
He  sent. a  fleet  to  coast  round  the  north  shore  of  the  Aegean,  and 
himself  led  an  army  parallel  to  it  by  the  great  road  which  runs 
between  the  sea  and  the  spurs  of  the  Rhodope.  But  fortune  fought 
for  Athens.  A  hurricane  strewed  the  rocky  shores  of  the  peninsula 
of  Athos  with  the  wrecks  of  three  hundred  Persian  galleys.  A 
few  days  later  a  desperate  battle  with  the  wild  Thracian  tribes  so 
thinned  the  ranks  of  Mardonius's  army  that,  although  victorious, 
he  halted,  and  shrank  from  a  further  advance.  The  attack  on  the 
king's  enemies  had  to  be  put  off  for  another  year. 

Before  proceeding  to  relate  the  results  of  the  first  Persian  expedi- 
tion which  touched  the  shores  of  European  Greece,  we  must  explain 
the  condition  of  affairs  in  that  country. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

EVENTS  IN  GREECE  AFTER  THE  FALL   OF  THE  PEISISTRATIDAE — THE 
CONSTITUTION  OF  CLEISTIIENES  (510-8  B.C.), 

Op  the  numerous  tyrants  of  European  Greece  the  son  of  Peisis- 
tratus  had  been  the  last  to  fall.  Even  before  his  expulsion  the 
zeal  which  had  led  on  the  Spartans  to  attack  tyrants  wherever  they 
found  them  had  cooled  down  ;  and  it  had  been  with  a  half-hearted 
effort  that  they  had  cast  out  the  ruler  of  Athens.  The  danger  of 
an  anti-Dorian  movement  led  by  a  league  of  tyrants  had  been 
removed  long  before,  when  Corinth  fell ;  and  in  crushing  Hippias 
the  Spartans  had  destroyed  a  useful  ally  merely  to  satisfy  a 
religious  scruple — a  scruple  which,  as  they  soon  heard,  had  been 
deliberately  played  upon  by  an  unscrupulous  politician  and  a 
mercenary  priesthood.  Apollo  must  have  been  in  bad  odour  at 
Sparta  when  the  bribery  of  his  oracle  was  discovered,  and  his 
behests  were  never  again  obeyed  with  the  single-hearted  loyalty 
of  old  days. 

When  Cleomenes  had  drawn  off  his  troops,  and  liberated  Athens 
was  left  to  herself,  it  seemed  for  a  moment  as  if  the  old  factions 

Tactions  at  ^^^^  learnt  no  lesson  under  the  strong  hand  of  the 
Athens.  Peisistratidae.  Civil  strife  at  once  broke  out;  the 
opposing  leaders  being  Cleisthenes  the  Alcmaeonid,  chief  of  the 
newly  returned  exiles,  and  Isagoras,  the  son  of  Tisander.  The 
matter  was  at  first  a  personal  rivalry  between  two  powerful  nobles, 
but  ere  long  it  took  the  shape  of  a  political  struggle;  for  when 
Isagoras  strengthened  himself  by  organizing  a  new  olig^irchic 
party,  Cleisthenes  at  once  assumed  the  role  of  leader  of  the  popu- 
lace. "He  took  the  democracy  into  partnership,"  says  Herodotus, 
"  it  having  been  previously  excluded  from  all  authority."     Thirty 


609B.0.]  Ckomenes  takes  Athens.  149 

years  of  the  rule  of  the  Peisistratidae  had  weakened  the  oligarchic 
tendencies  in  Athens,  by  breaking  np  the  traditions  of  authority 
and  influence  which  had  belonged  to  the  old  houses.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  had  been  favourable  to  the  growth  of  democratic  feeling ; 
for  under  the  tyrants  all  men  had  been  equal,  though  equal  in 
slavery  alone.  Accordingly  it  was  found  that  Isagoras  had  sum- 
moned to  his  aid  a  waning  power,  while  Cleisthenes  was  backed  by 
the  rising  sentiment  of  the  majority  of  the  nation.  The  oligarch 
was  easily  worsted,  and  had  to  fly,  while  the  democrat  was  left  in 
possession  of  the  field  (509  B.C.). 

Isagoras  without  delay  called  in  foreign  enemies  in  order  to  Avorst 
his  rival,  reckless  of  the  evils  he  was  thereby  bringing  on  his 
country.  Flying  to  Sparta,  he  stirred  up  his  personal  friend  King 
Cleomenes,  to  expel  Cleisthenes  from  Athens  by  force.  So  easy 
was  the  task  in  the  king's  estimation,  that  he  marched  on  Athens 
at  the  head  of  a  few  hundred  personal  retainers  only,  without 
asking  for  or  receiving  the  national  army  of  Sparta,  or  the  con- 
tingents of  the  numerous  Peloponnesian  states  which  looked  tiy 
that  city  as  their  head.  He  sent  before  him  a  herald  to  bid  the 
Athenians  "  expel  the  accursed  family,"  using  the  old  cieomenes 
scruple  concerning  the  hereditary  blood-guiltiness  of  ta^^es  Athens, 
the  Alcmaeonidae  for  their  sacrilegious  slaughter  of  the  Cylonian 
conspirators,  in  order  to  discredit  the  Alcmaeonid  Cleisthenes 
with  his  fellow-citizens.  The  reformer  had  either  overrated  the 
strength  of  the  Spartan  army,  or  resolved  to  do  his  best  to 
deprive  Cleomenes  of  his  nominal  cams  helli.  Immediately  on 
the  arrival  of  the  herald  he  withdrew  from  Athens.  Deprived  of 
their  leader,  and  not  yet  realizing  their  own  or  their  adversaries 
strength,  the  Athenians  threw  open  their  gates  to  Cleomenes  and 
Isagoras.  The  Spartan's  retainers  garrisoned  the  Acropolis,  while 
the  oligarch  installed  himself  in  office  as  archon,  and  mustered  his 
partisans  to  overthrow  the  new  democratic  constitution  by  a  fictitious 
vote  of  the  people.  Then  Isagoras  declared  the  Athenian  "  Senate 
of  Four  Hundred "  dissolved,  and  replaced  it  by  a  body  of  three 
hundred  oligarchs  named  by  himself.  At  the  same  time  seven 
hundred  families  of  the  democratic  party  were  expelled  from  the 
city,  and  sent  to  join  Cleisthenes  in  exile  (508  B.C.). 

Meanwhile  the  people  of  Athens  had  the  time  to  count  up   the 


150  Constitution  of  Cleisthettes.  [sosb.o. 

numbers  of  Cleomenes'  body-guard,  and  to  gauge  the  strength  of 
cieomenes  the  native  partisans  of  Isagoras.  The  result  Avas  a 
capitulates,  sudden  and  spontaneous  insurrection,  which  broke 
the  power  of  the  ohgarchs  in  a  few  hours.  Isagoras  and  his 
followers  were  driven  pell-mell  within  the  gates  of  the  Acropolis, 
the  only  spot  which  his  Spartan  friends  were  able  to  hold  for  him. 
The  Senate  of  Four  Hundred  reassembled  and  assumed  its  old 
functions,  recalling  Cleisthenes  and  all  the  other  exiles,  and 
setting  the  full  armed  force  of  Attica  to  blockade  the  Acropolis. 
The  crowd  in  the  fortress  was  great,  and  no  stock  of  provisions 
had  been  laid  in,  so  that  in  a  very  few  days  the  garrison  were 
approaching  a  state  of  starvation.  They  were  soon  compelled  to 
surrender  at  discretion.  The  Athenians,  loth  to  drive  Sparta  to 
a  war  of  vengeance,  spared  the  lives  of  Cleomenes  and  his  hoplites, 
and  allowed  them  to  depart.  The  king  succeeded  in  smuggling  off 
Isagoras  in  the  ranks  of  his  troops,  but  the  rest  of  the  oligarchs 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  people.  So  gi-eat  was  the  rage  in  Athens 
at  their  detestable  attempt  to  destroy  the  national  constitution  by 
the  aid  of  the  foreigner,  that  all  the  prominent  men,  many  scores 
in  number,  were  put  to  death.  The  rest  of  the  guilty  party  were 
sent  into  exile. 

Far  from    feeling    gratitude    for  the  preservation  of   his  life, 
Cleomenes  had  no  other  sentiment  in  his  heart,  when  he  returned 
to  Sparta,  than  hatred  for  the  people  who  had  brought  his  over- 
weening   confidence   to    such    an    ignominious    fall.     News    soon 
arrived  at  Athens   that   the   king  was    straining  every  nerve  to 
organize  a  second  and  more  formidable  expedition  against  those 
who  had  worsted  him.     So  large  was  the  Spartan  contingent  in 
the  new  army,  that  King  Demaratus,  the  colleague  of  Cleomenes, 
was  joined  with  him  in    command ;  while  the  whole  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  subject-allies  had  been  ordered  to  send  their  troops  to 
the   Isthmus,  though    no  information  was   given  them  as  to  the 
destination  or  object  of  the  expedition.     Temfied  at  the  impending 
storm,  the  Athenians  sent  ambassadors  to  Sardis,  to 
and         beg   for   aid  from  the   satrap   Artaphemes   and  his 
Artaphernes.  ^^^^^^  ^^^  ^^^^^  j^j^^^^     ^^^  ^^^  Persian  offered  hard 

terms  to  the  Athenian  envoys.     He  could  conceive  of  no  relation 
between  the  Great  King  and  a  foreign  people  other  than  that  of 


**08Ec.]  Cleomenes  invades  Attica.  151 

master  and  subject.  Accordingly  he  refused  to  pledge  the  armed 
aid  of  Persia  to  the  Athenians,  unless  they  should  make  the 
typical  offerings  of  earth  and  Avater,  and  acknowledge  Darius  as 
their  suzerain.  So  great  was  the  dread  of  Sparta  which  filled  the 
ambassadors'  minds,  that  they  actually  accepted  the  satrap's  con- 
ditions, and  undertook,  in  the  name  of  Athens,  to  do  homage  to 
the  king.  On  their  return,  however,  they  were  astonished  to  find 
themselves  met  with  the  wildest  indignation.  Even  in  the  worst 
extremity  the  Athenians  had  not  dreamed  of  surrendering  them- 
selves to  the  barbarian,  but  only  of  forming  an  alliance  with  him. 
The  engagement  was  repudiated,  the  treaty  disavowed,  and  the 
advocates  of  the  embassy  as  well  as  the  ambassadors  themselves 
fell  into  discredit. 

Athens  would  have  been  left  wholly  unaided  to  face  the  attack 
of  the  Peloponnesian  confederacy,  if  it  had  not  been  for  one  feeble 
ally  whom  she  possessed — the  little  Boeotian  town  of  Plataea. 
We  have  related  in  a  previous  chapter  Jiow  the  Peisistratidae  had 
undertaken,  in  behalf  of  Athens,  the  protection  of  the  Plataeans 
agamst  their  Theban  neighbours,  and  now  the  alliance  was  still 
preserved.  But  the  friendship  of  Plataea  ensured  the  enmity  of 
Thebes,  and  Avhen  Cleomenes  was  mustering  his  army  the  Boeotian 
League  thought  that  the  opportunity  had  come  to  reclaim  its  one 
recalcitrant  member.  The  Thebans  drew^  into  alliance  with  them- 
selves the  people  of  Chalcis,  the  great  maritime  town  of  Euboea, 
wdio  were  jealous  of  the  rising  commercial  and  maritime  power  of 
Athens,  and  were  not  averse  to  crush  a  city  -which  was  beginning 
to  supersede  older  marts  as  the  emporium  of  the  Central  Aegean. 
Cleomenes,  therefore,  found  it  easy  to  concert  a  plan  of  operations 
with  the  Boeotians  and  Chalcidians,  who  undertook  to  fall  on  Attica 
from  the  north  as  soon  as  the  Spartan  army  should  have  passed 
the  Isthmus. 

It  was,  accordingly,  with  every  prospect  of  success  before  him 
that  Cleomenes  led  his  army  through  the  Megarid  into  the  plain 
of  Eleusis.  Once  aiTived  there,  the  allies  learnt  tlie  cieomenes 
purpose  for  which  they  had  been  assembled — a  pur-^'^"^^'^^^-^"*^^ 
pose  which  many  of  them  viewed  with  the  highest  disgust.  For 
Cleomenes  now  proposed  a  plan  far  more  iniquitous  than  that  of 
overthrowing  the  democratic   constitution  of  Athens ;  he  openly 


152  Victories  of  the  Athenians.  [508b.c. 

avowed  that  he  would  make  his  friend  Isagoras  tyrant  of  Attica. 
Such  an  act  would  have  been  a  formal  repudiation  of  the  policy 
which  Sparta  had  hitherto  pursued,  that  of  expelling  all  the  tyrants 
whom  she  met.  King  Demaratus,  who  was  joined  with  Cleo- 
menes  in  the  command  of  the  army,  was  not  unnaturally  provoked 
into  setting  himself  in  opposition  to  his  colleague,  and  found  him- 
self supported  by  the  majority  of  the  allies.  The  Athenians,  who 
had  mustered  in  full  force  on  the  eastern  skirts  of  the  Thriasian 
Plain,  were  surprised  to  find  that  the  enemy  made  no  movement  of 
advance.  Everything,  indeed,  was  in  confusion  in  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  camp.  The  Corinthians,  who  remembered  the  ills  they 
had  suffered  under  the  house  of  Cypselus,  took  the  lead  in  refusing 
to  fight  merely  that  a  tyranny  might  be  established  at  Athens. 
Many  of  the  contingents  of  the  smaller  states  showed  a  similar 
disposition,  and  Demaratus  backed  them  with  his  authority.  At 
last,  after  a  stormy  council  of  war,  the  army  broke  up  ;  the  allies 
returned  to  their  homes,  and  Cleomenes  was  forced  to  retrace  his 
steps  towards  Sparta  without  having  enjoyed  his  revenge. 

While  the  Athenian  army  had  been  concentrated  in  front  of 
the  main  body  of  invaders,  the  Boeotians  and  Chalcidians  had 
ravaged  the  north-eastern  demes  of  Attica  \\athout  meeting  with 
resistance.  But  the  moment  that  the  Peloponnesians  had  departed, 
the  Athenians  hastily  turned  northward  to  check  these  incursions. 
They  marched  first  against  the  Chalcidians,  but,  hearing  that  the 
Thebans  were  hurrjnng  coastwards  to  join  their  confederates,  threw 
themselves  between  the  two  forces  and  attacked  them  in  detail. 
In  one  day  they  fought  two  battles.  In  the  morning  they  fell  on 
the  Boeotians  and  routed  them,  taking  seven  hundred  prisoners ; 
then,  crossing  the  Eurlpus  into  Euboea,  they  encountered  the 
Chalcidians  in  the  afternoon  and  won  another  victory. 

So  decisive  was  this  second  engagement,  that  Chalcis  itself  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  conquerors.  Expelling  from  the  city  the 
The  Athenians  f^™ili6s  called  Hippobotac,  who  had  ruled  it  as  a  strict 

take  Chalcis.  oligarchy,   the   Athenians    divided    their    confiscated 
estates  into   four   thousand   farms,  and  bestowed  them   on   poor 

citizens  of  Athens.     This  was  the  second  of  their  many  Clerudiies,'^ 

1  The  first  had  been  the  lotting  out  of  Salamis  after  its  conquest  from 
the  Megarians,  somewhere  about  the  year  ^87  B.C. ;  a  fact  preser\-ed  in  an 
inscription  only. 


008  B.C.]  Cleisthenes. 


153 


or  "  lottings-out "   of  conquered    territory.     Although   the   lower 

classes  m  Chalcis  were  left  unharmed  to  dwell  among  the  new 

settlers,  the  state  was  in  reality  transformed  into  a  mere  dependency 

of  Athens,  as  all  political  power  rested  with  the  permanent  garrison 

of  Cleruchs.    A  comparison  at  once  suggests  itself  between  this 

settlement  and  the  system  of  "  colonies  "  which  the  Romans  found 

so  effectual  in  holding  down  newly  conquered  districts  in  Italy. 

Few  statesmen  have  found  themselves  in  such  a  favourable 

position  as  Cleisthenes  enjoyed  at  this  iroment,  and  few  have  ever 

made  a  better  use  of  their  opportunities.     In  the  short 

„  ,  .  ,  ,       ,  Cleisthenes. 

tmie  of  his  ascendancy  he  completely  remodelJed  the 
Athenian  constitution.  A  taste  for  political  reorganization,  indeed, 
seems  to  have  been  innate  in  his  blood  ;  for  his  grandfather,  Cleis- 
thenes of  Sicj'on,  from  whom  ho  derived  his  name,  had  been  famous 
for  the  manner  in  which  he  recast  the  institutions  of  his  native 
town  ;  and  his  brother  Hippocrates  was  the  gi-andfather  of  the  yet 
greater  reformer  Pericles. 

The  results  of  the  work  of  Cleisthenes  were  not  to  be  ephemeral ; 
they  made  themselves  felt  through  the  whole  of  the  subsequent 
history  of  Athens,  and  were  the  foundation  on  which  all  suc- 
ceeding legislators  built.  For  their  plan  was  so  well  suited  to  the 
needs  of  the  times,  that  it  admitted  with  ease  and  safety  of  all 
those  additions  and  modifications  in  a  democratic  direction  which 
Aristeides,  Pericles,  and  other  statesmen  afterwards  devised.  At  the 
base  of  the  new  constitution  lay  the  idea  of  the  supreme  authority  of 
the  whole  body  of  citizens  gathered  in  their  assembly;  and  this  being 
once  granted,  all  new  developments  of  the  functions  of  that  body  were 
logical  consequences  of  the  original  conception  of  its  omnipotence. 

Cleisthenes  began  his  reforms  with  the  most  simple  elements  of 
the  state,  completely  recasting  the  Avhole  of  the  local  and  tiibal 
divisions  of  the  citizens.  He  could  not,  of  course,  constitution 
interfere  with  the  ancient  ties  of  the  ^eVoj,  the  clan  of  cleisthenes. 
brotherhood  of  families  who  owned  a  common  hearth  and  altar, 
a  common  burial-ground  and  common  festivals,  and  were  bound 
by  reciprocal  oaths  to  aid  and  cherish  each  other.  But  the  asso- 
ciations larger  than  the  clan  he  was  determined  to  dissolve.  Neither 
tribal  exclusiveness  nor  local  jealousies  should  keep  the  Athenian 
people  from  blending  into  a  homogeneous  whole, 


154  Constitution  of  Clcisthcnes,  [508b.o. 

Cleisthenos  accordingly  Biiperserlcd  the  four  ancient  Ionic  tribes, 
whose  hneages  were  supposed  to  descend  from  the  four  mythic 
The  new  ^^"^^  ^^  -^0" — ^'^®  strangely  named  Hoples,  Geleon, 
tribes.  Argades,  and  Aegicores.  For  the  four  tribes  he  sub- 
stituted ten,  which  took  their  names  from  Attic  kings  and  heroes.^ 
The  new.  tribesmen  were  to  reverence  their  eponymous  patron,  but 
they  could  make  no  pretence  of  being  descended  from  him.  To  bo 
a  member  of  the  tribe  Cecropis  did  not  imply  supposed  connection 
with  the  snake-footed  king,  nor  did  all  who  worshipped  Ajax 
thereby  claim  a  Salaminian  pedigree.  The  units  which  com- 
posed the  new  tribal  divisions  were  local,  consisting 
of  denies.  The  deme  was  a  small  township  or  parish 
— to  use  English  terminology — whose  origin  could  in  some  cases 
be  traced  back  to  one  of  the  old  Attic  boroughs,  such  as  Rhamnus 
or  Sphettus,  or  Eleusis,  which  Theseus  had  united  into  the  one 
Athenian  state.  In  others  it  was  the  settlement  of  a  clan,  the 
home  of  the  real  or  reputed  descendants  of  a  single  ancestor ;  for 
the  deme  of  Echelidae  or  Philaidae  was  the  settlement  of  the 
children  of  Echelus  or  Philaeus,  just  as  in  Saxon  England  the 
township  of  Oddington  was  the  settlement  of  the  children  of  Odda. 
Now,  if  Cleisthenes  had  given  ten  neighbouring  denies  of  the  hill- 
country  to  the  tribe  Antiochis,  or  ten  sea-coast  demes  to  the  tribe 
Cecropis,  he  would  have  simply  been  opening  up  again  opportunities 
for  the  reconstruction  of  the  old  local  factions  of  the  Hills,  the  Plain, 
and  the  Shore.  Accordingly,  he  took  exactly  the  opposite  course. 
Except  in  the  case  of  one,  or  at  most  two,  tribes,  he  carefully  gave 
each  of  them  a  cluster  of  demes  in  each  of  the  three  districts,  so 
that  the  tribal  interest  should  be  divided  equally  into  three.  So 
Oenoe  in  the  north-west,  and  Agra  in  the  midland,  fell  to  the  same 
tribe,  Hippothoontis,  as  did  Azenia  in  the  extreme  south-east.  The 
town  of  Athens  itself  was  split  up  into  eight  demes,  belonging  to  six 
different  tribes,  while  the  other  four  were  represented  in  its  suburbs. 
So  well  did  this  scheme  work,  that  never  again  in  the  course  of 

1  The  name  of  the  tribe  Aiantis  was  probably  devised  in  order  to  assert 
the  fact  that  Salamis,  the  fatherland  of  Ajax,  had  become  completely  part 
and  parcel  of  Attica,  so  that  Athens  might  claim  its  heroes  as  her  own. 
The  names  of  the  tribes  were  Cecropis,  Pandionis,  Erectheis,  Aegeis. 
Acamantis,  Hippothoontis,  Antiochis,  A.iantis,  Leontis,  Oeneis. 


508 BC]  The  D ernes.  155 

Attic  history  do  we  find  local  associations  giving  trouble  to  the  state. 
Within  a  few  years  the  union  of  the  demes  of  the  north-east  into  a 
faction  of  Diacrii,  or  of  those  of  the  south-west  into  a  faction  of 
Paralii,  had  ceased  to  be  conceivable.  While  the  deme,  with  its 
demarch  and  local  judges,  dealt  with  the  details  of  local  administra- 
tion and  justice,  the  tribe  was  made  the  unit  for  all  state  business. 

Into  the  demes  and  tribes  Cleisthenes  swept  almost  the  whole 
free  population  of  Attica,  and  many  persons  who  could  not  even 
be  called  wholly  free.  He  enfranchised  not  only  such  "  metics " 
or  resident  aliens  as  desired  to  take  np  the  citizenship  of  Athens, 
but  even  servile  clients,  or  ^oZKoi  fieroiKot,  as  they  were  called.  This 
class  consisted  of  slaves  who  dwelt  apart  from  their  masters,  and 
possessed  property  of  their  own,  though  they  had  not  yet  been 
completely  freed.  By  becoming  citizens  they  were  of  course 
relieved  of  all  their  disabilities,  and  raised  to  the  same  status  as 
their  ex-proprietors.  The  new  citizens  went,  as  Cleisthenes  had 
no  doubt  intended,  to  swell  the  forces  of  the  democracy.  It  must 
have  been  no  small  blow  to  the  pride  of  the  old  oligarchic  houses 
to  find  themselves  enrolled  in  the  same  tribe — perhaps  even  in  the 
same  deme — as  their  late  dependents.  But  we  do  not  find  that 
the  strength  and  vigour  of  the  state  was  in  the  least  decreased  by 
the  influx  of  the  newly  enfranchised ;  indeed,  for  a  city  which  was 
just  about  to  step  forward  to  compete  for  the  hegemony  in  Greece, 
the  accession  of  thousands  of  willing  arms  was  an  unmixed 
blessing. 

The  tribe  organization  was  made  by  Cleisthenes  the  basis  of  a 
reorganization  of  the  Boule,  or  Senate.  That  body  was  for  the 
future  to  consist  of  five  hundred  members,  of  whom 
fifty  were  elected  from  each  tribe.  Solon's  old  number 
of  four  hundred  senators  therefore  now  vanishes.  The  Senate 
formed  a  permanent  deliberative  body,  charged  with  the  duty  of 
discussing  all  matters  of  public  import,  and  sending  down  recom- 
mendations dealing  with  them  to  be  voted  on  by  the  public 
assembly  of  the  whole  body  of  citizens.  These  recommendations, 
or  ■n-pofiovXevfj.ara,  had  no  validity  in  themselves,  and  only  assumed 
force  after  they  had  been  ratified  by  the  Ecclesia.  In  this  they 
differed  from  the  Roman  "  Senatus  Consultum,"  which,  acquiring 
by  usage  an  independent  authority,  made  the  Senate  at  Rome  a 


156  Constitution  of  Cleist'/ienes.  [508b.o. 

power  practically  co-ordinate  with  the  assembly  of  citizens. 
Besides  acting  as  a  body  for  preliminary  deliberation,  the  Athenian 
Senate  supplied  presidents  to  the  Ecclesia.  The  year  was  divided 
into  ten  periods  of  thirty-five  or  thirty-six  days  each,  and  one  of 
these  was  given,  in  a  rotation  settled  by  lot,  to  the  senators  of 
each  tribe.  The  period  was  called  a  Prytany  {irpyraveia),  and  the 
fifty  senators  who  were  in  office  during  its  continuance  v/ere  known 
as  Prytaneis.  They  were  boarded  and  lodged  in  a  public  building, 
named  the  Prytaneium,  at  the  expense  of  the  state.  Thus  they 
were  always  on  the  spot,  ready  to  act  as  a  committee  of  the  Senate 
at  the  shortest  notice.  Each  Prytany  was  divided  into  five 
bodies  of  ten  men  each  (Proedri),  and  each  ten  presided  for  seven 
days  at  all  meetings  both  of  Senate  or  Ecclesia  which  occurred 
during  their  term  of  dignity.  They  chose  from  among  themselves 
every  day  a  chairman  called  the  Epistates,  who  was,  during  his 
twenty-four  hours  of  oflSce,  supreme  president  alike  of  Senate  and 
public  assembly.  To  him  were  handed  over  every  morning  the 
keys  of  the  Acropolis  and  the  treasury,  together  with  the  great 
seal  of  the  republic,  all  Avhich  the  ephemeral  dignitary  i-esigned  to 
his  successor  at  the  next  dawn. 

By  the  wholesale  additions  which  he  made  to  the  roll  of  fully 

qualified  citizens,  Cleisthenes  largely  increased  the  numbers  of  the 

The         public   assembly— a  body  which  is  now  known   as 

Ecclesia.  u  Ecclesia "  when  it  meets  for  political  purposes, 
"  Heliaea "  when  it  has  judicial  business  in  hand.  Anything 
which  the  assembly  may  have  lost  in  authority  by  becoming 
unmanageably  numerous  was  more  than  compensated  by  its  in- 
creased privileges  and  new  opportunities  for  interference  in  all 
state  business.  Instead  of  being  convoked  at  irregular  mtervals 
according  to  the  caprice  of  the  magistrates,  the  Ecclesia  was  now 
given  one  day  of  meeting  in  each  Prytany,  so  that  it  would  not 
be  summoned  less  than  ten  times  in  the  year.  But,  in  addition, 
it  might  be  convoked  at  any  extraordinary  crisis  by  authority  of 
the  Senate  or  of  the  Strategi.  These  extra  sessions  grew  more  and 
more  numerous,  till  at  last,  by  the  fifth  century,  the  number  of 
meetings  during  a  Prytany  was  increased  to  four,  the  power  to 
hold  additional  ones  when  necessary  being  still  retained  in  spite 
of  the  multiplication  of  ordinary  days  of  assembly.     The  Ecclesia 


608 BC]  The  Ecdesia.  I57 

as  we  know  it  in  the  fifth  century  could  deal  with  every  kind 
of  business.  It  heard  foreign  ambassadors,  and  after  due  dis- 
cussion decided  on  questions  of  war,  peace,  alliance,  or  treaty. 
It  received  at  the  end  of  the  year  an  account  of  his  stewardship 
from  every  magistrate  who  served  the  republic.  It  could  supple- 
ment the  constitution  by  passing  new  laws  of  universal  application, 
or  special  decrees  to  meet  special  circumstances.^  It  could  exercise 
by  its  votes  full  authority  over  revenue  and  taxation.  It  dis- 
tributed honours  and  rewards  to  deserving  citizens  or  strangers. 
In  short  the  democracy  now  controlled  the  executive  and  legislative 
departments  of  government,  and  in  another  form  and  under  another 
name,  that  of  Ileliaea,  it  had  also  full  possession  of  the  judicial 
functions  of  the  state.  After  the  introducer  of  a  measure  and  the 
privileged  presidents  of  the  assembly,  the  Epistates  and  Proedri, 
had  spoken,  it  was  open  to  any  citizen  to  rise  from  his  place, 
mount  the  Bema,  or  speaker's  platform,  and  address  the  people. 
This  much-valued  right  of  free  speech  [Tro^pTjo-ia]  was  the  proudest 
boast  of  the  Athenian.  Its  possession  led  a  very  large  number 
of  citizens  to  qualify  themselves  as  public  speakers,  so  that 
oratorical  power  and  capacity  for  debate  were  not  confined  to 
any  class  or  profession  in  the  city.  Of  course  the  Ecclesia  had  its 
well-known  favourites,  who  could  almost  be  called  professional 
orators,  but  their  harangues  might  be  interspersed  with  those  of 
any  farmer  or  artisan  whom  enthusiasm,  indignation,  or  impudence 
stirred  up  to  speaking-point.  Bad  oratory  found  its  check  in  the 
hoots  and  hisses  with  which  the  crowd  were  ready  to  silence  the 
windbag  or  the  bore,  for  the  Ecclesia  was  more  celebrated  for 
liveliness  than  for  decorum.  On  days  of  an  important  debate  the 
whole  Pnyx  would  be  crammed  with  citizens,  but  when  the  agenda 
Avere  of  an  uninteresting  nature  a  small  muster  was  often  seen.  If 
it  was  too  scanty,  the  presidents  could  send  out  public  slaves, 
armed  with  a  rope  smeared  with  red  paint,  to  sweep  the  neigh- 
bouring streets  of  their  loungers.  Thus  even  a  dull  day  in  the 
Ecclesia  was  not  destitute  of  its  humours.    Any  one  who,  while 

•  Of  decrees  at  Athens,  •i^-i\<^i<T}i.a.  is  one  passed  on  its  own  initiative  by  the 
Ecclesia ;  TrpofiovKfvfjLa  is  a  recommendation  of  the  Senate  sent  down  to 
the  Ecclesia  for  ratification  ;  vinos  is  a  permanent  part  of  the  constitution. 


158  Constitution  of  Cleisthenes.  I508b.c. 

endeavouring  to  evade  the  ropo  and  escape  the  meeting,  received 
a  touch  of  the  paint  was  hable  to  fine. 

The  Ileliaea,  liive  the  Ecclesia,  was  probably  composed  of  the  whole 
X.  y  t>ody  of  full  citizens,  or,  at  least,  of  all  full  citizens  over  thirty  years 
/f  yj^'  ^^  ^S^'     ^^^  history  is  less  exactly  known  than  that  of 

U  e    e  laea.  ^j^^  Ecclesia,  but  it  would  appear  that  its  function  as 

settled  by  Cleisthenes  was  to  hear  appeals  from  decisions  of  magis- 
trates, and  to  try  persons  accused  of  crimes  against  the  state,  such  as 
treason.  Cases  between  private  persons  still  had  a  first  hearing  before 
the  archons  or  other  individual  magistrates,  while  the  court  of  the 
Areopagus  retained  its  jurisdiction  in  cases  of  homicide,  and  its 
general  censorial  power  of  supervising  the  lives  of  citizens.  It 
was  probably  not  during  the  lifetime  of  Cleisthenes,  but  at  some 
subsequent  date  in  the  first  quarter  of  the  fifth  centurj^,  that  the 
Heliaea  was  divided  into  dikasteries.  By  later  ages  these  courts 
were  often  ascribed  to  Solon,  but  when  we  find  the  name  used  in  his 
time  it  probably  meant  the  whole  Heliaea,  not  a  subdivision  of  it. 
In  later  times  they  were  ten  large  coiu'ts  each  composed  of  many 
hundred  sworn  jurers,  called  Heliasts  or  Dicasts.  When  a  case 
came  on  for  decision,  the  dikastewes  cast  lots  to  see  which  should 
try  it ;  while  the  six  junior  archons,  or  Thesmothetae,  also  cast  lots 
to  settle  which  of  them  was  to  sit  as  president  of  the  dikastery. 
These  elaborate  precautions  were  directed  against  the  possible  use 
of  bribery  or  intimidation.  For  since  a  criminal  would  not  know 
till  the  last  moment  which  archon  would  be  the  presiding  judge, 
or  which  dikastery  would  be  the  jury  at  his  trial,  he  could  not 
set  to  work  to  exert  influence  or  corruption  on  them.  More- 
over, the  great  size  of  the  dikastery  itself  would  have  made  it 
difficult  to  try  bribery.  Justice  at  Athens,  then,  might  be  per- 
verted by  prejudice  or  party  strife,  but  hardly  ever  by  the  coarser 
means  of  corruption.  In  this  the  Athenian  courts  compare  very 
favourably  with  those  of  Rome,  where  during  the  last  century  of 
the  republic  bribery  seems  to  have  been  the  rule  rather  than  the 
exception. 

Having  discussed  the  Ecclesia  and  the  Heliaea,  we  must  now 
turn  to  the  magistracy.  Solon's  complicated  arrangements  for  the 
choice  of  archons  had  fallen  into  desuetude  during  the  tyranny  of 
the  Peisistratidae,  who  had  practically  nominated  such  persons  as 


608B.C.]  Ostracism.  159 

they  chose  for  the  office.  Cleisthenes  now  placed  the  election  in 
the  hands  of  the  newly-developed  Ecclesia,  which  thus  became  the 
maker  as  well  as  the  judge  of  the  chief  magistrates.  It  will  be 
remembered  that  direct  popular  election  had  never  before  pre- 
vailed; before  Solon  the  Archons  had  been  nominated  by  the 
Areopagus ;  after  him  the  hazard  of  the  lot  had  limited  the  electors' 
choice.  It  was  not  till  now  that  the  democracy  really  obtained 
a  preponderating  influence  over  its  officials.  One  result  of  this 
arrangement  of  Cleisthenes  was  to  strengthen  the  Areopagus,  for 
all  archons  were  now  men  of  mark,  the  direct  choice  of  the  Ecclesia, 
and  as  they  passed  on  to  the  Areopagus  after  leaving  office,  brought 
it  a  great  accession  of  personal  influence. 

In  the  first  draft  of  the  new  constitution  the  old  military  arrange- 
ments of  the  republic  were  left  untouched,  the  polemarch  or  third 
archon  remaining  as  commander-in-chief,  while  under  him  served 
four  strategi,  who  had  formerly  represented  the  four  old  tribes.  But 
some  years  later,^  Cleisthenes'  new  arrangement  of  the  tribes  was 
carried  into  the  province  of  war.  That  measure  had  resulted  in  the 
division  of  the  national  army  into  ten  bodies  of  approximately 
equal  strength.  To  suit  the  change,  the  number  of  strategi  was 
now  increased  to  ten,  each  to  head  the  hoplites  of  a  single  tribe. 
These  strategi  served  under  the  polemarch,  and  seem  from  the  first 
to  have  limited  his  authority  to  a  very  considerable  degi'ee.  Being 
independent  officers  chosen  by  the  people,  they  were  not  so  wholly 
or  thoroughly  under  his  control  as  he  might  have  wished.  He  seems 
to  have  been  obliged  to  treat  them  as  a  permanent  council-of-war, 
and  on  one  occasion  we  shall  find  their  vote  counting  for  as  much 
as  his. 

There  remains  for  consideration  one  more  provision  of  importance 
in  the  Cleisthenic  constitution — the  extraordinary  device  called 
Ostracism.  The  personal  and  political  rivalry  of 
gi-eat  party  leaders  had  been  the  curse  of  Athens ;  it  ^  ""acism. 
had  led  to  the  usurpation  of  the  Peisistratidae,  and  had  reasserted 
itself  again  the  moment  that  the  Peisistratidae  had  been  driven 
out  in  the  conflict  between  Cleisthenes  and  Isagoras.   The  reformer 

'  Aristotle's  newly-discovered  work  gives  two  irreconcilable  dates  for 
this  supplementary  legislation— it  may  have  been  either  in  504  b.c.  or 
601  B.C. 


i6o  Constitution  of  Cleisthenes.  [bosb.o 

cast  about  for  a  means  to  prevent  it  for  the  future,  and  found  one 
in  the  institution   of  honourable  banishment,  which   men   called 
Ostracism.     He   j^rovided   that  at  any  political   crisis  a   special 
meeting  might  be  held,  in  which  the  people  could  declare  by  their 
vote  that  the  presence  of  any  individual  in  Athens  was  prejudicial 
to  the  state.     If  six  thousand  votes — ostralca,  as  they  were  called, 
from  being  Avritten  upon  a  pot-sherd  {6<npaKov) — were  cast  into 
the  ballot-box  against  any  one  name,  that  statesman  went  into 
exile  for  ten  years.     This  banishment  implied  no  necessary  slur  on 
the  personal  or  political  character  of  the  sufferer.     He  did  not  lose 
his  rights  of  citizenship,  or  incur  confiscation  of  property.     When 
his  enforced  travels  were  ended,  he  re-entered  the  city  with  the 
same  property  and  status  as  he  had  possessed  before  his  departure. 
His  exile  had  not  been  intended  for  a  punishment  on  him,  but  as  a 
means  of  ending  a  political  dead-lock,  or  of  removing  a  personality 
which  was  inimical  for  the  time  being  to  the  interests  of  the  state, 
or  of  averting  the   consequences   of    an   honest  but   injudicious 
statesman's  personal  influence  on  the  people.    If  we  examine  the 
list  of  persons  ostracized,  we  find  that  not  only  Hipparchus,'  the 
advocate  of  the  return  of  the  Peisistratidae,  and  Damon,  the  over- 
zealous  friend  who  was  suspected  of  fostering  autocratic  views  in 
the  mind  of  Pericles,  are  included  in  it,  but  also  the  blameless 
Aristeides,  who  incurred  his  fate  merely  because  he  staked  his 
political  career  on  a  persistent  opposition  to  the  views  of  Themis- 
tocles,  which  were  in  favour  with  the  people  at  the  time.    Ciinon 
and  Thucydides  son  of  Melesias,  also  suffered  from  ostracism,  pro- 
voked by  the  necessity  put  before  the  Ecclesia  of  choosing  between 
their  policy  and  that  of  Pericles.     But  Cleisthenes  forgot  that  it 
was  possible  that  there  might  arise  more  than  two  parties  in  the 
state,  each  with  its  rival  policy.   The  final  disuse  of  Ostracism,  after 
an  employment  of  about  a  century,  came  about  from  the  discovery 
that  it  was  powerless  to  remedy  the  confusion  which  arose  from 
the  coexistence  of  more  than  two  factions.     For  when  the  tribunal 
of  ostracism,  in  418  B.C.,  was  called  upon  to  decide  between  the 
leaders  of  the  war  party  and  the  peace  party,  Alcibiades  and  Nicias, 
the  partisans  of  those  statesmen  combined  to  black-ball  the  dema- 
gogue Hyperbolus,  chief  of  a  third  party,  the  extreme  democrats. 

'  Not  to  be  confused  with  his  relative,  the  tyrant  slain  by  Harmodius. 


6o8B.e.j  Effects  of  the  New  Constitution.  i6i 

Thus  the  two  statesmen,  whose  policies  were  antagonistic,  still 
remained  to  divide  the  city  with  their  rivalry.  After  this  failure 
ostracism  was  never  again  employed. 

Such  were  the  chief  points  in  the  constitution  of    Cleisthenes, 
whose  estabhshment  marks  the  commencement  of  Athenian  great- 
ness.   It  was  the  most  thoroughly  democratic  scheme 
of  legislation  which  had  yet  been  seen,  and  partook  of  new  consti- 

,  „        .  .  .  .,..,.  tution. 

the  nature  oi  a  gigantic  experiment  in  pohtical  science. 
No  previous  constitution  in  any  Greek  city  had  given  the  assembly 
of  the  full  body  of  citizens  such  untrammelled  power  to  sway  the 
state.  Instead  of  the  restricted  privileges  which  it  had  been  granted 
bj'  Solon — the  right  to  elect  magistrates  and  to  call  them  to  account 
at  the  expiration  of  their  office — it  now  enjoyed  almost  unfettered 
control  over  the  foreign  and  home  policy  of  Athens,  and  also  had 
the  supreme  judicial  power  in  the  state.  The  partisans  of  oligarchy 
foretold  the  speedy  ruin  of  the  city  which  had  placed  the  conduct 
of  aftairs  in  the  hands  of  an  untried  and  fickle  populace.  But  the 
actual  result  of  the  adoption  of  democracy  at  Athens  was  an  out- 
burst of  vigour,  unparalleled  before  or  after  in  any  Greek  city. 
The  town,  which  had  been  looked  upon  as  a  state  of  the  second 
class,  lying  off  the  main  road  of  commerce,  and  exercising  little 
influence  in  international  politics,  suddenly  started  up  as  a  gi'eat 
naval  and  military  power,  and  went  forth  conquering  and  to  conquer. 
Its  hoplites,  alone  and  unaided,  faced  and  flung  back  the  hitherto 
unvanquished  armies  of  the  king  of  the  East;  its  triremes,  after 
leading  the  united  fleets  of  Hellas  to  victory  against  the  common 
enemy,  established  an  unquestioned  supremacy  at  sea  which  the 
once-famed  squadrons  of  Corinth  and  ^gina  were  not  able  to 
dispute.  An  outburst  of  literary  and  artistic  energy  made  itself 
felt  at  tlie  same  moment,  and  rendered  Athens  the  intellectual  as 
well  as  the  commercial  centre  of  the  Hellenic  race.  Far  from  being 
diverted  into  material  channels  by  the  far-reaching  political  interests 
of  the  day,  the  genius  of  Athenian  art  and  literature  was  stimulated 
by  them  into  higher  flights,  and  its  fullest  development  was  con- 
temporaneous with  the  zenith  of  the  imperial  greatness  of  the  city. 

How  far  was  the  glory  of  Athens  in  the  fifth  century  the  result 
of  the  constitutional  reforms  which  had  marked  the  end  of  the 
sixth?     It  would,  no  doubt,  be  easy  to  exaggerate  the  extent  of 


102  Constitution  of  Cieisthenes.  [608B.a 

their  connection,  and  to  forget  tiie  inspiring  ofl'ect  which  the 
victory  over  Persia,  won  twenty  years  later,  exercised  over  the 
whole  Hellenic  race  no  less  than  over  Athens.  But  the  records  of 
the  years  which  preceded  Salaniis  would  be  sufficient  by  themselves 
to  prove  that  Athens  had  set  forth  on  the  path  of  greatness  long 
before  the  final  defeat  of  the  Eastern  invader.  In  the  history  of 
the  struggle  which  she  waged  in  order  to  maintain  her  new  consti- 
tution, when  her  neighbours  banded  themselves  together  to  crush 
her  rising  greatness,  we  shall  see  the  signs  of  the  same  spirit  which 
afterwards  enabled  her  to  withstand  the  Persian  and  to  found  an 
empire  of  the  seas. 


CHAPTER  XVIT. 

EVENTS   IX  EUROPEAN   GKEECE    DOWX   TO   THE   BATTLE   OF 
MARATHON,  509-490  B.C. 

In  spite  of  the  defeat  of  their  alHes,  the  Boeotian  confederacy 
continued  the  war,  but  they  met  with  no  success  in  it.  Sending 
for  advice  to  Delphi,  the  Thebans  received  from  the 

War  between 

oracle  the  command  to  "  ask  aid  of  those  nearest  to  Athens  and 
them."  This  dark  saying  could  not  apply  to  their  eema. 
neighbours  of  Coronea  or  Tauagra,  who  were  already  serving  in 
the  army  of  the  league,  so  was  interpreted, — as  no  doubt  the  oracle 
had  designed, — into  a  hint  to  form  an  alliance  with  the  Aeginetans, 
Thebe  and  Aegina,  it  was  remembered,  were,  according  to  the  old 
myths,  sisters,  daughters  of  the  river-god  Asopus ;  hence  their 
descendants  might  be  regarded  as  the  "  nearest  relatives  "  of  each 
other.  An  embassy  was  therefore  sent  to  ask  the  aid  of  the  powerful 
island  state. 

The  same  commercial  jealousy  which  had  influenced  Chalcis 
made  itself  felt  at  Aegina  with  redoubled  force.  Athens  was  a 
possible  rival  before  the  fall  of  Chalcis,  but  after  she  had  swallowed 
up  the  trade  of  the  great  Euboean  town  she  had  become  doubly 
formidable.  If  we  add  that  as  Dorians  the  Aeginetans  despised 
their  Ionian  neighbours,  and  as  oligarchs  detested  their  democratic 
constitution,  we  can  easily  understand  their  frame  of  mind.  They 
still  possessed  the  largest  navy  in  European  Greece,  and  determined 
to  use  it  ere  Athens  had  time  to  grow  yet  greater.  Accordingly 
they  commenced  to  ravage  Phalerum  and  the  other  sea-coast  demes 
of  Western  Attica,  and  by  these  attacks,  Avhich  the  Athenian  fleet 
was  not  strong  enough  to  resist,  drew  off  the  pressure  of  the  war 
from  the  Boeotians  (506  B.C.), 


164  The   Years  509-490  6.C.  tsdes.c.- 

Meanwhile  Cleomenes  had  returned  to  Sparta,  and  in  spite  of  his 
second  failure  found  himself  able  to  stir  up  his  countrymen  to  new 

Hippiasat  projects  against  Athens.  They  tacitly  threw  blame 
Sparta,  ^j^  Demaratus  for  having  opposed  his  colleague's  plans 
by  passing  a  decree  "  that  the  two  kings  should  never  in  future  go 
out  in  the  same  army."  Moreover,  they  summoned  a  congress  of 
delegates  from  the  whole  of  the  allied  states  to  assemble  at  Sparta, 
for  they  apparently  considered  that  although  the  confederates  had 
refused  to  march  against  Athens  when  the  order  was  suddenly  and 
arbitrarily  laid  before  them,  they  might  be  induced  to  reconsider 
their  determination  by  argument  and  debate.  The  Spartans  also 
took  the  strange  step  of  sending  for  Hippias  from  his  refuge  at 
Sigeum,  and  offering  to  restore  him  to  the  tyranny.  Finding  that 
Isagoras'  party  had  failed  to  help  them,  they  hoped  that  the  faction 
of  supporters  of  the  Peisistratidae,  which  still  surviA'cd  in  Athens, 
might  be  stirred  into  activity  by  their  aid,  and  used  to  break  up 
the  power  of  the  new  democracy.  Forgetting  the  old  grudge  of  his 
expulsion  fi'om  Athens  by  Spartan  hands,  the  ex-tyrant  repaired  to 
the  congress,  and  joined  Cleomenes  in  plying  every  argument  on 
the  assembled  allies.  The  Corinthians,  however,  remained  obdurate, 
and  the  majority  of  the  members  of  the  Peloponnesian  league 
evidently  inclined  to  non-intervention.  Nothing  could  be  done  to 
convince  them,  and  Hippias  returned  in  disgust  to  his  place  of  exile 
in  the  Troad.  For  the  present  he  abandoned  the  attempt  to  make 
any  capital  out  of  the  internal  pohtics  of  Greece,  and  set  himself 
instead  to  win  favour  with  the  satrap  Artaphernes  of  Sardis,  who 
was  already  ill-disposed  towards  Athens  on  account  of  the  uncere- 
monious way  in  which  that  state,  two  years  before,  had  repudiated 
the  half-ratified  treaty  which  had  bound  it  to  Persia.  An  attempt 
to  conciliate  the  offended  magnate  which  the  Athenians  made, 
when  they  heard  of  the  intrigues  of  the  ex-tyrant,  had  no  other 
effect  than  to  draw  from  Artaphernes  the  declaration  that  "  they 
could  only  secure  their  safety  by  receiving  back  Hippias,  and 
giving  the  Great  King  earth  and  water."  From  that  moment  the 
Athenians  regarded  peace  with  the  great  Eastern  power  as  im- 
possible, and  resigned  themselves  to  the  necessity  of  adding  the 
Persian  to  the  already  considerable  list  of  their  enemies  (505  B.C.). 
At  a  moment  when  the  armies  of  IMegabazus  were  slowly  making 


605  B.C.]  Ckomenes  defeats  the  Argives.  165 

their  way  westward  through  Thrace  and  Macedon  towards  Greece, 
the  consequences  of  offending  the  Great  King  must  have  seemed 
Hkely  to  be  fatal.  But  rather  than  give  up  their  cherished  consti- 
tution the  Athenians  resolved  to  brave  them. 

After  the  unfruitful  congress  at  Sparta,  in  which  the  Pelopon- 
nesians  had  refused  to  crush  Athens  for  Cleomenes'  gratification, 
the  Athenians  were  freed  from  the  foe  whom  they  most  dreaded. 
The  peace  party  at  Sparta  was  not  only  headed  by  King  Demaratus, 
but  favoured  by  the  ephors,  who  dreaded  lest  Cleomenes  should 
attempt  to  win  back  the  old  royal  power  of  the  Ileraclidae. 
Accordingly  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  no  longer  appear 
among  the  enemies  of  Athens,  and  when  next  a  Spartan  king  is 
heard  of  in  connection  with  Athenian  affairs,  he  appears  in  a 
benevolent  rather  than  a  hostile  aspect.    It  is  probable  that  the 

continued  neutrahty  of  the  Peloponnesian  powers  was 

,       Warbetvreen 

m  some  degree  secured  by  a  desperate  war  which  spartaand 
about  this  time  broke  out  between  Sparta  and  Argos  '^^°^' 
(arc.  505  B.c.).^  The  Argives  had  never  forgotten  the  ancient 
supremacy  which  their  city  had,  in  the  days  of  Pheidon,  enjoyed 
over  all  the  lands  within  the  Isthmus,  and  seized  their  opportunity 
when  Sparta  was  estranged  from  the  majority  of  her  allies.  Instead, 
however,  of  being  able  to  molest  the  Lacedaemonians,  they  were 
obliged  to  fight  on  the  defensive,  for  Cleomenes  advanced  at  once 
into  Argolis.  After  trying  unsuccessfully  to  attack  Argos  from 
the  west,  the  king  compelled  the  Aeginetans  and  Sicyonians  to 
supply  him  with  ships,  and  landed  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Tiryns. 
Here  he  found  the  Argive  army  occupying  a  defensive  position  at 
a  place  called  Sepeia,  between  their  capital  and  the  sea.  By  gross 
carelessness  the  Argives  allowed  themselves  to  be  surprised,  and 
received  a  crushing  defeat.  Nor  was  this  all :  the  majority  of  the 
fugitives  sought  refuge  hard  by,  in  the  sacred  gi-ove  of  the  hero 
Argos,  where  they  were  completely  surrounded  by  the  Spartan 
army.  Cleomenes  might  have  received  them  to  surrender,  and 
obtained  any  terms  he  thought  fit  to  ask  for  their  release ;  but  he 
chose  instead  to  commit  an  atrocity  which  has  few  parallels  in  Greek 

'  The  date  of  this  war  is  doubtful.  Some  place  it  as  early  as  517  n.c, 
others  as  late  as  493  b.c.  The  date  given  above  seems  probable,  ho^v 
ever. 


i66  The    Years  509-490  B.C.  [50ob.c.- 

history.  He  blocked  all  the  outlets  with  troops,  and  then  set  fire 
to  the  grove.  Not  an  Argivc  escaped  from  the  flames  except  to 
fall  by  the  sword.  In  this  huge  disaster  the  vanquished  lost  six 
thousand  men,  two-thirds  of  their  citizens  capable  of  bearing  arms. 
Cleomenes  might  have  taken  the  city  had  he  chosen,  but  instead 
of  doing  so  returned  home,  only  celebrating  his  victory  by  forcing 
his  way  into  the  gi'eat  temple  of  Hera,  which  stood  outside  the 
walls  of  Argos,  and  doing  solemn  sacrifice  therein,  despite  the 
priests,  whom  he  caused  to  be  flogged  for  their  remonstrances.  On 
being  attacked  at  Sparta  for  his  remissness,  he  gave  the  ephors 
the  curious  answer  that  the  Delphic  oracle  had  foretold  that  he 
should  "  destroy  Argos."  When  he  found  that  this  was  the  name 
of  the  grove  which  he  had  burnt  after  the  battle,  he  saw  that  the 
prophecy  had  been  fulfilled ;  moreover,  the  sacrifice  which  he  made 
at  the  temple  of  Hera  had  not  been  so  propitious  as  to  promise 
complete  success,  and  he  had  therefore  returned.  Whether  con- 
vinced or  not,  the  ephors  desisted  from  their  reproaches.  The  main 
importance  of  this  campaign  was  that  it  took  Argos  out  of  Greek 
politics  for  more  than  a  generation.  Its  reduced  population  saw 
their  subject-allies  of  Orneae  Cleonae  and  Mycenae  in  successful 
revolt,  and  were  even  reduced  to  struggle  for  existence  with  their 
own  agricultural  serfs,  who  rose  and  maintained  a  vigorous  war 
against  them  for  several  ji'ears. 

We  must  now  return  to  Athens.     That  state,  though  freed  from 
fear  of  Sparta,  had  a  war  with  Thebes  and  Aegina  still  on  her  hands, 
besides  the  prospect  of  another  with  Persia  impending.     Of  the 
details  of  the  former  struggle  we  unfortunately  knoAV  nothing ;  but 
it  cannot  have  been  unsuccessful,  since,  when  the  revolted  lonians 
y J  C,-'-^-''         sent  Aristagoras  to  beg  for  aid  in  500  B.C.,  Athens  was 
<r    \  '-'     tion  to  sardis,  in  a  condition  to  spare  a  squadron  of  twenty  ships  for 
499  B.C.      distant  operations  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor.     This 
was  the  expedition  which  co-operated  with  the  Eretrians  and  Mile- 
sians in  that  unfortunate  attack  on  Sardis  which  roused  such  wrath 
in  Darius.  Probably  the  vicissitudes  of  the  war  with  Aegina  account 
for  the  fact  that,  except  on  this  one  occasion,  Athens  sent  no  help 
to  her  Eastern  kinsmen ;  for  it  is  impossible  to  find  any  other 
reason  for  her  desertion  of  the  lonians,  when  that  people  were 
fighting  her  battles  by  keeping  her  enemy  employed  at  home. 


490 B.C.]  Growth  of  the  Poiver  of  Athens.  167 

That  the  Athenians  reah'zed  the  meaning  to  themselves  of  the 
failure  of  the  Ionic  revolt  is  sufficientlj'  shown  hy  their  conduct  in 
the  matter  of  Phrynichus's  play,  "The  Fall  of  Miletus"  (see  p.  145). 

For  six  years,  however,  the  revolt  in  Asia  Minor  left  the  Persian 
no  spare  time  for  interference  with  states  beyond  the  Aegean,  and 
the  respite  was  very  precious  to  Athens.  It  allowed  a  whole 
generation  to  arise  which  had  been  educated  in  a  free  and  demo- 
cratic city,  where  the  traditions  of  tyranny  and  seditious  party 
strife  were  yearly  growing  less  dangerous.  Nothing,  indeed,  could 
have  been  more  fortunate  for  Athens  than  the  course  which 
events  took  in  the  period  510-490  b.c.  The  memory  of  the  deeds 
of  Ilippias  and  Isagoras  was  enough  to  make  oligarchy  or  tyranny 
impossible,  while  the  violent  interference  of  Sparta  had  made  men 
associate  in  all  their  thoughts  the  autonomy  of  Athens  and  her 
democratic  constitution,  which  had  been  alike  threatened  by  foreign 
arms.  Finally,  the  long  war  with  Aegina  hindered  the  Athenians 
from  relapsing  into  their  old  party  quarrels,  by  the  continual  state 
of  tension  in  which  it  kept  them,  and  at  the  same  time  drove  them 
to  become  more  and  more  of  a  naval  power. 

Public  opinion,  not  onlj^  in  Athens,  but  among  enlightened  men 
throughout  Greece,  laid  the  prosperity  of  the  city  to  the  credit  of 
the  constitution  of  Cleisthenes.  "In  this  whole  course  of  events," 
writes  Herodotus,  "  it  was  plainly  evident  what  an  excellent  thing 
is  a  democratic  constitution.  For  while  Athens  was  ruled  by 
tyrants  her  citizens  were  no  more  fortunate  in  war  than  their 
neighbours,  but  when  they  were  freed  they  proved  themselves  far 
the  best  soldiers.  This  evidently  came  from  the  fact  that  they 
were  slack  while  they  w'orked  for  a  master,  but  grew  zealous  when 
every  man  w^as  fighting  to  defend  his  own  liberty." 

The  twenty  years  510-490  b.c  were  the  training-school  of 
Athenian  greatness ;  and  the  turn  which  the  history  of  the  subse- 
quent half-century  took  is  only  to  be  explained  when  we  realize 
their  meaning  and  importance.  Nothing  can  illustrate  their  effect 
better  than  the  influence  which  they  exerted  on  the  character  and 
position  of  the  three  great  men  whom  Athens  produced  during  this 
epoch. 

Jliltiades,  son  of  Ciraon,  was  a  man  who,  in  an  earlier  generation, 
would  have  proved   either  an   aspirant  for  tyraimy  or  a  bitter 


1 68  The  Years  509-490  b.c.  [499 b.c.- 

oligarcliic  partisan.  He  sprang  from  one  of  the  oldest  Attic  families, 
Miitiades  at  ^'^^  Acacidae,  who  claimed  descent  from  the  Sala- 
Athens.  rninian  Ajax.  The  wealth  and  influence  of  his  father 
were  so  great  that  it  had  drawn  down  on  him  banishment  at  the 
hands  of  Peisistratus,  and  assassination  from  the  more  reckless 
Hippias.  Miitiades  himself  had  withdrawn  from  Athens  to  escape 
a  similar  fate,  and  had  succeeded  to  a  curious  inheritance  in  the 
Thracian  Chersonese.  His  uncle  and  namesake  had,  thirt)'  years 
before,  become  king  of  a  small  tribe  of  barbarians  named  the 
Dolonci,  who  dwelt  upon  the  shore  of  the  Hellespont  (see  page  114). 
These  people,  being  oppressed  in  war  by  their  neighbours,  had,  by 
the  advice  of  the  Delphic  oracle,  taken  a  Greek  for  king.  The 
elder  Miitiades  not  only  reigned  over  them,  but  subdued  by  their 
aid  several  small  Greek  cities  in  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  so  that 
he  was  at  once  a  Doloncian  king  and  a  tyrant  over  Cardia  and  its 
Hellenic  neighbours.  In  this  double  capacity  he  was  succeeded  by 
two  nephews,  of  whom  his  more  famous  namesake  was  the  second. 
The  younger  Miitiades  has  already  met  our  notice,  at  the  moment 
when  he  endeavoured  to  persuade  the  other  Greek  vassals  of  Darius 
to  destroy  the  Danube  bridge,  at  the  time  of  that  monarch's  expe- 
dition into  Scythia.  When  the  Ionic  revolt  took  place  ho  joined  in 
it  hear  til}',  and,  after  driving  out  the  Persian  garrisons  from  Imbros 
and  Lemnos,  took  his  countrymen  at  home  into  partnership,  and 
aided  them  to  establish  their  third  great  Cleruchy  in  the  con- 
quered islands  (499  B.C.).  When,  however,  the  Hellespontine 
towns  were  recovered  by  the  armies  of  the  great  king  in  497  n.c, 
Miitiades  was  compelled  to  fly  from  his  own  little  dominion  in  the 
Thracian  Chersonese,  and,  after  a  hairbreadth  escape  from  a  Phoe- 
nician squadron,  which  chased  his  galleys  across  the  Aegean, 
thought  himself  fortunate  to  reach  Athens  in  safetj'.  The  people 
were  not  ungrateful  for  the  services  he  had  done  them  in  the 
matter  of  Imbros  and  Lemnos,  and  ere  long  chose  him  as  one  of  the 
ten  strategi  of  the  year.  That  an  ex-tyrant  and  a  member  of  one 
of  the  old  oligarchic  families  could  be  elected  to  the  highest  otflce 
by  the  democracy  proves  two  things.  The  constitution  of  Cleis- 
thenes  must  have  obtained  such  a  firm  hold  on  the  esteem  of  the 
Athenian  people  that  thej'  had  grown  to  regard  it  as  invulnerable 
to  the  assaults  of  any  internal  enemy;  even  a  man  of  the  most 


493  BC]  Aristeides.  169 

undemocratic  antecedents  could  not  harm  it,  though  he  held  one  of 
the  chief  magistracies  in  the  state.  Secondly,  Miltiades  himself 
must  have  possessed  no  small  share  of  that  power  of  adapting  one's 
self  to  circumstances  which  formed  such  a  prominent  feature  in 
the  Attic  character.  For  an  independent  sovereign  to  become  a 
republican  othcial,  and  to  win  high  renown  in  that  capacity,  was 
indeed  a  marvel.  Nevertheless,  Miltiades  had  not  been  brought 
up  under  the  training  of  the  constitution  of  Cleisthenes — the 
Athenians  never  felt  that  he  was  quite  one  of  themselves — and,  in 
spite  of  his  many  excellent  qualities,  he  could  never  make  himself  so 
thoroughly  the  people's  hero  and  champion  as  two  younger  men  who 
came  into  prominence  at  Athens  about  the  same  time  as  himself. 

These  two  were  Aristeides  son  of  Lysimachus,  and  Themistocles 
son  of  Neocles.  Both  were  sprung  from  undistinguished  families 
of  the  middle  class,  and  the  second  was  not  even  of  pure  Attic 
parentage,  his  mother  having  been  a  Carian  woman.  Each,  there- 
fore, owed  his  position  to  his  own  ability,  and  only  rose  to  pro- 
minence through  the  carriere  ouvcrte  mix  talents  Avhich  the 
democratic  constitution  opened  to  him.  But,  except  in  age  and 
station,  the  two  men  were  as  dissimilar  as  it  is  possible  for  human 
beings  to  be.  Aristeides  won  the  confidence  of  the  Athenian  people 
by  his  possession  of  those  virtues  which  were  most  wanting  in  the 
national  character.  Themistocles,  on  the  other  hand,  rose  to 
renown  because  he  reproduced  in  their  highest  possible  develop- 
ment all  the  features,  good  and  bad  alike,  of  the  Athenian  dis- 
position. 

The  son  of  Lysimachus  displayed  two  great  and  excellent  traits. 
He  was  rigidly  just  and  honourable,  and  he  was  gifted  with  the 
most  imperturbable  cool-headedness.  The  faults  of 
the  Athenian  democracy  were  precisely  the  reverse 
of  these  good  qualities.  Their  foible  was  over-hasty  action,  the 
tendency  to  be  led  astray  in  matters  both  of  right  and  wrong  and 
of  expediency  and  inexpediency  by  the  impulses  of  the  moment. 
Hence  they  learnt  by  experience  to  respect  the  one  man  who  was 
never  moved  by  passion  and  prejudice,  but  always  summed  up 
clearly  on  the  side  of  honour  and  justice.  But  ere  he  fully  won  the 
confidence  of  his  countrymen,  Aristeides  had  to  undergo  a  rough 
probation.    Often  his  advice  was  scorned,  and  once  he  was  even 


lyo  The    Years  509-490  i3.c.  kssB.c- 

ostracized  for  his  unconiproraiBing  opposition  to  the  policy  wliich 
liad  the  momentary  approbation  of  the  people.  Every  one  has  heard 
the  story  of  the  prejudiced  and  ignorant  voter  who,  on  that  occasion, 
gave  his  voice  for  expulsion,  "  because  he  was  tired  of  always  hear- 
ing Aristcides  called  '  The  Just.' "  True  or  false,  the  anecdote 
brings  into  relief  the  pettiness  of  human  nature  and  the  stupid 
jealousy  which  Aristeides  had  to  surmount  before  his  position  gi'ew 
unquestioned. 

The  son  of  Neocles  was  a  man  of  a  very  diflerent  type.  The 
respectable  talents  of  Aristeides  were  thrown  into  the  shade  by  liis 
genius,  but  to  his  rival's  moral  virtues  he  had  nothing 
to  oppose.  The  characteristics,  evil  as  well  as  good, 
of  the  Athenian  people  seemed  incarnate  in  him.  Of  all  statesmen 
that  Greece  ever  knew,  he  was  incomparably  the  most  versatile  and 
ingenious.  Thucydides  says  that  at  unpremeditated  action  there  was 
no  one  to  compare  with  him.  AVith  the  shortest  notice  given,  he 
would  always  hit  on  a  happy  expedient,  and  his  forecasts  of  future 
events  Avere  wonderfully  accurate.  Nor  did  his  successes  proceed 
from  study  and  long  forethought;  they  were  the  fruits  of  the 
untaught  quickness  of  his  intellect.  But  Themistocles'  ready  brains 
were  employed  to  benefit  his  country  only  so  long  as,  while  so 
doing,  he  benefitted  himself  also.  If  he  was  patriotic,  his  patriotism 
was  merely  a  larger  kind  of  selfishness,  which  embraced  his  country 
as  a  thing  necessary  to  his  comfort.  Above  all,  he  was  hopelessly 
corrupt  in  money  matters.  He  made  politics  a  paying  trade.  Left 
a  patrimony  of  three  talents  by  his  father,  he  was  found  to  possess 
more  than  ninety  at  the  moment  of  the  sudden  end  of  his  career  in 
Athens,  and  this  large  foi'tune  had  been  mainly  accumulated  liy 
taking  bribes  from  foreign  states.  That  he  was  nothing  more  than 
an  unscrupulous  adventurer  was  sufficiently  shown  by  the  fact  that, 
when  expelled  from  his  country,  he  promptly  went  over  to  the 
Persians,  and  died  in  the  receipt  of  a  pension  from  King  Artaxerxes. 
All  the  vices  of  the  Greek  character  were  indeed  embodied  in  him — • 
selfishness,  double-dealing,  want  of  political  principle,  malevolent 
jealousy,  and  that  love  of  ostentation  which  drives  men  to  the 
acquisition  of  wealth  by  any  means,  whether  dishonourable  or  fair 
and  open.  Yet,  ere  his  faults  were  discovered  by  his  countrj'men, 
he  had  done  them  benefits  whose  effects  were  unparalleled.     For  in 


493  s.c]  Fortification  of  Peiracus,  171 

the  earlier  days  of  his  life,  when  in  working  for  Athens  he  also 
worked  for  himself,  his  services  to  tlie  state  were  such  as  no  states- 
man, not  even  Pericles,  was  ever  able  to  surpass. 

It  was  the  necessities  of  the  war  with  Aegina  which  first  brought 
Themistocles  into  prominence.  When  he  obtained  the  archonship 
in  493  B.c.,^  he  persuaded  his  country-men  to  fortify  the  Fortification 
Peiraeus  and  make  it  their  naval  arsenal.  Previously  °^  Peiraeus. 
the  Athenian  harbour  had  been  the  open  roadstead  of  Phaleium, 
whose  only  advantage  was  that  it  lay  on  the  spot  at  which  the  sea 
approached  the  city  most  nearly.  The  Peiraeus  had  been  merely  a 
rock}''  waste  peninsula,  undefended  and  unemployed.  Themistocles 
saw  its  capacities,  and  at  his  instigation  it  was  walled  off,  and  made 
the  naval  station  of  the  Athenian  fleet.  For  this  purpose  it  was 
admirably  fitted,  presenting  as  it  did  one  large  and  two  smaller 
harbours,  all  deep  enough  to  receive  the  largest  ships,  and  yet  so 
narrow  at  their  mouths  that  they  could  be  closed  with  chains  and 
booms  so  as  to  be  perfectly  inaccessible  to  an  enemy.  The  Peiraeus 
was  inconveniently  distant  indeed  (four  miles)  from  Athens,  and 
did  not  lie  so  thoroughly  under  the  ej-es  of  all  who  dwelt  in  the  city 
as  did  the  Bay  of  Phalerum ;  but  for  safety,  strength,  and  commercial 
use  it  was  so  incomparably  superior,  that  it  superseded  the  older 
station  at  once.  In  a  few  years  it  became  a  considerable  town,  the 
head-quarters  of  the  most  democratic  section  of  the  Athenian  people  ; 
for  the  landless  class  flocked  down  in  crowds  to  the  port,  where 
employment  was  easy  to  find,  either  on  shipboard  or  in  connection 
with  the  small  industries  which  Avere  called  into  existence  by  the 
necessities  of  the  seafaring  population.  The  va.v^[Kos  ox>^os  of  the 
Peiracus  grew  ere  long  to  be  a  prominent  factor  in  Athenian  politics  ; 
for  the  events  of  the  years  which  followed  the  founding  of  the  new 
port  were  such  as  to  bring  forward  in  every  way  the  importance  of 
the  naval  side  of  the  city's  strength. 

In  493  B.C.,  the  very  year  of  Themistocles'  archonship,  the  hands 
of  the  Persian  satraps  of  Asia  Minor  were  once  more  entirely  free. 
The  last  throes  of  the  Ionic  revolt  were  over,  and  the       Darius 
great  king  might  now  send  forth  his  armies  to  renew     ^Qreec^"^ 
that  Westward  progress  which  had  been  interrupted      493  b.c. 
by  the  rebellion.     To  give  an  opportunity  for  prompt  submission 

*  Some  writers  doubt  this  archonship,  but  it  rests  on  good  authority. 


172  The   Years  509-490  B.C.  [403 b.o. 

to  any  states  which  might  choose  to  do  Iiomage  without  making 
any  attempt  to  defend  themselves,  Darius  sent  heralds  to  every 
city  in  Greece  to  demand  the  customary  "  earth  and  water." 
After  the  afl'air  of  the  burning  of  Sardis,  the  Athenians  could  not 
hope  for  favourable  treatment  at  the  hands  of  Persia ;  but  their 
indignant  rejection  of  submission  might  have  taken  a  less  ferocious 
form.  They  cast  the  unfortunate  herald  into  the  Barathrum,  or 
pit  into  which  criminals  were  thrown,  and  bade  him  take  earth 
therefrom.  Themistocles  is  said  to  have  instigated  the  act,  nor  is 
it  out  of  keeping  with  his  character.  It  is  more  surprising  to  find 
the  same  deed  repeated  by  the  self-contained  Spartans.  Indignant 
that  the  first  state  in  Greece  should  be  held  so  lightly  by  the 
king,  they  gave  his  herald  water  by  tossing  him  into  a  well. 
These  two  desperate  defiances  proclaimed  that  it  was  war  to  the 
death  between  Persia  and  the  two  most  resolute  states  in  Greece. 
But  in  other  cities  the  summons  did  not  meet  such  an  answer ; 
many  dismissed  the  heralds  witli  scorn ;  but  some  gave  the 
necessary  pledge,  and  notable  among  these  were  the  Aeginetans, 
who  were  probably  impelled  as  much  by  dislike  of  Athens  as  by 
mere  dread  of  Darius. 

The  submission  of  Aegina  had  an  unexpected  result  in  reconciling 
Athens  and  Sparta.    Hearing  of  the  line  which  the  Lacedaemonians 

Quarrels  of  ^^^'^  taken  up,  the  Athenians  sent  to  them,  ignoring 
cieoraenes  and  old  grudgcs,  and  appealed  to  them  to  hinder  the 
desertion  of  the  cause  of  Grecian  freedom  which 
the  Aeginetans  meditated.  Nor  did  they  appeal  in  vain.  King 
Cleomenes  had  lost  the  memory  of  his  old  wrath  with  Athens 
while  engaged  in  the  subsequent  struggle  with  Argos,  and  in  a 
long  course  of  wrangling  with  his  colleague  Demaratus.  He  took 
up  warmly  the  grievance  against  Aegina,  all  the  more  so  that 
Demaratus  did  the  reverse.  Going  in  person  to  the  island,  he 
declared  there  his  intention  of  coercing  any  traitorous  attempt 
against  the  common  weal  of  Greece.  Acting  under  private  advice 
from  Demaratus,  the  Aeginetans  took  no  notice  of  the  threat,  and 
Cleomenes  returned  in  high  dudgeon  to  Sparta.  There  he  at  once 
put  into  action  a  long-meditated  scheme  against  his  colleague  and 
enemy.  He  laid  against  him  a  charge  of  illegitimacy,  and  when 
an  appeal  was  made  on  the  point  to  the  Delphic  Apollo,  a  bribed 


492  B.C.  1  Persian  Attack  on  Attida.  ly^ 

oracle  replied  that  Demaratus  was  no  true  son  of  King  Ariston. 
He  was  dethroned  and  superseded  by  Leotychides,  who  had  been 
Cleomenes'  confederate  in  the  plot.  Demaratus  fled  to  Asia,  and 
repaired  to  the  court  of  Darius,  whose  favour  he  won.  From  that 
time  forward  his  return  at  the  head  of  a  Persian  army  was  a 
constant  source  of  dread  to  Cleomenes  and  every  other  Spartan, 
and  its  prospect  did  much  to  keep  them  firm  in  their  resistance  to 
the  great  king. 

When  he  had  thus  provided  himself  with  a  subservient  colleague, 
Cleomenes  swooped  down  on  Aegina.  So  irresistible  did  he  now 
appear,  that  the  Aeginetans  submitted  to  him  without  a  struggle. 
He  bound  them  to  peace  with  Athens,  and,  to  secure  it,  took  from 
them  ten  hostages  of  the  highest  rank,  whom  he  lianded  over  to 
the  custody  of  the  Athenians.  Thus  when  the  armies  of  the 
Mede  presented  themselves  on  Attic  soil  two  years  later,  there 
was  no  hostile  power  ready  to  distract  the  defence  by  attacks  in 
the  rear. 

We  have  already  related  how  the  expedition  which  Mardonius 
launched  against  Greece  in  492  B.C.  was  shattered  against  the  rocks 
of  Athos,  and  the  stubborn  resistance  of  the  Thracian  „ 

.  Persian  attack 

tribes.     Eighteen  months  were  employed  to  gather  a     on  Attica, 

.  490  B  C 

second  army  and  fleet,  but  m  the  summer  of  490  i;.c. 
all  was  ready.  Phoenicia  and  Ionia  had  furnished  six  hundred  war- 
gaheys,  while  the  land  contingents  of  the  western  satrapies  mustered 
at  Tarsus  under  Artaphernes,  son  of  that  satrap  of  Lydia  of  whom 
we  have  so  frequently  heard.  Datis  the  Mede  brought  down  from 
Susa  a  select  force  recruited  in  the  far  East.  Thirty-six  nations 
were  represented  in  the  combined  army,  from  the  Greeks  of 
Ionia  to  the  Sakae  of  Eastern  Tartary.  They  may  well  have 
numbered  the  hundred  thousand  foot  and  ten  thousand  horse 
which  are  ascribed  to  them.  Nor  were  they  without  guidance ; 
besides  many  other  Greek  exiles,  there  sailed  with  them  the 
aged  Hippias,  who  now  for  the  last  time  led  a  hostile  force 
against  his  native  country,  that  he  might  win  back  his  long-lost 
tyranny.  The  Peisistratidae  still  numbered  a  few  partisans  at 
Athens,  and  the  ex-tyrant  hoped  great  things  from  their  co- 
operation. 

It  was  rather  late  in  the  summer  when  the  expedition  went  forth 


174  ^/^^    Years  509-490  B.C.  t490B.a 

to  cany  out  the  behests  of  Darius  by  subduing  all  the  Greeks  who 
had  not  given  him  earth  and  water,  and  more  especially  by  bringing 
before  him  in  chains  those  Eretrians  and  Athenians  who  had 
insulted  his  majesty  by  crossing  the  Aegean  and  burning  his  city  of 
Sardis. 


CHAPTER  XVIIT. 

FROM    THE    BATTLE    OF    MARATHON    TO    THE    IXVASTOX    OF    XERXES, 
490-480   B.C. 

Warned  of  the  clangers  of  the  Thracian  coast  by  the  great  ship- 
Vt^reck  of  Mardonius's  fieet  in  492  B.C.,  Datis  and  Artaphernes  steered 
straight  across  the  Aegean  through  the  Cyclades.  The  Persians 
Their  gi-eat  armament  terrified  the  islanders,  most  of  *^^®  Eretna. 
whom  hastened  to  give  earth  and  water  to  the  great  king.  The 
Naxians,  after  refusing  submission,  took  refuge  in  the  hill-tops, 
abandoning  their  city  to  the  spoiler.  Apparently  they  had  for- 
gotten their  own  successful  defence  against  Megabates  and  Arista- 
goras  just  twelve  years  before.  Passing  the  holy  island  of  Delos, 
which  they  left  unsacked,  and  treated  with  all  respect,  the  Persians 
came  to  Euboea,  and  landed  not  far  from  Eretria,  the  first  goal  at 
which  they  aimed.  There  was  panic  in  the  city,  and  although  the 
Athenian  "Cleruchs"of  Chalcis  came  to  their  aid,  the  Eretrians 
dared  not  take  the  field.  They  shut  themselves  up  within  their 
walls,  but,  to  the  dismay  of  all  freedom-loving  Greeks,  the  town 
was  betrayed  by  malcontents  from  within  after  a  siege  of  only  six 
days,  and  its  citizens  made  prisoners  en  masse.  Placing  them  on 
shipboard  in  chains,  Datis  and  Artaphernes  coasted  down  the 
Euripus  to  Attica.  Hippias  guided  them  to  the  plains  of  Marathon, 
the  spot  at  which  he  himself  and  his  father  had  landed  fifty  years 
before,  on  their  last  and  most  successful  expedition  against  Athens. 
It  is  not  quite  certain  whether  the  intention  of  the  Persian  com- 
manders was  to  march  straight  on  Athens  across  the  spurs  of  Mount 
Brilessus,  as  Peisistratus  had  done,  or  whether,  after  attracting  the 
Athenian  army  to  the  extreme  north-east  limit  of  Attica,  they 
proposed  to  send  troops  round  on  the  fleet  in  order  to  fall  upon  the 


1 7^  The  First  Persian  Invasion.  [490 b.c 

city  when  stripped  of  its  defenders.  'J'hc  latter  scheme,  at  any  rate, 
is  suggested  by  the  fact  that  the  few  traitors  who  existed  in  Athens 
had  promised  Hippias  to  give  a  signal  when  there  was  a  favourable 
opportunity  for  attackiug  Athens,  by  raising  a  bright  shield  on  the 
summit  of  Mount  Pentelicus. 

The  sudden  fivll  of  Eretria  liad  set  Athens  in  a  ferment :  there 
was  no  thought  of  surrender,  but  very  little  of  success.  The  first 
measure  taken  was  to  send  for  instant  aid  to  Sparta.  Philippides, 
a  famous  runner,  took  the  message,  and  sped  along  with  such  good 
will  that  he  reached  Sparta  in  two  days,  though  he  had  no  less  than 
a  hundred  and  fifty  miles  to  cover.  A  legend  of  the  time  tells 
how  when,  dazed  and  weary,  he  breasted  the  last  Arcadian  mountain 
•which  separated  him  from  his  goal  in  the  vale  of  the  Eurotas,  the 
god  Pan  suddenly  appeared  before  him,  spoke  words  of  cheering 
import  for  Athens,  and  then  vanished  away.  But  there  was  no 
encouragement  to  be  drawn  from  the  immediate  effect  of  Philippides' 
mission.  The  Spartans  were  honestly  ready  for  the  fight,  but  the 
summons  unfortunately  reached  them  on  the  eve  of  a  great  festival, 
and  such  was  their  reverence  for  tradition  that  they  dared  not 
move  before  the  full  moon  had  come.  Not  till  five  all-important 
days  had  passed  did  their  army  sat  out,  and  then  the  crisis  had 
passed. 

Miltiades,  as  we  have  already  mentioned,  was  one  of  the  ten 
strategi  in  the  year  490  b.c,  and  his  rank,  military  experience,  and 

hatred  of  Persia  gave  him  an  undisptited  pre-eminence 

Persian  ,  .  ,,  ,^^,  /  i     i      j- 

Invasion  of  among  his   colleagues.      \\  hen  the  enemy  s  landmg 

Attica.       j^^^^^    \,^(t\\    reported,    the    polemarch   summoned  his 

council  of  war,  to  decide  whether  the  army  should  take  the  field, 

or  shut  itself  up  within  the  walls  of  the  city.     Miltiades  chose  the 

bolder  plan,  but  five  of  his  coadjutors  voted  against  it.     It  was  long 

remembered  how,  at  that  council  of  war  which  practically  decided 

the  freedom  of  Greece,  Miltiades  solemnly  rose  when  the  votes 

seemed  going  against  him,  and  adjured  the  archon  Callimachus, 

who,   as  polemarch,   had    the   chief  command  and   the    decisive 

vote,  to  take   the   side  of  cotirage,  pointing  out  the  opportunity 

which   delay  would  give  to   domestic  traitors,  and   the  splendid 

results  which  immediate  action  woidd  secure.   It  seemed  a  desperate 

moment  at  which    to    forecast    success,   but  the   enthusiasm   of 


490  B.C.]  The  Battle  of  Marathon.  1 7  7 

Miltiades  won  over  the  polemarch's  vote,  and  the  army  marched  on 
Marathon. 

The  site  of  the  coming  battle  was  a  bare  open  plain,  six  miles 
long  by  less  than  two  broad,  which  lies  between  the  lower  spurs 
of  Mount  Pentelicus  and  the  sea.  A  fine  bay  gave  The  Bay  of 
room  for  the  numerous  ships  of  the  Persians  to  be  Marathon, 
drawn  on  shore ;  but  it  was  not  at  every  point  that  access  from 
the  beach  to  the  plain  was  possible.  Two  marshes,  of  which  the 
more  northern  is  a  full  mile  long,  lie  between  the  hills  and  the  sea. 
Between  them  was  the  camp  of  the  invader.  Opposite  him  the 
Athenians  were  posted  on  the  steep  slope  of  the  mountains,  guarding 
the  two  roads  which  climb  up  from  the  level  ground  and  lead  to 
Athens.  Their  head-quarters  were  in  a  sacred  enclosure  dedicated 
from  time  immemorial  to  Heracles,  a  position  from  which  they 
easily  overlooked  the  hostile  camp.  They  mustered  about  nine 
thousand  hoplites,  besides  a  considerable  number  of  slaves  equipped 
as  light-armed  troops.  When,  however,  they  had  already  reached 
Marathon,  they  received  an  unexpected  accession  to  their  strength 
by  the  arrival  of  the  whole  disposable  force  of  the  little  town  of 
Plataea,  a  thousand  hoplites  more.  Athens  had  twice  taken  arms 
to  defend  Plataea  from  being  swallowed  up  by  the  Boeotian  League, 
and  now,  with  a  gratitude  rare  in  all  periods  of  history,  but  especially 
in  Greek,  the  smaller  state  sent  out  its  full  contingent  to  share  the 
fate  of  the  Athenians  in  their  apparently  hopeless  struggle  with 
Persia. 

It  is  probable  that  Miltiades  expected  at  first  to  be  attacked  by 
the  Persians  in  his  position ;  but  when  the  enemy  stayed  four  or 
five  days  without  an  advance,  probably  awaiting  Battle  of 
the  promised  signal  from  the  partisans  of  Hippias  in  Marathon. 
Athens,  he  determined  to  take  the  offensive  himself.  He  quietly 
got  his  men  into  order  and  prepared  for  action.  The  Athenians 
were  ranged  in  a  line,  of  which  the  centre  was  only  a  few  files 
deep,  while  the  wings  were  composed  of  deep  heavy  columns. 
The  poleraarch  Callimachus  headed  the  right  wing ;  Aristeides  took 
the  weak  centre,  which  was  composed  of  his  own  tribe,  the  Antiochis, 
and  the  Leontis;  w'hile  the  Plataeans  formed  the  extreme  left. 
Then,  at  Miltiades'  word,  the  whole  started  down  the  hill  at  a  run. 
There  was  a  mile  to  cover  before  the  Persian  camp  was  reached, 


178 


The  First  Persian  Invasion. 


[490  B.O- 


and  tliough  the  slope  added  momentum  to  the  charge,  the  long 
distance  must  have  disordered  the  ranks.  Probably,  as  in  all  cases 
•where  a  line  advances  in  haste,  the  flanks  'gained  ground  on  the 
centre,  so  that  the  army  must  have  assumed  a  crescent  shape  ere 
the  moment  at  which  it  crashed  into  the  Persian  host.  Datis  and 
Artaphernes  had  not  been  expecting  a  battle  at  that  moment ;  it 
would  seem  that  their  cavalry  was  on  shipboard,  ready  to  start  for 
the  projected  attack  on  Athens  from  the  west,  and  that  the  rest 
of  the  army  was  preparing   for  embarkation.     But  they  had  not 


IValker  CfBoutaltsc. 


neglected  to  keep  watch  while  in  presence  of  the  enemy,  and 
despite  ot  the  suddenness  of  Miltiades'  attack,  were  able  to  form 
up  some  sort  of  a  line  in  front  ot  their  camp.  The  Persians  and 
Sacae  held  the  centre,  the  post  of  honour,  the  subject  tribes  the  two 
wings.  All,  however,  must  have  been  still  in  disarray  when  the 
moment  of  the  shock  came.  At  the  first  the  enemy  had  regarded 
the  Athenians  as  madmen,  when  they  came  storming  down  the 
hill  to  attack  in  the  open  a  force  of  ten  times  their  own  number. 
But  when  the  barbarians  found  the  line  of  pikes  rolling  down  upon 
them  with  all  the  momentum  of  a  mile's  run  downhill,  while  they 


490 B.C.]  Victory  of  the  Athenians.  179 

themselves  were  caught  hurriedly  forming  their  array,  they  must 
have  recognized  that  there  was  a  method  in  the  madness. 

What  the  decisive  shock  would  bring  no  one  knew.  The  Persian 
had  so  often  worsted  the  Greek  in  battle,  that  the  Athenians  must 
have  felt  that  their  charge  was  little  less  than  desperate.  But  they 
did  not  shrink  from  it,  and  they  had  their  reward.  The  heavy 
columns  which  formed  their  wings  crashed  through  the  barbarian 
multitude  as  if  it  had  been  a  flock  of  sheep.  The  light-armed 
Orientals  were  riven  asunder  and  trodden  underfoot  by  the  mailed 
hoplites.  The  Persian  right  wing  was  thrown  into  the  swamp  at 
the  north  cud  of  the  beach,  where  many  perished ;  the  rest  fled 
with  the  left  wing  to  the  ships,  and  began  to  thrust  them  out  to  sea. 
In  the  centre,  indeed,  the  battle  was  for  a  time  doubtful,  and  the 
native  Persians  began  to  push  back  the  thin  line  where  Aristeides 
commanded.  But  the  Athenian  wings  turned  to  aid  their  over- 
matched countrymen,  and  when  the  barbarians  saw  themselves 
attacked  on  both  flanks  they  gave  way,  and  retreated  victory  of  tha 
seawards  like  their  fellows.  Meanwhile  most  of  the  Athenians, 
ships  were  afloat,  and  the  rest  were  being  launched  as  the  flying 
troops  sprang  on  board.  A  severe  struggle  now  raged  along  the 
beach,  for  the  Athenians  strove  to  capture  the  belated  vessels,  and 
the  barbarians  to  get  them  out  to  sea.  Here  fell  the  polemarch 
Callimachus,  and  with  him  Cynegeirus,  brother  of  the  poet 
Aeschylus,  whose  hands  were  hacked  off  as  he  clung  desperately 
to  the  poop-staff  of  a  galley  which  was  just  being  thrust  off  from 
the  shallows.  At  last  the  contest  was  ended  by  the  escape  of  the 
fleet,  wbich  left,  however,  seven  vessels  on  shore  in  the  power  of 
the  Athenians. 

Just  at  this  moment  the  bright  shield  was  hoisted  on  Pentc- 
licus  by  the  traitors  in  Athens,  who  had  promised  to  give  Hippias 
information  when  there  was  a  favourable  opportunity  for  attacking 
the  city.  It  was  seen  by  Datis  and  Artaphernes,  who  in  spite 
of  their  defeat  resolved  to  make  the  preconcerted  attempt.  But 
Miltiades  also  had  observed  the  signal,  and  divined  its  meaning. 
When,  therefore,  the  Persian  fleet  appeared  off  Phalerum,  after 
rounding  the  south  point  of  Attica,  it  was  found  that  the 
Athenians  who  had  fought  at  Marathon  had  already  returned 
by  a  forced  march,  and  were  drawn  up  ready  for  a  second  battle 


i8o  The  First  Persian  Invasion.  [490  e.g. 

on  the  slope  outside  the  southern  wall  of  the  city.  They  were 
plainly  visible  from  the  sea,  and,  with  a  routed  and  cowed  army, 
Datis  and  Artaphernes  did  not  care  to  venture  on  another  disem- 
barcation.  They  turned  back  and  sailed  for  Asia,  utterly  aban- 
doning the  expedition.  Their  Eretrian  prisoners  were  sent  up  to 
Susa,  where  they  served  to  prove  that  the  Greeks  from  beyond 
the  sea  had  not  gone  altogether  unpunished.  Darius  treated  them 
more  kindly  than  might  have  been  expected,  giving  them  lands  in 
Elam,  where  their  descendants  were  long  afterwards  to  be  traced. 

The  battle  of  Marathon  was  more  notable  for  its  moral  effect 
than  its  carnage.  Of  the  Persians,  6400  had  fallen,  no  very  great 
loss  out  of  an  army  of  100,000  men.  The  Athenians  counted  up 
192  hoplites  who  had  been  slain,  besides  some  of  the  Plataeaus 
and  of  the  light-armed  slaves.  Three  great  tumuli  were  reared 
over  the  bodies  of  the  victors,  on  the  largest  of  which — the  one 
which  covered  the  Athenian  hoplites — were  erected  ten  pillars, 
one  for  each  of  the  tribes,  bearing  the  names  of  the  fallen. 

To  the  Persians  the  battle  had  seemed  nothing  very  extra- 
ordinary ;  the  armies  of  the  great  king  had  received  many  more 
Moral  effect  of  crushing  defeats,  yet  eveiytliing  had  been  repaired 
the  victory,  afterwards.  But  to  the  Athenians  their  victory  was 
a  new  revelation;  like  all  other  Greeks,  they  had  been  accus- 
tomed to  regard  the  Persian  power  as  invincible,  and  to  look 
forward  to  almost  certain  disaster  when  facing  it.  Their  unfor- 
tunate expedition  to  Sardis  had  confirmed  them  in  this  opinion, 
and  it  was  only  a  desperate  resolve  to  defend  their  cherished  free- 
dom which  bad  nerved  them  to  resistance.  AVhen,  therefore, 
they  looked  the  danger  in  the  face,  and  found  it  so  much  less 
than  they  had  supposed,  the  revulsion  of  feeling  was  enormous. 
They  had  measured  themselves  with  the  conquerors  of  the  East, 
and  had  found  that,  man  for  man,  and  army  for  army,  they  were 
far  superior.  Such  a  victory,  coming  at  the  end  of  the  series  of 
struggles  against  odds  which  they  had  lived  through  since  the 
expulsion  of  the  Peisistratidae,  nerved  the  Athenians  to  exertions 
such  as  few  states  have  ever  known.  It  was  the  enthusiastic 
self-confidence  which  Marathon  gave,  that  enabled  them  to  bear 
so  cheerfully  the  trials  of  the  invasion  of  Xerxes,  and  afterwards 
to  strike  so  boldly  for  the  empire  of  the  seas. 


489  B.C.]  Miltiades  attacks  Paroi.  18 1 

The  immediate  consequences  of  the  battle  in  Greek  politics 
were  incalculable.  If  the  Athenians  had  been  beaten  at  Marathon, 
there  is  little  reason  to  doubt  that  Boeotia,  Aegiua,  Argos,  and 
other  Greek  states,  whose  national  traditions  made  them  hostile 
to  Sparta  and  Athens,  would  have  submitted  to  the  Persian.  Nor 
can  we  feel  any  certainty  that  the  Lacedaemonians  would  have 
been  able  to  make  a  successful  resistance  in  the  Peloponnese. 
The  freedom  of  Greece,  therefore,  had  depended  on  the  bold 
resolution  of  Miltiades  and  the  steady  onset  of  his  devoted  army. 

We  have  already  mentioned  the  foolish  superstition  which  had 
prevented  the  Spartans  from  arriving  in  time  to  join  in  the 
battle  of  IMarathon.  When  the  fateful  full  moon  came,  indeed, 
they  sent  out  two  thousand  citizens,  with  their  usual  contingents 
of  Perioeci  and  Helots — a  force  considerable  enough  to  have  been 
of  the  greatest  aid  to  Miltiades.  But  though  they  marched  the 
hundred  and  fifty  miles  in  three  days,  the  Spartans  came  too 
late  for  the  battle,  and  after  viewing  the  field  strewn  with  tlie 
bodies  of  the  slain  barbarians,  they  were  constrained,  as  Herodotus 
says,  to  praise  the  Athenians  and  their  deeds,  and  then  to  betake 
themselves  home  again. 

The  result  of  the  battle  raised  the  man  who  had  so  boldly 
prophesied  success,  and  won  it,  to  a  pitch  of  popularity  such  as  no 
other  Athenian  ever  knew.  Unfortunately  Miltiades  j^jjitjades 
chose  to  abuse  his  opportunity.  After  no  long  time  attacks  Paros, 
had  passed,  he  came  before  the  assembly,  and  promised 
to  place  the  state  in  the  way  of  acquiring  great  wealth  and  advantage, 
if  he  was  entrusted  with  seventy  ships,  and  a  corresponding  land 
force,  to  employ  as  he  might  choose.  The  people  blindly  voted 
the  armament,  which  Miltiades  turned  to  avenge  a  private  grudge 
which  he  owed  to  the  inhabitants  of  Paros.  He  sailed,  without 
declaration  of  war,  against  that  fertile  island,  and,  landing  on  it, 
demanded  a  hundred  talents  as  a  fine  for  the  submission  to  the 
Persians,  of  which  the  Parians,  like  the  other  islanders,  had  been 
guilty.  The  blackmail  was  denied  him,  and  he  proceeded  to  lay 
siege  to  the  town  of  Paros.  All  his  efforts  were  fruitless,  and, 
beginning  to  dread  the  reception  which  awaited  him  at  Athens 
in  the  event  of  failure,  he  endeavoured  to  bribe  the  priestess  ot 
Demeter  to  betray  the   city.     While  holding  a   secret  interview 


1 82  The  Years  490-480  p.  c.  [489  esc. 

with  her  by  night  without  the  walls,  he  was  startled,  and  as  he 
hastily  made  off,  disabled  himself  by  tearing  open  his  thigh  on  a 
stake.  The  armament  returned  to  Athens,  where  Miltiades  was 
received  with  wild  anger  for  his  semi-piratical  expedition,  and 
still  more  for  the  way  in  which  he  had  abused  the  confidence  of 
the  people.  He  was  tried  before  the  Heliaea,  though  he  had  to  be 
brought  into  court  on  a  litter,  dying  from  his  wound,  which  had 
gangrened.  His  accuser  was  Xauthippus,  the  father  of  Pericles, 
Death  of  "^^'^^0  demanded  that  the  penalty  of  death  should  be 
Miltiades.'  inflicted.  But,  mindful  of  Marathon,  the  people  con- 
tented themselves  with  inflicting  a  fine  of  fifty  talents,  which 
Miltiades  did  not  live  to  pay,  for  he  died  within  a  few  days.  His 
son  Cimon,  however,  afterwards  discharged  the  debt,  in  order  to 
clear  the  reputation  of  his  father  so  far  as  he  was  able.  Thus  a 
man  who  seemed  destined  to  play  a  great  part  in  the  affairs  of 
Greece  was  suddenlj--  removed  from  the  scene,  within  a  few 
months  of  the  splendid  achievement  which  has  for  ever  preserved 
his  name. 

There  is  little  doubt  that  the  expedition  which  failed  so  egre- 
giously  at  Marathon,  would  have  been  followed  up  by  another  and 
a  larger  armament,  if  the  hands  of  King  Darius  had  been  free. 
The  first  disappointment,  indeed,  had  irritated  him,  without  in- 
ducing him  to  reconsider  his  purpose  of  destroying  Athens,  and 
he  deternrined  to  lead  the  whole  force  of  his  empire  against  her 
himself.  But  in  487  B.C.  a  revolt  broke  out  in  Egypt,  which 
obliged  him  to  turn  his  arms  in  that  direction.  After  nominating 
as  his  colleague  his  favourite  son  Xerxes,  the  old  king  set  out 

against  the  rebels ;  but  died  on  the  way,  after  a  reign 
Darius.       of  thirty-six  yeare  (521-480  B.C.).     The  disturbances 

at  the  end  of  his  reign  and  the  fruitlessness  of  his 
expedition  against  Scythia  must  not  lead  us  to  undervalue  him.  He 
preserved  and  made  permanent  an  empire  whicli  seemed  on  the  eve 
of  disappearing ;  he  showed  a  genius  for  organization  unparalleled 
among  Eastern  conquerors,  and  was,  in  addition,  no  mean  general. 
Considering  his  position  as  an  Oriental  monarch,  he  must  be  pro- 
nounced moderate,  just,  and  merciful ;  the  history  of  his  son 
sufficiently  shows  the  freaks  of  cruelty  and  arrogance  which  were 
natural  to  a  Persian  autocrat,  but   from  such  faults  Darius  was 


490B.C.]  Death  of  Cleomenes.  183 

conspicuously  free.  With  his  deatli  the  expansion  of  the  Achae- 
menian  monarchy  came  to  an  end.  In  an  Oriental  state  every- 
thing depends  on  the  character  of  the  sovereign,  and  for  the  nest 
two  centuries  Persia  was  cursed  with  a  succession  of  tyrants  or 
weaklings,  who  gradually  ruined  the  excellent  administrative 
system  which  their  ancestor  had  established.  Nothing,  indeed, 
save  the  ingenuity  of  that  system  could  have  preserved  their 
empire  for  the  long  period  which  intervenes  between  the  death  of 
Darius  and  the  invasion  of  Alexander  the  Great. 

Meanwhile  the  Egyptian  war  and  the  decease  of  Darius  gave 
Greece  ten  years  of  respite  from  Persian  invasion — years  which 
were  all -important  as  covering  the  period  during  which  Athens 
transformed  herself  into  a  predominantly  naval  power,  during  the 
second  great  struggle  with  the  Aeginetans.  This  war  was  brought 
about  by  the  fall  of  Cleomenes  at  Sparta,  and  the  consequent 
cessation  of  the  anti-Aeginetan  policy  which  he  had  imposed  on 
his  countrymen.  It  was  apparently  in  490  B.C.  that  his  bribery 
of  the  Delphic  oracle  in  the  matter  of  Demaratus  came  to  light ; 
as  a  consequence  of  the  discovery,  he  found  himself  forced  to  quit 
Sparta,  like  the  colleague  whom  he  had  ruined  so  shortly  before. 
But  no  such  distant  prospect  of  vengeance  as  was  afforded  by 
taking  refuge  in  Persia  satisfied  Cleomenes.  Passing  into  Arcadia, 
he  began  to  form  an  anti-Spartan  league  among  the  numerous 
cities  of  that  district.  The  success  with  which  he  met  frightened 
the  Ephors,  who  offered  him  restitution  of  his  kingly  office  if  he 
would  return  home.  He  accepted  their  terms  and  appeared  again 
in  Sparta,  but  within  a  few  months  perished  in  a  somewhat  mys- 
terious manner.  His  conduct  had  often  been  eccentric,  and  this 
gave  the  Ephors  an  excuse  for  charging  him  with  madness,  and 
placing  him  in  the  stocks  as  a  raving  lunatic.  One  day  he  was 
found  dead,  horribly  mangled  with  a  knife;  it  was  Death  of 
given  out  that  he  had  committed  suicide,  but  con-  cleomenes. 
sidering  his  relations  with  the  Ephors,  his  end  appears  decidedly 
su.spicious.  Throughout  his  career  he  had  displayed  vigour 
and  capacity,  but  his  character  was  so  fickle  and  wrong-headed 
that  his  talents  brought  him  no  final  success.  He  is  chiefly 
noteworthy  as  being  the  last  King  of  Sparta  who  fought  on 
equal    terms  with    the    College  of  Ephors,   and   made    his    own 


1^4  The  Years  490-4S0  b.c.  I489b.c. 

personality  a  more  important  element  in  state  matters  than  their 
desires. 

Cleomencs  was  no  sooner  dead  than  the  Aeginetans  claimed 
their  hostages  who  had  been  interned  at  Athens.  The  Athenians, 
however,  refused  to  give  them  up,  though  Leoty chides,  who  had 
joined  Cleomenes  in  the  original  delivery  of  the  prisoners,  came  in 
person  to  plead  for  their  release.  This  conduct  on  the  part  of 
Athens  was  unjustifiable,  but  it  was  met  by  a  still  more  flagrant 
breach  of  international  law.  An  Aeginetan  squadron  lay  in  wait 
off  Sunium,  and  captured  a  vessel  which  was  carrying  a  sacred 
Second  war  of  embassy  from  Athens.  This  led  to  a  declaration  of 
Athens  and  ^^.^  ^^^  g^  lively  struggle  at  sea  for  the  mastery  of 
489  B.C.  the  Saronic  Gulf.  The  Athenians  endeavoured  to 
foment  a  civil  war  in  Aegina,  entering  into  a  conspiracy  with  a 
prominent  citizen  named  Nicodromus,  who  had  formed  a  plot  to 
overthrow  the  oligarchy  which  ruled  in  his  native  place,  as  it  did 
in  all  Dorian  towns.  They  were  still  too  weak  to  face  the  Aegi- 
netan fleet  unaided,  so  sent  to  ask  for  help  from  Coiinth,  where 
a  traditional  hatred  of  Aegina  prevailed.  The  Corinthians  did  not 
openly  engage  in  the  war,  but  helped  the  Athenians  by  selling 
them  twenty  war-galleys  for  the  ridiculous  price  of  five  drachmae 
apiece.  On  a  preconcerted  day  Nicodromus  raised  a  democratic 
revolt,  and  endeavoured  to  seize  Aegina  at  the  head  of  his  par- 
tisans ;  but  the  Athenian  fleet,  which  he  expected,  came  too  late 
to  bring  him  aid,  and  his  followers  were  completely  defeated.  A 
frightful  massacre  followed,  seven  hundred  of  the  democratic 
party  being  put  to  death  in  cold  blood  after  they  had  surrendered. 
Next  day  the  Athenian  fleet,  seventy  vessels  strong,  came  up, 
and  had  the  better  in  a  naval  engagement  with  the  Aeginetan 
squadron,  but  on  approaching  the  shore  found  no  supporters,  on 
account  of  the  extermination  of  the  party  of  Nicodromus 

Aegina  now  sought  aid  at  Argos,  and  obtained  much  the  same 
kind  of  informal  assistance  which  Athens  had  found  at  Corinth. 
Argos  was  still  too  weak,  after  the  frightful  disaster  she  had 
sustained  at  the  hands  of  Cleomenes,  to  engage  in  open  war  with 
a  first-class  power.  But  a  thousand  Argive  volunteers  joined  the 
Aeginetan  army,  without  any  objection  being  raised  by  the 
Government.     Shortly  afterwards  the  Athenians  made  a  second 


487  B.C.]  Archonship  by  Lot.  185 

attack  on  Aegina,  but  though  tlieir  array  woa  a  considerahle 
victory  on  shore,  and  slew  off  well-nigh  all  the  Argive  volunteers, 
their  fleet  was  decidedly  worsted,  and  was  compelled  to  pick  up 
the  land  force  and  retire  to  the  Peiraeus.  A  war  of  irregular 
descents  followed,  in  which  each  party  saw  its  coast  districts 
ravaged,  but  suffered  no  worse  harm  at  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

It  was  during  the  progress  of  this  war  that  an  important  political 
change  was  introduced  into  the  Athenian  constitution,  which  was 
destined  to  modify  to  some  extent  the  arrangements  of  Cleisthenes. 
Down  to  487  B.C.,  the  annually  elected  archons,  the  chosen  of  the 
whole  people,  were  indisputably  the  greatest  magistrates  of  the 
state.  But  in  that  year  the  archonship  ceased  to  be  elective,  and 
was  in  future  conferred  by  lot.  The  arrangement  was  not  the  old 
one  which  Solon  had  devised,  that  the  tribes  should  select  forty 
men,  between  whom  the  lot  should  make  decision.  This  time 
there  was  to  be  no  preliminary  selection  of  candidates,  and  the 
verdict  of  chance  was  left  untouched.  The  measure,  however,  was 
not  quite  so  wild  as  it  appears  at  first  sight.  It  was  still  only  the 
wealthy  "  Pentekosiomedirani "  who  were  eligible  for  the  office,  so 
that  there  was  as  yet  no  chance  of  an  archon  being  a  pauper 
subsidized  by  some  rich  wire-puller.  Moreover,  the  lots  were  not 
cast  between  the  whole  body  of  Athenians,  but  only  between  those 
who  chose  to  come  forward  as  candidates.  It  w^as  fair  to  assume 
that  any  man  who  offered  himself  for  an  office  which  was  laborious, 
responsible,  and  unremunerative,  would  be  possessed  of  energy  and 
public  spirit.  That  he  would  not  be  a  notorious  evil-  ^he  arohon- 
liver  was  secured  by  the  process  known  as  "  Doki-  ^^^p  '^^  ^°*' 
masia,"  or  examination  into  the  character  and  past  life  of  candidates, 
in  which  all  who  were  esteemed  disreputable  were  struck  out  of 
the  competition.  In  addition,  the  office  was  not  now  what  it  had 
once  been,  being  cramped  by  the  privileges  of  the  new  strategi 
and  still  more  by  the  enlarged  powers  of  the  Ecclesia.  It  might 
be  discharged  fiiirly  well  by  any  one  of  good  average  intelligence, 
probity,  and  decision.  For  some  time  after  the  change  men  of 
high  political  standmg  continued  to  present  themselves  to  encounter 
the  hazard  of  the  lot.  As  long,  in  fact,  as  no  one  but  politicians 
of  some  weight  engaged  in  the  struggle,  there  was  enough  proba- 
bility of  success  to  encourage  a  man  who  had  some  regard  for  his 


1 86  The    Years  490-480  B.C.  [487B.0.- 

flignity  to  cuter  for  it.  It  was  not  till  the  archonship  was  opened 
to  the  lower  classes,  and  till  men  of  no  weight  or  standing  began 
to  come  forward  as  candidates,  that  the  office  sank  into  a  mere 
ornamental  figure-head  of  the  ship  of  state,  while  the  real  adminis- 
trative power  passed  to  the  strategi. 

For  it  was  the  strategi — who  still  were  elected  by  the  direct  vote 
of  the  people — that  reaped  the  benefit  of  the  degradation  of  the 
archonship.  As  representing  the  choice  of  the  voters,  they  naturally 
came  to  be  regarded  as  more  serious  persons  than  the  archons,  who 
were  now  mere  children  of  chance.  It  could  not  be  expected, 
for  example,  that  ten  capable  military  officers  would  any  longer 
obey  a  polemarch,  who  might  be  entirely  ignorant  of  the  rudiments 
of  warlike  experience.  Hence  the  strategi  came  ere  long  to  assume 
some  of  the  functions  which  had  been  peculiar  to  the  archonate ; 
they  gained  power  to  convoke  the  Ecclesia,  and  habitually  con- 
ducted relations  with  foreign  states  before  they  were  submitted  to 
the  Ecclesia  for  ratification.  While  the  archons  fell  into  the 
background,  the  strategi  became  a  kind  of  ministry,  who  managed 
the  chief  departments  of  the  state,  under  the  constant  and  jealous 
control  of  the  Assembly. 

This  indecisive  prolongation  of  the  Aeginetan  war  occasioned 
much  dissatisfaction  at  Athens,  and  led  to  a  vigorous  attempt  to 
Themistociea  P^^t  down  Aegina  by  swamping  her  navy  by  force 
and  tbe  navy,  of  numbers.  Tliemistocles  was  the  author  of  this 
scheme,  as  he  had  previously  been  of  the  fortification  of  the 
Peiraeus.  It  happened  one  year  that  the  state  had  realized  a  very 
considerable  surplus  from  the  silver-mines  of  Laurium,  which 
were  public  property.  Two  hundred  talents  lay  in  the  treasury, 
and  were  about  to  be  dispersed  in  a  very  primitive  waj*,  each 
adult  Athenian  citizen  having  been  promised  ten  drachmae.  Tlie- 
mistocles stood  up  in  the  Ecclesia,  and  boldly  proposed  that 
the  money  should  not' be  distributed,  but  api)lied  entirely  to  tlie 
building  of  new  ships  of  war,  till  the  national  fleet  should  number 
two  hundred  vessels.  His  eloquence  persuaded  the  people  to 
this  piece  of  self-denial  and  far-sighted  policy.  New  keels  were 
at  once  laid  down,  and  the  richer  citizens  vied  with  each  other 
in  the  rapidity  and  completeness  with  which  they  equipped 
the  vessels  whose  construction  had  been  imposed  as  a  "liturgy" 


4*33 B.C.]  Ostracism  of  Aristeides.  187 

on  them.  The  energetic  work  of  three  years  tripled  the  Athe- 
nian navy,  and  ere  long  Themistocles  was  able  to  view  within 
the  harbours  of  Peiraens  a  number  of  vessels  as  large  as  the  com- 
bined fleets  of  Aegina  and  Corinth.  The  policy  which  aimed 
at  turning  the  whole  of  the  energies  of  Athens  towards  the  sea 
did  not  pass  without  opposition.  A  considerable  party  in  the 
state,  headed  by  no  less  a  personage  than  Aristeides,  held  that 
naval  supremacy  was  a  thing  so  fleeting  and  uncertain,  that  it 
was  imwise  to  sacrifice  all  other  ends  at  which  the  city  might 
aim,  in  the  endeavour  to  secure  so  problematical  an  advantage.  It 
was  urged  that  the  skill  of  the  seaman  was  a  less  firm  basis  for  the 
state  than  the  valour  of  the  hoplite,  and  that  the  influx  of  foreign 
population  and  foreign  manners,  which  would  follow  on  a  perse- 
verance in  Themistocles'  designs,  would  introduce  an  element  of 
corruption  and  weakness  in  the  city.  The  lavish  expenditure  of 
public  money  and  heavy  taxation  which  were  now  commencing, 
in  spite  of  the  surplus  from  the  mines,  frightened  the  more 
cautious  of  the  citizens.  Aristeides  set  himself  to  check  it  by 
repeatedly  challenging  the  accounts  of  the  public  officers  through 
whose  hands  the  money  was  passing;  he  succeeded  in  proving 
several  instances  of  embezzlement,  and  is  said  to  have  molested 
even  Themistocles  himself.    At  last  the  struggle  between  the  two 

statesmen  and  their  policies  grew  so  hot  that  recourse    „ 

,  .  .  .     .  Ostracism  of 

was    had    to    the    ostracism.      A   decisive    majority    Aristeidea, 

decreed  the  honourable  exile  of  Aristeides,  and  the 

advocate  of  a  quiet  and  conservative  policy  was  compelled  to  go 

into  banishment  (483  B.C.). 

Themistocles  had  now  a  free  hand,  and  was  able  to  direct  the 
course  of  the  state  without  meeting  with  any  opposition.  Under 
lu"s  guidance  the  works  by  the  sea  were  carried  out  with  the 
greatest  energy;  the  Peiraeus,  though  but  ten  years  since  it  had 
been  a  mere  barren  headland,  was  already*  growing  into  a  con- 
siderable town,  where  the  sea-going  and  mercantile  interests 
reigned  supreme.  Its  population  formed  a  body  of  no  incon- 
siderable impoi-tance  in  politics,  and  a  fertile  field  for  the  demo- 
cratic propaganda  of  the  party  in  the  state  which  was  opposed  to 
the  old  aristocratic  doctrines  of  class-privilege  and  miaggressive 
foreign   policy.     The  two  hundred  triremes  had  been  built,  and 


i88  The  Years  490-480  B.C.  r482B.c.- 

Athens  was  already  in  the  possession  of  the  strongest  navy  which 
any  single  Greek  state  had  ever  owned,  when  once  more  clouds 

Character  of  began  to  arise  from  the  East.  The  young  King 
Xerxes.  Xerxes  had  now  been  sitting  for  five  years  on  the 
tlirone  of  Persia;  he  had  successfully  put  down  the  Egyptian 
revolt  which  had  vexed  the  last  days  of  his  father,  and  was  free 
to  turn  the  undivided  strength  of  his  empire  against  any  foe  whom 
he  might  choose.  The  traditions  of  Persia  pointed  to  foreign  con- 
quest as  the  noblest  occupation  and  truest  glory  of  the  Great  King, 
and  Xerxes  was  not  insensible  to  their  influence.  Personally, 
indeed,  he  was  but  a  mediocrity.  The  fair  and  stately  face  and 
form  which  seemed  to  mark  him  as  a  king  of  men,  were  belied 
by  his  intellectual  feebleness  and  moral  instability.  His  whole 
character  was  that  of  the  mere  harem-bred  Eastern  despot,  and 
no  spark  of  his  father's  genius  inspired  his  actions.  Vain  and 
luxurious,  indolently  good-natiu-ed,  but  capable  of  sudden  and  savage 
outbursts  of  cruelty,  easily  swayed  by  a  courtier  or  a  sultana,  by  no 
means  fond  of  exposing  his  sacred  person  to  the  hazards  of  battle, 
he  seemed  extremely  unlikely  to  leave  his  name  associated  with 
one  of  the  greatest  events  of  history.  But  though  the  man  was 
weak,  his  position  was  strong ;  if  no  better  motives  could  stir  him 
to  action,  his  vanity  could  not  suffer  him  to  fall  behind  the 
achievements  of  his  predecessors.  A  warlike  race  of  subjects  ex- 
pected him  to  lead  them  to  new  conquests;  an  enemy  who  had 
routed  his  father's  armies  stood  before  him  inviting  chastisement 
and  revenge ;  Demaratus  of  Sparta,  and  other  exiles  from  beyond 
the  Aegean,  thronged  his  court,  and  were  continually  pointing  out 
the  weakness  and  divisions  of  their  land :  small  wonder,  then,  if  this 
arrogant  despot  was  led  into  his  famous  campaign  against  the  Greeks. 

Greek  legend  adorned  the  story  of  the  commencement  of  the 
design  of  Xerxes  with  many  striking  details,  into  the  credibility  of 
Xerxes  plans  '^^'bich  there  is  no  need  to  make  inquiry.  But  this 
Invasion,  niucli  is  Undoubted,  that  by  the  spring  of  481  n.c.  all 
Asia  was  astir  with  preparations  for  the  invasion  of  the  lands  beyond 
the  Aegean.  The  king  had  declared  his  intention  of  leading  the 
armament  in  person,  and  the  whole  scale  of  the  undertaking 
was  to  be  very  different  from  that  of  the  comparatively  modest 
expedition   cf   Datis   and  ArtapheVnes.    Not    only  the  Western 


48XB.0.]  The  Congress  of  Corinth.  189 

satrapies,  but  the  remotest  provinces  of  inner  Asia  were  ordered 
to  provide  contingents;  every  maritime  town  in  the  Levant  that 
owned  the  autliority  of  the  Great  King  liad  its  quota  of  ships 
appointed.  The  cities  of  the  Hellespont  and  Thi-ace  were  directed 
to  collect  magazines  of  every  kind  of  provision  on  the  largest  scale 
for  the  army.  The  whole  Persian  empire  had  for  some  time  been 
ringing  with  preparation,  and  the  rumour  of  the  coming  storm 
must  liave  already  reached  Greece,  when  Xerxes  despatched  his 
heralds,  to  make  the  formal  demand  for  earth  and  water  which  was 
to  serve  him  as  a  casus  belli.  Only  to  Athens  and  Sparta  was  no 
summons  sent ;  the  brutal  treatment  which  the  Persian  messengers 
had  received  in  those  towns,  ten  years  before,  had  put  them  beyond 
the  pale  of  repentance.  To  all  the  other  states  the  heralds  went, 
nor  was  their  mission  altogether  without  effect. 

With  the  certain  prospect  of  an  invasion  by  the  innumerable 
hordes  of  Asia  before  them,  the  Greeks  drew  together  with  an 
unwonted  unanimity.  The  idea  of  a  Pan-Hellenic  Greek 
Union  had  already  been  dimly  shadowed  forth  in  the  '^°co^^nth^' 
predominance  of  Sparta  in  the  Peloponnese;  and  48ib.c. 
Sparta,  as  one  of  the  two  states  against  whom  the  Persian  attack 
was  more  especially  directed,  had  now  every  motive  to  encourage 
her  confederates  to  bind  themselves  more  closely  to  her.  Athens 
had  even  stronger  reasons  for  endeavouring  to  bring  about  a  union 
against  the  invader ;  she  was  not  only  destitute  of  allies,  but  was 
still  engaged  in  her  protracted  war  with  Aegina.  Accordingly 
it  is  not  strange  to  find  that  Themistocles  was  the  statesman  to 
whom,  in  conjunction  with  one  Chileus  of  Tegea,  the  convocation 
of  delegates  from  the  greater  number  of  the  states  of  European 
Greece  was  due.  These  representatives  met,  late  in  the  summer 
of  481  B.C.,  at  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth,  under  Spartan  presidency. 
The  gathering  was  larger  than  men  of  a  desponding  frame  of  mind 
could  have  hoped  to  see.  It  is  true  that  two  powers  of  the  first 
magnitude,  Argos  and  Thebes,  had  failed  to  respond  to  the 
summons — actuated,  the  one  by  her  ancient  rivalry  with  Sparta, 
the  other  by  her  jealousy  of  the  rising  power  of  Athens.  But  well- 
nigh  all  the  other  states  of  continental  Greece  appeared  by  their 
delegates  on  the  appointed  day.  From  the  Cambunian  mountains 
on  the  north,  where  the  last  free  Greek  district  touched  the  Persian 


190  The   Years  490-480  u.c.  [48ib.c. 

vassal-kingdom  of  Macedon,  to  Taenanim  in  the  extreme  .south,  the 
Hellenic  states  had,  with  the  two  exceptions  before  mentioned, 
answered  to  the  appeal.  It  was  no  ordinary  crisis  that  could  cause 
old  enemies  like  Athens  and  Aegina,  Thessaly  and  Phocis,  Tegea 
and  Mautinea,  to  forget  their  feuds  and  remember  that  all  Avere 
sons  of  Hellen  and  lovers  of  freedom.  But  under  the  stress  of  the 
attack  of  Persia  reconciliation  had  become  possible.  Some  came 
to  the  meeting  determined  to  resist  at  any  cost;  others  were  so 
deeply  impressed  with  the  might  of  the  oncoming  enemy,  that 
comparatively  little  confidence  was  to  be  placed  in  their  stead- 
fastness ;  but  even  these  last  had  not  ventured  to  neglect  the 
summons. 

'  The  first  step  of  the  congress  was  to  mediate  between  those  of 
its  members  who  were  at  feud  with  each  other.  In  consequence 
of  this  action,  Aegina  and  Athens,  as  well  as  sundry  other  states, 
were  induced  to  suspend  their  hostilities.  Next,  a  solemn  appeal 
was  made  for  assistance  to  all  the  outlying  sections  of  the  Greek 
race  beyond  the  seas.  This  idea  deserved  greater  success  than 
it  obtained;  the  Cretans  excused  themselves  on  the  ground  of  a 
prohibition  from  the  Delphic  oracle ;  the  Corcyraeans  promised 
aid,  but  by  starting  their  squadron  late,  and  ordering  it  to  delay 
on  the  way,  caused  it  to  arrive  long  after  the  crisis  of  the  war  was 
over.  Gelo,  the  powerful  despot  of  SjTacuse,  made  most  liberal 
offers  of  assistance,  promising  twenty  thousand  hoplites  and  two 
hundred  triremes,  but  only  on  the  preposterous  condition  that  he 
should  be  made  generalissimo  of  the  whole  confederate  army,  a 
demand  which  he  must  have  known  would  be  refused  by  Spartan 
pride.  Indeed,  it  is  most  unlikely  that  he  ever  dreamed  of  sending 
help  across  the  Ionian  Sea,  for  he  was  at  this  very  moment 
threatened  by  a  fonuidable  invasion  of  the  Carthaginians  from 
Africa,  which  was  in  all  probability  concerted  to  synchronize  with 
Xerxes'  attack  on  Greece. 

Although  they  had  now  ascertained  that  they  would  have  to 
rely  on  themselves  alone,  the  delegates  of  the  confederate  Greeks 
resolved  to  issue  a  bold  manifesto  ere  they  separated.  Accordingly 
they  pubhshed  a  solemn  warning  that  any  state  which  submitted 
to  Xerxes  without  having  been  compelled  by  force,  should,  after 
the  termination  of  the  war,  be  attacked  liy  all  the  confederates, 


481  B.C.]  The  Forebodings  of  the  Oracles.  191 

and  that  one-tenth  of  the  booty  obtained  from  it  should  be  dedicated 
to  the  Delphic  Apollo. 

It  was  now  too  late  in  the  autumn  to  allow  the  Persian  attack 
to  be  delivered  in  481  c.c.  The  crisis  was  evidently  to  take  place 
in  the  spring  of  the  following  year,  and  four  months  of  suspense 
lay  before  the  confederates.  To  this  period  belong  the  numerous 
appeals  which  the  difterent  states,  in  their  feverish  anxiety  to 
know  the  unknowable,  made  to  the  Delphic  oracle.  Much  to  his 
discredit,  Apollo  showed  no  slight  tendency  to  '•  Medize,"  or  take 
the  side  of  the  Great  King.  No  doubt  the  Delphians,  then  as 
always  in  the  possession  of  excellent  information  as  to  foreign 
parts,  had  fully  realized  the  strength  of  Xerxes,  and  foresaw  his 
success.  At  any  rate,  the  oracle  told  the  Spartans  that  "  not  even 
if  they  had  the  strength  of  bulls  or  of  lions  could  they  resist  the 
Persian,  and  that  either  Sparta  or  a  Spartan  king  must  perish." 
Athens  received  an  even  more  dismal  reply :  "  She  was  rotten  in 
head  and  body,  hand  and  foot — fire  and  sword  in  the  wake  of  the 
Syrian  chariot  should  destroy  the  city  of  Pallas ; "  while  but  poor 
consolation  was  given  by  a  supplementary  rhapsody,  which  stated 
that  "safety  should  be  found  in  the  wooden  wall,  and  divine 
Salamis  should  destroy  the  children  of  men."  Argos,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  encouraged  in  her  policy  of  selfish  isolation  by  the  advice 
to  "keep  her  head  within  her  shell"  like  the  tortoise,  and  let  events 
take  their  course. 

Betwixt  hopes  and  fears,  the  winter  of  481-80  n.c.  slipped  by, 
and  the  approaching  spring  made  the  commencement  of  warlike 
operations  possible. 


^^ 


V. 


/    V 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

THE   INVASION   OF  XEEXES — THERMOPYLAE   AKD   AETEMISIUM. 

As  early  as  the  spring  of  481  B.C.  the  orders  of  Xerxes  had  set 
the  contingents  of  the  distant  satrapies  of  the  East  in  motion,  and 
The  host  of  ^7  the  autiimn  of  the  same  year  the  whole  land  force 
Xerxes.  ^f  ^i^e  Persian  empire  had  gathered  at  its  appointed 
meeting- place,  the  plain  of  Critalla  in  Cappadocia.  In  summoning 
it,  the  king  had  thought  more  of  his  own  personal  dignity  than 
of  any  other  consideration.  His  following  was  to  be  worthy  of  his 
greatness,  and  when  he  went  forth  to  war  he  did  not  consider  it 
fitting  that  any  of  his  subjects  should  claim  an  immunity  from 
its  dangers.  Accordingly  he  had  demanded  contingents,  not  only 
from  the  peoples  whose  military  virtues  were  known,  but  from 
every  tribe,  great  or  small,  brave  or  unwarlike,  whom  his  dominions 
contained.  It  naturally  resulted  that  his  army  was  more  fitted  to 
serve  as  an  ethnological  museum  than  as  an  efficient  machine  fur 
conquest.  His  own  Persians  were  gallant  and  loyal,  but  side  by 
side  with  them  marched  worthless  hordes  drawn  from  nations 
destitute  of  military  reputation,  half-naked  savages  dragged  from 
the  ends  of  the  earth,  and  Asiatic  Greeks  despatched  against  their 
will  to  subdue  their  own  brethren.  The  muster-roll  of  the  host 
of  Xerxes  has  been  preserved  for  us  in  the  pages  of  Herodotus. 
Its  contents  go  far  to  justify  the  boast  of  the  Greeks  that  they  had 
faced  a  whole  world  in  arms,  but  at  the  same  time  explain  why 
the  seeming  miracle  was  possible.  There  were,  indeed,  in  the  great 
king's  army,  beside  his  own  ten  thousand  "  Immortals  "  of  the 
body-guard  and  the  other  native  Persians,  numerous  contingents 
of  value.  The  Bactrian  horse  and  the  archers  of  the  Sacae  could 
be  trusted  to  do  good  service ;  the  Lycians  and  Carians  were  armed 


480  B.C.J  The  Army  of  Xerxes.  193 

after  the  Greek  fashion,  and  had  ere  now  faced  Greeks  in  battle; 
but  equally  numerous  were  the  masses  of  savages  who  had  not 
even  learnt  the  use  of  metals  or  the  value  of  defensive  armour. 
*'  The  Aethiopians  from  beyond  Egypt,"  for  example,  as  we  read, 
*'  were  clad  in  leopard-skins,  and  carried  bows  made  of  the  central 
rib  of  the  palm  leaf.  Their  arrows  were  reeds  tipped  with  sharp 
fragments  of  stone,  and  they  were  armed  in  addition  with  spears 
pointed  with  gazelles'  horns  or  knotted  clubs.  They  painted  half 
their  body  white  and  half  red  before  going  into  battle."  The 
Sagartian  horsemen  came  bearing  no  weapons  but  a  lasso  and  a 
long  knife.  The  Libyans  had  no  better  arras  than  staves  with 
their  points  hardened  in  the  fire.  The  wild  tribes  of  the  Caucasus 
tried  to  guard  their  heads  with  wooden  hats,  but  had  no  form  of 
protection  fur  their  bodies,  and  only  short  darts  and  knives  as 
offensive  weapons.  It  can  easily  be  imagined  how  utterly  useless 
were  these  half-naked  barbarians  when  Greek  hoplites  had  to  be  faced 
in  the  narrow  frontage  of  a  Greek  pass.  But  Hiey  were  even  worse 
than  useless,  for  they  increased  the  line  of  march  to  an  unwieldy 
length,  consumed  vast  quantities  of  provisions,  and  in  the  moment 
of  conflict  were  certain  to  enfeeble  the  steadier  troops  who  were 
mixed  with  them  in  the  line  of  battle. 

How  many  fighting-men,  good  bad  or  indifferent,  Xerxes  took 
with  him  it  is  impossible  to  say.  Report  swelled  their  numbers 
to  five  millions,  and  the  least  exaggerated  accounts  speak  of  eiglit 
hundred  thousand — a  figure  which  does  not  seem  utterly  impossible 
when  we  remember  the  vigour  with  which  the  king  had  urged  on 
the  armament,  and  the  years  he  had  spent  in  preparation.  But  if 
we  consider  the  quality  of  the  host,  its  quantity  becomes  a  matter 
of  comparatively  little  importance. 

After  meeting  at  Critalla,  the  army  moved  westward  to  Sard  is, 
and  went  into  winter  quarters  in  that  city  and  the  neighbouring 
Lydian  and  Ionian  towns  till  the  spring  of  480  B.C.  arrived.  It 
was  during  this  interval  that  spies  sent  by  the  Greeks  were  detected 
in  the  Persian  camp.  Xerxes  thought  that  he  had  everything  to 
gain  by  the  full  number  of  his  army  being  known  across  the 
Aegean,  and  instead  of  slaying  the  men,  had  them  conducted 
through  every  part  of  his  cantonments,  and  then  dismissed  them 
jn  safety  to  tell  all  that  they  had  seen, 

0 


it)4  Thermopylae  and  Artimisium.  [48ob.c. 

Early  in  480  B.C.  the  Persian  army  was  joined  by  its  fleet,  which 
safely  rounded  the  Triopian  promontory  and  cast  anchor  at  Samos. 
•  The  fleet  of  The  marine  conscription  had  beea  no  less  rigorous 
Xerxes.  t^jr^Q  ^j^^t  on  land,  and  every  maritime  people  in 
Xerxes' dominions  had  been  compelled  to  put  forth  its  full  strength 
— even  nations,  like  the  Egyptians,  who  were  little  habituated  to  the 
sea.  The  most  trustworthy  portion  of  the  fleet  was  composed  of 
the  ships  of  the  Phoenician  cities ;  the  kings  of  Tyre  Sidon  and 
Aradus  each  appeared  in  person  at  the  head  of  his  contingent,  and 
together  these  amounted  to  more  than  three  hundred  vessels ;  the 
Egyptians  Cypriots  Cilicians  and  Greeks  of  Asia  Minor  con- 
tributed nine  hundred  more,  so  that  the  whole  armada  mustered 
twelve  hundred  vessels  of  war,  in  addition  to  numerous  tenders 
and  transports.  Each  trireme  carried,  beside  its  native  crew,  a 
detachment  of  thirty  Persian  soldiers,  who  were  destined  to  serve 
■as  marines. 

Before  fleet  and  army  finally  started  on  their  way,  the  king  had 
commanded  the  execution  of  two  works  of  great  magnitude  and 
The  HeUes-  kittle  utility,  which  he  imagined  would  facilitate  their 
pont  bridged,  progress,  Lcst  his  ships  should  suffer  at  the  stormy 
headland  of  Mount  Athos  a  disaster  similar  to  that  which 
Mardonius  had  experienced  twelve  years  before,  he  had  the  sandy 
isthmus,  w^hich  connects  the  peninsula  of  Acte  with  the  mainland 
of  Chnlcidice,  pierced  by  a  canal.  This  saved  the  fleet  a  few  miles 
of  sea  at  the  cost  of  an  incalculable  amount  of  labour  and  expense. 
But  the  second  engineering  work  was  even  more  useless.  In  order 
that  his  army  might  be  able  to  move  straight  on  from  Asia  into 
Europe,  without  being  delayed  by  the  necessity  of  crossing  the 
Hellespont  on  shipboard,  he  determined  to  bridge  over  that  strait. 
Six  hundred  and  seventy-four  merchantmen,  moored  in  two  rows 
side  by  side,  and  fastened  together  with  strong  cables,  formed  two 
bridges  spanning  the  space  of  somewhat  less  than  a  mile  between 
the  continents,  and  connecting  the  European  shore  near  Sestos  with 
the  Asiatic  heights  above  Abydos.  A  continuous  flooring  of  planks 
w-as  laid  on  the  vessels,  and  earth  rammed  down  on  top  of  it,  while 
hoardings  were  erected  on  each  side  of  the  gangway  to  hide  the 
view  of  the  sea  from  the  horses  and  baggage  animals.  Not  long 
after  its  completion  the  bridges  were  shattered  by  a  storm ;  thereupon 


480  B.C.]  Xerxes  bridges  the  Hellespont.  195 

Xerxes  asserted  his  authorit}"  by  ordering  the  engineers  who  had 
designed  them  to  be  beheaded,  and,  if  we  may  believe  tradition,  by 
inflicting  three  hundred  lashes  on  the  unruly  sea,  and  causing  chains 
to  be  cast  into  its  rebellious  waters.  The  officials  to  whom  the 
rebuilding  of  the  bridge  was  entrusted  took  warning  by  the  fate  of 
their  predecessors,  and,  by  doubling  the  strength  of  their  fastenings, 
produced  a  more  durable  work,  which  endured  the  stress  of  all 
wx\atheis  for  nine  months.  Over  this  structure  the  whole  Persian 
laud  force  defiled  in  safety,  while  Xerxes,  seated  on  a  marble 
throne  on  the  Asiatic  shore,  watched  the  interminable  line  of 
march  as  it  pressed  forward  into  Europe.  At  the  sight  of  such 
countless  myriads  of  men  even  the  reckless  despot  was  touched 
by  a  feeling  of  common  humanity :  he  burst  into  tears  when  he 
reflected  that  of  the  whole  host  not  one  man  would  be  alive  a 
hundred  years  hence. 

Immense  mngazines  of  provisions  had  been  collected  during  the 
past  three  years  at  four  points  on  the  Thracian  coast — Leuce  Acte, 
Tyrodiza,  Doriscus,  and  Eiou — so  that  the  expedition  xerxe3 
was  enabled  to  push  on  westward  without  suffering  ^rougli 
any  privations.  At  Doriscus  Xerxes  held  a  review  of  iiirace. 
all  his  forces  by  land  and  sea ;  the  fleet  sailed  by  under  his  eyes, 
while  the  army  was  numbered  by  the  primitive  method  of  finding 
how  large  an  enclosure  would  hold  exactly  ten  thousand  men,  and 
then  sending  the  contingents  one  after  the  other  into  the  space 
till  all  had  been  measured  by  it.  Pressing  on  from  Doriscus,  the 
king  reached  the  frontiers  of  the  vassal  state  of  Macedonia,  where 
he  was  joined  by  the  whole  force  of  the  land  under  its  prince 
Alexander.  In  the  Pangaean  hills  his  baggage-train  suffered  much 
molestation  from  the  lions,  which  then  abounded  in  that  part  of 
Europe,  though  they  have  since  entirely  disappeared.  Meanwhile 
the  fleet  passed  through  the  canal  on  Mount  Athos,  and  rounded 
the  capes  of  the  other  two  Chalcidic  peninsulas,  finally  rejoin- 
ing the  army  at  Therma,  the  town  which  later  generations  knew 
as  the  great  harbour  of  Thessalonica.  From  this  point  Xerxes  had 
full  in  his  view  the  towering  heights  of  Olympus,  the  only  barrier 
which  now  intervened  between  him  and  the  plain  of  Thessaly, 
There  were  exiled  Thessalian  princes  of  the  great  house  of  Aleuas 
in  his  camp,  and  from  them  he  was  able  to  gain  information  as  to 


196  Thermopylae  and  Arteinisinm.  [480e.c. 

the  disposition  of  the  first  free  Greek  people  with  whom  he  was 
to  come  into  contact. 

The  moment  that  the  news  of  Xerxes'  passage  of  the  Hellespont 
reached  Greece,  the  delegates  of  the  preceding  year  had  reassembled 
at  Corinlh.  The  Thessalians,  on  whom  the  storm  was  first  to 
break,  spoke  out  in  no  hesitating  terms.  They  placed  their  whole 
force  at  the  disposition  of  the  confederates,  provided  that  adequate 
assistance  from  Southern  Greece  was  granted  them,  but  they  insisted 
that  they  should  not  be  left  alone  to  face  the  first  shock.  If  no 
army  came  to  their  aid,  they  would  not  undertake  to  fight  alone  in 
behalf  of  absent  allies,  and  would  make  what  terms  they  could 
with  the  Great  King.  The  confederates  had  no  thought  of  allowing 
the  rich  and  populous  Thessalian  plain  to  pass  into  Persian  hands 
without  a  blow  being  struck,  and  promptly  collected  a  contingent 
of  ten  thousand  hoplites  and  a  considerable  squadron  of  ships. 
The  service  was  considered  so  important  that  Themistocles  was 
placed  in  command  of  the  Athenian  troops,  though  the  Spartan 
Euaenetus  took  charge  of  the  whole  army.  They  embarked  at 
the  isthmus,  rounded  Simiiim,  and  passing  up  the  Euripus  disem- 
barked at  Halus,  in  Phthiutis,  where  the  fleet  remained,  blocking 
the  strait  between  Euboea  and  the  mamland.  The  full  force  of  the 
Thessalian  cities,  including  their  famous  and  formidable  cavalrj', 
joined  the  confederates  in  the  valley  of  the  Peneus,  and  the  whole 
advanced  to  the  pass  of  Tempe,  the  narrow  defile  at  the  mouth  of 
that  river,  through  which  the  main  road  from  Macedonia  passes. 
The  position  was  excellent  for  a  small  army  designing  to  block  the 
road  of  a  much  superior  force,  but  it  had  the  disadvantage,  to  which 
well-nigh  all  positions  are  liable,  of  being  able  to  be  turned  by  a 
long  flank  march.     The  Greeks  had  been  only  a  few  days  in  Tempe 

.„,    .,     ,      when  they  received  secret  notice  from  Alexander  of 

The  Greeks  '' 

abandon  Maccdon,  whoj^asscd  for  a  well-wisher  to  Greece,  though 
eEsa  y.  ^^  ^^^  ^  Persian  vassal,  to  the  effect  that  Xerxes  was 
about  to  use  not  only  the  main  road,  but  also  the  upland  passes 
which  lead  from  Western  Macedonia  to  Gonnus  and  the  other 
towns  of  North-AVestern  Thessaly.  If  these  were  once  forced,  the 
army  in  the  defile  of  Tempe  would  be  compelled  to  retire,  and  would 
probably  be  caught  and  trodden  underfoot  in  the  plain  of  Thessaly 
by  the  innumerable  hosts  of  the  Great  King.    Strategically  this  was 


•680 E.G.]  The  Greeks  evacuate  Thessaly.  197 

true,  but  the  danger  was  not  yet  imminent,  and  the  political  reasons 
for  endeavouring  to  keep  up  a  show  of  resistance  on  the  Thessalian 
border  were  manifest.  If  the  example  was  once  set  of  deserting 
allies  because  they  did  not  possess  a  thoroughly  defensible  frontier, 
there  was  no  saying  where  the  retreat  would  end,  and  all  confidence 
in  the  action  of  the  confederacy  must  cease.  Nevertheless  the 
nerve  of  Euaenetus  and  his  colleagues  seems  to  have  failed  them  ; 
without  waiting  for  the  Persians  to  develop  an  attack,  they  hastily 
broke  up  their  camp,  deserted  their  Thessalian  comrades,  and 
hurrying  down  to  Halus  took  ship  back  to  the  Isthmus. 

It  naturally  followed  that  the  Thessalians,  with  all  their  dependent 
tribes — the  Magnesians  Malians  Aenianes  and  Dolopes — lost  not  a 
moment  in  sending  earth  and  water  to  Xerxes.  It  was  not  yet  too 
late  to  propitiate  him  by  a  prompt  submission  before  they  had  been 
attacked.  Thus  the  largest  Greek  land  in  the  whole  peninsula  was 
lost  to  the  confederates  before  a  blow  had  been  struck. 

There  was  much  wrangling  and  recrimination  at  Corinth  when 
the  fruitless  expedition  returned.  The  evil  was  now  at  the  very 
doors  of  the  states  of  Central  Greece,  and,  to  make  the  matter  worse, 
it  was  known  that  Thebes  and  her  dependents  in  the  Boeotian 
League  were  ready  to  follow  the  example  of  the  Thessalians,  not 
merely  from  fear, — as  had  been  the  case  with  the  latter  people, — 
but  from  an  active  dislike  to  their  neighbour  Athens,  and  a  wish 
to  crush  her  newly  risen  power.  The  only  doubt  which  could 
influence  the  confederate  synod  was  whether  the  next  stand  should 
be  made  at  Thermopylae  or  at  the  Corinthian  Isthmus.  If  the 
latter  position  was  chosen,  Athens  Phocis  and  Euboea  must  be 
sacrificed,  as  Thessaly  had  already  been.  It  was,  therefore,  not 
difficult  to  foresee  that  the  more  advanced  post  would  be  occupied, 
in  spite  of  the  reluctance  of  some  of  the  Peloj^onnesians  to  fight  at 
such  a  distance  from  their  homes.  Accordingly  it  was  determined 
to  seize  and  hold  Thermopylae  with  an  army,  and  the  straits  of 
Euboea  with  a  fleet,  before  the  Persians  should  have  crossed 
Thessaly.  Luckily  Xerxes  tarried  long  at  Therma  The  con- 
before  resuming  his  march,  and  the  scheme  turned  ^^'i®'''^*^^  ^^  • 
out  to  be  feasible.  A  fleet  of  271  ships,  of  which  as  many  as  127 
were  Athenian,  met  in  the  Saronic  Gulf  and  passed  up  the  Eurfpus. 
It  was  commanded  by  the  Spartan  Eurybiades,  for  the  Corinthians 


198  Thermopylae  and  Artonisium.  t^soB.c. 

and  Aeginetans  refused  to  serve  unJer  an  Athenian  admiral, 
although  Athens  contributed  by  far  the  largest  contingent  to  the 
fleet,  while  the  Athenians  were  equally  averse  to  yielding  pre- 
cedence to  any  one  save  a  Spartan.  Eurybiades  was  a  man  of 
narrow  mind  and  hopeless  obstinacy,  and  it  required  every  blandish- 
ment of  his  able  subordinate  Themistocles  to  keep  him  from  ruining 
the  cause  of  Greece  by  his  continual  blunders  and  vagaries.  The 
land  force  was  placed  under  the  command  of  the  Spartan  king 
Leonidas,  who  had  succeeded  his  brother  Cleomenes  after  the  latter's 
untimely  death.  The  space  to  be  traversed  by  the  land  force  in 
its  march  to  Thermopylae  was  greater  than  that  which  the  fleet 
had  to  cover,  and  the  time  required  to  collect  the  contingents  far 
longer;  there  was,  therefore,  no  slight  danger  that  the  army  might 
arrive  at  Thermopylae  only  to  find  that  it  was  already  in  the  hands 
of  the  Persians.  The  situation  was  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  the 
Spartans  were  on  the  eve  of  celebrating  their  great  festival  of  the 
Carneia,  and  were  troubled  by  the  same  ridiculous  scruples  as  to 
marching  in  the  holy  season  which  had  caused  them  to  arrive  too 
late  at  Marathon  ten  years  before.  Leonidas  was  unable  to  lead 
March  of  <^^*'  ^^  ^^  ioxcQ  of  Lacouia,  and  had  to  depend  for 
Leonidas.  the  moment  on  his  personal  following.  Recognizing 
that  he  had  a  service  of  great  danger  before  him,  and,  moreover, 
having  the  prophecy  that  "  either  Sparta  or  a  Spartan  king  must 
perish  "  ringing  in  his  ears,  he  chose  as  his  body-guard  not  the 
three  hundred  youths  who  usually  accompanied  him  to  the  field, 
but  the  same  number  of  men  who  had  sons  living,  and  whose 
families  would  not  be  extinguished  in  the  event  of  a  disaster. 
Without  delay  he  set  out  at  the  head  of  this  small  force,  and  of 
the  usual  contingent  of  Helots,  who  in  all  Spartan  expeditions 
accompanied  their  masters  in  the  proportion  of  seven  or  eight  to 
each  of  the  citizens.  From  the  Arcadian  towns  which  lay  directly 
on  his  route  he  hastily  collected  something  more  than  two  thou- 
sand hoplites,  while  at  the  isthmus  seven  hundred  Corinthians, 
Phliasians,  and  Mycenaeans  joined  him.  With  this  force  at  his 
back  he  suddenly  presented  himself  before  the  gates  of  Thebes, 
whose  citizens  had  not  yet  accomplished  their  meditated  defection 
to  the  Persians.  As  they  were  unprepared  for  resistance,  Leouidns 
was  able  to  overawe  the  ruling  oligarchy,  and  to  draw  from  its 


480  B.C.]  The  Pass  of  Thermopylae.  199 

ranks  a  coutingent  of  four  hundred  men,  who,  though  their  hearts 
were  not  in  the  cause,  still  served  as  hostages  for  the  fidelity  of 
their  countrymen.  From  Thespiae,  on  the  other  hand,  the  town 
which  had  always  taken  the  lead  in  opposing  the  centralizing 
policy  of  Thebes,  came  of  their  own  accord  a  body  of  seven  hundred 
hoplites,  who  proved  in  the  subsequent  operations  that  some  at 
least  of  the  Boeotians  were  true  to  the  cause  of  Hellas.  Giving 
out  that  his  force  was  but  the  vanguard  of  the  full  levy  of  the 
Peloponnese,  Leonidas  pressed  forward  to  Thermopylae,  and  arrived 
there  long  before  the  Persians  had  crossed  Thessaly.  The  troops 
of  Phocis  and  of  the  Locrians  of  Opus  joined  him  in  the  pass,  and 
raised  his  total  numbers  to  nearly  ten  thousand  men,  a  body  quite 
sufficient  to  occupy  the  narrow  defile.  The  first  step  for  the 
defence  of  Central  Greece  had  been  successfully  carried  out,  but  it 
was  rendered  of  no  avail  by  the  delay  of  the  Peloponnesian  con- 
federates in  bringing  up  their  main  body.  It  is  impossible  to 
ascribe  this  merely  to  dilatoriness, negligence,  or  religious  scruples; 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  selfishness  played  a  larger  part  in 
causing  their  delay  than  did  any  other  motive. 

The  celebrated  pass  in  which  Leonidas  took  np  his  position 
consists  of  a  narrow  slip  of  level  ground  between  the  sea  and  the 
cliffs  of  Mount  Callidromus,  one  of  the  numerous  off-  The  pass  of 
shoots  of  the  range  of  Oeta.  It  looks  westward  into  Thermopylae, 
the  little  plain  of  Malis,  while  behind  it  to  the  east  lies  the 
coast-land  of  Locris  and  Phocis.  As  the  space  between  the  moun- 
tains and  the  water  contracts,  the  defile  becomes  narrower,  till  at 
its  culminating  point  there  is  barely  room  for  a  carriage-way. 
The  whole  passage,  from  the  river  Asopus  on  the  Malian  side  to 
the  Locrian  village  of  Alpeni,  is  about  two  miles  in  length.  In  the 
middle  of  the  defile  lay  the  hot  springs  which  give  the  place  its 
name.  In  front  of  them  the  level  ground  expands  for  a  few 
furlongs,  so  as  to  leave  room  for  the  temple  of  Demeter,  at  which 
the  Amphictyouic  deputies  used  to  meet.^  In  rear  of  this  spot  there 
lay  an  ancient  fortification,  a  wall  which  the  Phocians  had  once 
raised  to  restrain  the  inroads  of  their  Thessalian  neighbours  ;  it  was 
now  half-ruined,  but  still  served  to  mark  the  line  on  which  resistance 

'  At  the  western  end  of  the  pass,  near  Anthela,  was  another  hot  spring? 
and  contraction  of  the  road,  which  has  been  called  "  the  False  Thermopylae." 


soo 


Thermopylae  and  Arlemisinin, 


[480  E.C. 


to  an  invader  coming  from  the  nortli-west  would  be  easiest.  Here, 
then,  Leonidas  and  his  men  fixed  their  camp;  to  their  light  lay 
the  strait,  some  five  miles  broad,  and  beyond  it  the  mountains  of 
Euboea.  To  their  left  were  inaccessible  rocks  rising  in  many  places 
to  sheer  cliffs  eight  hundred  feet  high.  So  rugged  was  the  defile, 
that  in  its  whole  length  not  one  path  led  down  from  the  mountain 
to  the  shore.  But  from  Trachis,  beyond  the  Malian  end  of  the  pnss, 
a  winding  track,  curving  far  inland  over  a  ridge  called  Anopaea, 
reached  Alpeni  in  the  rear  of  the  Greek  position.      This  was  the 


A.k.fii.Trachof  Hydarnes       . -^ i 

B.PostofthePhocians          ^  J^     ^^  ^ 

C.Positionofthe  Hot  SpHngs  of  Thermopylae  -^^ 

? 5^__12__J3  Stadia  ^  " 


1  ■ 

\        ,^  PLAN  OF  THE  PASS 


THERMOPYUAE 


ll'alfctr  Cr  Bautall  sc. 

only  route  by  which  the  pass  could  be  turned,  without  making  an 
enormous  detour  of  several  days'  march  into  the  upper  valleys  of 
Mount  Oeta.  To  guard  it,  Leonidas  placed  the  whole  of  his  Phocian 
allies  on  the  hills,  while  his  Peloponnesian  forces  held  the  pass. 

Meanwhile  Eurybiades,  with  the  confederate  fleet,  took  post  at 
the  promontory  of  Artemisium,  a  point  on  the  Euboean  Strait  con- 
siderably to  the  north  of  Thermopylae,  so  that  it  was  impossible 
for  the  Persian  fleet  to  pass  by  the  position  of  Leonidas  in  order  to 
land  troojDS  in  his  rear.  Of  this,  as  it  happened,  there  was  little 
danger.     With  the  instinct  of  a  barbarian  utterly  unused  to  the 


480 B.C!.]  The  Fleets  at  Arteviisium.  201 

sea,  Xerxes  never  seems  to  have  reflected  that  his  fleet  could  be 
used  to  explore  the  way  for  his  army,  or  to  take  the  enemy  in  the 
rear.  It  was  rather  the  army  which  pushed  ahead  to  explore  the 
way  for  the  fleet.  Not  till  twelve  days  after  the  Persian  rear- 
guard had  defiled  through  the  gates  of  Therma  did  the  armada 
set  sail  on  its  southern  voyage.  Coasting  down  the  rocky  shore  of 
Magnesia,  the  ships  reached  Cape  Sepias,  where  the  The  storm  off 
range  of  Pelion  abruptly  ends  in  a  sea-beaten  pro-  capesepias. 
montory.  Here  the  fleet  halted,  a  single  row  of  vessels  being 
drawn  up  on  the  narrow  beach,  while  the  rest — seven  deep — rode 
at  anchor  off  the  harbourless  coast.  At  midnight  a  sudden  storm 
from  the  north-east  swept  down  on  the  dangerously  crowded  arraj', 
and  threw  all  into  disorder.  Some  captains  made  for  the  open 
sea,  while  others  endeavoured  to  beach  their  vessels  on  the  already 
crowded  strip  of  shingle.  The  hurricane  lasted  three  days,  and, 
at  its  end,  no  small  part  of  the  king's  fleet  was  found  to  have 
been  destroyed  or  disabled.  The  rocky  coast  for  miles  to  the  north 
was  strewn  with  wrecks,  and  many  scores  of  vessels  were  struck 
from  the  muster-roll  of  the  Persian  armament.  The  Greeks, 
meanwhile,  who  had  remained  safely  moored  in  the  harbour  of 
Histiaea,  exclaimed  that  Boreas — kinsman,  according  to  a  strange 
myth,  of  the  Athenian  kings  of  old — had  come  to  the  help  of 
his  relations,  and  sailed  out  to  destroy  the  king's  fleet,  which 
was  said  to  have  been  utterly  shattered  by  the  storm.  They 
found,  however,  that  the  Persians  were  still  nearly  ^j^g  Greeks  at 
four  times  as  numerous  as  themselves,  and  at  Artemisium. 
once  trie  Peloponnesian  admirals  proposed  to  fall  back  on  the 
Isthmus,  and  gather  reinforcements  there.  Eurybiades  was  only 
induced  to  remain  by  a  large  bribe  which  his  colleague  Tlieniis- 
tocles  administered  to  him.  That  astute  statesman  had  just 
received  thirty  talents  from  the  cities  of  Euboea,  who,  being 
covered  while  the  fleet  remained  at  Artemisium,  were  most  re- 
luctant to  see  it  depart.  Making  over  about  a  third  of  the  sum 
to  his  colleagues,  Themistocles  pocketed  the  rest.  The  talents 
which  he  spared  for  the  Peloponnesians  did  their  work,  and  the 
fleet  kept  its  position.  Meanwhile  the  Persian  admirals  hnd  got 
their  armada  again  in  hand;  they  sent  two  hundred  ships  down 
the  eastern  coast  of  Euboea  to  round  the  southern  point  I'f  the 


202  Thermopylae  and  Artemisiiim.  [48ob.c. 

island  and  block  the  exit  of  the  Euilpus,  and  prepared  with  the 
remainder  to  crush  the  Greeks  at  Artemisium,  A  day's  fighting 
in  the  strait  brought  no  decisive  result,  but  on  the  next  night 
another  storm  arose,  not  leas  dreadful  than  the  one  of  the  preceding 
week.  Not  only  did  it  damage  the  king's  fleet,  which  now  lay  in 
the  Thessalian  harbour  of  Aphetae,  but  it  caught  the  detached 
squadron  as  it  sailed  down  the  iron-bound  eastern  coast  of  Euboea, 
and  dashed  it  to  pieces  on  the  rocks  of  Geraestus  ;  it  seemed  as 
if  the  gods  were  working  to  bring  down  the  Persian  fleet  to  an 
equality  with  the  Greeks.  Two  days  more  of  indecisive  fighting 
iu  the  strait  followed,  in  which  the  weaker  party  held  its  own. 
The  enemy  was  still  too  numerous  to  be  crushed,  but  though  he 
spread  his  vessels  out  in  an  enormous  crescent,  and  endeavoured 
to  envelop  the  confederates,  he  suffered  far  more  damage  than  he 

Battle  of  inflicted.  The  Athenian  ships  were  always  to  the 
Artemisium.  front,  and  suffered  a  proportionately  heavier  loss  than 
their  allies ;  but  their  numbers  were  more  than  sustained  by  the 
arrival  of  a  reserve  squadron  of  fifty-three  triremes,  which  came  up 
the  Euripus  in  time  for  the  third  day's  fighting.  Nothing  decisive 
had  yet  occurred  at  Artemisium,  when,  on  the  fourth  day,  a  swift 
rowing-boat  was  seen  coming  up  from  the  south.  In  it  was 
Abronychus,  an  Athenian  who  had  been  left  off  the  Malian  coast 
to  bear  intelligence  from  the  army  to  the  fleet.  The  news  which 
he  brought  from  Thermopylae  was  so  disastrous  that  the  admirals 
had  not  a  moment  to  lose  before  they  retreated. 

AVhen  the  multitudes  of  Xerxes  came  pouring  over  the  passes 
of  Othrys  into  the  Malian  plain,  they  halted  on  finding  that  the 
defile  of  Thermopylae  was  occui^ied.  The  king  had  now  before 
him  two  alternatives  :  he  might  force  the  pass,  or  he  might  move 
inland,  and  march  round  by  the  upland  roads  which  pass  through 
Doris,  so  as  to  turn  Thermopylae  just  as  he  had  turned  Tempe. 
To  take  the  inland  road  meant  to  lose  many  days,  and  to  break  off" 
communication  with  tlie  fleet.  He  therefore  determined  to  assault 
the  Phocian  wall,  and  trample  down  its  presumptuous  defenders. 

The  story  of  the  fight  in  the  pass  of  Thermopylae  is  surrounded 
Xerxes  before  ^^  ''*'  ^^^^^  ^^  legends,  probable  possible  and  impossible, 
Thermopylae,  -whose  authenticity  it  is  useless  to  discuss.  Most  of 
them  illustrate  the  utter  insensibility  of  the  Spartans  in  the  face  of 


480  B.C.]  The  Fight  in  the  Pass.  203 

imminent  death,  and  the  bewilderment  which  that  insensibility 
caused  in  the  mind  of  a  king  accustomed  to  regard  courage  as  the 
ofTspring  of  confidence  in  victory  alone.  When  the  Persian  scouts, 
we  are  told,  appeared  for  the  first  time  in  front  of  the  pass,  they 
did  not  find  the  Spartans  cowering  behind  their  wall,  but  carclesslj'' 
wandering  without  it,  combing  their  long  hair,  or  indulging  in 
gymnastic  exercises.  The  king  laughed  at  them  as  madmen  for 
not  taking  to  flight,  and  was  only  amused  when  Demaratus,  the 
exiled  Spartan  king  who  had  attached  himself  to  the  Persian 
court,  explained  that  their  heedlessness  was  the  sign  of  desperate 
resolution,  and  not  of  folly.  After  waiting  awhile  to  allow  the 
madmen  time  to  come  to  their  senses,  Xerxes  grew  irritated,  and 
sent  forward  a  body  of  troops  from  Media  and  Elam,  bidding  them 
"  take  these  presumptuous  men  alive,  and  bring  them  before  the 
face  of  the  king." 

Leonidas  must  have  already  realized,  as  the  days  went  by 
without  the  promised  succours  from  Peloponnesus  reaching  him, 
that  he  was  sent  on  a  hopeless  task,  for,  although  he  might  main- 
tain the  defile  and  even  the  flanking  road  over  Anopaea,  he  could 
Qo  nothing  to  keep  the  king  from  the  more  western  passes.  But, 
like  a  true  Spartan,  he  kept  his  orders  before  him,  and  took  no 
thought  of  the  consequences.  He  had  by  this  time  repaired  the 
Phocian  wall  to  serve  him  as  a  final  defence,  but  was  still  holding 
ground  in  front  of  it,  at  one  of  the  narrowest  points  of  the  pass. 
He  had  divided  his  men  into  several  bodies,  of  which  each  was  to 
take  the  place  of  danger  in  turn,  for  a  few  score  of  hoplites  only 
could  find  space  between  the  water  and  the  cliff,  and  the  rest  had 
perforce  to  remain  in  reserve. 

The  Medes  came  on  with  great  confidence,  pushing  forward  into 
the  defile  till  they  formed  a  long,  deep  column,  with  a  front  no 
broader  than  that  of  the  Greeks.  Then  the  shock  ihe  fight  in 
came,  and  ere  long  the  Asiatics  were  hurled  back  the  pass, 
in  disorder.  In  fighting  hand-to-hand  on  equal  terms,  it  was  seen 
now,  as  it  had  been  at  Marathon  ten  years  before,  that  the  lightly 
armed  Oriental,  with  his  dart  and  scimitar  and  wicker  shield,  could 
do  nothing  against  the  hoplite  cased  in  brass  from  head  to  foot, 
and  armed  with  the  long,  thrusting  spear.  The  Medes  were  fight- 
ing under   the   eye  of  their  king,  and  would   not  give  up  the 


204  Thermopylae  and  Arlemisinin.  [48oB.o. 

contest;  Ibey  came  on  again  and  again,  to  be  Leatcn  back  with 
fearful  slaughter.  Then  Xerxes,  thinking  that  it  was  for  want  of 
courage  that  they  failed,  called  them  in,  and  sent  forward  instead 
his  own  body-guard,  the  ten  thousand  chosen  Persians,  called  "  The 
Immortals."  But  though  they  fought  gallantly  enough,  (he  second 
column  was  dashed  back  with  even  greater  loss  than  the  first. 
Night  then  fell,  but  next  morning  the  attack  was  renewed,  for  the 
king  was  beside  himself  with  rage,  and  had  determined  to  wear 
out  the  Greeks  by  mere  force  of  numbers,  if  no  other  means  would 
avail.  But  Leonidas,  relieving  each  of  his  battalions  as  it  grew 
tired  by  another  from  the  reserve,  kept  his  ground  with  little  loss, 
while  the  road  before  hira  was  almost  choked  with  dead  Asiatics, 
and  the  Persian  officers  were  seen  endeavouring  to  lash  their 
dispirited  men  back  to  the  charge  with  whips,  when  no  lighter 
j)ersuasion  would  induce  them  to  tempt  the  dangers  of  the  reeking 
pass.  By  the  second  evening  it  was  evident  that  no  effort  from 
in  front  could  possibly  break  through;  the  whole  invasion  was  at 
a  standstill,  and  although  the  actual  loss  signified  little  among 
the  myriads  of  Xerxes'  army,  the  moral  effect  of  the  check  was 
growing  fatal.  If  ten  thousand  Greeks  could  hold  the  king  at  bay, 
what  was  likely  to  happen  when  the  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men  whom  a  national  levy  might  at  any  moment  produce,  came 
up  to  help  their  comrades  ?  It  was  fortunate  for  Xerxes  that  the 
Peloponnesian  towns  were  too  far  off  to  allow  the  news  of  the  first 
days  of  battle  to  work  any  immediate  effect.  Despondency  still 
reigned  at  Sparta,  while  eager  self-confidence  was  felt  at  Ther- 
mopylae. 

It  was  on  the  night  following  the  second  conflict  that  a  Malian 
named  Ephialtes  came  before  the  downcast  king,  and  offered,  for  a 
The  pass  large  sum  of  gold,  to  guide  the  Persians  over  the 
turned.  heights  of  Anopaea  by  the  winding  path  which  came 
out  at  the  rear  of  the  pass.  Strangely  enough,  no  previous  search 
seems  to  have  been  made  for  such  a  road,  though  its  existence 
must  have  been  known  to  every  inhabitant  of  Trachis,  where 
Xerxes  had  now  been  tarrying  for  six  days.  The  traitor's  j^roposals 
were  readily  received,  and  at  midnight  the  satrap  Hydarnes 
started,  with  the  king's  "  Immortals,"  to  attempt  the  passage.  It 
was  in  the  stillness  of  the  last  hour  of  the  night,  just  before  the 


480  3.0.)  The  Death  of  Lconidas.  205 

dawn,  that  Ephialtes  brought  the  Persians  to  the  point  on  the 
ridge  where  lay  the  Phocian  force  which  Leonidas  had  set  to 
guard  his  flank.  The  Phociaus  kept  a  careless  watch  ;  and  when 
the  rustling  of  thousands  of  feet  among  the  dead  leaves  of  the 
oak  forest  smote  upon  their  ears  as  they  woke,  they  were  seized 
with  panic.  Instead  of  holding  the  path,  they  ran  back,  and  formed 
up  to  defend  themselves  on  the  summit  of  Caliidromus.  But 
Hydarnes,  paying  no  further  attention  to  them,  passed  rapidly 
on,  and  next  morning  the  Greelis  in  the  pass  saw,  to  their  utter 
dismay,  the  head  of  the  Persian  column  descending  from  the  hills 
in  their  rear. 

There  was  small  time  for  debate,  and  as  little  need,  since  it  was 
evident  that,  if  the  army  was  not  to  be  lost,  an  instant  retreat  must 
begin.  Then  came  the  crowning  moment  in  the  life  of  Leonidas. 
As  a  Spartan  king  at  the  head  of  the  vanguard  of  the  hosts  of 
Greece,  he  felt  that  he  must  not  desert  the  post  committed  to  his 
charge.  His  orders  bade  him  hold  Thermopylae,  and  spoke  of 
nothing  more  :  Thermopylae,  then,  he  would  hold.  He  sent  away 
his  Arcadian  and  Corinthian  auxiliaries ;  they  were  not  bound  by 
the  iron  bonds  of  Spartan  discipline  and  Spartan  honour,  and 
might  retreat  without  disgrace  from  a  hopeless  field.  The  four 
hundred  Thebans,  however,  he  would  not  suffer  to  depart ;  he  knew 
that  they  were  traitors  at  heart,  and  had  no  reason  to  spare  them. 
The  Thespians,  with  a  constancy  as  unexpected  as  it  was  splendid, 
stayed  behind  of  their  own  free  will.  Adding  to  them  his  own 
three  hundred  Spartans  and  their  Helots,  Leonidas  had  something 
like  four  thousand  men  left  for  the  final  struggle. 

The  third  day's  fighting  at  Thermopylae  was  quite  unlike  that 
which  had  gone  before.  Instead  of  waiting  to  be  attacked,  and 
keeping  strong  reserves  in  hand,  Leonidas  determined  ,       . , 

i      ^  ^  Leonidas  and 

to  throw  himself  on  the  enemy  in  front,  and  do  what  the  three  hun- 
damagc  he  could,  before  Hydarnes  came  up  to  surround 
him.  Accordingly,  when  the  Persians  came  flooding  up,  as  on  the 
previous  days,  he  ran  out  into  the  wider  parts  of  the  pass,  and  cut 
his  way  deep  into  the  midst  ot  them.  Then  the  Greeks  turned 
and  burst  back  again  as  far  as  the  Phocian  wall,  losing  heavily 
as  their  ranks  grew  looser  in  the  onset,  but  thrusting  the  barbarians 
by  hundreds  into  the  sea,  and  rolling  column  against  column  till 


2o6  Thermopylae  and  Artemisiuin.  [48ob.c. 

more  perished  by  being  trampled  down  ia  the  press  tlian  fell  by 
the  edge  of  the  sword.  Ere  long  Leonidas  was  slain,  but  the 
fight  went  on  only  the  more  fiercely  over  his  body,  and  two 
brothers  and  two  uncles  of  Xerxes  went  down  in  the  indee. 
Presently  Ilydarnes  and  the  "  Immortals  "  came  up  from  Alpeni. 
By  this  time  the  surviving  Greeks  were  well-nigh  wearied  out ; 
their  spears  were  broken,  their  swords  blunted,  their  armour 
hacked  from  their  limbs.  But  retiring  on  to  a  hillock  beside  the 
roadway,  they  made  one  final  stand,  till  they  fell  under  the  arrows 
and  javelins  of  a  foe  who  dared  not  close.  Only  the  Thebans 
escaped.  Early  in  the  conflict  they  had  fallen  back  and  surrendered 
to  the  nearest  enemy ;  they  were  led  to  the  Persian  camp,  and 
branded  with  the  king's  mark  as  his  slaves;  but  when  Xerxes 
learnt_that  they  were  only  in  arms  by  compulsion,  and  that  their  city 
was  about  to  "  Medize  "  on  his  approach,  he  at  once  set  them  free. 

Thus  ended  the  fight  in  the  pass  of  Thermopylae.  It  had  caused 
the  death  of  some  four  thousand  Greeks  and  of  more  than  twenty 
Moral  results  thousand  Persians.  But  its  effects  were  not  to  be 
of  the  battle,  measured  by  the  mere  numbers  of  the  slain.  Its 
real  importance  lay  in  the  impression  which  it  left  on  the  mind 
of  the  Great  King  and  his  army.  Xerxes  had  at  last  begun  to 
have  doubts  of  his  own  omnipotence,  and  his  self-confidence  had 
been  the  only  spring  of  strength  in  his  character.  Deprived  of  it, 
he  would  become  the  weakest  of  despots.  His  soldiery  had 
imbibed  an  exaggerated  dread  of  their  enemies.  There  was  but 
one  Leonidas  in  Hellas,  and  Sparta  was  but  a  single  state  among 
a  multitude ;  but  to  the  Persian  spearman  every  Greek  was  in 
future  a  reckless  hero,  careless  of  life,  and  only  bent  on  slaughter — 
an  adversary  who  in  open  fight  was  individually  superior  to  him- 
self, and  could  only  be  overpowered  by  numbers.  There  were 
many  brave  men  in  Xerxes'  host,  who  in  later  engagements  went 
into  battle  readily  enough ;  but  they  never  after  fought  with  the 
confidence  in  their  own  superiority  which  had  been  the  strength 
of  the  Persian  down  to  Thermopylae.  This  was  fortunate  for 
Greece ;  for  one  Leonidas  there  were  in  the  Greek  ranks  scores  of 
weak,  venal,  selfish  leaders,  whoso  inefficiency  was  hidden  from  the 
enemy  by  the  glory  which  surrounded  the  name  of  the  hero  of 
Thermopylae. 


480  B.C.]  Mo7-al  Effect  of  Thermopylae.  207 

But  for  the  moment  tlie  Greeks  could  not  judge  of  the  moral 
effect  of  the  battle  ou  the  enemy,  and,  looked  at  from  the  military 
aspect,  the  war  had  begun  with  a  disaster.  A  Spartan  king,  the 
soul  of  the  war-party,  had  fallen ;  the  vanguard  of  the  confederate 
host  had  been  cut  to  pieces;  the  strongest  position  in  Greece  had 
been  forced  by  the  enemy,  who  was  now  ready  to  pour  down  into 
the  plain  of  the  Cephissus,  and  to  be  joined  by  all  the  Medizing 
cities  of  Boeotia.  The  fleet,  too,  was  compelled  to  fall  back  at  once 
from  the  Euboean  Strait,  and  where  its  retreat  might  end  it  was 
impossible  to  foresee.  In  short,  no  one  in  Greece  could  tell  at  the 
time  that  the  moral  gain  of  Thermopylae  had  been  so  tremendous 
as  quite  to  outweigh  the  military  and  political  loss. 


CHAPTER  XX, 

THE   INVASION   OF   XERXES — SALAMIS   AND   PLATAEA. 

The  inexcusable  slackness  and  selfishness  of  the  Peloponnesians, 
which  had  ruined  Leonidas  by  depriving  him  of  his  expected 
The  Greek  fleet '■^ii^f^'"'^^!^'^^^*'^'   reacted    at    once    on   the    fleet    at 

at  saiamis.  Artemisium.  In  order  to  avoid  being  cut  off, 
Eurybiades  had  to  weigh  anchor  on  the  night  after  the  ill  news 
arrived.  He  retired  down  the  EurTpus,  leaving  Themistocles  and 
a  detachment  of  the  Athenian  squadron  to  bring  up  the  rear, 
and,  after  rounding  Sunium,  halted  opposite  Athens  in  the  bay  of 
Saiamis.  The  Athenian  admiral  is  said  to  have  employed  himself 
during  the  retreat  in  painting  up,  on  the  rocks  near  the  watering- 
places  of  the  Euboean  coast,  appeals  to  the  lonians  in  the  Persian 
fleet  not  to  destroy  the  land  of  their  ancestors.  If  this  tale  be 
true,  he  was  probably  aiming  at  making  Xerxes  suspicious  of  his 
Greek  subjects,  rather  than  at  inducing  them  to  come  over ;  for 
he  must  have  known  well  enough  that  the  lonians  were  not  the 
men  to  desert  a  winning  for  a  losing  cause. 

In  consequence  of  the  retreat  of  the  Greek  squadron,  the 
Euboeans  found  that  their  bribes  to  Themistocles  had  availed 
them  but  for  a  few  days.  Their  leading  men  took  refuge  on  the 
Euboean  ships  in  the  confederate  fleet,  and  followed  its  fortunes, 
but  the  towns  themselves  made  their  peace  with  Xerxes. 

On  the  mainland  the  loss  to  the  cause  of  independence  was 
even  greater.     When  Thermopylae  was  clear,   Xerxes   began   to 

Xerxes  in     push  his  army  forward,  using  not  only  the  pass  he 

Boeotia.      j^ad   forced,   but   the    more    circuitous    inland   road 

through  Doris  and   the  Upper   Cephissus  valley,  which   he  had 

previously  left  unessayed.     The  Phocians,  who  refused  to  submit 


480  B.C.]  Xerxes  in  Boeotia.  209 

to  hiiu,  were  compelled  to  take  to  the  bills,  and  to  see  all  tbeir 
townships  harried  by  the  Persian,  to  whom  tbeir  hereditary  enemies 
the  Thessalians  acted  as  willing  guides.  The  Locrians  of  Opus, 
and  the  oligarchies  who  governed  the  majority  of  tbe  Boeotian 
towns,  took  tbe  opposite  course,  and  promptly  made  tbeir  sub- 
mission to  tbe  king,  who  received  them  graciously  enough,  and 
contented  himself  witb  incorporating  their  contingents  in  bis 
army.  Plataea  Thespiae  and  Haliartus  alone  refused  to  join  in 
tbe  general  surrender,  and  bad  to  face  tbe  consequences  of  tbeir 
patriotism.  Tbe  last-named  town  suffered  complete  destruction, 
but  from  tbe  others,  which  lay  further  from  tbe  enemy,  tbe  in- 
habitants bad  time  to  escape.  Tbe  Thespians,  though  they  bad 
suffered  so  severely  at  Thermopylae,  were  in  nowise  shaken  in 
tbeir  devotion  to  the  national  cause,  but  took  refuge  at  Corinth. 
The  Plataeans  retired  to  their  old  friends  at  Athens,  wbose  fortunes 
now,  as  ten  years  before,  they  bad  determined  to  follow. 

Now  that  the  Great  King  was  already  in  Boeotia,  and  bis  vanguard 
might  at  any  moment  reach  the  foot  of  the  passes  of  Cithaeron,  the 
Athenians  had  to  face  the  whole  danger  of  their  position.  Ot 
defending  Attica  by  land  there  could  be  no  question :  if  Ther- 
mopylae could  not  beheld,  it  would  be  madness  to  attempt  to  block 
tbe  four  comparatively  easy  roads  which  converge  on  Athens  from 
the  north.  Three  alternatives  only  were  possible :  to  submit  to 
Xerxes;  to  man  tbe  walls  and  stand  a  siege ;  or  to  abandon  tbe  city 
and  retire  on  the  Peloponnese,  as  the  Thespians  bad  already  done. 
Eacb  opinion  had  its  advocates — even  the  first  and  most  dishonour- 
able. But  Themistocles,  in  the  moment  of  crisis,  carried  everything 
before  him  by  bis  ready  eloquence.  He  pointed  out  tbe  hopeless- 
ness of  surrender  for  the  city,  which  was  beyond  all  others  tbe 
pepuliar  object  of  the  hatred  of  tbe  Great  King,  and  so  incensed  the 
people  against  Cyrsilus,  an  orator  who  pleaded  in  favour  of  that 
mean  and  witless  step,  that  we  hear  that  the  traitor  was  stoned  on 
the  spot.  He  bad  in2,enious  arguments  to  urge  against  those  who 
bade  Athens  stand  at  bay  behind  her  ramparts,  on  the  spot 
hallowed  by  tbe  traditions  of  centuries.  He  pointed  to  tbe  fleet, 
his  own  creation,  as  the  true  hope  and  safety  of  the  people ;  in  it 
was  to  be  found  tbe  "  wooden  wall "  of  which  the  Delphic  oracle 
bad  spoken  as  tbe  sole  refuge  in  the  day  of  disaster.     To  abandoQ 

P 


2IO  Sala?nis  and  Plataea.  f480B.c. 

without  a  struggle  the  temples  of  their  national  deities  and  the 
tombs  of  their  ancestors,  required  a  pitch  of  patriotic  exaltation 
which  it  was  hard  for  the  Athenians  to  attain,  when  ultimate 
snccess  was  so  problematic.  Nevertheless  Themistocles  roused  his 
couutrymen  to  stake  everything  on  tbo  fleet,  to  deliberately 
Evacuation   Gvacuate   Attica    and   Athens,  place   the  aged,   the 

of  Athens,  women,  and  children  in  safety,  and  then  man  every 
available  vessel  and  stand  for  the  mastery  in  the  waters  of  the 
Attic  Strait.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  his  plan  was  the  only 
feasible  one.  The  experience  of  Thermopylae  had  shown  that 
the  land  army  of  Xerxes  would  probably  fail  at  the  Isthmus,  where 
it  would  be  met,  not  by  a  scant  ten  thousand  men,  but  by  the 
national  levy  of  the  Peloponnese.  Now,  if  the  position  at  the 
Isthmus  could  be  turned  by  the  Persians  from  the  side  of  the  sea, 
and  troops  landed  in  its  rear,  the  previous  disaster  would  onlj'  be 
repeated  on  a  larger  scale.  But  if  the  great  king's  fleet  could  be 
driven  back,  and  kept  from  assisting  his  army,  the  whole  expedition 
would  be  brought  to  a  check ;  for  the  Corinthiau  Isthmus  offered 
no  facilities  for  a  flank  movement  by  land  such  as  had  settled  the 
day  at  Thermopylae.  The  battles  of  Artemisium  had  made  it 
clear  that  the  Persian  fleet  could  be  harassed  and  insulted  by  a 
squadron  of  far  inferior  numbers,  and  at  those  engagements  the 
Greeks  had  brought  up  little  more  than  half  of  their  available 
strength.  Themistocles,  therefore,  was  convinced  that  in  a  vigorous 
assault  on  the  sea-power  of  the  enemy  lay  the  only  hope  of  salvation  ; 
and  it  was  fortunate  for  Athens,  for  Greece,  and  for  the  whole 
world,  that  his  fiery  eloquence  won  over  his  countrymen  to  accept 
his  views. 

It  was  not  every  Athenian  who  could  be  convinced  by  the 
orator.  A  small  but  obstinate  party  refused  to  find  the  "  wooden 
wall,"  which  was  to  save  the  city,  anywhere  but  in  the  palisades 
of  the  Acropolis,  and  shut  themselves  up  therein,  relying  on  divine 
aid.  But  the  vast  majority  set  to  work  to  transport  their  families 
and  their  portable  goods  to  a  place  of  safety.  For  several  days 
every  available  ship  was  pressed  into  service  to  ferry  the  exiled 
multitude  over  the  Saronic  Gulf.  Troezeu,  a  town  connected  with 
Athens  both  by  traditional  ties  and  close  commercial  intercourse, 
M'as  the  chosen  point  of  refuge,  and  its  hospitablp  citizens  not  only 


480  B.C.)  Evacuation  of  Athens.  211 

received  the  fugitives  with  ls:iudncss,  but  oven  assisted  them  with 
a  considerable  allowance  from  the  public  revenue.  Some  of  the 
Athenians  also  retired  to  Aegina,  and  a  few  went  no  further  than 
Salamis,  but  the  great  bulk  of  them  sought  the  more  distant  and 
secure  haven  in  the  Peloponnesus.  It  is  said  tliat  the  departing 
multitude  were  in  no  small  degree  comforted  by  the  disappearance 
of  the  snored  snake  of  the  Acropolis  on  the  first  day  of  embarkation 
— a  portent  which  was  taken  to  imply  that  Athena  and  her  visible 
representative  had  quitted  the  city  in  company  with  her  worshippers. 
Probably  Themistocles  could  have  explained  the  marvel  had  he  so 
chosen.  The  last  act  of  the  Athenians  before  deserting  their  home 
was  to  pass  an  act  of  indemnity  for  all  exiles,  inviting  them  to 
return  and  help  their  brethren  in  the  day  of  adversity.  Of  the 
many  who  took  advantage  of  this  decree,  and  prepared  to  join  the 
fleet,  by  far  the  most  important  was  Aristeides,  who,  since  his 
ostracism  four  years  ago,  had  been  living  in  retirement  in  the 
Peloponnese.  The  moment  that  he  reappeared  in  the  Athenian 
ranks  his  old  influence  returned  to  him,  and  he  was  not  the  man 
to  use  it  amiss  in  the  time  of  danger. 

AVhile  the  embarkation  was  proceeding  at  the  quays  of  Peiraeus 
and  Phalerum,  the  armies  of  the  great  king  were  hurrying  through 
the  plains  of  Boeotia  on  their  southward  march,  and  Tije  Persians 
before  it  was  completed  the  passes  of  Cithaeron  must  ^"^^k  Delphi, 
have  already  fallen  into  their  hands.  "While  the  main  body  pressed 
on  for  Athens,  a  considerable  detachment  marched  west  to  seize 
Delphi,  whose  vast  temple-treasures  were  enough  to  tempt  the 
invader,  even  if  he  had  no  conception  of  the  shock  which  he  could 
inflict  on  Greek  national  feeling  by  the  destruction  of  the  greatest 
sanctuary  of  the  Hellenic  world.  But  this  expedition  came  to 
nought ;  its  end  is  so  shrouded  with  wild  legends  that  it  is  hard 
to  ascertain  the  facts.  We  hear  of  great  falls  of  rock  in  the  passes 
of  Parnassus  which  slew  many  of  the  Asiatics,  and  of  a  x)anic  fear 
which  fell  upon  them  when  the  holy  place  was  almost  in  their 
grasp,  and  sent  them  crowding  back  in  groundless  terror  into  the 
Boeotian  plain.  The  Delphiaus  maintained  that  Apollo  had 
interfered  in  person  to  save  his  temple,  though  the  god  had  shown 
himself  apathetic  enough  when  his  "  loved  Didymean  dwelling  "  at 
Branchidae  had  been  sacked  by  the  same  enemy,  at  tl:c  time  of  the 


212  Said  mis  a  fid  Flaiaed.  [480  b.o. 

Ionian  I'LVolt.  At  any  rate  the  treasures  of  Del^ihi  remained  un* 
spoiled,  and  the  fact  of  their  preservation  went  far  to  rescue  the 
repute  of  the  oracle  from  the  discredit  cast  upon  it  by  the  dismal 
Medizing  prophecies  which  it  had  been  venting  during  the  previous 
year. 

If  the  sanctuary  of  Apollo  remained  unscathed,  the  liome  of 
Pallas  on  the  Athenian  Acropolis  had  a  very  ditierent  fate.  The 
Xerxes  takes  heads  of  the  Persian  columns  converged  on  Athens, 
Athens.  ^^^  entered  the  city  only  to  find  it  completely 
deserted,  save  for  the  few  fanatics  who  were  still  holding  out  behind 
the  palisades  of  the  Acropolis.  They  made  a  longer  defence  than 
might  have  been  expected,  but  finally  a  body  of  Persians,  scram- 
bling up  the  almost  impracticable  cliff  below  the  temple  of  Aglaurus, 
carried  the  place  by  escalade,  and  slew  the  remnant  of  the  garrison 
in  the  very  temple  of  Athene.  Xerxes  was  determined  to  make 
an  example  of  the  city  which  bad  so  long  and  so  successfully  defied 
his  father  and  himself.  Contrary  to  the  custom  of  the  Persians, 
he  not  only  burnt  all  private  dwellings,  but  levelled  to  the  ground 
the  sacred  buildings  on  the  Acropolis,  as  if  determined  to  drive  the 
gods  of  Athens  as  well  as  her  citizens  from  their  ancient  stronghold. 
So  thoroughly  did  he  do  his  work,  and  so  completely  was  every- 
thing overturned,  that  many  of  the  statues  which  he  then  cast 
down  remained  buried  in  the  fragments  of  the  edifices  which  had 
contained  them,  only  to  be  unearthed  by  the  explorers  of  our 
own  day. 

The  destruction  of  Athens  was  carried  out  under  the  very  eyes 
of  her  citizens,  for  the  flames  of  the  city  were  plainly  visible  from 
Salamis,  where  the  Greek  fleet  was  still  lying.  The  vessels  which 
fought  at  Artemisium  had  now  been  largely  reinforced  by  fresh 
detachments  from  various  localities ;  the  Sicyonians  had  doubled 
their  contingent,  and  the  ships  of  the  Corinthian  colonies  on  the 
west  coast  of  Greece  had  at  last  arrived.  But  except  Athens  no 
city  had  exerted  itself  to  its  utmost.  Aegina,  for  example,  kept 
more  than  half  her  fleet  at  home,  to  provide  for  her  safety  in  the 
event  of  defeat;  and  Corinth  only  put  forty  ships  into  the  confederate 
squadron.  Then  it  came  to  pass  that  Athens,  in  spite  of  consider- 
able losses  at  Artemisium,  still  supplied  almost  half  the  total — 180 
triremes  out  of  the  378  which  lay.-  in  the  S.ilamiaiau  Bay.     The 


430  B.0.3  The  Greek  Admirals  at  Salamis.  213 

Spartan  Eurybiades  still  held  nominal  command  of  the  wliolc,  but 
his  personal  incompetence  threw  the  settlement  of  every  important 
question  into  the  hands  of  stormy  councils  of  war.  Tlie  admirala 
of  the  various  squadrons  were  hopelessly  at  variance ;  re  ♦ 
Adeimantus  the  Corinthian  and  the  majority  of  the  the  Greek 
Peloponnesians  were  for  retiring  to  the  Isthmus,  and 
acting  in  close  concert  with  the  land  army,  wliich  had  now  gathered 
there  in  strength,  and  was  commencing  to  build  a  wall  from  sea  to 
sea  for  the  defence  of  the  peninsula.  Eurybiades,  in  his  vacillating 
way,  inclined  to  favour  this  course.  But  Themistocles  was  deter- 
mined to  attack  the  Persian  ships  the  moment  they  appeared  in 
Attic  waters,  and  before  they  could  commence  any  movement  against 
the  rear  of  the  Greeks.  The  Aeginetan  and  Megarian  admirals 
adhered  to  his  opinion,  for  the  position  at  Salamis  protected  their 
cities,  which  would  be  exposed  to  attack  from  the  sea  the  moment 
the  confederate  fleet  retreated  to  Corinth.  The  contention  was 
brought  to  a  crisis  by  the  appearance  of  the  Persian  armada,  which 
rounded  Sunium  and  appeared  in  the  harbour  of  Phalerum.  After 
a  fruitless  discussion  many  of  the  Peloponnesians  were  actually 
preparing  to  weigh  anchor,  Avhen  Themistocles,  bringing  all  the 
iniluence  of  his  vehement  personality  to  bear  on  Eurybiades,  pro- 
cured  a  final  meeting  of  the  admirals  at  midnight.  Here  words 
grew  hot  and  furious.  Adeimantus  bade  Themistocles,  "  a  man  who 
had  no  longer  a  country,"  hold  his  peace  and  obey.  The  Athenian 
replied  that  the  admiral  who  had  a  hundred  and  eighty  war-ships 
at  his  back  could  choose  himself  a  countr}'  wiierever  he  wished, 
and  swore  that  if  the  Peloponnesians  retired  to  the  Isthmus,  the 
Athenian  squadron  should  separate  itself  from  them,  take  on  board 
the  fugitives  at  Troezen,  and  sail  for  Italy,  there  to  found  a  new 
Athena.  This  threat  so  disturbed  Eurybiades  that  he  threw  all 
his  influence  into  the  scale,  and  ere  daybreak  the  council  of  war 
resolved  (0  stand  firm  and  offer  battle  in  the  strait. 

The  chosen  battle-field  was  the  space  of  land-locked  water  whoso 
northern  portion  forms  the  Strait  of  Salamis.  A  deep  curve  in  the 
Attic  coast  is  faced  for  the  gi-eater  part  of  its  length  by  the  eastern 
shore  of  the  rugged  and  irregularly  shaped  island  of  Salamis,  which 
leaves  in  the  centre  a  considerable  expanse  of  sea,  but  sends  out  to 
Qast  and  west  long  promontories  which  approach  the  mainland, 


214 


Salaiiu's  cvid  Plataea. 


(480  B.C. 


ami  contract  the  bay  m'.o  a  atrait.  In  the  eaSi^cvn  exif  of  this 
island  sea  lie  the  harbour  and  town  of  Salamis,  where  the  Grecian 
fleet  was  moored.  Further  out,  beyond  the  strait,  and  round  an 
angle  of  the  Attic  coast,  lay  the  Persian  fleet  in  the  harbour  of 
Phalerum.  As  long  as  this  remained  the  relative  position  of  the 
two  armaments,  the  eastern  passage  was  practically  barred  to  the 
confederates,  but  they  had  full  opportunity  to  retire  on  Megara 
and  Corinth  by  the  western  exit. 


A  Grech  Line  of  Battle 
CD-       B  Persian  ,,    ,,       ,, 
Ci*.  ^«^J      CSeat  of  Xerxes 

■    "> 


ll'dlkcr  &■  Bai'la.11  sc. 


Iir  the  vehemence  of  his  desire  to  precij^itate  a  collision, 
Themistocles  now  had  recourse  to  one  of  those  ingenious  but  uu- 
Themistocies  scrupulous  manoeuvres  which  give  the  key  to  his 
communicates  character.  He  sent  by  night  a  confidential  Asiatic 
■  slave  to  the  Persian  camp ;  the  man  bore  letters  to  the 
king  which  protested  that  the  Athenian  admiral  was  anxious  to  serve 
him,  and  would  have  him  know  that  the  Greek  commanders  were 
about  to  retire  under  cover  of  the  darkness.  If,  therefore,  he  wished 
to  crush  his  enemies,  he  must  make  haste  to  seize  both  entries  of 
the  bay  of  Eleusis,  or  the  confederate  fleet  would  escape  westward.' 
Themistocles  thus  provided  for  himself,  whatever  the  course  of 
events  might  be.  If,  as  he  hoiked,  the  Persians  should  proceed  to 
attack,  the  battle  for  which  he  yearned  would  take  place,  and 
victory  would  probably  follow ;  but  if  Xerxes  either  should  r'=!fus8- 


480  B.C.)  The  Persians  surround  Salainis.  215 

to  advance,  or  should  attack  and  be  successful,  he  would  at  any 
rate  be  personally  well  disposed  to  a  man  who  had  endeavoured  to 
do  something  in  his  behalf. 

The  events  fell  out  exactly  as  the  ingenious  plotter  desired.  The 
Great  King,  in  fear  that  his  enemies  might  escape,  determined  to 
render  their  flight  impossible.  Before  dawn  his  vessels  were 
already  filing  out  from  the  Phaleric  harbour,  and  pushing  on  to  the 
north  and  west  so  as  to  completely  encircle  the  anchorage  where 
the  confederates  lay.  He  even  ordered  land  troops  to  be  trans- 
ported across  to  the  small  island  of  Psyttaleia,  which  lies  off  the 
south-east  exit  of  the  bay,  in  order  that  they  might  seize  any 
Greeks  whose  vessels  might  run  ashore  upon  that  island — an  excess 
of  precaution  which  was  soon  to  appear  ludicrous  enough  during 
the  battle.  The  confederate  admirals  w'cre  thrown  into  a  new 
fever  of  indecision  by  the  advance  of  the  Persian  fleet,  and  spent 
the  day  in  inconclusive  debates,  during  which  several  of  the 
Peloponnesians  showed  that  their  old  design  of  absconding  was 
not  even  now  forgotten.  But  meanwhile  the  horns  of  the 
crescent  into  which  the  hostile  squadron  had  formed  itself  were 
slowly  contracting,  till  retreat  had  grown  impossible.  At  nightfall 
the  exiled  Aristides  made  his  appearance  among  the  Athenians,  to 
announce  that  he  had  only  just  found  it  possible  to  slip  between 
the  nearest  ships  of  the  enemy  and  the  shore,  while  his  news  w-ere 
soon  confirmed  by  deserters,  who  reported  that  a  complete  blockade 
of  the  Strait  of  Salamis  had  been  established.  A  battle  next  day 
was  inevitable. 

The  Persian  king  had  still  about  a  thousand  vessels,  in  spite  of  all 
his  losses  by  war  and  shipwreck.  He  had  enclosed  his  enemies  in  a 
position  where  defeat  must  mean  destruction,  and  felt  strength  of 
no  doubt  of  the  result.  His  crews  were  roused  to  *^^  fleets, 
unusual  excitement  by  the  fact  that  they  were  to  fight  under 
his  own  royal  eye.  For  on  the  slope  of  Mount  Aegialeus,  over- 
looking the  bay,  a  splendid  throne  had  been  erected,  and  on  it  the 
king  took  his  seat,  surrounded  by  his  princes  and  courtiers,  and 
well  furnished  with  scribes,  who  were  to  take  down  the  names 
and  actions  of  all  who  distinguished  themselves  in  the  coming  en- 
gagement. Not  a  soul  had  ventured  to  raise  a  doubt  as  to  the  policy 
of  fighting,  save  Artemisia,  the  widowed  Queen  of  nalicarnassus. 


2 1 6  Sala/iils  and  Flataea.  (48o  b.c. 

wlio  had  headed  her  own  squadron  on  the  expedition,  and  more  than 
once  displayed  prudence  and  foresight  which  should  have  Lien  in- 
valuable to  the  king.  But  Xerxes  treated  her  advice,  to  attack  the 
Isthmus  by  land  before  joining  battle  by  sea,  with  quiet  disregard, 
and  no  one  else  had  the  temerity  to  run  counter  to  the  royal  will. 

By  the  desertion  of  two  vessels,  a  Lemnian  and  a  Tenian,  from 
the  enemy,  the  Greek  armament  had  been  raised  to  380  sail. 
Eetreat  was  completely  cut  off,  so  that  it  Avas  for  every  man  a 
question  of  victory  or  destruction  ;  and  there  was  no  opportunity 
for  faint-hearted  captains  to  edge  away  and  make  for  the  open 
sea,  as  the  Samians  had  done  with  such  fatal  result  fifteen  years 
before,  at  the  battle  of  Lade.  The  Athenians  and  Aeginetans, 
who  formed  the  majority  of  the  combatants,  were  ready  enough 
for  the  fight ;  while  the  Peloponnesians,  though  they  had  wished 
to  avoid  an  engagement,  had  no  temptations  to  slackness  now 
that  one  had  become  inevitable.  The  generals  did  their  best  to 
cncourag3  their  men  by  citing  such  prophecies  and  oracles  as 
seemed  to  portend  a  victory  for  Greece,  and  even  fetched  out  and 
placed  on  shipboard  th?  images  of  Ajxx  and  his  kinsmen,  the 
tutelary  heroes  of  Salarais,  as  if  to  make  them  their  leaders  in 
a  fight  which  seemed  to  reproduce  the  old  struggle  with  Asia  in 
the  mythic  days  of  Troy.  But  no  less  important  than  the  moral 
advantages  of  the  Greeks  was  the  character  of  the  waters  in 
which  they  were  about  to  fight.  The  sea-room  was  so  confined, 
and  so  hampered  with  reefs,  promontories,  and  islands,  that  the 
king's  admirals  could  not  make  full  use  of  their  overwhelming 
numbers,  while  their  inferior  seamanship  and  want  of  knowledge 
of  the  localities  led  to  overcrowding,  stranding,  and  other  small 
mishaps  long  before  the  battle  began. 

Next  morning  each  fleet  discerned  the  other  drawn  up  in  battle 
array.  On  the  side  of  the  confederates  the  Athenian  squadron 
held  the  left  wing,  the  Euboeans  and  Aeginetans  the  centre,  the 
Corinthians  and  other  Peloponnesian  contingents  the  right,  the 
l.lace  of  honour:  here,  too,  Eurybiades,  the  commander-in-chief, 
with  his  sixteen  ships  from  Liconia,  took  his  station.  Among  the 
barbarians  the  Phoenicians  were  on  the  right,  facing  the  Athe- 
nians, the  Cilicians  and  Pamphylians  in  the  centre  and  the  Ionian 
squadrons  on  the  left. 


480  B.C.]  Batlle  of  Salaviis.  217 

The  flay  was  rough,  a  south-west  wind  was  blowing  across  the 
breadth  of  the  bay,  and  the  surf  ran  high.  Nevertheless,  it  was  the 
king's  fleet  which  made  the  first  movement.  Rowing  against  wind 
and  tide,  and  suffering  much  from  overcrowding,  they  slowly  and 
laboriously  advanced.  For  a  moment  the  Greeks  hung  back,  close 
to  the  land  and  their  anchorage ;  then  Ameinias  of  Pallene,  an 
Athenian  trierarch,  shot  out  from  the  line  and  rammed  a 
Sidonian  vessel.  Ship  after  ship  followed  him,  and  Battle  of 
soon  battle  had  been  joined  all  along  the  strait,  and  saiamis. 
the  water  was  covered  by  a  confused  medley  of  galleys,  circling 
round  each  other,  and  seeking  opportunity  to  ram,  or  locked  in 
close  combat,  where  the  press  was  thicker  and  no  room  for 
manoeuvring  remained.  On  neither  side  was  much  strategy 
displayed;  the  day  was  decided  by  the  superior  seamanship  and 
determination  of  the  confederates,  not  by  the  ability  of  their 
admirals.  Before  long  it  was  evident  that  the  barbarians  were 
gaining  no  advantage,  but  their  confidence  la  gross  numbers  kept 
them  from  panic,  and  there  were  ships  unnumbered  ready  to  press 
forward  into  the  fighting  line  to  replace  disabled  consorts.  Even  the 
lunians,  on  whose  desertion  many  of  the  Greeks  had  been  relying, 
sliowed  no  reluctance  to  engage,  and  took  their  full  share  of  the 
action.  For  manj^  hours  the  conflict  showed  no  signs  of  slacken- 
ing, and  the  king,  as  he  sat  on  Aegialeus,  with  his  scribes  at  his 
feet,  gazing  on  the  vast  panorama  in  the  bay,  had  time  enough  to 
note  down  many  a  bold  deed  of  friend  and  foe.  But  at  last  the 
current  of  the  fight  began  to  set  markedly  toward  the  south  and 
east;  numbers  of  Persian  ships  dropped  out  of  the  line  disabled, 
and  r.in  ashore,  or  drifted  down  the  coast ;  the  rest  fell  more  and 
more  into  confusion,  huddling  into  helpless  masses,  and  fighting 
purely  on  the  defensive.  Finally  their  losses  began  to  tell  on 
them.  The  king's  brother,  Ariabignes,  who  held  the  supreme 
command,  fell  as  he  was  attempting  to  board  an  Athenian  vessel, 
and  about  nightfall  the  broken  fleet  reeled  slowly  back  to  the 
Attic  coast  and  took  refuge  with  the  land  army,  which  had  moved 
down  to  the  beach  to  assist  it.  Most  of  its  rearmost  vessels  were 
cut  off  by  the  Athenians  and  Aeginetans,  who  pressed  their  victory 
home,  and  chased  the  enemy  till  he  was  absolutely  out  of  reach. 
To  crown  the  daj',  Aristides  embarked  some  Athenian  hoplite? 


2 1 8  Sa/ainis  and  Flataea.  (480  b.c. 

from  the  town  of  Salauiis,  and  putting  them  ashore  on  Psyttaleia 
cut  to  pieces  the  Persian  detachment  which  had  landed  there,  and 
was  now  completely  isolated  by  the  falling  back  of  the  fleet. 

So  ended  the  battle  of  Salamis.  Balancing  the  mere  loss  of 
ships,  we  find  that  the  king's  fleet  had  been  diminished  by  some 

Results  of    two  hundred  vessels,  while   the   Greeks  were   only 

the  battle,  weakened  by  forty.  The  victory,  therefore,  though 
decisive  enough,  was  far  from  being  a  crushing  one,  and  the  bar- 
barians still  outnumbered  the  Hellenes  by  more  than  two  to  one. 
But  all  spirit  had  been  taken  out  of  the  vanquished.  The  Phoe- 
nicians accused  the  lonians  of  having  lost  the  battle  by  their 
slackness ;  while  the  lonians  fully  made  up  their  minds  that 
they  were  on  the  losing  side,  and  resolved  to  quit  it  as  soon  as 
possible.  Xerxes  was  profoundly  disgusted  with  his  fleet,  and 
began  to  deem  that  uncertain  element  the  sea  unworthy  of  his 
royal  notice.  At  the  same  time  he  realized  that,  if  he  was  no 
longer  master  of  the  Aegean,  his  homeward  route  by  the  long 
circuit  back  to  the  bridge  on  the  Hellespont  was  in  no  small 
danger.  When  once  his  self-confidence  was  abated,  regard  for  his 
own  valuable  person  began  to  assume  the  most  prominent  place  in 
his  thoughts,  and  those  of  his  courtiers  who  could  read  the  signs 
of  the  times  were  quick  to  fall  in  with  his  new  disposition. 

On  the  Greek  side  the  revulsion  of  feeling  was  no  less  great. 
There  were  few  who,  with  Themistocles,  had  foreseen  a  victory 
from  the  first;  the  majority,  even  among  the  Athenians,  had 
accepted  the  battle  as  the  last  desperate  chance  in  a  hazardous 
game  ;  many  had  not  fought  voluntarily  at  all,  but  merely  because 
their  retreat  was  cut  off,  and  no  other  alternative  remained.  The 
success  which  they  had  won  with,  such  small  loss  completely 
changed  their  spirit,  and  for  the  future  the  Greeks  by  sea  were 
inclined  to  recklessness  rather  than  fear,  and  thought  of  nothing 
but  taking  the  offensive.  More  than  any  others  did  the  Athenians 
rise  to  this  pitch  of  elation  :  they  had  staked  everything  on  the 
battle ;  they  alone,  by  the  numbers  of  their  contingent,  had  made 
victory  possible  ;  their  general  had  been  the  one  consistent  prophet 
of  good  fortune,  and  they  rightly  felt  that  the  credit  of  the  day  was 
almost  entirely  their  own.  The  council  of  admirals,  indeed,  awaided 
the  prize  of  valour  to  an  Aeginetan,  and  presented  Eurybiades  with 


480  Bc,  Xerxes  rchirns  io  Asia.  219 

A  wreath  of  honour,  but  their  partial  decision  deceived  nobody ; 
Athens  and  Themistocles  were  entitled  to  the  glory  of  having 
saved  Greece. 

For  a  few  days  after  the  battle  Xerxes  kept  up  a  show  of  pcr- 
S3verance;  his  army  commenced  to  construct  a  broad  mole  out 
from  the  mainland,  as  if  he  were  determined  to  win  Sal  amis  by 
military  if  not  by  naval  operations.  But  this  was  only  a  cover 
io  his  real  design  ;  he  had  made  up  his  mind  to  return  home. 
Mardoniut;,  who  had  been  the  most  prominent  supporter  of  the 
expedition,  aud  still  hoped  to  bring  it  to  a  successful  end,  supplied 
him  with  a  plausible  excuse.  Athens,  he  said,  had  been  the  city 
at  which  the  great  king's  wrath  had  been  directed,  and  now  that 
Athens  was  a  mass  cf  smoking  ruins,  the  object  of  the  invasion 
had  been  fulfilled.  The  minor  task  of  finishing  the  campaign 
might  be  left  to  inferior  hands.  Let  the  king,  therefore,  return 
to  Susa,  and  leave  some  satrap  with  an  adequate  force  to  complete 
the  subjection  of  Hellas.  Xerxes  eagerly  accepted  this  view;  he 
bade  Mardonius  chose  what  troops  he  wished,  and  announced  his 
intention  of  returning  home  with  the  remainder,  xerxes  rettims 
His  departure  is  said  to  have  been  hastened  by  a  to  Asia, 
secret  message  from  Themistocles,  who  again  despatched  his  con- 
fidential slave  to  the  mainland,  to  inform  the  king  that  he  had 
with  great  difficulty  induced  the  admirals  to  postpone  sailing  to 
the  Hellespont  to  destroy  the  bridge  of  boats,  and  that  it  would 
undoubtedly  be  attacked  ere  long.  As  a  matter  of  fact  Themis- 
tocles himself  had  advised  this  step,  but  Eurybiades  had  found  it 
too  rash,  and  prevented  any  such  design  from  being  takea  in  hand. 

Accordingly  Mardonius  chose  the  best  troops  of  the  army — all 
the  Persians,  including  the  king's  body-guard,  together  with  the 
Median  Sacan  and  Bactrian  contingents,  and  many  smaller  bodies 
from  other  nations.  The  rest  of  the  host  set  out  with  the  king,  to 
retrace  the  long  road  through  Boeotia  Thessaly  and  Macedonia  by 
which  they  had  advanced.  The  satrap  Artabazus,  with  sixty 
thousand  picked  men,  brought  up  the  rear,  and  after  coveiing  the 
march  of  the  main  body  as  far  as  the  Hellespont,  remained  behind 
to  overawe  the  Macedonians  and  keep  up  communications  between 
Mardonius  and  Asia.  The  Persians  are  said  to  have  suffered  severs 
privations  on  their  return  journey;  for  the  mngazincs  which  had 


2?o  Salami's  and  Plataea.  r48o  b.c- 

suppUed  them  during  their  advance  were  no  longer  full,  and  tho 
season  had  grown  late  and  was  now  verging  on  winter.  It  was 
with  ranks  much  thinned  by  dysentery  and  exposure  to  the  bleak 
Thracian  climate  that  Xerxes  reached  Abj'^dos.  There  he  found 
the  bridge  broken  by  the  storms  of  the  equinox,  and  was  compelled 
to  cross  on  shipboard.  His  army  was  slowly  ferried  over,  and 
followed  him  back  to  Sardis  in  a  sufficiently  depressed  and  dis* 
consolate  frame  of  mind. 

Meanwhile  the  Persian  fleet  had  left  the  ports  of  Athens  at  the 
same  time  that  Xerxes  set  out  on  his  return.  Sailing  by  night, 
The  Persian  ^^^  defeated  avmada  ingloriously  made  off  for  the 
fleet  departs.  Hellespont.  It  reached  Abj'dos  long  before  the  land 
army,  and  protected  the  passage  of  the  kin?,  which  was  not 
molested  by  the  Greeks.  Then  part  of  it,  apparently  the  Phoenician 
squadrons,  went  home ;  while  the  western  contingents  wintered  at 
the  harbour  of  Cyme  in  Aeolis.  The  Greek  admirals,  with  a  vague 
dread  of  the  power  of  Persia  still  hanging  about  them,  made  no 
attempt  to  pursue  the  enemy.  They  contented  themselves  with 
failing  to  the  nearer  Cyclades  and  compelling  the  islanders  to 
throw  off  their  lately  sworn  allegiance  to  Persia.  The  Andrians 
alone  made  resistance,  and  had  their  land  ravaged;  the  Parians 
and  some  others  got  their  submission  more  easily  accepted  by 
sending  large  bribes  in  secret  to  Themistocles,  who  readily  made 
their  peace  for  them  with  the  other  confederate  admirals.  After  a 
solemn  visit  to  the  Isthmus,  where  the  booty  of  Salamis  was 
divided  up,  and  large  offerings  made  to  the  national  gods — not 
even  the  Medizing  Apollo  of  Delphi  being  omitted — the  various 
squadrons  dispersed  to  their  native  cities. 

The  winter  of  480-479  b.c.  was  long  protracted,  and  more  than  six 
months  elapsed  before  warlike  operations  recommenced.  Mardonius 
■Winter  of  drew  back  his  army  far  to  the  north,  cantoning  the 
480-479  B.C.  greater  part  of  it  in  the  towns  of  Thessaly.  His 
Boeotian  allies  kept  to  their  own  territories  north  of  the  range 
of  Cithaeron,  and  Attica  was  therefore  left  unoccupied.  This 
emboldened  the  Athenians  to  return  to  their  ruined  city,  and  to 
bring  over  their  families  from  Troezen.  They  were  already 
beginning  to  restore  their  dilapidated  dwellings,  when  they  received 
r,  warning  that  their  troubles  were  not  yet  ended.     In  the  early 


479  fl.o.]  Mardonius  in  Attica.  22 1 

spring  Alexander  the  Macedonian  appeared  among  them,  bearing 
a  message  from  Mardonius.  The  Persiao,  anxious  to  detach  the 
Athenians  from  the  league  of  Greece,  proposed  to  them  terms  sucli 
as  the  great  king  had  never  before  deigned  to  proffer  to  an  ally. 
In  return  for  withdrawing  from  their  opposition,  they  were  not 
only  to  retain  complete  independence,  but  to  be  allowed  to  annex 
as  much  of  their  neighbours'  territory  as  they  might  choose,  and  to 
receive  from  Xerxes  a  sum  large  enough  to  enable  them  to  restore 
all  the  ruins  of  their  temples  and  dwellings.  Eefusal  was  to  be 
punished  by  a  second  occujiation  of  the  city,  when  the  campaigning 
season  came  round.  But  it  was  not  likely  that,  after  Salamis,  the 
Athen'ans  would  desert  a  cause  to  which  they  had  been  faithful 
in  the  darkest  hour.  They  sent  away  the  Macedonian  prince  with 
a  defiant  reply,  and  stoically  awaited  the  chances  of  war. 

Mardonius  was  as  good  as  his  word.  When  spring  arrived  his 
army  came  flooding  southward  from  Thessaly,  and  then,  swollen 
by  the  contingents  of  Boeotia,  swept  over  the  crest  Mardonius  re- 
of  Cithaeron  and  into  the  Thriasian  plain.  The  ^^^^^  *° -^-ttica. 
Athenians  had  been  hoping  that  their  allies  from  Peloponnesus 
would  come  out  in  full  force  from  the  Isthmus  and  help  them  to 
hold  the  passes  of  Cithaeron  against  the  Persian.  But  the  Spartans 
had  not  yet  given  up  their  old  scheme  of  making  the  wall  in  front 
of  Corinth,  now  completed  into  a  substantial  fortification,  their  line 
of  defence.  Not  a  hoplite  appeared  to  defend  Attica,  and  the 
Athenians  were  constrained  once  more  to  put  their  families  on 
shipboard  and  escape  to  Troezen  and  Salamis.  Exactly  ten 
months  after  Xerxes  had  first  entered  Athens,  Mardonius  appeared 
m  front  of  its  deserted  walls  and  occupied  them  without  resistance. 
The  Athenians  were  in  high  dudgeon  at  the  isolation  ^^^  Athenians 
in  which  they  were  left ;  they  sent  ambassadors  to  and  spartana 
Sparta  to  upbraid  their  selfish  confederates,  and  to 
endeavour  to  drive  them  forward  by  hinting  that  they  still  had 
before  them  the  proposals  made  by  Alexander  of  Macedon,  and 
might  be  driven  to  accept  them  it  no  help  came.  This  threat 
secretly  moved  the  ephors,  but  they  determined  to  conceal  their 
perturbation  from  the  Athenians,  and  put  oft  the  ambassadors 
some  days  before  giving  them  an  answer,  alleging  aa  an  excuse  the 
fact  that  their  great  festival,  the  Hyacinthia,  was  at  that  moment 


222  Salami's  and  Plataca.  [479  b.c. 

being  celebrated.  They  then  collected  iivc  thousana  Spartans, — 
more  than  half  the  available  force  of  the  state ; — placed  Pausanias, 
thenephewof  Leonidas,  in  command,  and  started  them  off  by  night 
to  inarch  northward.  Thus,  when  the  Athenian  ambassadors 
received  their  audience,  they  learnt  to  their  surprise  that  the 
Spartan  army  was  already  far  advanced  towards  the  Isthmus,  and 
had  its  orders  to  go  beyond  it.  Five  thousand  hoplites  of  the 
Perioeci  accompanied  the  ambassadors  on  their  return  journey,  and 
soon  it  became  apparent  that  the  whole  of  the  Pelopounese  was  on 
the  march.  All  the  contingents  of  the  states  that  owned  the 
hegemony  of  Sparta  came  flocking  in  to  Corinth ;  then 
advance  from  the  whole  body,  an  army  such  as  Greece  had  never 
Corinth,  -^gfoi-e  put  in  the  field,  advanced  to  Megara  and 
Eleusis.  At  the  latter  place  they  were  joined  by  eight  thousand 
A.thenian  hoplites,  who  crossed  the  strait  from  Salamis.  But  they 
did  not  find  Mardonius  in  front  of  them  and  offering  battle,  as  they 
had  expected.  On  their  approach  the  satrap,  after  directing  a 
cavalry  reconnaissance  as  far  as  the  gates  of  Megara — the  furthest 
point  to  the  west  which  the  Persian  arms  reached — had  evacuated 
Athens.  He  carefully  destroyed  any  remains  of  the  temples  and 
walls  that  had  escaped  the  first  occupation,  and  levelled  the  new 
buildings  which  had  been  commenced  in  the  winter.  Then  he 
marched  across  the  front  of  the  advancing  Greek  army,  passed 
Cithaeron,  and  settled  down  in  the  valley  of  the  Asopus.  Here  he 
offered  battle  in  the  plain  of  Southern  Boeotia.  His  camp, 
surrounded  by  an  earthen  rampart  which  formed  a  square  of  ten 
furlongs,  was  pitched  by  the  river,  facing  towards  Plataea,  the  spot 
The  armies  ^*  which  the  roads  leading  from  Megara  and  the 
at  Plataea.  Peloponnese  into  Boeotia  converge.  The  Greeks  lay 
above  on  the  hillside,  for  they  did  not  dare  to  come  down  into  the 
plain  on  account  of  the  large  bodies  of  horse  which  Mardonius 
could  put  into  the  field.  As  the  two  armies  were  posted,  the 
Persian  threatened  equally  the  pass  into  the  Megarid  and  that 
which  led  by  the  shore  of  the  Corintluan  Gulf  towards  the  Isthmus. 
Similarly  the  Greeks  were  posted  so  that  they  could  attack 
Mardonius  at  advantage  in  the  hilly  ground,  if  he  moved  forward 
on  either  of  these  lines  of  communication.  For  some  time  the  two 
armies  faced  each  other,  each  expecting  the  other  lo  make  the  j 


479  B.C. 


The  Greek  Army  in  Boeotia. 


223 


decisive  move.  !Mardonius  was  determined  not  to  attack  the 
Greeks  on  billy  gromid,  remembering  Thermopj'lae.  Pausanias, 
though  a  brave  and  ambitious  man,  had  no  military  judgment  or 
power  of  initiative,  and  feared  that  the  morale  of  many  of  his 
troops  was  bad. 


TheThree  Positions 

OF  THE 

GrtEEK Army 
before  the 
Battle  OF  Plataea 


I.  Original  Position 
II.  Second  Position  during 

10  days  of  waiting 
\\\.Position  at  momentof  Battle 
A.  A.  Battlefield 


Walker  e:- Ho. 


The  G-reek  army  had  now  swelled   to  more  than  a  hundred 

thousand  men,  of  whom  nearly  forty  thousand  were  troops  ot  the 

line,  hoplites  in  full  brazen  panoply,  such  as  no  Asiatic  torce  of 

anything  like  equal  numbers  could  nope  to  resist.*     Yet  thero 

'  Herodotus  gives,  in  ix.  28,  29,  the  full  muster-roll  of  tbe  Greeks. 


224  Scilamls  and  Plataca.  [479  b.o. 

were  still  many  contingents  due;  the  ElcianS  and  Mantineans 
alone,  who  were  expected  every  day,  were  bringing  up  at  least 
five  or  six  thousand  hoplites  more.  The  strength  of  Mardonius 
we  cannot  so  easily  calculate ;  but,  including  his  Greek  allies,  he 
must  have  had  at  least  twice  or  three  times  the  numbers  of 
Pausanias. 

After  some  days  Mardonius  sent  bodies  of  cavalry  up  the  gentler 
part  of  the  slopes  of  the  Greek  position,  to  annoy  the  confederates 
Preliminary  ^'^^  tempt  them  to  advance.  There  was  hot  skir- 
skirmishes.  wishing  in  the  centre  of  the  Greek  army,  but  it 
terminated  in  the  complete  repulse  of  the  Persians,  who  left 
Masistius,  commander  of  the  cavalry  of  the  whole  army,  dead  on 
the  field  within  the  Greek  lines. 

This  emboldened  Pausanias  to  come  down  more  into  the  plain  : 
the  first  dread  of  the  Persian  cavalry  had  passed  away,  now  that 
it  was  discovered  to  be  by  no  means  invincible.  Accordingly  the 
Greeks  marched  westward,  and  drew  up  upon  a  line  of  hillocks 
which  run  out  from  Cithaeron  some  two  miles  and  a  half  in  front 
of  Piataea,  behind  the  fountain  of  Gargaphia.  The  Spartans  held 
the  right  wing,  nearest  to  the  mountains  ;  the  other  Peloponnesians 
formed  the  centre ;  while  the  Athenians  on  the  left  wing  lay 
furthest  out  in  the  plain.  For  ten  days  they  lay  in  this  position, 
with  the  Asopus  between  them  and  the  enemy.  They  were, 
however,  much  annoyed  by  the  Persian  cavalry,  who  stopped  up 
the  fountain  in  front  from  which  they  drew  their  water,  and 
sometimes  rode  round  their  flanks  and  intercepted  the  convoys 
which  brought  up  provisions  from  Megara.  Pausanias  was  still 
unable  to  make  up  his  mind  to  attack,  and  had  the  tameness  of 
spirit  to  determine  on  drawing  his  army  back  nearer  to  Piataea, 
to  a  position  where  water  was  more  abundant  and  the  slopes  less 
exposed  to  cavalry  raids.  Accordingly  the  army  commenced  its 
retreat  by  night ;  but  everything  went  wrong  with  the  movement. 
The  Peloponnesians  of  the  centre  started  oif  in  a  hurry,  and  did 
not  halt  in  the  chosen  position,  but  a  mile  too  far  to  the  rear. 
The  Spartans  delayed  till  nearly  day ;  for  one  commander  of  a 
brigade  obstinately  refused  to  believe  in  a  retreat,  and  had  to  be 
convinced  by  Pausanias  himself  before  he  would  move.  The  Athe- 
nians waited  for  the  Lacedaemonians  to  retire  before  they  them- 


473  B.c]  £attle  of  Plaiaea,  225 

selves  went  back.  Ilciice  it  came  to  pass  that  when  day  broke 
the  Persians  saw  that  the  Greek  centre  had  disappeared,  while  the 
two  wings  were  retreating  across  the  rolling  ground  towards  Plataea, 
without  any  connection  between  their  movements. 

Mardonius  thought  his  opportunity  had  come,  and  sallied  forth 
with  horse  and  foot,  taking  no  trouble  to  form  a  line  of  battle,  but 
hurrying  on  to  catch  the  enemy  before  they  could  Battle  of  1 
take  up  a  poiition.  It  looked  as  if  the  Greeks  Piataea. 
were  lost,  but  despair  gave  Pausanias  the  necessary  courage ;  he 
fronted  up  the  portion  of  the  army  that  was  with  him — tea  thousand 
Spartan  and  Laconian  hoplites,  fifteen  hundred  Arcadians  of  Tegea, 
and  a  mass  of  some  thirty-five  thousand  Helots  and  other  light 
troops.  Then,  after  sending  off  to  tell  the  Athenians  that  he  was 
going  to  fight,  he  dashed  at  the  confused  mass  of  pursuers  that 
was  streaming  after  him.  Here  the  Persians  were  in  front,  while 
the  rest  of  the  army  was  hurrying  up  from  the  camp  in  great 
disorder,  and  was  not  yet  on  the  field.  The  Persians  set  their 
large  wicker  shields  on  the  ground  before  them,  and  began  to  ply 
their  bows,  but  after  they  had  let  fly  a  few  volleys  the  Greek  line 
came  crashing  down  upon  them,  rolled  over  the  barrier  of  shields, 
and  fell  to  work  at  close  quarters  with  sword  and  lance.  There 
was  half  an  hour  of  hard  fighting,  for  the  picked  troops  of  the 
army  of  Mardonius  stood  their  ground  like  men.  But  their  short 
swords  and  quilted  tunics  were  not  a  fair  match  for  the  heavy 
pike  and  complete  mail  of  the  Spartans.  They  began  to  fall  back 
towards  the  river,  and  rolled  in  upon  the  hordes  that  were  advancing 
to  join  them.  Mardonius  was  struck  down  by  a  stone  ;  no  officer 
came  forward  to  take  his  place,  and  the  whole  vast  body  of  Asiatics 
broke  up  in  disorder.  Artabazus,  who  led  the  rear,  drew  off  his 
forty  thousand  men  and  retired  in  safety  on  the  road  which  led  to 
the  north-west.  He  started  off  with  all  speed,  and  marched  day 
and  night,  everywhere  preceding  the  rumour  of  the  disaster,  so 
that  he  got  safely  away  to  Thessaly,  and  finally  reached  Asia.  No 
doubt  he  was  fullowed  by  many  other  scattered  bodies.  But  the 
mass  of  the  Asiatics  fell  back  on  their  fortified  camp  beyond 
the  Asopus,  and  then  turned  to  bay. 

Meanwhile,  far  to  the  left,  a  separate  battle  had  been  going  on 
between  the  Athenians  and  the  Boeotian  contingent  of  the  Persian 

Q 


2  26  Salcunis  and  Plataea.  l479B.c. 

army.  It  raged  until  the  Boeotians  saw  that  their  main  body 
was  routed ;  then  they  gave  way  and  retreated  on  Thebes.  The 
Athenians  did  not  pursue  them,  but  marched  on  the  Persian  camp, 
where  they  found  the  Spartans  vainly  endeavouring  to  force  an 
entrance.  Presently  the  Greek  centre  also  a]ipeared,  too  late  to 
take  any  part  in  the  main  battle.  It  had  not  seen  an  enemy, 
except  one  stray  body  of  Thebau  horse,  which  caught  the  Megarian 
contingent  on  the  march,  and  slew  six  hundred  men  before  it  was 
driven  off. 

After  some  severe  fighting  at  the  palisades  of  the  entrenched 
camp,  the  Athenians  and  Tegeans  burst  their  way  in.  The  rest 
Capture  of  the  followed,  and  then  the  resistance  of  the  Orientals 
Persian  camp.  su(Jdenly  collapsed.  'I'hey  let  themselves  be  butchered 
without  a  struggle,  till  the  corpses  lay  massed  in  heaps  in  every 
corner  of  the  camp.  Nothing  put  an  end  to  the  slaughter  but  the 
weariness  of  the  conquerors.  The  spoil  which  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  Greeks  was  enormous ;  the  camp  equipage  of  the  Persian 
ofBcers  comprised  cups  and  dishes  of  silver  and  gold,  rich  stuffs 
and  hangings,  and  troops  of  slaves  and  concubines ;  even  their 
inlaid  weapons  and  armour  were  of  very  considerable  value ; 
horses,  camels,  and  mules  in  countless  numbers  were  also  captured. 
It  was  a  booty  such  as  no  Greeks  had  ever  divided  before. 
.  Plataea  was  fought  and  won  in  the  most  unscientific  way ;  not 
even  at  lukerman  was  the  generalship  more  wanting  on  both 
sides.  But  the  victory  was  none  the  less  decisive  :  while  the 
victors  only  lost  thirteen  hundred  men,  the  Persian  army  was 
annihilated ;  nothing  was  left  of  it  save  broken  bands  flying 
northward  towards  the  Hellespont.  All  that  remained  to  be  done 
was  to  punish  the  traitors  in  Greece.  A  few  days  after  the  battle 
the  army  marched  on  Thebes  and  laid  siege  to  it ;  ere  long  the 
town  had  to  surrender.  It  was  punished  by  the  public  execution 
of  the  leaders  of  its  oligarchy,  and  deprived  of  its  presidency  in  the 
Boeotian  League,  which  seems  to  have  fallen  for  a  time  to  Tanagra. 
The  other  allies  of  Persia  submitted  without  striking  a  blow. 

On  the  very  day  on  which  the  battle  of  Plataea  had  been  fought. 

The  Greek  fleet  another  engagement  of  great  importance  had  taken 

off  Asia.        place  on  the  other  side  c^  the  Aegean.     At  the  same 

time  that   the  QreelJ    army  marched    for   Boeotia,  a  confederate 


479 B.C.]  Battle  of  Alycale.  227 

fleet  of  oue  hundred  and  ten  ships  had  been  collected  at  Aegina, 
under  the  Spartan  King  Leotychides  and  the  Athenian  Xanthippus. 
This  squadron  was  destined  to  create  a  diversion  in  Asiatic  waters, 
and  to  watch  the  remnant  of  the  Persian  fleet,  of  which  three 
hundred  vessels  still  lay  off  the  coast  of  louia.  Moreover,  there 
was  some  hope  that  the  Greeks  of  Asia,  especially  the  islanders, 
would  rise  in  revolt  when  they  saw  the  confederate  fleet  at  hand. 

Accordingly  the  Greeks  advanced  as  far  as  Delos;  here  they 
received  emissaries  from  Samos  promising  active  assistance,  and 
heard  that  an  outbreak  had  already  taken  place  at  Chios.  This 
emboldened  them  to  push  out  and  search  for  the  Persian  fleet.  They 
found  it  drawn  ashore  on  the  promontory  of  Mycale,  Battle  of 
not  far  from  Miletus.  A  considerable  land  force,  sent  Mycaie. 
down  from  Sardis,  lay  encamped  beside  the  fleet.  With  a  prompt- 
ness and  decision  which  contrasts  very  strongly  with  the  slo^vness 
and  timidity  of  Pausanias  at  Plataea,  Leotychides  and  Xanthippus 
determined  on  an  immediate  attack.  They  landed  on  the  main- 
land and  marched  straight  on  the  Persian  camp.  The  enemy  came 
out  to  meet  them,  and  a  protracted  struggle  was  fought  on  the 
shore,  which  ended  in  the  retreat  of  the  Asiatics  towards  their 
entrenched  camp.  Here  a  second  contest  raged,  but  it  was  short, 
for  the  Athenians  and  Corinthians  got  in  at  the  gates  along  with 
the  flying  foe.  Then  the  Persians  dispersed  and  took  to  the  hills, 
leaving  both  their  camp  and  their  three  hundred  ships  on  the  shore 
in  the  hands  of  the  victors.  Tiie  loss  of  the  Greeks  was  heavy, 
that  of  their  enemies  enormous,  and  many  of  the  fugitives  were  cut 
off  by  the  Milesians,  who  now  rebelled  openly,  and  beset  the  passes 
through  which  the  Persians  fled. 

Such  was  the  end  of  the  Persian  dominion  in  Ionia ;  for  the 
moment  that  the  battle  was  known  all  the  islands  threw  oft'  their 
allegiance  to  Xerxes,  and  as  many  of  the  mainland  towns  as  dared 
followed  their  example.  The  Great  King  made  his  way  home  to 
Susa,  not  only  without  having  gained  the  new  provinces  he  had 
coveted,  but  having  actually  lost  the  greater  part  of  one  of  his  owii 
satrapies.  \     ^ 


u^ 


CHAPTER  XXI. 


THE    GUEEKS    OF    ITALY    AXD    SICILY    DOWN    TO    THE    END    OF    THE 
TYKAKNY  AT   SYRACUSE,    G00-4G5   B.C. 

While  the  recorded  history  of  the  states  of  Greece  becomes  foiny 
continuous  in  the  seventli  century,  that  of  the  colonies  of  Sicily  and 
Magna  Graecia  remains  very  fragmentary  till  the  end  of  the  sixth. 
This  is  but  natural;  the  earlier  years  of  the  existence  of  these  cities 
must  have  been  occupied  with  little  more  than  monotonous  increase 
and  expansion,  and  obscure  wars  with  the  tribes  of  the  inland.  It 
would  not  be  until  they  had  arrived  at  their  full  maturity,  and 
found  leisure  for  other  things  than  mere  growth,  that  their  annals 
were  likely  to  become  important. 

Of  the  relations  of  the  Greeks  of  Italy  and  Sicily  with  their 
barbarian  neighbours  there  is  little  to  tell  before  the  fifth  century. 
The  Oenotrians  and  Messapians  of  the  one  country,  the  Sicels  and 
Sicaniaus  of  the  other,  gave  little  trouble  to  the  immigrants.  But 
behind  these  feeble  tribes  there  loomed  in  the  distance  two  great 
powers  with  whom  the  Greeks  were  one  day  to  be  engaged  in 
desperate  struggles.  The  colonists  of  Cumae  and  Neapolis  dwelt 
hard  by  the  Etruscan ;  those  of  Sellnus  and  Himera  were  the 
immediate  neighbours  of  the  Carthaginian  merchants  of  Panormus 
and  Lilybaeum.  But  it  would  seem  that  these  nations  were  very 
seldom  provoked  to  war  by  the  growth  of  the  Greek  states  till  the 
commencement  of  the  fifth  century.  Nor  was  it  till  the  end  of 
that  period  that  the  warlike  Sabellian  tribes  came  wandering  down 
Central  Italy,  and  commenced  to  cut  short  the  dominions  of  the 
states  of  Magna  Graecia ;  then  only  do  the  names  of  the  Samnite 
or  the  Lucanian  begin  to  be  heard. 


620  B.C.]  The  Pythagoreans  in  Italy.  229 

Among  the  Italiot  Greeks  the  most  import;int  events  of  the  sixth 
century  are  connected  with  the  curious  story  of  the  Pythagorean 
brotherhoods.  Pythagoras  was  a  celebrated  philo-  The  Py-thago- 
sophcr,  a  Samian  by  birth,  but  a  resident  in  Italy  by  J^eans  m  Italy, 
choice.  His  tenets  were  strange  and  fanciful — including  such 
beliefs  as  the  transmigiation  of  souls  and  the  mystic  meaning  of 
arithmetical  numbers ;  but  he  imported  a  moral  earnestness  and 
a  religious  fervour  into  his  teaching  which  secured  him  many 
disciples.  These  followers  were  formed  into  societies,  and  bound 
themselves  by  oath  to  assist  each  other  as  well  in  temporal  matters 
as  in  the  diffusion  of  the  Pythagorean  philosophy.  No  member 
was  admitted  without  long  probation,  and  the  societies  were 
divided  into  a  hierarchy  of  grades,  through  which  the  aspirant  had 
to  pass  before  becoming  fully  initiated.  It  may,  therefore,  be  said 
that  the  organization  of  these  brotherhoods  had  a  considerable 
resemblanca  to  that  of  the  Freemasons  of  our  own  daj\  But  they 
were  far  from  preserving  the  character  of  societies  for  mutual 
benevolence  and  philosophic  life,  and  verj'  soon  took  to  interfering 
in  politics.  They  fostered  such  a  feeling  of  clanship,  and  such  con- 
tempt for  the  unphilosophic  multitude,  that  the  Pythagoreans  were 
ore  long  found  acting  as  an  organized  party  in  the  Italiot  cities. 
Their  strongest  seat  was  at  Croton,  where  the  philosopher  himself 
had  settled,  and  where  many  of  the  leading  men  had  become  his 
disciples.  Everywhere  they  are  found  on  the  side  of  oligarchy  ; 
the  teaching  of  Pythagoras  was  too  subtle  to  attract  the  ignorant 
masses,  and  lent  a  sanction  to  the  contempt  which  the  upper 
classes  nourished  for  the  proletariate.  When,  as  happened  at 
Croton,  the  Pythagorean  brotherhoods  secured  a  hold  on  the  magis- 
tracy and  the  conduct  of  public  affairs,  they  worked  in  favour  of 
autocratic  government  by  the  initiated,  and  the  exclusion  of  the 
democracy  from  power. 

Croton,  while  under  the  rule  of  the  Pythagoreans,  became  involved 
in  a  war  with  her  wealthy  and  luxurious  neighbours  of  Sybaris. 
The  stniggle  was  fought  out  on  a  larger  scale  and  carried  to  a  more 
bitter  end  than  was  usual  in  the  contests  of  Greek  states.  When 
each  town  had  called  in  its  allies  and  armed  its  native  Italian 
subjects,  Sybaris  is  said  to  have  put  three  hundred  thousand,  and 
Croton  a  hundred  thousand  men  into  the  field.     The  numbers  are 


230  The  Greeks  of  Italy  and  Sicily.  [siob.c. 

no  doubt  exaggerated,  but  they  bear  witness  to  tlie  size  and  wealtli 
of  the  cities  of  Magna  Graecia.  Milo  the  famous  athlete,  a  dis- 
tinguished follower  of  Pythagoras,  commanded  the  Crotoniatc  army 
and  triumphed  over  the  enemy,  whose  tyrant  Tclys — Avith  thousands 
^    ^      ^.       of    his   followers — was    slain   in    the    battle.      The 

Destruction 

of  Sybaris,  couqucred  city  itself  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors, 
wdio  granted  no  terms,  but  expelled  the  whole  of  the 
inhabitants,  and  divided  up  their  land  among  themselves.  Tlic 
exiled  Sybarites  wandered  far  and  wide,  but  the  majority  settle<l 
at  Laiis  and  Scidrus  on  the  Tyrrhenian  Sea,  old  colonies  of  their 
native  town.  The  whole  Greek  world  was  surprised  and  shocked 
at  the  fall  of  so  great  a  city ;  even  the  distant  Milesians  put  on 
mourning  when  the  news  reached  them ;  for  they  had  long  been 
boimd  to  Sybaris  by  commercial  ties,  and  their  manufacturers  were 
wont  to  weave  into  garments  the  wool  of  the  rich  Sybarite  flock- 
masters. 

Their  ruthless  treatment  of  the  conquered  city  was  ultimately 
the  cause  of  the  ruin  of  the  Pythagoreans  of  Croton.  The  oligarchs 
divided  up  all  the  Sybarite  territory  among  themselves,  and  refused 
to  grant  allotments  to  the  proletariate.  This  gave  rise  to  a 
sedition  much  resembling  some  of  the  agrarian  troubles  at  Rome. 
The  populace  took  anns  under  a  certain  Cylon,  and  made  an  attack 
on   the  haudity   iihilosopliers.      A   democracy    was 

Democracy  o      j     i.  i.  j 

estabUshed  Successfully  established,  and  the  Pythagorean  brother- 
mitay.  j^Q^^jg  ^gj.g  subjected  to  such  a  relentless  persecution 
that  after  much  bloodshed  they  were  crushed.  Similar  but  less 
violent  movements  troubled  the  other  Italiot  cities,  and  resulted  in 
the  destruction  of  Pj^thagoreanism  as  a  political  power.  As  a 
philosophy,  however,  it  long  remained  vigorous  in  Italy ;  as  late 
as  376  B.C.  Archytas,  the  great  legislator  of  Tarentum,  is  said 
to  have  endeavoured  to  embody  Pythagorean  principles  in  his 
system  of  government. 

Like  their  mother-cities  in  Greece,  the  majority  of  the  states  of 

Italy  and  Sicily  passed  under  the  rule  of  a  tyrant  at  some  period 

^,    ,    .       of  their  existence.     The  most  famous  amonsr  the  earlier 
Phalaria  ° 

tyrant  of     despots  was  Phalaris  of  Acragas  (circ.  570  B.C.),  a 

crag  8.     n^agigtrate  who  had  seized  the  throne  by  means  of 

the  numerous  clients  and  public  servants  whom  his  office  put  at  his 


485  B.C.'  Gelo  Tyrant  of  Syracuse.  231 

disiTOsal.  He  was  noted  above  all  lu.s  fellows  in  the  AVest  or  the 
the  East  for  his  savage  cruelty ;  even  Periander  is  not  credited 
with  any  deeds  so  atrocious  as  that  of  roasting  enemies  alive  within 
a  brazen  bull,  which  tradition  ascribes  to  Phalaris.  This  ruffian 
was  overthrown  at  the  end  ot  sixteen  years  by  a  popular  outbreak, 
but  Acragas  was  not  thereby  freed  from  tyrants;  the  grandsons 
of  Tclcmachus,  the  leader  who  slew  Phalaris,  are  found  ruling  the 
city  as  despots  till  475  c.c. 

Anaxilaiis,  of  the  Italiot  town  of  Rhegium,  was  another  tyrant  of 
great  power  and  resolution.  His  chief  exploit  was  to  seize  com- 
plete control  over  the  Sicilian  Strait  by  capturing  Foundation  of 
the  town  of  Zancle,  which  lay  over  against  him  on  Messene, 
the  other  side  of  the  water  (493  B.C.).  He  instigated  the  exiled 
Samians,  who  fled  from  Asia  after  the  Ionic  revolt,  to  seize  the 
place  by  a  treacherous  and  piratical  descent.  AVhen  they  had  done 
this  he  himself  fell  upon  them,  and  avenged  the  Zancleans  by 
crushing  their  conquerors.  He  then  settled  up  the  town  with 
colonists  of  his  own,  who  changed  its  name  to  Messene,  in  honour 
of  the  Messenian  blood  which  ran  in  the  veins  of  the  population  of 
Pihegium.  Thus  the  great  port  on  the  Sicilian  shore  of  the  strait 
became  a  Dorian  instead  of  an  Ionian  town. 

But  the  greatest  of  the  despots  of  the  "West  were  the  two  sons 
of  Deinomenes,  Gelo  and  Hiero,  tyrants  of  Syracuse.  They  were 
originally  officers  in  the  service  of  Hippokrates,  the  Qgio  tsrrant  of 
ruler  of  Gela ;  but  when  their  master  was  killed  in  Syracuse, 
battle,  Gelo,  by  the  aid  of  the  army,  became  his  successor.  Five 
years  after,  the  oligarchic  party  at  Syracuse — expelled  from  their 
city  by  the  populace — called  in  Gelo  to  help  them.  The  tyrant 
restored  them  to  their  homes,  but  retained  possession  of  Syracuse 
for  himself  (485  B.C.).  He  fixed  his  abode  there,  and  handed  over 
Gela  to  be  governed  by  his  brother  Hiero.  Gelo  was  the  founder 
of  the  supremacy  of  Syracuse  in  Sicily :  before  his  day  it  would 
seem  that  both  Acragas  and  Gela  were  more  important  places.  His 
method  of  enlarging  Syracuse  was  not  unlike  that  of  the  Assyrian 
kingsofold;  he  took  Camarina,  and  forced  all  its  inhabitants  to 
come  and  dwell  in  his  new  capital.  Soon  after  he  fell  on  Megara 
Hyblaea  and  other  neighbouring  places,  and  after  selling  the  lower 
classes  as  slaves — "  for  he  thought  the  proletariate  a  most  trouble- 


232  The  Greeks  of  lialy  and  Sieily.  [<»8ob.c. 

some  companion  to  dwell  with  "  ' — transplanted  the  wealthier 
citizens  to  Syracuse.  These  accessions  of  population  may  have 
made  that  city  larger  and  richer,  but  they  paved  the  way  for 
countless  troubles  in  the  future;  for,  as  was  natural,  the  old  and 
the  new  inhabitants  were  always  quarrelling.  But  perhaps  Gelo 
calculated  that  their  divisions  made  him  strong.  He  fortified 
Syracuse  with  new  walls  and  adorned  it  with  many  public  edifices. 
His  undisputed  sway  extended  over  the  larger  half  of  Sicily ;  only 
Messene,  Acragas,  Himera,  and  Selluus  were  outside  his  power. 
Moreover,  he  maintained  an  immense  mercenary  army,  the  inevi- 
table appendage  of  a  tyranny.  So  large  was  it,  that  when  the 
Greeks  sent  to  ask  aid  at  the  time  of  the  invasion  of  Xerxes,  Gelo 
was  able  to  profifer  them  twenty  thousand  hoplites  and  eight 
thousand  horsemen  and  light-troops,  if  only  they  would  accept  him 
as  their  commander-in-chief.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  con- 
federates very  wiselj''  refused  to  put  themselves  in  the  hands  of  the 
unscrupulous  tyrant. 

The  same  spring  which  witnessed  the  invasion  of  Greece  by 
Xerxes  proved  a  time  of  no  small  danger  for  Gelo.    The  Cartha- 
ginians seem  to  have  been  moved  into  a  fear  for  their 
Carthaginian  °  .  ,  ,  1        ^     ,        r^ 

invasion  of    own   possessions   by  the   growth  of  the   Syracusan 

Sicily.  power.  Moreover,  there  were  Sicilian  exiles  who, 
with  the  true  Greek  recklessness  in  matters  of  civil  strife,  called  in 
the  barbarians  to  aid  them.  It  is  said  too  that  the  Persian  king 
urged  them  on  to  the  attack,  in  order  that  they  might  prevent  any 
aid  from  being  sent  to  Greece  by  the  Italiot  or  Siceliot  towns.  It  is, 
at  any  rate,  certain  that  the  first  great  Carthaginian  invasion  of 
Sicily  coincides  in  time  with  Thermopylae  and  Salamis.  Hamilcar, 
one  of  the  two  "  suffetes,"  or  supreme  magistrates  of  Carthage, 
landed  on  the  north  coast  of  the  island  with  a  vast  mercenar}'  army 
of  barbarian  troops,  drawn  from  all  the  tribes  of  the  Western  Medi- 
terranean ;  it  is  said  to  have  amounted  to  three  hundred  thousand 
men.  He  then  laid  siege  to  Himera,  the  nearest  Greek  city,  and 
was  lying  before  it  when  Gelo  attacked  him.  The  tyrant  had  got 
together  all  his  own  forces,  and  was  joined  by  those  of  Acragas, 
whose  ruler  Thero  was  his  close  friend.  With  about  sixty  thousand 
rneu  in  hand,  he  boldly  fell  upon  the  Carthaginian  camp.  The  day 
J  Herod,  vii,  c,  15G. 


474  B.C]  Hiero  Tyrant  of  Syracuse.  233 

was  bloody  and  the  victory  long  disputed,  but  at  last  Gdo  learnt, 

from  an  intercepted  letter,  that  Haniilcar  was  expect- 

ing  a  reinforcement  of  cavalry.     Disguising  a  body  of     Himora, 

his  own  horsemen,  he  sent  them  round  to  the  back  of 

the  Carthaginian  camp,  and  at  the  critical  moment  these  supposed 

friends  charged  the  rear  of  Hamilcar's  men  and  threw  them  into 

confusion.     This  settled  the  fight ;  the  Carthaginian  suffetc  fell, 

his  army  was  scattered,  and  its  loss  in  slain  and  prisoners  was 

so  great  that  it  was  practically  annihilated.     The  victory  was  soon 

followed  by  a  peace,  and  it  was  seventy  years  before  another  army 

from  Africa  dared  to  make  a  descent  on  the  shores  of  Sicily. 

While  the  laurels  wliich  he  had  earned  by  saving  the  Greeks 
of  the  West  from  the  barbarian  were  still  fresh,  Gelo  died  of  a 
dropsical  complaint,  and  left  his  throne  and  his  army 
to  his  brother  Hiero  (478  B.C.).  That  prince  was  not  battle  of 
less  powerful  or  less  able  than  his  predecessor.  The  umae. 
chief  event  of  his  reign  was  the  defeat  which  he  inflicted  on  the 
barbarian  power  which  stood  to  the  Greeks  of  Italy  in  much  the 
same  relation  that  Carthage  did  to  the  Greeks  of  Sicily.  The 
Etruscans  had  long  resented  the  attempts  of  Hellenic  merchant.s 
and  settlers  to  establish  themselves  in  the  northern  half  of  the 
Tyrrhenian  Sea.  Half  a  century  before  they  had  succeeded,  after 
a  desperate  struggle,  in  preventing  the  exiled  Phocaeans  of  Asia 
Minor  from  establishing  themselves  in  Corsica  (540  b.c).  Now 
they  themselves  took  the  offensive,  and  collecting  a  considerable 
fleet  laid  siege  to  Cumae,  the  northernmost  of  the  Italiot  cities. 
The  Cumaeans  sent  for  aid  to  Hiero,  who  came  up  in  haste  with  a 
powerful  squadron,  and  completely  defeated  the  Etruscans  (474  B.C.). 
Chance  has  preserved,  among  the  few  relics  of  the  fifth  century 
which  have  come  down  to  us,  one  of  the  original  Etruscan  helmets 
which  the  victor  offered  up  to  Apollo  at  Delphi,  with  its  dedicatory 
inscription  still  legible. 

In  Sicily  Hiero  extended  the  dominion  which  his  brother  had 
left  him.      He  quarrelled   with   Thrasydaeus,    son   of  Thero   ot 
Acragas,   and    succeeded    in   expelling    that   tyrant    Foundation 
and  annexing  his  dominions.     This  conquest  made     ofAetna. 
him  master  of  all  Sicily  except    the    extreme   west   and   north- 
east of  the  island.     Hiero  rc.'^olved  to  make  himself  a  name  by 


234  The  Greeks  of  Italy  and  Sicily.  i468b.c. 

establishing  a  ucw  city,  and  set  to  work  much  in  the  same  way  as 
his  brother  had  done  in  peopling  Syracuse.  He  compelled  the 
inhabitants  of  the  Ionic  city  of  Catana  to  remove  to  Leontini, 
and  fixed  on  their  deserted  city  as  the  place  for  his  new  foundation. 
On  its  site,  which  he  renamed  Aetna  after  the  mountain  which  over- 
looked it,  he  settled  ten  thousand  colonists,  mostly  chosen  from  the 
ranks  of  his  mercenaries.  So  pleased  was  he  with  this  achieve- 
ment, that  when  his  chariot  chanced  to  be  victorious  at  the 
Olympic  games,  he  ordered  the  heralds  to  proclaim  his  name  us 
"  Hiero  the  Aetnaean  "  rather  than  "  the  Syracusan." 

After  a  prosperous  reign  of  ten  years,  Hiero  died  (-iGS  B.C.).  His 
death  was  the  signal  for  the  wildest  internal  commotions  at  Syra- 
End  ot  tyranny  ^^^6.  The  throne  was  disputed  between  his  brother 
at  Syracuse.  Thrasybulus,  and  his  nephew,  the  son  of  Gelo.  This 
quarrel  gave  the  Syracusans  an  opportunity  of  coming  by  their 
own.  After  a  stormy  period,  in  which  the  old  citizens  and  the 
mercenaries  of  Hiero  settled  all  their  outstanding  grudges  with 
the  sword,  the  party  of  the  tyrants  had  the  worst  of  the  game. 
Thrasybulus  was  besieged  in  Ortygia,  the  island-citadel  of  Syracuse, 
and  at  last  compelled  to  surrender  it,  and  to  retire  under  a  capitu- 
lation to  Italy.  His  departure,  however,  was  far  from  making  an 
end  of  the  civil  broils.  The  rights  of  the  original  inhabitants  of 
the  city,  of  the  Camarinaeans  and  others  whom  Gelo  had  forced 
to  dwell  there,  of  the  strangers  from  all  parts  of  Greece  who 
had  been  invited  over  by  the  tyrants,  and  of  the  numerous  exiles 
who  returned  to  reclaim  their  property,  were  so  hopelessly  at 
variance  that  no  j)eaceful  agreement  could  be  made  between  them. 
Seditions  were  equally  rife  in  the  other  towns  of  Sicily ;  when  the 
strong  hand  of  Hiero  was  removed,  the  faction  which  had  supported 
and  that  which  had  opposed  the  tyrants  promptly  fell  to  blows. 
It  was  not  till  several  years  of  desperate  sedition  and  civil  war  had 
elapsed  that  the  Siceliots  arrived  at  a  modus  vivendi.  It  was  the 
democratic  faction  which  conquered ;  they  celebrated  their  triumph 
by  giving  back  to  each  city  its  complete  autonomy,  and  by  restor- 
ing all  the  exiles  who  had  been  driven  out  by  the  sons  of  Deino- 
menes.  The  survivors  of  the  mercenaries  of  Hiero  were  allowed  to 
settle  down  at  Messene  alone.  Catana  was  reconquered  by  its  old 
inhabitants,  and  resumed  its  former  name.     Gamarina  also  rose 


4G5  B.C.]  Democracy  established  in  Sicily.  235 

from  the  dust,  and  everywhere  an  endeavour  was  made  to  restore 
the  old  state  of  things  which  had  existed  before  the  rise  ot  the 
tyrants.  The  next  forty  years  formed  the  most  flourishing  period 
in  the  whole  of  the  history  of  Sicily.  The  troubles  which  the 
islanders  had  undergone  seem  to  have  aroused  them  to  the  same 
energy  which  the  Persian  wars  had  kindled  in  their  brethren  of 
Greece  proper.  Their  progress  in  wealth  and  prosperity  was 
astonishing ;  that  side  of  culture  which  displays  itself  in  art  was 
especially  rapid  in  development;  in  the  middle  of  the  fifth  century 
the  Sicehots  were  decidedly  ahead  of  their  contemporaries  in  the 
older  Hellenic  lands.  It  was  not  till  the  influence  of  Pheidias  was 
felt  in  Greece  that  art  in  the  mother-country  attained  to  the  level 
of  art  in  the  colonies.  In  political  matters  the  Siceliots  remained 
consistently  attached  to  democracy,  until  a  series  of  disasters  at  the 
end  of  the  century  drove  them  to  take  refuge  once  more  under  the 
strong  hand  of  a  despot.  But  for  sixty  years  they  flourished  beneath 
the  democratic  form  of  government  which  was  best  suited  to  cities 
that  possessed  such  a  mixed  body  of  inhabitants. 

The  Greeks  of  Italy  had  never  fallen  so  wholly  into  the  power 
of  tyrants  as  had  their  Siceliot  brethren.  The  few  towns,  such  as 
Rhegium,  which  were  despotically  governed  seem  to  ™,j^  y^.  , .  . 
have  freed  themselves  about  the  same  time  that  the  and  their 
despots  of  Sicily  were  expelled.  The  chief  event  in  ®  ^  ' 
Italiot  history  which  marked  this  period  was  the  first  check  which 
the  Greeks  suffered  at  the  hands  of  the  peoples  of  the  interior.  In 
473  B.C.,  the  next  year  after  the  defeat  of  the  Etruscans  at  Cumae, 
the  Tarentiues  and  Rhegines  allied  themselves  to  make  an  attack 
on  the  powerful  tribe  of  the  lapygians,  in  hope  of  extending  the 
area  of  Greek  colonization.  But  they  suffered  a  most  disastrous 
repulse,  and  the  greater  part  of  their  army  was  cut  to  pieces. 
"  Never  in  my  day,"  wrote  Herodotus,  "  was  there  such  a  terrible 
slaughter  of  Hellenes :  three  thousand  of  the  Rhegines  alone  fell, 
and  the  loss  of  the  Tarentines  was  even  greater."  This  defeat  was 
but  the  first  intimation  of  greater  disasters  to  come,  when  two 
generations  later  the  Sabellian  tribes  were  to  set  themselves  to  cut 
short  the  borders  of  the  states  of  Magna  Graecia.  But  for  the 
present  the  Italiot  cities  shared  alike  in  the  rapid  development  and 
the  democratic  tendencies  of  their  Siceliot  neighbours. 


072^:-' 


le  (?   •" 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

KVENTS    IN    ASIA     MINOU     AND     GREFX'E,   479-lCG   B.C.  — ORIGIN     01^ 
THE    CONFEDKRACY   OF    DELOS. 

After  the  battle  of  Mycale  the  Peloponnesian  admirals  considered 
that  enough  had  been  done  in  disabling  the  Persians  from  further 
naval  operations  in  the  Aegean.  This  was  not,  however,  the  opinion 
of  Xanthippus  and  the  Athenians;  strengthening  themselves  with 
ships  from  the  revolted  Ionian  cities,  they  sailed  north,  and  began 
to  attack  the  Persian  garrisons  along  the  Hellespont.  They  found 
the  famous  bridge  completely  destroyed  by  storms,  but  the  towns 
in  its  neighbourhood  were  still  so  firmly  held  by  the  Persians  that 
Siege  of  the  inhabitants  had  not  dared  to  rise.  Sestos  was  the 
Sestos,  place  which  gave  the  Athenians  most  trouble ;  they 
lay  before  it  all  the  autumn,  and  did  not  take  it  until  the  famishing 
garrison  slipped  out  by  night  into  the  Tliracian  hills,  there  to  be 
cut  to  pieces  by  the  natives.  Only  Artayctts,  the  governor  of  the 
district,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  besiegers ;  him,  contrary  to 
Greek  custom,  they  put  to  death  by  crucifixion,  to  avenge  a  wanton 
pollution  of  the  temple  of  Protesilaiis,  of  which  he  had  been  guilty. 
After  this  the  Athenians  sailed  horne,  and  their  allies  dispersed. 

Such  was  the  panic  which  the  result  of  Plataea  and  Mycale  had 
cast  on  the  soul  of  Xerxes,  that  the  Great  King  made  no  further 
endeavour  to  sustain  the  numerous  outlying  garrisons  which  still 
held  for  him  the  cities  of  the  Thracian  coast  and  other  distant 
possessions.  Nevertheless  the  Persian  power  had  been  so  firmly 
rooted  beyond  the  Hellespont  that  it  did  not  fall  at  once.  Several 
years  of  war  were  necessary  to  reduce  these  strongholds.  In 
478  B.C.  the  Peloponnesians  fitted  out  a  small  fleet  of  twenty  ships, 
which  was  joined  by  thirty  more  from  Athens,     They  were  placed 


478B.0.5  Pausanias  at  Byzantium,  257 

under  Pausanias,  regent  of  Sparta,  the  victorious  commander  at 

Plataea ;  while  the  Athenian  squadron  was  headed  by  Aristeides 

and  by  Cimon,  the  young  son  of  the  great  Miltiades.     After  sailing 

into  the  Levant  and  assisting  the  Greek  cities  of  Cyprus  to  revolt, 

Pausanias  turned  north  and  laid  siege   to  Byzantium,  the  most 

important  of  the   Persian   fortresses  in  Thrace.     It  held  out   as 

obstinately  as  Sestos  in  the  previous  year ;  but  later  in  the  autumn 

the  governor,  a  kinsman  of  Xerxes,  surrendered.     The  fleet  was 

therefore  able  to  winter  at  the  town. 

Pausanias  was  a  man  of  more  ambition  than  ability  ;  the  honours 

and  wealth  which  had  fallen  to  him  on  account  of  his  share  in  the 

triumph  of  Plataea  had  completely  turned  bis  head.  ^ 

'■  .  Pausanias  at 

He  took  the  whole  credit  of  the  battle  to  himself,  and    Byzantium, 

dedicated  in  his  own  name,  and  not  in  that  of  the      ^'^^'^■^■ 

confederates,  the  tripod  which  was  set  up  at  Delphi  as  a  memorial 

of  the  victory.     While  in  Sparta  he  had  openly  showed  his  dislike 

for  the  frugal  and  irksome  manner  of  life  which  was  there  imposed 

upon  him,  and  when  once  he  was  away  from  home  his  luxury, 

haughtiness,  and  reckless  violence  became  unbearable.     But,  ill 

regulated  though  his  ambition  might  be,  it  was  not  at  first  suspected 

that  it  would  spur  him  on  to  high  treason  against  Greece.     Such, 

however,  was  its  effect;  after  taking  Byzantium  he  secretly  released 

some  of  the  prisoners,  and  charged  them  with  letters  to  the  Persian 

kiug,  in  which  he  offered  to  subdue  Greece  and  to  do  homage  for 

it  as  the  vassal  of  Xerxes,  if  only  he  were  supplied  with  sufficient 

means  and  granted  the  king's  daughter  as  his  wife.     It  was  his 

aim,  in  short,  to  become  tyrant  of  all  Greece,  and  he  was  ready  to 

purchase  his  opportunity  by  becoming  the  servant  of  the  barbarian 

whose  armies  he  had  routed. 

Xerxes  was  far  from  estimating  the  presumptuous  regent  at  his 

right  value,  and  showed  himself  delighted  with  his  overtures.     lie 

placed  his  resources  at  the  Spartan's  disposal,  and  bade  him  "  work 

on  night  and  day  to  accomplish  his  purpose,  without  letting  himself 

be  held  back  by  lack  of  gold  or  silver,  or  want  of  troops,  for  all 

should  be  at  his  command."    If  Pausanias  could  have  kept  ccol,  ho 

might  have  become  really  dangerous  to  Greece,  but  when  once  ha 

had  the  king's  letters  before  him  his  conduct  grew  so  outrageous 

that  his  designs  began  to  be  suspected.     Not  only  did  he  affect 


238  Origins  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos.        t47eac. 

royal  state  and  surround  himself  with  numbers  of  foreign  merce- 
naries, but  his  bearing  towards  the  allies  assumed  such  an  arbitrary 
and  dictatorial  cast  that  no  Oriental  despot  could  have  been  more 
offensive.  Ere  long  reports  of  his  behaviour  reached  Sparta,  and 
provoked  the  ephors  into  issuing  a  warrant  for  his  recall,  and 
appointing  a  certain  Dorcis  admiral  in  his  stead. 

Before  Dorcis  could  reach  Byzantium,  matters  had  come  to  a 
head;  the  fleet  had  refused  to  obey  its  commander,  and  placed 
Mutiny  against  itself  at  the  disposition  of  the  Athenian  leaders,  Aris- 

Pausanias.  teides  and  Ciraon.  One  morning,  we  are  told,  a 
Samian  captain  gave  the  signal  for  revolt,  by  rowing  up  to  the 
regent's  galley  and  running  into  it  in  a  deliberate  and  malicious 
manner.  Pausanias  was  driven  to  fury,  when  his  angry  rebukes 
were  met  by  the  reply  that  "  he  had  better  go  home,  and  that  if 
it  had  not  been  for  the  memory  of  Plataea  he  would  have  been 
punished  as  he  deserved."  He  could  do  nothing  to  revenge  himself; 
the  Pelopounesian  ships  in  the  fleet  were  few,  and  those  of  the 
Athenians  and  the  revolted  Greeks  of  Asia  outnumbered  them 
threefold.  The  would-be  tyrant  found  himself  stripped  of  his 
power,  and  summoned  home  to  take  his  trial  for  treason  at  Sparta. 
His  successor's  orders  were  quietly  disregarded  by  the  fleet,  which 
acknowledged  Aristeides  alone  as  admiral. 

The  mad  conduct  of  Pausanias  had  precipitated  a  change  which 
was  inevitable ;  it  was  obvious  that  Sparta  could  not  any  longer 
pretend  to  the  direction  of  the  confederate  fleet.  Her  contingent 
did  not  amount  to  a  tithe  of  its  force,  and  was  in  no  way  distin- 
guished for  conduct  or  seamanship.  Her  admirals  had  nearly 
wrecked  the  cause  of  Greece  at  Artemisium  and  Salamis.  The 
Athenians,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  owed  h«r  no  gratitude ;  the  Greeks 
of  Asia  were  loniaus  who  preferred  to  follow  their  kinsmen  of 
Athens  rather  than  a  Dorian  from  Spaita.  Moreover,  Aristeides 
and  Cimon  were  personally  the  models  of  everything  that  Pausanias 
was  not;  the  inflexible  honesty  of  purpose  of  the  one,  and  the 
gallantry  and  generosity  of  the  other,  won  every  heart,  and  made 
the  transference  of  power  as  popular  as  it  was  necessary. 

While  the  siege  of  Byzantium  was  in  progress,  a  very  dangerous 
crisis  in  the  home  politics  of  Greece  had  been  tided  over.  When  the 
winter  which  followed  Plataea  and  Mycale  had  passed,  the  Athenians 


478  B.C.J  The  Fortification  of  Athens.  239 

set  themselves  to  rebuild  their  twice-ruined  city.     They  included 
in  the  new  circuit  much  "round  which  had  formerly      _  ,  . 

"  ■^         Intrigues 

been  outside  the  walls,  and  ijlauned  for  its  defence  a  far  against  Athens, 

479—4:78  B  C 

more  formidable  line  of  fortifications  than  had  existed 

before.     The  energy  which  they  displayed  in  this  work  roused  an 

unworthy  jealousy  in  the  hearts  of  their  neighbours.    Several  states, 

beaded  by  Aegina,  sent  private  information  to  Sparta,  to  the  effect 

that  Athens  was  making  herself  dangerously  strong,  and  urged 

the  ephors  to  endeavour  to  arrest  the  work.     The  Spartans  were 

already  growing  alarmed  at  the  power  and  resolution  which  Athens 

had  displayed  in  the  late  war;  their  timid  and  conservative  p)olicy 

was  sure  to  come  into  collision  sooner  or  later  with  the  designs  of 

the  active  and  restless  naval  state.     Accordingly  they  listened  with 

attention  to  the  complaints  of  their  allies,  and   determined  to 

interfere.     For  very  shame  they  could  not  venture  absolutely  to 

forbid  the  fortification  of  Athens,  but  they  sent  an  embassy  to  urge 

that   the  work  was   both  unnecessary   and  inexpedient.     In  the 

event  of  another  Persian  invasion  they  asserted  that  the  possession 

of  a  strongly  walled  city,  just  outside  Peloponnesus,  would  give  the 

enemy  a  dangerous  base  of  operations,  and  they  offered  to  receive 

the  Athenians  within  the  Isthmus  and  give  them  safe  harbourage 

there,  if  ever  they  were  again  compelled  to  evacuate  Attica.     The 

plea  was  futile  and  obviously  insincere,  but  the  Athenians  were  for 

the  moment  in  too  hazardous  a  position  to  return  a  bold  refusal. 

Their  walls   were  but   half-built,  and  showed  gaps  and  breaches 

everywhere. 

The  crisis  was  one  at  which  the  subtle  genius  of  Themistocles 

was  able  to  display  itself  in  all  its  power.     By   his  advice  the 

Athenian  assembly  returned  answer  that  an  embassy  _,      .  ^    , 

•'  •'   Themistocles 

should  at  once  be  sent  to  Sparta  to  discuss  the  matter,  and  the  waUs 
Themistocles  was  given  two  colleagues  and  entrusted 
with  the  affair ;  he  himself  went  off  at  once,  and  notified  his  mission 
to  the  ephors,  but  his  companions,  bj'  previous  arrangement,  were 
long  in  making  their  appearance.  Until  they  arrived  Themistocles 
professed  himself  unable  to  commence  the  negotiations.  Meanwhile 
the  whole  population  of  Attica,  men,  women,  and  children,  were 
working  day  and  night  to  complete  the  wall.  Abundant  material 
was  at  hand  in  the  ruins  of  the  old  city,  and  the  fortifications  rose 


240  Origins  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos.        [4775.0. 

at  an  incredible  rate  ;  ever  after  the  haste  of  the  builders  could  be 
discerned  frona  the  roughness  of  their  construction  ;  tombstones, 
temple-columns,  and  wrought  blocks  of  all  kinds  may  still  be  soen 
built  up  in  the  courses  of  the  wall.  By  the  time  that  the  two 
belated  ambassadors  reached  Sparta,  Athens  was  already  getting 
into  a  state  of  defence.  Meanwhile  rumours  of  this  activity  began 
to  reach  the  ephors  ;  but  Themistocles  succeeded  in  keeping  them 
quiet,  by  asserting  with  the  utmost  confidence  that  nothing  was 
being  done  at  Athens.  He  even  induced  the  Spartans  to  send 
commissioners  to  obtain  confirmation  with  their  own  eyes  as  to  the 
suspension  of  the  work ;  when  these  envoys  arrived  in  Athens  they 
were  treated  with  courtesy,  but  detained  to  serve  as  hostages  for 
the  personal  safety  of  Themistocles  and  his  colleagues.  At  last 
several  months  had  been  wasted,  and  the  walls  were  sufficiently 
strong  to  withstand  a  siege  ;  Themistocles  then  changed  his  tone, 
boldly  avowed  the  stratagem,  and  proclaimed  the  fortifications  of 
Athens  as  an  accomplished  fact.  The  Spartans  were  bitterly  vexed 
at  the  trick,  but  the  time  for  action  had  now  gone  by,  and  they 
were  compelled  to  accept  the  inevitable,  and  leave  Athens  to 
herself.  This  incident,  combined  with  the  mutiny  against  PausaniaC'', 
sufficed  to  complete  the  estrangement  of  the  two  powers  which  had 
conquered  the  Persian. 

When  the  walls  of  the  old  city  of  Athens  were  finished,  Themis- 
tocles prevailed  on  his  countrymen  to  enlarge  their  system  of 
Peiraeus  fortifications.  Such  was  his  influence  with  the 
fortified.  Ecclesia,  that  he  obtained  a  vote  which  sanctioned 
the  erection  of  another  line  of  walls  around  Peiraeus  and  the 
neighbouring  harbour  of  Munychia.  This  work  was  even  more 
laborious  and  expensive  than  that  which  had  just  been  completed. 
The  ramparts  were  built  to  a  thickness  of  fourteen  or  fifteen  feet, 
and  not  lined  with  rubble,  as  was  usual  in  Greek  fortifications,  but 
composed  of  hewn  stone  throughout ;  they  were  by  far  the  strongest 
piece  of  military  architecture  which  Greece  had  yet  seen.  In  the 
splendid  harbours  which  they  protected,  ships  might  ride  by  the 
hundred,  while  the  ample  open  spaces  which  lay  within  them 
were  large  enough  to  serve  as  a  refuge  for  a  great  part  of  the 
inhabitants  of  Attica.  Ere  long  the  population  of  Peiraeus  began 
to  increase  at  a  much  more  rapid  rate  than  that  of  the_  old  city; 


478  B.O.) 


Origin  of  the  Confederacy  of  Deles.  241 


it  Y/as  always  the  chosen  abode  of  the  mercantile  and  sealiiring 
classes,  and  now  became  the  chief  haunt  of  the  numerous  Metics 
(or  resident  aliens)  who  were  drawn  to  Attica  by  the  commercial 
advantages  to  be  found  there.  Indeed,  if  it  had  not  been  for  the 
sentimental  patriotism  which  clung  to  the  time-honoured  rock  of 
the  Acropolis,  Peiraeus  rather  than  Athens  might  have  become  the 
capital  of  the  land. 

The  transference  to  Athenian  hands  of  the  control  over  the  con- 
federate fleet  at  Byzantium  was  destined  to  have  the  most 
momentous  consequences.  The  stress  of  circumstances  combined 
with  the  ability  of  the  Athenian  leaders  to  turn  the  unexpected 
situation  of  the  moment  into  a  permanent  settlement.  Asiatic 
Greece  was  but  half  liberated,  and  the  Athenians  and  their  Ionian 
kinsmen  were  set  upon  completing  the  work.  Now  that  the 
Peloponnesians  had  withdrawn  from  the  enterprise,  there  was  no 
third  party  present  to  prevent  them  from  coming  to  an  agreement. 
Accordingly  it  was  but  natural  that  Aristeides,  as  representing 
Athens,  should  conclude  conventions  with  the  Ionian  states  for 
the  regulation  of  the  future  conduct  of  the  war.  On  these  compacts, 
freely  and  voluntarily  entered  into  by  both  parties,  the  future 
empire  of  Athens  was  to  be  built. 

1'he  chief  clauses  of  the  treaties  which  were  now  ratified  pro- 
vided that  the  several  states  should  furnish  ships  or  money  for  the 
further  prosecution  of  the  war  with  Persia,  and  should  ^  .  . 

^  Origin  of  the 

not  withdraw  from  the  alliance  without  the  consent  Confederacy 
of  the  whole  body  of  confederates.  The  probity  of  °  ^  °^' 
Aristeides  was  so  universally  recognized,  that  he  was  allowed  to 
assess  the  liabilities  of  the  various  cities  at  his  own  discretion. 
We  read  that  he  fixed  the  sum  required  for  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  at  four  hundred  and  sixty  talents  per  annum,  partly  payable 
in  ships,  partly  in  money.  The  amount  appears  considerable,  but 
when  it  is  remembered  that,  besides  the  Ionian  and  Aeolian  towns, 
all  the  islands  of  the  Cyclades,  the  colonies  of  Chalcidice,  and  the 
liberated  states  along  both  shores  of  the  Hellespont  were  enrolled  as 
contributors,  it  ceases  to  appear  excessive.  Subsequent  experience 
showed  that  it  could  be  largely  increased  without  becoming  un- 
bearable. The  westernmost  of  the  confederates  were  the  cities  of 
Euboea,  the  most  easterly  the  Byzantines  ;  but  the  list  of  members 


242  Rise  of  the  Delian  League.  x'ini  b.c. 

Wcis  ere  long  to  be  largely  increased.  It  was  agreed  that  the 
common  treasury  of  the  league  should  be  placed  in  the  sacred 
island  of  Delos,  and  that  delegates  from  every  state  should  annually 
repair  to  the  same  spot  to  discuss  the  needs  of  the  war.  The 
execution  of  the  decrees  of  this  synod  was  placed  in  the  hands  of 
the  Athenians,  who  were  also  charged  with  the  appointment  of  the 
officers,  afterwards  called  Hellenotamiae,  by  whom  the  funds  of  the 
league  were  to  be  collected.  In  their  behalf  tax-gatherers  sailed 
round  the  Aegean  every  spring,  and  gathered  in  all  contributions, 
from  the  few  drachmae  at  which  Ceria  or  Auaphe  were  assessed, 
to  the  numerous  taleuts  OAved  by  Miletus  or  Abdera. 

The  Confederacy  of  Delos,  as  this  league  came  to  be  styled,  was 
in  its  origin  i^urely  military;  the  sole  end  which  it  proposed  to 

Campaigns    itself  was  the  expulsion  of  the  Persian  from  the  various 

^Persfans!^    outlying  strongholds  in  which  he  was  still  established. 

477-470  B.C.  Iq  tliis  design  it  had  no  small  success.  Its  first 
triumphs  were  won  over  the  garrisons  which  held  the  towns  of  the 
Thracian  coast ;  but  of  the  operations  Avhich  dislodged  them  only  one 
has  left  a  mark  in  history.  This  was  the  siege  of  Eion,  the  fortress 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Strymon,  by  the  Athenians  under  Cimon. 
Boges,  the  Persian  governor,  made  a  resistance  which  surpassed 
in  obstinacy  any  that  the  Greeks  had  yet  known.  When  his 
provisions  at  last  gave  out,  he  gathered  his  family  and  his  treasures 
on  a  great  funeral  pyre  and  burnt  himself  alive,  like  the  legendarj' 
Sardauapalus.  In  the  course  of  nine  or  ten  years  of  war  the 
Athenians  and  their  confederates  succeeded  in  completely  expelling 
the  Persian  from  Euroi)8,  and  in  restricting  his  dominion  in 
AYestern  Asia  Minor  to  the  inland  parts.  The  whole  coast-line, 
except  a  small  tract  between  the  Troad  and  the  northernmost  towns 
of  Aeolis,  was  liberated ;  and  its  towns,  without  exception,  enrolled 
themselves  in  the  Confederacy  of  Delos.  As  these  new  members 
came  in,  the  payments  of  the  original  confederates  were  probably 
reduced,  so  that  nothing  more  than  the  necessary  four  hundred 
and  sixty  taleuts  might  be  raised.  Athens  had  not  yet  contem- 
plated turning  her  predominance  into  an  empire,  and  was  still 
anxious  to  show  that  her  activity  was  disinterested. 

While  the  Confederacy  of  Delos  was  gaining  strength  beyond  the 
Aegean,  the  course  of  politics  in  European  Greece  was  compa"a- 


469  B.C.J  The  Death  oj  Pausanias.  243 

tively  uneventful.  At  Simrta  Pausanias  had  been  tried  for  treason 
after  his  return  from  Byzantium,  but  either  because  The  treason  ot 
of  the  caution  with  which  he  had  conducted  his  I'ausanias. 
traitorous  correspondence,  or  because  the  ephors  did  not  wish  to 
push  matters  to  extremity,  he  was  acquitted.  Nevertheless  he  was 
a  marked  man,  and  was  never  again  entrusted  with  a  command. 
Yet  though  reduced  to  the  condition  of  a  private  individual,  he  did 
not  desist  from  his  intrigues  with  Xerxes.  He  sailed  back  to  the 
East,  and  once  more  placed  himself  in  secret  connection  with  the 
satraps  of  Asia  Minor,  The  wealth  which  he  had  at  his  disposal 
and  the  etern;il  factions  which  divided  the  Greek  cities  still  gave 
him  some  hopes  of  success.  At  Byzantium  he  gained  such  an 
ascendancy  that  the  Athenians  were  obliged  to  interfere,  and  to 
expel  him  by  force.  He  then  established  himself  in  the  Troad,  and 
continued  his  schemes  with  such  vigour,  that  the  Spartan  govern- 
ment at  last  summoned  him  back  to  stand  another  trial.  He  had 
the  assurance  to  accept  the  challenge,  and  when  he  appeared  at 
home  no  accuser  had  the  courage  to  appear  against  him.  He  there- 
fore remained  at  large,  though  shunned  and  suspected  by  his  fellow- 
citizens.  This  social  ostracism  drove  him  to  plan  a  more  violent 
revenge ;  he  commenced  to  intrigue  with  the  Helots,  and  set  on  foot 
a  scheme  for  a  general  insurrection  of  the  serfs  of  Laconia  and  the 
massacre  of  the  Dorian  oligarchy.  The  Helots  were  always  ready 
to  revolt  when  a  leader  presented  himself,  and  Pausanias  found 
them  ready  to  follow  him.  Although  the  ephors  obtained  some 
hints  as  to  his  designs,  they  could  obtain  no  convincing  evidence 
till  chance  placed  it  in  their  hands. 

Pausanias  had  a  confidential  slave,  who  was  acquainted  with  all 
his  secrets ;  one  day  his  master  entrusted  him  with  a  letter  directed 
to  the  satrap  Artabazus.    The  slave  had  observed  that,  ^^^  A^^Xh.  of 
of  all  the  messengers  who  were  sent  to  Asia,  none  ever    Pausanias, 
returned.    This  induced  him  to  tamper  with  the  letter ; 
he  opened  it,  and  found  in  a  postscript  a  request  that  the  bearer 
might  be  put  to  death.     This  discovery  naturally  induced  him  to 
lay  the  whole  matter  before  the  Spartan  government.     In   order 
that  they  might  have  clear  evidence  against  the  traitor,  the  ei^hors 
laid  a  trap  for  him.     They  directed  the  slave  to  take  sanctuary  at 
'J'aenarum,  and  arranged  a  hiding-place  for  two  of   their  number 


244  ^^^^  of  ^^^^  Delian  League.  469  b.c. 

witbia  earshot  of  his  refuge.  Pausanias  hastened  to  the  spot  to 
remonstrate  with  his  messenger,  and  the  concealed  ephors  were 
able  to  gather  from  his  conversation  ample  proof  of  his  guilt. 
When  be  returned  to  Sparta  orders  were  issued  for  his  arrest,  and 
the  officers  set  out  to  seize  him.  Pausanias  was  passing  by  a 
temple  of  Athena  when  he  saw  the  ephors  and  their  followers 
approachiDg  him ;  his  guilty  conscience  gave  him  sufficient 
warning,  and  he  rushed  into  the  temple  and  took  sanctuary. 
Instead  of  tearing  him  from  the  altar,  the  ephors  ordered  the  doors 
to  be  built  up,  and  left  the  ex-regent  to  die  of  starvation.  It  is 
said  that  his  own  mother  was  the  first  to  approach  and  aid  the 
magistrates  in  the  work.  When,  after  some  days,  Pausanias  was 
drawing  near  his  last  gasp,  the  ephors  had  the  temple  opened,  and 
took  the  dying  man  outside,  that  the  holy  place  might  not  be 
polluted  by  his  death.  Thus  perished  the  conqueror  of  Plataca,  the 
victim  of  his  own  insane  pride  and  ambition  (469  b.c). 

The  fall  of  Pausanias  brought  about  the  disgrace  of  a  man  of 

much  greater  genius,  one  who  had  done  ten  times  more  service  for 

^,,    Greece  than  the  vain-glorious  regent.     For  the  last 

Decline  of  the  °  ° 

power  of  few  years  Themistocles  had  been  steadily  declining  in 
'  popularity  at  Athens.  His  unscrupulous  talents  were 
better  suited  to  troublous  times  than  to  the  less  eventful  days 
which  had  now  arrived,  and  his  gross  l;iults  were  more  easily 
discerned  when  no  crisis  was  at  hand  to  distract  the  attention  of 
his  fellow-citizens.  The  fact  that  his  political  schemes  never 
showed  the  least  respect  for  honesty  or  good  faith  might  not 
entirely  have  alienated  the  people.  But  his  open  corruption  could 
not  be  palliated ;  it  was  well  known  to  every  one  that  he  took 
bribes  from  all  quarters  on  all  possible  occasions.  A  characteristic 
story  relates  that  while  Themistocles  was  debating  in  public  with 
Aristeides,  he  observed  in  a  self-laudatory  manner  "  that  the  chief 
excellence  of  a  statesman  was  to  be  able  to  foresee  and  frustrate 
the  designs  of  public  enemies,"  to  which  Aristeides  rejoined  "  that 
another  very  excellent  and  necessary  qualitj'^  in  a  statesman  was  to 
have  clean  hands."  The  retort  was  considered  crushing.  It  was 
indeed  unfortunate  for  Themistocles  that  he  was  continually  being 
contrasted  with  Aristeides,  a  man  who  as  much  exceeded  the 
average  Greek  standaid  of  probity  as  he  himself  fell  below  it. 


471  B.C.]  Ostracism  of  ThemisiodcL  i>45 

Moreover,  he  had  the  bad  taste  to  be  continually  reminding  the 
Athenians  of  the  services  he  had  done  them — the  worst  way  to  keep 
the  favour  of  the  multitude,  for  repetition  sickens  the  hearer.^ 

It  is  also  probable  that  the  influence  of  Themistocles  was 
weakened  by  the  fact  that  his  political  antagonists  no  longer 
showed  themselves  such  foes  to  democratic  reforms  Reforms  of 
in  the  constitution  as  they  had  been  before  the  Aristeides. 
Persian  war.  The  result  of  Salamis  had  convinced  even  the 
most  conservative  statesmen  that  the  future  career  of  Athens  was 
to  be  found  on  the  sea,  and  that  her  true  strength  lay  in  the  arms 
of  her  sailors.  Nothing  marks  this  change  of  opinion  better  than 
the  fact  that  it  was  Aristeides,  the  old  opponent  of  naval  expansion, 
who  founded  the  Confederacy  of  Delos.  He  is  also  said  in  his  later 
years  to  have  advised  the  concentration  of  the  whole  population  of 
Attica  in  Athens,  a  step  which  he  would  have  opposed  fifteen  years 
earlier. 

About  the  year  471  B.C.,  the  strife  of  political  parties  became  so 

keen  that  recourse  was  once  more  had  to  ostracism,  the  expedient 

which  had  been  fatal  to  Aristeides  twelve  years  before.  ^ 

•'  Ostracism  of 

But  this  time  it  was  Themistocles  who  was  its  victim ;  Tiiemistocies, 
he  was  sent  into  honorary  banishment,  and  took  up 
his  abode  at  Argos.  While  he  was  staying  there,  Pausanias,  then 
deep  in  his  treasonable  schemes,  sounded  him  as  to  his  willingness 
to  join  in  the  plot  against  the  liberties  of  Greece.  With  more 
firmness  than  might  have  been  expected  of  him,  Themistocles 
refused  to  take  part  in  the  intrigue  but  he  did  not  reveal  the 
plans  of  Pausanias  to  any  one.  AVhen  the  ephors  seized  the 
traitor's  jiapers  after  his  death,  they  found  traces  of  this  cor  re* 
spondence  with  Themistocles,  though  there  was  nothing  which 
actually  proved  the  Athenian's  implication  in  the  plot.  However, 
his  countrymen  showed  an  intention  of  bringing  the  exiled  states- 
man to  trial,  and  sent  to  fetch  him  from  Argos.  Themistocles 
resolved  to  fly  rather  than  to  face  his  political  opponents ;  he 
reached  Corcyra,  but  such  a  hue-and-cry  after  him  proscription  of 
was  raised  throughout  Greece,  that  he  could  find  no  Themistocles. 
safe  refuge,  and,  after  a  series  of  hair-breadth  escapes,  which  lasted 

'  The  story  in  tbe  IToAiTeia  twv  ^ KQ-r\va[mv  about  Themistocles'  intrigues 
against  the  Areopagus  in  -1G3  is  impossible  ;  he  was  in  exile  long  before. 


246  Rise  of  the  Delian  League.  i460  b.c.  ? 

for  more  than  two  years,  was  compelled  to  take  refuge  in  Asia,  on 
Persian  ground  (4GG  B.C.), 

All  chance  of  an  honourable  career  in  Athens  was  now  gone 

from  Themistocles.     In  sheer  disgust  he  turned  to  his  old  enemies, 

Themistocies  and  craved  the  protection  of  the  Great  King.     Xerxes 

^^  death.  ^^  "^^^  J"st  dead,  slain  by  a  domestic  conspiracy,  and  it 

460  B.C.  ?  .^as  to  his  young  son  Artaxerxes  that  the  exile  made 
his  petition.  The  name  of  Themistocles  was  so  dreaded  at  Susa, 
that  his  offers  of  service  produced  all  the  effect  he  could  have  desired. 
It  is  even  said  that  Artaxerxes  was  so  affected  with  joy,  that  he  was 
heard  at  night  to  cry  thrice  in  his  dreams,  "  Themistocles  the 
Athenian  is  mine."  The  king  received  his  suppliant  with  the  greatest 
favour,  listened  with  attention  to  his  schemes  for  the  subjugation  of 
Greece,  and  sent  him  down  to  Asia  Minor  furnished  with  ample 
resources.  He  was  allotted  considerable  revenues  for  his  support, 
and  made  tyrant  of  Magnesia,  where  he  dwelt  in  great  state. 
Here  he  was  joined  by  his  family,  and  his  friends  in  Attica  con- 
trived to  remit  him  the  greater  part  of  his  fortune.  Eighty  talents 
had  been  seized  by  the  state,  yet  this  was  only  the  smaller  half  of 
the  wealth  of  a  man  who  at  the  moment  he  entered  public  life  had 
not  three  talents  of  his  own.  Themistocles  ruled  at  Magnesia  for  a 
few  years,  and  then  died,  without  having  fulfilled  any  of  the 
promises  which  he  had  made  to  the  Persian.  It  is  probable  that 
he  never  had  the  heart  to  injure  Athens,  and  resigned  himself  to 
ending  his  life  in  exile  as  the  pensioner  of  the  barbarian.  If  he 
had  really  intended  to  forward  the  intrigues  of  Artaxerxes,  there  is 
little  doubt  that  he  might  have  done  much  against  the  liberties  of 
Greece ;  that  he  failed  in  his  promise  argues  want  of  will  rather 
than  want  of  power.  Perhaps  his  last  years  may  have  been  made 
less  unbearable  to  him  by  the  sight  of  the  rapid  expansion  of  the 
naval  power  of  Athens,  a  power  of  which  he  had  himself  been  the 
sole  founder. 


07 


I. 


<JJ^ 


CHAPTER   XXIII. 

TIIK   BUILUING   UP   OF   THE    ATHENIAN   EMPUIE,    471-458    B.C. 

Three  years  after  Themistocles  had  snflered  ostracism  and  disap- 
peared from  the  politics  of  Athens,  his  great  rival  was  removed  by 
death.     Aristeides  had  come  to  be  considered  so  far      ^     ,    , 

Death  of 

above  all  mere  party  and  faction,  that  his  death  was  Aristeides, 
mourned  by  every  class  alike — as  much  by  the  demo- 
crats, who  remembered  his  services  at  Byzantium  and  his  later  con- 
titutional  reforms,  as  by  the  old  Attic  party,  which  recollected  the 
history  of  his  earlier  years.  Although  the  legends  which  relate  that 
he  died  in  absolute  poverty  deserve  little  credit,  it  is  certain  that  he 
was  not  an  obol  the  richer  for  all  the  years  he  had  spent  in  the  service 
of  the  state.  Athens  never  saw  his  like  again  ;  though  she  owned 
many  able  statesmen  in  after  years,  and  many  true  patriots,  she 
was  never  so  happy  as  to  produce  another  man  who  combined  in 
such  a  degree  the  spiiit  of  honour  and  self-abnegation  with  the 
highest  practical  ability. 

The  death  of  Aristeides  left  Ciraou  the  most  prominent  figure 
in  Athenian  politics.     The  son  of  Miltiades  was  a  man  of  generous 

impulses  and  perfect  honesty,  but  he  could  never  rise 

•,  ...  Cimon. 

above  the  position  of  a  party  leader,  or  wm  the  entire 

confidence  of  his   fellow-citizens.     The  aristocratic  spirit  was  so 

deeply  rooted  in  him,  that  he  was  constantly  acting  in  a  way  which 

caused  him  to  be  suspected  by  the  democratic  party.     Above  all, 

his  reverence  and  admiration  for  Sparta,  and  the  efforts  which  he 

made  to  keep  his  country  on  good  terms  with  her,  were  destined 

to  work  him  harm.     The  Athenians  could  never  believe  that    a 

man  who   loved   Laconian   manners   and   admired   the    Laconian 

constitution  was  a  safe  political  guide.     Nevertheless,  there  were 


248       The  Building  up  of  the  Athenian  Empire.     i47o  B.C. 

many  things  in  his  favour:  his  first  appearance  in  public  life  had 
been  when  he  discharged,  in  the  true  spirit  of  filial  piety,  the  fine 
which  had  been  inflicted  on  his  father  Miltiades.  Next  he  had 
ably  seconded  Aristeides  at  the  time  of  the  foundation  of  the 
Confederacy  of  Delos.  Again  he  had  greatly  distinguished  himself 
in  the  campaign  against  the  Persian  garrisons  in  Thrace,  the  first 
occasion  on  which  he  had  been  placed  in  supreme  command  of  an 
Athenian  armament.  Moreover,  his  life  at  home  was  devoted  to 
winning  the  hearts  of  the  multitude.  He  threw  his  parks  and 
gardens  open  to  the  public,  and  kept  a  free  table  for  all  the  poorer 
members  of  his  own  deme.  We  are  even  assured  that  he  used  to 
walk-  abroad  with  a  retinue  of  well-dressed  slaves,  and,  if  he  met 
a  citizen  in  threadbare  clothes,  would  order  some  one  of  them  to 
change  garments  with  him.  But  all  this  liberality  won  him 
applause  rather  than  confidence  from  the  classes  that  he  courted. 

Cimon's  political  schemes  were  entirely  directed  towards  the 
East.  He  thought  that  Athens  should  carefully  avoid  all  entangle- 
ments in  the  quarrels  of  European  Greece,  and  devote  herself  solely 
to  the  war  with  Persia  and  the  strengthening  of  the  maritime 
confederacy.  He  wished  to  preserve  a  benevolent  attitude  towards 
Sparta,  and  even  to  assist  her,  if  need  should  arise,  to  maintain 
her  old  position  of  predominance  on  land.  In  return  he  hoped  to 
secure  her  goodwill,  and  to  induce  her  to  acquiesce  in  the  naval 
supremacy  of  Athens.  His  blind  admiration  for  the  Lacedaemo- 
nians caused  him  to  forget  the  narrowness  and  selfishness  of  their 
views,  and  to  hope  that  they  would  join  in  a  fair  and  equal  alliance 
— a  policy  of  which  those  dull  egoists  were  quite  incapable. 

While  Athens  was  under  the  political  guidance  of  Cimon,  her 

maritime  expeditions  never  ceased.     In  470  b,c.  she  fell  upon  the 

„    ^        ^    island  of  Scyros  and  occupied  it.     The  inhabitants. 
Capture  of  -rw  i      • 

Scyros,  a  people  of  Dolopian  race,  were  much  addicted  to 
piracy,  and  had  made  themselves  such  a  nuisance 
to  traders  that  their  expulsion  was  hailed  as  a  public  benefit  to 
Greece.  The  island  was  occupied  by  a  body  of  Athenians  as 
"  Cleruchs."  They  settled  there,  not  as  an  independent  community, 
but  as  an  outlying  body  of  citizens  who  did  not  abandon  their 
civic  rights  at  home.  Athenian  superstition  was  much  gratified 
by   the  discovery   iii   Scyros  of  a  gigantic   skeleton,  which   was 


466  B.C.J  Battle  of  the  Etirymedon.  249 

pronounced  to  be  that  of  the  old  Attic  hero  Theseus,  who  had, 
according  to  legend,  died  in  exile  on  the  island.  The  bones  were 
brought  to  Athens  with  great  rejoicings,  and  a  temple  named  the 
Theseum  was  built  over  them. 

A  more  important  expedition  was  that  which  Cimon  led,  a  few 
years  later,  to  liberate  the  Greek  cities  of  Lycia  and  Pamphylia, 
many  of  which  were  still  in  the  hands  of  the  Persians.  He  set  sail 
from  Cnidus  with  three  hundred  Athenian  and  Ionian  galleys,  and 
passed  eastward,  expelling  Persian  garrisons  from  Phaselis  and 
other  places.  At  last  he  heard  that  a  fleet  was  collecting  to  oppose 
him.  The  satrap  in  command  had  not  yet  been  joined  by  his 
Phoenician  contingents,  and  in  order  to  avoid  a  battle  retired  up 
the  river  Eurymedon,  on  whose  shores  a  considerable  land  army 
was  lying.  Cimon  was  set  upon  fighting  before  this  reinforcement 
arrived;  he  pushed  up  the  river  and  brought  the  -^^^.-^ 
enemy  to  action  in  a  confined  space  where  the  Eurymedou, 
sujjerior  seamanship  of  the  Athenians  was  of  little 
avail.  Nevertheless  he  gained  a  decisive  victory,  and  when  the 
defeated  Persians  ran  their  galleys  aground,  and  endeavoured  to 
save  them  by  the  aid  of  their  land  army,  he  put  his  hoplites  ashore 
and  won  a  second  battle  on  the  beach.  His  good  fortune  and 
skilful  strategy  combined  to  give  him  yet  another  triumph ; 
putting  to  sea,  he  intercepted  the  eighty  Phoenician  galleys,  which 
had  set  out  to  join  the  main  armament,  and  destroyed  most  of  them 
off  the  coast  of  Cyprus. 

This  brilliant  series  of  victories  completely  broke  the  naval 
power  of  Persia;  two  generations  were  to  pass  before  a  barbarian 
fleet  was  again  seen  in  Greek  waters.  Meanwhile  Phaselis  and  the 
other  Greek  towns  of  the  neighbourhood  joined  the  Confederacy  of 
Delos,  and  the  liberation  of  the  Asiatic  Hellenes  was  completed. 

The  nominal  object  of  the  league  which  the  Athenians  and 
the  lonians  had  formed  at  Byzantium  was  now  fulfilled.  There 
was  DO  longer  any  Greek  state  in  servitude  to  the  barbarian.  It 
might,  therefore,  be  reasonably  pleaded  that  the  reasons  for  the 
existence  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos  no  longer  survived.  The 
Persian  had  ceased  to  be  dangerous,  and  any  further  attacks  on 
him  could  merely  lead  to  imnecessary  expenditure  of  blood  and 
money.     T.Ioreover,  the  continuance  of  the  league  left  in  the  hands 


250       The  Building  up  of  the  Atheinan  E/nfire.     [466  B.C. 

of  Athens  a  power  of  taxing  her  allies  and  imposing  orders  on  thera 
which  was  decidedly  in  contradiction  to  the  universal  Greek  desire 
for  "autonomy."  The  states  of  Asia  and  the  Aegean  had  placed 
power  in  her  hands  in  the  moment  of  danger,  but  had  not  intended 
it  to  be  permanent.  When  the  crisis  was  over,  they  began  to  think 
of  withdrawing  from  the  league  and  managing  their  own  affairs. 

The  first  state  which  declared  its  secession  from  the  confederacy 

of  Delos  was  the  wealthy  island-city  of  Naxos  in  the  Cyclades. 

^   „     Probably  her  citizens  remembered  the  repulse  which 

Revolt  of  ■'      .  ^ 

Naxos,  they  had  inflicted  on  the  Persian  in  501  B.C.,  and 
thought  that  they  were  once  more  quite  able  to  take 
care  of  themselves.  In  the  same  year  that  the  battle  of  the 
Eurymedon  was  fought,  they  announced  that  they  intended  to 
withdraw  from  the  league.  In  strict  equity  Athens  ought  to  have 
allowed  her  recalcitrant  ally  to  secede ;  but  she  had  no  intention 
of  doing  so.  Her  greatness  and  strength  were  so  bound  up  with 
her  position  as  head  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos,  that  her  states- 
men had  no  thought  of  allowing  the  league  to  dissolve.  When 
Naxos  proclaimed  its  secession  it  was  immediately  blockaded  by 
an  Athenian  fleet.  After  a  siege  of  some  duration  the  islanders 
were  forced  to  surrender ;  they  were  punished  by  the  demolition 
of  their  walls,  the  forfeiture  of  their  war- ships,  and  the  iinpositiun 
of  a  heavy  fine. 

It  was  now  evident  to  the  whole  body  of  the  allies  of  Atliens 
that  by  joining  the  league  they  had  provided  themselves  witli  a 

Changed  inistress  rather  than  a  leader.  Moreover,  the  slackness 
'^theDeUan^  ^^  many  members  of  the  confederacy  had  been  for 

League,  some  time  working  to  diminish  the  naval  strength  of 
the  whole  body  of  allies  as  compared  with  that  of  Athens.  It  had 
grown  customary  for  cities,  especially  small  places  which  had  no 
old  traditions  of  naval  greatness,  to  compound  for  their  contingent 
of  ships,  by  paying  a  larger  annual  contribution  in  money.  Athens 
had  gladly  accepted  their  offers,  and  the  galleys  which  should  have 
been  supplied  by  them  were  now  replaced  by  Athenian  vessels 
maintained  by  their  composition-money.  This  enabled  the 
Athenian  government  to  keep  afloat  a  much  larger  number  of 
ships  than  could  have  been  supported  from  the  mere  revenues  of 
Attica.     There  was,  at  first  perhaps,  no  ulterior   motive  in   the 


463  B.C.I  Revolt  of  Thasos.  251 

minds  of  Cimon  or  his  fellows  when  they  supported  this  scheme. 
They  were  merely  desirous  of  having  a  larger  number  of  Athenian 
vessels  with  them,  because  of  their  superiority  in  efficiency  to  those 
of  the  allies.  But,  at  the  same  time,  the  system  of  composition 
worked  entirely  in  the  direction  of  giving  Athens  a  complete 
mastery,  and  of  turning  her  allies  into  mere  payers  of  tribute. 

Two  years  after  the  reduction  of  Naxos  another  powerful  island- 
state  broke  out  into  rebellion  against  the  supremacy  of  Athens. 
The  people  of  Thasos  had  from  very  early  times  possessed  a  slip  of 
coast  land  on  the  mainland  of  Thrace  opposite  to  their  island.  By 
liolding  it  they  engrossed  the  trade  of  the  valley  of  the  Strymon, 
and  held  the  rich  gold-mines  of  Mount  Pangaeus.  But  tlie  Athenians, 
after  the  capture  of  Eion,  set  themselves  to  develop  that  port  as  the 
commercial  centre  of  Thrace.  They  even  sent  two  considerable 
expeditions  inland,  with  the  object  of  seizing  the  lower  _,  . ..  . 
course  of  the  Strymon.  A  spot  called  "The  Nine  in  Thrace, 
Ways"  (Ewe'a  (5501),  where  that  great  river  first  ~  '  ' 
begins  to  broaden  out  into  its  estuary,  but  can  stiU  be  spanned 
by  a  bridge,  was  the  chosen  site  for  a  fortress  to  secure  the  hold 
of  Athens  on  the  land.  But  the  native  Thracian  tribes  banded 
themselves  together,  and  fell  upon  the  invaders  with  such  despera- 
tion that  both  the  Athenian  armies  were  defeated ;  the  rout  of  the 
second  and  larger  force  in  465  c.c.  Avas  a  heavy  disaster  for  Athens; 
of  the  ten  thousand  men  under  Leagrus  who  had  formed  the 
expedition,  the  larger  half  were  cut  to  pieces  on  the  battle-field. 
It  was  probably  the  discouragement  which  this  defeat  caused  at 
Athens  that  emboldened  Thasos  to  declare  her  secession  from  the 
confederacy  of  Delos.  She  wished  to  save  her  Thracian  trade, 
before  Athens  could  make  another  attempt  to  divert  it  from  her. 
The  Thasians  did  not  rely  on  their  own  resources  alone ;  they 
enlisted  the  Thracians  and  Macedonians  of  the  mainland,  and  sent 

to  SiJarta  to  endeavour  to  induce  the  ephors  to  declare 

A    1  11  Revolt  of 

war  on  Athens,  as  a  traitor-state  who  was  endeavouring  Thasos 
to  steal  away  the  autonomy  of  her  neighbours.  The  '°~*  ^  ^'^' 
Spartans  were  in  a  jealous  and  sullen  mood,  and  sufficiently 
alarmed  at  the  continued  growth  of  Attic  power  to  make  them 
think  of  granting  aid  to  Thasos.  But,  at  the  very  moment  that 
they  were  about  to  declare  war,  they  were  diverted  from  it  by  a 


252       TJie  Building  up  of  the  AtJi6}iian  E)iipirc.    (464 b.c- 

disaster  that  no  one  could  liave  foreseen.     The  island-state  was 

therefore  left  to  its  own  resources ;  and  these  were  so  considerable 

that  she  held  out  against  the  force  of  the  Athenian  confederacy  for 

two  whole  years.     But  her  ultimate  failure  was  inevitable  when 

she  met  with  no  asisistance  from  without.     She  was  obliged  at  last 

to  surrender  to  Cimon,  whose  army  had  long  been  lying  before  her 

walls.     Like  Naxos,  she  was  punished  for  her  defection  by  the  loss 

of  her  war-fleet  and  her  fortifications,  and  the  imposition  of  a 

fine  of  many  talents.     Still  more  galling  must  have  been  the  final 

loss  of  her  trade  with  Thrace,  which  now  passed   entirely  into 

Athenian  hands. 

Up  to  the  moment  of  the  siege  of  Thasos,  Athens  had  been  for 

some  fourteen  or  fifteen  years  entirely  untroubled  by  the  home  affairs 

_  .      of  Greece ;  this  freedom  she  owed  partly  to  the  policy 

Peloponnesian  '  \.         j  >.         j 

affairs,  of  Cimon,  and  partly  to  the  condition  of  affau's  in 
~  "  '  Peloponnesus.  Since  the  fall  of  Pausanias,  Sparta  had 
been  undergoing  many  troubles  at  home.  Her  old  rival  Argos  had  at 
last  recovered  from  the  blow  which  had  been  dealt  her  by  Cleomenes 
in  the  previous  generation.  In  4G8  B.C.  she  began  to  bestir  himself, 
and  to  reclaim  her  old  dominion  over  her  nearest  neighbours.  One 
of  her  expeditions  ended  in  the  final  destruction  of  Mycenae,  the 
little  Achaian  state  in  the  hills  which  had  survived  so  many 
vicissitudes  of  fortune.  It  last  appears  in  history  as  having  sent 
a  small  contingent  to  Plataea,  in  marked  contrast  to  the  selfish 
in.'lifference  of  Argos.  Now  at  last  it  met  its  fate,  and  was  left  an 
empty  ring  of  Cyclopean  walls  on  its  lonely  hillside  (468  B.C.).  This 
activity  of  the  Argives  soon  brought  down  on  them  the  anger  of 
Sua'ta;  and  a  war  broke  out,  in  which  many  of  the  Arcadian  states 
ioiit  their  aid  to  Argos.  The  Spartans  fought  two  severe  battles — 
one  in  front  of  Tegta  against  the  allied  Tegeans  and  Argives;  the 
other  at  Dipaea  with  the  full  force  of  Arcadia,  except  the  Mantineans, 
who,  out  of  hatred  to  Tegea,  clung  to  their  old  masters.  In  both 
conflicts  the  Lacedaemonians  were  victorious,  and  Argos  had  once 
more  to  sink  back  into  her  usual  sullen  apathy,  while  the  Arcadians 
returned  to  their  allegiance.  It  was  soon  after  the  termination  of 
this  war  that  the  overtures  of  the  Thasians  were  made  at  Sparta. 
The  event  which  prevented  them  from  receiving  attention  was  the 
great  earthquake  of  464  b.c.     Such   a  terrific   shock  had  never 


462  B.C.I  The  Third  Messeniafi    J  Far.  253 

visited  Peloponnesus  before ;  its  worst  force  was  felt  in  the  valley  of 
the  Eurotas.  The  earth  was  cleft  asunder  into  chasms ;  Earthquake 
fearful  landslips  occurred  on  the  slopes  of  Taygetus;  464B^c'^*and 
while  in  the  town  of  Sjmrta  hardly  a  house  or  temple  Heiot  rising. 
was  left  standing,  and  the  loss  of  life  was  enormous.  This  disaster 
emboldened  the  Helots  to  attempt  a  rising.  They  had  been  more 
suspected  and  oppressed  than  ever  since  the  conspiracy  of  Pausanias, 
and  were  ready  for  any  desperate  treason.  All  Messenia  rose  as 
one  man,  and  much  of  Laconia  followed  its  example.  The  Spartans, 
backed  by  their  Perioeci,  had  great  difticulty  in  making  head  against 
the  rebels,  who  fortified  as  their  base  of  operations  the  old  Messenian 
citadel  and  sanctuary  on  Mount  Ithome. 

The  Spartans  were  still  engaged  in  a  desperate  struggle  with 
their  revolted  subjects,  when  the  siege  of  Thasos  came  to  an  end. 
Cimon,  who  was  now  at  the  height  of  his  reputation 

1  .11.  >  1,  ^1  Clmon  helps 

and  power,  saw  with  distress  the  troubles  of  the  city      sparta. 
he  so  much  admired.     Pie   set  himself  to  persuade  '  ' 

the  Athenians  that  they  ought  to  forget  old  grudges,  and  save 
from  destruction  the  state  which  had  shared  with  them  the  glory 
of  the  Persian  war.  "  Would  they,"  he  asked,  "  consent  to  see 
Hellas  lamed  of  one  leg,  and  Athens  drawing  without  her  yoke- 
fellow ?  "  His  pleading  was  bitterly  opposed  by  the  anti-Spartan 
party  at  Atliens,  headed  by  two  statesmen,  Ephialtes  and  Pericles, 
who  had  already  come  into  notice  as  antagonists  of  Cimon.  But 
the  more  generous  and  unwise  policy  prevailed,  and  four  thousand 
hoplitcs  were  sent  to  the  aid  of  Sparta.  This  army  was  pursued 
by  misfortune ;  it  was  so  unsuccessful  in  attacking  Ithoaie,  that 
the  Spartans  attributed  its  failure  to  ill  will  rather  than  ill  luck. 
They  therefore  began  to  treat  their  allies  with  marked  dis- 
courtesy, and  at  last  sent  them  home  without  a  word  of  thanks, 
merely  stating  that  their  services  could  be  of  no  further  use.  This 
rudeness  and  ingratitude  fully  justified  the  anti- Spartan  party  at 
Athens  for  their  opposition  to  the  projects  of  Cimon,  and  gave 
them  a  power  with  the  assembly  which  they  had  not  previously 
enjoyed. 

Cimon  was  now  no  longer  able  to  deal  with  the  policy  of  the 
state  as  he  chose,  and  the  conduct  of  affairs  began  to  pass  into 
the  hands  of  men  whose  foreign  and  domestic  policy  were  alike 


254       T]ie  Building  t(p  of  tJie  Athenian  Empire.     t46iB.c. 

opposed  to  all  Lis  views.  Epliialtes  and  Pericles  proceeded  to  form 
alliances  abroad  with  all  the  states  which  were  ill 
disposed  toward  Sparta^  and  at  home  to  commence 
a  revision  of  the  constitution.  They  were  determined  to  carry  out 
to  its  furthest  logical  development  the  democratic  tendency  which 
Cleisthenes  had  introduced  into  the  Athenian  polity.  Of  Ephialtes, 
the  son  of  Sophonides,  comparatively  little  is  known.  Although 
he  at  first  appears  as  the  recognized  leader  of  the  popular  and 
anti-Spartan  party  at  Athens,  he  was  destined  to  be  cut  off  so 
early  in  his  career  that  we  have  little  record  of  his  character  and 
doings.  He  seems  to  have  been  an  eloquent  and  fiery  speaker, 
and  an  extreme  democrat.  But  Pericles  was  a  man 
of  very  diflerent  importance.  He  was  the  son  of 
Xanthippus,  the  accuser  of  Miltiades  in  489  B.C.,  and  the  victor  of 
Mycale  and  Sestos ;  while,  on  his  mother's  side,  he  came  of  the  blood 
of  the  Alcmaeonidae.  Pericles  was  staid,  self-contained,  and  haughty 
— a  strange  chief  for  the  popular  party.  But  his  reiatiuuship  to 
Cleisthenes,  and  the  enmity  which  existed  between  his  house  and 
that  of  Cimon,  urged  him  to  espouse  the  cause  of  democracy.  More- 
over, the  foreign  policy  to  which  he  was  devoted  was  the  one 
Avhich  had  commended  itself  to  the  populace.  He  wished  to  con- 
tinue the  schemes  of  Theraistocles,  and  to  extend  the  Athenian 
power  in  all  directions,  without  any  regard  for  the  susceptibilities 
of  Sparta.  The  war  with  Persia  he  was  ready  to  abandon,  now 
that  all  danger  from  that  side  had  passed  away,  while  he  designed 
to  strengthen  and  enlarge  the  confederacy  of  Delos  in  every 
l^ossible  way,  and  to  make  use  of  its  power  to  the  west  as  well  as 
the  east  of  the  Aegean.  While  Cimon  had  Greece  in  his  mind, 
Pericles  could  only  think  of  Athens,  and  the  temper  of  the  times 
was  favourable  to  the  narrower  policy. 

Pericles  wms  a  man  of  grave  and  noble  presence ;  his  friends  in 
admiration  and  his  enemies  in  jest  alike  compared  him  to  Zeus. 
He  lived  a  reserved,  secluded  life,  and  was  seldom  to  be  seen 
except  on  great  public  occasions.  His  eloquence  was  all  the  more 
effective  for  not  being  heard  every  day ;  for  he  always  withheld 
himself,  and  only  appeared  to  speak  on  affairs  of  high  moment. 
But  though  the  man  was  better  fitted  to  command  respect  than 
affection  from  his  followers,  his  policy  was  one  which  was  so  well 


462  B.C.]  Ephialtes  and  Pericles.  255 

suited  to   the   spirit  of  the   times,  that  the  populace    was  quite 
enthusiastic  in  his  favour. 

The  first  aim  which  Ephialtes  and  Pericles  set  before  them- 
selves was  the  cutting  down  of  the  power  of  the  Areopagus. 
That  bod\'  had  since  the  Persian  war  been  the  strong- 

1     n       r-     T        ^  .  ,      ,  .,     ^  .  ^   Attack  on  the 

Jiold  01  the  Conservative  and  philo-Laconian  part\'.  Areopagus. 
Though  it  had  no  longer  any  important  political 
power  by  the  strict  letter  of  the  constitution,  its  patriotic  efforts 
during  the  Persian  wars  had  enabled  it  to  retain  much  influence. 
Moreover,  it  was  the  one  political  corporation  at  Athens  whose 
members  held  office  for  life,  and  were  not  responsible  for  their 
votes  to  the  people.  This  by  itself  sufficed  to  give  the  Areopagus 
a  conservative  tendency,  like  that  which  may  be  remarked  in  such 
bodies  as  our  own  House  of  Lords. 

Ephialtes  took  the  lead  in  the  attack  on  the  Areopagus.  He 
chose  a  moment  when  Cimon  was  away  in  the  field,  assisting 
the  Spartans  against  the  revolted  Helots.  After  a  violent  struggle, 
he  succeeded  in  caiTj'^ing  a  law  which  deprived  the  Areopegus 
of  its  ancient  censorial  power,  and  reduced  it  to  a  mere  court 
to  try  homicide.  As  a  sign  that  the  guardianship  of  the  laws 
was  thereby  taken  from  the  ancient  corporation  and  i^laced  in 
the  hands  of  the  people,  he  brought  down  from  the  Acropolis  the 
tablets  inscribed  with  the  laws  of  Solon,  and  set  them  up  before 
the  Prytaneium  in  the  market-place.  The  prerogatives  of  the 
Areopagus  wei'e  divided  among  the  Council  of  Five  Hundred, 
the  Ecclesia  and  the  Dicasterics.  The  Law  courts  took  over  its 
moral  supervision  of  the  private  lives  of  the  citizens,  while  the 
Nomopliylaces  undertook  its  other  function  of  guarding  the  con- 
stitution. These  officers  were  given  a  seat  of  honour  in  the  public 
assembly,  and  instructed  to  interfere  with  a  veto,  whenever  a 
legislative  proposal  was  made  which  transgressed  one  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  constitution. 

When  Cimon  came  home  from  the  war,  he  was  wildly  enraged 
at  the  advantage  that  had  been  taken  of  his  absense,  and  actu- 
ally endeavoured  to  repeal  the  decree  of  Ephialtes  on  a  technical 
point  of  law.  This  brought  matters  to  a  crisis,  and,  in  the 
confusion,  recourse  was  had  to  the  test  of  ostracism.     It  decided 


256      The  Building  up  of  the  Athenian  Empire.      (468 B.r 

against  Cimon,  who  therefore  went  into  banishment.     But  thi 
wrong  against  the  gi'eatest  general  of  Athens  was,  n^, 

of  Cimon,     long  after,  avenged  by  an  over-zealous  and  unscrupu- 
lous friend.     Ephialtes  was  slain  by  assassins  in  his 
own  house,  and  though  no  one  could  accuse  Cimon  himself,  it  was 

Murder  of    Certain  that  his  party  were  responsible  for  the  deed. 

Epbiaites.  "jj^g  immediate  result  of  this  murder  was  to  leave 
Pericles  in  sole  and  undivided  command  of  the  democratic  party. 

The  foreign  policy  of  Pericles  soon  began  to  involve  Athens 
in  troubles  at  home.  He  concluded  alliances  with  Argos  and 
Thessaly,  both  states  at  variance  with  Sjmrta,  and  thereby  made 
a  collision  with  the  Lacedaemonian  confederacy  inevitable.  He 
gave  still  more  direct  offence  to  Corinth,  one  of  the  most  powerful 
members  of  that  conftderacy,  by  concluding  a  close  alliance  witli 
Megara.  That  state  had  been  engaged  in  unsuccessful  war  with 
Corinth,  and  had  placed  herself  under  the  protection  of  Athens 
to  save  her  existence.  In  Boeotia,  too,  he  stirred  up  enmity,  by 
giving  an  active  support  to  the  democratic  party  in  that  countrj'', 
which  was  at  this  moment  endeavouring  to  subvert  the  oligarchies 
which  prevailed  in  most  of  its  cities.  These  provocations  mac^o 
war  inevitable. 

In  458  B.C.  the  storm  burst;  the  Corinthians  formed  an  alliance 

with  the  Aeginetans,  whose  jealousy  of  Athens  was  as  great  as 

War  of  Athens  it  had  been  in  the  earlier  years  of  the  century,  and 

with  Corinth  ^,jj^i^   ^|^(3j^  Dorian    kinsmen  at   Epidaurus.      They 

and  Aegina,  ^  •' 

458 B.C.  were  encouraged  by  the  fact  that  a  fleet  of  no  less 
than  two  hundred  Athenian  ships  had  just  been  sent  to  Egypt,  to 
continue  the  help  which  Cimon  had  afforded  to  the  rebel  prince 
Inartis  in  his  revolt  against  Persia.  The  allies  had  also  the  secret 
goodwill  of  Sparta,  but  as  that  state  had  not  yet  succeeded  in 
putting  down  its  revolted  Helots,  it  could  not  spare  any  aid  to  its 
confederates,  and  did  not  even  declare  war  on  Athens. 


/  0  '^ 


CHAPTER   XXIV. 

ATHEXS    AT  THE   HEIGHT   OF   HER    POWER,    458— i-45   B.C. 

At  the  moment  of  the  outbreak  of  the  fii-st  important  naval  war 
which  she  had  to  wage  with  a  Greek  enemy  since  the  formation  of 
her  empire,  Athens  took  two  important  steps.     The 

,       .       ,  .  ,         .  ,       p       .   .  TheDelian 

fii-st  was  destnied  to  guard  agauist  the  risk  of  misfor-League  and  ita 
tunes  by  sea;  it  consisted  in  the  transference  from  "^e^sury. 
Delos  to  Athens  of  the  central  treasury  of  the  confederacy.^  The 
Samians  pointed  out  the  exposed  situation  of  the  sacred  island,  and 
the  gi-eat  hoard  was  moved  to  Athens.  If  they  had  been  more 
wary  the  Samians  would  have  refrained  from  proposing  this  motion, 
which  helped  Athens  forward  one  more  stage  in  the  process  of 
turning  her  "  hegemony  "  into  an  empire.  By  the  removal  of  the 
common  funds  of  the  league  from  the  sanctuary  of  Delos,  the 
oiiginal  religious  and  patriotic  pui-pose  of  the  confederates  was 
obscured ;  by  their  storage  at  Athens  it  began  to  appear  that  the 
allies  were  paying  tribute  to  their  powerful  protectress.  It  was 
not  long  before  the  Athenians  came  to  regard  the  treasury  as  their 
own,  and  to  draw  upon  it  for  purely  Attic  needs,  which  liad  no 
connection  with  the  welfare  of  the  other  confederates.  Pericles 
and  his  party  were  not  at  a  loss  for  arguments  to  justify  this 
misappropriation  of  the  funds  of  the  league.  They  represented  that 
Athens  had  for  some  time  had  the  entire  supervision  of  the  war  in 
her  hands,  and  that  the  other  cities  had  practically  abandoned  their 
share  in  the  undertaking :  Chios,  Lesbos,  and  Samos  were  the  only 
states  which  continued  to  supply  ships  to  the  confederate  fleet ; 
all  the  others  had  commuted  their  galleys  for  money.     Athena 

'  Some,  however,  place  the  date  of  the  transference  in  455  or  454. 

S 


258  Athens  at  the  Height  of  her  Fozver.        r458B.a 

had  continued  the  struggle  with  Persia  in  the  most  energetic  way, 
and  spent  so  much  of  her  own  money  on  it,  that,  if  she  trespassed 
on  the  surplus  in  the  common  chest  of  the  league,  she  was  but 
repaying  herself  for  her  losses.  Moreover,  no  one  could  dispute 
that  she  had  carried  out  the  purposes  of  the  league  with  perfect 
success;  she  had  liberated  all  the  Hellenic  subjects  of  the  Great 
King,  and  was  now  giving  him  such  trouble  in  Egypt  that  he 
would  never  be  able  to  stir  against  Hellas.  If  tins  could  be  done 
at  less  expense  than  was  originally  calculated,  it  was  due  to  her, 
and  she  deserved  the  surplus  as  her  reward. 

The  second  important  event  of  the  year  458  b.c.  was  the  com- 
mencement of  the  famous  "  Long  Walls  "  of  Athens.     They  had 

The  "Long  ^"^^  suggested  by  a  much  smaller  work  of  the  same 
■WaUs"  built,  kind  at  Megara.  After  forming  their  alliance  with 
that  city,  the  Athenians  had  connected  the  old  town, 
which  lay  on  a  hill  not  quite  a  mile  from  the  sea,  with  its  seaport 
of  Nisaea,  by  building  two  walls  which  secured  a  safe  passage 
between  them.  But  the  Megarian  "  Long  Walls  "  were  only  seven 
stadia  from  end  to  end,  while  Athens  was  divided  from  Phalerum 
and  Peiraeus  by  thirty-five  and  forty  stadia  respectively.  The 
gigantic  scheme  of  constructing  walls  for  the  whole  four  miles 
which  lie  between  the  old  city  and  the  water's  edge  could  only 
have  been  formed  when  a  war  with  an  enemy  overwhelmingly 
powerful  on  land  was  in  view.  It  must  have  been  the  dread  of 
Spartan  interference  which  led  to  the  building  of  these  great  works. 
When  they  were  finished,  Athens,  Peiraeus,  and  Phalerum  formed 
the  angles  of  avast  fortified  triangle,  while  the  space  between  them, 
a  considerable  expanse  of  open  country,  could  be  utilized  as  a 
place  of  refuge  for  the  population  of  Attic  and  even  for  their  flocks 
and  herds.  Some  years  afterwards  a  second  wall  (ri  Sia  ixitrov  reTxos) 
was  erected  close  to  and  parallel  with  the  original  wall  running  to 
Peiraeus.  This  gave  an  additional  security  to  the  communication 
between  the  city  and  its  ports ;  even  if  the  Phaleric  wall  were 
forced,  there  would  still  be  free  access  from  the  upper  city  to 
Peiraeus. 

The  war  with  Corinth  and  Aegina  commenced  by  two  severe 
naval  engagements  in  the  Saronic  Gulf.  The  first,  fought  off  the 
island  of  Cecryphaleia  near  the  coast  of  Argolis,  had  no  decisive 


468  B.CJ 


J  Far  7C'///i   Corinth  and  Aegina.  259 


result.     But  when  the  fleets  met  for  the  second  time  opposite  to 

the  to'mi  of  Aegina   itself,  the  Athenians  gained  a    war  with 

crushing  victory.     No  less  than  seventy  Corinthian    ^°]^^g^l^^ 

and  Aeginetan   vessels  fell   into   their   hands.     The      458  B.C. 

astonishing  part  of  this  success  was  the  fact  that  two  hundred 

Athenian  galleys  were  at  that  moment  in  Egypt,  so  that  it  was 

with  less  than  half  her  resources  that  Athens  succeeded  in  beating 

the  two  navies  which  were  reckoned  the  second  and  third  in  Greece. 

After   their  victory   the   Athenians   landed   and   laid   siege  to 

Aegina  with  the  ful)  force  of  hoplites  that  was  at  that  moment  at 

home.     The  Corinthians  determined  to  do  all  they  could  to  save 

their  ally,  and  resolved  to  create  a  diversion  by  attacking  Megara. 

They  calculated  that,  as  the  whole  force  of  Athens  was  either  in 

Egypt  or  at  Aegina,  no  army  could  be  put  into  the  field  against  them, 

unless  the  siege  of  Aegina  was  raised.     But  they  had  not  reckoned 

on  the  indomitable  spirit  of  their  enemies.     Since  all  the  men  of 

military  age  were  absent,  Athens  determined  to   call  out  those 

who  had  not  yet  reached  it,  or  had  long  passed  it.  „^      .  ^    . 

''  '  ="   ^  The  victories 

Myronides  raised  an  army  exclusively  composed  of  ofMyronides. 

boys  and  old  men,  and  marched  to  relieve  Megara. 
He  took  up  a  defensive  position  and  repulsed  the  attack  which 
was  made  on  him  ;  although  not  very  severely  handled,  the  Corin- 
thians retired  home  and  Megara  was  saved.  But  when  the  defeated 
soldiery  learnt  the  nature  of  the  force  which  had  beaten  them, 
they  found  the  taunts  of  their  fellow-citizens  unbearable,  and 
returned  to  take  their  revenge.  Myronides  again  went  out  to 
meet  them,  probably  reinforced  by  the  troops  of  Megara.  This 
time  the  battle  was  decisive ;  the  Corinthians  were  routed,  and 
their  loss  was  heavy,  for  a  large  body  were  surrounded  in  a  walled 
enclosure  and  shot  down  to  a  man.  As  an  assertion  of  the  courage 
of  her  citizens,  Athens  regarded  these  battles  as  only  inferior  to 
Marathon.  In  commemoration  of  the  achievements  of  this  season 
monumental  pillars  were  erected  in  the  Cerameicus,  recording  that 
"  in  one  and  the  same  year  the  soldiers  of  Athens  had  fallen  off 
Cyprus,  in  Egypt,  Phoenicia,  Argolis,  Aegina,  and  Megara."  ^     A 

>  The  fighting  in  Egypt,  Aegina,  and  Megara  we  have  already  men- 
tioned, That  in  Argoli.s  was  an  Athenian  descent  on  the  Halieis,  which 
failed  ;  that  in  Cyprus  and  Phoenicia  was  dependent  on  the  great  expedi- 
tion to  Egypt. 


26o  Athens  at  the  Height  of  her  Power.        [457  b.c. 

fragment  of  this  inscription  still  survives,  to  recall  the  energy  of 

the  Athenians  at  the  highest  moment  of  their  glory. 

Meanwhile  a  second  war  had  broken  out  in  Central  Greece, 

between  two  ancient  enemies,  the   Phocians  and  the   Boeotian 

.^     .         League.     The  ruling  oligarchies  in  Boeotia  were  so 
Warm  f  _  o        o 

Boeotia.  anti-Athenian  in  their  sentiments,  that  the  Phocians 
were  felt  to  be  fighting  the  battle  of  Athens  by  keep- 
ing employea  an  enemy  who  would  otherwise  have  joined  Corinth 
and  Aegina.  During  this  war  the  Phocians  fell  upon  and  occupied 
the  little  district  to  their  north,  the  home  of  the  four  Dorian 
communities  who  had  remained  behind  in  their  original  seats, 
when  the  rest  of  the  nation  invaded  Peloponnesus  (see  p.  49).  The 
conquered  Dorians  made  a  piteous  appeal  to  Sparta,  the  natural 
protector  of  all  states  of  kindred  blood.  The  Spartans  were  at  this 
moment  beginning  to  make  some  headway  in  their  long  struggle 
with  the  revolted  Helots;  and  though  Ithome  was  not  yet  taken, 
felt  that  they  were  in  honour  bound  to  aid  their  compatriots. 
Making  a  gi-eat  effort,  they  despatched  an  army  of  eleven  thousand 
men,  partly  Laconians,  partly  Peloponnesian  allies,  by  sea  across  the 
gulf  of  Corinth  into  Boeotia.  Here  they  were  joined  by  the  Thebans 
and  their  friends,  and  marched  into  Phocis.  After  completely 
defeating  the  Phocians  and  driving  them  out  of  Doris,  they  set  forth 
homeward.  But  their  way  lay  through  the  territory  of  Megara, 
and  when  they  arrived  on  its  borders  they  were  refused  a  passage. 
The  Athenians  had  seen  with  suspicion  a  Spartan  army  in  Boeotia, 
and,  regarding  war  as  inevitable,  had  determined  to  face  its  dangers 
at  once,  and  to  prevent  the  returning  army  from  joining  the  Corin- 
thians. They  had  obtained  a  thousand  hoplites  from  Argos,  and 
a  considerable  body  of  horse  from  Thessaly,  and,  joining  these  to 
the  levies  of  Megara  and  Plataea  and  such  force  as  Athens  could 
spare,  had  posted  themselves  in  front  of  the  passes  which  led 
from  Boeotia  towards  the  Isthmus.  It  was  said  that  some  of  the 
oligarchic  party  at  Athens  had  been  making  overtures  to  the  Spartans, 
but  the  traitors  were  few;  Cimon,  though  in  exile,  appeared  in 
the  Athenian  army  as  soon  as  it  had  passed  the  border,  and 
earnestly  begged  that  he  might  fight  as  a  volunteer  in  the  ranks 
of  his  own  tribe.  The  Strategi  refused  him  the  favour,  but  ere  he 
departed  he  adjured  his  friends  to  prove  by  their  conduct  in  battle 


456B.C.J  Myronides  conquers  Boeotia.  261 

that  their  party  contained   no  traitors.     The  armies  met  near 
Tanagra,  and  a  hard-fought  engagement  ensued ;  for      ^  ^^,     ^ 

°  000  1  Battle  of 

a  long  time  the  day  was  doubtful,  but  in  the  heat  of     Tanagra, 

the  fight  the  Thessalian  cavalry  deserted  their  allies, 
and  lost  the  Athenians  the  victory.  No  less  than  a  hundred  of  the 
friends  of  Cimon  fell  in  the  forefront  of  the  battle,  proving  by 
their  reckless  courage  that  the  Conservative  party  was  unjustly 
accused  of  treason.  The  Spartans  were  never  skilful  at  improv- 
ing the  results  of  a  success,  and  their  commander,  the  regent 
Nicomedes,'  contented  himself  with  ravaging  the  Megarid,  and  then 
returned  to  Peloponnesus  across  the  now  unguarded  passes  of 
Geraneia. 

By  her  last  stroke  of  policy  Athens  had  now  added  Sparta  and 
the  Boeotian  League  to  the  list  of  her  enemies.  It  was  necessary 
to  act  quickly  and  promi)tly,  or  she  would  be  crushed,    „ 

,  Z      ^  ,  Conquest  of 

when  the  full  force  of  Boeotia  and  Peloponnesus  was  Boeotia, 
put  into  the  field.  The  first  step  taken  was  to  mark 
the  suspension  of  party-feuds  at  Athens ;  the  party  of  Cimon  had 
behaved  so  well  at  Tanagra  that  their  conduct  had  won  the  con- 
fidence of  their  very  opponents.  Pericles  himself  proposed  the 
decree  which  revoked  the  ostracism  of  his  great  rival.  Then,  long 
before  the  campaigning  season  had  arrived,  Myronides,  with  the 
full  force  of  Athens  at  his  back,  burst  into  Boeotia,  The  inroad 
was  quite  unexpected,  for  the  winter  was  not  yet  done.  No  aid 
from  Corinth  or  Sparta  was  at  hand,  but  the  Thebans  and  their 
supporters  from  the  other  Boeotian  cities  met  the  invaders  at 
Oenophyta  in  the  valley  of  the  Asopus.  After  a  hard  struggle  they 
were  beaten,  and  the  land  lay  exposed  to  the  conqueror.  The 
successes  of  Myronides  were  rapid  and  startling  ;  a  discontented 
party  existed  in  every  Boeotian  town,  which  regarded  the  rule  of 
their  oligarchs  with  hatred.  These  partisans  of  democracy  joined 
the  Athenians,  and  town  after  town  threw  open  its  gates.  Even 
Thebes,  the  centre  of  the  oligarchic  party,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
invaders.  Myronides  then  set  up  democratic  constitutions  in  every 
city,  and  handed  over  the  government  to  the  partisans  of  Athens ; 
the  great  families,  for  the  most  part,  retired  into  exile.     It  would 

'  Nicomedes  was  regent  in  behalf  of  the  young  king  Pleistoanax,  son  of 
Pausanias. 


262  Athens  at  the  Height  of  her  Poiver.        [456  b.c. 

seem  probable  that  tbe  Boeotiaa  League  was  dissolved,  and  a 
sejxarate  treaty  concluded  by  Athens  with  each  individual  state ; 
at  any  rate,  the  complete  autonomy  of  all  towns,  small  and 
great,  Avas  secured,  and  the  paramount  influence  of  Thebes  in  the 
district  destroyed.  When  Boeotia  fell  into  the  hands  of  Athens, 
the  Locrians  of  Opus  also  cast  off  their  oligarchy,  and  sent  a 
hundred  hostages  from  their  leading  families  to  be  kept  at  Athens. 
The  Phocians,  who  had  been  at  war  with  Thebes,  were  also  glad  to 
enter  the  Athenian  alliance.  Thus  at  a  single  blow  Athens  had 
become  a  great  land  power,  and  secured  dominion  over  all  the 
districts  as  far  as  Mount  Oeta.  Moreover,  she  was  well  backed  by 
a  party  in  each  state,  who  regarded  their  predominance  at  home  as 
bound  up  with  her  success. 

Meanwhile  the  siege  of  Aegina  was  arawmg  to  a  close ;  in  spite 
of  all  their  operations  on  the  mainland,  the  Athenians  had  stead- 
FaUof  fastly  kept  up  the  blockade,  and,  after  nine  months  of 
Aegina.  waiting,  the  provisions  of  the  garrison  began  to  fail. 
Except  one  reinforcement  of  three  hundred  hoplites,  they  had 
received  no  helj)  from  Peloponnesus,  and  their  own  resources  were 
quite  exhausted.  The  ancient  rivals  of  Athens  were  obliged  to  sue 
for  peace,  which  they  only  obtained  on  condition  of  destroying 
their  walls,  giving  up  their  war-galleys,  and  entering  the  Con- 
federacy of  Delos  as  tribute-paying  ra  mbers, 

Sparta  seems  to  have  taken  little  trouble  to  support  her  allies 

outside  Peloponnesus,  but  within  it  her  efforts  were  at  last  drawing 

Sparta      to  a  successful  end.     After  ten  years  of  revolt  the 

the  Helots,  Helots  Were  driven  to  bay;    their  last  bands  were 

455B.C.  besieged  in  Ithome,  and  finally  permitted  to  depart 
under  an  agreement  never  to  return  to  Peloponnesus.  An  Athenian 
fleet  under  Tolmides  was  at  that  moment  ravaging  the  coasts  of 
Messenia,  and  the  defeated  rebels  were  taken  on  board.  Tolmides 
soon  after  captured  the  town  of  Naupactus  on  the  Aetolian  coast, 
and  here  he  settled  the  exiled  Messenians  with  their  families,  to 
serve  as  an  outpost  for  Athens  on  the  Corinthian  Gulf. 

It  would  seem  that  not  even  the  capture  of  Ithome  could  give 
Sparta  sufficient  breathing-space  to  recover  her  strength  and  to 
strive  for  the  hegemony  of  continental  Greece.  For  the  next  three 
years  she  made  no  attempt  to  force  the  passes  of  the  Megarid  and 


455  B.C.]  Athenian  Disaster  in  Egypt.  263 

attack  Athens.  Nor  could  she  even  defend  Peloponnesus ;  she 
had  to  see  her  own  naval  arsenal  at  Gythium.  burnt,  and  to  hear  of 
the  ravaging  of  the  territories  of  her  Dorian  dependents  of  Sicyon 
and  Epidaurus.  She  could  not  even  prevent  Troezen  and  the  coast 
cities  of  Achaia  from  openly  joining  the  Athenian  alliance  ;  it 
would  seem,  indeed,  that  Argos  alone  suSBced  to  keep  her  in 
check  while  Athens  was  extending  her  dominion  to  right  and 
left. 

There  is  no  knowing  where  the  extension  of  the  Athenian 
power  would  have  stopped,  if  a  fearful  disaster  had  not  intervened 
to  weaken  its  growth.  In  454  b.c.  a  large  Athenian  Defeat  01  the 
expedition,  not  less  than  two  hundred  galleys,  '^vas  "^^^^^  ^* 
again  despatched  to  Egypt  to  aid  King  Inarus.  But  454  b.c. 
at  that  moment  the  satrap  Megabj-zus  invaded  that  country  with 
a  stronger  army  than  the  Great  King  had  previously  devoted  to 
its  conquest.  The  Athenian  fleet  sailed  up  the  Nile  as  far  as 
Memphis,  and  got  so  far  from  the  sea  that  they  were  finally  cut 
off  from  their  retreat,  and  besieged  with  their  Egyptian  allies  in 
the  isle  of  Prosopltis.  Megabyzus  diverted  one  of  the  branches 
of  the  Nile  which  encircles  the  island,  and  crossed  over  on 
foot ;  a  desperate  struggle  ensued,  and,  after  burning  their 
ships,  the  main  body  of  Athenians  were  cut  to  pieces.  The 
survivors  defended  themselves  so  vigorously  that  the  Persian 
granted  them  quarter,  and  thus  a  few  scattered  fugitives 
escaped  across  the  desert  to  Gyrene,  and  brought  the  news  to 
Athens. 

By  the  end  of  452  B.c.  the  belligerents  in  Greece  had  arrived  at 

a  standstill,  and  by  the  mediation  of  Cimon  a  truce  for  five  years 

was    brought    about    between    Sparta   and    Athens,    „^    ,,„. 

o  i  '     The  "Five 

together  with  their  respective  allies.     That  no  defini-  Years'  Truce," 

.  451  B  C 

tive  peace  was  concluded  was  due  to  the  action  of 
Corinth,  who  would  not  consent  to  recognize  the  new  position  of 
Athens  on  her  borders.  The  agreement,  therefore,  only  amounted 
to  a  prolonged  armistice,  based  upon  the  actual  position  of  the 
various  powers.  This  moment  marks  the  highest  tide  in  the 
fortunes  of  Athens.  Her  influence  was  predominant  in  Megaris, 
Boeotia,  Locris,  Phocis,  Achaia,  and  Troezen,  while  Argos  was  her 
firm  ally.      Her  empire  on  land  covered  as  large  an  expanse  as 


264  Athens  at  the  Height  of  her  Power.        [449  b.c. 

that  of  Sparta,  while  at  sea  every  city  in  the  Aegean  and  Pro- 
pontis  from  Aegina  to  Byzantium  did  her  homage.^ 

Freed  from  their  war  with  Sparta,  the  Athenians  turned  to 
revenge  their  defeat  in  Egypt.     Cimon  was  once  more  at  home, 

liastcam-  and  had  regained  no  small  portion  of  his  old  power. 
c1mon°^  He  found  it  easy  to  persuade  his  fellow-citizens  that 
449  B.C.  the  massacre  of  Prosopitis  called  for  vengeance,  and 
obtained  a  fleet  of  two  hundred  vessels  and  a  free  commission  to 
attack  wliat  portion  of  the  Persian  empire  he  might  choose.  He 
determined  to  fall  on  the  Phoenician  cities  of  Cyprus,  which  still 
maintained  their  allegiance  to  Artaxerxes.  Accordingly  he  laid 
siege  to  Citium :  while  lying  before  its  walls  he  was  stricken  down 
by  disease,  and  felt  his  end  approaching.  But  on  his  very  death- 
bed he  was  able  to  give  the  directions  which  resulted  in  two  brilliant 
victories ;  the  Phoenician  fleet  which  came  to  raise  the  blockade  of 
Citium  was  defeated  off  the  neighbouring  port  of  Salamis,  and 
shortly  after  a  land  army  was  routed  on  the  shore.  The  expedition, 
thus  deprived  of  its  leader,  returned  to  Athens,  and  made  no  further 
attack  on  Asia. 

Cimon's  untimely  death — he  was  still  in  the  full  vigour  of  man- 
hood— preserved  him  from  seeing  the  commencement  of  a  series  of 

disasters  which  were  about  to  befall  his  country.   The 
Revolt  in  '' 

Boeotia,      Athenian  land  empire  was  to  be  lo?t  as  rapidly  as  it 

447  B  C 

was  won.  It  was  an  impossibility  that  such  old  ene- 
mies as  the  Boeotians  should  ever  be  faithful  allies  to  Athens  ;  the 
democratic  governments  which  had  been  set  up  in  the  various  cities 
of  that  land  grew  more  and  more  unpopular.  Not  only  were  they 
hated  by  patriotic  Boeotians  as  the  tools  of  Athens,  but  they  made 
themselves  odious  by  their  misgovernment.  At  last,  in  447  B.C., 
an  insurrection  broke  out  against  the  democratic  party  in  the 
towns  of  Northern  Eoeotia.  All  the  oligarchic  exiles  hastenel 
home  to  join  the  rebels,  who  ma'le  their  stronghold  at  Orchomenus. 
The  Athenians  despatched  Tolrnides  with  not  more  than  a  thousand 
Battle  cf  hoplites  to  support  the  Boeotian  democrats.  But 
Coroneia  ag  \q  marched  along  the  shore  of  Lake  Copai's  be- 
tween Haliartus  and  Coroneia,  he  was  surprised  by  the  oligarchic 

>  A  district  on  the  Bay  of  Adramyttium  in  Aeolis  was  the  only  piece  of 
land  that  interrupted  the  continuous  line  of  Athenian  allies  in  Asia. 


446  B.C.]  Revolt  of  Euboea.  265 

army,  who  fell  on  him  and  routed  him  by  the  force  of  superior 
numbers.  Tolmides  himself  fell  on  the  field,  but  several  hundreds 
of  his  soldiery  were  taken  prisoners,  and  to  secure  their  lives  the 
Athenians  were  forced  to  conclude  a  treaty  with  the  victors,  by 
which  they  engaged  not  to  interfere  any  more  in  Boeotian  affairs. 
They  were  therefore  compelled  to  look  on  while  their  democratic 
partisans  were  expelled  from  the  various  cities,  and  the  old  con- 
stitution was  reiatroduced.  Once  more  oligarchy  was  restored,  and 
Thebes  took  up  her  old  position  as  managing  partner  in  the  league. 
Locris  immediately  followed  the  example  of  Boeotia,  and  disclaimed 
her  dependence  on  Athens. 

Nor  was  this  all ;  the  cities  of  Euboea,  who  had  long  been  quiet 
and  obedient  members  of  the  Delian  confederacy,  now  thought  that 

a  favourable  opportunity  for  freeing  themselves  from     .„      ,,   ^ 
^  ^  ''  °  Revolt  of 

their  tribute  and  their  dependence  on  Athens  had  Euboea. 
come.  Histiaea,  Eretria,  Styra,  Carystus,  and  the 
other  towns  of  the  island  rose  in  concert.  So  pressing  was  the 
emergency  considered,  that  Pericles  himself  took  the  command  of  an 
army  which  hastened  across  to  reconquer  the  island ;  but  scarcely 
had  he  reached  it  when  he  was  recalled  by  the  equally  disastrous 
news  that  Megara  had  revolted.  That  city  had  entered  the  Athenian 
alliance  of  her  own  free  will,  and  had  been  saved  by  it  from  falling 
under  the  power  of  Corinth.  But  with  signal  perfidy  her  inhabi- 
tants not  only  broke  off  their  connection  with  Athens,  but  surprised 
and  massacred  a  body  of  Athenian  troops  which  lay  within  their 
walls.  It  was  a  small  consolation  that  their  port  of  Nisaea 
remained  in  the  hands  of  Athens.  Corinth,  Epidaurus,  and  Sicyon 
lent  their  encouragement  to  their  revolted  Dorian  kinsmen.  Nor 
was  this  the  end  of  the  misfortunes  of  Athens  ;  it  was  remembered 

that  the  five  years'  truce  with  Sparta  was  on  the  eve  _ 

^  Renewed  war 

of  expirmg,  and  ominous  preparations  fur  war  were  with  spana, 
being  made  in  Peloponnesus.     The  expectation  was     *'*^^"^- 
well-grounded ;    Athens'  extremity  was  Sparta's  opportunity,  and 
when  the  five  years  were  over  war  was  promptly  declared. 

In  the  spring  of  446  B.C.  the  young  king  Pleistoanax  and  his 
guardian  Cleandridas  led  an  overwhelming  force  from  Pelopon- 
nesus into  the  Megarid,  and  prepared  to  attack  Attica.  They  had 
reached  Eleusis  when  they  suddenly  halted,  and  after  a  few  daya 


266  Athens  at  the  Height  of  her  Poiver.        [446  b.c. 

returned  home.     It  was  soon  rumoured  abroad  that  bribery  had 

been  at  work.     Spartan  generals  were  notoriously  venal,  and  it  is 

probable  that  the  report  was  true,  which  related  that  Pericles  had 

entered  into  secret  relations  with  the  enemy,  and  paid  a  vast  sum 

to  Cleandridas,  perhaps  to  Pleistoanax  also,  on  the  condition  that 

they  should  find  excuses  for  causing  the  expedition  to  fail.      This 

at  least  is  certain,  that  when  the  Peloponnesian  army  returned,  the 

Ephors  apprehended  and  tried  both  the  king  and  his  guardian, 

convicted  them,  and  sent  both  into  banishment. 

When  this  danger  was    passed,  Pericles  took  fifty  ships  and 

five  thousand  hoplites,  and  hastened  across  to  Euboea.     The  main 

force  of  Athens,  both  by  land  and  sea,  was  left  behind 
Euboea  re-  -,%.         r~,  i  -n  i 

conquered,    to  guard  against  attack  from  Cormth  or  Peloponnesus. 

****  •  •  "With  the  force  that  was  entrusted  to  him,  Pericles 
carried  out  a  most  brilliant  campaign ;  he  retook  city  after  city 
till  the  whole  island  was  subdued,  and  finally  strengthened  the  hold 
of  Athens  on  the  land  across  the  Euripus  by  planting  a  second 
Cleruchy  therein.  The  land  for  this  settlement  was  taken  from 
the  exiled  oligarchs  of  Histiaea. 

But  Euboea  was  the  only  one  of  her  numerous  losses  which 
Athens  was  destined  to  recover.  The  odds  against  her  were  so 
great  that  Pericles  himself  shrank  from  the  idea  of  continuing  the 
contest.  He  let  it  be  known  at  Sparta  that  Athens  was  ready  to 
treat  for  peace  on  the  basis  of  abandoning  her  claim  to  any  empire 
by  land.  When  negotiations  were  found  to  be  feasible,  an  embassy 
headed  by   Callias  was   sent  to  negotiate  with  the 

The  "Thirty  ''  ° 

Years' Peace."ephors.  They  conceded  everything  on  land  that 
^  '  ■  Sparta  and  her  allies  could  ask,  and  a  "  Thirty  Years' 
Peace"  was  concluded  between  the  belligerents.  Athens  recognized 
the  hegemony  of  Sparta  in  Peloponnesus,  while  Sparta  undertook 
not  to  interfere  with  the  confederacy  of  Delos.  All  Athenian 
alliances  with  outlying  states,  such  as  Achaia  or  Troezen,  were 
abrogated,  and  the  garrisons  which  she  maintained  in  Nisaea  and 
certain  other  outlying  fortresses  withdrawn.  Megara  and  Boeotia 
were  recognized  as  free  and  autonomous  states,  and  enrolled  among 
the  allies  of  Sparta.  To  sum  up  the  conditions  of  the  peace,  we 
may  say  that  Athens  gave  up  everything  on  land,  asking  in  return 
nothing  but  that  her  naval  supremacy  should  be  left  untouched 


445 B.C.]  Peace  ivith  Persia.  267 

Not  long  after  the  conclusion  of  the  "  Thirty  Years'  Peace," 
Athens  concluded  another  important  piece  of  negotiation.  Now 
that  Cimon  was  dead  there  was  no  one  among  her  End  of  the 
statesmen  who  desired  to  prosecute  the  never-ending  ^^r^a**^ 
war  with  Persia.  The  campaigns  in  Egypt  had  failed  445  B.C. 
so  signally  and  cost  so  many  lives  that  no  further  laud  operations 
were  likely  to  be  undertaken,  while  by  sea  Persia  had  nothing 
more  to  lose.  Accordingly  Callias,  the  successful  negotiator  at 
Sparta,  was  sent  up  to  Susa  to  propose  conditions  of  peace  to  King 
Artaxerxos.  Athenian  vanity  in  after  years  fabled  that  Callias 
extorted  such  conditions  as  he  chose  from  the  Persian,  even  so  ft\r 
as  to  make  him  promise  to  send  no  war-vessels  west  of  the  Cyanean 
rocks  at  the  mouth  of  the  Bosphorus,  and  the  Chelidonian  Cape  in 
Lycia.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  no  formal  treaty  seems  to  have 
been  concluded,  and  Callias  on  his  return  was  prosecuted  for  wilful 
mismanagement  of  the  negotiation.  However,  by  a  working  agree- 
ment with  the  satraps  of  Asia  Minor,  a  modus  vivendi  was 
established.  The  Athenians  and  their  confederates  abstained  from 
any  further  attacks  on  Persian  territory,  while  the  satraps  remained 
contented  with  the  inland  and  made  no  attempt  to  regain  the  coast. 
Nevertheless  the  names  of  the  lost  cities  of  Ionia  and  Caria  still 
remained  inscribed  on  the  tribute-roll  of  the  Great  King,  and  the 
Persian  power  awaited  its  opportunity  to  reassert  all  its  old 
rights. 


^^^^'^^^ 


}1    ,\..Z.^-^c.,U-^ 


-l   .-t-Cy   / 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

THE    YEARS   OF   PEACE,   445-431  B.C. — PERICLES   AND   THE 
ATHENIAN   EMPIRE. 

The  "Thirty  Years'  Peace  "  concluded  between  Athens  and  Sparta 
in  445  B.C.,  though  not  destined  to  endure  for  half  of  its  appointed 
time,  gave  Greece  some  fourteen  years  of  comparative  quiet.  The 
war  which  it  terminated  had  not  brought  about  any  final  balance 
of  power;  it  had  merely  settled  that  Sparta  should  retain  a  hegemony 
on  land,  and  that  Athens  should  confine  her  empire  to  the  sea. 
Which  was  the  stronger  had  not  yet  been  decided,  and  till  this 
was  known  it  was  impossible  that  any  permanent  peace  should  be 
established.  Nevertheless,  the  two  great  powers  having  made  trial 
of  each  other's  strength,  and  discovered  that  the  final  struggle 
for  mastery  would  be  long  and  exhausting,  were  in  no  hurry  to 
recommence  hostilities.  It  required  the  accumulated  giievances 
of  fourteen  years  to  bring  them  again  into  collision. 

At  Athens  these  years  coincided  with  the  zenith  of  the  power 

and  influence  of  Pericles,  who  was  practically  first  minister  of  the 

Omnipotence '^^P'lblic  for  the  whole  period,  though  he  had  several 

of  Pericles,  times  to  undergo  attacks  on  his  policy  and  to  suffer 
temporary  eclipses  of  his  popularity.  Now  that  Cimon  was  dead 
there  was  no  one  in  the  state  who  could  hope  to  vie  in  personal 
Influence  with  Pericles.  The  conservative  party  could  only  oppose 
to  him  Thucydides  son  of  Melesias,  a  statesman  of  far  iuferior 
capacity  and  power.  In  the  democratic  pirty  there  was  no  one 
since  the  murder  of  Ephialtes,  who  in  any  measure  approachea 
the  importance  of  the  great  leader.  He  was,  in  fact,  so  pre- 
eminently the  leading  man  in  the  state  that  his  enemies  did  not 
scruple  to  call  him  its  tyrant,  and  to  insinuate  that  his  appearance, 


446  B.C.  Domestic  Policy  of  Pericles.  269 

demeanour,  and  oratory  bore  a  marked  resemblance   to   those  of 
Peisistratus. 

In  his  domestic  policy  Pericles  set  himself  to  work  out  to  its 
full  extent  the  movement  which  he  had  begun  by  his  attack  on 
the  Areopagus,  He  set  to  work  to  thoroughly  democratize  all  the 
institutions  of  the  state,  to  do  away  with  all  the  checks  which 
limited  the  omnipotence  of  the  Ecclesia  in  political  and  the 
Dicasteries  in  judicial  matters.  While  he  himself  was  alive  the 
consequences  of  this  policy  were  not  immediately  apparent,  for 
the  people  was  so  habitually  ready  to  follow  him,  that  its  decrees 
seldom  lacked  the  unity  of  purpose  which  marks  the  action  of  a 
single  mind.  As  long  as  the  Ecclesia  let  itself  be  guided  by  one 
leader  the  real  effects  of  a  purely  democratic  constitution  did  not 
make  themselves  felt.  It  was  only  after  his  death,  when  the 
assembly  found  itself  urged  in  many  different  directions  by  a  crowd 
of  statesmen  who  agreeed  in  nothing  but  their  mediocre  ability, 
that  the  defects  of  "  government  by  plebiscite "  became  visible, 
and  measures  that  indicated  energy  or  vacillation,  desire  for  war 
or  desire  for  peace,  were  passed  in  chaotic  succession,  according  as 
the  passion  of  the  moment  decreed. 

One  of  the  first  measures  of  Pericles  was  the  complete  ^'ulgarization 
of  the  archonship.  In  456  B.C.  it  was  opened  to  the  Zeugitae, 
having  been  up  to  that  time  confined  to  the  wealthier  classes.  Nor 
was  this  all.  Very  soon  men  who  were  not  even  possessed  of  the 
modest  income  of  a  Zeugites,  appeared  as  candidates,  and  were  not 
refused.  The  only  formality  retained  was  that  when  the  lot  fell  on 
them  they  were  not  registered  as  Thetes,  but  as  Zeugitae. 

Among  the  most  characteristic  of  the  features  of  the  policy  of 
Pericles  were  the  laws  which  subsidized  the  poorer  citizens  for 
their  trouble  in  attending  to  the  affairs  of  the  state.  Payment  of 
Instead  of  holding  that  only  those  who  interested  Dicasteries. 
themselves  in  such  matters  should  be  encouraged  to  take  part  in 
pubhc  business,  Pericles  desired  to  attract  every  citizen  to  the 
Ecclesia  and  the  law  courts,  and  used  the  most  direct  means  to 
secure  their  attention  by  providing  them  with  pay  out  of  the 
public  purse.  At  some  date  early  in  the  fifth  century  the  Heliaea, 
which  Cleisthenes  had  instituted  as  the  supreme  court  of  justice 
for  the  state,  had  been  divided  into  the  smaller  bodies  known  as 


270  The  Age  of  Pericles. 

Dicasteries.  It  was  probably  because  of  the  large  increase  of 
business  which  came  before  it, — as  the  archonship  gradually  lost 
credit  and  men  ceased  to  be  satisfied  to  take  their  lawsuits  before 
the  six  junior  archons  for  trial, — that  this  division  took  place.  The 
work  of  the  Dicasteries  was  still  more  increased  when  Pericles  and 
ICphialtes  stripped  the  magistrates  of  well-nigh  all  their  judicial 
powers.  But  the  largest  rise  in  the  number  of  suits  needing  a 
court  to  decide  them,  must  have  resulted  from  the  gradual  increase 
of  the  custom  of  sending  cases  pending  between  members  of  the 
Confederacy  of  Delos  to  be  tried  at  Athens.  It  was  but  natural 
that  legal  disputes  between  two  of  her  subject  allies  should  be 
settled  by  the  head  of  the  league ;  but  not  only  these,  but  all  cases 
in  which  an  Athenian  was  either  plaintiff  or  defendant,  and  finally, 
as  it  would  appear,  all  important  suits — even  though  they  were 
between  citizens  of  the  same  city — were  called  up  to  the  supreme 
court  of  justice.  The  vast  number  of  trials  on  hand  must  have 
proved  a  heavy  tax  on  the  time  and  patience  of  those  citizens 
who  were  drawn  as  jurymen,  and  found  themselves  set  down  for 
a  year's  work  in  the  Dicasteries.  But  Pericles  changed  the  face 
of  affairs  by  paying  the  Dicast,  and  thereby  made  his  position 
one  to  be  sought  rather  than  avoided.  The  sum  given  was  at  first 
one  obol — an  amount  which  seems  small  to  us,  but  was  enough  to 
be  of  consequence  to  a  poor  Athenian ;  it  was  afterwards  raised  to 
three,  nearly  the  same  as  the  hoplites  daily  pay.  From  this  time 
forward  the  Dicasteries  became  the  almost  permanent  abode  of  many 
citizens,  particularly  of  those  of  the  poorer  classes  who  were  past  the 
age  of  military  service,  and  therefore  had  no  other  duty  which  could 
override  the  liability  to  act  as  jurymen.  Forty  years  later  the 
leaders  of  the  democracy  began  to  pay  the  Ecclesia  as  well  as  the 
Dicasteries,  a  step  which  was  a  logical  carrying  out  of  Pericles' 
idea. 

The  Athenian  democrats  boasted  that  by  means  of  these  subsidies 
a  knowledge  of  law  and  politics  was  diffused  through  the  whole 
body  of  citizens,  and  a  level  of  political  intelligence  reached  with 
which  no  other  state  in  Greece  could  vie.  This  was  to  a  certain 
extent  true ;  but  there  is  a  limit  to  the  educating  influence  of 
politics  or  lawsuits,  and  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  that 
country  was  likely  to  be  well  governed  where  every  citizen  aspired 


Pericles  and  State  Doles.  271 

to  be  a  professional  statesman  and  judge,  and  was  paid  for  his 
aspirations.  The  enemies  of  Pericles  summed  up  the  results  of 
his  legislation  by  saying  that  it  made  the  Athenians  idle,  loquacious, 
and  money-loving.  It  led  men,  they  complained,  to  spend  more 
time  than  was  right  in  hanging  about  the  Pnyx  and  the  law- 
courts  ;  it  set  every  one  practising  public  oratory  or  judicial  plead- 
ing ;  it  induced  Athenians  to  think  that  they  ought  to  be  paid  for 
carrying  out  the  primary  duties  of  citizenship — liabilities  which 
ought  to  be  regarded  as  sacred  trusts  rather  than  as  work,  deserving 
remuneration.  Probably  the  opponents  of  Pericles  had  the  greater 
share  of  reason  on  their  side ;  it  is  likely  that  the  state  suffered 
more  from  the  encouragement  of  amateur  statesmanship  than  it 
gained  by  the  increased  amoimt  of  political  intelligence  which 
prevailed  in  the  multitude. 

The  system  of  subsidizing  the  poor  did  not  stop  short  in  the 
Ecclesia  and  the  Dicasteries;  it  was  carried  by  Pericles  himself 
into  other  spheres  of  life.  He  was  the  author  of  laws  state 
by  which  the  state  charged  itself  with  numerous  I'oies. 
doles  and  payments  on  the  occasion  of  public  festivals.  It  is  said 
that  these  measures  originated  in  his  opposition  to  Cimon :  the 
wealthy  conservative  statesman  had  been  accustomed  to  throw 
open  his  parks  and  gardens  to  the  multitude,  and  to  keep  free 
house  for  his  demesmen.  Pericles'  private  means  did  not  permit 
him  to  practise  bribery  on  such  a  magnificent  scale,  and  he  is  said 
to  have  adopted  the  idea  of  supplying  from  the  public  i)urse 
what  was  not  forthcoming  from  his  own.  He  is  recorded  as  having 
been  the  proposer  of  a  number  of  grants  of  public  money  made  at 
festivals,  in  order  that  the  poor  might  not  only  witness  state 
pageants,  but  might  even  buy  themselves  meat  and  wine  at  the 
public  expense  whenever  days  of  public  rejoicing  came  round.  It 
was,  in  short,  an  anticipation  of  the  system  whereby  Rome  in  a  later 
age  was  demoralized  bj'^  the  doles  and  games  of  her  emperors.  The 
worst  feature  of  such  gi-ants  and  of  all  kindred  institutions  was 
that  the  money  did  not  really  come  out  of  the  treasury  of  the 
Attic  state,  but  out  of  that  of  her  allies,  the  confederates  of  the 
league  of  Delos,  for  without  their  accumulated  tribute  the  dis 
tributions  would  have  been  impossible. 

A  not   less    efficacious  method   for  draining   the   treasury  was 


272  The  Age  of  Pericles.  [440  b.c- 

discovered  when  Pericles  set  to  work  to  streDgthea  and  beautify 
The  buildings  Athens  out  of  the  commoa  fuuds  of  the  league.     Wo 

of  Pericles,  have  already  spoken  of  the  third  Long  Wall  which 
he  built  between  the  upper  city  and  the  Peiraeus ;  but  this  was 
one  of  the  least  ambitious  of  his  ventures  in  stone  and  mortar. 
Far  more  important  among  his  achievements  were  the  noble  public 
buildings  with  which  he  adorned  Athens.  Some  of  these  lay  in 
the  level  parts  of  the  city ;  such  was  the  Odeum  at  the  foot  of  the 
south-eastern  cliff  of  the  Acropolis,  whose  roof — copied,  according 
to  legend,  from  the  vast  and  gorgeous  tent  of  Xerxes — sheltered 
musical  performances.  Others  lay  in  the  Peiraeus,  such  as  the 
great  Corn  Hall  and  the  Deigma,  or  exchange  for  merchants. 
Even  outside  Athens  magnificent  temples  were  commenced  at 
Rhamnus,  Eleasis,  and  Sunium.  But  by  far  the  most  important 
group  of  buildings  which  Pericles  took  in  hand  were  those  situated 
on  the  Acropolis.  At  its  western  end,  where  alone  the  slope  was 
Tjjg         accessible,  the  architect  Mnesicles  was  set  to  build 

Propyiaea.  the  Propylaea,  or  entrance  halls  of  the  citadel.  These 
works  alone  cost  two  thousand  talents.  They  consisted  of  a 
magnificent  flight  of  marble  steps,  seventy  feet  broad,  leading  up 
to  a  double  colonnade,  through  which  the  visitor  entered  the  Acro- 
polis. This  central  colonnade  was  flanked  by  two  projecting  wings 
carried  along  the  edge  of  the  cliff,  and  opening  with  smaller  rows 
of  columns  on  to  the  central  staircase.  The  northern  wing  con- 
tained a  celebrated  chamber  called  the  Pinacotheca,  from  its  being 
covered  with  frescoes  of  the  great  painter  Polygnotus. 

After  passing  through  the  Propylaea,  the  visitor  found  himself 

facing  the  colossal   bronze   statue  of  Athene   Promachos,  which 

Athene       represented  the  guardian  goddess  of  the  city  in  full 

Promachos.  armour,  with  outstretched  spear  and  shield.  This 
great  work  of  Pheidias  was  more  than  fifty  feet  in  height,  and 
was  raised  t\yenty  feet  more  by  its  pedestal,  till  it  overtopped  the 
temple  roofs ;  the  golden  plume  of  Athene's  helmet  was  to  be  seen 
far  out  at  sea,  and  formed  a  well-known  landmark  to  the  sailors 
of  the  Gulf  of  Aegina. 

Beyond  the  statue  of  Athene  Promachos  stood  the  greatest  oi 
the  works  which  Pericles  called  into  being — the  famous  Parthenon, 
the  largest  and  most  beautiful,  though  not  the  most  revered,  of  the 


438  B.C.]  Building  of  the  Parthenon.  273 

temples  on  the  Acropolis,     The  neighbouring  temple  of  Athene 
Polias '  contained  the  sacred  wooden  image  of  im-  i^e 

memorial  antiquity  which  was  the  Palladium  of  the      Parthenon, 
city,  the  holy  olive  tree  which  had  sprouted  forth  again  after  it 
had  been  felled  by  the  axe  of  the  Persian,  and  the  living  snake 
which  symbolized  the  presence  of  the  goddess.    But  if  the  Parthenon 
did  not  gather  around  it  any  of  the  old  superstitious  awe  which 
the  neighbouring   building  called  forth,  it  symbolized  to  every 
Athenian  the  imperial  greatness  of  his  city.     Not  only  was  its 
glorious  decoration  paid  for  out  of  the  funds  of  the  subject  allies, 
but  its  walls  themselves  served  as  the  treasury  for  the  hoarded 
tribute  money  which  gave  Athens  her  strength,  while  the  inscrip- 
tions which  set  forth  the  amount  that  each  member  of  the  Delian 
League  paid  to  the  central  power  were  engraved  without.     The 
architecture  of  the  Parthenon  was  the  work  of  Ictinus,  its  sculptures 
and  reliefs  that  of  Pheidias.     Not  only  did  the  great  sculptor  place 
in   the  "pediments,"   or  eastern  and  western   gable-ends  of  the 
temple,  elaborate  groups   representing  the   birth  of  Athene  and 
the  strife  of  Athene  and  Poseidon,  but  he  filled  the  ninety-two 
"  metopes,"  or  square  spaces  which  lay  above  the  capitals  of  the 
columns  and  beneath  the  edge  of  the  roof,  with  as  many  separate 
compositions,  showing  the  battles  of  the  ancient  heroes  with  the 
Amazons  and  the  Centaurs.     Moreover,  within  the  outer  colonnade 
of  the  Parthenon  he  traced  along  the  upper  portion  of  the  wall  of 
the  temple  itself  an  endless  procession  of  graceful  figures,  repre- 
senting the  ceremonies  of  the  Panathenaic  festival — the  setting 
forth  of  the  priests  and  magistrates,  the  maidens  and  knights  of 
Athens,  to  do  honour  to  Athene  on  the  day  of  her  greatest  festival. 
No  less  than  four  thousand  square  feet  of  surface  were  covered  by 
the  works  of  the  sculptor's  untiring  hand.     While  the  hinder  part 
of  the  temple,  called  the  Opisthodomos,  served  as  a  vast  strong- 
room for  the  treasures  of  the   state,  the  front  half  formed  the 
actual    sanctuary.      Here  was  placed  the   most   gorgeous  of  the 
works  of  Pheidias — a  colossal  figure  of  Athene,  wrought  not  in 
marble  or  bronze,  but  in  ivory  and  gold.    Her  robes  alone  contained 
forty  talents'  weight  of  gold  (£9750),  and  her  armour  was  studded 
with  precious  stones  of  great  price.     But  the  mere  monetary  worth 
•  Better  known  as  the  Erechthoum. 

T 


2  74  '^^^^  -^S^  ^f  Pericles. 

of  this  imposing  figure  was  as  nothing  compared  with  its  artistic 

value,  as  the  masterpiece  of  the  greatest  sculptor  of  the  ancient 

world  ;  there  was  nothing  in  Greece  which  could  compare  with  it, 

save  the  colossal  Zeus  at  Olympia  whi^h  Pheidias  constructed  a  few 

years  later.     If  Pericles  sinned  against  international  morality  in 

using  the  treasures  of  the  Delian  League  for   the  adornment  of 

Athens,  it  must  at  any  rate  be   confessed  that   he  applied   the 

embezzled  talents  to  no  unworthy  end. 

The  final  developments  of  Pericles'  constitutional  changes  did  not 

come  about  till  the  party  which  opposed  them  had  been  completely 

swept  out  of  the  field.     We  have  already  mentioned 
Ostracism  of  ^  '' 

Thucydides,  that  after  the  death  of  Cimon  the  leadership  of  the 
conservative  and  Philo-Spartan  party  fell  into  the 
hands  of  his  kinsman,  Thucydides  the  son  of  Melesias.  This  states- 
man kept  up  a  bitter  opposition  to  all  the  proposals  of  Pericles  ; 
he  taught  his  followers  to  sit  close  together  in  the  assembly,  and 
compensate  for  their  lack  of  numbers  by  their  simultaneous  shouts 
and  well-drilled  applause.  But  this  custom  of  herding  together 
also  served  to  betray  to  their  enemies  their  decided  inferiority  in 
voting  strength.  The  democrats  nicknamed  them  "  the  Few," 
and  were  encouraged  to  persevere  by  the  manifest  majority  which 
they  possessed.  It  was  in  vain  that  Thucydides  denounced  all  the 
measures  of  Pericles  in  terms  of  warm  moral  indignation,  declaring 
that  he  had  brought  dishonour  on  Atliens  by  inducing  her  to 
turn  to  her  private  use  moneys  that  were  contributed  for  the 
public  benefit  of  Greece ;  and  that  all  the  world  would  consider  it 
the  act  of  a  tyrant  city  to  use  the  gold  of  the  allies  in  subsidizing 
her  proletariate  and  adorning  her  streets  with  temples  and  monu- 
ments :  "  when  Athens  wasted  talents  by  the  thousand  from  the 
Delian  treasury  in  gilding  her  statues  and  carving  her  shrines, 
she  was  but  acting  like  a  light  and  vain  woman  decking  herself 
with  ill-gotten  jewels."  Pericles  made  his  usual  reply — that  as 
long  as  Athens  kept  off  Persian  invasions  she  was  entitled  to 
spend  what  she  chose  out  of  the  funds  of  the  Delian  League,  and 
suppressed  the  fact  that  all  operations  against  Persia  had  been 
abandoned  since  he  came  into  power.  The  continual  bickering 
between  the  democrats  and  the  followers  of  Thucydides  lasted  till 
the  year  443  b.c  ,  when  the  persistent  but  fruitless  opposition  of 


443  B.C.J    Osh-acism  of  Thucydides,  Son  of  Melesias.         275 


Thucydides  was  brouglit  to  an  end  by  a  recourse  to  ostracism. 
The  stronger  party  voted  his  exile,  and  Pericles  was  left  without 
any  opponent  of  importance. 


^r\h^     TRIBUTE 


Walker  &  BoutalUc. 


The  foreign  policy  which  was  pursued  by  Athens  under  the 
direction  of  Pericles  was  directed  to  vigorous  extension  of  her 
power  in  all  direction^,  except  indeed  in  those  continental  districts 


276  The  Age  of  Pericles.  [443 b.o. 

close  at  hand,  where  interference  would  have  brought  about  an 
immediate  war  with  Sparta  or  Thebes. 

The  organization  of  the  Delian  League  had  now  been  perfected. 
It  embraced  all  the  coast-cities  of  Asia  Minor  from  Artane,  just 
outside  the  Bosphorus  in  Bithynia,  down  to  Calydna 
the  Athenian  in  Lycia.  Similarly  in  Europe  an  unbroken  chain  of 
empire.  ^^tj^gnian  tributaries  stretched  along  the  Thracian  and 
Chalcidian  shores  from  Byzantium  to  Aeneia.  All  the  islands  of 
the  Aegean,  except  the  insignificant  Dorian  states  of  Melos  and 
Thera,  were  also  numbered  among  the  confederates.  Even  outside 
these  limits  there  were  many  cities  which  had  joined  the  league ; 
Nymphaeum  in  the  distant  Tauric  Chersonese  (Crimea),  and 
Celenderis  in  Cilicia,  were  members  of  the  Athenian  alliance  no  less 
than  Eretria  or  Aegina.  Among  the  two  hundred  and  forty-nine 
cities  whose  names  appear  on  the  tribute  lists  which  have  been 
dug  out  from  the  ruins  of  Alliens,  only  three — Samos,  Lesbos, 
and  Chios — had  refused  to  compound  their  original  contingents  of 
ships  for  a  money  payment,  and  still  possessed  a  war-navy.  The 
remaining  two  hundred  and  forty-six  were  divided  for  financial 
purposes  into  five  groups,  known  as  the  Thracian,  Insular,  Helles- 
pontine,  Ionian,  and  Cariau  tribute-districts.  At  fixed  times 
tax-collecting  galleys  sailed  round  the  Aegean  and  Hellespont  and 
gathered  in  the  contributions  due  from  each  city,  which  were  finally 
paid  over  to  the  Hellenotamiae  and  stored  in  the  Acropolis  of 
Athens.  The  synodic  meetings  seem  to  have  dropped  entirely  out 
of  use  ;  if  any  occurred  they  were  mere  formal  assemblies,  at  which 
no  one  except  Athenian  deputies  appeared.  The  total  annual  sum 
which  the  tribute  brought  in  during  the  ascendancy  of  Pericles 
was  about  six  hundred  talents ;  the  only  outgoings  for  league 
purposes  were  the  moneys  required  to  keep  sixty  Athenian  galleys 
constantly  cruising  in  the  Aegean.  Hence  it  was  possible  for  no 
less  than  nine  thousand  seven  hundred  talents  to  accumulate  m 
the  Acropolis,  in  spite  of  the  large  sums  which  were  spent  on 
Athenian  state-doles,  pageants,  and  public  edifices. 

The  amount  due  from  each  city  was  carefully  revised  every  four 
years,  and  that  justice  on  the  whole  prevailed  in  the  assessment 
appears  from  the  fact  that  places  like  Aegina  or  Naxos,  against 
which  Athens  might  have  been  expected  to  feel  a  grudge,  are  not 


443  B.C.I      Foundation  of  Atnphipolis  and  Thurii.  277 

rated  on  a  heavier  scale  than  their  more  docile  fellow-subjects. 

It  was  not  the  fact  that  they  were  over-taxed,  but  the  fact  that 

they  were  taxed  at  all  for  Athenian  objects,  which  made  the  tribute 

so  hateful  to  the  allies. 

We  have  already  spoken  of  the  Chruchies  which  were  planted 

by  Pericles  in  Euboea  after  the  rebellion  of  the  year  446  B.C. 

Similar  garrisons  of  Athenian  citizens  were  also  placed  by  him 

in  other  localities,  notably  in  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  the  old 

patrimony  of  Militiades.     Bat  such  settlements  were  not  the  only 

means  which  he  devised  for  extending  the  influeoce  of  Athens; 

actual  colonies  were  also  sent  forth  to  well-choseu  spots.     Amisus 

and  Sinope  in  Paphlagonia  were  strengthened  by  bands  of  emigrants 

despatched  under  Athenian  guidance.     The  site  of  Ennea  Hodoi  on 

the  Strymon,  so  fatal  to  the  arms  of  Athens  twenty-nine  years  before 

(see  p.  251),  was  seized  for  a  third  time,  and  fortified,  in  437  B.C. 

This  time  the  Thracians  proved  unable  to  dislodge  the  settlers,  and 

Hagnon  became  the  oekist  of  the  new  town  of  Amphipolis.     The 

Athenian  element  among  the  population  was  in  this  case  but  small, 

but  the   nationality  of  the  ofBcial  founder  served  to  constitute 

Amphipolis  a  nominal  dau2;hter-state  of  Athens.    The    „  ,     . 

J-      ^  •^  Colonies  at 

same  was  the  case  in  another  colony  of  equal  impor-  Amphipolis 
tance  in  the  far  West.  For  seventy  years  ihe  site  of 
the  great  city  of  Sybaris  on  the  lapygian  shore  had  been  lying 
desolate,  and  the  surviving  families  of  Sybarite  origin  had  been 
dwelling  scattered  through  Italy,  Pericles  now  collected  them, 
associated  with  them  a  certain  number  of  Athenian  emigrants  and 
a  much  larger  body  of  lonians  and  other  Greeks,  and  planted  a 
new  Sybaris  close  to  the  ruins  of  the  old  city.  Several  very  dis- 
tinguished men  joined  in  the  colonization  of  Sybaris ;  among  them 
were  the  historian  Herodotus,  the  philosopher  Protagoras,  and  the 
orator  Lysias,  After  a  short  time  quarrels  arose  between  the  citizens 
of  old  Sybarite  blood  and  the  settlers  from  the  East :  the  attempt 
of  the  former  to  form  themselves  into  an  oligarchy  was  put  down, 
and,  to  mark  the  changed  character  of  the  state,  the  victorious 
party  changed  its  name  to  Thurii  (443  b.c). 

The  administration  of  Pericles  was  not  disturbed  by  more  than 
one  important  campaign  during  the  fourteen  years  which  followed 
the  peace  of  445  b.c.    This  isolated  struggle  resulted  from  the  revolt 


278  The  Age  of  Pericles.  (440  b.c. 

of  Samos — one  of  the  last  three  states  of  the  Delian  League  which 
had  maintained  their  war-navies,  and  kept  themselves 

The  revolt  i  •       .  i  .   i 

of  Samos,  from  falhug  into  the  complete  subjection  which 
440  B.C.  j^^^  befallen  their  neighbours.  Samos  had  engaged 
in  a  dispute  with  Miletus  about  the  boundaries  of  her  territory 
on  the  mainland.  The  decision  of  the  question  was  referred 
to  the  Athenians,  who  awarded  the  land  to  Miletus.  But  the 
oligarchy  of  Samos  refused  to  give  up  their  claim  to  the  territory, 
and  remained  obdurate  till  a  fleet  of  forty  ships  sailed  across  from 
Athens  and  entered  their  harbour.  The  commander  was  Pericles, 
who  promptly  put  down  the  oligarchic  government,  established  a 
democracy,  and  took  off  a  hundred  hostages,  whom  he  deposited  at 
the  Athenian  Cleruchy  of  Lemnos,  This  high-handed  action  pro- 
voked the  national  sentiment  of  the  Samians;  the  remaining 
oligarchs  called  in  the  aid  of  the  satrap  Pissuthnes,  overturned  the 
new  democratic  constitution,  and  disavowed  their  membership  of 
the  Delian  League.  A  few  ships  sailed  hastily  across  to  Lemnos 
and  liberated  the  hostages,  and  then  open  war  on  Athens  was 
proclaimed.  Undeterred  by  the  memory  of  the  fates  of  Naxos 
and  Thasos,  the  Samians  thought  that  they  could  regain  their 
complete  autonomy,  and  called  on  the  other  members  of  the  Delian 
confederacy  to  join  them  in  revolt.  Of  the  whole  body  of  allies, 
however,  only  Byzantium  was  bold  enough  to  declare  its  secession 
and  face  the  wrath  of  Athens. 

The  moment  that  the  news  of  the  Samian  lising  arrived  at 
Athens  an  expedition  was  sent  off  to  attack  the  rebels,  A  fleet 
of  sixty  ships,  among  whose  ten  commanders  Pericles  held  the 
chief  place  and  the  poet  Sophocles  was  also  numbered,  crossed  the 
Aegean,  met  the  Samian  fleet  off  the  island  of  Tragia,  and  defeated 
it.  Soon  after  Pericles  was  largely  reinforced  from  Athens,  Chios, 
and  Lesbos,  till  he  had  a  hundred  and  twenty-five  vessels  with 
him,  and  was  able  to  blockade  Samos  by  sea  and  land.  But  a 
false  rumour  that  the  satrap  Pissuthnes  had  ordered  up  the 
Phoenician  fleet,  induced  hitn  to  detach  half  his  force  to  watch 
for  its  approach  along  the  Lycian  coast.  The  Samians  seized  this 
opportunity,  came  boldly  out  of  their  harbour  with  seventy  ships, 
and  engaged  the  blockading  squadron,  which  they  completely 
routed.     For  fourteen  days  they  held  the  mastery  of  the  sea,  and 


439  B.C.J  Revolt  and  Reconquest  of  Samos.  279 

were  able  to  send  out  messengers  to  beg  for  aid  from  all  quarters, 
and  especially  from  the  Spartans.  But  soon  Athenian  reinforce- 
ments came  flocking  from  all  directions,  and  the  blockade  was 
renewed.  The  Samians  held  out  with  desperate  energy ;  in  spite 
of  a  number  of  new  siege-engines  which  were  constructed  for  Pericles 
by  Artemon,  the  most  celebrated  engineer  of  the  time,  they  main- 
tained their  defence  with  complete  success.    It  was  not  till  nine 

months  were  passed,  and  it  had  become  completely  „  ^. 

i^  >  .         Subjugation 

certain  that  no  help  from  without  was  approaching  ofSamos, 
them,  that  the  islanders  capitulated.  They  were 
treated  in  accordance  with  the  precedents  of  Naxos  ana  Tnasos ; 
being  compelled  to  raze  their  walls,  give  up  their  war-ships,  and 
pay  an  indemnity  of  a  thousand  talents.  Strangely  enough,  the 
Athenians  did  not  reimpose  a  democratic  government  on  them, 
but  allowed  the  oligarchy  to  survive.  Byzantium  surrendered  the 
moment  that  the  fate  of  Samos  was  known. 

The  appeal  of  the  Samians  to  Sparta  had  nearly  brought  about 
a  general  war  in  European  Greece.  The  ephors  had  summoned 
together  a  congress  of  their  allies,  and  many  states  had  deemed 
the  opportunity  favourable  for  an  attack  on  Athens.  But  the 
Corinthians  prevailed  on  the  Spartan  government  to  hold  back, 
induced,  it  is  said,  by  the  fact  that  they  themselves  were  in  diffi- 
culties with  their  subject  allies,  and  dreaded  the  precedent  of 
encouraging  revolt.  It  was  to  be  another  series  of  grievances,  and 
not  the  wrongs  of  Samos,  that  was  to  cause  the  renewal  of  war 
in  Greece. 


c^oJ^J^ 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

THE   OUTBREAK   OF   THE   PELOPONNESIAN   WAR   AND   ITS   CAUSES, 

435-432  B.C. 

As  late  as  the  year  of  the  revolt  of  Samos  the  balance  of  opinion 
among  the  allies  of  Si>arta  was  still  in  favour  of  preserving  peace 
FeeUngat  with  Athens;  but  very  shortly  after  the  scales  had 
Sparta.  ijegun  to  incline  in  the  opposite  direction.  The 
causes  which  led  to  this  change  of  feeling  were  very  various. 
In  Sparta  itself  a  new  generation  was  now  coming  to  the  front, 
which  had  grown  up  since  the  truce  of  445  b.c.  These  younger 
men  did  not  remember  the  dangers  and  difficulties  of  the  time 
that  had  followed  the  great  earthquake  of  464  b.c.  and  the  revolt 
of  the  Helots.  Moreover,  a  dozen  years  of  unbroken  peace  had 
sufficed  to  restore  the  power  of  Sparta,  and  to  consolidate  once 
more  her  ancient  hegemony  in  Peloponnesus.  There  was  no  longer 
any  fear  of  seeing  a  renewal  of  those  Athenian  attempts  to  vrin 
territory  within  the  Isthmus  which  the  elder  men  could  remember. 
In  the  depth  of  his  heart  well-nigh  every  Spartan  felt  a  grudge 
against  Athens,  for  having  built  up  an  empire  which — even  since 
the  loss  of  her  dominion  on  land— was  sufHcient  to  overshadow 
the  comparatively  loose  and  ill-defined  hegemony  which  his  own 
city  possessed  in  Peloponnesus.  He  was  jealous  that  any  Grecian 
state  should  be  able  to  vie  with  Sparta,  and  anxious  to  fight  out 
to  a  final  decision  the  question  whether  that  state  or  Sparta  were 
really  the  stronger.  It  was  remembered  that  the  Spartan  dis- 
cipline and  the  Spartan  constitution  existed  for  the  sole  object  of 
producing  warlike  efficiency,  yet  for  more  than  a  dozen  years  no 
war  had  been  waged.  Nevertheless,  some  further  impulse  from 
without  was  reijuired  to  induce  the  slow-movmg  Lacedaemonians 


435  B.c]    lU-tvill  for  At/iens  in  Boeotia  and  Megara.     281 

to  plunge  into  war.     They  needed  the  pressure  of  circumstance  tf> 

drive  them  to  take  the  decisive  step. 

Among  the  allies  of  Sparta  there  were  several  states  which  had 

standing  grievances  against  Athens.      The  Thebans  could  never 

forget  the  ten  years  of  Athenian  supremacy  in  Boeotia, 

V   1  IP,-  ,  ,      I  Grievances  of 

and  longed   fur  their   revenge ;    moreover,  they  had    Boeotia  and 

always  before  their  eyes  the  town  of  Plataea,  once  Megara. 
a  member  of  their  own  confederacy,  but  now  an  Athenian  outpost 
pushed  forward  beyond  Cithaeron.  The  Megarians  had  a  more 
recent  and  a  more  tangible  grievance.  Athens  had  never  forgiven 
them  their  revolt  m  446  B.C.,  and  the  treacherous  massacre  of  their 
Athenian  garrison.  Though  compelled  to  make  peace  with  them. 
In  common  with  the  other  allies  of  Sparta,  in  445  B.C.,  she  had 
taken  the  first  opportunity  to  do  them  an  ill  turn.  Utilizing  as 
excuses  some  disputes  about  fugitive  slaves  and  debatable  lands 
on  the  frontier,  she  had  picked  a  quarrel  with  Megara.  Then, 
covering  her  designs  with  one  cf  those  superstitious  pleas  which 
were  so  well-known  in  Greek  diploraac}',  she  had  accused  the 
Megarians  of  sacrilege,  for  tilling  some  frontier-land  dedicated  to 
Demeter.  Finally,  as  a  punishment  for  this  alleged  sacrilege,  she 
had  closed  her  ports  and  markets  to  Megarian  merchants,  and 
compelled  all  her  subject  allies  to  do  the  same.  These  proceedings 
inflicted  a  deep  wound  on  her  Dorian  neighbour.  Megara  had 
always  been  a  naval  state,  with  a  considerable  trade  both  to  east 
and  west.  The  prohibition  to  visit  the  harbours  of  any  of  the 
members  of  the  Delian  confederacy  destroyed  half  her  commerce 
at  a  blow.  The  whole  state  languished  and  decayed  in  conse- 
quence; again  and  again  embassies  were  sent  to  beg  the  aid  of 
Sparta,  and  to  beseech  her  to  compel  the  Athenians  to  rescind 
the  obnoxious  decree.  But  for  some  time  no  result  followed  these 
petitions. 

There  was  yet  another  state,  not  far  from  Megara,  whose  con- 
dition was  likely  to  provoke  discontent  at  Sparta.  Aegina,  once 
the  equal  and  the  rival  of  Athens,  and  for  many  years  a  member 
of  the  Peloponnesian  alliance,  had  been  compelled,  in  the  days  of 
Sparta's  weakness,  to  become  a  mere  dependency  of  Athens  and  to 
join  the  Delian  confederac}'.  Though  no  formal  embassy  could  be 
sent  by  her,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  her  Dorian  oligarchy 


282  Origin  of  the  Peloponnesian    War.         '4353.0. 

contrived  to  keep  her  unhappy  condition  b.  fore  the  eyes  of  the 
cphors,  and  to  make  private  petition  for  release  from  the  Athenian 
yoke.  But  in  spite  of  all  their  grievances,  it  was  neither  Thebes, 
Megara,  nor  Aegina  which  was  to  play  the  chief  part  in  driving 
Sparta  into  a  new  struggle  with  Athens.  Corinth,  the  state  which 
in  439  B.C.  had  been  the  strongest  partisan  of  peace,  was  destined 
to  become,  under  the  stress  of  circumstances,  the  chief  advocate 
of  war. 

AVe  have  already  had  occasion  to  mention  the  fact  that  Corinth 
was  far  more  successful  than  other  Greek  states  in  keeping  her 

Corinth  and  colonies  in  a  state  of  dependence.  The  chaia  of  cities 
corcyra.  -^vhich  she  had  founded  along  the  western  coast  of 
Greece  was,  with  one  exception,  retained  under  her  power.  Am- 
bracia,  Leucas,  Auactorium,  and  the  other  colonies  were  united 
by  a  close  alliance  to  their  mother-city ;  they  formed  a  commercial 
union  whose  currency  was  interchangeable,  and  a  political  con- 
federacy whose  resources  were  always  used  in  common.  Corinth 
was  the  managing  partner  in  the  alliance,  and  her  colonies  were 
content  to  follow  her  guidance.  But  to  the  north  of  the  other 
Corinthian  cities  lay  one  colony  which  had  always  taken  a  different 
line.  Corcyra  had  from  her  first  foundation  been  hostile  to  her 
mother-city.  After  a  severe  struggle  she  had  made  herself  inde- 
pendent in  the  seventh  century ;  the  tyrant  Periander  had  once 
reduced  her  to  obedience,  but  after  his  death  she  had  again  torn 
herself  free  from  the  Corinthian  alliance.  Lying  as  she  did  full 
in  the  course  of  the  trade  route  from  Corinth  to  Tarentum  and 
Syracuse,  she  was  frequently  able  to  interfere  with  the  commerce 
of  her  mother-country,  and  used  her  power  to  the  full.  It  was  not 
unnatural,  then,  that  Corinth  and  Corcyra  were  bitter  enemies. 

On  the  Illyrian  shore,  some  distance  to  the  north,  lay  the  town 
of  Epidamnus,  better  known  in  later  days  as  Dyrhachium.  The 
Corcyraeans  had  founded  the  place,  but,  in  accordance  with  the 
universal  usage  of  Greece,  had  taken  a  Corinthian,  the  Heracleid 
Phallus,  as  the  official  oekist  of  the  settlement.  Epidamnus  was  m 
435  B.C.  engaged  in  one  of  those  fierce  civil  wai's  between  the  oli- 
garchy and  the  democracy  to  which  every  Greek  state  was  liable. 
The  populace  finally  expelled  their  opponents,  who  took  refuge  with 
the  neighbouring  Illyrian  tribe  of  the  Taulantii,  and  stirred  tJiem 


435  B.C.)  The  Troubles  at  Epidavtnus.  283 

up  to  attack  the  city.  Being  cooped  up  within  their  walls  by  thu 
barbarians,  and  prevented  from  cultivating  their  ter-  The  troubles 
ritory,  the  Epidamnian  democrats  were  reduced  to  ^*  Epidamnus. 
great  straits ;  accordingly  they  made  application  for  help  to  the 
Corcyvaeans,  as  their  nearest  neighbours  and  kinsmen.  The 
Corcyraean  government,  however,  refused  to  interfere  in  the  party 
quarrel,  and  would  not  grant  assistance.  It  then  occurred  to  the 
Epidamnians  that  they  were  connected  with  Corinth  also,  from 
the  fact  that  their  oekist  had  been  a  Corinthian.  Accordingly 
they  sent  an  embassy  to  beg  from  the  mother-city  for  the  aid 
which  they  had  been  unable  to  obtain  from  the  daughter.  The 
Corinthians  were  delighted  to  have  the  opportunity  of  doing 
Corey ra  an  ill  turn,  by  obtaining  her  nearest  neighbour  as  an  ally, 
and  extending  their  influence  up  the  Illyrian  G-iilf.  If  Epidamnus 
were  incUided  in  their  commercial  league,  the  harm  that  Corcyia 
could  do  them  would  be  much  diminished.  Accordingly  they 
received  the  Epidamnian  ambassadors  with  effusion,  and  promised 
them  prompt  assistance.  Not  only  did  they  equip  a  small  fleet, 
and  place  on  board  of  it  a  garrison  for  Epidamnus,  but  they  invited 
emigrants  to  come  forward  to  reinforce  the  thinned  population  of 
the  place,  and  guaranteed  them  the  protection  of  Corinth.  This 
expedition  reached  Epidamnus,  and  greatly  strengthened  its  power 
of  resistance ;  but  at  the  same  time  it  called  down  on  the  town  the 
wrath  of  Corcyra.  The  Corcyraeans  were  indignant  that  Corinth 
should  trespass  in  waters  which  they  considered  to  be  their  own, 
and  resolved  to  put  an  end  to  the  alliance  of  Corinth  and  Epi- 
damnus by  force.  Accordingly  they  sent  a  fleet  of  forty  ships  to 
blockade  the  town  from  the  side  of  the  sea,  and  entered  into  an 
alliance  with  the  Epidamnian  oligarchs  and  the  Taulantii,  who  were 
besieging  it  on  land. 

This  action  on  the  part  of  Corcyra  was  certain  to  lead  to  open 
war.  The  Corinthians  took  up  the  challenge,  equipped  thirty  ships 
of  their  own,  called  out  contingents  from  their  Leu-  -vp-arof  Oorinth 
cadian  and  Ambraciot  colonists,  and  obtained  aid  and  Corcyra, 
also  from  Megara,  whose  citizens  —  debarred  by 
Athens  from  eastern  trade — were  eager  to  find  new  outlets  to  the 
west.  Late  in  the  year  435  B.C.  a  combined  fleet  of  seventy-five 
galleys,  under  the  Corinthian  Aristeus,  set  sail  to  raise  the  blockade 


284  Origin  of  the  Peloponnesian   lV(f>'.  433  b.c 

of  Epidamnus.  They  were  met  off  the  promontory  of  Actium  by 
eiglity  Corcyraean  vessels,  who  completely  defeated  them,  with  the 
loss  of  fifteen  ships.  On  the  same  day  Epidamnus  surrendered,  the 
native  population  consenting  to  receive  back  their  exiled  oligarchy, 
while  the  Corinthian  garrison  were  made  prisoners  of  war. 

This  check  caused  the  wildest  wrath  at  Corinth,  and  extensive 
preparations  were  at  once  set  on  foot  to  repair  the  disaster.  The 
Corinthians  spent  the  whole  of  434  B.C.  in  strengthening  and 
equipping  their  fleet,  and  by  the  spring  of  the  next  year  had  ninety 
galleys  ready  for  sea.  They  bade  their  subject  allies  follow  their 
example,  and  raised  thirty-eight  ships  from  them.  This  armament, 
strengthened  by  a  dozen  Megarian  and  ten  Eleian  vessels,  composed 
a  fleet  which  Corcyra  could  not  hope  to  withstand,  although  she 
was  accounted  the  second  naval  power  of  Greece,  and  owned  not 
less  than  a  hundred  and  twenty  triremes. 

The  Corcyraeans  had  up  to  this  moment  held  themselves  aloof 
from  Grecian  politics;  not  even  such  a  crisis  as  the  invasion  of 
corcjrraasks  Xerxes  had  been  able  to  induce  them  to  interest 
Athens^  themselves  in  anything  that  went  on  to  the  east  of 
433  B.C.  Cape  Malea.  But  when  they  had  drawn  upon  them- 
selves such  a  storm  as  was  now  impending,  they  were  constrained 
to  look  around  for  allies.  All  the  naval  states  of  Western  Greece 
were  leagued  with  Corinth ;  their  Italiot  neighbours  across  the  sea 
had  no  war- fleets  of  importance.  JSTowhere  could  they  discover 
any  power  except  Athens  which  could  afford  them  the  help  they 
needed.  After  many  searchings  of  heart,  and  with  great  reluctance, 
the  Corcyraeans  resolved  to  apply  to  be  admitted  into  the  alliance 
of  Athens,  although  they  thereby  sacrificed  the  comjilete  indepen- 
dence which  had  hitherto  been  their  pride.  In  the  early  spring  of 
433  B.C.  they  despatched  envoys  to  solicit  the  conclusion  of  an 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance.  The  moment  that  the  news  of 
this  move  arrived  at  Corinth,  the  government  of  that  city  sent  a 
counter-embassy  to  persuade  the  Athenians  to  refuse  the  i^etition 
of  their  enemies.  Thus  it  came  to  pass  that  on  the  day  on  which 
the  Corcyraean  ambassadors  appeared  before  the  Ecclesia  with  their 
propositions,  the  Corinthians  were  also  present  to  set  forth  the 
arguments  against  the  conclusion  of  the  alliance. 

Thucydides  has  -oreserved  for  us  the  substance  of  the  speeches 


433B.C.J  Quarrel  of  Corinth  and  Corcyra.  285 

made  by  the  rival  envoys  on  this  occasion ;  though  expressed  in 
his  own  language,  they  fairly  represent  the  arguments  employed 
during  the  debate,  at  which  the  historian  himself  was  probably 
present.  The  Corcyraeans  appealed  entirely  to  the  self-interest  of 
Athens  \.  they  acknowledged  that  they  had  no  moral  claim  for  her 
assistance,  but  pointed  out  that  they  possessed  the  second  largest 
navy  in  Greece,  and  that,  if  they  were  allowed  to  fall  under  the  power 
of  Corinth,  that  navy  might  at  any  time  be  turned  against  Athens. 
They  declared  that  war  between  Athens  and  the  Peloponnesian 
alliance,  of  whicb  Corinth  was  such  a  prominent  member,  was  cer- 
tain to  break  out  ere  long,  and  asked  whether  it  was  better  that  the 
Corcyraean  fleet  should  be  found  on  that  day  on  the  side  of  Athens? 
or  on  that  of  her  enemies.  As  to  the  idea  that  the  conclusion  of 
an  alliance  with  themselves  would  bring  on  an  immediate  war  with 
Corinth  and  Sparta,  they  declared  that  the  reverse  would  be  the 
case ;  for  the  Athenian  and  Corcyraean  navies,  if  united,  would  be 
so  powerful  that  the  Peloponnesians  would  not  dare  to  attack 
them. 

While  the  Corcyraeans  spoke  of  profit  and  expediency,  the 
Corinthian  envoys  in  their  reply  took  a  higher  tone.  They  pointed 
out  that  Corcyra  had  always  pursued  a  selfish  and  false  policy, 
that  she  bad  been  equally  careless  of  the  common  interests  of 
Greece  and  of  the  respect  due  to  her  mother-city,  and  that  in  the 
case  of  Epidamuus  she  had  been  actuated  by  mean  jealousy.  If 
any  state  might  make  an  appeal  for  the  friendship  of  Athens,  it 
was  Corinth,  who  had  not  only  doue  her  gooi.1  services  in  past 
days,'-  but  had  only  a  few  years  before  restrained  Sparta  from 
declaring  war  at  the  moment  of  the  revolt  of  Samos.  On  that 
occasion  Corinth  had  vindicated  the  rights  of  every  sovereiga  state 
to  punish  its  own  subject  allies,  and  now  she  expected  that  Athens 
would  do  as  much  for  her.  If  the  treaty  which  the  Corcyraeans 
desired  was  now  concluded,  there  would  be  full  precedent  for  the 
Peloponnesian  alliance  helping  the  next  member  of  the  Delian 
Confederacy  that  revolted.  As  to  the  plea  that  war  was  inevitable, 
and  that  even  if  Corcyra  did  not  furnish  a  casus  belli  some  other 
must  ere  long  arise,  they  declared  that  unless  Athens  provoked 

'  As,  for  example,  during  the  invasion  of  Attica  by  Cleomene3  in  609, 
and  the  Acginetan  war  of  489. 


286  Origin  of  the  Peloponnesian   War.  [432  b.c. 

them  they  had  no  intention  of  attacking  her,  and  that  the  majority 
of  the  members  of  the  Peloponnesian  alliance  were  of  the  same 
mind. 

After  the  ambassadors  had  spoken,  Athenian  orators  took  up 
tlie  debate,  which  was  protracted  far  into  the  second  day.  It  was 
Athens  aUied  the  speech  of  Pericles  which  decided  the  vote  of  the 
tocorcyra.  Ecclesia :  the  great  statesman  had  fully  made  up  his 
mind  that  war  must  come  sooner  or  later,  and  threw  his  weight 
on  to  the  side  of  the  Corcyraeans.  In  accordance  with  his  advice 
a  defensive  alliance  was  concluded  with  them,  which  bound  Athens 
to  lend  them  ber  help  if  they  were  attacked.  As  an  earnest  of  the 
protection  which  was  thereby  granted,  Lacedaemonius,  the  son  of 
the  great  Cimon,  was  sent  with  a  small  squadron  of  ten  ships  to 
cruise  in  Corcyraean  waters. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Athens  put  herself  in  the  wrong  by 
this  action.  The  treaty  with  Corcyra  was  virtually  a  declara- 
tion of  war  on  Corinth,  whose  fleet  was  just  about  to  sail  against 
that  city.  Of  all  the  allies  of  Sparta,  Corinth  deserved  the  best 
treatment  from  Athens,  and  was  the  state  which  could  be  most 
easily  conciliated,  for  the  lines  of  Corinthian  and  Athenian 
commerce  did  not  cross  each  other  to  any  great  extent.  Even  if 
war  was  really  inevitable,  it  was  not  worth  while  to  precipitate  it 
by  high-handed  action  which  obviously  broke  the  spirit  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  Truce.  Nor  was  Corcyra  an  ally  whose  pa-t  history 
gave  much  promise  of  future  good  faith;  she  had  always  played  a 
purely  selfish  game,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  gave  Athens  very  little 
assistance  in  the  coming  struggle.  During  the  twenty-eight  years 
of  the  war  not  a  single  Corcyraean  galley  rounded  Cape  Malea  to 
help  Athens  in  her  struggle  to  maintain  the  empire  of  the  Aegean. 

Though  fully  aware  of  the  meaning  of  the  new  treaty,  Corinth 

persisted  in  her  intention  of  chastising  her  undutiful  daughter-city. 

A  few  days  after  the  ten  Athenian  ships  under  Lace- 
Battle  of  •'  ,      /.    1 
Sybota.      daemouius  had  reached  Corcyra,  the  approach  of  the 

433  B.C.  Coi-inti^ian  fleet  was  signalled.  Now  that  all  its 
reinforcements  had  come  in,  from  Megara,  Leucas,  and  elsewhere, 
the  armament  mustered  one  hundred  and  fifty  sail;  the  Corcy- 
raeans put  out  to  meet  it  with  one  hundred  and  ten  vessels. 
With   them  sailed   Lacedaemonius  and  his  ten   ships;   but   the 


432  B.C.J  Battle  of  Sybota.  287 

Athenian  commander  had  determined  to  take  no  active  part  in 
the  coming  fight  unless  compelled,  for  he  was  under  orders  not  to 
attack  the  Corinthians,  and  only  to  resist  if  circumstances  com- 
pelled him.  The  fleets  met  off  the  coast  of  Epirus,  at  the  island 
of  Sybota,  and  battle  was  joined  along  the  whole  line,  except  at 
the  extreme  left  flank  of  the  Corcyraean  squadron,  where  the  ten 
Athenian  ships  kept  manoeuvring  without  coming  to  close  quarters. 
After  a  hard  fight,  carried  on  with  more  courage  than  naval  skill, 
the  Corinthian  right  wing  broke  through  the  opposing  line,  and, 
although  the  Corcyraeans  had  some  advantage  at  other  points, 
decided  the  fate  of  the  battle.  More  than  half  of  the  Corcyraean 
fleet  were  sunk,  taken,  or  disabled ;  and  Lacedaemonius,  who  only 
took  an  active  part  in  the  fight  when  liis  allies  were  already 
beaten,  could  not  do  much  to  protect  their  retreat.  After  pausing 
to  rearrange  their  disordered  line  of  battle  and  to  capture  or  slay 
the  crews  of  the  disabled  Corcyraean  ships,  the  Corinthians  came  on 
for  a  second  attack,  that  must  have  been  fatal  to  the  defeated  fleet, 
which  did  not  now  muster  more  than  fifty  or  sixty  seaworthy 
ships.  But  after  advancing  to  within  a  short  distance  of  the 
enemy,  the  victorious  squadron  was  suddenly  seen  to  back  water, 
go  about,  and  retreat  down  the  Epirot  coast.  The  cause  of  this 
manoeuvre  was  the  sudden  appearance  of  a  second  Athenian 
squadron,  which  had  been  sent  out  to  reinforce  Lacedaemonius. 
It  only  mustered  twenty  ships,  but  the  Corinthians  took  them  for 
the  mere  vanguard  of  a  large  fleet,  and  cautiously  drew  back. 
When  the  new-comers  had  joined  the  Corcyraean  fleet,  the 
Corinthian  admiral  sent  out  an  officer  in  a  small  boat  to  denounce 
the  conduct  of  the  Athenian  commander,  and  to  ask  him  whether 
he  was  intending  to  break  the  peace  existing  between  Corinth  and 
Athens.  Lacedaemonius  answered  that  he  was  not  about  to  begin 
offensive  hostilities,  but  intended  to  protect  Corcyra.  Thereupon 
the  Corinthian,  resolved  not  to  precipitate  a  general  war  by  hasty 
action,  gave  orders  for  his  armament  to  steer  homeward.  Before 
starting  he  set  up  a  trophy  on  the  Epirot  coast  as  a  testimony  to 
his  victory  in  the  battle ;  the  Corcyraeans  also,  we  learn  to  our 
surprise,  claimed  a  success  because  their  enemies  had  retired, 
and  set  up  another  trophy  on  the  southernmost  headland  of  their 
island.     Except   the   capture  of  a  thousand   prisoners  from   the 


288  Origm  of  I  he  Peloponnesian   War.         i43sb.o. 

conquered  fleet,  the  Coriathians  had  made  no  gain   from  their 
carefully  prepared  expedition. 

The  battle  of  Sybota  made  war  between  Athens  aud  the  Pelopon- 
nesian alliance  practically  certain,  but  the  movements  of  Sparta 
Kevoitof     ^^"^^  so  slow  that  events  were  able  to  develop  them- 
Potidaea.     selves  for  some  months  before  the  actual  rupture  came. 

432  S  G 

The  chief  interest  during  this  jjeriod  lay  in  a  series 
of  events  which  took  place  in  the  north-western  Aegean.  Peidiccas, 
King  of  Macedonia,  the  successor  of  that  Alexander  who  took  part 
in  the  invasion  of  Xerxes,  had  for  some  time  been  at  variance  with 
Athens.  He  endeavoured  to  harm  her  by  inducing  the  tributary 
cities  of  Chalcidice  to  revolt.  Among  the  most  important  of  these 
places  was  Potidaea,  a  Corinthian  colony,  which,  in  spite  of  its 
membership  in  the  Delian  Confederacy,  was  still  so  closely  connected 
with  its  mother-country  as  to  receive  its  annual  magistrates  from 
her.  The  Potidaeans  were  induced  to  lend  a  favourable  ear  to  the 
proposals  of  Perdiccas  by  the  encouragement  which  they  received 
from  Corinth.  To  revenge  the  Corcyraean  treaty  the  Corinthians 
were  ready  to  molest  Athens  in  any  way  they  could ;  and  secretly 
prepared  an  expedition  of  two  thousand  men,  under  their  favourite 
general  Aristeus.  When  this  force  arrived  at  Potidaea  the  town 
openly  revolted,  as  did  many  of  the  smaller  places  in  its  neigh- 
bourhood. However,  an  Athenian  force  which  was  then  operating 
against  Perdiccas  was  at  once  diverted  against  the  rebel  towns. 
In  a  battle  fought  in  front  of  the  walls  of  Potidaea  the  Athenians 
were  victorious,  though  their  general  Callias  was  slain.  They 
then  laid  siege  to  the  town  ;  but  it  had  been  amply  provisioned  in 
preparation  fur  the  revolt,  and  proved  able  to  resist  for  many 
months. 

Athens  and  Corinth  were  now  virtually  at  war,  though  no  open 
declaration  of  hostilities  had  yet  been  published.  Before  definitely 
Sparta  decides  committing  herself  to  the  struggle,  Corinth  had  deter- 
on  war.  mined  to  make  certain  of  the  assistance  of  Sparta,  her 
ancient  protector.  The  Spartans  had  long  been  contemplating  the 
approach  of  war,  and  were  not  unprepared  for  the  appeal  of  their 
allies.  Late  in  the  year  432  B.C.  the  ephors  allowed  the  Corinthians 
to  set  forth  their  grievances  before  a  meeting  of  the  Apella.  The 
Megarlans  and  other  states  who  were  at  odds  with  Athens  also 


432  B.C]  Congress  at  Sparta.  289 

appeared  to  make  their  wrongs  known.  The  general  drift  of  all  the 
speeches  was  the  same :  Athens  had  become  haughty  and  high- 
handed ;  she  was  an  intolerably  bad  neighbour,  whose  one  aim  was 
to  reduce  and  impoverish  every  state  which  was  not  numbered 
among  her  subject  allies ;  the  empire  which  she  had  built  up  was 
kept  together  m  violation  of  the  natural  law  which  made 
autonomy  the  sacred  right  of  every  Hellenic  community ;  if  her 
restless  activity  were  not  checked,  the  liberty  of  Greece  was  in 
danger.  Some  Athenian  ambassadors,  who  chanced  to  be  in 
Sparta  on  another  mission,  spoke  before  the  Apella  in  defence  of 
the  conduct  of  their  country ;  but  they  could  not  deny  the  charge 
which  was  at  the  bottom  of  the  accusations— the  fact  that  Athens 
had  turned  her  hegemony  over  the  states  of  the  Aegean  into  an 
imperial  dominion,  where  no  pretence  was  made  of  granting  her 
allies  a  share  in  the  control  of  affairs.  The  Spartan  king  Archi- 
damus  also  spoke  against  an  immediate  declaration  of  war,  on  the 
ground  that  the  Peloponnesian  states  were  as  yet  ill-prepared  for 
a  struggle  with  an  enemy  whose  main  power  lay  on  the  sea.  But 
the  large  majority  of  the  Sjmrtans  had  long  made  up  their  minds : 
their  opmion  was  curtly  stated  by  the  ephor  Sthenelai'das,  when 
he  told  the  assembly  "  they  must  not  suffer  the  Athenians  to 
become  any  greater,  nor  sit  still  when  their  allies  were  being 
wronged,  but  march  with  the  aid  of  the  gods  against  these  wrong- 
doers." So  certain  was  SthenelaKdas  of  the  numerical  superiority 
of  his  party,  that  he  actually  took  the  step,  unheard  of  before, 
of  bidding  the  assembly  divide,  instead  of  merely  listening  to  its 
tumultuous  cries  ot  assent  or  dissent.^  As  he  had  foreseen,  an 
enormous  majority  voted  in  favour  of  war. 

A  formal  congress  ot  all  the  allies  of  Sparta  was  then  held,  to 
ratify  the  decision  of  the  Apella.  It  was  well  known  that  the 
greater  part  ot  the  states  were  quite  ready  to  follow  the  lead  of 
their  suzerain.  Many  places  besides  Corinth,  Megara,  and  Thebes 
had  their  own  private  grudges  against  Athens ;  Elis,  Epidaurus, 
and  Phlius,  for  example,  had  been  interested  in  the  success  of  the 
campaign  against  Corcyra,  to  whose  expenses  they  had  contributed. 
The  Arcadian  tribes  were  always  ready  for  a  war  which  gave  a 
promise  of  plunder,  and  yet  was  never  likely  to  extend  to  the 
'  See  pp.  6G,  67,  as  to  the  voting  in  the  Spartan  assembly. 


290  Origin  of  the  Felopoiwesian  War.  r432B.c.- 

neighbourliood  of  their  own  inland  mountains.  Accordingly  the 
congress  of  allies  proceeded  to  conBrm  the  decision  of  the  Spartan 
assembly;  if  any  votes  were  given  in  favour  of  peace,  they  were  so 
unimportant  that  no  record  of  them  has  been  preserved. 
'  Two  diplomatic  episodes  occurred  before  the  actual  outbreak  of 
hostilities.  The  Spartans  first  sent  a  message  designed  to  shake 
the  credit  of  Pericles  with  the  more  superstitious  of  his  fellow- 
citizens.  It  bade  the  Athenians,  in  the  old  formula  (see  p.  105), 
"expel  the  accursed  family  of  the  Alcmaeonidae."  To  this  no 
reply  was  made  except  by  a  contemptuous  tu  quoque,  in  which 
the  Spartans  were  told  to  "  expiate  the  pollution  they  had  brought 
on  themselves  by  the  starving  of  Pausanias  in  the  temple  of  Athene, 
and  by  putting  to  death  certain  Helots  who  had  taken  refuge  in  the 
sanctuary  of  Taenarum." 

The  Peloponnesian   alliance  then  presented  a  peremptory  note 

to  Athens  which  contained  three  points.      It  required  that  the 

The  Spartan  decrees  against  the   Megarians    should  be   repealed, 

demands,  tji^t  Aegina  should  be  restored  to  her  autonomy,  and 
that  the  blockade  of  Potidaea  should  be  raised.  The  first  demand 
was  one  which  might  possibly  have  been  granted;  but  the  two  last 
struck  at  the  whole  principle  of  the  Athenian  naval  dominion, 
bidding  Athens  permit  secessions  from  the  Confederacy  of  Delos, 
— a  proceeding  which  her  conduct  in  the  Cases  of  Naxos,  Thasos, 
and  Samos  showed  that  she  would  never  sufler.  Naturally  the 
demands  were  refused.  A  few  days  after  the  Spartans  sent  in  an 
ultimatum,  couched  in  the  form  of  a  demand  that  Athens  should 
"restore  their  autonomy  to  the  states  of  Greece."  The  Spartan 
ambassadors  who  came  as  bearers  of  the  ultimatum  expected  a 
peremptory  refusal  of  these  demands,  and  must  have  been  some- 
what surprised  when  the  Athenian  peace-party  proved  strong  enough 
to  raise  a  lively  debate  in  the  Ecclesia,  for  the  purpose  of  taking 
the  three  points  into  consideration. 

During  the  seven  or  eight  months  which  had  elapsed  since  the 
battle  of  Sybota,  the  power  of  Pericles  had  been  suffering  a  tem- 

„  porary  eclipse.     Now  that  war  had  become  certain, 

Temporary     •!•'■'■ 

unpopularity  all  the  classes  which  were  likely  to  suffer  from  it  felt 

ill  disposed  towards  the  statesman  whose  advice  had 

brought  it  on.    The  ill  will  shown  against  Pericles  was  so  general 


431B.CJ  Attacks  on  Pericles.  291 

that  his  enemies  thought  that  a  favourable  opportunity  had  arrived 

for  molesting  him.  Their  attacks  took  the  form  of  accusations 
against  his  friends  and  confidants.  The  philosopher  Anaxagoras 
was  accused  of  impiety,  and  the  sculptor  Pheidias  of  embezzlement, 
merely  because  they  were  honoured  with  the  friendship  of  Pericles. 
The  former  was  obliged  to  leave  Athens,  the  latter — though  he 
successfully  proved  by  the  test  of  the  scales  that  he  had  not  made 
away  with  any  of  the  gold  which  had  been  given  him  for  the 
statue  of  Athene  Parthenos — was  retained  in  prison  on  another 
charge.  He  had  introduced  portraits  of  Pericles  and  himself  among 
the  ancient  heroes  represented  in  the  "  metopes  "  of  the  Parthenon, 
and  this  was  imputed  to  him  as  sacrilege.  Before  his  second  trial 
the  unfortunate  sculptor  died  in  prison.  The  musician  Damon,  an 
intimate  friend  of  Pericles  since  his  youth,  was  accused  of  having 
spoken  in  favour  of  tyranny  as  a  form  of  government,  and  suffered 
ostracism.  A  fourth  attack  was  aimed  at  a  personage  still  nearer 
and  dearer  to  Pericles.  The  great  statesman  had  been  unhappy 
in  his  married  life,  and  after  divorcing  his  wife  had  been  living  in 
a  connection  not  hallowed  by  the  tie  of  wedlock  with  a  Milesian 
lady  named  Aspasia.  The  equivocal  position  of  the  mistress  of 
Pericles  made  her  an  easy  mark  for  slander,  and  she  was  indicted 
for  impiety  and  evil-living.  When  she  appeared  before  the  dicas- 
tery,  Peiicles  for  once  broke  through  his  habitual  reserve,  and 
appeared  in  court  to  plead  the  cause  of  Aspasia.  His  biographers 
relate  that  during  his  oration  he  was  seen  to  shed  tears,  for  the  first 
time  on  record  during  his  public  life :  his  evident  emotion  had  its 
effect,  and  the  trial  resulted  in  a  verdict  of  acquittal. 

At  the  moment  that  the  Spartan  ambassadors  appeared  in  Athens 
to  lay  their  ultimatum  before  the  Ecclesia,  the  discontent  felt 
against  Pericles  was  still  high,  and  it  was  this  fact       ,^^ 

^  °    '  Athens 

that  led  to  the  discussion  of  the  three  points.  But  rejects  the 
after  many  speeches  had  been  made,  Pericles  was  able  ""*  ^"^ 
once  more  to  assert  his  mastery  over  the  assembly.  He  showed 
clearly  enough  that  it  was  not  the  IMegarian  decrees  or  the  siege  of 
Potidaea  that  were  the  real  causes  of  the  hostility  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesiaus.  The  true  reason  for  the  hatred  which  Sparta  felt  towards 
Athens  was  her  jealousy  at  the  formation  of  the  Athenian  empire, 
which  so  much  overshadowed  her  own  local  pre-eminence  in  PelO' 


292  Origifi  of  the  Peloponnesian  War.  [431  b.c. 

ponnesus.  The  Corinthians  and  other  maiitime  allies  of  Sparta 
were  envious  of  the  commercial  prosperity  of  Athens.  Neither 
Sparta  nor  her  allies  would  ever  be  satisfied  as  long  as  the  Con- 
federacy of  Delos  continued  to  exist ;  if  the  three  points  now 
brought  forward  were  conceded,  it  would  only  cause  the  appearance 
of  another  and  more  stringent  set  ot  demands.  The  force  of  these 
arguments  was  soon  felt;  it  was  recognized  that  for  the  last  year 
war  had  been  inevitable,  and  the  Spartan  ambassadors  were  sent 
back  with  the  refusal  that  they  had  expected. 

A  few  days  later  the  actual  outbreak  of  hostilities  occurred, 
apparently  in  the  mouth  of  March,  431  b.c. 


CHAPTER  XXVIL 

THE   EARLY   TEARS   OF   THE   PELOPONNESIAN   WAR   DOWN   TO   THE 
DEATH   OF   PERICLES,   431-429   B.C. 

Before  passing  on  to  describe  the  opening  of  the  Peloponnesian 
war,  it  will  not  be  out  of  place  to  recapitulate  the  resources  of  the 
two  confederacies  which  were  pitted  against  each  other. 

The  Spartans  had  enlisted  in  their  cause  the  full  force  of  their 
Peloponnesian  allies ;  that  is,  they  were  supported  by  Elis,  Corinth, 
Sicyon,  all  the  Arcadian  states,  Epidaurus,  Hermione, 

m  1    -ni  !•  11      1  •        1       .       /-  The  Pelopon- 

iroezen,  and  rhlius:  all  the  peninsula,  in  fact —  nesiancon- 
except  Argos  and  Achaia,  which  remained  neutral —  ^  eracy, 
was  ranked  on  their  side.  Outside  the  Isthmus  they  could  count 
on  the  zealous  assistance  of  Megaraand  the  Boeotian  League,  while 
the  Phocians,  the  Locrians,  and  the  Corinthiaa  colonies  along  the 
Acarnanian  coast  were  also  numbered  among  their  allies.  Every 
one  of  these  powers  could  put  a  considerable  body  of  hoplites  into 
tlie  field,  and  the  Boeotians  and  Locrians  could  supply  cavalry 
also.  If  the  whole  army  of  the  alliance  could  have  been  mustered 
for  a  great  battle,  it  would  have  amounted  to  more  than  a  hundred 
thousand  foot,  with  perhaps  two  thousand  horse.  But  great  battles 
on  shore  were  very  rare  during  the  Peloponnesian  war,  and  no  such 
force  was  ever  engaged  at  one  time  during  the  whole  twenty-seven 
years  of  its  course.  By  sea  the  Spartan  alliance  was  comparatively 
weak ;  except  Corinth  there  was  no  first-class  maritime  power 
included  in  it.  But  Sicyon  and  Megara  were  each  possessed  of 
some  scores  ol  galleys,  and  Elis,  Epidaurus,  and  even  Sparta  and 
the  Boeotian  League  were  not  entirely  without  war-vessels.  It  was 
not,  however,  in  numbers  alone  that  the  allies  of  Sparta  felt  them- 
selves weak  at  sea ;  the  mQrale  and  the  training  of  their  seamen 


294  Early  Years  of  the  Peloponnesian  War.       1431  b.c. 

were  equally  deficient.  Tlieir  officers  were  unaccustomed  to  the 
management  of  a  large  fleet ;  their  crews,  except  the  Corinthians, 
had  no  recent  experience  of  naval  war.  Moreover,  the  Athenian 
navy  had  developed  in  the  last  forty  years  a  new  system  of  tactics 
and  manoeuvres,  while  their  enemies  were  still  employing  the  same 
methods  which  had  served  at  Salamis.  The  old  school  of  seamen 
had  heen  accustomed  to  lay  their  vessels  alongside  of  the  enemy, 
and  then  to  allow  the  hoplites  and  light  troops  on  board  to  fight 
the  matter  out.  The  Athenians  had  altogether  abandoned  these 
tactics;  they  had  cut  down  the  number  of  marines  whom  a  vessel 
carried,  and  trusted  almost  entirely  to  ramming.  Their  system 
Its  weakness  ^^^  ^^  secure  by  rapid  and  skilful  manoeuvring  a 
at  sea.  favourable  moment  to  drive  their  galley's  beak  into 
the  enemy's  side,  or  to  crash  into  and  disable  his  long  projecting 
line  of  oars.  The  Peloponnesian  had  no  conception  of  any  other 
way  of  conquering  his  enemy  than  by  grappling  with  him,  while 
the  Athenian  loved  a  running  fight,  avoided  close  grips,  and 
trusted  to  a  rapid  and  unexpected  charge.  With  these  tactics  the 
old-fashioned  seamen  of  Corinth  or  Megava  were  at  first  utterly 
unable  to  cope.  They  knew  their  inferiority,  and  refused  to  engage 
unless  they  found  themselves  in  largely  superior  force. 

Next  to  its  acknowledged  inferiority  at  sea,  the  greatest  weak- 
ness of  the  Spartan  confederacy  lay  in  its  financial  poverty.  Sparta 
herself  possessed  no  monetary  resources,  and  among  her  allies 
Corinth  and  Thebes  alone  had  any  accumulated  wealth.  The  rest 
were  "  ready  enough  with  their  persons,  but  not  at  all  ready  with 
their  purses."  ^  So  obvious  was  the  financial  difficulty  of  maintain- 
ing the  war,  that,  even  before  hostilities  had  begun,  proposals  were 
made  that  the  league  should  borrow  money  from  the  temple- 
treasures  of  Olympia  and  Delphi — a  course  which  those  who  made 
it  would  have  been  the  first  to  denounce  as  sacrilege,  had  it  been 
brought  forward  on  any  other  occasion.  Thus  it  came  to  pass  that 
Sparta  could  summon  a  very  large  army  into  the  field  for  five  or 
six  weeks,  but  could  not  keep  permanently  on  foot  more  than  a  few 
thousand  men,  for  sheer  want  of  money  to  pay  them.  She  and  her 
allies  were  invincible  for  a  single  battle  or  a  frontier  raid,  but  com- 
paratively helpless  in  carrying  on  a  prolonged  campaign, 
1  Thuc.  i.  Ul. 


431  B.C.J  The  Resources  at  Athens. 


295 


The  position  of  Atliens  was  very  dift'erent.  On  land  slie  had 
few  allies ;  her  trusty  neighbours  at  Plataen,  her  dependents  the 
Messenians  of  Naupactus,  and  the  Acarnanians,  who  ^^^  resources 
joined  her  because  of  their  perpetual  feuds  with  their  of  Athena. 
Corinthian  neighbours  of  Leucas  and  Ambracia,  were  the  only 
friends  on  whom  she  could  thoroughly  rely.  Corcyra,  of  course, 
•was  enlisted  on  her  side,  but  proved  of  little  assistance.  Some  of 
the  Thessalian  cities  also  had  concluded  alliances  with  her,  but 
their  forces  never  took  the  field  in  her  favour,  and  they  practically 
remained  neutral  in  the  war.  Her  own  military  resources  were  very 
considerable,  amounting  to  twelve  hundred  horsemen  and  thirteen 
thousand  hoplites  fit  to  take  the  field,  beside  sixteen  thousand  more 
— men  past  the  prime  of  life  or  resident  aliens — who  were  available 
only  for  garrison  duty  at  home. 

The  Athenian  fleet  ready  for  sea  amounted  to  not  less  than  three 
hundred  galleys  in  the  highest  state  of  efficiencj'',  and  the  well- 
stored  arsenal  of  Peiraeus  was  able  to  equip  a  yet  larger  number- 
The  two  Asiatic  islands  which  still  maintained  a  war  navy — Lesbos 
and  Chios— could  reinforce  their  suzerain  with  a  considerable 
squadron.  With  this  exception  the  Confederacy  of  Delos  con- 
tributed no  naval  or  military  assistance.  The  states  which  com- 
posed it  had  long  ceased  to  maintain  a  fleet,  while  it  would  seem 
that  Athens  accounted  their  hoplites  as  too  wanting  in  spirit  or 
loyalty  to  make  it  worth  her  while  to  call  them  out  in  large 
numbers.  At  any  rate,  Ionian  troops  were  scarcely  ever  brought 
across  the  Aegean  to  reinforce  the  Athenian  army  for  a  campaign 
in  Europe. 

The  finances  of  Atliens  were  in  the  most  flourishing  condition. 
She  was  enjoying  an  average  annual  revenue  of  about  a  thousand 
talents,  of  which  six  hundred  consisted  of  the  tribute  of  the  con- 
federacy of  Delos,  while  the  rest  was  obtained  from  various  forms 
of  domestic  taxation.  [Moreover,  she  possessed  a  large  accumula- 
tion of  hoarded  wealth.  Of  the  surplus  of  the  tribute-money  six 
thousand  talents  were  lying  in  the  Acropolis  ready  for  instant  use. 
This  great  treasure  had  a  few  years  before  amounted  to  as  much 
as  nine  thousand  seven  hundred  talents,  but  the  lavish  expenditure 
of  Pericles  for  the  adornment  of  Athens,  together  with  the  cost  of 
the  siege  of  Potidaca,  had  decreased  it  by  more  than  a  third. 


2  9^  Early  Years  of  tJie  Pelopo7incsimi  War.       (431  e.c. 

In  considering  the  relative  strength  of  Sparta  and  Athens,  there 

was  another  element,  not  less  important  than  their  military  and 

financial  resources,  to  be  taken  into  account.     This 

Feellnersof  ,        .    ,.  ,     ,.  .,.  /.    ^i     ■  .• 

the  allies  on  was  the  feeling  and  disposition  of  their  respective 
each  side.  ^^^^^  jjere  Sparta  had  the  advantage  ;  the  greater 
l^art  of  the  members  of  her  alliance  had  an  active  dislike  and  fear 
of  Athens,  and  looked  upon  the  war  against  her  as  a  crusade  in 
favour  of  that  "  autonomy  "  which  every  Greek  valued  so  highly. 
Among  the  subjects  of  Athens  no  such  feeling  against  Sparta 
existed.  The  members  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos  had  long  ceased 
to  look  upon  their  connection  with  Athens  as  an  advantage.  It 
was  only  the  fear  of  sharing  the  fate  of  Thasos  or  Samos  that  kept 
them  quiet ;  if  that  fear  could  be  removed,  they  were  for  the  most 
part  ready  to  secede.  The  victory  of  Athens  over  Sparta  could 
bring  them  no  advantage,  while  the  continuance  of  the  war  might 
very  possibly  cause  a  diminution  of  trade  and  an  increase  of 
taxation.  Of  active  hatred  for  specific  acts  of  misgovernment  on 
the  part  of  Athens  there  was  little ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
yearning  after  autonomy  was  always  present,  to  make  them  long 
for  the  break-up  of  the  empire  of  their  suzerain.  The  allies  of 
Athens,  therefore,  were  at  the  best  passive  supporters,  and  might 
easily  be  turned  into  rebels  if  the  hardships  of  war  bore  heavily 
upon  them,  or  if  a  fair  chance  of  recovering  their  freedom  was 
presented  to  them.  The  chief  guarantee  for  fidelity  was  merely 
the  fact  that  they  were  cut  oS'  from  Sparta  by  an  expanse  of  sea, 
and  that  while  the  Athenian  fleet  was  undisputedly  supreme  they 
could  not  hope  to  obtain  aid  for  a  rebellion. 

The  first  blood  shed  in  the  struggle  was  spilt  in  Boeotia.     Before 

the  final  declaration  of  war  had  taken  place,  while  men  were  still 

The  surprise  awaiting  it,  the  Thebans  made  a  treacherous  attempt 

°March^^'    **'  ^^^^^  Plataea.     That  town,  like  every  Greek  state, 

431  B.C.      owned  a  discontented  faction  within  its  wall-^.     The 

majority  being  attached  to  Athens,  the  minority  were  partisans  of 

the  Boeotian  League.     They  entered  into  correspondence  with  the 

Theban  Government,  and  undertook  to  betray  their  city  by  opening 

one  of  its  gates  on  the  evening  of  a  festival.     On  a  night  of  wind 

and  rain  in  March,  three  hundred  Theban  hoplites  stole  beneath 

the  walls  of  Plataea,  while  the  whole  force  uf  the  city  followed  them 


431B.C.1       The  Thehans  attempt  to  surprise  Plataea,  297 

some  miles  behind  The  traitors  admitted  the  advanced  guard, 
who  marched  into  the  market-place  and  drew  themselves  up  there, 
sounding  their  trumpets  and  bidding  their  herald  proclaim  that  all 
true  Boeotians  should  take  arms  and  join  them.  But  the  oligarchic 
part}'  in  Plataea  was  not  numerous,  and  the  Thebans,  instead  of 
seizing  the  prominent  men  of  the  city,  remained  quietly  waiting  for 
their  reinforcements  to  come  up.  Unluckily  the  showers  of  the 
night  had  caused  the  river  AsGpus  to  rise,  and  the  main  Theban 
army  was  detained  beyond  it,  vainly  seeking  for  a  ford.  The  Pla- 
taeans,  who  had  awoke  at  midnight  to  find  their  city  betrayed, 
were  at  first  in  desjiair ;  but  after  a  time  they  perceived  that  their 
enemies  were  but  a  handful,  and  plucked  up  courage.  They  mus- 
tered in  the  side  lanes,  clapped  to  the  gates,  and  barricaded  the 
issues  from  the  market-place.  In  the  dusk  of  the  dawn  a  desperate 
street-fight  took  place,  when  the  Thebans  perceived  that  they  were 
entrapped,  and  strove  to  cut  their  way  out.  A  few  escaped  by  a 
postern  gate,  many  were  slain,  but  the  majority  Avere  driven  into 
a  large  granary,  whence  there  was  no  exit,  and  forced  to  lay  down 
their  arms.  Some  hours  afterwards,  when  all  their  countrymen 
were  taken  or  slain,  the  'J'heban  army  appeared  before  the  walls. 

Finding  that  they  were  too  late,  the  Theban  generals  at  once 
laid  hands  on  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  country-side,  and  held  them 
as  securities  for  the  lives  of  their  captured  friends.  The  Plataeans 
then  sent  out  a  herald  to  upbraid  their  neighbours  for  their 
treacherous  attack,  and  threatened  to  put  their  prisoners  to  death 
if  the  hostages  were  not  given  up  and  the  Plataean  territory 
evacuated.  Accordingly  the  Thebans  released  the  persons  they 
had  seized,  and  returned  home  across  the  border.  The  Plataeans 
drove  off  their  cattle  into  Attica,  brought  all  their  movable 
property  into  the  city,  and  then,  with  a  cruel  and  deliberate 
breach  of  faith,  slew  their  prisoners,  to  the  number  of  nearly  two 
hundred.  Thus  with  treachery,  perjury,  and  deliberate  massacre, 
in  which  it  is  difficult  to  blame  one  party  more  than  the  other, 
commenced  the  Peloponnesian  war. 

When  the  first  news  of  the  attack  on  Plataea  reached  Athens, 
the  strategi  had  sent  off  at  once  to  beg  their  allies  to  keep  their 
prisoners  safe,  as  a  means  of  bringing  pressure  to  bear  on  Thebes. 
The  news  of  the  massacre  caused  much  discontent,  but  nothing 


298  Ea7-}y  Years  of  the  Peloponnesian  War.       [431  B.C. 

could  be  done  to  repair  the  crime.  War  was  now  actually  begun  ; 
accordingly  the  frontier  forts  were  put  in  a  state  of  defence,  the 
flocks  and  herds  of  Attica  placed  in  safety  across  the  water,  in 
Salamis  or  Euboea,  and  the  inhabitants  received  warning  that  they 
would  soon  have  to  take  refuge  within  the  walls  of  the  city.  From 
Plataea  the  women  and  children  were  removed,  and  only  a  small 
garrison  of  four  hundred  citizens  and  eighty  Athenians  remained 
behind  to  man  its  ramparts. 

The  impending  storm  soon  broke  over  Attica.     A  few  weeks 

after  the  attempt  on  Plataea,  the  whole  armed  force  of  Peloponnesus 

mustered  at  the  Isthmus,  and  set  out  on  its  march 

Invasion  of  i        -r.  i  •    t         /■  • 

Attica,  June,  northward.  Every  state  had  sent  two-thirds  of  its 
^^^  ■  hoplitcs,  and  the  whole  amounted  to  some  seventy 
or  eighty  thousand  men.  Archidamus,  king  of  Sparta,  though 
originally  an  opponent  of  the  war,  had  been  place  1  in  command. 
After  being  joined  by  the  contingents  of  Boeotia,  lie  halted  on  the 
Attic  frontier,  and  sent  forward  an  anibas?a'ior  named  Melesippus 
to  offer  the  Athenians  one  final  chance  of  submission  before  war 
was  let  loose  upon  them.  But  on  the  motion  of  Pericles,  the 
Ecclesia  refused  the  envoy  a  hearing,  and  sent  him  back  under  guard 
to  the  frontier.  "When  he  was  dismissed  by  his  escort,  the  Spartan 
took  leave  of  them  with  the  solemn  words,  "  This  day  will  be  the 
beginning  of  great  evils  for  Greece,"  and  returned  to  the  camp  ot 
Archidamus. 

The  Spartan  king  had  calculated  that  the  approach  of  an  irresist- 
ible iirmy  would  humble  the  spirit  of  the  Athenians,  and  that  when 
they  saw  that  the  ravaging  of  Attica  was  about  to  begin,  they  would 
offer  terms  of  peace.  He  was  so  far  right  that  there  was  a  large 
party  which  looked  with  dismay  on  the  prospect  of  an  invasion^ 
and  the  ruin  to  their  country-side  which  must  follow.  But  the 
landed  interest  at  Athens  was  much  less  powerful  than  the  com- 
mercial, and  Pericles  had  succeeded  in  persuading  the  merchants 
capitalists  and  shipmasters  of  Athens  that  the  war  would  bring 
them  no  great  loss.  He  had  from  the  first  foreseen  that,  in  the 
case  of  invasion,  the  open  country  of  Attica  must  be  evacuated,  and 
abandoned  to  the  enemy.  He  had  familiarized  his  followers  with 
the  idea,  and  when  the  invasion  took  place,  the  terror  on  which 
Archidamus  reckoned  had  long  been  discounted.     Some  days  before 


431  B.C.]  Archidamtis  rava^res  Attica. 


299 


the  Spartan  army  arrived,  the  Athenian  proprietors  had  retired 
within  the  walls  of  the  city,  taking  with  them  their  families,  their 
slaves,  and  all  their  household  goods.  There  was  nothing  left  but 
empty  farmsteads  for  the  enemy  to  destroy. 

After  making  an  ineffectual  attempt  to  storm  the  frontier  fort 
of  Oenoe,  Archidamus  descended  from  the  spurs  of  Cithaeron  into 
the  plain  of  Eleusis,  and  began  to  burn  and  harry  the  Attica 
land  in  the  most  systematic  manner.  It  was  now  ravaged, 
early  June,  and  crops  and  fruits  were  well  advanced  towards 
maturity.  The  Peloponnesians  spread  over  the  face  of  the  country, 
beat  down  the  corn,  felled  the  orchards  and  olive  groves,  and  burnt 
the  deserted  farms  and  villas.  Working  steadily  south,  they 
crossed  Mount  Aegialeus,  entered  the  plain  of  Athens,  and  encamped 
hard  by  Acharnae,  the  richest  and  most  populous  of  the  Attic 
demes.  "When  the  smoke  of  the  burning  town  was  blown  towards 
the  walls  of  Athens,  and  the  bands  of  plunderers  were  seen  scattered 
like  locusts  over  the  plain,  there  was  great  excitement  in  the  city. 
Forgetful  of  their  inferior  numbers,  the  Athenians  longed  to  leave 
the  shelter  of  the  city  and  to  fall  on  the  invaders.  The  hoplites  of 
Acharnae  and  its  neighbourhood,  who  numbered  three  thousand 
ppears,  demanded  a  sortie.  Groups  of  armed  men  mustered  at 
the  gates,  and  it  required  all  the  personal  influence  of  Pericles  to 
prevent  the  excited  multitude  from  rushing  out  to  court  a  certain 
defeat.  It  was  the  firm  resolve  of  the  great  statesman  to  avoid  all 
fighting  in  the  open  field,  but  he  found  a  vent  for  the  feelings  of  his 
fellow-citizens  by  planning  two  naval  expeditions.  Naval 
One  consisting  of  thirty  triremes  sailed  up  the  Eurijous,  expeditions, 
and  made  predatory  descents  on  the  coasts  of  Boeotia  and  Locris. 
The  other,  mustering  not  less  than  a  hundred  shijis,  and  carrying 
a  thousand  hoplites  for  land  service,  coasted  round  Peloponnesus, 
and  did  all  the  harm  possible  to  the  seaboard  of  Laconia,  Messenia, 
and  Elis.  Then  it  was  joined  by  fifty  Corcyrean  galleys,  and 
passed  up  the  coast  of  Acarnania,  harrying  the  Corinthian  colonies 
in  that  quarter.  The  presence  of  this  powerful  fleet  in  Western 
waters  drew  over  to  the  Athenian  alliance  the  four  cities  of  Cephal- 
lenia,  which  had  hitherto  remained  neutral. 

After  remaining  forty  days  in  Attica,  Archidamus  drew  off  his 
army  from  the  wasted  land,  and  returned  to  Peloponnesus.    The 


300  Early  Years  of  the  Peloponnesian  War.      wsib.c- 

moment  that  he  was  gone,  Pericles  sallied  out  from  Athens  with 
thirteen  thousand  men,  marched  into  the  Megarid,  and  paid  off 
on  the  villages  and  farms  of  the  Megarians  all  the  ravages  that 
Attica  had  been  suffering  during  the  last  six  weeks.  This  destruc- 
tive visit  was  regularly  repeated  every  autumn  during  the  first 
eleven  years  of  the  war :  sometimes  the  Athenians  even  supple- 
mented it  by  an  additional  raid  in  the  spring. 

The  events  of  the  first  year  of  the  war  made  plain  to  every  one 

what   had  hitherto  been  suspected  by  few — the  fact  that  under 

Character  of  existing  Conditions  the  struggle  must  be  prolonged 

the  war.  indefinitely,  for  neither  party  had  shown  the  power 
to  strike  an  effective  blow  against  its  enemy.  If  the  Athenians 
refused  to  meet  the  Peloponnesian  army  in  the  open  field,  and 
acquiesced  in  the  abandonment  of  their  home  territory,  there  was 
no  means  of  bringing  pressure  on  them.  The  Spartans  could  not 
dream  of  besieging  the  vast  circuit  of  the  city  and  its  maritime 
suburbs ;  the  walls  were  too  strong  for  the  siege  artillery  of  those 
days,  and  the  sea  was  always  open  for  the  supply  of  new  resources. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Athenians  had  almost  as  little  power  to 
coerce  the  Peloponnesians  ;  no  amount  of  ravagings  of  the  Megarid 
or  hasty  descents  on  the  coast  of  Laconia  would  appreciably  effect 
the  policy  of  an  inland  state  like  Sparta.  Acute  misery  might  be 
inflicted  on  the  mercantile  classes  io  Corinth  or  the  farmers  of  the 
Eleian  seaboard,  but  their  sufferings  would  not  disturb  the  stolid 
Lacedaemoniaa.  Unless  one  side  or  the  other  found  some  more 
effective  way  of  harming  its  enemy,  the  war  might  go  on  for  ever. 
Pericles  had  long  foreseen  that  Sparta's  ability  to  harm  Athens  was 
confined  to  the  power  of  wasting  Attica,  and  had  made  up  his  mind 
that  after  some  years  of  ineffectual  effort  the  enemy  would  be 
reduced  to  sue  for  peace.  But  he  calculated  that  the  struggle  would 
be  long,  and  as  a  measure  of  precaution  induced  the  Ecclesia  to  vote 
that  a  thousand  talents  out  of  the  treasures  in  the  Parthenon 
should  be  put  aside  as  a  reserve  fund,  only  to  he  used  in  the  event 
of  an  attack  on  Athens  by  sea.  With  a  similar  object,  a  hundred 
triremes  fully  manned  were  always  to  be  kept  in  home  waters. 
The  Spartans  had  not  been  so  prescient  as  Pericles,  and  the  utter 
failure  of  their  first  attack  in  bringing  pressure  to  bear  on  Athens 
caused  much  discontent.     It  was  obvious  that  some  new  method 


430 B.C.I  The  Plague  of  Athens.  301 

of  coercing  the  enemy  must  be  found,  unless  the  war  was  to  last 
for  ever. 

Among  the  other  events  of  the  first  year  of  the  war  was  the 
expulsion  from  their  native  island  of  the  Aeginetans.  Aegina  had 
been  an  unwilling  member  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos 

.  _  ^  ,        ,  1  .   ,.  Expulsion  01 

Since  ner  conquest  in  456  b.c,  but  her  chief  men  were  the  Aegine- 
known  to  be  in  correspondence  with  Sparta,  and  ^^^^' 
Pericles  dreaded  the  possible  results  of  having  a  city  ripe  for  revolt 
at  the  very  gates  of  Athens.  As  long  as  Aegina  was  held  by  dis- 
aflfected.  allies,  it  remained.  "  the  eyesore  of  Peiraeus,"  and  the 
Athenians  now  took  the  cruel  and  high-handed  stejD  of  deporting 
its  whole  population.  As  Aegina  had  not  justified  this  arbitrary 
action  by  any  open  revolt,  much  indignation  was  felt  throughout 
Greece  at  seeing  an  ancient  and  famous  city  destroyed,  merely  to 
ease  the  suspicions  of  a  jealous  suzerain.  The  Spartans  granted 
to  the  expelled  inhabitants  the  land  of  Thyreatis  on  their  northern 
border,  close  to  the  frontiers  of  Argolis. 

At  the  end  of  the  campaigning  season  of  431  B.C.,  the  Athenians 
held  a  solemn  funeral  celebration  in  honour  of  those  citizens  who 
had  fallen  in  the  numerous,  if  unimportant,  skirmishes  of  the  year. 
The  oration  in  honour  ot  the  departed  was  spoken  by  Pericles ;  it 
was  accounted  the  highest  flight  of  his  eloquence,  and  contained, 
besides  its  ostensible  purport,  a  lofty  panegyric  on  the  social  and 
political  life  of  Athens. 

When  the  spring  of  430  B.C.  arrived,  the  Pelopounesian  confede- 
rates prepared  to  repeat  their  incursion  into  Attica.  The  second 
year  of  the  war  might  have  been  as  uneventful  as  the  „ 

''  °  .11.  Second  inva- 

first,  if  a  great  national  calamity  had  not  intervened  sion  of  Attica, 

430  £  C 

to  make  it  memorable.  The  army  of  Arch  idamus  had 
hardly  crossed  the  frontier,  and  the  hosts  of  fugitive  country-folk 
had  only  just  taken  refuge  within  the  walls  of  Athens,  when  the 
plague  broke  out  in  the  city.  There  ensued  a  fearful  outbreak  of 
pestilence,  comparable  in  the  fierceness  of  its  ravages,  though  not 
in  their  extent,  to  the  Black  Death  of  1348  or  the  London  Plague 
of  1665,  and  far  more  dreadful  than  any  of  the  visitations  of 
cholera  which  our  own  century  has  known.  The  infection  is  said 
to  have  originated  in  Egyiit,  and  to  have  been  brought  westward 
by  merchants  from  inner  Asia,  where  pestilence  is  almost  always 


302  Early  Years  of  the  Feloponnesian  War.      [43ob.c. 

raging.  It  might,  however,  have  passed  Athens  by,  if  everything 
there  had  not  been  prepared  to  make  a  disastrous  outbreak  easy. 
The  city  was  crowded  with  refugees  living  in  the  most  wretched 
and  unsanitary  condition.  They  had  quartered  themselves  as  best 
they  could  in  the  towers  of  the  fortifications ;  the  space  between 
the  Long  Walls  was  crowded  with  them ;  every  open  square  was 
crammed,  and  even  such  temples  as  were  not  kept  locked  up. 
They  dwelt  in  booths  and  tents,  even  (we  are  told)  in  tubs,  without 
any  possible  provision  for  cleanliness  or  comfort,  and  depending 
on  a  scanty  and  polluted  water-supply  In  the  heat  of  a  stifling 
June,  the  filth  and  overcrowding  had  prepared  the  way  for  the 
pestilence.  The  moment  that  the  infection  was  introduced  it 
spread  like  wildfire.  Thucydides  has  given  a  detailed  account  of 
the  symptoms  of  this  plague,  which  show  it  to  have  been  a  kind 
of  eruptive  typhoid  fever.  After  seven  or  nine  days  of  suffering, 
the  victims,  covered  with  pustules  and  racked  with  continual 
The  plague  vomiting  and  unquenchable  thirst,  sank  into  their 
of  Athens,  graves.  Kecoveries,  though  not  infrequent  (Thucy- 
dides himself  survived  an  attack),  were  few  in  comparison  to  the 
deaths.  Hence  the  earliest  symptoms  of  the  disease  brought  on 
a  state  of  reckless  despair  which  led  to  much  unnecessary  loss 
of  life.  The  physicians  had  nearly  all  fallen  victims,  and  when 
all  human  skill  was  found  unavailing,  a  selfish  panic  set  in. 
Many  refused  to  pay  the  least  attention  to  the  sufferings  of  their 
nearest  relatives,  and  left  them  to  perish  untended.  Moreover, 
under  the  moral  and  physical  strain  of  the  epidemic,  the  restraints 
of  social  order  broke  down,  and  men  abandoned  themselves  to  all 
manner  of  excess  and  debauchery.  Crime  and  riot  ran  wild  through 
the  streets,  while  unburied  corpses  lay  in  every  corner  and  cross- 
way.  The  cemeteries  were  ghastly  sights ;  funeral  trains  might  be 
seen  fighting  with  each  other  for  the  possession  of  a  pyre,  and 
when  a  burning  had  begun  the  attendants  fled,  leaving  the  body 
half-charred  to  pollute  the  neighbouring  air. 

At  least  a  quarter  of  the  population  of  Athens  perished  in  this 
horrible  calamity,  nor  were  its  ravages  confined  to  the  city  alone. 
The  plague  dogged  the  steps  of  two  considerable  expeditions  which, 
Pericles  sent  out  to  relieve  the  overcrowded  citj'.  A  force  of  four 
thousand   men,  despatched  on  shipboard  to  ravage  the  coasts  of 


430  B.C.]  Unpopularity  of  Pericles,  303 

Troezen  and  Epidaurus,  suffered  heavily.  The  army  lying  before 
Potidaea — which  was  still  holding  out,  though  now  in  the  twenty- 
fifth  month  of  its  siege — caught  the  infection  from  reinforcements 
which  arrived  from  Athens,  and  fifteen  hundred  hoplites  died  in 
the  camp.  It  was  not  till  the  approach  of  winter  that  the  death- 
rate  began  to  diminish. 

By  an  unreasoning  but  not  unnatural  impulse,  many  of  the 
Athenians  looked  on  Pericles,  the  author  of  the  war,  as  responsible 
for  the  calamities  of  his  country.  In  expression  of  unpopiuarity 
the  feeling  of  the  mob,  the  demagogue  Cleon  actually  of  Pericles, 
brought  a  charge  of  peculation  against  the  great  minister,  and,  to 
mark  their  anger,  thedicastery  found  him  guilty  of  the  preposterous 
charge.  A  vote  of  the  Ecclesia  even  ordered  the  despatch  of  envoys 
to  Sparta,  to  sue  for  peace.  This  was,  of  course,  refused  by  the 
enemy,  and  the  Athenians  gradually  came  round  again  to  their 
old  policy,  and  again  elected  Pericles  as  strategus.  The  plague 
had  left  the  rest  of  Greece  almost  untouched;  nowhere  were  the 
conditions  so  favourable  for  its  spread  as  at  Athens,  and  the 
mortality  in  the  few  places  in  which  it  appeared  was  therefore  small. 
The  Peloponnesians  were  able  to  harry  Attica  in  June  and  July 
without  catching  the  infection,  and  carried  their  incursions  into 
every  nook  and  corner  of  the  land  that  had  been  left  unvisited  in 
the  previous  year. 

In  the  autumn  of  430  B.C.,  after  the  Athenian  fleets  had  gone  home, 
a  considerable  Peloponnesian  squadron  collected  at  Corinth,  and 
ventured  out  into  the  Ionian  Sea ;  but,  though  muster-  xhe  fate  of 
ing  a  hundred  ships,  it  did  no  more  than  execute  a  -Ansteus. 
hasty  descent  on  Zacynthus,  and  then  returned  into  the  gulf.  A 
more  efficient  method  of  harming  Athens  than  such  a  timid  excursion 
was  devised  in  the  same  year  by  the  Peloponnesians ;  they  deter- 
mined to  endeavour  to  make  an  alliance  with  the  Great  King,  and 
to  obtain  from  him  Persian  gold  to  supplement  their  own  slender 
resources.  Aristeus  the  Corinthian  and  five  others  set  out,  to 
make  the  long  land-journey  to  Asia  which  the  preponderance  of 
Athens  at  sea  rendered  necessary.  On  their  way  the  envoys  passed 
through  Thrace,  Avhere  reigned  Sitalkes,  a  firm  ally  of  Athens. 
Apprised  of  their  arrival  in  his  dominions,  the  barbarian  king  laid 
hands  on  them,  and  made  them  over  to  the  Athenian  envoy  at  his 


304  Early  Years  of  the  Feloponnesian  War.      [430  b.o. 

court.  They  were  forwarded  to  Athens,  and  there  put  to  death 
without  a  trial.  This  cold-blooded  execution  of  non-combatants 
exasperated  the  Peloponnesians  to  the  highest  pitch  of  fury,  all  the 
more  because  Aristeus  was  one  of  the  most  distinguished  officers 
of  their  whole  confederacy.  The  justification  which  the  Athenians 
gave  of  their  conduct,  was  that  the  crews  of  several  merchant 
vessels,  which  had  been  taken  by  Feloponnesian  privateers,  had 
suffered  massacre :  it  was  suspected  that  their  real  reason  was 
personal  hatred  for  Aristeus,  arising  from  the  trouble  he  had  given 
them  at  Potidaea. 

A  few  months  after  the  death  of  Aristeus,  the  town  which  he 

had  induced  to  revolt  fell  into  the  hands  of  its  enemies.     Potidaea 

Fau  of       had  now  been  under  siege  for  about  thirty  months, 

November    ^"^^  ^  ^''^  magazines  had  been  exhausted.     The  walls 

430  B.C.  were  still  intact,  but  there  was  hardly  a  crumb  of 
food  left  in  the  city  :  we  are  told  that  some  of  the  inhabitants 
had  even  been  reduced  to  feed  on  the  bodies  ot  the  dead.  Seeing 
that  there  was  no  hope  of  help  from  Peloponnesus,  the  Potidaean 
leaders  at  last  proposed  a  surrender.  The  Athenian  generals 
Xenophon  and  Hestiodorus,  wishing  to  spare  their  army  the  hard- 
ships of  another  winter  in  the  trenches,  granted  easy  terms,  on 
condition  that  the  surrender  should  take  place  at  once.  Accord- 
ingly the  Potidaean s,  their  families,  and  their  Corinthian  auxiliaries 
were  permitted  to  depart  whither  they  chose,  though  no  individual 
was  to  take  with  him  more  than  a  single  change  of  raiment  and 
a  fixed  sum  of  money.  The  Athenian  assembly  was  much  dis- 
contented with  this  capitulation  ;  they  bore  a  heavy  grudge  against 
the  Potidaeans,  as  one  of  the  causes  of  the  war,  and  had  been  look- 
ing forward  to  wreaking  their  vengeance  on  them  when  the  long« 
expected  surrender  took  place.  A  few  weeks  more  of  blockade, 
as  was  very  justly  observed,  would  have  compelled  Potidaea  to 
surrender  at  discretion,  and  placed  all  her  inhabitants  at  the  mercy 
of  the  besiegers,  to  be  slain  or  sold  as  slaves.  More  than  two  thou- 
sand talents  had  been  spent  on  the  siege,  and  many  lives  had  been 
lost  in  the  trenches ;  we  cannot,  therefore,  wonder  that  Xenophon 
and  his  colleagues  were  severely  censured  by  the  home  government. 
The  fall  of  Potidaea  was  the  last  mihtary  event  of  430  B.C.,  and 
must  have  occurred  in  the  late  autumn  of  that  year. 


i29  B.C.I  Death  of  Pericles.  305 

The  third  year  of  the  war  opened  with  an  event  destined  to 
exercise  the  greatest  influence  on  the  policy  of  Athens.  In  the 
early  summer  of  429  b.c,  two  years  and  six  months 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  Pericles  died.  The  Pericles, 
great  statesman  was  struck  down  by  the  plague, 
which  had  reappeared  with  the  hot  weather.  Although  he  re- 
covered from  the  attack,  he  was  left  too  weak  to  rally,  and  sank 
into  his  grave  from  sheer  weakness  a  few  weeks  after.  Since  the 
previous  year  he  had  not  been  the  same  man.  The  plague  had 
carried  off  his  two  sons,  his  sister,  and  most  of  his  intimate  friends. 
After  the  death  of  his  younger  son,  Paralus,  he  shut  himself  up  in 
his  house,  and  was  with  difficulty  induced  to  come  abroad,  or  to 
take  an  interest  in  public  business.  The  ingratitude  of  the  people, 
which  had  resulted  in  his  trial  and  condemnation  on  the  charge 
of  Cleon,  must  have  added  to  his  weariness  of  life.  But  down  to 
the  last  he  maintained  his  ascendency  over  the  Ecclesia.  Just 
before  he  died  the  Athenians  gave  him  a  signal  proof  of  their 
renewed  confidence.  The  death  of  his  sons  having  left  him  with- 
out an  heir,  the  revulsion  of  feeling  which  succeeded  to  their 
momentary  anger,  took  the  form  of  a  decree  of  the  Ecclesia,  which 
legitimatized  a  natural  son  whom  Aspasia  had  borne  to  him.  This 
youth,  who  bore  the  same  name  as  his  father,  was  reserved  for  a 
stirring  career  and  an  unhajjpy  end. 

Pericles  viewed  his  approaching  end  with  philosophic  calm.  As 
he  lay  dying,  his  surviving  friends  spoke  by  his  bedside  of  the  great 
achievements  of  his  life.  They  thought  him  far  gone  beyond  the 
power  of  hearing  and  speech  ;  but  he  presently  raised  himself  and 
said,  "  I  marvel  that  you  so  dwell  upon  and  praise  these  acts  of 
mine.  Fortune  had  her  share  in  them,  and  many  other  generals 
have  done  more.  But  you  take  no  notice  of  that  which  is  my  real 
pride,  that  no  Athenian  ever  wore  mourning  through  me." 


CHAPTER  XXVIIL 

FROM  THE  DEATH  OF  PERICLES  TO  THE  FALL  OF  PLATAEA, 

429-427  B.C. 

The  death  of  Pericleo  deprived  the  Athenian  democracy  of  the 
one  guiding  spirit  whom  it  was  accustomed  to  obey,  and  left  it 
exposed  to  the  varying  impulses  of  half  a  dozen  statesmen  of 
second-rate  ability.  As  long  as  Pericles  lived,  the  war  had  been 
conducted  towards  a  definite  end  on  one  simple  and  rigid  plan. 
Sparta  was  to  be  wearied  out,  not  struck  down ;  therefore  all  action 
on  land  was  to  be  avoided^  all  distant  and  hazardous  enterprises 
eschewed ;  the  forces  of  Athens  were  to  be  kept  in  hand,  and  devoted 
solely  to  preserving  her  supremacy  at  sea,  and  preventing  any 
communication  between  her  enemy  and  her  discontented  subject- 
allies  across  the  Aegean.  After  a  time — probably  a  very  consider- 
able time,  but  still  one  whose  coming  was  inevitable — the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  confederacy  would  despair  at  its  inability  to  harm 
Athens,  would  tire  of  seeing  its  commercial  navy  kept  under  per- 
petual blockade  and  its  coast-land  exposed  to  the  constant  descents 
of  an  enemy  who  eluded  any  counter-blow.  Sparta's  allies,  if  not 
Sparta  herself,  would  then  sue  for  peace,  and  Athens  would  be  left 
witli  her  empire  unimpaired,  beyond  all  contradiction  the  strongest 
state  in  Greece. 

The  policy  of  Pericles,  if  it  could  have  been  consistently  carried 
out,  would  probably  have  proved  efficacious ;  but  it  was  a  policy 
particularly  hard  to  enforce  in  a  democratic  state.  We  may,  indeed, 
say  that  no  statesman  save  the  one  who  had  for  so  long  exerted 
the  influence  of  his  master-mind  on  the  Ecclesia  could  possibly 
have  put  it  in  practice.  It  involved  the  constant  exercise  of 
tenacity  and  self-restraint,  the  two  virtues  in  which  a  democratic 


4S9B.C]  Archidamm  at  Plataea.  307 

assembly  is  notoriously  wanting.  It  often  exacted  the  neglect 
of  tempting  opportunities  for  action  on  land,  or  promising  expedi- 
tions to  distant  regions;  it  gave  few  opportunities  for  distinction 
to  the  ambitious  military  men  in  whom  the  state  abounded ;  it 
brought  the  most  cruel  suffering  on  the  agricultural  classes  of 
Attica,  who  were  compelled  to  give  up  their  farms  year  by  year 
to  be  ravaged  by  the  invader.  Hence  it  was  certain  that,  when 
the  guiding  hand  of  Pericles  was  removed,  the  Ecclesia  would  be 
driven  by  anger,  fear,  or  ambition  into  abandoning  the  narrow  line 
of  policy  which  he  had  marked  out  for  it.  We  shall  soon  be  able 
to  trace  the  results  of  his  removal,  by  noting  the  increasing  scope 
and  variety  of  the  efforts  of  Athens  during  the  few  succeeding 
years. 

The  Peloponnesian  army,  which  marched  up  from  the  Isthmus 
about  the  time  of  the  death  of  Pericles  (June,  429  ?),  did  not  repeat 
the  ravages  of  the  two  preceding  years.  King  Archi-  Archidamus 
damns  this  time  left  Attica  untouched — perhaps  the  before  Plataea. 
renewed  outbreak  of  the  plague  in  Athens  frightened  him — and 
turned  northward  to  strike  at  a  smaller  prey.  Plataea  had  for  the 
last  two  years  been  deserted  by  its  inhabitants,  and  contained  only 
a  small  garrison  of  some  five  hundred  men.  To  oblige  his  Boeo- 
tian allies,  Archidamus  had  determined  to  dislodge  this  outpost 
of  Athenian  power.  When  his  army  sat  down  before  their  walls, 
the  Plataeans  protested  that  half  a  century  before  Pausanias  the 
Spartan,  after  his  great  victory  over  the  Persians,  had  pronounced 
the  soil  of  Plataea  hallowed  ground,  and  guaranteed  its  perpetual 
autonomy.  They  therefore  begged  Archidamus  to  remember  this 
sacred  obligation,  ond  to  withdraw  his  forces.  The  king  replied  by 
an  offer  to  leave  them  unmolested,  if  they  would  become  allies  of 
Sparta,  or  even  if  they  would  renounce  their  alliance  with  xVthens 
and  stand  neutral  in  the  war.  To  this  the  Plataeans  answered  that 
as  their  families  and  their  goods  had  been  removed  to  Athens, 
and  were  in  the  custody  of  their  allies,  they  were  not  free  agents ; 
but  that,  if  they  were  permitted,  they  would  send  an  envoy  to  beg 
from  the  Athenian  Ecclesia  leave  to  become  neutrals.  Archidamus 
then  made  a  very  liberal  offer;  he  promised  to  allow  the  Plataeans 
to  depart,  after  handing  over  the  town  and  district  to  the  custody 
of  Sparta,  together  with  a  list  of  all  the  buildings,  orchards,  planta- 


3o8  Plaiaea  and  Mitylene.  [429 b.c. 

tions,  and  so  forth  contained  therein.  They  should  be  held  in 
trust  during  the  continuance  of  the  war,  kept  in  good  order,  and 
restored  to  the  Plataeans  on  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace.  He 
was  even  ready  to  guarantee  an  allowance  to  the  exiled  citizens 
from  the  proceeds  of  the  cultivation  of  their  land. 

This  proposal  tempted  the  Plataeans  sorely,  but  they  again 
required  permission  to  communicate  with  Athens.  Archidamus 
granted  leave,  and  messengers  went  forth  from  the  city,  only  to 
return  with  the  answer  that  "  Athens  never  deserted  her  allies,  and 
would  not  now  neglect  the  Plataeans,  but  succour  them  with  all 
her  might.  Wherefore  the  alliance  must  stand,  and  the  attack  of 
the  Spartans  be  withstood."  Accordingly  the  pro^josals  of  Archi- 
damus were  rejected,  and  the  siege  began. 

After  running  a  continuous  line  of  palisades  around  the  little 

town,  the  Spartans  commenced  to  throw  up  a  mound  against  one 

siege  of      portion  of  the  wall,  intending  to  raise  it  until  it  filled 

Piataea.  -yp  the  ditch  and  rose  level  with  the  battlements,  so 
as  to  furnish  a  path  into  the  city.  To  foil  this  design,  the  Plataeans 
kept  raising  the  height  of  the  wall  as  the  mound  grew,  and,  when 
this  proved  an  inadequate  defence,  pierced  through  the  lower  course 
of  their  ramparts  and  ran  a  tunnel  into  the  interior  of  the  mound. 
Through  this  tunnel  they  removed  the  earth  in  such  quantities 
that  the  mound  kept  crumbling  and  sinking  in.  The  Spartans, 
however,  foiled  this  method  of  defence  by  heaping  on  the  mound, 
not  loose  mould,  but  crates  and  hurdles  tightly  wedged  up  with 
clay.  Finding  themselves  in  imminent  danger,  the  Plataeans  next 
built  a  crescent-shaped  wall  in  rear  of  the  threatened  point,  with 
materials  taken  from  the  deserted  houses  of  the  city.  "When, 
therefore,  the  mound  had  accomplished  its  purpose,  the  Spartans 
found  themselves  in  front  of  a  second  line  of  wall.  They  then 
vainly  attempted  to  set  fii-e  to  the  town.  When  this  expedient  also 
failed,  the  season  was  so  far  advanced  that  Archidamus  gave  up  all 
hope  of  capturing  Plataea  in  the  current  year.  He  resolved  to 
turn  the  siege  into  a  blockade,  and  to  dismiss  the  greater  part  of 
his  army  homewards.  Accordingly  he  surrounded  the  city  with 
carefully  planned  lines  of  circumvallation,  consisting  of  two  sub- 
stantial walls  of  unbaked  brick,  with  towers  at  regular  intervals ; 
they  faced,  the  one  inward  and  the  other  outward,  in  case  any 


429 B.C.]  Operations  in  Acarnania.  309 

attempts  might  be  made  by  the  Athenians  to  raise  the  blockade. 
In  front  of  each  of  the  faces  lay  a  ditch,  while  the  space  between 
the  two  walls  provided  dwelling-space  for  the  troops.  Leaving  a 
force,  consisting  half  of  Boeotians  and  half  of  Peloponnesians,  to 
maintain  these  lines,  Archidamus  marched  back  to  Corinth  with 
the  bulk  of  his  army. 

During  the  summer,  while  the  army  of  Archidamus  remained  in 
Boeotia,  the  Athenians  had  kept  within  their  walls.  But  it  is 
surprising  to  find  that,  when  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  had 
departed,  they  made  no  attempt  to  relieve  Plataea,  in  spite  of  tho 
solemn  assurances  of  assistance  which  they  had  given  to  its  in- 
habitants at  the  time  of  the  negotiations  with  Archidamus.  But 
in  the  whole  of  429  b.c.  the  Athenians  made  no  expeditions  near 
home;  the  military  interest  of  the  year  is  centred  entirely  in 
operations  in  the  distant  land  of  Acarnania, 

At  the  same  time  that  Archidamus  laid  siege  to  Plataea,  a  small 
Peloponnesian  expedition  under  a  Spartan  officer  named  Cnemus, 
had  crossed  the  mouth  of  the  Gulf  of  Corinth,  and  operations  in 
joined  the  land  forces  of  the  Leucadians  and  Ambra-  -^camama. 
ciots.  They  were  bent  on  conquering  the  Acarnanians  and  the 
Messenians  of  Xaupactus,  the  only  continental  allies  whom  Athens 
possessed  in  "Western  Greece.  A  long  feud  had  existed  between 
the  Corinthian  colonists  on  the  shore,  and  the  Acarnanian  and 
Amphilochian  highlanders  of  the  inland;  the  former  were  con- 
tinually encroaching  on  the  territory  of  the  latter,  and  had  of  late 
brought  matters  to  a  head  by  seizing  Argos,  the  capital  of  the 
Amphilochian  tribe.  It  was  owing  to  this  local  quarrel,  and  not 
to  any  love  for  Athens,  that  the  Acarnanians  are  found  enrolled 
in  the  Athenian  alliance.  When  Cnemus  had  been  joined  by  the 
troops  of  Leucas  and  the  other  Corinthian  towns,  and  had  further 
strengthened  himself  by  summoning  to  his  standard  a  number  of 
the  predatory  barbarian  tribes  of  Epirus,  he  advanced  on  Stratus, 
the  chief  city  of  Acarnania,  At  the  same  time  a  squadron  of 
Peloponnesian  ships  collected  at  Corinth,  and  set  sail  down  the 
gulf  towards  Naupactus.  The  only  Athenian  force  in  these  waters 
consisted  of  twenty  galleys  under  an  able  officer  named  Phormio, 
who  was  cruising  off  the  straits  of  Rhium,  to  protect  Naupactus 
and  blockade  the  Corinthian  Gulf. 


3IO  Plataea  and  Mitylene.  r429B.c.- 

Both  by  land  and  by  sea  the  operations  of  the  Peloponnesians 
miscarried  miserably.     Cnemus  collected  a  very  considerable  armj% 
but  as  he  sent  his  men  forward  to  attack  Stratus  by  three  separate 
roads,  he  exposed  them  to  defeat  in  detail.     His  centre,  composed 
of  his  Epirot  auxiliaries,  was  routed  by  the  Stratians,  and  the  Greek 
troops  on  either  flank  were  then  compelled  to  retire  without  having 
struck  a  blow.     By  sea  the  defeat  of  the  Peloponnesians  was  even 
more  disgraceful ;  the  Corinthian  admirals  Machaon  and  Isocrates 
were  so  scared,  when  they  came  across  the  squadron  of  Phormio  at 
the  mouth  of  the  gulf,  that,  although  they  mustered  forty-seven 
ships  to  his  twenty,  they  took  up  the  defensive.    Huddling  together 
in  a  circle,  they  shrank  from  his  attack,  and  allowed  themselves  to 
Phormio's    ^^  hustled  and  worried  into  the  Achaian  harbour  of 
sea-flghts.    Patrae,  losing  several  ships  in  their  flight.     Presently 
reinforcements  arrived ;  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  was  raised  to  no 
less  than  seventy-seven  vessels,  and  three  Spartan  officers  were 
sent  on  board,  to  compel  the  Corinthian  admirals,  who  had  behaved 
so  badly,  to  do  their  best  in  future.     The  whole  squadron  then  set 
out  to  hunt  down  Phormio.      They  found  him  with  his  twenty 
ships  coasting  along  the  Aetolian  shore  towards  Naupactus,  and  at 
once  set  out  in  pursuit.    The  long  chase  separated  the  larger  fleet 
into  scattered  knots,  and  gave  the  fighting  a  disconnected  and 
irregular  character.     While  the  rear  ships  of  Phormio's  squadron 
were  compelled  to  run  on  shore  a  few  miles  outside  Naupactus, 
the  eleven  leading  vessels  reached  the  harbour  in  safety.     Finding 
that  he  was  now  only  pursued  by  about  a  score  of  the  enemy — the 
rest   having   stayed   behind   to  take   possession  of    the   stranded 
Athenian  vessels — Phormio  came  boldly  out  of  port  again.     His 
eleven  vessels  took  six,  and  sunk  one  of  their  pursuers;  and  then, 
pushing  on  westward,  actually  succeeded   in  recapturing  most  of 
the  nine  ships  which  had  been  lost  in  the  morning.     This  engage- 
anent,  though  it   had  no  great  results,  was  considered   the  most 
daring  feat  performed  by  the  Athenian  navy  during  the  whole  war. 
Phormio  was  soon  after  reinforced  from  Athens,  and  the  Pelopon- 
nesians sailed  back  to  Corinth.     While  they  lay  there,  Brasidas, 
one  of  the  Spartan  officers  serving  on  board  the  squadron,  carried 
out  a  sudden  and  desperate  feat  of  arms  which  gave  earnest  of  his 
future  achievements.     Ever   since   the  beginning  of  the  war  the 


428  B.C.J  Revolt  hi  Lesbos.  311 

Megarian  navy  Lad  been  lying  in  port,  without  daring  to  venture 
out  into  the  Saronic  Gulf.  It  amounted  to  forty  vessels,  of  wliicli 
many  were  old  and  leaky,  but  all  could  be  used  for  a  short  cruise, 
Choosing  the  best  of  their  crews,  the  Peloponnesian  commanders 
marched  them  overland  to  Megara,  each  man  carrying  his  oar  and 
mat,  and  manned  the  galleys  at  nightfall.  Then  Descent  on 
suddenly  putting  out  to  sea,  they  captured  three  Saiamis. 
Athenian  galleys  which  were  blockading  the  port  of  Nisaea,  and 
afterwards  landed  on  Saiamis.  That  island  had  been  considered 
a  secure  refuge  by  the  Athenians,  and  was  full  of  cattle  and 
property  that  had  been  removed  for  safety  out  of  Attica.  All  this 
the  Peloponnesians  swept  off,  and  so  promptly  did  they  act  that 
they  re-embarked  unharmed  with  their  prisoners  and  spoil.  The 
Athenians,  who  had  thronged  down  in  rage  and  uproar  to  man  the 
galleys  that  lay  at  Peiraeus,  were  too  late  to  catch  a  single  one  of 
the  marauders. 

With  the  exception  of  a  fierce  but  fruitless  inroad  made  by  the 
Thracian  allies  of  Athens  into  Macedonia,  no  other  operations  took 
place  iu  429  B.C.  The  winter  passed  uneventfully,  and  the  war 
seemed  as  far  as  ever  from  showing  any  signs  of  producing  a  definite 
result.  But  although  the  Spartan  invasion  of  428  B.C.  had  no  more 
effect  than  those  of  the  preceding  years,  yet  in  the  late  summer 
there  occurred  an  event  so  fraught  with  evil  omens  for  Athens,  as 
to  threaten  the  whole  fabric  of  her  empire.  For  the  first  time  since 
the  commencement  of  hostilities,  an  important  subject  state  made 
an  endeavour  to  free  itself  by  the  aid  of  the  Spartan  fleet.  Lesbos 
was  one  of  the  two  Aegean  islands  which  still  remained  free  from 
tribute,  and  possessed  a  considerable  war-navy.  Among  its  five 
towns'  Mitylene  was  the  chief,  and  fi\r  exceeded  the  others  in 
wealth  and  resources.  It  was  governed  by  an  oligarchy,  who  had 
long  been  yearning  to  revolt,  and  bad  made  careful  preparation  by 
accumulating  warlike  stores  and  enlisting  foreign  Revolt  of 
mercenaries.  Before  their  arrangements  were  quite  Lesbos, 
complete,  their  neighbours  of  Tenedos  and  Methymna  sent  secret 
information  to  Athens  of  the  intended  rebellion.  The  Athenians 
at  first  hardly  credited  the  news,  and  thought  it  a  serious  matter 
to  have  to  add  such  a  powerful  state  to  the  list  of  their  enemies. 
>  Mitylene,  Methymna,  Antissa,  Eresus,  Pyrrba. 


312  I^^ataea  and  Mitylene.  [428  b.c. 

They  sent  ambassadors  to  pacify  the  Mitylenaeans,  but  without 
any  result.    The  whole  island  except  Methymna,  where  a  democracy 
ruled,  rose  in  arms,  and  determined  to  send  for  aid  to  Sparta. 
The  Athenians  at  once  despatched  against  Mitylene  a  squadron  of 
forty  sliips  under  Clei'ppides,  which  had  just  been  equipped  for  a 
cruise  in   Peloponnesian  waters.     This   force  had  an  engagement 
with  the  Lesbian   fleet,  and  drove  it   back   into  the  harbour  of 
Mitylene.     To  gain  time  for  assistance  from  across  the  Aegean  to 
arrive,  the  Lesbians  now  pretended  to  be  anxious  to  surrender,  and 
engaged  Cleippides  in  a  long  and  fruitless  negotiation,  while  they 
were  repeating  their  demands  at  Sparta.     But  at  last  the  Athenian 
grew  suspicion?,  established  a  close  blockade  of  Mitylene  by  sea, 
and  landed  a  small  force  of  hoplites  to  hold  a  fortified  camp  on  shore. 
The  autumn  had  now  arrived,  and  the  Lesbian  envoys  who  had 
been  sent  to  Sparta  were  conducted  to  Olympia,  where  the  represen- 
tatives of  the  various  Peloponnesian  states  were  just  assembling 
to  assist  at   the  celebration  of  the  games.     Here  they  laid  their 
grievances    before   the   confederates,   dwelling    not    so   much   on 
individual  instances  of  oppression  on  the  part  of  Athens,  as  on  the 
fact  that  her  empire  made  impossible  that  autonomy  which  was 
the  right  of  every  state,  and  complaining  that  though  they  had 
only  entered  the  Delian  League  to  aid  in  freeing  the  Aegean  from 
the  Persians,  they  were  now  employed  against  their  wuU  in  every 
private  quarrel  which   Athens  waged   with   another  Greek  city. 
Believing  the  revolt  of  the  Lesbians  to  be  the  earnest  of  a  general 
rising  of  all  the  vassals  of  Athens,  the  Peloponnesians  determined 
to  make  a  vigorous  effort  in  their  favour.     The  land  contingents  of 
the  various  states  were  summoned   to  the  Isthmus — though   the 
harvest  was  now  ripe,  and  the  allies  were  loath   to   leave  their 
reaping — while  it  was  also  determined  to  haul  over  the  Corinthian 
Isthmus  the  fleet  which  had  fought  against  Phormio,  and  then  to 
despatch  it  to  relieve  Mitylene. 

It  would  seem  that  much  of  this  temporary  burst  of  activity 
among  the  Peloponnesians  was  due  to  the  idea  that  Athens,  ia 
consequence  of  the  plague  and  the  four  years  of  costly  and  indecisive 
war,  was  now  brought  very  low  in  resources.  They  were  soon 
undeceived;  the  Athenians  were  furious  at  the  idea  that  their 
vassals  were  now  about  to  be  stirred  up  to  revolt,  and  strained 


428-7  B.C.]  Siege  of  Alitylene,  313 

every  nerve  to  defend  themselves.  While  the  blockade  of  Mitylene 
•was  kept  up,  and  a  hundred  galleys  cruised  in  the  Aegean  to 
intercept  any  succours  sent  to  Lesbos,  another  squadron  of  a 
hundred  ships  sailed  round  Peloponnesus  and  harried  the  coastland 
with  a  systematic  ferocity  that  surpassed  any  of  their  previous 
doings.  To  complete  the  crews  of  the  two  hundred  and  fifty  ships 
now  afloat  and  in  active  service  proved  so  great  a  drain  on  the 
military  force  of  Athens,  that  not  only  the  Thetes  but  citizens  of 
the  higher  classes  were  drafted  on  shipboard.  Nevertheless  the 
effect  which  they  designed  by  this  display  of  power  was  fully  pro- 
duced. To  defend  their  own  harvests  the  confederates  who  had  met 
at  the  Isthmus  went  homewards,  while  the  dismay  at  the  strength 
of  the  Athenian  fleet  was  so  great  that  the  plan  of  sending  naval 
aid  to  Lesbos  was  put  off  for  the  present.  Only  a  Lacedaemonian 
officer  named  Salaethus  was  secretly  sent  across  to  Mitylene,  when 
winter  had  already  arrived ;  he  was  but  a  poor  reinforcement  when 
the  Lesbians  had  been  expecting  a  whole  fleet  to  come  to  their  aid. 

All  through  the  winter  of  428-7  B.C.  the  blockade  of  Mitylene 
was  kept  up,  though  its  maintenance  proved  a  great  drain  on  the 
resources  of  Athens.  On  the  land  side  a  considerable  siege  of 
force  of  hoplites  under  Paches  strengthened  the  troops  Mityiene. 
already  on  the  spot,  and  made  it  possible  to  wall  the  city  in 
with  lines  of  circumvallation.  To  provide  funds  for  the  siege,  the 
Athenians,  having  now  exhausted  the  greater  part  of  the  hoarded 
treasure  of  the  Delian  League,  raised  two  hundred  talents  from 
among  themselves  by  a  property-tax,  and  also  sent  round  galleys  to 
collect  extra  contributions  from  their  allies. 

When  the  spring  of  427  B.C.  arrived,  the  Spartans  determined  to 
make  a  serious  attempt  to  send  aid  to  Lesbos ;  but  the  fear  of 
imperilling  all  their  naval  resources  in  a  single  expedition  kept 
them  from  despatching  a  fleet  of  sufficient  size.  Only  forty-two 
galleys,  under  an  admiral  named  Alcidas,  were  sent  forth  from 
Corinth.  This  squadron  managed  to  cross  the  Aegean  without 
meeting  the  Athenians,  by  steering  a  cautious  and  circuitous  course 
among  the  islands.  But  eo  much  time  was  lost  on  the  way,  that 
on  arriving  off  Embatum  in  Ionia,  Alcidas  found  that  Mitylene 
bad  surrendered  just  seven  days  before. 

The  circumstances  of  the  fall  of  Mitylene  were  peculiar.     Pro- 


314  Plataea  and  Mitylene.  \427B.c, 

visions  had  been  growing  scarce,  and  Salaethus,  whom  the  Lesbians 
Fall  of       ^^^^  placed  in  command,  resolved  to  break  the  Athe- 
Mityiene.     njan  lincs  of  investment  by  a  sortie  of  the  full  force 
of  the  city.     For  this  purpose  he  distributed  full  armour  to  all 
the  lower  classes  of  the  city,  who  had  previously  served  only  as 
light  troops.     But  the  proletariate  of  Mitylene  had  no  interest  in 
the  war,  which  had  been  entirely  the  work  of  the  oligarchy.    They 
only  thought  of  ending  the  semi-starvation  from  which  they  had 
been  suffering  of  late.     When  they  were  provided  with  arms  they 
refused  to  march,  mustered  in  the  market-place,  and  demanded 
with  threats  that  all  the  provisions  in  the  town  should  be  placed 
in  their  hands,  swearing  to  throw  the  gates  open  to  the  Athenians 
if  any  delay  was  made.     The  sedition  grew  so  hot  that  the  magis- 
trates, in  fear  for  their  lives,  resolved  to  make  terms  with  the 
besiegers  before  the  rioters  anticipated  them.     Accordingly  they 
merely  stipulated  with  Paches  that  no  one  should  be  put  to  death 
until  the  Athenian  Ecclesia  should  have  come  to  a  decision  as  to 
the  fate  of  the  city,  and  that  when  the  matter  was  being  debated 
they  might  be  allowed  to  send  envoys  to  speak  in  their  defence. 
These  terms  amounted  to  a  surrender  at  discretion,  and  were  readily 
granted  by  the  Athenian  general.     Placing  the  leading  men  of  the 
oligarchical  party  in  bonds  at  Tenedos,  he  let  the  rest  of  the  people 
remain  undisturbed,  only  throwing  a  strong  garrison  into  the  town. 
A  few  days  after  the  capitulation  Alcidas  and  his  fleet  arrived  in 
Asiatic  waters.     Learning  the  fall  of  Mitylene,  he  made  off  south- 
ward, and,  after  intercepting  many  merchant  vessels  off  the  Ionian 
coast  and  brutally  slaying  their  crews,  returned  to  Corinth  without 
having  struck  a  single  blow  for  the  cause  of  Sparta.     Paches  soon 
reduced  Antissa,  Eresus,  and   Pyrrha,  the   three   Lesbian  towns 
which  had  joined  in  the  revolt  of  Mitylene,  and  was  then  able  to 
sail  back,  taking  with  him  the  Laconian  general  Salaethus,  who 
had  been  caught  in  hiding  at  Mitylene,  together  with  the  other 
leaders  of  the  revolt. 

When  the  prisoners  arrived  at  Athens  Salaethus  was  at  once  put 

to  death  without  a  trial.     But  the  fate  of  the  Lesbians  was  the 

Debate  in  the  Subject  of  an  important  and  characteristic  debate  in 

Ecclesia.     the   Ecclesia.      Led   by   the   demagogue   Cleon,  the 

Athenians  at  fii"st  passed  the  monstrous  resolution  that  the  whole 


427  B.C.  Cleon.  315 

of  the  Mitylenaeans,  not  merely  the  prisoners  at  Athens,  but 
every  adult  male  in  the  city,  should  be  put  to  death,  and  their 
wives  and  faraflies  sold  as  slaves.  It  is  some  explanation  but  no 
excuse  for  this  horrible  decree  that  Lesbos  had  been  an  especially 
favoured  ally,  and  that  its  revolt  had  for  a  moment  put  Athens  in 
deadly  fear  of  a  general  rising  of  Ionia  and  Aeolis. 

Cleon  the  leather-seller,  the  author  of  this  infamous  decree,  -was 
one  of  the  statesmen  of  a  coarse  and  inferior  stamp,  whose  rise 
had  been  rendered  possible  by  the  democratic  changes 
which  Pericles  had  iatroduced  into  the  state.  We 
need  not  brand  him  with  ignominy,  as  did  Aristophanes,  for  being 
low-born  and  ill-educated,  or  following  a  distasteful  trade ;  but  his 
character  is  sufficiently  blackened  by  the  acknowledged  facts  of  his 
history.  He  had  first  made  himself  known  as  an  uncompromising 
democrat,  and  a  captious  critic  of  every  one  who  held  an  office ; 
even  Pericles  himself  had  suffered  from  his  boisterous  assaults. 
Cleon  was  one  of  those  men  who,  being  gifted  with  very  moderate 
abilities,  endeavour  to  thrust  themselves  to  the  front  by  the 
profession  of  a  narrow  and  unscrupulous  patriotism.  He  openly 
treated  international  morality  as  non-existent,  and  proclaimed  that 
his  country's  interest  overrode  all  considerations  of  right  and 
wrong.  Cleon's  ability  was  limited  to  a  power  of  gauging  very 
accurately  the  varying  moods  of  the  Ecclesia.  He  rose  to  notoriety 
by  making  himself  the  mouthpiece  of  the  public  opinion  of  the 
moment,  and  by  always  coming  forward  to  lead  the  assault  on  any 
statesman  or  general  who  made  himself  obnoxious  to  popular  pre- 
judice. The  chief  victims  of  his  invective  were  the  remains  of  the 
old  Conservative  party,  whom  he  unceasingly  accused  of  sympa- 
thizing with  Sparta  and  designedly  mismanaging  the  war.  It  is 
unfortunate  for  bis  reputation  that  his  portrait  has  been  drawn 
for  us  by  two  authors  whom  he  had  personally  injured  :  he  had 
driven  the  historian  Thucydides  into  exile,  and  endeavoured  to 
deprive  the  comic  dramatist  Aristophanes  of  his  citizenship.  But 
even  when  we  discount  the  wholesale  charges  of  cowardice,  corrup- 
tion, cruelty,  and  shamelessness  brought  against  him  by  those 
authors,  it  is  obvious  that  he  was  a  bane  to  his  cotmtry.  The 
statesman  who  preaches  to  the  populace  that  they  are  infallible  and 
omniscient,  and  at  the  same  time  encourages  them  to  cast  aside 


3i6  Plataea  and  Mitylene.  [427 b.o. 

principle  and  guide  themselves  by  self-interest  alone,  is  the  most 
pernicious  product  of  democracy.  Cleon's  action  at  the  Mitylenaean 
debate  is  a  fair  sample  of  the  whole  of  his  public  life. 

At  the  end  of  the  first  day  of  debate  the  motion  of  Cleou  had 
been  passed,  and  a  galley  sent  off  to  Paclies  at  Mitylene,  bidding 
him  slay  all  the  Lesbians;  but  on  the  next  morning,  when  men 
thought  over  the  matter  in  cold  blood,  there  arose  such  a  revulsion 
of  feeling  among  the  citizens  of  the  better  sort,  that  the  prytaneis 
were  induced  to  reassemble  the  Ecclesia,  and  bring  forward  the 
question  of  the  fate  of  Mitylene  for  a  second  decision. 

The  second      ■* 

Mitylenaean  CleoQ  stuck  to  his  bloodthirsty  resolution  ;  he  openly 
®  ^  ^"  said  that  the  Athenian  empire  rested  on  fear  alone, 
and  that  the  only  way  to  keep  the  rest  of  the  allies  in  a  wholesome 
state  of  fear  was  to  visit  the  Mitylenaeans  with  the  harshest  punish- 
ment that  could  be  devised.  If  the  assembly  voted  one  thing  one 
day  and  another  the  next,  it  would  become  the  laughing-stock  of 
Greece ;  while  its  imbecile  good-nature  would  encourage  other 
states  to  revolt,  in  the  expectation  that,  even  if  they  were  subdued, 
they  would  not  fare  very  ill. 

Diodotus,  the  orator  who  came  forward  to  answer  Cleon,  did 
not  dare  to  appeal  to  the  justice  of  the  assembly,  but  rather  strove 
to  demonstrate  that  expediency  required  Athens  to  refrain  from 
wholesale  massacre.  "  Let  the  leaders  be  put  to  trial,"  he  said, 
"  but  the  rest  left  alone.  If  you  condemn  the  common  people  of 
Mitylene,  who  took  no  part  in  the  revolt,  and  as  soon  as  they  got 
possession  of  arms  attacked  the  rebels,  you  are  not  merely  slaying 
your  benefactors,  but  committing  a  political  blunder.  At  present 
the  ruling  classes  in  every  allied  state  are  ready  to  revolt,  while  the 
proletariate  is,  on  the  whole,  well  disposed  towards  Athens.  But  if 
you  execute  all  the  Mitylenaeans  without  distinction,  the  populace 
in  every  city  will  feel  that  their  cause  is  the  same  as  that  of  the 
nobles,  and  revolts  for  the  future  will  be  desperate  and  unanimous." 
Such  arguments  won  over  the  Ecclesia  to  the  side  of  mercy.  The 
decree  of  Cleon  was  rescinded  by  a  small  majority,  and  a  second 
galley  sent  off  to  stay  Paches  from  the  massacre  which  he  had  been 
directed  to  commence.  But  the  first  ship  had  now  a  start  of  a  day 
and  a  night,  and  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  make  all  possible 
speed,  or  the  reprieve  would  come  too  late.     The  friends  and  repre- 


427B.C.]  Sortie  from  Plata ea.  317 

sentatives  of  the  Mitylenaeans  promised  the  crew  great  riswards  if 
they  would  only  arrive  in  time ;  and,  stimulated  by  their  promises, 
the  vessel  made  an  extraordinarily  rapid  passage.  The  oarsmen 
took  their  food  at  the  bench,  and  rested  in  relays,  so  that  the  ship's 
progress  never  slackened.  By  extraordinary  exertions  the  bearers  of 
the  reprieve  contrived  to  reach  Lesbos  only  a  few  hours  after  Paches 
had  received  the  first  despatch,  and  before  he  bad  time  to  put  it 
into  execution. 

Thus  the  majority  of  the  Mitylenaeans  were  saved;  but  all  their 
leaders  and  prominent  men,  not  less  than  a  thousand  in  number, 
were  put  to  death :  the  mercy  of  the  Athenian  j-^^g  ^^ 
Ecclesia  would  have  been  called  reckless  bloodthirsti-  Lesbos, 
ness  in  most  other  ages.  The  land  of  the  Lesbians  was  divided 
into  three  thousand  lots,  of  which  a  tenth  was  consecrated  to  the 
gcds,  while  the  rest  were  granted  out  to  Athenian  cleruchs,  who 
became  the  landlords  of  the  old  owners,  and  permitted  them  to 
cultivate  their  own  estates  at  a  rent  of  two  rainae  per  annum. 

Nothing  can  illustrate  more  strongly  the  emotional  and  incon- 
sistent character  of  the  Athenians  than  the  fate  of  Paches,  the 
conqueror  of  Mitylene.  On  his  return  home  he  was  prosecuted 
before  the  dicastery  for  having  done  violence  to  two  Mitylenaean 
ladies,  whose  husbands  he  had  put  to  death.  The  anger  excited 
by  this  atrocity  found  such  outspoken  expression,  that  the  criminal 
fell  on  his  sword  before  the  eyes  of  his  judges,  in  order  to  anticipate 
his  certain  condemnation  to  death.  Yet  the  mob,  which  howled 
down  Paches,  had  contemplated  an  outrage  on  a  scale  a  thousand- 
fold greater  than  that  which  their  victim  had  committed. 

In  the  winter  and  spring  of  427  B.C.,  while  the  siege  and  fall  of 
Mitylene  were  in  progress,  another  blockade  had  been  drawing  to  an 
end,  in  a  land  nearer  Athens.  Plataea  had  now  been  besieged  ever 
since  the  summer  of  429  B.C.,  and  as  the  Athenians  had  belied  their 
promises,  and  made  no  attempt  to  relieve  the  place,  the  garrison 
were  drawing  near  the  end  of  their  stores.  Starvation  was  grow- 
ing so  threatening  by  the  end  of  the  winter  of  428-7  B.C.,  that  a 
large  part  of  the  garrison  determined  to  make  a  desperate  attempt 
to  break  out.  Eupomi:)idas  the  Plataean  commander  xhe  sortie 
persuaded  about  fifty  Athenians  and  a  hundred  and  from  piataea. 
seventy  of  his  own  countrymen  to  follow  him,  though  the  prospect 


3i8  Plataea  and  Mitylene.  [4a7B.c. 

of  liaving  to  cross  two  ditches  and  force  two  separate  lines  of  wall 
might  have  appalled  the  most  venturesome  of  men.  They  chose 
a  moonless  night,  when  rain  was  falling,  and  stole  out  of  the  city 
carrying  scaling-ladders.  They  crossed  the  inner  ditch  unobserved, 
and  had  mounted  the  first  wall  before  they  were  discovered  by  the 
sentinels.  Then  the  alarm  was  given,  and  the  besiegers  began  to 
come  up  in  disorder  from  their  various  posts.  The  darkness,  how- 
ever, sent  many  astray,  while  those  of  the  Plataeans  who  had  not 
joined  in  the  attempt  made  a  sortie  from  the  opposite  side  of  the 
town  to  distract  the  enemy.  Thus  it  happened  that  the  adven- 
turers were  already  descending  from  the  second  wall  before  the 
besiegers  began  to  appear  in  force.  While  the  majority  were 
crossing  the  outer  ditch,  which  was  deep  and  full  of  floating  ice, 
the  rest  stood  at  bay  and  kept  back  the  approaching  Boeotians. 
So  silently  and  rapidly  was  the  matter  finished  that  the  Plataeans 
got  away  in  safety  almost  to  a  man,  for  two  hundred  and  twelve 
out  of  two  hundred  and  twenty  slipped  through.  After  escaping 
from  the  outer  wall  they  avoided  the  direct  road  to  Athens,  by 
which  they  knew  they  would  be  pursued,  and  making  a  detour  in 
the  plain  reached  a  hill-road  far  to  the  east,  by  which  they  escaped 
unmolested. 

This  gallant  and  successful  sortie  left  Plataea  very  scantily 
manned,  but  enabled  the  reduced  garrison  to  hold  out  much 
longer  on  their  limited  stock  of  provisions.  The  siege  was  pro- 
tracted not  less  than  six  mouths,  till  the  summer  of  427  B.C.  was 
at  its  height.  Then  absolute  starvation  so  weakened  the  Plataeans 
that  the  besiegers  might  have  taken  the  place  by  storm,  but  they 
refrained  from  doing  so  on  account  of  orders  from  Sparta,  which 
Plataea  ^^^^  them  wait  for  a  capitulation.  The  reason  of 
capitviiates.  tjijs  was  that  the  Ephors  intended  to  make  a  dis- 
tinction, if  ever  peace  with  Athens  became  necessary,  between 
places  which  had  been  captured  by  force  and  those  which  made  a 
voluntary  surrender.  At  last  the  besieged  were  brought  so  low 
that  they  surrendered  at  discretion,  on  the  ominous  condition 
"  that  the  Lacedaemonians  should  be  allowed  to  punish  the  guilty." 
Five  judges  were  sent  down  from  Sparta,  and  the  survivors  of  the 
garrison,  two  hundred  Plataeans  and  twenty-five  Athenians,  were 
arraigned  before  them.     The  trial  proved  a  preposterous  farce ;  the 


427  B.C.J  Fall  of  Plataea.  3 19 

prisoners  were  asked  one  after  the  other  "  whether  during  the  war 
they  had  done  any  service  to  the  Lacedaemonians  or  their  allies." 
On  making  the  only  possible  reply,  they  were  condemned  without 
exception  to  suffer  death.  It  was  to  no  effect  that  ThePiataeana 
their  leaders  pleaded  in  their  behalf  the  many  services  executed, 
which  Plataea  had  done  to  the  cause  of  Greece  during  past  times, 
and  especially  in  the  Persian  war.  The  Thebans,  who  had  never 
forgiven  the  massacre  of  their  two  hundred  citizens  at  the  out- 
break of  the  war,  answered  with  a  flood  of  bitter  invective,  and  put 
such  pressure  on  their  Spartan  allies  that  the  sentence  was  at  once 
carried  out.  Thus  fell  Plataea  after  two  full  years  of  siege,  in  the 
fifth  summer  of  the  war. 

The  Thebans  appropriated  the  territory  of  the  conquered  town, 
demolished  its  houses,  and  left  nothing  standing  on  the  spot  save 
the  temple  of  Hera,  and  a  sort  of  vast  inn  or  caravanserai  for  strangers, 
which  they  built  with  the  stonework  of  the  ruined  dwellings. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

SPHACTERIA   AND   DELIUM,    427-424  B.C. 

The  same  summer  which  saw  the  fall  of  Plataea  and  Mitylene 
beheld  the  first  grave  instance  of  divergence  from  the  policy  of 
Pericles  of  which  the  Athenians  had  yet  been  guilty.  Although 
they  were  conscious  of  the  imminent  danger  in  the  Aegean  which 
they  had  just  escaped,  they  now  proceeded  to  indulge  in  a  rash 
and  venturesome  expedition  far  from  home.  In  Sicily  a  war  was 
at  this  moment  raging  between  Syracuse — with  whom  were  allied 
Gela,  Selinus,  and  Acragas,  together  with  the  Italiot  town  of  Locri 
— and  a  confederacy  of  the  three  Ionian  cities  of  Naxos,  Catana, 
and  Leontini,  joined  with  Camarina  and  the  Italiots  of  Rhegium. 
We  are  assured  that  the  interference  of  Athens  in  this  distant  strife 
was  due  to  a  desire  to  establish  a  footing  in  Sicily,  and  to  a  plan 
for  ruining  the  corn  trade  with  the  West,  which  formed  the  most 
profitable  branch  of  the  commerce  of  Corinth.  Twenty  Athenian 
ships  under  Laches  sailed  round  by  Corcyra  to  Rhegium,  where 
they  joined  the  fleet  of  the  Ionian  cities,  and  next  spring  engaged 
in  a  desultory  naval  campaign  which  brought  neither  party  any 
gain. 

The  later  months  of  427  B.C.  were  also  notable  for  a  fierce 
sedition  in  Corcyra,  where  a  party  which  favoured  peace  with 
Corinth  made  a  desperate  rising,  and  strove  to  put  down  the 
democracy,  which  was  responsible  for  the  alliance  with  Athens  and 
the  continuance  of  the  war.  The  Spartans  determined  to  strengthen 
their  friends  by  sending  to  their  aid  the  fleet  which  had  failed  to 
relieve  Mitylene.  But  Alcidas  once  more  arrived  too  late;  the 
Corcyraean  oligarchs  were  put  down,  and  the  victorious  democratic 
faction   took  a  bloodv  and   reckless    revenge  on   their   defeated 


436  3.0.)  Demosthenes  in  Aetolia,  321 

opponents.  Several  hundreds,  including  many  who  were  inuocout 
of  treason,  were  put  to  death  without  any  regular  trial  or  con- 
demnation. 

The  next  year  of  the  war,  426  b.c,  was  perhaps  the  least  eventful 
which  had  passed  since  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  A  second  out- 
break of  the  plague  occurred  at  Athens,  but  it  wrought  no  very 
great  destruction  of  life  in  comparison  with  the  awful  visitation  of 
430  B.C.  The  most  important  event  of  the  year  was  an  expedition 
— as  reckless  though  not  so  remote  as  that  which  had  been  sent  to 
yicily — which  marked  once  more  the  tendency  of  the  Atheniaus 
to  ensaKe  in  distant  adventures.     Demosthenes,  the  ^ 

"  °  '  Demosthenes 

general  who  was  now  in  command  of  the  squadron  m  Aetoiia, 
in  the  Corinthian  Gulf  which  had  once  belonged  to  433 B.C. 
Phormio,  determined  to  make  an  attack  on  the  numerous  and  war- 
like tribes  of  Aetolia,  who  had  up  to  this  moment  preserved  their 
neutrality.  The  Messenians  of  Naupactus  had  persuaded  him  that 
their  Aetolian  neighbours  were  so  uncivilized  and  so  untrained  to 
regular  war,  that  they  would  yield  to  a  bold  attack,  and  consent  to 
join  the  Athenian  alliance.  Accordingly  Demosthenes  took  with 
him,  besides  his  own  hoplites,  forces  from  Naupactus  and  Zacyn- 
thus,  and  started  up  into  the  Aetolian  hills.  He  captured  a  village 
or  two,  but  presently  the  whole  country  side  turned  oat  in  arni.s, 
and  the  lightly  equipped  mountaineers  so  vexed  and  galled  the 
invaders  that  Demosthenes  was  obliged  to  fall  back.  When 
once  he  began  to  retire  he  was  so  closely  pressed  that  his  whole 
army  broke  up,  and  fled  in  disorder  to  Naujiactus  with  the  loss  of 
nearly  half  its  numbers. 

It  was  of  some  solace  to  Athenian  pride,  but  of  little  use  to 
Athenian  policy,  that  a  few  months  later  Demosthenes  succeeded 
in  retrieving  his  military  reputation  by  a  brilliant  victory  in 
Acarnania.  The  detachment  of  Pelopounesian  troops,  which  liad 
been  sent  to  that  country  in  429  B.C.,  had  been  once  more  joiucd 
by  the  hoplites  of  the  Corinthian  colonies  on  the  coast,  and  was 
again  attacking  the  Acarnanians.  Demosthenes,  massing  the  whole 
disposable  forces  of  his  allies,  threw  himself  between  the  main  body 
of  the  enemy  and  their  reserves.  On  one  day  he  defeated  the 
Peloponnesians  and  slew  their  leader,  Eurylochus ;  on  the  next  he 
fell  upon  the  Ambraciot  reinforcements  which  were  advancing  to 

y 


32  2  Sphaderia  and  Delium.  [426 b.c. 

aid  tlie  defeated  force,  and  almost  exterminated  tliem.     Tlie  blow 

to  Ambracia  was   so  great    that   in   the  oi^inion  of 

oipae,       Thucydides  it  was  the  heaviest  which  fell  on  any  city 

42  B.C.      jj^  j.j^g  whole  war,  and  tlie  proportion  of  the  military 

strength  of  the  place  which  was  destroyed  was  almost  incredibly 

large.     But  the  victory  led  to  an  unexpected  result ;  the  Acarua- 

nians,  knowing  themselves  to  be  free  from  any  further  danger  from 

their  neighbours  of  the  sea-coast,  made  a  separate  peace  with  them. 

The  Athenian  alliance  had  served  their  purpose  in  preserving  them 

from  concxuest  by  the  Corinthian  colonists,  and  they  had  no  longer 

any  keen  interest  in  the  war.     Thus  Demosthenes,  though  he  had 

crippled  an  enemy  of  Athens  by  his  victory,  had  also  taken  off 

the  edge  of  the  devotion  of  a  zealous  and  useful  ally. 

The  year  425  b.c.  was  destined  to  be  more  fruitful  in  decisive 
events  than  any  which  had  preceded  it  since  the  opening  of  the 
war.     These  events,  however,  sprung  not  from  the  deliberate  plans 
of  either  side,  but  from  a  mere  chance.     Early  in  the  year  the 
Athenians,  still  following  their  visionary  scheme  for  establishing  a 
foothold  in  Sicily,  had  determined  to  send  out  reinforcements  to 
the  west.    A  fleet  of  forty  ships,  under  an  officer  named  Eurymedon, 
was    despatched    thither.      Demosthenes,    too,    sailed    with    this 
squadron :  he  had  returned  to  Athens  since  his  victories  in  Acarnania, 
and  was  now  going   back   to  his  post.      After   Eurymedon  and 
Demosthenes  had  rounded  Taenarum,  a  storm  compelled  them  to 
put  into  the  Messenian  harbour  of  Pylos,>  and  kept 
atPyios.      them  wind-bound  for  several  days.     The  sailors  ven- 
425  B.C.      ^m.gjj  ashore,  and,  to  secure  themselves  from  sudden 
attacks  of  the  Peloponnesians,  threw  up  a  light  entrenchment  on 
the  rocky  headland  which  forms  the  northern  point  of  the  Pylian 
bay.     The  stay  of  the  fleet  was  protracted  far  beyond  the  expecta- 
tions of  the  admirals,  and  it  presently  occurred  to  Demosthenes 
that    the  extemporized  fort  might  be  strengthened  and  made  a 
permanent  base   for  incursions  against  the  western  shore  of  the 
Peloponnese.     It  was  perched  on  an  extraordinarily  inaccessible 
spot,  commanded  a  good  harbourage,  and  lay  in  that  Messenian 
district   whose   Helots   had   risen   so   often  against   the   Spartan. 
Accordingly   Demosthenes  persuaded   his  men   to  entrench    the 
'  Probably  not  the  same  as  the  Pylos  of  Nestor  mentioned  on  p.  34. 


425 B.C.]  Demosthenes  at  Pylos.  323 

headland  as  best  they  could,  piling  stone  on  stone  into  a  strong 
though  rough  wall  wherever  it  was  possible  to  ascend  the  slope 
on  the  land  side,  till  the  fort  was  made  tenable  against  any  ordinary 
assault.  On  the  sea  side  the  cliffs  allowed  of  approach  only  on 
one  narrow  slip  of  beach,  where  lay  the  landing-place  at  which 
the  Athenians  had  gone  ashore.  When  the  work  of  fortification 
had  been  completed,  Eurymedon  proceeded  on  his  way  to  Sicily 
with  thirty-five  ships,  leaving  Demosthenes  with  five  to  hold  tho 
fort. 

The  news  of  the  occupation  of  Pylos  soon  reached  Sparta,  and 
the  strength  of  the  Athenian  force  which  had  landed  was  so 
exaggerated  by  report,  that  the  ephors  sent  in  hot  haste  to  recall 
the  Peloponnesian  army,  which  had  marched  a  few  weeks  before 
to  carry  out  the  usual  summer  raid  into  Attica.  Accordingly, 
King  Agis  with  his  host  quitted  their  ravaging,  and  set  out 
homeward.  At  the  same  moment  the  fleet,  which  had  been  so 
unfortunately  tardy  at  Mitylene  and  Corcyra,  was  summoned  up 
to  complete  the  blockade  of  Pylos  on  the  sea-front.  Demosthenes 
had  just  time  to  send  off  two  vessels  to  report  the  approach  of  the 
enemy,  before  he  was  completely  invested  and  beset  on  all  sides. 

The  promontory  of  Pylos  forms  the  northern  horn  of  the  bay 
of  the  same  name;  facing  it  at  a  distance  of  a  hundred  yards, 
and  fronting  the  whole  expanse  of  the  bay,  lies  the  island  of 
Sphacteria,  a  narrow  rock  some  two  miles  in  length,  overgrown 
with  underwood  and  thickets.  As  this  island  was  the  natural  point 
which  an  Athenian  force,  desiring  to  relieve  Pylos,  would  choose 
as  its  base  of  operations,  the  Spartans  determined  to  occupy  it. 
Accordingly  they  sent  over  to  it  four  hundred  and  twenty  hoplites, 
together  with  the  usual  complement  of  light-armed  Helots  in 
attendance  on  their  masters — a  force  sufficient  to  make  any  landing 
difficult.  The  two  narrow  inlets  to  the  north  and  south  of  the 
island  they  intended  to  bar  with  a  close  line  of  vessels  moored 
across  the  entrance,  but  this  design  was  not  completed. 

Meanwhile  the  garrison  at  Pylos  was  exposed  to  several  desperate 
attacks.     Knowing  that  an  Athenian  fleet  would  probably  appear 
ere    long    to   aid    Demosthenes,    the    Spartan   com-  The  spartana 
manders  made  a  vigorous  attempt  to  take  the  fort  ^"^'^'^  ^y^°^' 
by  storm  before  it  could  be  succoured.     The  land  and  sea  fronts 


324 


Sphacieria  and  Delium. 


[425  B.C. 


were  simultaueoiisly  assaulted;  on  the  former  side  the  positioa 
was  so  strong  that  a  small  part}'  of  the  besieged  was  able  to  keep 
the  Peloponnesians  at  bay.  But  a  desperate  struggle  took  place 
on  the  narrow  slip  of  beach  where  alone  landing  was  possible. 
There  Demosthenes  and  his  hoplites  stood  in  serried  rows,  while 
trireme  after  trireme  tried  to  push  itself  up  to  the  landing-place 
and  to  throw  its  fighting-men  ashore.    Only  two  or  three  vessels 


IVulker  CrliciUallsc. 


could  approach  at  a  time,  and  the  front  on  which  fighting  could 
take  place  was  so  narrow  that  superiority  of  numbers  was  of  no 
avail.  After  a  prolonged  encounter  the  Peloponnesians  backed 
water ;  the  difficulty  of  the  place  had  been  too  much  for  them ; 
they  had  lost  many  men,  and  Brasidas,  their  best  officer,  had 
fallen  back  on  his  deck  desperately  wounded,  at  the  moment  that 
he  was  endeavouring  to  leap  ashore.  The  assault,  indeed,  had  so 
signally  failed  that  the  Athenians  set  up  a  trophy  to  commemorate 


425 B.C.]  Sea-fight  off  Fylos.  325 

it,  binding  thereto  tlie  shield  of  Brasidas,  which  had  fallen  into 
the  sea  at  the  moment  that  its  owner  was  struck  down. 

Before  the  Spartans  had  time  to  construct  siege-engines  or  com- 
mence a  regular  blockade  of  Pylos,  an  Athenian  fleet  appeared  in 
the  ofEng.  Eurymedon  had  mot  the  vessels  which  sphacteria 
Demosthenes  had  sent  off  to  seek  him,  and  had  turned  blockaded, 
back  to  relieve  his  colleague,  after  strengthening  himself  with  the 
squadron  which  was  stationed  off  the  Acarnanian  coast.  The 
Peloponnesian  admirals,  instead  of  endeavouring  to  block  the  two 
entrances  of  the  bay  of  Pylos,  allowed  the  Athenian  fleet  to  file  into 
the  harbour,  and  engaged  it  in  the  space  of  water  between  Sphacteria 
and  the  mainland.  The  forty-three  vessels  under  the  Spartan  com- 
mander were  defeated  with  ease  by  the  fifty  galleys  of  Eurymedon. 
Five  were  taken,  and  the  rest  driven  to  run  ashore  and  seek  the  pro- 
tection of  their  friends  of  the  land  army.  The  importance  of  this 
victory  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  Spartan  hoplites  on  Sphacteria  were 
now  completely  cut  off  from  help,  and  imprisoned  on  their  island. 
They  included  some  of  the  most  important  citizens  of  the  state, 
and  were  a  very  appreciable  part  of  the  small  body  of  pure-blooded 
Lacedaemonians.  Shut  up  on  a  desolate  island,  with  provisions 
for  a  few  days  only  in  hand,  they  were  obviously  destined  to  fall 
into  the  power  of  the  Athenians,  unless  something  could  be  done 
to  deliver  them. 

When  the  news  from  Pylos  reached  Sparta,  the  ephors  at  once 
set  out  for  the  camp,  and  viewed  the  situation  with  their  own  eyes. 
So  little  confidence  did  their  visit  bring  them,  that  they  at  once 
proix)sed  to  Demosthenes  and  Eurymedon  to  conclude  an  armistice, 
and  offered  to  send  an  embassy  to  Athens  to  treat  for  peace.  The 
danger  of  four  hundred  of  their  owm  citizens  had  brought  them  at 
once  to  a  state  of  despondency  and  humiliation,  which  no  amount 
of  suffering  inflicted  on  their  allies  would  have  produced.  The 
Athenian  commanders  consented  to  grant  a  truce,  and  to  allow  the 
blockaded  hoplites  to  be  supplied  with  a  bare  ration  of  food,  day 
by  day,  as  long  as  the  armistice  continued.  But  they  exacted  in 
return  that  the  Peloponnesian  vessels,  which  were  lying  on  shore  by 
the  camp,  should  be  placed  in  their  hands,  as  a  security  for  the  full 
observance  of  the  terms  of  the  truce.  To  this  the  ephors  consented, 
and  at  once  despatched  ambassadors  to  Athens  to  treat  for  peace. 


326  Sphaderia  and  Delinni.  i;425B.o. 

This  was  the  one  opportunity  wliich  was  presented  to  Ihe 
Athenians,  daring  the  war,  of  retiring  from  the  contest  with  glory 
Abortive  ^^^  profit.  The  Spartans  announced  that  they  were 
negotiations  ready  to  revert  to  the  status  qiio  of  431  B.C.,  and 
to  ratify  a  permanent  peace ;  they  pointed  out  that 
the  war  had  hitherto  been  inconclusive,  and  that,  if  their  over- 
tures were  now  refused,  the  next  turn  of  fortune  might  make 
the  Athenians  lament  their  lost  chance.  The  proposal  was  one 
which  Pericles  would  undoubtedly  have  accepted;  it  left  Athens 
with  her  empire  and  the  commerce  unimpaired,  and  proved  that, 
even  when  all  the  land-powers  of  Greece  banded  themselves  to- 
gether, they  had  been  unable  to  shake  her  dominion.  But  the 
firm  hand  and  cool  head  of  Pericles  no  longer  swayed  the  Athenian 
assembly,  and  the  windy  demagogues  who  now  ruled  it  were  set 
ujwn  pressing  the  advantage  of  Athens  to  the  uttermost,  without 
any  regard  for  caution  or  moderation.  Now,  as  at  the  time  of 
the  Mitylenean  debate,  Cleon  made  himself  the  mouthpiece  of 
the  ultra-patriotic  party ;  he  declared  that  Athens  must  not  throw 
away  her  chance  of  making  a  hard  bargain  with  Sparta,  and  pro- 
posed that,  in  return  for  peace,  the  Peloponnesians  should  surrender 
to  Athens  the  districts  which  had  formed  part  of  the  Athenian 
land-empire  twenty  years  before.  He  demanded  that  Troezen, 
Achaia,  and  the  ports  of  the  Megarid — Nisaea  and  Pegae — all  of 
which  had  been  given  up  in  445  B.C.,  should  be  made  over  to 
their  former  suzerain.  The  Laconian  ambassadors  replied  that 
the  terms  were  inadmissible,  but  professed  themselves  ready  to 
make  advantageous  proposals,  if  the  Athenians  would  depute  com- 
missioners to  treat  with  them,  and  not  insist  on  the  negotiations 
being  carried  on  in  the  heated  atmosphere  of  the  Ecclesia.  Cleon 
at  once  burst  out  with  invectives.  He  insisted  that  the  envoys 
were  trifling  with  the  people,  and  could  have  no  honest  intentions 
if  they  would  not  declare  their  whole  mission  in  public.  The 
feeling  of  the  assembly  was  so  obviously  on  his  side  that  the 
Spartans  withdrew  in  despair,  and  returned  to  report  to  the  ephors 
the  complete  failure  of  their  embassy. 

The  rupture  of  negotiations  at  Athens  was  the  signal  for  the 
resumption  of  hostilities  at  Pylos.  The  Spartans  on  the  island, 
who  had   for   twenty  days  been   subsisting  on  the  rations  with 


425 B.C.]  Blockade  of  Sphaderia.  ;^2'j 

which  they  were  supplied  in  accordauce  with  the  terms  of  the 
truce,  were  again  thrown  on  their  own  slender  resources.  No 
help  for  them  seemed  possible,  more  especially  since  Eurymedon, 
alleging  some  slight  infraction  of  the  truce  by  the  hostile  com- 
manders, utterly  refused  to  restore  the  Pelopounesian  war-galleys 
which  had  been  entrusted  to  him.  His  plea  seemed  to  have  been 
quite  untenable,  but,  having  the  vessels  in  his  hands,  he  was 
master  of  the  situation.  While  the  Athenian  fleet  blockaded 
Sphacteria,  two  triremes  being  continually  kept  moving  up  and 
down  its  coast  in  opposite  directions,  the  marines  strengthened 
the  fort  at  Pylos.  A  very  large  Peloponnesian  army  now  lay 
before  that  work,  but  proved  entirely  unable  to  master  it. 

A  few  days  would  have  sufficed  to  starve  out  the  garrison  of 
Sphacteria,  had  it  not  been  for  the  extraordinary  measures  which 
the   Spartans   took  to   keep  it   supplied  with    food.    ^ 
On  every  dark  or   stormy  night  small  vessels  put    blockade  of 

.    P  .  ^        e  T'T  T  •  J  Sphacteria, 

out  from  various  ports  of  Llis  or  Laconia  and  ran 
the  blockade;  such  high  rewards  were  promised  by  the  ephors 
for  every  sack  of  flour  or  skin  of  wine  that  could  be  thrown 
ashore,  that  the  merchants  and  seamen  were  ready  to  run  any  risk, 
and  though  many  boats  were  taken,  others  continually  succeeded 
in  reaching  the  island.  "We  are  also  assured  that  strong  swimmers 
would  frequently  cross  the  bay  at  nigh':  from  the  mainland, 
dragging  behind  them  skins  filled  with  linseed  or  honey,  and  other 
food  that  would  pack  close.  These  expedients  kept  the  men  on  the 
island  supplied  with  a  ration  sufficient  to  maintain  them,  and 
the  blockade  was  therefore  protracted  far  beyond  the  expectation  of 
the  Athenians,  who  had  looked  for  the  immediate  surrender  of  the 
garrison.  After  two  months  had  gone  by  the  autumn  was  drawing 
on,  and  it  began  to  appear  as  if  the  storms  of  the  equinox  would 
ere  long  drive  the  Athenians  from  their  bleak  and  dangerous 
harbourage  under  the  promontory  of  Pylos. 

The  discontent  felt  at  Athens  over  the  miscarriage  of  the  blockade 
was  now  growing  acute,  and  the  people  began  to  regret  their 
refusal  of  the  terms  of  peace  which  Sparta  had  offered.  This 
induced  them  to  turn  their  anger  against  Cleon,  who  had  caused 
those  terms  to  be  rejected.  The  demagogue,  wishing  to  divert 
their  discontent,  replied  that  the  real  fault  lay  with  the  generals 


328  Sphacteria  and  Delhcnt.  '425  B.C. 

at  Pylos,  who  had  showed  a  great  lack  of  courage  and  enterprise, 
and  might  have  reduced  the  island  long  ago  if  they  had  possessed 
ordinary  vigilance  and  energy.  "I  could  have  taken  Sphacteria 
myself,"  he  added,  "  if  I  had  been  in  command."  This  casual 
remark  was  at  once  taken  up  by  the  enemies  of  Cleon.  "  If  it  is  so 
easy,  why  not  go  and  try  it?  "  was  shouted  from  the  crowed.  Then 
Cleon  sent  to  Nicias,  son  of  Niceiatup,  one  of  the  strategi,  a  rich 
pylos.  citizen  who  detested  Cleon's  political  methods,  stepped 
on  to  the  Bema,  and  formally  proposed  that  the  tanner  should  be 
sent  to  Pylos.  This  decree  was  only  proposed  at  first  as  a  piece  of 
party  sarcasm  ;  the  conception  of  Cleon  at  the  head  of  a  fleet  was 
too  ridiculous  in  the  eyes  of  his  opponents  to  be  taken  seriously. 
An  absurd  scene  then  ensued,  as  the  demagogue  kept  declining  the 
unexpected  honour,  and  his  enemies  continued  to  press  it  on  him 
with  effusion.  But  to  many  of  the  multitude  the  notion  of  Cleon 
in  command  did  not  appear  so  preposterous  as  it  did  to  Nicias ;  and 
those  who  had  been  accustomed  to  follow  the  tanner's  political  lead, 
cried  out  in  earnest  that  he  was  quite  able  to  undertake  the  business. 
The  proposal  which  had  been  brought  forward  in  jest  was  ere  long 
seriously  taken  into  consideration.  Nicias  was  unable  to  withdraw 
his  motion,  and  Cleon  found  himself  constrained  to  stand  by  his 
first  unguarded  words.  Thus  it  came  to  pass  that  in  the  end 
the  demagogue  plucked  up  his  courage,  declared  that  he  did  not 
share  that  panic  fear  of  Spartan  heroism  which  other  men  seemed 
to  feel,  and  staked  his  career  on  a  promise  to  capture  or  destroy 
the  garrison  of  Sphacteria  within  twenty  days.  He  asked  for  no 
Athenian  troops  to  help  him,  and  undertook  to  finish  the  game 
with  four  hundred  archers,  some  hoplites  from  Imbros  and  Lemnos 
who  were  then  in  the  city,  and  a  body  of  Thracian  light  infantrj'. 
Control  over  these  forces  was  granted  him,  and  he  sailed  at  once 
for  Pylos.  "The  most  sensible  men  at  Athens,"  says  Thucydides, 
"  thought  that  they  had  now  gained  one  of  two  good  things. 
Either  (as  was  most  likely)  Cleon  would  fail  and  be  politically 
extinguished  for  ever ;  or  else  he  would  succeed,  and  a  heavy  blow 
be  inflicted  on  Sparta." 

Cleon's  undertaking  was  not  so  rash  and  ridiculous  as  men 
thought.  He  was  quite  right  in  believing  that  Spartans  were  after 
all  not  invulnerable  and  invincible  heroes,  but  men  who  could  be 


425 B.C.]     Surrender  of  the  Spartans  in  SpJiaderia  329 

overwhelmed  by  stress  of  numbers  like  any  other  troops.  The 
detachment  on  Sphactcria  was  composed  of  some  few  hundred  men, 
and  if  attacked  with  sufficient  vigour  by  four  or  five  times  its  own 
force  must  finally  succumb.  It  is  said  that  Demosthenes  had 
already  been  thinking  of  an  attack  on  the  island,  and  had  only 
been  prevented  by  the  caution  of  his  colleague. 

Just  before  Cleon  arrived  at  Sphacteria,  an  accidental  fire  had 
destroyed  most  of  the  woods  with  which  the  island  was  overgrown, 
and  deprived  the  Spartans  of  the  greater  part  of  their  sphacteria 
cover.  Their  numbers  could  be  more  clearly  seen  and  captured, 
their  manoeuvres  more  closely  followed  than  had  hitherto  been  pos- 
sible. Cleon  at  once  took  general  charge  of  the  operations,  handing 
over  the  execution  of  the  details  to  Demosthenes.  They  resolved 
to  overwhelm  the  Spartans  by  gross  force  of  numbers.  Eight  hun- 
dred hoplites  were  landed  by  night,  near  the  southern  extremity  of 
the  island,  and  covered  the  disembarcation  of  the  rest  of  the  force. 
They  cut  off  an  outpost  of  thirty  men  which  was  posted  in  that 
direction,  and  were  firmly  established  on  shore  before  Epitadas, 
the  Spartan  commander,  approached  them  with  his  main  body  of 
three  hundred  and  fifty  men.  By  this  time  eight  hundred  bowmen, 
the  same  number  of  Peltasts,  a  body  of  Messeniau  light  troops, 
and  a  large  draft  from  the  crews  of  the  seventy  sliips  at  Pylos, 
had  been  thrown  on  the  shore.  When  Epitadas  advanced  against 
the  hoplites,  a  cloud  of  slingers  and  bowmen  closed  in  on  his 
flanks  and  rear,  and  so  beset  him  with  a  cloud  of  missiles,  that 
his  small  body  of  men  were  gradually  brought  to  a  standstill. 
They  were  now  charging  over  ground  covered  by  the  smouldering 
ashes  of  the  burnt  wood,  and  the  dust  and  reek  well-nigh  choked 
and  blinded  them.  As  the  Athenians  would  not  close,  but  kept 
shooting  them  down  from  a  distance,  their  position  became  unbear- 
able. At  last,  after  Epitadas  had  been  slain,  his  successor  in 
command  gave  the  signal  for  retreat,  and  the  surviving  Spartans 
cut.their  way  through  the  light  troops,  and  threw  themselves  into 
a  ruined  fort  of  prehistoric  days,  which  lay  at  the  north  end  of  the 
island.  Here  they  maintained  themselves  for  a  short  time  ;  but 
presently  some  Messenians,  finding  a  way  up  a  crag  which  over- 
iiung  the  fort,  appeared  on  a  spot  which  completely  commanded 
the  Spartan  position,  and  commenced  to  pick  off  the  enemy  from 


330  Sphaderia  and  Deliuvi.  [425  b.c. 

the  rear.  The  Spartans  were  now  obviously  doomed  men,  and 
Cleon  and  Demosthenes,  holding  back  their  troops  for  a  minute, 
sent  out  a  herald  to  bid  them  surrender.  To  the  surprise  of  those 
who  believed  that  a  Spartan  never  would  lay  down  his  arms,  the 
majority  of  the  survivors  lowered  their  shields  and  waved  their 
hands  to  show  that  they  accepted  the  proposal.  Their  officers 
asked  leave  to  communicate  with  the  army  on  the  mainland,  and 
after  doing  so,  and  receiving  the  despairing  advice  to  "take  such 
measures  as  they  could,  so  long  as  they  were  not  dishonourable," 
completed  a  formal  capitulation.  Two  hundred  and  ninety-two 
hoplites  still  survived  out  of  the  four  hundred  and  twenty  on  the 
island ;  how  many  of  their  Helots  were  left  is  not  known.  No 
less  than  one  hundred  and  twenty  of  the  prisoners  were  members 
of  the  first  families  of  Sparta. 

Thus  had  Cleon  fulfilled  his  promise  to  the  Athenian  Ecclesia. 
We  are  told  that  his  success  was,  "  of  all  the  events  of  the  war, 
the  one  which  caused  most  surprise  in  Greece."  If  this  was  so, 
it  illustrates  the  exaggerated  impression  of  Spartan  valour  which 
prevailed  at  the  time,  rather  than  the  rashness  or  good  luck  of 
Cleon.  He  landed  on  the  island  with  more  thousands  at  his  back 
than  Epitadas  had  hundreds,  and  yet  his  victory  was  considered 
remarkable. 

After  their  fleet  returned  with  the  prisoners  on  board,  the 
Athenians  thought  that  the  whole  game  was  in  their  hands. 
Cleon,  inflated  by  his  exploits,  was  more  exacting  than  ever ;  and 
when  a  new  Spartan  embassy  arrived  to  propose  once  more  a 
general  peace,  and  the  restoration  of  their  prisoners,  the  terms  offered 
them  were  even  harder  than  before,  so  that  nothing  could  be  done. 

The   success   at  Sphacteria  soon  tempted  the   Athenians   into 

action   on   land   more  dariug   than  any   they  had  hitherto  per- 

second       formed.     Before  the  year  was  out  they  landed  several 

^corcyM,?*'  thousand  hoplites  near  the  Corinthian  Isthmus,  de- 
435  B.C.  feated  the  Corinthians  in  a  pitched  battle  at  Soly- 
geia,  and  retired  unmolested  to  their  ships.  Then  coasting  south- 
ward, they  again  landed  in  the  territory  of  Epidaurus,  and  seized 
and  fortified  the  peninsula  of  Methone.  About  the  same  time  the 
bloody  scenes  which  had  occurred  at  Corcyra  two  years  before  were 
repeated  under  circumstances  of  even  greater  atrocity  than  those 


424  B.C.  Second  Sedition  at  Corey ra.  331 

of  427  B.C.  The  democrats,  aid(i(i  by  an  Athenian  force,  having 
suppressed  a  second  armed  insurrection  of  the  oligarchic  party, 
allowed  their  defeated  enemies  to  capitulate  on  promise  of  their 
lives.  Then  they  deliberately  persuaded  a  few  of  the  oligarchs 
to  break  their  parole,  and,  on  pretence  that  this  invalidated  the 
vrhole  agreement,  opened  the  prisons  and  butchered  such  of  the 
three  or  four  hundred  prisoners  as  did  not  seek  a  speedier  death  by 
suicide.  The  Athenian  general  Eurymedon  made  no  attempt  to 
save  the  unfortunates,  though  he  had  been  a  party  to  the  capitula- 
tion, and  had  pledged  his  word  that  they  should  be  given  a  fair 
trial  at  Athens. 

Cleon  was  now  at  the  height  of  his  power.  His  ascendancy  in 
Athens  was  marked  by  a  characteristic  piece  of  legislation,  showing 
his  disregard  for  the  allies.  At  one  blow  he  doubled  their  tribute. 
This  measure  goes  far  to  explain  the  revolts  of  the  next  few  years. 

The  year  424  b.c.  opened  with  the  brightest  prospects  for  the 
Athenians,  and  for  its  first  few  months  the  tide  of  their  successes 
continued  to  advance.  The  strategus  Nicias,  early  in  the  year, 
captured  the  large  but  rugged  island  of  Cythera,  which  lies  off 
Cape  Malea,  facing  towards  the  Laconian  Gulf.  It  was  at  once 
enrolled  as  a  member  of  the  Delian  League,  and  its  harbours  served 
as  the  starting-point  for  many  raids  on  the  opposite  coast,  till  the 
truth  of  the  old  saying,  "  Well  for  Sparta  if  Cythera  were  sunk  in 
the  sea,"  was  realized  more  keenly  than  ever.  It  was  the  darkest 
moment  of  the  war  for  the  Spartans;  Athens  would  _      ., 

^  AFdiSici&s  S6ZIT 

grant  no  reasonable  terms  of  peace,  and  her  obstmacy  ag-ainst 
drove  them  to  desperate  measures  to  defend  them- 
selves. To  prevent  the  general  revolt  of  the  Helots,  which  they 
expected,  they  set  the  Crypteia  (see  p.  74),  or  secret  police,  Avorking 
with  even  more  than  their  usual  cruelty ;  it  is  said  that  as  many  as 
two  thousand  victims  were  secretly  despatched  by  this  means.  In 
their  anxiety  to  strike  a  blow  which  should  be  felt  at  Athens, 
whatever  might  be  the  cost,  the  ephors  gave  their  consent  to  a 
new  and  hazardous  scheme  for  sapping  the  foundations  of  the 
Confederacy  of  Delos.  Athens  possessed  one  group  of  snl)ject 
allies  who  dwelt  on  the  mainland  of  Europe,  and  could  be  ap- 
proached without  that  sea-voyage  which  had  become  the  terror  of 


332  Sphacteria  and  Dclium.  [424  b.o. 

every  Peloponnesian.  But  these  pities,  the  towns  of  Chalcidice  and 
the  Thracian  shore,  were  separated  from  Phocis,  the  nearest  state 
of  the  Spartan  alliance,  by  a  vast  stretch  of  land,  comprising 
Thessaly,  where  most  of  the  towns  preserved  a  friendly  neutrality 
towards  Athens,  and  the  barbarian  kingdom  of  Macedonia.  It  had 
never  before  occurred  either  to  the  Athenian  or  the  Spartan  mind 
that  the  towns  of  the  Thracian  tribute-district  might  be  assailed 
from  the  inland.  But  now  the  task  was  to  be  essayed.  Brasidas, 
the  most  enteri:)rising  officer  that  Sparta  possessed,  was  commis- 
sioned to  levy  a  force  which  should  march  northward,  and  endea- 
vour to  rekindle  the  embers  of  war  which  still  smouldered  to  the 
north  of  the  Aegean.  A  few  towns,  which  had  revolted  along  with 
Potidaea,  were  still  maintaining  an  obscure  warfare  against  Athens, 
and  would  serve,  if  once  they  could  be  reached,  as  a  base  of 
operations.  Seven  hundred  Helots,  who  had  been  promised  their 
freedom  if  they  volunteered  for  foreign  service,  formed  the  nucleus 
of  Brasidas's  army.  So  hazardous  was  the  expedition  considered, 
that  no  state  was  asked  to  supply  a  contingent  for  it,  and  indi- 
vidual recruits  were  collected  in  scanty  numbers  by  the  promise  of 
high  pay.  Brasidas  was  at  Corinth  with  about  seventeen  hundred 
men  in  hand  when  he  was  drawn  northward,  before  he  was  ready, 
by  the  action  of  the  Athenians. 

Still  intent  on  their  new  policy  of  vigorous  action  on  land, 
the  Athenians  had  resolved  to  attempt  the  surprise  of  Megara. 

Brasidas  at  Some  partisans  of  democracy  within  its  walls  had  con- 
Megara.  gented,  in  the  true  Greek  spirit  of  faction,  to  betray 
their  city  to  the  enemy.  One  night  they  threw  open  a  postern  in 
the  "  Long  Walls"  which  connected  Megara  with  its  port  Nisaea, 
and  the  Athenians,  rushing  in,  secured  the  long  walls,  and  next 
day  but  one  captured  Nisaea.  They  would  probably  have  taken 
Megara  itself,  for  the  factions  in  the  place  had  almost  fallen  to 
blows,  if  Brasidas  had  not  hurried  up  from  the  Isthmus  with  his 
own  force  and  the  levies  of  Corinth  and  Sicyon.  He  offered  the 
Athenians  battle  in  front  of  Megara,  but  they  would  not  accept 
it,  and,  contenting  themselves  with  the  capture  of  Nisaea,  went 
off  homewards.  Somewhat  later  in  the  summer  Brasidas,  having 
finished  his  preparations,  started  off  through  Boeotia  and  Phocis, 
to  attempt  the  hazardous  march  which  had  been  planned  for  him. 


424B.C.J  Battle  of  Delium.  333 

The  expedition  to  Megaia  was  only  a  foretaste  of  the  energy 
which  Athens  had  determined  to  put  forth  this  year.  She  had 
determined  to  repeat  the  tactics  of  the  heroic  days  of  456  B.C.,  and 
to  endeavour  to  disable  and  overrun  Boeotia  by  a  blow  struck  after 
the  ordinary  campaigning  season  had  closed,  and  when  no  aid  from 
Peloponnesus  could  be  readily  obtained.  The  plan  of  campaign 
was  comprehensive  and  complicated.  Demosthenes  was  to  land  at 
Siphae,  on  the  Corinthian  Gulf,  with  all  the  forces  he  could  collect 
from  the  western  allies  of  Athens.  On  the  same  day  the  general 
Hippocrates,  with  the  entire  home-levy  of  Attica,  was  to  enter 
north-eastern  Boeotia,  and  strike  at  Tanagra.  Simultaneously  the 
town  of  Chaeronea  was  to  be  seized  by  a  large  body  of  exiled  Boeo- 
tians of  the  democratic  faction,  wlio  had  undertaken  to  aid  Athens. 
But  the  plan  was  far  too  intricate.  All  expeditions  where  forces 
starting  from  distant  bases  attempt  to  co-operate,  are  especially 
liable  to  the  mischances  of  war.  Thus  it  came  to  pass  that  the 
attempt  to  seize  Chaeronea  was  betrayed  by  an  informer,  while  in 
the  rest  of  the  scheme  either  Demosthenes  was  over-early  or  Hippo- 
crates over-late.  The  former  landed  at  Siphae  with  his  allies  from 
Naupactus  and  the  western  islands,  and  drew  out  against  himself 
the  whole  force  of  Boeotia ;  for  Hippocrates  was  yet  far  away,  and 
had  not  crossed  the  border.  Being  too  weak  to  fight,  Demosthenes 
re-embarked ;  but  two  days  later  Hippocrates,  marching  by  Oropus 
and  the  shore  of  the  Euboean  Strait,  appeared  in  the  territory  of 
Tanagra.  He  seized  the  temple  and  precinct  of 
Apollo  at   Delium,   close   by  the  seaside,  and   em-      Deiium. 

424  S  C 

ployed  four  days  in  fortifying  it,  and  in  waiting 
for  news  of  the  diversions  which  ought  to  have  synchronized 
with  his  invasion.  On  the  fifth,  nothing  having  occurred,  he  de- 
termined to  return  home,  but  had  not  got  two  miles  from  Delium 
when  the  Boeotian  army  appeared  on  his  flank.  After  watching 
Demosthenes  depart,  it  had  turned  north-eastward,  and  was  in  full 
time  to  attack  Hi^^pocrates.  The  forces  were  not  very  unequal  in 
numbers.  The  Boeotians  had  brought  up  eight  thousand  hoplitcs, 
a  thousand  cavalry,  and  ten  thousand  light-armed  troops;  the 
Athenians  had  about  the  same  number  of  hoplites,  but  were  con- 
siderably weaker  in  horse,  though  they  had  a  vastly  greater  multi- 
tude of  light-troops.     The  majority  of  the  eleven  Boeotarchs  (or 


334  Sphacteria  and  Delium.  (434  b.c. 

generals  of  the  Boeotian  League)  had  been  against  fighting,  but 
Pagondas,  one  of  the  two  Theban  membeiss  of  their  body,  had  over- 
ruled the  majority  and  forced  on  the  combat.  The  army  of  Hippo- 
crates had  just  time  to  form  up,  fronting  westward  and  with  its 
back  to  the  sea,  when  the  enemy  came  suddenly  over  the  brow  of 
a  hill  and  charged.  Kavines  prevented  the  light-troops  on  the 
flanks  from  engaging,  but  the  main  bodies  of  each  army  closed  and 
fought  desperately  for  some  time.  Pagondas  had  drawn  up  his 
own  Theban  contingent  in  a  dense  column  twenty-five  deep ;  the 
rest  of  the  Boeotians  fought  in  the  usual  line-formation.  Hence  it 
came  to  pass  that  while  the  battle  went  hardly  for  the  Boeotians 
on  their  left,  where  the  Thespians  were  completely  routed,  on  their 
right  the  Theban  column  crushed  through  the  Atlienian  line,  and 
rolled  it  downhill  in  disorder.  An  opportune  cavalry  charge 
checked  the  victorious  Athenian  right  wing,  and  then  the  whole 
army  of  Hippocrates  wavered  and  broke.  A  few  fled  northward  to 
Delium ;  the  rest  took  to  the  hills,  and  saved  themselves  on  the 
spurs  of  Parnes.  Nearly  a  thousand  Athenians,  including  Hippo- 
crates himself,  had  fallen  in  the  conflict,  while  the  Boeotians  had 
lost  about  half  that  number.  A  fortnight  after  the  battle  the  forti- 
fied post  at  Delium  fell,  the  palisading  with  which  the  Athenians 
had  surrounded  it  having  been  set  on  fire  by  the  military  engines 
which  the  Boeotians  turned  against  it. 

This  battle  quite  cured  the  Athenians  of  the  taste  for  expedi- 
tions on  land,  which  had  been  growing  on  them  since  the  capture 
of  Sphacteria.  It  also  marked  the  limit  of  their  good  fortune. 
Never  again  did  they  win  a  considerable  success,  or  find  themselves 
in  a  position  to  make  peace  upon  the  terms  which  they  had  so 
rashly  rejected  at  the  moment  of  their  triumph  in  425  b.c. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

BRASIUAS   IN   THRACE — THE    PEACE    OE    NICIAS,    424-421    B.C. 

Even  before  tlie  battle  of  Delium  had  been  fought,  the  end  of  the 
good  fortune  of  Athens  had  been  marked  by  other  events.  The 
wild  and  useless  expedition  to  Sicily  had  come  to  a  sudden  termi- 
nation. The  Sicilian  towns  had  grown  tired  of  their  purposeless 
strife,  and  concluded  a  general  peace  at  Gela  ;  when  this  had  taken 
place  nothing  remained  for  the  Athenian  squadron  but  to  return 
home.  Sophocles  and  Eurymedon,  its  commanders,  were  prose- 
cuted, unjustly  enough,  on  their  return,  for  having  failed  to  prolong 
the  war ;  they  were  condemned,  the  one  to  go  into  exile,  and  the 
other  to  pay  a  heavy  fine.  About  the  same  time  troubles  appeared 
to  be  brewing  in  Asia  Minor ;  the  exiled  Lesbian  oligarchs  got 
together  in  some  force,  and  seized  the  towns  of  Sigeum  and  Antan- 
drus  in  the  Troad ;  while  at  the  same  time  a  faction  of  the  Samiaus, 
who  had  established  themselves  at  Anaea,  vexed  the  neighbouring 
Ionian  towns. 

But  these  symptoms  of  rebellion  in  the  eastern  districts  of  the 
Athenian  empire  were  of  small  consequence   compared  with  the 
troubles  which  were  now  rising  in  the  north.     We  have  already 
spoken  of  the  departure  from  Corinth  of  Brasidas  and  his  seventeen 
hundred  Peloponnesian  adventurers.      Pushing  on  for  some  time 
through  friendly  territory,  they  met  their  first  difficulties  on  the 
Thessalian   frontier.      Here  the  envoys  of  the  Thessalian  towns 
which  favoured  Athens  forbade  the  army  to  proceed.     But  Brasidas 
cajoled  them  with  feigned  negotiations,  and  then  slipped 
past    them    and   crossed   the    great    plain    in   three    marches  to 
forced  marches.     He  was  in  the   Perrhaebean  hills, 
and  far  on  his  way  towards  Macedonia,  before  his  stratagem  was 


^;^6        Brasidas  in  Thrace — The  Peace  oj  Nicias.    (4S3b.c. 

detected.  In  Macedonia  he  joined  with  King  Perdiccas,  an  old 
enemy  of  Athens,  who  granted  him  a  free  passage  into  Chalcidice. 
Strengthening  himself  with  the  troops  of  the  revolted  towns  in 
that  direction,  Brasidas  at  once  commenced  a  campaign  against  the 
allies  of  Athens.  He  met  with  little  active  resistance ;  Acanthus 
and  Stagirus  fell  into  his  hands  before  the  winter  arrived,  and  even 
after  the  cold  weather  had  set  in  the  Spartan  kept  the  field.  His 
next  attack  was  directed  against  Amphii)olis,  the  new  and  flourish- 
ing Athenian  colony  on  the  Strymon,  which  commanded  the  only 
road  that  led  eastwards  from  Chalcidice  towards  the  cities  of  the 
Thraclan  coast.  If  once  Amphipolis  and  its  all-important  bridge 
were  in  his  hands,  no  limit  could  be  set  to  the  eastward  extension 
of  the  revolt.  Coming  unexpectedly  down  to  the  Strymon,  Brasidas 
Brasidas  seized  the  bridge  by  a  daring  coui[)  de  main  during  a 
AmphipoHs  s^owstorm.  He  laid  hands  on  many  of  the  Amphi- 
423  B.C.  politans  who  dwelt  without  the  city  walls,  and  on  all 
the  flocks  and  herds  of  the  community.  Moved  with  fear  for  their 
property  and  their  friends,  a  party  in  the  town  proposed  a  surrender ; 
the  Athenian  governor  was  unable  to  command  obedience,  and  the 
gates  were  thrown  open.  The  historian  Thucydides,  who  was  in 
command  of  a  .small  Athenian  squadron  which  lay  at  Thasos, 
arrived  too  late  to  save  the  place.  So  rapidly  had  events  gone 
on,  that  though  only  one  day's  sail  from  the  town,  he  failed  to 
come  up  in  time,  and  only  succeeded  in  preserving  for  Athens 
ETon,  the  port  at  the  mouth  of  the  Strymon.  For  his  tardiness, 
which  was  probably  more  the  result  of  ill-luck  than  of  negligence, 
Thucydides  was  prosecuted  and  exiled  by  a  decree  proposed  by 
Cleon. 

Brasidas  had  not  yet  completed  the  full  measure  of  his  successes. 
Before  the  winter  was  done  he  had  gained  possession  of  nearly  all 
the  towns  which  lie  on  the  coast  of  Mount  Athos,  and  also  of 
Torone  on  the  central  headland  of  the  Chalcidic  peninsula.  These 
surrenders  struck  terror  into  the  hearts  of  the  Athenians,  not 
merely  on  account  of  the  actual  importance  of  the  losses — though 
these  were  heavy  enough — but  as  showing  the  utter  disloyalty 
which  pervaded  the  whole  body  of  their  subject  allies.  When 
Brasidas  presented  himself  before  the  walls  of  a  town,  there  was 
always  an  oligarchic  party  which  was  zealous  to  admit  him,  while 


423 B.C.]  Revolt  of  Sdone.  337 

the  democratic  faction,  wliicli  should  naturally  have  been  friendly 
to  Athens,  showed  at  most  a  passive  disinclinatiun  to  revolt,  and 
would  not  strike  a  blow  for  its  suzerain.  Hardly  a  single  town 
preserved  its  allegiance  when  attacked,  unless  there  happened  to 
be  an  Athenian  garrison  within  its  walls.  The  personality  of 
Brasidas  aided  to  no  small  extent  in  securing  his  successes  ;  he  was 
no  less  distinguished  for  tact  than  for  courage,  and  won  golden 
opinions  by  his  generosity,  moderation,  and  good  faith.  The 
power  of  his  name  began  to  grow  mighty  in  Chalcidice,  and  it  soon 
became  evident  that  unless  he  were  promptly  crushed,  or  disarmed 
by  the  conclusion  of  a  general  peace,  Athens  would  lose  every  one 
of  her  tributaries  to  the  north  of  the  Aegean. 

The  battle  of  Delium  had  stripped  Athens  of  her  self-confidence  ; 
the  loss  of  Amphipolis  and  Torone  had  made  her  contemplate  with 
equanimity    the   prospect   of  a   peace.     Accordingly 
when,  early  in   the   next   spring   (423   B.C.),  Sparta   schemes  for 
again  made  overtures  for  a  pacification,  the  Athenian 
Ecclesia  for  once  showed  itself  reasonable.     To  afford  an  oppor- 
tunity for  the  conclusion  of  a  final  and  definitive  peace,  the  two 
powers  agreed  to  a  truce  for  twelve  mouths.     For  the  first  time 
for  eight  years    the  Athenians  were  able  to  put  their   neglected 
fields  under  the  plough,  with  a  reasonable  prospect  of  reaping  what 
they  had  sown.     Nor  was  the  boon  less  to  the  maritime  states  of 
Peloponnesus,  who  could  now  resume  the  coasting  trade  which  had 
been  forbidden  to  them  for  so  long. 

Matters  seemed  in  a  fairway  towards  peace,  when  an  unexpected 
complication  occurred  to  postpone  the  negotiations.     By  the  terms 
of  the  truce  each  party  was  to  retain  in  its  hands  the     ^  volt  of 
places  belonging  to  the  enemy  which  it  had  captured  ;       scione. 
Thebes,  for  instance,  still  held  Plataea,  and  Athens 
Cythera  and  Pylos.     But  at  the  very  moment  of  the  ratification  of 
the  truce,  the  important  town  of  Scione,  in  Chalcidice,  opened  its 
gates  to  Brasidas ;  the  Athenians  insisted  that  the  place  ought  to 
be  restored  to  them,  while  Brasidas  maintained  that,  as  the  truce 
was  unknown  in  Thrace  when  the  place  revolted,  it  did  not  come 
under  the  terms  of  the  agreement.     While  this   matter   was  in 
dispute,  the  still  more  important  city  of  Mende,  the  third  in  size 
of  the  Chalcidian  communities,  followed  the  example  of  Scione. 

z 


338        Brasidas  in   Thrace— The  Peace  of  Nicias.    ('422  b.c. 

These  events  so  excited  the  Athenian  Ecclesia,  that  it  voted,  on  the 
motion  of  Cleon,  that  an  expedition  should  be  sent  against  Scione, 
and  that,  when  the  town  was  taken,  its  entire  population  should 
be  exterminated. 

Thus  it  came  to  pass  that  although  the  truce  was  observed  iu 
Greece,  and  all  around  the  southern  Aegean,  war  still  continued 
in  the  north.  Nicias  sailed  with  a  considerable  armament  to 
Thrace,  and  recaptured  Mende ;  but  he  failed  at  Scione,  and  his 
troops  were  still  lying  before  its  walls  when  the  year's  truce 
expired,  early  in  422  B.C.  Hostilities  then  recommenced  along  the 
whole  line  of  contact  between  Athens  and  her  enemies ;  but  at 
home  little  of  importance  occurred,  save  that  the  fortress  of  Panac- 
tum,  which  commanded  one  of  the  passes  of  Cithaeron,  fell  by 
treachery  into  the  hands  of  the  Boeotians. 

In  Chalcidice,  however,  the  war  came  to  its  head.      Early  in  the 

year  Cleon  appeared  before  Scione,  at  the  head  of  a  considerable 

army.     His  second  venture  in  generalship  was  due  to  much  the 

same  causes  as  his  first;  now,  as  in  425  B.C.,  he  had  put  himself 

at  the  head  of  tlie  party  of  action,  and  was  consequently  made 

responsible  for  the  conduct  of  the  war.     Probably  the  democracy 

had  come  to  believe  in  his  good  luck,  and  hoped  that,  by  some 

fortunate  chance,  he  would  put  down  Brasidas  as  easily  as  he  had 

conquered  Si)hacteria.  Cleon's  first  operations  were 
Cleon  sent  to  ^  ^  i    3   •  i  .        m 

Thrace,      not  badly  planned;  he  succeeded  in  retaking  iorone 

'  '  and  Galepsus,  and  tlien  landed  at  Ei'on,  and  sat  down 
opposite  Amphipolis,  where  Brasidas  had  concentrated  the  main 
part  of  his  forces.  There  he  waited,  while  reinforcements  of  light- 
troops  were  being  collected  from  Thrace  ;  for  he  was  weak  in  that 
arm,  and  very  wisely  refused  to  give  battle  till  he  was  raised  to 
an  equality  with  the  enemy.  But  the  Athenian  hoplites  grumbled 
at  their  commander's  inaction,  and  the  tanner,  who  lived  by 
following  every  breath  of  public  opinion,  did  not  dare  to  disregard 
their  murmurings.     Accordingly  he  started  off  with  his  whole  force 

to  reconnoitre  the  position  of  Brasidas,  and  to  offer 
Amphipolis,  him  battle.     Brasidas  drew  his  army  into  the  town, 

and  kept  perfectly  quiet,  allowing  the  Athenians  to 
march  past  his  front  without  any  molestation.  Cleon  rashly  con- 
cluded that  the  enemy  would  not  fight,  and  neglected  every  military 


42SB.CJ  Battle  of  Amphiplis.  339 

precaution;  he  himself  went  on  ahead  to  explore  the  country-side 
to  the  north,  while  he  left  his  army  halted  within  a  few  score  yards 
of  the  walls  of  Amphipolis,  but  not  drawn  up  in  battle  array. 
Presently  news  was  sent  on  to  the  demagogue  that  the  streets 
near  the  gates  ol  the  town  were  crowded  with  armed  men,  and  that 
an  attack  was  impending.  He  at  once  hurried  back  to  join  his 
men^  and  ordered  the  army  to  retire  and  take  ground  to  its  left — a 
command  which  caused  the  Athenians  to  defile  once  more  before 
the  gates  of  the  town.  This  was  what  Brasidas  had  been  expect- 
ing. "  I  see,"  he  cried,  "  that  those  troops  will  not  stand ;  I  know 
it  from  the  wavering  of  tiieir  spears ; "  and  Avheu  the  Athenian 
centre  was  opposite  him,  he  launched  a  column  out  of  each  gate, 
and  charged  the  enemy's  line  of  march.  Cleou's  men  were  caught 
while  executing  a  hurried  movement  of  retreat,  with  their  shield- 
less  side  exposed  to  the  enemy.  Many  of  them  broke  at  the  fii'st 
onset :  the  left  wing,  which  headed  the  line  of  march,  fled  back  to 
E'ion  without  suffering  much  loss ;  but  the  right  wing  and  the 
centre,  who  were  driven  off  their  line  of  retreat  by  Brasidas's 
charge,  were  very  severely  handled.  Cleon  turned  to  fly,  like  the 
majority  of  his  followers,  and  was  speared  as  he  ran  by  a  Thracian 
peltast.  Only  tlie  Athenian  right  wing  made  any  attempt  at 
resistance,  and  that  body  was  soon  overwhelmed  by  numbers,  and 
scattered  by  a  vigorous  cavalry  charge.  The  rout  was  very 
bloody.  Six  hundred  Athenians  had  fallen,  and  not  a  dozen  of  their 
opponents  ;  but  among  the  few  whose  loss  the  victors  had  to  mourn 
was  their  general.  Brasidas  had  received  a  spear-thrust  in  the 
side,  and  only  lived  long  enough  to  hear  that  his  victory  was 
complete.  The  Amphipolitans  buried  him  with  the  most  splendid 
funeral  rites,  set  up  a  temple  to  his  memory,  and  vowed  to  honour 
him  as  their  Oekist,  instead  of  Hagnon.  the  original  Athenian 
founder  of  the  city. 

The  deaths  of  Cleon  and  Brasidas  removed  the  chief  obstacles 
to  a  general  peace.     When  the  Spartan  was  gone,  the  revolt  in 
Chalcidice  ceased  to  spread,  for  it  was  his  personal 
influence  which  had  from  tlie  first  been  its  mainstay.        Nicias, 

4:21  B  C 

At  home  in  Sparta  also  Brasidas  had  always  been  at 

the  head  of  the  party  of  action,  and  his  death  greatly  weakened 

its  influence.     On  the  other  hand,  when  Cleon  was  removed,  the 


34<:>        Brasidas  in  Thrace — The  Peace  of  Nicias.    C421BC 

strongest  advocate  of  war  in  the  Athenian  Ecclesia  disappeared, 
and  the  partisans  of  peace  could  bring  forward  their  proposals 
without  any  fear  of  being  overwhelmed  by  his  blustering  eloquence. 
The  negotiations  which  had  been  interrupted  by  the  events  in 
Thrace  were  soon  resumed,  and  brought  to  a  successful  issue.  The 
Spartan  king  Pleistoanax,  who  had  lately  been  restored  after  more 
than  tweaty  years  of  exile  (see  p.  266),  and  the  Athenian  general 
Nicias,  were  mainly  instrumental  in  the  pacification,  to  which  the 
latter  has  given  his  name.  The  treaty  provided  for  a  fifty  years' 
peace,  and  enjoined  a  mutual  restoration  of  prisoners  and  of  places 
captured  during  the  war,  but  this  arrangement  was  not  perfectly 
carried  out ;  for  the  Thebans  refused  to  give  up  Plataea,  on  the 
ground  that  it  had  not  been  taken  by  force,  but  had  surrendered 
on  capitulation.  On  a  similar  plea,  therefore,  Athens  refused  to  give 
up  the  Corinthian  colonies  of  SoUium  and  Anactorium,  and  the 
Megarian  port  of  Nisaea.  In  her  anxiety  to  secure  the  evacuation 
of  the  Athenian  strongholds  around  Peloponnesus,  and  the  release 
of  the  prisoners  of  Sphacteria,  Sparta  sacrificed  the  interests  of  the 
Chalcidian  cities  whom  she  had  tempted  to  revolt;  she  promised 
to  surrender  Amphipolis  in  return  for  Pylos  and  CythOra,  and  to 
break  off  her  alliance  with  the  other  Thraceward  cities.  In  their 
behalf  she  only  stipulated  that  Athens  should  not  coerce  them  by 
force,  though  she  might,  if  she  could,  induce  them  to  re-enter  the 
Delian  League  of  their  own  free  will.^  Scione,  which  was  still  being 
invested  by  an  Athenian  army,  was  left  to  take  its  chance ;  and 
when  it  fell,  a  few  months  later,  suffered  the  penalty  which  had 
been  decreed  for  it  eighteen  months  before  by  the  law  of  Cleou ; 
its  men  were  slain  and  its  women  sold  as  slaves.  Asa  matter 
of  fact,  AmxAipolis  was  never  given  up  to  the  Athenians,  for 
Clearidas,  who  had  succeeded  Brasidas  in  command,  declared  that  he 
was  not  strong  enough  to  surrender  it  contrary  to  the  will  of  its 
inhabitants,  and  contented  himself  with  returning  home  with  his 
Peloponnesian  troops.  In  consequence  of  this  infraction  of  the 
treaty,  the  Athenians  refused  to  evacuate  Pylos  or  Cythera.  Thus 
it  came  to  pass  that  although  the  prisoners  on  both  sides  were 

•  The  Chalcidian  towns  thus  granted  a  qualified  freedom  were  Olj'ntbus, 
Acanthus,  Staglrus,  Argilus,  Sane,  Singus,  and  a  few  more,  Amphi- 
polis, being  never  recovered  by  Athens,  shared  their  lot. 


42XB.a]  The  Peace  of  Nicias.  341 

restored,  the  other  clauses  of  the  peace  of  Nicias  were  not  fully 
carried  out,  and  the  main  result  of  the  pacification  was  to  leave 
each  party  in  possession  of  just  so  much  as  it  was  holding  at  the 
moment  of  the  suspension  of  hostilities.  Several  of  the  most  im- 
portant allies  of  Sparta  considered  that  they  had  been  betrayed  by 
their  leader,  and  refused  to  ratify  the  treaty.  The  Thebans,  there- 
fore, contented  themselves  with  concluding  a  temporary  armistice 
with  Athens,  which  was  renewable  every  ten  days,  and  might  at 
any  moment  be  denounced  at  that  short  notice.  The  Mcgarians 
and  Corinthians  made  no  formal  truce  at  all,  but  merely  abstained 
from  hostilities. 

Thus  the  first  stage  of  the  Peloponncsian  war  came  to  an  end, 
just  ten  years  after  the  first  invasion  of  Attica  by  Archidamus  in 
431  B.C.  Its  results  had  been  almost  purely  negative ;  a  vast 
quantity  of  blood  and  treasure  had  been  wasted  on  each  side,  but 
to  no  great  purpose.  The  Athenian  naval  power  was  unimpaired, 
and  the  Confederacy  of  Delos,  though  shaken  by  the  successful 
revolt  of  Amphipolis  and  the  Thraceward  towns,  was  still  left 
subsisting.  On  the  other  hand,  the  attempts  of  Athens  to  accom- 
plish anything  on  land  had  entirely  failed,  and  the  defensive 
policy  of  Pericles  had  been  so  far  justified.  Well  would  it  have 
been  for  Athens  if  her  citizens  had  taken  the  lesson  to  heart,  and 
contented  themselves  with  having  escaped  so  easily  from  the  greatest 
war  they  had  ever  known. 


C?<^ 


\ 


(k4' 


.^„ 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

THE  YEARS  OF  THE  TRUCE,  421-41G  B.C. 

The  period  during  which  the  truce  of  Nicias  was  more  or  less 
observed  amounted  to  nearly  seven  years,  but  they  are  hardly  to 
be  reckoned  as  a  time  of  peace.  "  It  is  true,"  says  Thucydides, 
"  that  the  Athenians  and  Lacedaemonians  abstained  for  six  years 
and  ten  months  from  marching  against  each  other's  territory,  but 
with  that  exception  they  did  each  other  as  much  damage  as  they 
could.  They  actually  came  into  contact  at  Mantinea  and  Epi- 
daurus,  and  all  the  time  hostilities  were  proceeding  in  Thrace  just 
as  before ;  so  that  if  any  one  objects  to  consider  it  a  time  of  war, 
he  will  not  be  estimating  it  rightly."^ 

But  though  there  was  no  actual  interval  of  peace  after  the  treaty 
of  421  B.C.,  yet  the  main  action  of  the  great  drama  stood  still,  and 
the  events  of  the  years  421-415  B.C.  formed  a  strange  and  inco- 
herent interlude  between  the  two  acts  of  the  Peloponnesian  war. 
The  parties  in  the  struggle  are  grouped  differently,  a  new  set  of 
motives  influence  the  actors,  and  the  original  causes  and  objects  of 
the  war  are  lost  sight  of. 

One  of  the  chief  reasons  which  had  made  Sparta  anxious  to  con- 
clude peace  with  Athens  was  the  fact  that  a  thirty  years'  truce 

Rupture      with  Argos,  which  had  been  concluded  in  451  B.C., 

Sparta^and  ^''^^  ""^^^  drawing  to  an  end,  and  that  it  was  strongly 
Argos,  421  B.C. suspected  that  the  Argives  were  disposed  to  try  the' 
fortune  of  war.  The  ephors  had  been  anxious  to  end  one  conflict 
before  tiiey  were  involved  in  another.  Their  suspicions  were  not 
misplaced.  Argos  had  accumulated  new  strength  in  her  thirty 
years   oi   rest,  and   thought   that   Sparta  was   so  weakened  and 

'  Thuc.  V.  25,26. 


421B.C.1      Jiisings  against  Sparta  in  Pelopotinesns.  343* 

brought  down  by  ten  years  of  warfare  that  she  might  be  faced 
with  ease.  Moreover,  the  Argive  government  had  been  sounding 
all  the  Peloponnesian  states  which  were  supposed  to  have  a  grudge 
against  Sparta,  and  thought  that  they  could  find  several  powerful 
allies.  The  Corinthians,  who  were  grievously  offended  at  the 
sacrifice  of  their  colonies  of  Sollium  and  Anactorium  to  Athens ; 
the  Mantineans,  who  had  been  frustrated  by  Sparta  in  an  attempt 
to  subdue  their  smaller  neighbours,  and  tlie  Eleans,  who  had  also 
plunged  into  a  quarrel  with  Sparta  concerning  the  border-town 
of  Lepreum,  were  all  believed  to  be  ready  to  join  in  a  rising  to  do 
away  with  the  Lacedaemonian  hegemony  in  the  Peloponnesus. 
Amphipolis  and  the  states  of  Chalcidice  were  thought  to  cherish 
similar  feelings,  owing  to  the  way  in  which  they  were  abandoned 
to  the  mercy  of  Athens  by  the  peace  of  Nicias. 

Ambassadors  were  soon  passing  from  state  to  state,  with  the 
final  result  that  Argos,  Elis,  Mantinea,  and  the  Chalcidians  entered 
into  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance,  which  soon  brought  them 
into  hostile  contact  with  Sparta.  Corinth  drew  back,  and  would 
not  commit  herself  to  war  with  her  old  suzerain,  while  the  majority 
of  the  smaller  states  of  Peloponnesus  showed  no  desire  to  break 
with  their  Laconian  allies. 

Hostilities  commenced,  late  in  the  summer  of  421  b.c,  by  a  raid 
of  King  Pleistoanax  into  Arcadia,  when  he  took  several  places 
belonging  to  Mantinea.  But  nothing  of  importance  had  been 
accomplished  when  the  coming  of  winter  brought  about  a  sus- 
pension of  operations. 

By  the  outbreak  of  this  war  Athens  was  compelled  to  make  her 
choice  between  two  policies.  It  was  doubtful  whether  she  would 
do  more  wisely  by  standing  aside  from  the  struggle,  Poiicyof 
and  concentrating  her  energies  on  the  recovery  of  the  Athens, 
revolted  cities  of  Chalcidice,  or  by  taking  advantage  of  Sparta's 
difficulties  and  renewing  hostilities.  In  justification  of  the  latter 
course,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  Lacedaemonians  had  failed  to 
observe  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty,  having  neither  restored 
Amphipolis,  nor  compelled  their  Boeotian  and  Corinthian  allies  to 
ratify  the  terms  of  peace.  On  the  other  side,  it  was  urged  by 
Nicias  and  the  philo-Spartan  party  that,  before  engaging  in  another 
war,  Athens  should  reconquer  what  she  had  lost,  and  that  the  state 


344  The   Years  of  the  Ti'uce.  (420  b.c. 

was  above  all  things  in  need  of  a  period  of  rest,  to  bring  her  ruined 
country-side  once  more  into  cultivation.  When  the  summer  of 
420  B.C.  arrived,  ambassadors  both  from  Argos  and  from  Sparta 
appeared  at  Athens  to  plead  respectively  the  causes  of  war  and  of 
peace.  Nicias  and  his  party  would  probably  have  prevailed,  and 
the  Argive  embassy  would  have  been  dismissed,  had  it  not  been 
for  the  machinations  of  a  young  statesman  who  now  stood  forward 
prominently  for  the  first  time  on  the  political  stage. 

Alcibiades,  the  son  of  Cleinias,  was  at  this  moment  still  a  young 

man.     "In  any  other  state  than  Athens,"  says  Thucydides,  "he 

would  have  been  considered  far  too  young  to  become 

Alcibiades  .  „  .  ,.  ./         o 

a  serious  figure  m  politics.  But  at  Athens  he  had 
already  made  himself  a  name,  and  was  a  well-known  figure  on 
the  Bema.  He  came  of  an  ancient  and  wealthy  stock,  which 
traced  its  origin  back  to  the  old  Salaminian  kings,  and  was  placed 
by  his  position  among  the  first  families  of  Athens.  His  handsome 
person  and  ready  wit  made  him  the  idol  of  the  "  gilded  youth  "  of 
the  city,  and  his  reckless  love  of  adventure  and  mischief  was  con- 
tinually  bringing  him  into  notice.  Any  drunken  escapade,  any 
malicious  practical  joke,  any  ingenious  piece  of  fooling  that  was 
perpetrated  in  Athens,  was  instantly  credited  to  his  account.  He 
was  continually  indulging  in  freaks  that  put  him  in  danger  of  the 
law  courts ;  but  offences  that  would  have  brought  fine  and  im- 
prisonment on  any  other  citizen  were  visited  lightly  on  the  spoilt 
child  of  the  people.  His  profligacy  and  insolence  raised  up  many 
enemies,  but  with  the  masses  he  was  immensely  popular.  His 
utter  want  of  decorum  only  amused  them.  When  he  spoke  before 
the  Ecclesia  with  a  pet  quail  tucked  unJer  his  arm,  it  was  con- 
sidered an  excellent  jest;  when  in  the  law  court  he  casually 
snatched  up  and  destroyed  the  indictment  brought  against  one  of 
his  friends,  he  was  laughed  at  and  not  prosecuted.  But  in  his  more 
serious  moments  Alcibiades  frequently  turned  to  politics,  which 
he  treated  as  an  ingenious  and  amusing  game,  well  suited  for 
the  display  of  his  abilities.  As  a  politician  he  might  have  been 
described  as  a  second  Themistocles,  had  not  his  inherent  frivolity 
and  fickleness  placed  him  far  below  the  great  statesman  of  the 
times  of  the  Persian  war  ;  but  he  had  all  the  readiness,  ingenuity, 
and   persuasive  power  of  his   prototype.      Like   Themistocles  he 


420  B.C.]  Alcibiades. 


345 


was  n,  strong  democrat.  It  is  true  that  on  his  first  entry  into 
political  life  he  had  come  forward  as  an  oligarch  and  a  friend  of 
Sparta,  and  had  put  his  good  offices  at  the  disposal  of  the  prisoners 
of  Sphacteria;  but  the  respectable  Nicias  and  his  philo-Spartan 
friends  were  appalled  at  the  prospect  of  having  to  co-operate  with 
a  colleague  of  such  approved  disreputability ;  they  rejected  his 
advances,  and  advised  the  Siwrtans  to  have  nothing  to  do  with 
him.  Alcibiades  immediately  performed  a  political  somersault, 
and  promptly  appeared  as  an  ardent  democrat.  It  became  his 
ambition  to  take  up  the  fallen  mantle  of  Cleon,  and  to  be  known 
as  the  people's  friend  and  the  mouthpiece  of  jiublic  opinion.  He 
had  not  only  greater  natural  abilities  than  Cleon,  but  a  double 
portion  of  his  unscrupulousness.  He  soon  became  a  considerable 
power  in  politics,  and  would  have  risen  to  the  highest  place  if  his 
levity  and  reckless  vanity  had  not  been  too  well  known. 

In  420  B.C.  Alcibiades  was  set  on  causing  the  Spartan  embassy 
to  Athens  to  fail,  and  on  bringing  about  an  alliance  with  Argos. 
His  plan  was  characterized  by  shameless  dllplicit3^    .,...,    , 
He  secretly  visited  the  Lacedaemonian  envoys,  and     intrigues. 

419  S  C 

assured  them  that  if  they  acknowledged  that  they  '  ' 

possessed  full  powers  to  agree  to  any  terms  of  alliance  which 
Athens  might  propose,  they  would  find  themselves  forced  to  grant 
more  than  they  could  wish.  But  if  they  would  say  that  they 
were  merely  authorized  to  report  the  Athenian  proposals  to  the 
ephors,  he  would  throw  his  personal  influence  on  to  their  side,  and 
obtain  for  them  the  restoration  of  Pylos,  and  anything  else  that 
they  might  desire.  The  unwary  ambassadors  believed  bis  protesta- 
tions ;  and,  although  they  had  announced  only  a  few  days  before 
that  they  possessed  full  powers  to  treat,  declared  at  the  next 
meeting  of  the  Ecclesia  that  no  such  authority  had  been  granted 
to  them.  Then  Alcibiades  arose,  and  to  the  dismay  of  the  simi:)le 
Spartans  proceeded  to  denounce  them  to  the  people  as  reckless 
deceivers,  who  said  one  thing  one  day  and  another  the  next,  and 
whose  overtures  should  be  received  with  contempt.  Tlie  people 
shouted  applause,  and  the  embassy  was  wrecked.  A  few  days 
later  a  decree  was  passed  whereby  Athens  concluded  an  ofiensive 
and  defensive  alliance  for  a  hundred  years  with  Argos,  Elis,  and 
Manijnea.     All  that  Nicias,  v»-ho  opposed  the  motion  with  such 


346  The  Years  of  the  Irucc.  [419  b.c- 

cnergy  as  he  possessed,  could  obtain,  was  that  war  with  Sparta  was 
not  actually  declared,  nor  the  truce  formally  denounced.  But  to 
make  alliance  with  Argos  was  not  very  remote  from  entering  into 
hostilities  with  Lacedaemon. 

The  next  two  years  were  occupied  by  a  desultory  and  sporadic 
war  in  Peloponnesus,  in  which  both  sides  displayed  an  astonishing 
want  of  generalship  and  decision,  1"he  new  confederacy  possessed 
many  advantages.  Mantinea  almost  blocked  the  way  from  Sparta 
to  Corinth  and  the  other  towns  which  remained  faithful  to  their 
old  suzerain  ;  Elis  and  Argos  threatened  it  on  each  flank  ;  yet, 
whenever  the  Spartans  made  a  serious  attempt  to  force  their  way 
northward,  they  invariably  succeeded.  The  allies  could  never  agree 
for  a  common  plan  of  campaign ;  the  Eleans  wished  to  attack 
Lepreum  and  to  carry  the  war  into  Messenia,  while  the  Argives 
were  intent  on  subduing  their  neighbours  of  Epidaurus  and  Phlius, 
and  the  Mantineans  only  thought  of  extending  their  power  in 
Central  Arcadia.  But  this  want  of  common  purpose  among  the 
Agis  at  Argos  ^^I'^s  led  to  110  immediate  disaster,  for  the  Spartan 
418B.C.  King  Agis,  who  directed  the  movements  of  the 
enemy,  was  quite  unequal  to  his  position.  After  many  indecisive 
moves,  he  at  last,  in  the  summer  of  418  B.C.,  succeeded  in  bringing 
matters  to  a  head.  While  he  himself,  with  the  forces  of  Laconia 
and  his  Arcadian  allies,  slipped  past  Mantinea  and  appeared  at  the 
mouth  of  the  southernmost  of  the  three  passes  which  lead  down 
into  the  Argive  plain,  a  second  column  from  Corinth  and  Phlius 
debouched  by  the  central  pass,  and  a  large  body  from  the  north, 
mainly  consisting  of  Boeotians  and  Megarians,  advanced  down  the 
main  road  which  leads  by  Nemea.  The  Argives  were  completely 
outgeneralled  and  outnumbered,  though  they  had  received  con- 
siderable contingents  from  Elis  and  Mantinea.  Their  army  was, 
however,  bent  on  fighting,  and  would  doubtless  have  suffered  a 
complete  disaster  if  two  of  their  leaders  had  not  opened  negotia- 
tions for  a  peace  with  Agis.  Instead  of  using  the  advantages  of 
Ins  position,  the  Spartan  king  consented  to  treat,  on  the  assurance 
that  Argos  was  ready  to  lay  down  her  arms,  and  submit  her  dis- 
putes with  Sparta  to  arbitration.  He  therefore  dismissed  his  army,  _ 
and  permitted  the  Argives  to  escape.  A  few  days  later  there 
arrived  at  Argos  a  considerable  Athenian  force   under   Laches ; 


418B.CJ 


Athenian  Expeditions  to  Peloponnesus.  347 


and  on  very  slight  persuasion  the  Argive  democracy  was  induced 
to  disavow  the  agreement  witli  Agis,  on  the  pretext  that  it  liad 
been  concluded  without  the  consent  of  their  allies,  and  to  recom- 
mence hostilities.  Thus  the  Sparlaus  lost  all  the  fruits  of  their 
campaign  through  the  simplicity  of  their  king. 

While  the  Peloponnesians  were  engaged  in  these  operations, 
Athens  had  been  halting  between  the  two  policies  that  were  open 
to  her.  She  had  not  thrown  herself  heart  and  soul  Athenian 
into  the  Argive  alliance,  nor  had  she  taken  decisive  expeditions, 
measures  to  reconquer  the  rebellious  cities  of  Chalcidice.  At  nome 
she  had  offended  Sparta,  without  materially  harming  her ;  for 
although  the  peace  of  Nicias  was  still  so  far  observed  that  her 
fleets  refrained  from  ravaging  Laconia,  yet  small  forces  were  con- 
tinually sent  to  aid  the  Argives,  and  to  support  Athenian  interests 
in  other  parts  of  Peloponnesus.  In  these  operations  Alcibiades 
made  his  first  essays  in  military  command,  and  gained  some  credit 
for  establishing  the  Athenian  party  in  possession  of  the  Achaian 
town  of  Patrae.  Meanwhile  a  desultory  warfare  was  still  going  on 
in  Chalcidice ;  but  since  the  attention  of  Athens  was  mainly  directed 
towards  the  south,  no  adequate  force  was  directed  against  Amphi- 
polis  or  Olynthus.  In  consequence  nothing  more  was  recovered 
after  the  capture  of  Scione,  and  several  small  towns  joined  the 
rebels.  At  last  the  Athenians  acknowledged  their  weakness  in 
this  quarter,  by  concluding  a  truce,  renewable  every  ten  days,  with 
their  revolted  subjects. 

The  Spartan  ephors  had  been  greatly  angered  by  the  failure  of 
Agis  at  Argos ;  they  had  actually  proposed  to  demolish  his  house 
and  fine  him  ten  thousand  drachmae,  but  this  punishment  was  not 
carried  out;  it  was  merely  enacted  that  when  again  in  command 
he  should  be  bound  to  refer  all  important  matters  to  a  council  of 
war — an  infringement  of  the  royal  prerogative  such  as  had  not 
before  been  known  in  Sparta.  In  spite,  however,  of  his  unpopu- 
larity, he  was  still  retained  in  command,  owing  to  the  general 
distrust  felt  for  his  colleague  Pleistoanax.  Burning  to  avenge  the 
perjury  of  the  Argives,  Agis  resolved  to  give  them  battle  whenever 
he  found  them.  Although  he  had  not  been  joined  by  any  of  his 
allies  except  the  Tegeans  and  Heraeans,  he  brought  the  enemy  to 
action  not  far  from  Mantinea.     The  Argives  and  Mantineans  in 


348  The  Years  of  the  Truce.  [413b.o.. 

full  force,  together  with  their  subject  allies  aad  a  body  of  thirteen 
hundred  Athenians,  wore  opposed  to  him ;  the  Eleans  were  absent, 
engaged  in  operations  against  Lopreuna 

The  battle  of  Mantinea  was  a  fair  stand-iip  fight  between  two 

armies  of  almost  equal  force,  in  which  the  troops  met  front  to  front 

without  anv  attempt  to  win  tactical  advanta2;es,  and 

Battle  ot  -  ^  ' 

Mantinea.  settled  the  day  in  hand-to-hand  fighting.  Each  side 
was  found  to  have  slightly  outflanked  its  enemy  on 
the  right.'  The  Tegeans  on  the  Spartan  right  stretched  beyond 
the  Athenians,  who  held  the  left  wing  in  the  Argive  army ;  simi- 
larly the  Mantineans  had  outflanked  the  division  of  Laconian 
Perioeci,  who  formed  the  Spartan  left.  In  each  case  the  body  that 
was  outflanked  suffered  a  disaster,  but  the  fate  of  the  Laconians 
was  the  worst,  for  Agis  had  contrived  to  cause  a  gap  between  his 
centre  and  his  left  wing,  by  ordering  the  latter  to  take  ground  to  the 
left  at  the  moment  of  charging.  Into  the  interval  thus  opened  a 
regiment  of  a  thousand  picked  Argive  troops  made  their  way ;  they 
turned  the  defeat  of  the  Spartan  left  wing  into  a  rout,  and  pushed 
on  into  the  camp  of  Agis,  where  they  cut  the  baggage-guard  to 
jDieces.  Meanwhile  the  native  Spartan  troops  in  the  centre  had 
smashed  to  atoms  the  line  opposed  to  them,  where  the  main  body 
of  the  Argives,  and  the  Argive  Perioeci  from  Orneae  and  Cleonae, 
were  posted.  Agis  then  assisted  the  Tegeans  to  complete  the  rout 
of  the  Athenians,  and  fioally  turned  on  the  victorious  right  wing 
of  the  enemy,  where  he  cut  up  the  Mantineans  severely,  and  forced 
the  Argive  thousand  off  the  field. 

Though  tactically  beaten,  through  the  mismanagement  of  Agis, 
the  Spartans  fairly  won  the  field  by  hard  fighting.  Their  ancient 
valour  was  found  to  be  undiminished,  and  the  unmerited  disrepute 
into  which  they  had  fallen  since  the  surrender  at  Sphacteria  was 
at  once  forgotten.  In  the  fight  eleven  hundred  hoplites  of  the 
allied  army  had  fallen,  among  whom  were  numbered  Laches  and 
Nicostratus,  the  two  Athenian  generals.    Of  the  army  of  Agis  three 

'  There  was  always  a  tendency  in  Greek  armies  to  advance  taking 
ground  sliglitlj'  to  the  right,  bo  as  to  outflank  the  enemj'  at  the  extreme 
right  wing.  The  last  hoplite  on  the  right  wing  pushed  forward  to  the 
right,  in  order  to  avoid  exposing  his  imshielded  side  to  the  enemy  ;  his 
neighbours  carried  on  the  movement  till  it  went  all  down  the  line. 


416B.C.  The  Mas^cn  of  MeloL  349 

hundred  had  been  slain,  all  of  them  Spartans   or  Perioeci,  for  the 
Tcgeans  hardly  lost  a  man. 

The  defeat  of  Mantinea  drove  Argos  into  peace  with  Sparta ; 
soon  afterwards  the  democratic  government,  discredited  by  the 
disasters  it  had  broiif'ht  upon  the  city,  was  overthrown  .,      ,  .. 

^         i^  J '  Hevolutions 

by  a  sudden  oligarchic  rising,  in  which  the  regiment     at  Argos, 

.  ...  .  417  B.C. 

of  the  thousand,  wljich  had  distinguished  itself  at 
Mantinea,  took  the  chief  part.  But  the  Argive  oligarcliy  proved 
unbearably  insolent  and  brutal ;  its  leaders  perpetrated  murders 
and  outrages  which  led  in  a  few  months  to  a  counter-revolution. 
The  victorious  democratic  party  soon  found  itself  committed  to  a 
renewed  war  with  Sparta,  and  was  compelled  to  call  in  once  more 
the  aid  of  Athens.  The  Athenians  and  Argives  now  attempted  to 
put  Argos  in  safety  by  constructing  long  walls  from  the  city  to  the 
sea.  But  soon  a  Spartan  army  appeared  in  Argolis,  and  they  were 
compelled  to  abandon  the  attempt,  which  would  have  involved 
the  building  of  a  double  wall  not  less  than  five  miles  in  length. 

The  new  war  proved  as  indecisive  as  that  which  had  preceded 
it.  Argos  was  completely  overmatched,  but  the  Spartans  made  no 
adequate  use  of  their  superiority,  and  contented  themselves  with 
.supporting  their  allies  of  Phlius  and  Epidaurus,  and  keeping  the 
Argive  armies  at  home.  The  Athenians  despatched  no  large  forces 
to  Peloponnesus,  and  still  avoided  direct  attacks  on  Laconia,  though 
the  exiled  Messenians,  whom  they  had  established  at  Pylos,  were 
not  so  forbearing. 

The  chief  event  of  41G  B.C.  was  the  attack  which  the  Atlienians 
made  on  Melos.  That  island,  though  its  name  is  found  in  the 
tribute-iists  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos,  had  of  late  Fau  of  Meios, 
years  slipped  out  of  control,  and  refused  to  aid  in  the  ^^^  ^^' 
war,  because  it  was  a  colony  of  Sparta.  With  no  other  justifi- 
cation except  that  an  autonomous  island  was  an  anomaly,  the 
Athenians  threw  a  strong  force  ashore  and  summoned  the  Melians 
to  submission.  When  the  islanders  refused  to  surrender  theiy 
independence,  their  city  Was  blockaded  by  sea  and  land.  After  a 
vigorous  defence  the  place  fell ;  in  brutal  assertion  of  the  right  of 
the  stronger,  the  Athenians  slew  olf  the  whole  male  population, 
and  sold  the  women  as  slaves.  This  action  was  perhaps  the  most 
atrocious  political  crime  committed  in  the  whole  war ;  Melos  was 


350  The  Years  of  the  Truce.  f4i6B.c. 

a  neutral  state,  bad  given  Athens  no  offence,  and  had  been  attacked 
without  any  declaration  of  hostilities.  Its  destruction  was  the 
crowning  achievement  of  Athenian  lust  for  empire,  and  every  right- 
minded  man  in  Greece  saw  the  vengeance  of  Heaven  for  the  massacre 
of  Melos  in  the  unbroken  series  of  disasters  which  thenceforward 
attended  tlie  Athenian  arms. 


J 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

THE    EXPEDITION    OF    THE    ATHENIANS   TO   SICILY,   415-413    B.C. 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  while  the  Chalciclian  cities  were 
still  Tinsubdiied,  and  while  Sparta  was  gradually  freeing  herself 
from  her  home  troubles,  Athens  would  have  refrained  from  any 
further  indulgence  in  those  distant  and  hazardous  expeditions 
which  had  proved  so  profitless  hitherto.  But  this  was  not  to  be  ; 
inspired  by  its  accustomed  hopefulness,  and  led  on  by  the  volatile 
Alcibiades,  the  Ecclesia  now  proceeded  to  undertake  an  adventure 
which  far  surpassed  in  recklessness  anything  that  it  had  previously 
sanctioned.  Peace  at  home  was  precarious,  for  the  Boeotians  might 
at  ten  daj^s'  notice  renew  hostilities,  and  Corinth  and  Megara 
were  also  free  from  any  permanent  engagement.  The  Spartans 
were  known  to  have  been  bitterly  provoked  by  the  Athenian 
alliance  with  Argos  and  by  the  appearance  of  Athenian  troops  in  the 
Peloponnese,  and  had  fair  grounds  for  repudiating  at  any  moment 
the  treaty  of  421  B.C.  The  fields  of  Attica  were  only  just  resuming 
their  ancient  aspect  of  cultivation.  The  depleted  treasury  of  the 
Delian  League  was  far  from  showing  the  superabundant  masses  of 
bullion  which  it  had  contained  before  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
Yet,  in  spite  of  these  obvious  facts,  Athens  proceeded  to  stake  her 
whole  empire  on  a  single  reckless  cast,  and  to  imperil  the  reality 
of  power  in  the  Aegean  while  grasping  at  a  shadow  of  conquest  in 
the  waters  of  the  West. 

It  was  now  eight  years  since  the  first  Athenian  expedition  to 
Sicily  had  been  brought  to  an  ignominious  end  by  the  conclusion 
of  peace  between  the  belligerent  states  in  the  island    xroubies  in 
(see  p.  335).      Since   that    time    new    troubles   had       Siciiy. 
arisen.    In  Vv'estern  Sicily  a  war  had  broken  out  between  the  Dorian 


352         The  Expedition  of  the  Athenians  to  Sieity,   t^isB. 

state  of  Sellmis  and  tlic  barbaiian  city  of  Scgcsta.     In  Eastei 
Sicily   Syracuse   had  talccn  advantage  of  civil   strife  among  ^I'l  (;j 
Ionian  neighbours  of  Leontini,  and  destroyed  their  city ;  but  tl 
exiled   Leontincs   were  keeping   up  a  desultory   warfare  again: 
their  oppressor  from  such  strongholds  as  they  could  retain.     Bot 
the  Scgostans  and  the  Leontincs  had  been  allies  of  Athens,  and  i 
was  natural  that  in  tliuir  hour  of  distress  they  should  bethink  then 
'.'f  the  great  imperial  city,  who  had  before  shown  that  her  arm  \va 
lull''  enough  to  reach  out  and  deliver  blows  in  the  distant  West 


iiffi 


„,    „       ,        About  the  middle  of  the  year  416  B.C.,  a  Segcstar . 

The  Sogestans  •'  .  \£ 

send  to  Athens,  embassy  appeared  at  Athens  to  ask  for  assistance; 


and  to  promise  lavish  supplies  of  money  and  vigorous 
military  aid  to  any  force  that  should  be  sent  to  help  them.  The 
Kcclesia  voted  that  envoys  should  be  sent  to  Sicily  to  investigate 
the  state  of  affairs;  this  was  done,  and  in  the  spring  of  415  B.C.  ^ 
their  report  was  laid  before  the  assembly.  They  brought  sixty 
talents  of  silver,  as  an  earnest  of  the  resources  which  Segesta 
would  put  at  the  disposal  of  Athens,  and  gave  a  glowing  account 
of  the  wealth  and  strength  of  the  city.  It  is  said  that  while 
in  Sicily  they  had  been  victimized  by  an  elaborate  scheme  of 
deception  practised  by  their  hosts,  who  passed  oft'  on  tliem  all 
the  silver-gilt  vessels  in  their  temi^les  as  solid  gold,  and  made  a 
sumptuous  display  of  private  riches,  by  sending  round  to  every 
house  at  which  the  envoys  were  entertained  all  the  plate  which 
could  be  borrowed  in  the  city.  Blinded  by  this  ostentatious 
show  of  wealth,  the  ambassadors  held  out  magnificent  prospects  to 
the  Ecclesia ;  the  Segestans  who  accompanied  them  renewed  their 
appeal,  and  some  of  the  exiled  Leontincs  came  forward  to  back  their 
petition. 

The  ConseiTative  party  at  Athens  put  forth  all  their  power  to 
oppose  the  gi'ant  of  aid  to  the  Segestan  envoys.  Nicias,  now  as 
Debates  In  the  '''^^^''^J'^  Acting  as  their  spokesman,  denounced  the  idea 

^ciesia,  of  interfering  in  Sicilian  affairs  as  preposterous.  But, 
led  ou  by  Aleibiades,  the  assembly  voted  that  sixty 
ships  should  be  sent  to  Sicily,  in  order  "  to  assist  the  Segestans, 
to  join  in  re-establishing  Leontini,  and  to  carry  out  such  other 
measures  in  Sicily  as  should  be  best  for  the  Athenians."  The  last 
clause  of  the  decree  was  no  idle  pi'.ce  of  verbiage,  but  covered  a 


jBisB.c.]  The  Sicilian  E.xpcdition   Voted.  553 


sign — fully  worked  out  in  the  mind  of  Alcibiades,  though  oniy 

jjgl.rtially  apprehended  by  his  followers — of  reducing  the  whole  of 

( J.e  Sicilian  states  to  dependence  on  Athens.     The  idea  had  entered 

e  teeming  brain  of  Alcibiades  that  Sicily  was  so  honeycombed 

j]j  J  intestine   feuds    that   state   might    be   systematically   turned 

;ainst  state  till  all  were  subdued.     He  thought  that  the  expe- 

.tion  of  427  B.C.  had   failed  merely  for  want  of   strength    and 

Liidance,  and  that  a  large  armament,  used  with  sufficient  unscru- 

ulousness  and  decision,  would  easily  achieve  his  end.     He  got 

imself  nominated  as  one  of  the  three  commanders  of  the  expe- 

ition ;  the  other  two  were  Lamachus,  a  skilful  but  poor  and  unin- 

uential  soldier  of  fortune,  and  Nicias.     The  name  of  the  latter 

aust  have  been  inserted  by  the  vote  of  the  opponents  of  Alci- 

tiades,  who  would  not  have  clogged  himself  with  such  an  un^con- 

;enial  colleague. 

Appointed  against  his  will  to  conduct  a  war  which  he  had 
lenounced,  Nicias  cast  about  for  means  to  prevent  the  expedition 
rom  setting  out.  The  bent  of  his  mind  inclined — as  his  conduct 
n  425  B.C.  with  reference  to  Cleon  and  Sphacteria  had  shown^ 
towards  diplomacy  rather  than  straightforwardness.  Accordingly 
he  refrained  from  any  further  open  opposition  to  the  Sicilian  scheme, 
and  only  strove  to  disgust  the  people  with  it,  by  enlarging  on  its 
difficulties,  and  magnifying  the  land  and  sea  forces  which  would 
be  necessary  to  carry  it  out.  But,  to  his  horror  and  disgust,  the 
Ecclesia,  now  as  in  425  B.C.,  took  him  at  his  word.  If  sixty  galleys 
seemed  too  small  a  squadron  to  him,  he  should  be  given  a  hun- 
dred ;  if  the  force  of  hoplites  voted  in  the  first  bill  was  insufficient, 
he  should  be  allowed  to  fix  the  number  for  himself.  Alcibiades 
completed  the  victory  of  his  side  by  a  fiery  speech,  in  which  he 
appealed  to  the  national  pride  in  the  prestige  of  Athens,  and 
promised  his  countrymen  an  easy  victory  over  the  mixed  multi- 
tudes of  the  faction-ridden  cities  of  Sicily.  Accordingly  the  decree 
was  passed  that  the  armament  should  be  prepared,  and  that  its  size 
and  scope  should  be  settled  by  the  three  generals  who  had  been 
elected  to  command  it. 

Alcibiades'  vanity  and  ambition  led  him  to  ask  for  control  over 
as  large  a  force  as  the  people  would  grant  him,  while  Nicias — 
though  he  did  not  believe  in  the  possibility  of  success— =-had  corae  to 

2  A 


354        1"^^^  Expedition  of  the  Athenians  to  Sicily.   [415b.c. 

the  conclusion  that  a  powerful  armament  would  fail  less  disas- 
The  expedition  trously  than  a  weak  one.     Accordingly  the  generals 

prepared,  agreed  la  demanding  the  most  ample  resources. 
Besides  the  hundred  Athenian  vessels  voted  to  them,  they  raised 
thirty-four  more  from  the  subject-allies  ;  two  thousand  two  hundred 
Athenian  hoplites  formed  the  core  of  the  land  force ;  to  them  were 
added  about  two  thousand  allies,  with  five  hundred  Argives  and 
two  hundred  and  fifty  Mautineans,  whom  Alcibiades  succeeded  in 
enlisting  in  the  Peloponnese.  Of  slingers  and  bowmen  from 
Rhodes,  Crete,  and  elsewhere,  they  hired  thirteen  hundred.  Athens 
had  once  or  twice  sent  out  larger  expeditions  for  some  short  cam- 
paign near  home,  but  such  a  force  had  never  been  despatched  on 
a  distant  adventure  fully  equipped  for  many  months  of  service. 

Public  opinion  in  the  city  was  so  thoroughly  convinced  of  the 
feasibility  of  the  conquest  of  Sicily  and  of  the  unlimited  possi- 
bilities of  private  money-getting  that  would  follow,  that  every  one 
was  eager  to  have  a  hand  in  the  business.  The  trierarchs  spared 
no  expense  in  the  fitting  out  of  their  vessels ;  the  hoplites  who 
were  drawn  for  the  expedition  considered  themselves  favoured  by 
fortune ;  numerous  merchants  made  ready  to  accompany  the  fleet 
in  their  own  ships,  in  order  to  get  the  first  choice  of  the  new  lines 
of  trade  that  were  to  be  opened.  Alcibiades,  whose  windy  pro- 
mises buoyed  every  one  up,  had  promised  that  the  fall  of  Sellnus 
and  Syracuse  should  be  a  mere  prelude  to  the  subjection  of  all 
Sicily,  the  conquest  of  Carthage,  and  the  absorption  of  the  whole 
commerce  of  the  Western  Mediterranean.  Most  men  were  ignorant 
of  the  size  and  power  of  the  Siceliot  cities,  and  even  those  who 
knew  were  carried  away  by  the  enthusiasm  of  the  hour.  In  pure 
heedlessness  and  lightness  of  heart  the  Athenians  committed  them- 
fielves  irrevocably  to  the  adventure  that  was  to  be  their  ruin. 

The  expedition  was  not,  however,  destined  to  set  forth  under 
favourable  auspices.  Just  as  the  dockyards  and  arsenals  of  Athens 
Mutilation  of  were  Completing  the  last  equipments  of  the  fleet,  and 

the  Hermae.  ^]jg  generals  were  on  the  eve  of  putting  their  men  on 
shipboard,  a  mysterious  outrage  threw  all  Athens  into  perturba- 
tion. There  were  scattered  throughout  the  citj'^,  before  the  doors 
(if  private  houses,  as  well  as  at  every  street  corner  and  in  every 
place  of  public  resort,  quantities  of  Hermae,  or  busts  of  the  god 


415 B.C.J  Mutilation  of  the  Hermae.  355 

Hermes,  consisting  of  pillars  about  five  or  sis  feet  high,  with  their 
upper  portions  hewn  into  the  semblance  of  that  deity's  head  and 
shoulders.  They  were  as  common  and  as  superstitiously  reverenced 
as  the  shrines  of  the  Madonna  at  the  street  corners  of  a  modern 
continental  town.  In  a  single  night  unknown  hands  played 
havoc  with  all  these  images,  chipping  and  hacking  away  every 
vestige  of  human  shape  from  them.  It  is  said  that  only  one  bust 
in  the  whole  city  escaped  mutilation. 

Next  morning  there  was  a  universal  cry  ot  wrath  at  tne  sense- 
less and  profane  outrage.  It  was  not  merely  the  superstition  of 
the  Athenians  that  was  roused;  the  vast  number  of  the  figures 
that  had  been  harmed  proved  that  scores  of  persons  must  have 
been  concerned  in  the  affair,  and  the  city  was  frightened  to  find 
that  a  large  band  of  secret  conspirators  was  lurking  in  its 
midst.  The  first  cry  of  the  public  voice  was  that  Alcibiades  was 
the  only  person  in  Athens  capable  of  such  a  wild  and  impious 
freak.  But  public  opinion  was  almost  certainly  wrong ;  there  was 
much  method  in  the  madness  of  Alcibiades.  Eeckless  as  he  was, 
he  must  have  been  most  desirous  at  this  moment  that  his  expe- 
dition should  start  with  every  favourable  omen.  It  is  far  more 
likely  that  the  enemies  of  Alcibiades  did  the  deed,  knowing  that 
it  would  be  laid  at  his  door,  and  perhaps  hoping  that  it  might  stop 
the  expedition. 

Large  rewards  were  at  once  offered  for  information  as  to  the 
outrage,  and  a  special  commission  was  appointed  to  conduct  the 
inquiry ;  but  the  secret  was  well  kept,  and  no  evidence  Alcibiades  in 
was  forthcoming.  A  quantity  of  information,  how-  danger, 
ever,  cropped  up  concerning  other  recent  pieces  of  sacrilege,  the 
most  prominent  of  which  was  a  profane  parody  of  the  Eleusinian 
mysteries,  in  which  Alcibiades  had  taken  the  leading  part.  At  tlie 
next  meeting  of  the  Ecclesia,  a  citizen  named  Pythonlcus  rose  to 
charge  Alcibiades  with  this  crime,  to  argue  that  he  must  also  have 
mutilated  the  Hermae,  and  to  demand  his  instant  prosecution. 
The  young  general  denied  the  accusation,  and  asked  for  a  prompt 
trial ;  but  it  was  refused  him,  for  his  own  side  thought  the  proposal 
preposterous,  and  his  enemies  preferred  to  bring  charges  against 
him  in  his  absence,  when  he  could  not  refute  them. 

Accordingly  AlcUnades  set  sail  with  the  other  generals,  at  tne 


356        T)ie  Expedition  of  the  Athetiiam  io  Sicily.    [415b.o. 

head  of  the  expedition.  Their  departure  was  a  magnificent  and 
impressive  scene,  for  the  whole  city  thronged  down 

the  fleet,  to  Peiraeus  to  bid  God-speed  to  the  great  arma- 
415  B.C.  jj-jgjjj.^  Avhich  was  to  win  Athens  a  new  empire  in 
the  West.  The  heralds  proclaimed  silence,  and  public  prayer  waa 
made  for  the  success  of  the  expedition  ;  seamen  and  officers  joined 
in  pouring  libations  to  the  deities  of  the  sea,  and  as  they  chanted 
the  hymn  of  departure,  the  great  multitude  on  shore  joined  in. 
Then  all  the  fleet  simultaneously  weighed  anchor,  and  the  swifter 
galleys  raced  with  each  other  as  far  as  Aegina,  before  falling  in  to 
the  column  of  route.  The  scene  was  long  remembered.  It  was 
the  last  day  of  unalloyed  hope  and  exultation  that  a  whole  genera- 
tion of  Athenians  was  to  know.  The  fleet  rounded  Malea  and 
steered  an  uneventful  course  as  far  as  Corcyra,  w^here  it  picked  up 
a  large  convoy  of  store  ships  and  merchantmen,  which  had  been 
sent  on  before  to  that  place  of  rendezvous.  Then,  after  despatch- 
ing three  vessels  to  Sicily  to  warn  the  Segestans  and  Leontines 
of  their  approaching  arrival,  the  generals  crossed  the  Ionian  Sea 
at  its  narrowest,  and  pushed  along  the  Calabrian  coast  toward 
Tarentum. 

The  Siceliots  had  long  refused  to  credit  the  designs  which  Athens 
was  entertaining.     They  believed  that  at  the  most  a  small  squadron, 

Feeling  in  ^i^^  those  which  Laches  and  Eurymedon  had  brought 
sicUy.  across  in  427.  and  425,  was  likely  to  visit  their  waters, 
and  made  little  or  no  preparations  to  resist  it.  Knowing  that 
the  strong  anti-Syracusan  alliance,  which  had  existed  twelve  years 
before,  had  now  ceased  to  be,  they  thought  that  an  Athenian  army 
would  get  no  foothold  in  the  island,  and  would  soon  be  constrained 
to  return.  It  was  not  till  the  fleet  of  invasion  reached  Corcyra 
that  they  recognized  that  a  real  danger  was  impending  over  them, 
and  learnt  the  true  size  and  scope  of  the  expedition.  The  Syra- 
cusans,  on  whom  the  brunt  of  the  attack  was  likely  to  fall,  then  at 
last  began  to  make  preparations  for  war,  sending  out  garrisons  to  the 
forts  which  kept  down  their  Sicel  subjects,  and  despatching  envoys  to 
all  the  cities  in  the  island  for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  Pan-Siceliot 
alliance  to  preserve  their  common  autonomy.  But  if  the  Athenian 
generals  had  acted  witli  reasonable  promptitude,  they  would  have 
?ound  Syracuse  still  far  from  ready  for  an  immediate  struggle. 


415  B.C.]  The  Athenians  reach  Sicily.  357 

Nicias  and  his  colleagues  were  now  coasting  down  the  shores  of 
Italy ;  they  found  the  Italiot  states  determined  to  preserve  a  jealous 
neutrality.  Towns  like  Thurii  and  Metapontum,  which  were  bound 
to  Athens  by  old  ties  of  alliance,  only  granted  the  armament  water 
and  an  anchorage ;  Tarentum  and  Locri  denied  them  even  those 
small  boons.  It  was  not  till  they  reached  Rhegium  that  they  could 
find  a  state  which  would  allow  them  to  purchase  provisions  in  a 
market  outside  its  walls.  While  they  lay  in  the  Ehegine  territory 
they  received  a  discouraging  report  from  the  vessels  which  had 
been  sent  on  to  Segesta.  Instead  of  proving  to  be  wealthy  and 
powerful,  the  Segestans  were  found  to  be  unable  to  contribute  more 
than  thirty  talents  to  the  support  of  the  allies  they  had  summoned. 

This  depressing  intelligence  affected  the  generals  in  different 
ways.  Nicias  held  that,  as  a  cold  welcome  awaited  them  in 
Sicily,  they  should  content  themselves  with  striking  pians  of  the 
a  blow  at  Selinus,  and  then  return  home,  and  justify  eenerais. 
themselves  to  the  Ecclesia  by  pleading  the  misleading  nature  of 
their  instructions.  Lamachus  proposed  to  sail  straight  to  Syracuse 
before  the  enemy  had  realized  the  nearness  of  their  approach,  and 
to  endeavour  to  capture  or  cripple  the  city  by  a  sudden  attack. 
Alcibiades  held  the  first  scheme  pusillanimous  and  the  second 
rash,  and  proposed  to  open  negotiations  with  the  various  towns 
which  had  a  grudge  against  Syracuse,  to  incite  the  Sicels  to  rebel, 
and  meanwhile  to  endeavour  to  get  possession  of  some  city  in  the 
western  part  of  the  island  as  a  place  of  arms  and  a  base  of  opera- 
tions against  Syracuse.  This  fatal  "  middle  course  "  was  adopted. 
Nicias'  proposal  would  have  brought  the  armament  safely,  if  in- 
gloriously,  home;  that  of  Lamachus  would  have  offered  some 
chance  of  a  victory,  and  brought  matters  quickly  to  a  head.  But 
Alcibiades'  plan,  by  the  long  delays  which  it  necessitated,  ruined 
the  purpose  of  the  expedition. 

In  pursuance  of  the  plan  of  Alcibiades,  the  Athenians  spent  the 
remaining  months  of  the  summer  in  coasting  round  Sicily  in  search 
of  allies,  and  allowed  every  one  to  learn  their  numbers,  their 
objects,  and  their  plans.  They  were  unable  to  win  any  town  to 
themselves,  except  Naxos  and  Catana;  the  latter  was  compelled 
perforce  to  join  them,  for  while  negotiations  were  going  on,  a  party 
of  Athenians  slipped  in  at  an  unguarded  postern  door  in  the  wall, 


358         The  Expedition  of  the  Athenians  to  Sicily.    r4i5B.c.- 

and  left  the  Catananaeans  no  choice  but  alliance  or  destruction. 
Camarina  and  Messene,  allies  of  Athens  in  -127  B.C.,  would  have 
nothing  to  do  with  their  old  friends.  Some  slight  forays  into  the 
territories  of  Syracuse  and  Gela  failed  completely.  The  only 
military  achievement  of  the  Athenians  was  to  capture  the  small 
Sican  town  of  Hyccara,  whose  inhabitants  they  sold  as  slaves — a 
proceeding  which  brought  them  some  gain,  but  taught  every  state 
in  the  island  what  it  had  to  expect  in  the  event  of  an  Athenian 
success. 

While   this  dilatory  campaign  was   in  progress,  the    Salaminia, 

one  of  the  two  Athenian  state-galleys,  arrived  in  Sicily  with  orders 

Aicibiades    ^^"^  Alcibiades  to  consider  himself  under  arrest,  and  to 

recaued.  rctum  at  once  to  take  his  trial  for  the  matter  of  the 
profanation  of  the  mysteries.  Since  the  departure  of  the  fleet, 
the  Athenian  government  had  been  making  desperate  efforts  to 
unravel  that  mystery ;  their  offers  of  rewards  and  indemnity  to  any 
informers  who  should  present  themselves  produced  a  crop  of  venal 
and  untrustworthy  witnesses.  Scores  of  persons  were  thrown  into 
prison  on  such  testimony,  and  the  unending  series  of  ai  rests  led  to 
something  like  a  panic  in  the  city.  The  whole  business  has  been 
not  inaptly  compared  to  the  stir  in  England  which  followed  the 
so-called  "  Popish  Plot"  of  1679.  The  Titus  Gates  of  Athens  was 
the  orator  Andocides.  Finding  himself  arrested  and  in  danger,  he 
proceeded  to  make  a  pretended  confession,  on  condition  that  his 
own  life  should  be  spared.  He  named  himself  and  many  other 
persons  as  guilty  of  the  sacrilege.  His  story  was  confused  and  im- 
probable, but  the  authorities  were  ready  to  take  any  evidence  that 
presented  itself.  Hastily  accepting  the  whole  tale  as  true,  the 
Athenians  brought  to  trial  and  executed  every  one  within  their 
reach  whom  Andocides  denounced.  The  next  thing  was  to  investi- 
gate the  profanation  of  the  Eleusinian  mysteries  in  which  Alcibiades 
had  been  declared  to  be  implicated.  His  political  enemies,  the 
demagogues  Peisander  a-nd  Charicles,  cried  loudly  for  his  punish- 
ment, and  he  was  accordingly  summoned  to  return  and  appear  for 
trial.  He  started  homeward  from  Catana,  with  several  of  his 
friends  who  were  also  accused,  but  on  arriving  at  Thurii  very  wisely 
gave  his  conductors  the  slip,  went  into  hiding,  and  is  next  heard 
of  as  crossing  the  sea  and  appearing  at  Sparta  to  do  what  harm  be 


414  B.C.] 


The  State  of  Syracuse. 


359 


could  to  his  ungrateful  country.  He  had,  of  course,  beeu  condemned 
to  death  in  his  absence,  his  flight  being  taken  as  convincing 
evidence  of  guilt. 

When  Alcibiades  was  removed,  we  might  have  expected  that 
one  of  the  schemes  whicli  Nicias  and  Lamachus  had  recommended 
would  have  been  put  into  action.  But  this  was  not  to  be  ;  all  that 
the  generals  did  was  to  land  near  Syracuse,  defeat  the  Syracusan 
army  in  the  plain  south  of  the  city,  and  then  to  sail  back  again  to 
Catana  and  go  into  winter  quarters.      The  descent  was  perfectly 


The  Siege  of  Syracuse 
Taken  from  Hauerficld's  Relief 
-Map  of  Syracuse 

Furyelus     ^K_^3^  ,'  .<  4' 


objectless,  unless  it  was  to  serve  as  the  immediate  prelude  to 
the  siege.  All  that  it  did  was  to  reveal  to  the  Syracusans  the 
nearness  of  the  danger,  and  to  induce  them  to  take  more  vigorous 
measures  for  defence  than  they  had  hitherto  thought  necessary. 

Syracuse,  as   it   then   stood,   consisted   of   two   portions.     The 
narrow-necked  peninsula  t)f  Ortygia,  the  oldest  part  of  the  place, 
projecting    into   the   sea  on   its   long   spit   of    land,    Position  of 
formed   the  inner   and   lower  cit^'.     The  larger  and     Syracuse, 
newer  quarter,  the  "  Outer  City,"  lay  around  the  heads  of  the  two 
harbours.     The  two  quarters  seem  each  to  have  had  its  separate 


360       The  Expediiion  of  /he  Athenians  to  Sicily,     f4i4B.c. 

wall,  the  one  cutting  off  the  peninsula  from  the  mainland,  and 

forming  an  inner  line  of  defence  (b  on  the  map) ;  the  other,  whose 

exact  line  is  micertain,  forming  an  outer  circle  (perhaps  as  A  A  in 

map).     To  the  north  lay  the  bare  limestone  plateau  of  Epipolae,  a 

long  spur  of  upland  which  runs  down  from  the  mountains  of  the 

interior,  and  overlooks  the  two  harbours  and  the  city  around  them. 

During  the  winter  of  415-414  b.c.  it  occurred  to  the  Syracusans  that, 

if  once  the  enemy  seized  Epipolae,  they  would  be  able  to  blockade 

the  city  with  little  difficulty,  owing  to  the  narrowness  of  the  front 

of  the  defences.     Accordingly,  during  the  four  months'  respite 

which  the  inaction  of  the  Athenians  gave  them,  the  Syracusans 

worked  hard  to  construct  a  new  wall.     Starting  from  the  sea  on 

the  north,  they  built  a  line  of  fortifications  right  across  Epipolae 

fiom  north  to  south,  including  all  the  eastern  part  of  the  plateau, 

and  forming  a  strong  line  of  defence,  with  a  much  longer  front  than 

that  of  the  previous  city-wall  (c  c  in  map). 

Nor  did  the  Syracusans  neglect  other  precautions.     They  placed 

in  chief  command  Hermocrates,  their  best  general,  renewed  old 

alliances  with  their  neighbours,  and   sent  for  aid   to  Sparta  and 

Corinth.    At  Corinth,  their  mother  city,  they  met  with  a  favourable 

-,  .^.   ,         reception,  and  were  at  once  promised  assistance.     At 
Alcibiacles  at  -^  -^ 

Sparta,  Sparta  the  ephors  hesitated  for  some  time,  but  were 
at  length  convinced  by  the  arguments  of  Alcibiades, 
who  had  joined  the  Syracusan  embassy,  and  did  all  in  his  power 
to  further  its  objects.  He  explained  to  the  ephors  the  full  scope 
of  the  Athenian  designs  on  Sicily,  and  pointed  out  how  they  could 
be  most  easily  frustrated.  He  recommended  that  a  Spartan  oEBcer 
should  be  sent  to  Syracuse  with  some  troops  at  his  back  to 
encourage  the  Siceliots.  Moreover,  he  advised  the  open  renewal 
of  war  with  Athens,  now  that  so  large  a  part  of  her  resources  was 
diverted  to  the  West.  But  above  all  he  laid  stress  on  the  advan- 
tage of  seizing  and  fortifying  the  commanding  j)osition  of  Decelea 
on  the  brow  of  Mount  Parnes,  and  of  retaining  it  as  a  permanent 
post  for  the  molestation  of  Athens,  to  play  in  Attica  the  part  that 
Pylos  had  played  in  Laconia.  Much  of  this  advice  the  ephors 
were  ready  to  take.  They  did  not  declare  immediate  war  on 
Athens,  but  they  resolved  to  send  a  force  under  Gylippus,  an 
officer  of  distinction,  to  assist  the  Syracusans;  Athenian  auxiliaries 


414 B.C.]      Adidas  and  Lainachus  besiege  SyTacuse,  361 

had  been  found  in  the  Argive  line  of  battle  at  Mantiuea,  and 
Athens  could  not  complain  if  Laconians  and  Corinthians  were  seen 
fighting  in  the  Syracusan  ranks.  Four  ships  were  ordered  to  be 
prepared  for  Gylippus  at  once,  to  sail  from  Corinth ;  others  were 
to  follow. 

When  spring  came  round,  Nicias  and  Lamachus  received  from 
Athens  a  reinforcement  of  cavalry,  in  which  arm  they  had  hitherto 
been  deficient.     They  also  raised  some  horse  from  the   ^ 

Commence- 

begestans,  Catanaeans,  and  Sicels,  till  they  had  alto-  ment  of  siege, 
gether  six  hundred  and  fifty.  Thus  strengthened,  *^*  '^' 
they  landed  at  Leon,  a  village  a  few  miles  north  of  Syracuse,  and 
advanced  towards  the  town.  Before  them  lay  a  line  of  heights, 
the  northern  slope  of  the  plateau  of  Epipolac.  The  cliff  could 
only  be  ascended  at  certain  points,  and  the  Syracusans  had  placed 
there  a  guard  of  six  hundred  men.  But  this  force  was  caught 
unprepared,  for  every  one  had  been  expecting  the  Athenians  to 
disembark  south,  not  north,  of  the  city.  Accordingly,  the  invading 
army  had  reached  the  brow  of  Epipolae  before  the)'  were  attacked, 
and  succeeded  in  driving  ofif  the  defenders  and  establishing  them- 
selves on  the  plateau,  facing  the  new  Syracusan  wall.  The  fleet 
came  to  anchor  at  Thapsus,  a  little  to  the  north  of  Leon. 

Kicias  and  Lamachus  had  resolved  to  wall  in  Syracuse  witli 
lines  of  circumvallation,  in  the  orthodox  fashion  of  Greek  siege- 
craft.  The  ground  over  which  their  lines  would  have  to  run  was 
settled  by  the  contour  of  the  new  wall  which  the  Syracusans  had 
buHt  in  the  winter  ;  opposite  it,  at  a  distance  just  beyond  bowshot, 
the  Athenian  lines  were  to  be  constructed.  The  northern  half  of 
their  extent  would  cut  across  the  high  plateau  of  Epipolae ;  the 
southern  half  would  lie  on  the  slope  where  Epipola?  sank  down 
towards  the  Great  Harbour,  and  on  the  marshy  plain  by  the  sea- 
shore. Nicias  began  by  constructing  a  fort  called  Labdalum  at  the 
highest  point  on  Epipolae,  and  then  a  large  circular  entrenchment 
(k  in  map)  somewhat  furthersouth.  The  latter  was  to  be  the  central 
point  of  the  line  of  circumvallation,  lying  at  an  equal  distance  from 
the  open  sea  on  the  north  and  the  Great  Harbour  on  the  south. 
Instead  of  comiug  out  and  oflering  battle,  the  Syracusan  generals 
had  determined  to  endeavour  to  frustrate  the  attempt  to  build  them 
in,  by  throwing  out  counter-walls  from  the  city,  across  the  ground 


362         The  Expedition  of  the  Athenians  to  Sicily.    (414  b.c. 

wliere  the  Athenian  lines  were  to  be  drawn.  They  accordingly 
built,  towards  the  southern  brow  of  the  plateau  of  Ejupolae,  a 
stockade  running  east  and  west  (h  on  the  map),  south  of  the 
central  fort  which  Nicias  had  erected.  The  Athenian  works  could 
not  be  continued  unless  this  entrenchment  were  captured  and 
destroyed;  accordingly  a  vigorous  and  successful  attempt  was  made 
to  storm  it,  when  the  Syracusans  at  midday  were  intent  on  their 
rest  or  their  meal.  The  counter-wall  was  destroyed,  and  the 
Athenian  line  of  circumvallation  completed  southward  from  the 
circular  fort  as  far  as  the  foot  of  Epipolae. 

The  Syracusans,  still  persevering  with  the  same  plan  of  resist- 
ance, now  builfc  a  second  counter-wall  on  the  low  marshy  ground 

Athenian     "^ar    the    Great   Harbour   (j   on   the   plan).      This 

successes,  ^^q  \^^q  Athenians  assaulted,  but  they  did  not  on 
that  occasion  surprise  the  enemy,  who  came  out  in  full  force  into 
the  open,  and  fought  a  general  action  in  defence  of  the  counter- 
wall.  Again,  however,  the  Athenians  were  victorious ;  the  S3Ta- 
cusans  were  scattered  and  routed,  and  their  entrenchment  carried 
by  storm.  But  in  the  midst  of  the  battle  Lamachus  was  slain,  so 
that  the  sole  command  of  the  Athenian  army  now  devolved  upon 
Nicias.  This  was  an  immense  misfortune  for  Athens;  the  fallen 
general  was  a  man  of  energy  and  decision  and  a  practised  soldier, 
while  the  survivor  was  more  of  a  politician  than  a  military  man, 
and  though  tit  enough  for  fair-weather  campaigning,  was  prone  to 
doubt  and  irresolution  at  critical  moments.  Moreover,  he  hated 
the  task  which  had  been  put  upon  him,  and  believed  in  his  own 
heart  that  it  was  impossible.  To  add  to  his  troubles,  he  was 
suffering  from  a  painful  internal  disease,  which  frequently  confined 
him  to  his  tent. 

Having  driven  the  Syracusans  within  their  walls,  the  Athenian 
army  was  now  in  a  position  to  complete  the  lines  of  circumvalla- 
tion. Kicias  had  brought  round  the  fleet  from  Thapsus  to  the 
Great  Harbour,  had  landed  all  his  Stores  and  drawn  his  ships 
ashore  on  its  beach.  He  therefore  thought  it  most  important  to 
complete  the  southern  portion  of  the  lines,  so  as  to  cover  the  fleet ; 
the  northern  section,  towards  the  open  sea,  he  left  unfinished  till  he 
should  have  fully  built  the  rest.  Thus  it  came  to  pass  that  while 
the  circumvallation  from  the  brow  of  Epipolae  to  the  Great  Harbour 


414B.C.]  Gylippiis  enters  Syracuse.  t,6t, 

was  elaborately  complete,  with  a  double  line  of  wall,  that  which  ran 
from  the  central  circular  fort  to  the  northern  sea  was  full  of  gaps, 
and  in  places  hardly  even  commenced.  This  was  to  prove  of  fatal 
importance  during  the  next  few  weeks. 

The  Athenians  had  now  reached  the  height  of  their  good  fortune, 
though  this  only  amounted  to  having  shut  up  the  Syracusans  in 
their  city;  the  real  siege  had  yet  to  begin.  Nevertheless  the 
moral  effect  of  their  success  was  considerable  :  a  faction  in  Syracuse 
had  already  commenced  to  talk  of  asking  for  terms  of  peace,  and 
reinforcements  were  beginning  to  join  the  invaders  from  several 
states  hitherto  neutral,  even  from  distant  Etruria. 

Just  at  this  moment  a  new  factor  intervened  in  the  struggle. 
Gylippus  had  started  from  Corinth  with  his  four  ships  when  the 
spring  came  round,  and  had  now  arrived  in  Sicily,  ©yuppus  in 
He  landed  at  Hiraera,  hardly  hoping  to  save  Syracuse,  sicuy. 
for  rumour  had  reported  that  the  city  was  now  entirely  circum- 
vallated.  Finding  that  this  was  not  yet  the  case,  he  resolved  to 
throw  himself  into  it.  He  added  to  the  seven  hundred  men  whom 
he  had  brought  with  him  several  thousand  more  from  Himera, 
Sellnus,  and  Gela,  and  marched  rapidly  towards  Syracuse.  Coming 
upon  the  unfinished  portion  of  the  Athenian  lines,  on  the  northern 
side  of  Epipolae,  he  passed  through  one  of  the  gaps  and  threw 
himself  into  the  town.  The  whole  Syracusan  army  o-yiippus enters 
came  out  to  join  him,  and  then  offered  the  Athe-  Syracuse. 
nians  battle.  Nicias  would  not  accept  the  challenge,  finding 
himself  outnumbered  now  that  Gylippus'  army  had  arrived.  He 
lay  with  his  troops  under  arms  near  the  circular  fort  on  the  south 
side  of  Epipolae,'and  made  no  movement  when  Gylippus  laid  hands 
on  the  unfinished  wall  to  the  north,  pulled  it  down,  and  began  to 
build  with  its  materials  a  counter-wall  running  out  from  the 
Syracusaa  lines  of  defence  toward  the  highest  ground  on  Epipolae. 
He  allowed  his  fort  at  Labdalum  to  be  surprised  and  captured,  and 
thus  entirely  lost  command  of  the  northern  slope  of  the  plateau. 
Presently  the  Syracusan  counter-wall  reached  the  level  of  tho 
Athenian  lines,  just  north  of  the  circular  fort ;  if  it  could  be  con- 
tinued any  further,  Nicias  could  not  hope  to  recover  his  lost  ascen- 
dancy, and  would  himself  be  besieged  rather  than  besieging.  It 
required  two  sharp  engagements  to  settle  the  question ,  but  in  the 


364       The  Expedition  of  the  Athenians  to  Sicily.    [414b.c.- 

second  Gylippus  was  wholly  victorious,  and  the  counter-wall  was 
carried  past  the  critical  point.  During  the  succeeding  month  the 
Syracusans  prolonged  it  more  and  more  to  the  west,  till  it  finally 
reached  Euryelus,  the  narrow  and  lofty  western  summit  of  Epipolae  ; 
at  the  more  exposed  jDoints  on  its  front  it  was  strengthened  with 
four  forts  (k  k  in  map). 

The  misfortunes  of  Nicias  were  only  just  beginning.  A  few 
days  later  twelve  Peloponnesian  triremes  ran  the  blockade,  and 
entered  the  small  harbour  in  safety.  They  annoimced  that  more 
ships  were  to  follow,  a  promise  which  encouraged  the  Syracusans 
to  think  of  launching  their  own  fleet;  they  possessed  some  forty 
or  fifty  vessels,  which  had  not  yet  ventured  out  of  port,  for  fear  of 
the  overwhelming  forces  of  the  Athenians.  The  stir  which  was 
soon  visible  in  the  Syracusan  arsenal  disturbed  Nicias,  for  his 
own  squadron  was  now  in  very  bad  condition.  The  galleys  had 
been  lying  on  the  beach  for  some  months  far  from  any  dock,  and 
were  growing  leaky.  The  crews  were  out  of  condition,  and  many 
of  the  slaves  and  mercenaries  who  filled  the  lower  benches  had 
begun  to  desert  since  the  fortune  of  the  armament  seemed  at  an 
end. 

Nicias  now  began  to  take  defensive  measures,  in  case  Gylippus 
should  be  emboldened  to  take  the  offensive.  He  occupied  the 
Nicias  asks  peninsula  of  Plemmyrium,  which  runs  out  into  the 
for  aid.  ggg^  opposite  Ortygia,  and  removed  to  it  the  greater 
part  of  nis  stores,  and  a  considerable  portion  of  the  fleet.  Three 
forts  were  erected  in  commanding  positions  to  protect  the  new 
depot.  If  the  unfortunate  general  had  possessed  sufficient  moral 
strength  to  carry  out  his  own  plans,  he  would  now  have  put  his 
troops  on  shipboard  and  sailed  home,  abandoning  the  whole 
enterprise.  But  Nicias  was  a  man  of  irresolute  nature,  and  terribly 
afraid  of  responsibilitJ^  He  dreaded  the  reception  which  would 
have  awaited  him  in  Athens,  and  instead  of  departing,  as  his  own 
impulse  urged,  contented  himself  with  sending  despatches  home 
to  describe  his  evil  plight,  and  to  ask  for  further  orders.  "  Unless 
Athens,"  he  wrote,  "  was  rea.ly  to  send  to  his  assistance  a  very 
large  expedition  in  the  shortest  possible  time,  or  to  allow  him  to 
return,  he  foresaw  a  disaster."  Autumn  was  now  at  hand,  and 
the  time  required  for  sending  to  Athens  and  receiving  an  answer 


413 B.C.]  Renewal  of  the   War  in  Greece.  365 

was  so  great,  that  it  was  obvious  that  the  spring  would  have  arrived 
before  any  orders  sent  from  home  could  be  carried  out. 

The  despatches  of  Nicias  reached  Athens  at  a  most  unfavourable 
moment,  for  it  had  just  become  evident  that  the  renewal  of  llie 
war  with  Sparta  was  at  hand.  Exasperated  by  the  The  war 
sending  of  Peloponnesian  troops  to  Syracuse,  the  '^^or^ce^'* 
Athenians  had,  in  the  summer  of  414  B.C.,  openly  414B.c. 
broken  the  truce  with  Sparta  by  sending  a  fleet  of  forty  ships 
to  harry  the  coast  of  Laconia.  Prasiae,  Epidaurus  Limera,  and 
other  places  had  been  sacked  and  burnt ;  the  ephors  had  sworn 
vengeance,  and  it  was  known  that  the  great  inroads  into  Attica, 
which  had  ceased  since  421  B.C.,  were  to  recommence  next  spring. 
It  might  have  been  expected  that  when  the  old  strife  with  Sparta 
was  about  to  be  renewed,  the  Ecclesia  would  have  commanded  the 
instant  return  of  the  army  in  Sicily  for  service  nearer  home.  But, 
blinded  by  their  usual  over-confidence  and  hopefulness,  the 
Athenians  resolved  to  persevere  in  the  attack  on  Sysacuse.  They 
refused  to  recall  Xicias  or  to  bring  home  the  army,  and  sent  out 
word  that  he  should  have  reinforcements  sufficient  to  bring  the 
siege  to  a  successful  end.  Demosthenes,  the  most  distinguished 
general  that  Athens  possessed,  was  to  head  the  new  expedition, 
which  was  almost  to  rival  the  first  in  its  strength  and  resources, 
Eurymedou  was  sent  forward  at  midwinter  with  ten  ships  to  warn 
Nicias  of  the  approaching  aid. 

Meanwhile  at  Syracuse  the  winter  of  414-13  B.C.  was  passing 
by.     No  decisive  event  had  happened,  but  the  Athenian  army  was 
visibly  growing  weaker,  while  Gylippus  had  raised  several  thousand 
men,  from  the  Siceliot  cities  allied  with  Syracuse,  to  strengthen 
his  already  superior  force.     He  had  also  persuaded  the  Syracusaus 
to  launch  every  war-vessel  that  could  possibly  be  made  seaworthy, 
and  not  less  than  eighty  galleys  were  now  lying  ready  for  service 
in   the   two  harbours.      When   the   spring   arrived,    he  assumed 
the  offensive ;  marching  inland,  he  worked  right  round  to  the  rear 
of  the  Athenian  camp,  and  established  himself,  under  cover  of  the 
night,  close  to  their  depot  at  Plemmyrium.     When  gg^gghtsat 
the  dawn  came,  his  ships  left  the  harbour  and  oftered     Syracuse, 
the  Athenians  battle ;  a  violent   conflict  took  place 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Great  Harbour,  which  ended  in  the  defeat 


366         Tlie  Expedition  of  the  Athe?iians  to  Sicily.    [413b.c. 

of  the  Syracusans.  But  while  Nicias  was  intent  on  the  sea- 
fight,  Gylippus  had  fallen  upon  the  forts  at  Plemmyrium,.  stormed 
all  three,  and  got  possession  of  the  vast  stores  which  had  been 
heaped  together  on  that  peninsula.  So  far,  too,  were  the  Syracusans 
from  feeling  discouraged  by  the  result  of  the  naval  engagement, 
that  a  few  days  later  they  sent  out  a  squadron  of  twelve  ships  to 
cruise  in  the  open  sea.  These  vessels  fell  in  with  some  Athenian 
ships,  which  were  conveying  treasure  to  Nicias,  and  destroyed 
several  of  them. 

Meanwhile  King  Agis,  with  a  large  Peloponnesian  army,  nad 
invaded  Attica  in  April,  and  ravaged  the  whole  country.  He  had 
taken  the  advice  of  Alcibiades,  and  established  a  permanent 
Spartan  garrison  at  Decelea.  Nevertheless  the  Athenians  had  not 
slackened  in  their  determination  to  send  help  to  Nicias,  and  while 
the  Spartan  army  was  still  in  the  land,  had  sent  forth  Demosthenes 
and  his  expedition.  He  had  seventy-five  triremes,  five  thousand 
hoplites,  of  whom  twelve  hundred  were  Athenians,  and  a  large 
force  of  light-troops.  On  his  way  he  obtained  considerable  rein- 
forcements from  Acarnania  and  also  from  Italy ;  for,  owing  to 
domestic  revolutions,  the  states  of  Metapontum  and  Thurii  had 
just  changed  their  policy  and  concluded  an  alliance  with  Athens. 
About  the  same  time  that  Demosthenes  sailed  forth,  the  Spartans 
despatched  several  small  squadrons,  with  about  two  thousand 
troops  on  board,  under  orders  to  cross  the  open  sea  to  Sicily  and 
run  the  Athenian  blockade. 

When  the  news  of  the  approach  of  Demosthenes  reached  Syra- 
cuse, Gylippus  and  his  Syracusan  colleagues  resolved  to  make  a 
determined  attempt  to  crush  Nicias,  before  he  could  receive  his 
reinforcements.  The  Syracusan  army,  divided  into  two  bodies, 
attacked  the  Athenian  camp  both  from  the  city  and  from  the 
inland ;  at  the  same  time  their  fleet  offered  battle  with  eighty 
ships  in  the  Great  Harbour.  The  forces  of  Nicias  were  now  so 
weakened  that  he  could  only  man  seventy-five  ships,  though  forty 
or  fifty  more  lay  empty  on  the  beach.  The  attempt  on  the 
Athenian  camp  failed,  but  by  sea,  after  two  days'  hard  fighting, 
the  Syracusans  had  the  mastery,  and  compelled  the  enemy  to  seek 
refuge  on  shore  under  the  protection  of  his  land  army,  leaving 
seven  or  eight  galleys  behind  him.     The  victory  of  the  Siceliots 


413 B.C.]  Demosthenes  at  Syracuse.  367 

was  ascribed  to  the  manner  in  which  they  had  equipped  their 
fleet;  they  had  cut  down  and  strengthened  the  bows  of  each  ship, 
and  made  their  beaks  short  and  strong  instead  of  long  and  sharp. 
When  a  Syracusan  and  an  Athenian  vessel  came  into  direct 
collision,  stem  to  stem,  it  resulted  that  the  Aveaker  beak  of  the 
latter  made  little  impression  on  the  solid  bows  of  the  other,  while 
the  shorter  but  stronger  beak  usually  broke  through  tlie  slighter 
frame  of  the  Athenian  ship.  These  direct  collisions  were  bound  to 
occur  veiy  frequently  in  the  confined  space  of  the  Great  Harbour, 
which  gave  the  Athenians  little  room  for  the  skirmishing  tactics  in 
which  they  excelled. 

Within  a  few  days  of  the  sea-fight  Demosthenes  arrived  with 
his  great  armament,  and  once  more  threw  the  balance  of  power  on 
to  the  side  of  the  Athenians.  Being  a  man  of  vigour  Demosthenes 
and  decision,  he  overruled  the  dilatory  Kicias,  and  at  Syracuse, 
commenced  offensive  operations  the  moment  that  his  men  were  on 
shore.  He  first  brought  military  engines  to  bear  on  the  Syracusan 
counter-\«all,  which  shut  the  Athenians  off  from  the  plateau  of 
Epipolae,  and  then  tried  to  storm  the  works.  His  attack  was 
repulsed,  but  his  resources  were  not  at  an  end.  Marching  inland 
under  cover  of  the  night,  he  ascended  the  hillside  beyond  Euryelus, 
the  westernmost  point  of  Epipolae,  where  the  Syracusan  counter- 
wall  ended.  This  circuitous  route  brought  him  to  the  rear  of  the 
enemy's  position,  where  his  attack  was  wholly  unexpected.  He 
captured  a  fort,  drove  back  the  forces  left  to  guard  the  wall,  and 
pushed  on  for  some  time,  carrying  all  before  him.  But  presently 
his  troops  fell  into  disorder,  the  enemy  rallied,  and  a  desperate  and 
confused  conflict  was  carried  on  in  the  darkness.  It  terminated  iu 
the  rout  of  the  Athenians,  who  sufi'ered  terribly  as  they  fled 
along  the  steep  clifls,  and  lost  as  many  men  by  the  precipices  as  by 
the  sword  of  the  enemy.  The  defeat  cost  so  many  Defeat  of 
lives,  and  demoralized  the  army  to  such  an  extent,  Demosthenes, 
that  Demosthenes  at  once  decided  that  nothing  remained  possible 
but  instant  retreat.  Nicias,  however,  withstood  him,  and  insisted 
that  the  position  was  not  yet  hopeless,  and  that  Syracuse  would 
ere  long  ask  for  terms  from  sheer  inability  to  bear  any  longer  the 
intolerable  pressure  of  the  war.  But  soon  the  reinforcements  from 
Tcloponuesus  joined  CTyl)i)pus,  and  at  the  same  time  a  fever,  bred 


358        The  Expedition  of  the  Athenians  to  Sicily.    l4i3B.o. 

in  the  marsh  beside  the  Athenian  camp,  began  to  thin  the  invader'a 
ranks.  Even  Nicias  now  consented  to  abandon  the  siege,  and  gave 
orders  for  embarkation.  But,  on  the  niglit  before  the  day  of 
departure,  a  total  eclipse  of  the  moon  occurred.  The  soothsayers, 
who  were  called  in  to  interpret  the  omen,  proclaimed  that  the 
army  must  remain  quiet  fur  thrice  nine  days.  Nicias,  who  was 
intensely  superstitious,  insisted  on  following  their  advice,  and  the 
embarkation  was  postponed  for  the  period  named. 

This  was  the  last  stroke  needed  to  complete  the  ruin  ol  tne 
Athenians.  The  obvious  preparations  for  departure  in  the  in- 
Great  sea-fleht  vader's  camp  had  raised  the  spirits  of  the  Syracusans 
in  the  harbour,  ^q  i^^  highest  pitch  of  exultation,  and  they  com- 
menced a  series  of  attacks  which  made  the  position  of  Nicias  and 
Demosthenes  more  and  more  difficult.  Their  fleet,  though  little 
more  than  half  as  strong  in  mere  numbers  as  that  of  the  Athenians, 
was  incessantly  active.  Its  vigour  and  daring  grew  so  great,  that 
at  last  seventy-six  Syracusan  vessels  routed  a  squadron  of  eighty- 
six  which  Eurymedon  led  out  against  them,  slew  that  officer,  and 
took  eighteen  of  his  ships.  The  next  action  of  Gylippus  showed 
that  he  had  got  beyond  the  idea  of  merely  driving  the  Athenians 
away,  and  had  begun  to  think  of  annihilating  them.  He  rapidly 
threw  across  the  narrow  mouth  of  the  Great  Harbour,  between 
Ortygia  and  the  northernmost  point  of  Plemmyrium,  a  barrier 
composed  of  merchantmen  moored  stem  to  stern,  so  as  to  com- 
pletely shut  in  the  Athenian  fleet. 

This  drove  even  Nicias  to  desperate  and  immediate  action. 
Every  seaworthy  ship  that  the  invaders  could  muster  was  drawn 
down  to  the  sea ;  large  drafts  both  of  hoplites  and  of  light-armed 
troops  were  sent  on  board,  and  a  sui^reme  effort  was  made  to  crush 
the  Syracusans  by  gross  force  of  numbers.  A  hundred  and  ten 
galleys,  with  Demosthenes  at  their  head,  sailed  forth  to  burst  the 
barrier  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbour,  while  Nicias  kept  guard  in 
the  camp  on  shore.  The  Syracusans,  though  they  could  only 
send  out  eighty  vessels,  did  not  decline  the  combat.  The  two 
fleets  grappled  together  in  the  confined  space  of  the  harbour,  and 
lay  locked  in  close  conflict  for  hours.  The  whole  of  Syracuse 
crowded  to  the  walls  of  Ortygia  to  view  the  fight,  while  the 
Athenian   land   army  mounted   the   ramparts   of  their   camp    to 


413  B.C.]  The  Athenians  Retreat  by  Land.  369 

watch  the  dicision  of  their  fate.  The  stake  at  issue  was  so  heavy 
that  the  victory  was  disputed  with  far  greater  obstinacy  than  had 
been  seen  in  any  previous  engagement.  The  Athenians  had  ruin 
staring  them  in  the  face,  if  they  could  not  burst  the  barrier  and 
force  their  way  to  sea ;  the  Syracusans  were  borne  up  by  the  self- 
confidence  which  their  previous  successes  had  generated,  and 
determined  not  to  lose  the  fruits  of  their  long  struggle.  There 
was  little  manoeuvring  possible,  and  the  fight  resembled  a  land 
battle  on  the  sea,  for  the  vessels  drifted  into  knots,  and  lay  wedged 
together,  while  the  hoplites  fought  hand  to  hand  in  their  attempts 
to  board.  At  last  the  resolution  of  the  Athenians  began  to  fail 
them  ;  in  spite  of  their  superior  numbers  they  had  made  no  head- 
way, and  had  not  even  approached  the  boom.  With  a  simultaneous 
impulse  every  vessel  that  could  get  loose  backed  water,  turned, 
and  made  for  the  shore.  The  land  army,  with  one  loud  groan  of 
despair,  ran  down  from  the  camp  to  the  beach,  to  aid  in  dragging 
the  ships  into  safet3^  Sixty  came  safely  to  land,  fifty  were  left 
in  the  power  of  the  enemy,  or  lay  at  the  bottom  of  the  harbour. 
The  Syracusans  had  sufiered  almost  as  severely  in  proportion  to 
their  numbers,  for  nearly  thirty  of  their  vessels  were  sunk  or 
utterly  disabled. 

Demosthenes  made  one  final  appeal  to  the  defeated  armament. 
He  pointed  out  that  the  Athenian  vessels  which  survived  still 
outnumbered  the  enemy,  that  the  victors  were  completely  ex- 
hausted, and  that  the  only  real  chance  for  escape  lay  in  bursting 
the  barrier.  But  when  he  ordered  the  seamen  once  more  to  embark, 
they  sullenly  refused  to  return  to  the  battle;  nothing  more  could 
be  done  at  sea. 

The  only  remaining  course  for  the  Athenians  was  to  burn  their 
fleet,  evacuate  their  camp,  start   inland,  and  attempt  to  reach 
Catana  by  a  march  of  forty  miles  through  the  hills 
and  defiles  of  the  Syracusan  territory.     Clear-headed    retreat  by 
men  foresaw  that  the  attempt  must  end  in  ruin,  for        laid, 
the  army  was  demoralized,  the  roads  were  bad,  and  a  victorious 
enemy  in  overwhelming  numbers  was  ready  to  start  in  pursuit. 
But  to  give  the  retreat  any  chance  of  success  it  must  be  commenced 
id  once,  before  the  Syracusans  had  time  to  beset  the  passes  through 
which  the  army  must  thread  its  way.     Misled,  however,  by  false 

2  B 


370        The  Expedition  of  the  Athenians  to  Sicily.    [413b.c. 

reports  of  the  intentions  of  the  enemy,  Nicias  refused  to  start  the 
night  after  the  battle,  and  even  the  next  day  was  occupied  in 
sorting  over  the  stores,  packing  up  treasure  and  provisions,  and 
setthng  the  details  of  the  march.  On  the  third  morning  the  whole 
army  started  forth  in  a  great  hollow  square,  with  the  baggage  in 
the  centre.  Nicias  led  the  van,  Demosthenes  the  rear.  Vast 
quantities  of  stores  were  abandoned,  and  the  apathy  and  careless- 
ness displayed  was  so  great  that  the  larger  part  of  the  fleet  was 
left  unburnt  for  the  enemy  to  tow  away  at  leisure.  Not  only  were 
the  corpses  of  those  who  had  fallen  still  lying  unburied  on  the 
shore,  but  several  thousand  wounded  were  left  behind,  in  spite 
of  the  pitiful  appeals  for  aid  which  they  addressed  to  their  depart- 
ing countrymen.  The  whole  mass  of  combatants  and  non-com- 
batants hurried  away  without  any  thought  than  that  of  saving  their 
own  persons.  "  They  were  quite  disheartened  and  demoralized," 
writes  Thucydides,  "  and  resembled  nothing  but  a  whole  city  starved 
out  and  endeavouring  to  escape;  and  no  small  city  too,  for,  counting 
the  whole  multitude,  there  were  not  less  than  forty  thousand  on  the 
march." 

Meanwhile  the  two  days  of  delay  had  permitted  the  Syracusans 
to  seize  all  the  difficult  passes,  throw  up  works  against  the  fords, 
Disasters  of  and  break  down  the  bridges  on  every  road  which  the 
the  retreat,  jf^^ti^enians  could  take.  Moreover,  they  had  planted 
parties  of  cavalry  wherever  the  ground  was  open  and  level,  so  that 
no  one  could  straggle  from  the  ranks  of  the  retreating  force.  On 
the  first  day  the  army  forced  the  passage  of  tlie  river  Anapus  and 
advanced  five  miles,  not  without  sufiiering  severe  losses.  On  the 
second  day  they  reached  the  foot  of  a  pass  called  the  Acraean  Cliff, 
and  found  it  strongly  held  by  the  enemy.  The  third  and  fourth 
days  were  spent  in  attempts  to  force  this  defile,  which  proved 
entirely  unavailing :  while  the  head  of  the  army  was  fighting  in 
the  j)ass,  the  rear  was  being  galled  by  unceasing  cavalry  charges, 
and  shot  down  from  a  distance  by  the  light-armed  troops  of  the 
Syracusans.  Finding  the  Acraean  Cliff  impregnable,  the  Athenians 
now  fronted  to  the  rear,  and  started  off  in  a  new  direction ;  as  they 
could  not  reach  Catana,  they  would  endeavour  to  make  their  way 
to  the  friendly  Sicels  of  the  interior.  The  march  now  lay  south- 
ward; before  it  could  begin,  Nicias  had  to  cut  his  way  through 


413 B.C.]  The  Athenians  Surrender.  371 

the  Syracusau  corps  which  had  been  hanging  on  his  rear,  a  feat 
which  he  accomplished  only  with  heavy  loss.  The  food  of  the 
retreating  army  was  now  well-nigh  exhausted,  and  there  was  no 
spirit  for  fighting  left  in  them;  the  whole  force  was  ready  to 
disband,  and  many  thousands  had  already  deserted  and  taken 
to  the  hills,  in  the  hope  of  finding  their  way  to  Catana.  When 
night  came,  the  generals  ordered  fires  to  be  lighted  to  deceive  the 
enemy,  and  led  off  their  remaining  troops  with  such  speed  as 
they  could.  Nicias,  with  the  smaller  half  of  the  army,  got  clear 
away  and  gained  some  miles  on  his  pursuers ;  but  Demosthenes, 
who  had  lost  his  way  in  the  darkness,  was  struggling  along  far  to 
the  rear.  Tn  the  morning  the  Syracusans  found  the  enemy 
vanished,  and  started  off  in  hot  haste  to  pui'sue  him.  They  came 
up  with  Demosthenes'  corps  as  it  was  making  its  way  through  a 
narrow  defile.  The  Athenians  made  little  resistance;  many  were 
cut  dovvn,  the  main  body  took  refuge  in  a  walled  enclosure  which 
they  held  for  a  few  hours.  Then,  finding  themselves  entirely  sur- 
rounded, they  laid  down  their  arms  on  condition  that  their  lives 
should  be  spared.  Six  thousand  men  were  taken  here,  a  much 
larger  number  had  fallen  or  been  captured  before  Demosthenes 
the  final  surrender.  Demosthenes  threw  himself  captured, 
upon  his  sword  when  the  surrender  took  place ;  but  the  wound  was 
not  mortal,  and  he  was  borne  back,  still  living,  to  Syracuse. 

Meanwhile  Nicias,  relieved  for  a  day  from  the  pressure  of  the 
enemy  on  his  rear,  had  forced  the  passage  of  the  river  Cacyparis, 
and  made  considerable  progress  southward.  But  on  the  next  day 
the  Syracusan  horse  reappeared  to  molest  his  march,  and  brought 
him  news  of  the  capture  of  Demosthenes.  Gylippus  now  bade  the 
Athenian  surrender ;  but  Nicias,  making  a  final  effort,  pushed  on  as 
far  as  the  river  Asinarus,  though  his  men  were  now  so  famished 
and  weary  that  it  was  hard  to  get  them  to  move.  By  the  lime 
that  the  river  was  reached,  the  Syracusans  had  gone  round  and 
occupied  the  further  bank.  Hundreds  of  the  Athenians  perished 
in  the  stream,  as  they  strove  to  cross ;  as  many  were  trodden  down 
in  the  narrow  ford  by  their  comrades  as  fell  by  the  darts  of  the 
Siceliots.  Soon  the  resistance  ceased ;  Nicias  gave  Nicias 
himself  up  to  Gylippus,  and  such  of  his  followers  as  surrenders, 
were  granted  quarter  by  the  exultant  enemy  were  sent  to  join  the 


372       The  Expedition  of  the  Athenians  to  Sicily.    [-113 b.c. 

trooixs  of  Demosthenes  in  captivity.  A  few  scores  at  most  escaped 
to  the  hills  and  reached  Catana. 

"  Thus  ended,"  says  Thucydides,  "  the  greatest  adventure  thae 
the  Greeks  entered  into  during  this  war,  and  in  my  opinion  the 
greatest  in  which  Greeks  were  ever  concerned ;  the  one  most 
splendid  for  the  conquerors  and  most  disastrous  for  the  conquered ; 
for  they  suffered  no  common  defeat,  but  were  absolutely  annihilated, 
—land  army,  fleet,  and  all — and  of  many  thousands  only  a  handful 
ever  returned  home." 

The  Syracusans  used  their  victory  in  no  gentle  spirit.  In  spite 
of  the  remonstrances  of  Gylippus,  they  put  to  death  the  two  un- 

Fateofthe   fortunate  generals  who  had  fallen  into  their  bands.^ 

generals.  ^\\  Greece  lamented  Nicias,  "  the  most  respectable 
man  of  bis  age,"  whose  private  virtues,  moderation,  and  love  of 
peace  should  have  earned  him  a  better  fate.  But  in  troublous 
times  incompetence  incurs  a  greater  punishment  than  crime.  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  the  half-hearted  and  dilatory  proceedings 
of  Nicias  were  the  chief  cause  of  the  great  disaster  in  which  he 
perished.  It  is  doubtful  whether  the  supineness  with  which  he 
conducted  his  operations  at  first,  or  the  obstinacy  which  he  dis- 
played in  refusing  to  bring  the  expedition  home  when  fortune  had 
turned  against  him,  was  the  more  fatal  to  the  expedition.  At  any 
rate,  this  respectable  man  dragged  down  to  death  his  able  colleague 
Demosthenes,  lost  his  country  the  largest  and  finest  armament  it 
had  ever  sent  out,  and  ultimately  brought  about  the  downfall  of 
its  imperial  power. 

The  prisoners  who  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Syracusans 

were  hardly  better  treated  than  their  generals.     They  were  shut 

Misery  of  the  up  ^r  ^^^6  custody  in  the  quarries  which  abounded  on 

prisoners.  ^\-^q  hiHsides  of  Epipolae,  with  no  protection  from  the 
sun  or  the  rain,  and  a  very  insufficient  ration  of  bread  and  water, 
only  half  the  ordinary  dole  of  a  slave,  to  keep  body  and  soul 
together.  Worn  out  by  their  late  exertions,  and  exposed  to  absolute 
famine,  they  began  to  die  off  like  flies  as  the  unhealthy  weather 

'  Thucydides  saj's  that  they  were  actuallj'  executed  ;  other  authorities, 
that  they  slew  themselves  to  avoid  the  ignominy  of  a  public  execution, 
having  been  forewarned  of  their  fate  by  Gylippus,  or  by  the  Syracusan 
general  Hermocrates. 


413 B.C.]  Fate  of  the  Prisoners.  373 

of  the  autumn  set  in.  The  Syracusans  let  the  corpses  lie  unburied 
among  the  surviving  prisoners,  till  the  stench  bred  an  infectious 
fever  that  threatened  to  spread  into  the  cit3\  After  seventy  days, 
all  but  the  native  Athenians  and  those  of  their  allies  who  were 
Siceliots  were  sold  by  auction  as  slaves.  The  remainder  were 
exposed  to  the  miseries  of  the  quarries  for  eight  months,  till  the 
greater  portion  of  them  perished.  Those  who  still  survived  seem 
then  to  have  been  sold  into  slavery  like  their  companions.  We 
read  that  pity  for  their  fate,  and  admiration  for  the  calm  courage 
with  which  they  supported  their  misfortunes,  finally  led  to  the 
release  of  the  greater  number  of  them.  But  hardly  one  in  ten  of 
those  who  had  sailed  forth  in  such  exuberant  hopefulness  to  subdue 
Sicily  ever  saw  his  home  again. 


CHAPTEK  XXXIII. 

THE   DECLINE   OF   THE   POWER    OF   ATHENS,   DOWN   TO   THE   FALL   OF 
THE   FOUR   HUNDRED,  413-411  B.C. 

The  final  disaster  of  the  Athenians  in  Sicily  had  befallen  them 
about  the  middle  of  the  month  of  September ;  some  weeks  later 
confused  rumours  of  it  began  to  spread  through  Greece,  reaching 
Sparta  and  Corinth  long  before  they  arrived  at  Athens.  We  are 
assured  by  Plutarch  that  the  news  first  came  to  those  who  were 
most  concerned  in  it  in  the  most  casual  way.  A  seafaring  stranger 
landed  at  Peiraeus,  and  entered  a  barber's  shop,  where  he  began 
speaking  of  the  deaths  of  Nicias  and  Demosthenes  as  events  already 
known  to  every  one.  The  barber  no  sooner  heard  the  story  than 
he  ran  up  to  Athens,  to  give  information  to  the  magistrates.  But 
when  he  was  brought  forward,  interrogated  as  to  the  particulars 
of  the  disaster  and  told  to  produce  his  informant,  the  poor  man 
was  at  a  loss.  There  was  no  one  to  corroborate  his  tale,  and  as 
the  news  seemed  perfectly  incredible  to  those  who  had  seen  the 
two  magnificent  armaments  sail  forth  against  Syracuse,  he  was 
treated  as  a  forger  of  false  news  and  sentenced  to  be  exposed  on 
the  wheel.  He  had  been  suffering  the  torture  some  time,  when 
several  soldiers,  who  had  escaped  from  Sicily  before  the  final  sur- 
render, appeared  to  bear  out  his  tale.  But  even  when  well-known 
and  respectable  citizens,  who  had  seen  the  fatal  end  of  the  expedi- 
tion, came  straggling  back  to  Athens  with  full  particulars  of  the 
disaster,  the  people  refused  to  credit  them.  It  seemed  impossible 
that  so  large  and  strong  a  fleet  and  army  could  perish  so  utterly. 
Nevertheless  the  situation  had  to  be  faced.  It  was  of  no  use  to 
Exhaustion  niob  the  orators  who  had  promoted  the  expedition,  or 
of  Athens,  ^q  denounce  the  soothsayers  and  diviners  who  had 
prophesied  its  success.    What  had  to  be  done  was  to  take  stock  of 


413 B.C.]  The  Exhaustion  of  Athens.  375 

the  remaining  resources  of  the  city,  and  to  see  if  the  naval  and 
commercial  empire  of  Athens  could  yet  be  preserved.  The  survey 
did  not  promise  well ;  nearly  two  himdred  ships  out  of  a  navy  that 
had  never  numbered  more  than  three  hundred  had  been  engulfed 
in  the  disaster.  There  only  remained  to  Athens  a  squadron  of 
twenty-seven  vessels  at  Naupactus,  and  some  thirtj'  or  forty  more 
ready  for  service  in  home  waters.  Three  thousand  seven  hundred 
hoplites  had  been  lost  out  of  a  force  that,  since  the  great  plague, 
did  not  muster  more  than  ten  or  eleven  thousand  men  fit  for  foreign 
service.  Moreover,  tlie  finances  of  the  state  had  been  drained  to 
the  very  bottom  by  the  expense  of  sending  forth  the  second 
expedition  so  soon  after  the  first.  Of  all  the  funds  that  had  been 
stored  in  the  Acropolis,  there  only  remained  the  thousand  talents 
that  Pericles  had  set  aside,  to  be  used  only  if  Athens  were  to  be 
attacked  by  a  hostile  fleet.  The  soil  of  Attica  had  just  been 
ravaged  by  an  army  of  overpowering  strength,  and  the  fort  at 
Decelea  showed  that  the  Spartans  were  about  to  adopt  a  new  and 
annoying  method  of  warfare.  Already  some  thousands  of  slaves 
had  deserted  to  that  post,  which  offered  them  a  close  and  easy 
refuge  from  their  masters. 

Nor  was  this  all.  At  any  moment  a  Peloponnesian  squadron 
might  insult  the  scantly  guarded  coast  of  Attica,  and  ere  long  the 
confederate  fleet,  which  had  conquered  at  Syracuse, 

^  J  '  The  Athenians 

might  be  expected  to  appear  in  overwhelming  force  determine  on 
in  the  waters  of  the  Aegean.  Athens  might  well  '■®^'^*^'*°®- 
have  despaired,  and  sent  to  ask  from  her  enemies  what  terms  they 
would  be  pleased  to  grant  her.  It  is  surprising  to  learn  that  she 
showed  no  signs  of  doing  so ;  on  the  contrary,  crippled  and  beggared 
though  she  was,  she  nerved  herself  for  a  second  struggle,  not  less 
lengthy  and  far  more  desperate  than  that  which  had  raged  between 
431  B.C.  and  422  b.o.  The  deadly  fear  of  the  moment,  says 
Thucydides,  drove  the  democracy  into  a  mood  of  discipline  and 
self-restraint  to  which  it  had  long  been  a  stranger.  A  committee 
of  public  safety  was  elected  and  entrusted  with  absolute  power  for 
the  crisis ;  every  source  of  expenditure  in  the  city  that  could  be 
dispensed  with  was  cut  down ;  the  thousand  talents  which  Pericles 
had  laid  by  were  voted  as  supply  for  building  a  new  fleet ;  con- 
tributions of  money  and  ship-timber  were  requisitioned  from  the 


376  Athens  at  Bay.  t4i3B.c« 

allies,  and  gari'isons  were  seat  to  Euboea  and  certain  other 
strategical  points. 

All  this  i^reparation  would  have  been  useless  if  the  Spartans  had 
taken  time  by  the  forelock,  and  attacked  Athens  by  sea  and  land 
the  moment  that  the  result  of  the  fighting  at  Syracuse  was  known. 
But  Sparta  was  ever  dilatory ;  her  rulers  resolved  to  make  a  great 
effort,  but  took  their  time  to  prepare  it.  Instead  of  instantly 
blockading  Peiraeus  with  every  vessel  they  could  muster,  they 
decided  to  spend  the  winter  in  constructing  a  fleet  of  overwhelming 
strength,  and  to  defer  operations  till  the  spring.  It  seems  not  to 
have  occurred  to  them  that  while  they  were  building  new  triremes 
their  enemies  also  would  have  time  to  do  the  same.  Naturall}^ 
when  the  news  arrived  that  the  dockyards  of  Corinth  and  Gytheum 
and  Aulis  were  busy,  the  Athenians  commenced  to  lay  down  new 
keels  in  every  slip  that  Peiraeus  could  provide ;  by  the  midsummer 
of  412  B.C.  they  calculated  on  having  a  hundred  vessels  ready 
for  sea. 

The  winter  of  413-412  B.C.  was  spent  in  these  preparations  on 
each  side,  and  Athens  obtained  the  respite  that  she  so  much 
„        ,     .     needed.     But  meanwhile  the  members  of  the  Con- 

The  Athenian 

aUiesbenton  federacy  of  Delos  were  realizing  the  position  ;  in  well- 
nigh  every  state  there  was  a  powerful  oligarchic 
faction  eager  for  independence,  which  had  long  been  waiting 
for  an  opportunity  to  revolt  from  Athens.  The  democratic  party 
in  each  citj'-,  on  the  other  hand,  preserved  but  a  passive  and  un- 
enthusiastic  loyaltj"-  towards  its  suzerain,  and  was  quite  unpre- 
pared to  make  any  sacrifice  in  her  behalf.  The  reverses  of 
Athens  gave  to  the  one  faction  a  motive  for  instant  rebellion,  and 
laid  before  the  other  a  chilling  prospect  of  additional  taxes  and 
contributions  if  they  adhered  to  their  ancient  mistress.  Accord- 
ingly most  of  the  leading  states  of  Ionia  sent  secret  emissaries  to 
Sparta  or  Thebes,  offering  to  cast  off  the  Athenian  yoke  the 
moment  that  a  Peloponnesian  fleet  should  appear  in  Asiatic  waters. 
The  Chians  sent  emissaries  to  Sparta  and  oi^ened  negotiations  with 
the  ephors  through  the  medium  of  Alcibiades,  who  was  the  close 
friend  of  Endius,  the  most  prominent  member  of  the  Ephoralty. 
The  Lesbians  and  Euboeans  made  a  similar  application  to  King 
Agis,  who  was  occupied  in  Northern  Greece  and  had  planted  his 


413 B.C.J  Revolt  of  Chios,  377 

head-quarters  at  Decelea.  Pharnabazus,  the  Persian  satrap  of  the 
lands  on  the  Hellespont,  sent,  in  behalf  of  himself  and  of  several 
Greek  cities  in  his  neighbourhood,  to  beg  for  the  despatch  of  a  fleet 
to  the  Propontis.  Tissaphernes,  the  satrap  of  Lydia,  made  a  similar 
request,  and  supported  the  demand  of  the  Chians.  Each  of  these 
barbarians  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  break-up  of  the 
Athenian  empire  would  give  him  an  opportunity  of  recovering 
some  of  the  lost  coast-land  of  his  satrapy.  They  vied  with  each 
other  in  promising  assistance,  both  in  men  and  money,  if  once  a 
Peloponnesian  fleet  should  cross  the  Aegean. 

The  Spartans  resolved  to  send  first  to  Chios,  the  most  powerful 
of  the  disafl'ected  states,  and  afterwards  to  aid  Lesbos  and  the 
cities  of  the  Hellespont.    But,  instead  of  concentrating         ^^^^  ^^ 
their  fleet,  they  sent  out  small  squadrons  piecemeal,       Chios, 
just  as  eacii  could  be  got  ready  for  sea.     The  first 
which  sailed  consisted  of  twenty  Corinthian  ships,  but  this  was 
intercepted  and  blockaded  off  the  Argive  coast  by  the  Atheuiau 
home-fleet.     However,  the  Spartan  admiral  Chalcideus  slipped  out 
from  Gytheum  with  five  vessels,  taking  with  him  Alcibiades  as  a 
volunteer,  and  safely  reached   Chios.     That  great  city  at  once 
revolted,  and  placed  its  fleet  of  thirty  ships  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Spartan.      Clazomenae,   Erythrae,   and   Teos  soon    followed    the 
example  of  Chios ;  it  was  to  no  effect  that  the  Athenians  hurried 
off  every  galley  that  could  possibly  be  got  to  sea.     The  mischief 
was  done  before  the  first  of  them  could  reach  Ionia. 

A  desultory  naval  campaign  now  began  off  the  Asiatic  coast ;  it 
was  full  of  unforeseen  turns  of  fortune,  for  each  side  was  alternately 
receiving  reinforcements  from  home,  and  obtaining  a  precarious 
superiority  over  the  enemy.  The  balance  of  success,  however,  lay 
with  the  Spartans.  Although  they  failed  at  Mitylene,  which  revolted 
but  was  recaptured,  they  won  great  successes  in  other  quarters. 
Miletus,  still  a  great  town,  though  no  longer  the  metropolis  of 
Ionia,  joined  them  with  enthusiasm ;  lasus,  which  resisted  them, 
was  taken  by  storm.  At  the  approach  of  autumn  their  superiority 
was  made  more  marked  by  the  arrival  of  a  considerable  fleet  from 
Syracuse.  The  Siceliots  had  determined  to  repay  Athens  for  her 
unprovoked  aggression  in  415  B.C.,  and  sent  their  favourite  general 
Hermocrates  with  twenty -two  ships  to  aid  in  revolutionizing  Ionia. 


378  Athens  at  Bay.  [412 b.c. 

It  says  more  for  the  facility  than  for  the  Hellenic  patriotism  of 

the  Spartan  admirals  that  they  entered  into  very  humiliating  terms 

The  Spartans  of  alliance  with   the  Persian  satraps  of  the  neigh- 

itssaphernes,  hourhood.     An  agreement  drawn  up  between  Chalci- 

412  B.C.  deus  and  Tissaphernes  actually  stipulated  that,  in 
return  for  supplies  of  money,  Sparta  should  help  the  Persian 
to  take  back  "  all  that  the  Great  King's  forefathers  had  held  in 
Asia;"  a  phrase  which,  if  pressed  to  its  logical  meaning,  would 
have  surrendered  Miletus,  Clazomenae,  and  the  other  mainland 
towns  into  the  power  of  King  Darius.  Astyochus,  who  succeeded 
Chalcideus,  thought  the  wording  of  the  treaty  objectionable,  and 
substituted  for  the  original  clause  another,  which  merely  declared 
that  "  the  Lacedaemonians  and  their  allies  should  not  proceed  to 
attack  any  city  which  belonged  to  King  Darius  or  his  ancestors." 
This  change  relieved  the  Spartans  of  the  obligation  to  assist  the 
Great  King  in  recovering  the  Greek  towns  which  had  once  been 
his,  but  bound  them  to  stand  by  and  permit  the  restoration  of  the 
Persian  power,  if  the  satraps  were  strong  enough  to  effect  it. 
Though  less  disgraceful  in  form,  the  second  treaty  was  as  despicable 
in  spirit  as  the  first. 

The  first  year  of  war  after  the  Syracusan  disaster  had  failed  to 
ruin  Athens  ;  it  had  seen  the  revolt  of  some  of  her  most  important 
allies,  but  she  still  kept  up  the  fight,  favoured  by  the  dilatoriness 
and  want  of  fixed  purpose  which  the  Spartan  government  and 
the  Spartan  commanders  had  alike  displayed.  The  respite  had 
allowed  her  to  build  and  launch  a  formidable  fleet,  and  she  was 
now  in  a  position  to  struggle  on,  putting  off  by  her  desperate 
efforts  the  final  day  of  disaster,  which  was  bound  to  arrive  at  no 
very  distant  date.  For  when  once  the  great  Ionian  towns  had 
committed  themselves  to  revolt,  there  was  no  hope  that  the 
Athenian  empire  could  be  kept  together. 

For  the  ensuing  ijeriod  of  the  war  the  operations  of  the  Athenians 
were  carried  on  from  the  base  of  Samos.  In  that  island  the 
democratic  faction  had  just  risen,  and  massacred  some  hundreds 
of  oligarchs.  This  action  bounei  them  by  the  tie  of  fear  to  their 
suzerain,  for  they  knew  that  the  victory  of  Sparta  would  be 
followed  by  the  re-establishment  of  a  Philo-Laconian  oligarchy, 
which  would  take  ample  revenge  for  the  late  slaughter.     Samos 


411B.C.3  Alcibiades  in  Ionia.  379 

was  nearer  to  Athens  than  any  other  of  the  great  Ionian  ports,  and 
lay  in  an  advantageous  position,  enabling  its  possessors  to  intercept 
communications  between  the  two  chief  areas  of  revolt — the  northern 
which  centred  at  Chios,  and  the  southern  which  lay  around 
Miletus. 

In  the  early  spring  of  411  B.C.,  a  further   disaster  befell  the 
Athenians  by  the  revolt  of  the  three  cities  of  the  great  island  of 
Ehodes,   The  Athenians  from  Saraos  sailed  to  recover 
the  island,  but,  when  faced  by  the  combined  force  of      Rhodes, 
the  Peloponnesian  and  Chian  fleets,  declined  the  battle,       '*^^  ^^' 
on  account  of  their  decided  inferiority  in  numbers.     After  this, 
however,  the  successes  of  the  Spartans  came  to  a  standstill ;  their 
monetary  resources  had  been  exhausted  by  the  expense  of  keeping 
a  great  armada  at  sea  for  a  whole  year,  and  their  chief  paymaster, 
the  satrap  Tissaphernes,  was  beginning  to  slacken  in  his  granting 
of  subsidies. 

The  Persian  is  said  to  have  been  turned  from  his  zeal  for  the 
Spartan  cause  by  the  advice  of  Alcibiades.  That  volatile  personage 
had  sailed  for  Asia  with  the  full  intention  of  doing  all  .,  .^.   , 

^         Alcibiades  at 

in  his  power  to  spread  the  revolt ;  but  renegades  are  sardis. 
alwaj's  distrusted  by  those  they  serve,  and  Alcibiades 
had,  in  addition,  made  himself  personally  hateful  to  some  of  the 
leading  men  in  Sparta.  His  crowning  offence  is  said  to  have  been 
that  he  seduced  the  wife  of  King  Agis.  He  soon  found  that  he 
was  regarded  with  suspicion  by  his  colleagues,  and  after  an  unsuc- 
cessful engagement  in  front  of  Miletus,  which  had  been  entered 
into  by  his  advice,  was  constrained  to  quit  the  Spartan  camp,  in 
fear  for  his  life.  He  betook  himself  to  the  court  of  Tissaphernes, 
with  whom  he  soon  contrived  to  ingratiate  himself,  by  the  perfect 
knowledge  both  of  Spartan  and  Athenian  plans  which  he  displayed, 
and  by  the  ingenuity  with  which  he  pushed  the  satrap's  interests. 
He  pointed  out  to  the  Persian  that  if  he  lavished  his  resources  on 
the  Peloponnesian  fleet,  and  allowed  the  Athenians  to  be  crushed, 
he  would  find  that  he  had  only  replaced  the  Athenian  empire  by 
a  Spartan  empire.  Athens  was  a  naval  power  only  desirous  of 
holding  the  sea-coast;  but  the  Lacedaemonians,  who  had  always 
aimed  at  empire  on  land,  would  be  dangerous  neighbours,  likely  to 
covet  the  conquest  of  the  inner  districts  of  Asia  Minor.    The  wisest 


380  Athens  at  Bay.  t4iiB.o. 

course  would  be  lo  lot  the  two  Greek  powers  wear  down  each 
other's  resources,  and  meanwhile  to  lay  hands  quietly  on  every 
Ionian  town  that  could  be  secured,  and  hold  it  nominally  against 
the  Athenians,  but  really  for  the  Great  King. 

Tissaphernes  saw  the  force  of  this  advice,  and  promptly  cut 
down  by  half  the  supplies  of  money  he  had  been  furnishing  to  the 
Spartans.  He  also  kept  them  inactive,  by  promising  the  aid  of  a 
Phoenician  fleet  which  never  arrived ;  and  when  the  commanders 
complained  to  him,  put  them  off  with  personal  bribes,  but  did  not 
do  anything  for  their  armament.  Finding  Tissaphernes  so  ready 
to  take  his  advice,  Alcibiades  began  to  think  out  a  new  method  of 
turning  his  influence  with  the  satrap  to  good  account.  A  short 
experience  of  the  narrow  meanness  of  Spartan  life  and  the  soulless 
pomp  of  an  Oriental  court  had  set  him  longing  for  the  free  and 
liberal  atmosphere  of  Athens.  He  began  to  dream  of  securing  his 
return  from  exilo,  by  propitiating  Athenian  public  opinion  by 
some  extraordinary  service.  Had  it  been  only  the  matter  of  the 
Mysteries  that  stood  charged  to  his  score,  the  people  might  easily 
have  pardoned  him  ;  but  some  striking  feat  was  needed  to  atone 
for  his  flight  to  Sparta  and  his  too  effective  advice  that  Decelea 
should  be  fortified.  It  occurred  to  Alcibiades  that  if  he  could 
draw  Tissaphernes  over  to  the  Athenian  alliance,  and  induce  the 
Persian  to  open  his  purse  for  the  needs  of  the  well-nigh  bankrupt 
city,  his  pardon  might  jDOSsibly  be  granted. 

Accordingly  he  began  to  sound  his  private  friends  in  the  Athenian 
armament  at  Samos,  to  see  how  they  liked  the  idea.     He  found 

Alcibiades  that  there  was  a  strong  party  in  the  camp  who  were 
"the^AthenTau  lodging  to  get  rid  of  the  democratic  government  at 

oUgarchs.  Athens ;  it  was  the  democracy  which  had  been  respon- 
sible for  the  Sicilian  expedition,  and  the  wealthier  and  landed 
classes  were  now  suffering  for  its  sins  by  the  ruin  of  their  estates. 
Accordingly  he  found  it  easy  to  spread  a  report  among  the  mal- 
contents that  if  the  present  constitution  were  overturned  in  Athens, 
and  an  oligarchic  government  installed  in  its  place,  he  could 
undertake  to  bring  over  Tissaphernes  to  the  Athenian  alliance ; 
without  a  change  the  Persian  could  not  be  won,  for  he  had  a 
rooted  distrust  of  democracies.  The  intrigue  prospered  even  better 
than  Alcibiades  had  ventured  to  hope ;  many  ofiBcers  of  note  in 


411  B.C.]    Oligarchic  Conspiracy  at  Savios  and  Athens.        381 

the  force  at  Samos  furthered  it  with  zeal,  and  a  deputation  of  them, 
headed  by  the  general  Peisander,  sailed  across  to  Athens  to  enlist 
recruits  in  its  favour.  The  only  man  who  opposed  the  scheme  was 
Phrynichus,  another  of  the  generals,  and  he  set  himself  against  it, 
not  because  he  disliked  an  oligarchy,  but  merely  because  he  had  a 
personal  grudge  against  Alcibiades.  The  main  mass  of  the  array 
was  imperfectly  informed  about  the  intrigue ;  and  though  it 
suspected  and  disliked  the  proposals  of  the  conspirators,  it  was 
content  to  let  matters  take  their  course,  if  thereby  the  aid  of  Persia 
could  be  secured. 

Peisander  and  the  oligarchs  from  Samos  made  no  secret  of  their 
plans  at  Athens ;  they  boldly  laid  the  proposals  of  Alcibiades 
before  the  Ecclesia;  they  pointed  out  that  if  affairs  Peisander 
went  on  as  they  had  been  doing  of  late,  the  ruin  at  Athens, 
of  Athens  must  be  close  at  hand,  while  the  Persian  alliance 
would  save  the  state.  The  price  to  be  paid,  the  sacrifice  of 
the  cherished  democratic  constitution,  was  heavy;  but  was  not 
any  sacrifice  preferable  to  destruction?  One  after  another  the 
enemies  of  Alcibiades  rose  to  recall  the  misdeeds  of  the  renegade 
statesman ;  demagogues  denounced  his  lawless  insolence,  and 
priests  expatiated  upon  his  sacrilegious  outrages,  and  warned  the 
people  not  to  draw  down  the  wrath  of  Heaven  by  recalling  him. 
But  of  every  speaker  Peisander  asked  the  same  unanswerable 
question— Was  it  not  true  that  the  Spartans  were  superior  at  sea, 
that  the  allies  were  revolting,  that  the  treasury  of  the  state  was 
empty ;  if  so,  could  they  suggest  any  better  way  of  staving  off 
the  impending  ruin?  After  a  long  and  tumultuous  debate,  the 
people,  convinced  against  their  will,  voted  that  Peisander  and  ten 
commissioners  with  him  should  sail  to  Asia,  and  open  negotiations 
with  Alcibiades  and  Tissaphernes,  on  such  terms  as  they  could 
secure. 

Before  starting,  Peisander  set  working  all  the  oligarchic  influences 
which  could  be  utilized  in  Athens  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
constitution.     He  stirred  up  the  numerous  political    ^, 

•        1     />  <•     .    n  Oligarchic 

clubs,    which   existed   for    purposes   of   influencing    conspiracy 
elections  and  trials,  and  exhorted  them  to  unite  and    ^     *  ^°^' 
act  without  fear  or  scruple  when  a  favourable  moment  arrived. 
The   rhetorician   Antiphon,   a  skilful   wire-puller   who    took    no 


382  Athens  at  Bay.  t4iiB.c. 

ostensible  part  in  politics,  but  was  deep  in  all  the  secrets  of  the 
party,  was  entrusted  with  the  management  of  the  conspiracy. 
Other  leaders  were  soon  forthcoming,  among  them  many  men  who 
had  never  been  suspected  of  any  disloyalty  to  the  democratic 
constitution,  and  everything  was  prepared  for  a  vigorous  couj)  d^etat. 

But  when  Peisander  and  his  colleagues  had  returned  to  Asia  and 
arrived  at  the  court  of  Tissaphernes,  a  new  complication  arose. 
Alcibiades  found  that  he  had  much  less  influence  with  the  satrap 
than  he  had  supposed,  and  could  not  prevail  on  him  to  take  any 
steps  towards  concluding  an  alliance  with  Athens;  all  that  the 
Persian  would  do  was  to  stint  his  supplies  to  the  Peloponuesians, 
and  keep  their  fleet  idle.  When  placed  in  the  dilemma,  and  forced 
to  confess  that  he  was  either  unwilling  or  unable  to  carry  out  his 
promises,  Alcibiades  took  refuge  in  evasions.  He  pretended  that 
Tissaphernes  was  still  willing  to  conclude  a  treaty,  but  proposed  as 
preliminary  conditions  that  the  Athenians  should  surrender  to 
him  all  their  subject-cities  on  the  mainland  of  Asia.  When  his 
exorbitant  demand  was  reluctantly  granted,  he  began  to  ask  for 
the  Asiatic  islands  also,  and  made  himself  so  impracticable  that 
the  ambassadors  in  great  wrath  broke  off  the  negotiations  and 
returned  to  Samos. 

While  these  intrigues  were  in  progress  the  war  dragged  itself 
slowly  on,  without  any  important  action.  As  the  Spartan  fleet  lay 
immovable  at  Ehodes,  the  Athenians  from  Samos  succeeded  in 
establishing  a  blockade  round  Chios,  and  even  landed  troops  on 
that  island,  but  did  not  make  any  great  progress  towards  its 
reduction.     Elsewhere  the  war  stood  still. 

The  failure  of  Peisander's  negotiations  with  Alcibiades  placed 

the  oligarchic  party  in  a  very  difticult  position.     They  had  made 

„  ,.^.    ,      all  arrangements  for  a  revolution,  and  gone  so  far 
Political  .  ,  »  » 

murders  at    that  it  was  difflcult  to  stop.     At  home  the  clubs  had 

been  hard  at  work;  proposals  had  been  mooted  to 

entrust  the  conduct  of  the  war  to  some  less  unwieldy  body  than 

the    Ecclesia,    to    abolish    all    payments    to    dicasts   and    eccle- 

siasts,  and  to  save  the  scanty  revenue  of  the  state  to  maiutaip 

the  soldiers  and  seamen  in  active  service.     These  proposals  pro 

voked  opposition  from  the  democratic  party;  but  when  Androcles, 

the  leading  demagogue  of  the  day,  and  several  of  his  supporter? 


411  B.C.J  The  Four  Hundred.  383 

were  promptly  slain  by  assassins,  the  people  were  cowed,  and  open 
resistance  to  the  oligarchic  agitation  almost  entirely  ceased. 
Conscious  that  a  great  plot  was  on  foot,  but  ignorant  of  its  extent 
and  objects,  the  mass  of  the  citizens  waited  passively  to  sec  what 
was  going  to  happen. 

Emboldened  by  the  impunity  which  they  were  enjoying,  the 
oligarchs  resolved  to  carry  out  their  plans,  even  though  Alcibiades 
had  played  them  false.  Many  of  them  felt  all  the  more  confident 
from  not  having  the  over-subtile  exile  on  their  side ;  and  several 
men  of  importance,  including  the  ex-general  Phrjmichus,  joined 
the  party  when  once  they  knew  that  Alcibiades  was  not  to  have 
any  control  over  its  actions.  It  was  resolved  that  a  simultaneous 
attempt  should  be  made  to  win  over  to  the  oligarchy  the  fleet  at 
Samos  and  the  city  of  Athens. 

At  Samos  the  plot  failed ;  when  the  oligarchs,  allied  with  the 

aristocratic  party  among   the  Samians,  rose  in  arms  under  the 

General  Charmlnos,  they  found  themselves  too  weak      .^    ^. 

'         ''  Abortive 

for  their  task.    After  slaying  a  few  of  their  opponents,      rising  at 

— among     them    the    exiled    Athenian    demagogue         ^-mos. 

Hyperbolas,  who  had  been   for  some  time  resident  at  Samos — 

they  were  put  down  by  force  of  numbers.     The  Samian  democracy 

and  the  majority  of  the  Athenians  from  the  fleet  combined  against 

them,  and  crushed    them   without   any   serious    fighting.      The 

moment  that  the  rising  was  suppressed,  the  victors  sent  home  the 

state-galley  called  the  Paralus  with  the  news. 

When  the  Paralus  anived  at  Athens,  that  city  was  found  to 

have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  oligarchs.     The  revolution  at 

Athens  had  been  conducted  with  more  dexterity  and  less  violence 

than  that  at  Samos.     Peisander,  Antiphon,   and   Phrynichus  had 

determined  to  avoid  open  fighting  if  possible.     When  they  knew 

that  the  Ecclesia  had  been  frightened  and  paralyzed  by  the  sudden 

murder  of  Androcles  and  other  democratic  leaders,  they  brought 

forward  a  motion  that  ten  ^  commissioners  should  be  appointed  to 

lay  before  the  people  a  scheme   of  constitutional  reform.     This 

proposal  was  carried ;  a  few  days  after,  the  commissioners,  who  had 

been  carefully  chosen  from  among  the  oligarchs,  summoned  the 

■  Thucj'dides  says  ten :  the  new  noAireia  tuiv  ^AOrjualut'  thirty. 


384  Athens  at  Bay,  [4iib.o. 

Ecclesia  to  meet,  not  on  the  Pnyx,  but  at  the  temple  of  Poseidon 
at  Colonus,  a  suburb  a  mile  without  the  city. 

The  democracy,  suspecting  some  snare — perhaps  an  attack  from 

the  garrison  of  Decelea — would  not  trust  themselves  outside  the 

The  Four     walls  of  Athens,  and  a  packed  and  scanty  meeting  at 

=?Ji°,!^«^,.    Colonus  was  able  to  vote  away  the  time-honoured 

seize  pow^er  •' 

at  Athens,  constitution  of  Cleisthenes.  On  the  proposal  of 
Peisander,  a  bill  was  carried  to  elect  five  men  as  presidents,  who 
again  should  chose  a  hundred,  and  each  of  these  hundred  three 
men  more,  and  that  the  whole  body,  four  hundred  strong,  should 
assume  the  government  of  the  state  in  place  of  the  archons  and  the 
senate.  They  were  to  be  responsible  to  a  body  of  five  thousand 
full  citizens,  chosen  by  themselves;  the  rest  of  the  Athenians  were 
practically  disfranchised.^ 

When  the  assembly  had  dispersed,  without  a  single  voice  being 
raised  against  the  bill,  the  Four  Hundred  marched  on  the  Prytaneum, 
followed  by  a  body  of  hoplites  who  had  been  secretly  got  together 
for  their  assistance.  They  found  the  senate  in  session,  and 
summoned  it  to  disjierse ;  the  senators  were  no  less  terror-stricken 
than  the  people,  and  obeyed  the  command ;  as  they  went  out  each 
was  given  the  public  allowance  of  money  due  to  him  for  the 
remainder  of  his  term  of  office.  We  do  not  hear  that  a  single  man 
dared  to  resent  the  insult.  Having  cleared  out  their  predecessors, 
the  Four  Hundred  did  solemn  sacrifice,  and  assumed  all  the 
functions  of  government. 

Their  first  step  was  to  send  to  King  Agis  at  Decelea,  to  inform 
him  that  a  Philo-Spartan  oligarchy  was  installed  in  power,  and 
anxious  to  treat  for  terras  of  peace.  Agis,  however,  instead  of 
treating,  made  a  rapid  march  on  Athens,  thinking  to  find  it  in 
open  sedition,  and  easily  to  be  captured  by  a  vigorous  coup-de- 
main.  His  plan,  however,  was  foiled;  the  gates  were  closed  and 
the  walls  manned,  so  that,  after  losing  a  few  men  in  a  sally,  he 
was  fain  to  return  in  haste  to  Decelea.  When  the  Four  Hundred 
again  made  overtures  to  him,  he  received  them  with  greater  respect, 
and  forwarded  their  envoys  to  the  ephors  at  Lacedaemon. 

The  Paralus  arrived  at  the  Peiraeus,  with  the  news  of  the  sup- 

'  So  Thucydides.  The  rather  confused  account  in  the  \lo\ireia  tZv 
^AB-qvaltav  says  that  the  400  were  elected  by  the  tribes,  40  by  each. 


411  B.C.J  The  Athenians  at  Santos.  385 

pression  of  tho  oligarchic  rising  in  SamoH,  shortly  after  the  Four 
Hundred  had  taken  over  the  conduct  of  affairs.  The  army 
Fearing  lest  the  democracy  should  be  encouraged  to  deciar^°for 
revolt  when  the  events  at  Saraos  became  known,  the  democracy, 
new  rulers  imprisoned  some  of  the  crew  of  the  Paralus,  and  sent 
the  rest  off  at  once  to  cruise  round  Euboea.  But  Chaereas,  the 
captain  of  the  vessel,  escaped  and  returned  at  once  to  Samos,  where 
he  laid  the  news  of  the  revolution  before  the  army.  A  great  burst 
of  democratic  feeling  swept  through  the  ranks  of  the  soldiery  when 
the  tale  of  Peisander's  intrigues  was  heard ;  they  deposed  all  the 
generals  and  trierarchs  who  were  suspected  of  oligarchic  leanings, 
and  placed  at  their  head  two  officers  named  Thrasybulus  and 
Thrasyllus,  whose  loyalty  was  undoubted.  At  a  solemn  assembly 
the  whole  army  swore  "  to  hold  to  the  democracy,  to  live  in  con- 
cord, to  zealously  prosecute  the  war  with  Sparta,  and  to  be  foes  to 
the  Four  Hundred,  and  have  no  intercourse  with  them."  All  the 
Samians  of  the  democratic  party  took  the  same  oath,  being  as 
much  interested  as  the  Athenians  themselves  in  the  suppression  of 
oligarchic  plots.  Thrasybulus  and  his  colleagues  reasoned  that  as 
the  whole  naval  force  of  Athens  was  in  their  hands,  they  would  be 
able  to  rescue  the  mother-city  from  her  oppressors.  If  the  Four 
Hundred  held  out  against  them,  they  could  easily  make  Samos, 
and  not  Athens,  the  seat  for  the  time  being  of  the  Athenian  empire ; 
for  the  allied  states  would  pay  their  allegiance  and  hand  over  their 
tribute  to  the  party  which  controlled  the  fleet  of  Athens,  not  to 
that  which  sat  helpless  and  isolated  within  her  walls.  In  short, 
the  army  claimed  to  represent  the  Athenian  state,  and  resolved  to 
make  no  account  of  the  usurping  Four  Hundred. 

Thrasybulus  and  Thra.syllus  now  proposed  the  recall  of  Alcibiades 
from  exile,  intending  to  enlist  his  influence  with  Tissaphernes  on 
the  side  of  the  democracy.  Their  proposal  was  RecaUof 
welcomed  by  the  army,  and,  after  four  years  of  Alcibiades. 
banishment,  Alcibiades  appeared  once  more  in  the  assembly  of  his 
countrymen.  He  came  full  of  protestations  of  his  goodwill,  and  of 
his  ability  to  bring  over  his  friend  the  satrap  to  the  Athenian 
cause;  his  promises  gained  such  credit  that  he  was  at  once 
elected  as  a  colleague  to  Thrasybfdus  and  Thrasyllus,  and  granted 
full  powers  to  treat  with  Tissaphernes,     Accordingly  he  sailed  off 

2o 


386  Athene  at  Bay,  [41ib.c. 

to  find  the  satrap,  who  lay  at  this  moment  far  southward  ia  the 
PamphyHaa  city  of  Aspcndus. 

Tissaphernes  had  found  the  Peloponnesiaa  admirals  wrought  up 
to  a  dangerous  pitch  of  wrath  by  the  inactivity  to  which  he 
had  reduced  their  fleet,  and  by  his  constant  interviews  with 
Alcibiades ;  accordingly  he  had  at  last  determined  to  bring  up  the 
Phronician  fleet 'to  their  aid.  There  were  more  than  a  hundred 
Phoenician  vessels  lying  at  Aspendus  when  Alcibiades  arrived  at 
the  place.  Nevertheless,  the  Athenian  contrived  to  persuade  the 
satrap  to  send  the  ships  away,  though  he  had  only  just  brought 
them  on  to  the  scene  of  action.  The  fleet  returned  home,  and  the 
Spartans  were  more  than  ever  enraged  with  their  faithless  ally. 
The  most  important  result  of  this  diplomatic  success,  however,  was 
to  restore  Alcibiades  to  the  full  confidence  of  the  army  at  Samos, 
who  believed  that  he  had  given  conclusive  proof  of  his  absolute 
control  over  the  mind  of  Tissaphernes — a  control  which  he  was  in 
reality  very  far  from  possessing. 

Meanwhile,  everything  at  Athens  was  conspiring  to  ruin  the 
cause  of  the  Four  Hundred.     Their  authority  received  a  desperate 

Civil  strife    shock  when  the  news  of  the  events  at  Samos  became 

at  Athens,  j^nowu.  Dissensions,  too,  broke  out  among  their  own 
body.  The  more  violent  party  under  Phrynichus  and  Antiphon 
proposed  to  strengthen  their  position  by  throwing  themselves  into 
the  hands  of  the  Spartans,  and  by  calling  Peloponnesian  troops 
within  the  walls;  for  this  purpose  they  began  to  construct  a  fort 
at  the  mole  of  Eetiouea  in  the  Peiraeus,  built  so  as  to  facilitate  the 
entry  of  the  enemy.  Their  desperate  treason  was  opposed  by  a 
more  moderate  faction,  headed  by  Theramenes,  a  supple  statesman 
who  was  always  to  be  found  on  the  safe  side.  Luckily  for  Athens, 
the  Spartans  were  still  suspicious  of  the  good  faith  of  the  Four 
Hundred,  and  were  so  tardy  in  taking  advantage  of  the  civil  strife 
in  the  citj',  that  they  once  more  lost  their  opportunity.  The  first 
blow  to  the  oligarchy  came  from  the  assassination  of  Phrynichus ; 
as  he  left  the  Senate  House  he  was  stabbed  by  a  young  soldier, 
who  escaped,  though  the  deed  was  wrought  at  midday  in  the  midst 
of  the  market-place.  A  few  days  later  a  body  of  hoplites  broke 
into  open  mutiny,  seized  and  demolished  the  suspected  fort  at 
Eetionea,  and  placed  Theramenes  at  their  head. 


«iB.c.]  Revolt  of  Euboea.  387 

This  crisis  induced  the  Four  Hundred  to  take  measiures  to 
reader  their  j^ower  more  popular,  by  calling  the  assembly  of  the 
Five  Thousand  into  existence  :  hitherto  they  had  neg-  sea-fleht  at 
lected  to  summon  it.  But  it  was  too  late ;  open  war  Eretria. 
seemed  about  to  break  out  in  the  city ;  the  oligarchs  held  the 
Senate  House,  while  the  malcontents  lay  round  the  temple  of 
the  Diosciiri  to  the  south  of  the  Acropolis.  Suddenly,  however, 
the  face  of  affairs  was  changed  by  the  alarming  news  that  a  fleet 
of  forty-two  Peloponnesian  ships  was  threatening  Peiraeus. 
Abandoning  their  dissensions,  both  parties  ran  down  to  the  harbour 
and  commenced  to  launch  every  war-vessel  that  could  be  found. 
The  Spartan  admiral  Agesandridas  had  come  prepared  to  take 
advantage  of  the  treachery  of  Phrynichus ;  but  Phrynichus  was 
dead,  and  his  fort  at  Eetionea  destroyed.  Accordingly  the  Spartan 
left  Peiraeus  behind,  rounded  Sunium,  and  made  for  Euboea,  whoso 
malcontents  had  long  been  praying  for  aid  to  enable  them  to 
revolt.  Thirty-six  Athenian  ships,  manned  in  hot  haste  and  very 
imperfectly  fitted  out,  chased  Agesandridas  up  the  Euboean  strait, 
and  brought  him  to  action  off  Eretria.  The  fight  resulted  in  the 
complete  rout  of  the  ill-found  and  ill-handled  Athenian  fleet ;  only 
fourteen  vessels  succeeded  in  escaping  from  the  disaster.  The 
moment  that  the  result  of  the  battle  was  known,  every  city  in 
Euboea  revolted  to  the  Spartans,  with  the  single  exception  of 
Histiaea,  which  was  held  (see  j).  266)  by  Athenian  cleruchs.  To 
bind  the  island  to  the  mainland  and  obviate  the  possibility  of 
reconquest,  the  Euboeans  and  their  continental  neighbours  of 
Boeotia  combined  to  throw  a  bridge  over  the  narrowest  point  of  the 
Euripus,  just  opposite  Chalcis. 

The  loss  of  Euboea  was  a  terrible  blow  to  Athens ;  since  Attica 
had  become  unsafe,  it  had  been  customary  to  keep  in  that  spacious 
island  all  the  flocks  and  herds  which  supplied  the  city,  and  to 
utilize  it  as  a  storehouse  conveniently  placed  at  the  doors  of 
Athens.  The  news  of  its  revolt  almost  made  the  Athenians 
despair ;  even  the  disaster  at  Syracuse  had  caused  less  dismay,  for 
that  had  taken  place  far  away,  while  the  battle  of  Eretria  had  beea 
fought  in  the  home- waters  of  the  navy  of  Athens,  and  almost  under 
the  eyes  of  her  citizens. 

The  immediate  result  of  the  revolt  of  Euboea  was  the  final  over- 


388  Athens  at  Bay.  1411  b.c. 

throw  of  the  Four  Uiinrircd,  for  ever}'  one  cast  the  responsihility 
,    ^       for   the  disaster  on   the   shoulders   of  those   whose 

FaU  of 

the  Four  factious  violence  had  thro\vn  the  city  off  her  guard. 
An  assembly  once  more  met  on  the  Pnyx,  the  ancient 
gathering-place  of  the  democracy,  and  formally  deposed  the 
usurping  government.  The  body  of  the  Five  Thousand  was 
suffered  nominally  to  exist;  but  as  it  was  enacted  that  every 
citizen  possessing  a  suit  of  armour  should  be  included  in  the  number, 
a  modified  democracy  was  in  reality  restored.  The  same  assembly 
passed  a  decree  authorizing  the  return  of  Alcibiades  from  exile, 
and  approving  of  all  the  actions  of  the  army  at  Samos. 

"When  their  deposition  was  decreed,  the  Four  Hundred  dispersed 
and  fled.  Peisander  and  most  of  his  colleagues  made  their  way  to 
Decelea ;  one  of  them,  the  general  Aristarchus,  signalized  his 
defection  by  inducing  the  blockaded  garrison  of  Oenoe,  a  strong 
fort  on  the  northern  border,  to  surrender  to  the  Boeotians,  on  a 
false  report  of  a  general  pacification.  A  few  of  the  more  notable 
members  of  the  Four  Hundred  were  caught,  brought  to  trial,  and 
executed.  Of  these  the  most  prominent  was  the  rhetorician 
Autiphon,  whose  speech  in  defence  of  his  actions  was  considered 
the  most  stirring  burst  of  eloquence  ever  heard  in  an  Athenian 
law-court.  Nevertheless  he  was  condemned,  and  expiated  his 
treason  by  a  well-deserved  death.  Thus  fell  the  Four  Hundred, 
after  a  stormy  and  inglorious  rule  extending  over  no  more  than 
four  months.  The  net  result  of  their  cons"piracy  was  a  small  gain — • 
the  abolition  of  pay  for  civil  duties, — and  the  'great  loss — the  aban- 
donment of  Euboea.^ 

'  In  the  whole  matter  of  the  Four  Hundred  Thucydides  is  here  followed 
rather  than  the  noXire/a  rSiv  'AdijvMuy.  But  the  latter  certainly  appears 
to  be  drawing  from  official  dccuments,  though  quoting  them  in  a  very 
confused  way. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

THE   FAI,L   OF    ATHENS,   411-401   B.C.      END   OF   THE   PELOPON- 
NESIAN   WAR. 

It  might  have  heen  expected  that  the  civil  strife  caused  by  the 
usurpation  of  the  Four  Hundred  would  have  brought  about  tlie 
ruin  of  Athens.  But  once  more  the  slackness  and  want  of  enter- 
prise of  the  Spartan  commanders  came  to  the  rescue  of  their 
enemies.  In  the  western  Aegean  Agesandridas,  who  had  swept 
the  Athenian  home-fleet  off  the  water,  accomplished  nothing 
more  than  the  revolt  of  Euboea.  Though  completely  commanding 
the  sea,  he  made  no  attempt  to  blockade  Athens — a  feat  which  he 
could  have  accomplished  with  ease,  for  there  were  now  only  twenty 
ships  ready  for  service  at  Peiraeus.  After  lingering  some  time  by  the 
Euripus,  he  set  sail  eastward,  to  reinforce  the  Peloiwnnesian  fleet 
in  Asia.  "Truly,"  as  Thucydides  observes,  "the  Spartans  were 
a  very  convenient  people  to  be  at  war  with  ; "  they  generally  did 
what  their  enemy  most  desired. 

]\Ieanwhile  the  Athenians  at  Samos  bad  been  planning  an  expe- 
dition to  expel  the  Four  Hundred  from  the  mother-city,  a  design 
from  which  they  were  turned  by  Alcibiades,  who  persuaded  them 
to  persevere  in  the  defence  of  Ionia,  and  to  let  matters  at  home 
right  themselves.  This  advice  was  accepted,  and  the  Pclopou- 
uesian  fleet  was  not  left  to  work  its  will  unresisted,  as  would  have 
been  the  case  if  the  expedition  to  Athens  had  been  carried  out. 
By  giving  this  counsel  Alcibiades  did  a  real  service  to  his  country 
for  the  first  time  in  his  whole  political  career. 

As  the  autumn  drew  near,  the  Peloponnesian  admiral  IMindarus 
gave  up  all  hopes  of  help  from  Tissaphernes,  and  resolved  to  shift 
the  scene  of  action  northward.  He  knew  that  the  Hellespontino 
cities  were  ripe  for  revolt,  and  hoped  for  hearty  aid  from  Pharna- 


390  The  Fall  of  At  hois.  [41ib.c.- 

bazus,  the  Persian  satrap  of  Northern  Asia  Minor,  who  had  proved 
himself  a  zealous  and  trustworthy  ally  of  Sparta.  The  Spartans 
had  already  been  provided  with  a  base  of  operations  on  the  Helles- 
pont, for  two  small  expeditions  had  been  sent  thither  a  few  months 
before,  and  had  brought  about  the  rebellion  of  Abydos  and  Byzan- 
tium. Accordingly  Mindarus,  steering  a  westward  course  out  into 
the  Aegean,  so  as  to  escape  the  notice  of  the  Athenian  fleet  at 
Samos,  started  with  seventy-three  ships  for  the  Hellespont.  He 
intended  to  reach  the  straits,  seize  all  the  cities  on  their  shores,  and 
block  the  way  for  the  corn-sliips  from  the  Euxine,  that  brought  to 
Athens  the  supplies  of  food  on  which  her  inhabitants  were  mainly 
supported.  A  storm  delayed  the  Spartan,  and  when  he  reached 
the  Hellespont  the  Athenians  from  Samos  were  close  on  his  heels. 
The  generals  Thrasybiilus  and  Thrasyllns  had  put  to  sea  with 
every  ship  they  could  muster,  and  by  calling  in  detachments  from 
all  sides  had  got  together  a  fleet  nearly  as  strong  as  tliat  of  Min- 
darus. They  brought  him  to  action  in  the  narrow  waters  between 
Sestos  and  Abydos,  at  the  promontory  of  Cynossema,  hard  by  the 
tomb  and  chapel  of  the  legendary  Trojan  queen  Hecuba.  After 
a  hard  fight  Mindarus  was  beaten,  and  his  fleet  compelled  to  run 
ashore  under  the  walls  of  Abydos,  leaving  twenty-one  vessels  in 
the  hands  of  Thrasyllus.  But  though  checked  the  Spartan  was 
not  crushed ;  he  was  encouraged  by  the  revolt  of  several  cities  on 
the  Propontis,  and  he  hoped  to  renew  the  struggle  by  the  aid  of 
Agesandridas'  fleet  from  Euboca,  now  hastily  summoned  to  his  aid, 
and  of  some  reinforcements  from  Rhodes  which  were  on  their 
way  to  him.  The  squadron  from  Euboea  was  caught  in  a  storm  off 
Mount  Athos,  and  almost  entirely  destroyed ;  but  the  force  from 
,     the  south  reached  the  Hellespont,  though  pursued  by 

Battles  in  the  x         '  o      i 

HeUespont,  Alcibiades,  who  had  collected  a  small  fleet  at  Cos  and 
411  B.C.  gfii^os.  Seeing  his  reinforcements  at  hand,  Mindarus 
put  out  from  Abydos  to  join  them.  A  battle  ensued,  which 
remained  undecided  till  Alcibiades  was  seen  coming  up  in  the 
distance.  Then  the  Pcloponnesians  turned  tail  and  once  more 
sought  refuge  by  running  ashore;  there  they  were  joined  b}^  a 
Persian  force  under  Pharnabazus,  who  did  his  best  to  save  the 
stranded  ships.  But  the  Athenians  persisted,  and  toAved  off  in 
triumph   thirty   galleys,  a   full   third   of  the   fleet   of  Mindarus. 


410 B.C.]  Battles  in  the  Hellespont.  391 

Believing  that  the  Spartan  was  now  thorouglily  disabled,  Thra- 

syllus  and  Alcibiades  dispersed  their  fleet  and  went  into  winter 

quarters.     Alcibiades  took  the  opportunity  to  pay  a  visit  to  his 

old   friend   Tissaphernes ;    but  the   satrap  had  lately  received  a 

rebuke  from  Susa  on  account  of  his  double-dealing  policy,  and  was 

in  no  mood  to  welcome  the  Athenian.      Instead  of  meeting  his 

whilom  councillor  with  effusion,  he  cast  him  into  chains  and  sent 

him  to  Sardis.     But  a  month  later  Alcibiades  found  means   to 

escape  from  the  citadel,  rode  off  in  safety  to  the  coast,  and  rejoined 

the  fleet. 

When  the  spring  of  410  B.C.  came  round,  Mindarus  having  been 

reinforced,  again  put  to  sea  with  sixty  sail.     But  the  Athenians 

had  already  begun  to  concentrate  for  his  destruction. 

*'        '^  Battle  Of 

As  he  lay  opposite   Cyzicus,  the  Athenian  fleet  of      Cyzicus, 

eighty-six  vessels  stole  up,  ia  a  day  of  storm  and 

rain,  which  allowed  them  to  come  upon  him  unawares.     Wliile 

tlie   Athenian  centre  under  Alcibiades  kept  Mindarus  employed, 

the  wings  imder  Thrasybulus  and  Theramenes  slipped  round  the 

Spartan  to  cut  him  off  from  the  shore.     Seeing  this  mano3uvre 

Mindarus  turned,  and  forced  his  way  through  to  the  land,  where 

the  army  of  Pharnabazus  was  coming  to  his  succour.     But  the 

Athenians  pressed  hard  on  him  and  cut  off  many  vessels;   and 

when  he  ran  the   remnant   ashore,  Alcibiades   disembarked   and 

engaged   him    in  a  land   fight.      After  a  desperate   struggle   the 

Peloponnesiaus  and  Persians  were  completely  routed  ;   Mindarus 

fell,  and  every  single  ship  in  his  fleet  was  taken  or  sunk,  except 

the  few  Syracusan  vessels,  and  these  were  burnt  by  their  own 

crews   to   prevent   their   capture.      The   victory   seemed  decisive 

of  the  fate  of  Asia  Minor.     In  its  incidents  and  its  completeness 

alike  it  recalled  to  Athenian  minds  Cimon's  triumph  at  the  Enry- 

medon  fifty-six  years  before.     All  the  misdeeds  of  Alcibiades  were 

forgiven   and    forgotten,  now  that  he    had  won    for  Athens  the 

most  complete  victory  which  had  graced  her  arms  in  the  whole 

war. 

For  the  first  time  since  the  news  of  the  SjTacusan  disaster  had 

reached  them,  the  Athenians  were  able  to  breath  freely,  and  to  look 

beyond  the  needs  of  the  moment.     The  enemy's  main  armament 

had  been  destroyed  ;  the  Hellespont  was  reopened  ;  and  it  seemed 


392  The  Fall  of  Alhens.  (409 b.c. 

to  require  only  due  expenditure  of  time  to  reduce,  one  after  another, 
the  revolted  cities  of  Asia.  If  anything  could  have  been  wanting 
to  restore  the  confidence  of  Athens,  it  was  supplied  by  a  despatch 
from  Hippocrates,  the  Spartan  who  had  been  second-in-command 
to  Mindarus,  which  Was  intercepted  on  its  way  to  the  ei)hors. 
"  The  ships  are  gone,"  ran  the  laconic  document ;  "  Mindarus  is 
slain  ;  the  men  are  starving  ;  we  know  not  what  to  do."  The  mob 
of  shipless  seamen  under  Hippocrates  were  thrown  on  the  charity 
of  Pharnabazus,  whose  subsidies  alone  stood  between  them  and 
disbandment  or  destruction. 

It  is  not  surprising  to  learn  that,  on  the  receipt  of  the  news  of 

the  battle  of  Cyzicus,  the  Lacedaemonians  thought  for  a  moment 

^  ,.,  of  peace.     Endius,  the  Spartan  friend  of  Alcibiades, 

Futile  peace  ^  '  ^  .  _     ,     . 

negotiations,  came  to  Athens  to  sound  the  mind  of  the  Ecclesia, 
and  to  lay  before  it  proposals  for  a  general  cessation 
of  hostilities.  The  terms  offered  were,  as  was  but  natural, 
founded  on  the  actual  state  of  affairs.  Ehodes,  Chios,  Miletus, 
the  Euboeans,  and  the  other  revolted  allies  of  Athens,  were  to 
retain  their  independence;  but  Sparta  was  ready  to  evacuate 
Decclea,  and  to  promise  to  leave  undisturbed  those  members  of  the 
Confederacy  of  Delos  who  still  clung  to  Athens,  Endius  must 
have  felt  sure  that  the  Athenians  would  be  glad  to  get  rid  of  the 
war  at  any  price.  They  had  been  living  for  three  years  on  the 
brink  of  destruction,  and  when  an  honourable  peace,  involving 
no  further  surrender  of  territory  or  prestige,  was  offered  them, 
might  have  been  expected  to  accept  it.  But  the  hopefulness  and 
light-hearted  confidence  of  the  Ecclesia  was  once  more  too  strong. 
Led  on  by  the  demagogue  Cleophon,  the  people  voted  that  they 
would  listen  to  no  terms  which  left  their  revolted  allies  independent, 
and  Endius  was  accordingly  dismissed.  This  was  a  fatal  mistake ; 
the  resources  of  Athens  had  run  so  low  that  she  should  have 
embraced  any  opportunity  of  peace ;  her  success  was  but  momen- 
tary, and  the  next  turn  of  the  Avheel  of  fortune  was  destined  to 
render  an  honourable  conclusion  of  the  war  impossible. 

But  for  the  moment  all  looked  well  for  Athens.  Pharnabazus, 
indeed,  strained  his  resources  to  the  utmost  in  the  endeavour  to 
maintain  the  great  body  of  Peloponnesian  seamen  who  had  been 
thrown  upon  his  hands,  and  set  to  work  at  once  to  provide  them 


409  B.C.]  Successes  of  Alcibiadcs.  393 

with  shijjs.  But  they  were  far  from  any  friendly  arsenal— there 
was  none  nearer  than  Chios — shipwriglits  were  few,  and  the  timber 
for  the  vessels  had  actually  to  be  felled  on  Mount  Ida  before  any 
further  measures  could  be  taken.  For  more  than  a  year  the 
Athenians  were  completely  free  from  any  trouble  at  sea,  and  had 
full  leisure  for  re-establishing  their  ancient  naval  dominion. 

Nothing,  however,  could  have  marked  more  strongly  the  utter 
exhaustion  of  Athens,  and  the  hopelessness  of  the  struggle  in 
Avhich  she  was  engaged,  than  the  small  profit  she  was  able  to  draw 
from  the  victory  of  Cyzicus.  For  two  years  the  enemy  never 
dared  to  risk  a  naval  engagement ;  the  officers  whom  the  ephors 
des2)atched  to  Asia  were  men  of  little  mark  or  ability ;  the  revolted 
allies  were  cowed  and  disheartened.  On  the  other  hand,  Alcibiades 
and  Thrasyllus  were  both  men  of  energy  and  decision,  and  their 
troops  were  flushed  with  a  splendid  victory.  Yet  all  that  was 
accomplished  in  the  years  410-8  b.c.  was  the  successes  of 
reconquest  of  those  cities  on  the  Hellespont  and  Alcibiades. 
Propontis  which  had  revolted  at  various  times 
during  the  stay  of  Mindarus  in  those  parts.  Perinthus  and 
Selymbria  were  subdued  in  the  autumn  of  410  u.c. ;  the  great 
island  of  Thasos  returned  to  its  allegiance  in  the  following  winter ; 
in  409  B.C.  Alcibiades  ravaged  the  whole  coast-land  of  the 
satrapy  of  Pharnabazus,  and  laid  siege  to  Chalcedon,  the  city 
which  commands  the  Asiatic  shore  of  the  Bosphorus.  Meanwhile 
Thras3'llus  turned  south  and  attacked  the  revolted  cities  of  Ionia ; 
but  Colophon  was  the  only  place  which  he  succeeded  in  recapturing, 
and  in  front  of  Ephesus  he  received  a  severe  repulse  from  the 
Ephesians,  joined  with  the  Persian  troops  of  Tissapberncs,  who  was 
once  more  inclining  to  the  Spartan  alliance.  In  the  autumn  of 
409  B.C.  Thrasyllus  sailed  up  the  Hellespont  and  rejoined  Alci- 
biades ;  their  united  force  took  Chalcedon  in  the  spring  of  the 
following  year,  and  six  months  later  recovered  Byzantium,  after 
a  long  siege  which  lasted  till  the  inhabitants,  now  at  starvation 
point,  threw  open  the  gates  in  defiance  of  their  Spartan  governor. 
Thus  the  Bosphorus,  Hellespont,  and  Propontis  were  at  last  com- 
pletely freed  from  the  enemy,  and  the  corn-shins  of  Athens  cair.c 
through  once  more  from  the  Euxinc  without  having  to  dread  any 
disturbance  on  their  voyage.     After  the  fall  of  Byzantium,  Pharna- 


394  I'li^  F'^^l  ^f  Athens.  [408B.c.- 

bazus,  who  had  been  hearing  the  wliole  financial  strain  of  tlie  war 
for  more  than  two  years,  felt  himself  so  reduced  that  he  offered  to 
retire  from  the  Spartan  alliance  and  to  make  peace  with  Athens. 
This  was  the  most  promising  sym2:)tom  which  the  war  had  shown 
of  late,  but  it  was  destined  to  have  no  ultimate  effect. 

Further  than  this  the  successes  of  Alcibiades  did  not  go.  When 
the  Hellespont  was  at  last  clear,  he  made  no  attempt  against  the 
Alcibiades  Ionian  cities,  feeling  apparently  that  the  reduction 
^AthMs!°  °f  Chios  or  Miletus  was  hopeless.  Instead  of 
408  B.C.  sailing  south,  he  turned  homewards,  and  led  his 
fleet  back  to  the  Peiraeus.  It  was  with  some  hesitation  that 
he  ventured  to  approach  his  native  city;  even  though  he  had 
been  elected  general  in  his  absence,  and,  though  he  was  con- 
scious of  having  two  years  of  good  service  behind  him,  he  still 
dreaded  the  wrath  of  the  democracy,  and  remembered  the  curses 
which  had  been  heaped  upon  him,  and  the  sentences  which  were 
still  hanging  over  his  head.  His  reception,  however,  was  all 
that  ho  could  have  ventured  to  hope.  His  friends  and  relations 
thronged  down  to  the  harbour  to  welcome  him,  and  escorted  him 
in  triumph  to  the  city.  The  Senate  and  the  Ecclesia  gave  him  a 
solemn  hearing,  in  which  he  vindicated  himself  from  the  old  charge 
of  sacrilege,  and  swore  that  he  was  innocent  of  all  that  had  been 
laid  to  his  account.  His  sentence  was  thereupon  revoked,  and  all 
his  civic  rights  restored.  Not  only  was  his  term  of  office  as 
general  renewed,  but  he  was  entrusted  with  sole  and  absolute  con- 
trol over  a  considerable  armament — one  hundred  ships  and  fifteen 
hundred  hoplites — and  authorized  to  use  it  as  he  thought  best. 
He  first  employed  it  to  escort  the  procession  which  annually  went 
from  Athens  to  Eleusis  for  the  celebration  of  the  Eleusinian 
mysteries.  Ever  since  the  Spartans  had  seized  Decelea,  the  sacred 
cortege  had  been  compelled  to  proceed  to  Eleusis  by  sea ;  but 
under  the  protection  of  Alcibiades'  troops  the  procession  once  more 
marched  with  its  ancient  jwmp  along  the  line  of  the  Sacred  Way. 
After  making  a  fruitless  attempt  to  recover  the  island  of  Andros, 
which  had  revolted  to  Sparta  in  spite  of  her  late  misfortunes, 
Alcibiades  returned  to  Asia,  where  he  found  that  an  important 
change  in  the  spirit  of  affairs  had  lately  set  in,  and  that  the  star 
of  Athens  was  once  more  on  the  wane.     Two  causes  co-operated 


407 B.C.I  Cyrus  and  Lysander.  395 

for  this  end.  The  first  was  the  despatch  from  Sparta  of  a  really 
able  general  to  take  charge  of  the  war  in  Ionia.  Lysander  in 
Lysander,  the  son  of  Aristoclltiis,  was  the  most  loma. 
remarkable  man  that  Sparta  had  produced  for  a  century.  His 
family  was  impoverished;  his  father  was  one  of  those  citizens 
who  had  forfeited  from  poverty  part  of  their  civic  rights,  and 
his  youth  had  been  passed  in  obscurity.  But  by  sheer  energy 
and  force  of  character  he  had  made  his  way  to  the  front,  and 
had  at  last  been  appointed  to  the  office  of  nauarclius,  or  higli 
admiral.  Lysander  was  not  inferior  in  courage  or  ability  to 
Brasidas,  the  only  other  Spartan  of  genius  who  appeared  during 
the  war.  But  his  character  was  quite  diff'erent  from  that  of 
the  hero  of  Amphipolis.  Ilis  ambition  was  wholly  personal;  he 
had  no  sympathy  for  Hellenic  liberties,  or  care  for  the  interests 
of  his  allies.  If  he  served  Sparta  well,  it  was  only  because  the 
growth  of  her  power  favoured  his  own  aggrandizement.  His 
means  were  as  unscrupulous  as  his  ends  were  selfish,  and  treachery 
and  cruelty  were  no  less  prominent  in  his  actions  than  acutcness 
and  decision. 

Lysander  would  have  been  under  any  circumstances  a  dangerous 
foe  to  Athens,  but  at  the  moment  at  which  he  appeared  in  Ionia 
another  factor  was  introduced  into  the  politics  of  cyms 
Asia  Minor,  which  made  him  doubly  formidable,  governor  of 
The  court  of  Siisa,  resenting  the  endless  double-  ^^^^ 
dealing  of  Tissaphernes,  had  at  last  superseded  that  satrap,  and 
sent  down  in  his  stead  Cyrus,  the  second  son  of  the  reigning  king, 
Darius  II.  The  young  prince  was  not  only  entrusted  with  the 
satrapy  of  Lydia,  but  given  a  general  control  over  all  the 
neighbouring  governors.  Cyrus,  from  his  first  arrival,  showed 
himself  ruled  by  one  desii'e — the  wish  to  pay  off  on  Athens 
all  the  trouble  she  had  caused  to  his  ancestors  since  the  days  of 
Marathon  and  Salamis.  He  at  once  put  a  stop  to  Pharnabaz.us' 
negotiations  with  Athens,  and  summoned  the  Spartan  commander- 
in-chief  to  Sardis.  When  Lysander  arrived,  Cyrus  declared  tn 
him  that  he  had  five  hundred  talents  ready  to  assist  in  equipping 
a  new  fleet,  and  that,  if  these  were  not  enough,  he  would  provide 
more  out  of  his  own  private  means,  "  even  though  he  were  driven 
to  coin  into  darics  the  golden  throne  on  which  he  sat."     It  was  at 


39^  The  Fall  of  Athens.  (407 b.o.- 

first  settled  that  he  should  subsidize  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  to  the 
extent  of  paying  three  obols  a  day  to  each  seaman  ;  but  soon  after, 
at  the  requpst  of  Lysander,  to  whom  he  had  taken  a  great  personal 
liking,  he  raised  the  sum  to  four  obols,  an  allowance  greater  than 
the  Athenians  were  then  able  to  pay  their  men. 

Small  reinforcements  had  gradually  been  crossing  the  Aegean 

during  the   last    two   years — the   most   considerable    of   them   a 

■D  ♦*!     *      squadron  of  twenty-five  Syracusan  vessels — so  that 

Notium,      Lysander  was  ere  long  at  the  head  of  ninety  galleys, 

407  C  C 

which  he  collected  at  Ephesus.  Alcibiades,  with  the 
hundred  vessels  which  the  Athenians  had  given  him,  took 
his  post  at  Notium,  to  prevent  the  Spartan  from  putting  to  sea. 
Presently,  however,  Alcibiades  was  called  away  to  Phocaea,  and 
sailed  off,  leaving  his  fleet  in  charge  of  Antiochus,  a  satellite 
and  boon-companion  of  his  own,  whom  he  placed  over  the 
heads  of  all  the  officers  of  the  fleet,  though  he  had  only  been 
serving  as  master  on  board  the  flag-ship,  and  had  never  had  any 
ex])erience  in  command.  Alcibiades  bade  his  follower  avoid 
fighting;  but  the  moment  that  he  was  gone  Antiochus  sailed, 
in  mere  bravado,  into  the  harbour  of  Ephesus,  and  rowed  past 
the  Spartan  fleet,  challenging  Lysander  to  come  forth  and  meet 
him.  A  few  vessels  put  out  at  once  to  chase  the  presumptuous 
intruder ;  then,  seeing  the  enemy  on  the  move,  some  Athenian 
ships  from  Notium  came  to  the  rescue  of  their  commander. 
Gradually  the  whole  of  both  fleets  were  drawn  into  an  engage- 
ment, in  which  Lysander  won  an  easy  victory  over  the  ill- 
managed  Athenian  squadron.  Antiochus  was  slain,  and  fifteen  of 
his  galleys  sunk  or  taken  ;  the  rest  retired  to  Samos.  Here  they 
were  rejoined  by  Alcibiades,  who  had  been  spending  his  time  in 
a  high-handed  and  ill-judged  attempt  to  levy  extra  contiibutions 
from  the  cities  of  Aeolis.  Lysander  refused  a  second  battle,  and 
resumed  his  old  position  at  Ephesus,  so  that  nothing  had  really 
been  lost  by  the  recklessness  of  Antiochus.  Nevertheless  there 
was  such  a  strong  feeling  against  Alcibiades  roused  at  Athens,  on 
account  of  his  criminal  negligence  iu  entrusting  his  boon-companion 
with  the  command  of  the  fleet,  and  of  his  unwise  exactions  in 
Aeolis,  that  liis  enemies  succeeded  in  getting  him  deposed  by  a 
vote  of  the  Ecclcsia,  which  once  more  placed  the  conduct  of  the 


406  B.C.]  CaUicratidas  in  Asia.  397 

war  ill  the  hands  of  the  ten  strategi.  Alcibiades  sailed  off  to  the 
Thracian  Chersonese,  where  he  was  the  owner  of  a  large  domain 
and  a  castle,  and  spent  the  remaining  years  of  the  war  in 
retirement. 

Among  the  generals  who  superseded  Alcibiades,  the  most  promi- 
nent men  were  Thrasyllus,  long  noted  as  a  democratic  leader; 
Pericles,  the  son  and  namesake  of  the  great  statesman  (see  p.  305)  ; 
and  an  officer  named  Conon,  who  now  for  the  first  time  appears  in 
high  command.  It  was  Conon,  however,  who  took  charge  of  the 
fleet  at  Samos,  which  had  lately  been  imder  the  orders  of 
Alcibiades. 

About  the  same  time  that  the  change  in  the  Athenian  com- 
manders took  place,  the  Spartan  fleet  also  received  a  new  admiral. 
Lysander's  year  of  office  had  run  out,  and  the  ephors, 
adhering  to  the  rule  that  no  one  should  be  made  in  Asia, 
nauarclius  twice,  replaced  their  able  servant  by  an 
officer  named  CaUicratidas.  The  system  of  constant  change  was 
evil,  but  in  this  particular  case  led  to  no  great  harm,  as  CaUi- 
cratidas was  an  energetic  and  efficient  commander.  But  Lysander, 
piqued  at  his  deposition,  made  his  successor's  task  as  hard  as 
he  could  contrive,  by  prejudicing  the  mind  of  Cyrus  against 
him,  and  by  restoring  to  the  Persian's  treasury  all  that  remained 
vmspent  of  the  money  which  had  been  lent  him  for  the  pay 
and  equipment  of  the  Peloj^onnesian  fleet.  Thus  CaUicratidas 
found  on  his  arrival  the  military  chest  empty,  and  the  seamen 
clamouring  for  their  pay.  When  he  went  up  to  Sardis  to  ask 
Cyrus  for  a  subsidy,  he  was  kept  so  long  waiting,  without 
even  obtaining  an  audience,  that  he  had  to  depart,  "  cursing 
the  necessities  of  the  Greeks,  which  compelled  them  to  fawn  on 
barbarians  for  money,  and  declaring  that  if  he  ever  got  home  he 
would  do  his  best  to  reconcile  Athens  and  Sparta."  ^  However,  by 
persuading  the  Chians  and  Milesians  to  grant  him  a  small  contribu- 
tion, CaUicratidas  was  able  to  pay  his  men  some  of  their  arrears,  and 
to  get  his  fleet  to  sea.  The  Athenians  were  at  the  moment  very 
scattered  ;  some  lay  at  Samos,  while  the  main  body,  under  Conon, 
were  engaged  in  harrying  the  coasts  of  the  revolted  cities  of  Aeolis. 
CaUicratidas,  after  gathering  in  all  the  scattered  divisions  of  the 
■  Xenophon,  HeJlcn,  i.  6,  §  6. 


398  The  Fall  of  Athens,  [406b.c, 

SjiarLan  fleet,  had  no  less  than  a  hundred  and  seventy  galleys 
with  him — the  largest  force  that  had  yet  been  seen  during  the  war. 
He  sailed  nortli  and  landed  on  Lesbos,  where  he  took  the  town  of 
Methymna  by  storm.  There  his  moderation  was  shown  by  his 
refusal  to  sell  the  Methymnaeans  and  their  Athenian  garrison 
into  slavery,  as  his  allies  urged  him.  Next  day  Conon,  with 
seventy  Athenian  ships,  came  in  sight;  underrating  the  Spartan 
fleet,  he  ran  right  into  the  jaws  of  danger,  and  only  turned  to  fly 
when  it  was  too  late,  after  his  retreat  on  Samos  had  been  cut  off. 
He  was  compelled  to  take  shelter  in  the  harbour  of  Mitylene, 
after  a  running  fight,  in  which  he  lost  nearly  half  his  ships, 
and  only  saved  the  remainder  by  hauling  them  ashore  under  the 
ramparts  of  the  town.  Callicratidas  immediately  blockaded  the 
place  by  sea  and  land,  and  counted  on  taking  it  with  no  great 
difficulty,  for  the  Athenian  seamen  were  certain  to  exhaust  in  a 
few  weeks  the  food  of  a  town  which  had  not  been  prepared  to  stand 
a  siege. 

Conon  succeeded  in  sending  out  a  swift  vessel,  which  ran  tlic 
blockade,  and  arrived  in  Athens  with  the  tidings  of  his  danger. 

Distress  at  But  it  seemed  unlikely  that  he  could  be  saved,  for 
Athens,  there  was  no  Athenian  fleet  in  existence  flt  to  cope 
with  the  great  armament  of  Callicratidas.  A  few  dozen  ships 
were  lying  at  Samos,  but  there  was  no  otlier  considerable 
squadron  at  sea.  However,  the  Athenians,  with  their  usual 
vigour  and  perseverance,  resolved  to  make  an  attempt  to  rescue 
their  general.  The  arsenal  of  the  Peiraeus  happened  at  the 
moment  to  be  full  of  vessels  undergoing  repair,  or  far  advanced 
in  construction ;  it  was  resolved  to  send  out  everything  that 
was  in  any  way  seaworthy,  and  to  give  battle  to  Callicratidas. 
The  Ecclesia  voted  that  every  man  of  full  age,  slave  or  freeman, 
should  go  on  board ;  even  the  knights,  for  the  first  time  on 
record,  were  sent  to  sea.  In  less  than  thirty  days  there  were  a 
hundred  and  ten  vessels  manned,  though  the  crews  were  raw  and 
the  equipment  inadequate.  Eight  of  the  ten  strategi  took  the 
command,  and  the  fleet  pushed  across  the  Aegean  to  Samos,  where 
it  picked  up  nearly  fifty  galleys  more,  most  of  them  belonging  to 
Samos  and  the  other  loyal  states  of  Ionia.  On  hearing  that  the 
Athenians  had  reached  Asia,  Callicratidas  resolved  to  attempt  to 


406  B.C.]  The  Battle  of  Arginusae.  399 

maintain  the  blockade  of  Mitylene,  and  at  the  same  time  to  meet 
the  enemy  in  battle.  Leaving  his  second-in-command,  Eteonlcus, 
with  fifty  ships,  to  keep  Conou  iu  clieck,  he  took  post  with  one 
hundred  and  twenty  off  the  southernmost  cape  of  Lesbos.  The 
same  night  the  Athenian  fleet  came  in  view,  sailing  northward 
along  the  mainland.  Next  day  the  battle  took  place  Battle  of 
off  the  Arginusae,  a  cluster  of  small  islands  which  Arginusae. 
lie  south  from  Lesbos.  The  Athenian  generals  were  forced,  by 
the  inexperience  of  their  crews,  to  adopt  the  tactics  which  had 
once  been  peculiar  to  their  enemies — they  drew  up  their  fleet  iu 
a  dense  line  without  intervals,  and  endeavoured  to  come  to  close 
quarters  at  once  and  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  manoeuvring. 
Callicratidas,  on  the  other  hand,  came  on  with  his  ships  in  open 
order,  resolved  to  turn  the  flanks  of  the  Athenians  or  to  break 
their  line.  When  the  superior  numbers  of  the  enemy  became 
visible,  the  master  of  his  galley  besought  him  to  turn  back ; 
but  Callicratidas,  buoyed  up  by  confidence  in  his  own  bravery 
and  in  the  skill  of  his  seamen,  merely  replied  that  "flight  was 
disgraceful,  and  that  if  he  fell  Sparta  would  be  none  the  worse 
for  his  death." 

The  fleets  were  soon  locked  iu  close  combat,  and  after  a  while 
the  numerical  superiority  of  the  Athenians  began  to  tell.  Calli- 
cratidas was  thrown  into  the  sea  by  the  shock  of  a  hostile  galley, 
as  he  stood  by  liis  prow  preparing  to  board,  and  was  seen  no 
more.  No  less  than  seventy  Peloponnesian  ships  were  destroyed 
or  taken ;  the  flght  had  been  at  close  quarters,  and  when  the 
day  went  against  them  they  were  unable  to  get  away :  only  fifty 
escaped  to  Chios.  No  more  than  fifteen  Athenian  vessels  had  been 
sunk,  but  a  dozen  more  lay  waterlogged,  and  requiring  prompt 
assistance. 

There  would  seem  to  have  been  great  confusion  in  the  Athenian 
fleet  after  the  battle  was  won.  The  generals  resolved  to  push  on 
at  once  to  Mitylene,  and  to  catch  Eteonlcus  and  his  squadron 
before  he  could  escape  to  sea.  But  after  they  had  started  a  gale 
sprang  up,  and  induced  them  to  put  back  and  Jiaul  their  fleet 
ashore  for  the  night.  One  consequence  of  this  indecision  was  that 
Eteonlcus  was  able  to  slip  oft'  unharmed  to  Chios.  Another  was 
that  the  dozen  Athenian  ships  which  had  been  disabled  iu  the 


400  The  Fall  of  Athens.  i4oe  b.o. 

battle  went  down  with  all  their  crews,  without  having  received  any 
succour.! 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  the  Athenians  would  have 

forgotten  all  the  shortcomings  of  their  generals  in  the  moment  of 

^victory.     Their  hastily  equipped  vessels  had  won  the 

Impeachment  •'    _  j       \     i.  v 

of  the  day,  relieved  Mitylene,  and  saved  Conon.  The  con- 
genera  s.  q^el.Q^.g  Qf  Arginusae  expected  nothing  but  praise  and 
glory.  But  the  point  which  was  seized  by  public  opinion  at 
Athens  was  that,  by  gross  neglect  on  the  part  of  some  one  or 
other,  a  dozen  ships,  manned  by  hundreds  of  citizens,  had  been 
suffered  to  perish  unaided  after  the  battle.  The  demagogues 
Archedemus  and  Timocrates  brought  this  accusation  against  the 
generals  with  such  effect  that  they  were  immediately  deposed 
from  office.  Six  of  them,  among  whom  were  Thrasyllus  and 
Pericles,  returned  to  Athens  to  justify  themselves  before  the  people. 
But  when  they  appeared,  a  general  clamour  was  raised  against 
them,  and  Theramenes — the  converted  oligarch  who  had  played 
such  a  prominent  part  in  the  deposition  of  the  Four  Hundred — 
proposed  that  they  should  be  brought  to  trial  for  their  criminal 
negligence  in  failing  to  rescue  their  fellow-citizens.  To  this  the 
generals  replied  that  the  storm  had  been  too  much  for  them,  but 
that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  they  had  commissioned  Theramenes  him- 
self, and  Thrasybulus  with  ten  ships,  to  see  to  the  wrecks.  Thera- 
menes and  the  other  persons  named  utterly  denied  having  received 
any  such  orders,  and  it  seems  likely  that  this  part  of  the  generals' 
defence  was  an  after-thought ;  in  their  first  despatches  they  laid 
the  blame  on  the  storm  alone.  But  the  storm  cannot  have  been 
very  violent,  since  it  did  not  prevent  Eteonicus  and  his  Spartan 
ships  from  putting  to  sea ;  and  it  was  probably  the  disorder  and 
confusion  into  which  the  raw  and  ill-equipped  fleet  had  fallen  after 
a  day's  hard  fighting  that  really  caused  the  loss  of  the  disabled 
galleys. 
After  the  debate  as  to  the  responsibility  of  the  generals  had  pro- 

'  For  an  occurrence  in  modern  history  somewhat  similar  to  the  events 
at  Arginusae,  compare  the  storm  on  the  night  after  Trafalgar,  which  sent 
so  many  ships  to  the  bottom.  But  the  English  Government  did  not  court- 
martial  Coliingwood  for  neglecting  to  obey  Nelson's  dying  words,  and 
moor  his  fleet. 


406  B.C.]  Execution  of  the  Generals.  401 

ceeded  to  great  length,  the  Ecclesia  was  adjourned.  The  next  morn- 
ing happened  to  be  the  festival  of  the  Apaturia,  a  day  dedicated 
to  solemn  family  gatherings.  The  number  of  persons  who  appeared 
in  black  at  these  meetings,  as  having  lost  relatives  in  the  late 
battle,  was-  so  great  that  the  whole  city  was  shocked  and  excited, 
and  the  feeling  against  the  generals  rose  to  boiling  point.  When 
the  Ecclesia  reassembled,  a  senator  named  Callixenus  brought 
forward  a  decree  which  was  not  only  unjust  but  entirely  unconsti- 
tutional. It  proposed  that,  *'  as  both  the  accusers  and  the  generals 
had  been  heard  at  length,  the  people  should  at  once  proceed  to 
vote,  and  that  if  the  generals  were  convicted  the  penalty  should  be 
death."  This  decree  not  only  proposed  to  cut  short  the  defence  of 
the  generals,  but  violated  one  of  the  best  known  enactments  in  the 
Athenian  constitution,^  which  provided  that  accused  persons  should 
be  indicted  and  sentenced  one  by  one,  and  not  condemned  or 
acquitted  by  a  verdict  dealing  with  several  persons  simultaneously. 
The  decree  of  Callixenus  met  with  much  opposition;  several 
citizens  protested  against  its  illegality,  and  threatened  to  prosecute 
its  author  for  his  open  disregard  of  the  constitution.  But  the  mob 
was  so  violent,  and  the  threats  used  against  the  opponents  of 
the  bill  so  terrifying,  that  they  finally  gave  way.  Some  of  the 
Prytaneis  refused  to  put  the  question  to  the  vote,  and  were  only 
coerced  by  a  menace  which  Callixenus  made,  that  if  they  perse- 
vered they  should  be  included  in  the  generals'  sentence.  Even 
then  the  philosopher  Socrates,  who  happened  to  be  serving  as  one 
of  the  Prytaneis,  refused  to  assent  to  the  proposal.  But  his  protest 
was  disregarded ;  the  question  was  put,  and  the  un-  Kxecution  of 
fortunate  generals  condemned  to  instant  execution,  the  generals. 
Thus  perished,  by  a  most  unjust  and  cruel  perversion  of  justice, 
Pericles  the  son  of  Pericles,  Thrasyllus  the  victor  of  Cyzicus,  and 
four  more  officers,  Leon,  Diomedon,  Erasinades,  and  Aristocrates. 
No  long  time  after  the  people  repented  of  their  madness,  and 
ordered  the  impeachment  of  Callixenus  and  several  of  his  sup- 
porters. However,  the  author  of  the  infamous  decree  escaped 
without  a  trial,  owing  to  the  disasters  which  fell  upon  Athens  at 
the  time ;  but  we  learn  with  satisfaction  that  ho  remained  an  object 
of  public  execration,  and  finally  died  of  hunger  in  the  street. 
'  Known  from  its  .author's  name  as  the  Psciiliism  of  CanOnus. 

2  D 


402  The  fall  of  Athens.  [405b.c. 

After  the  death  of  Calhcratidas  the  Spartan  government  made 
another  attempt  to  come  to  terms  with  Athens,  offering  once  more 
peace  on  the  basis  of  "  uti  possidetis^  The  proposal  was  again 
defeated  by  Cleophon,  who  "  came  into  the  Ecclesia  drunk  and  with 
armour  on,  swearing  that  he  would  not  allow  it,  unless  the  Spartans 
gave  up  all  their  gains."  So  the  Ephors  had  to  continue  the  war, 
and  replace  Lysander  in  command;  but  in  order  to  preserve  the 
rule  that  no  one  sliould  be  nauarchus  twice,  he  was  given,  as  a 
nominal  superior,  an  officer  named  Aracus  (405  B.C.). 

Lysander  joined  to  the  wrecks  of  the  fleet  of  Callicratidas  all  the 
vessels  he  could  collect  from  the  Asiatic  allies  of  Sparta.     He  also 

Lysander    obtained  large  supplies  of  money  from  Cyrus,  who 

and  Cyrus,  threw  Open  his  treasury  the  moment  that  his  friend 
was  restored  to  command.  So  far  did  the  Persian  prince's  enthu- 
siasm for  the  Spartan  cause  lead  him,  that  when  he  was  sum- 
moned up  for  a  time  to  Media,  to  visit  his  sick  father,  he  made 
over  the  administration  of  the  revenues  of  his  satrapy  to  Lysander, 
and  bade  him  take  all  that  he  needed.  With  the  funds  obtained 
from  this  source  many  scores  of  new  ships  werQ  built  at  Antandrus. 
Still  the  Spartan  fleet  was  not  yet  equal  in  numbers  to  that  which 
Conon,  and  the  other  ofScers  who  had  replaced  the  victims  of 
Callixenus,  could  put  into  line  of  battle.  Accordingly  the  Spartan 
did  not  at  once  risk  an  engagement,  but  resolved  to  carry  out 
the  j)lan  which  Mindarus  had  attempted  in  410  B.C.,  and  to  block 
the  Hellesi^ont  against  the  Athenian  corn-ships.  He  slij^ped  north- 
ward, and  falling  on  the  rich,  town  of  Lampsacus,  on  the  Asiatic 
side  of  the  strait,  took  it  by  storm,  and  made  it  the  base  of  his 
operations.  The  Athenians  soon  got  the  news.  Conon  and  his 
colleagues  called  in  every  galley  they  could  muster,  and  appeared 
off  Lampsacus  with  a  fleet  of  no  less  than  a  hundred  and  eighty 
vessels.  For  four  days  they  offered  Lysander  battle,  but  the 
Spartan  kept  his  ships  under  the  shelter  of  the  walls  of  Lampsacus, 
and  refused  to  put  out  to  meet  them.  Accordingly  the  Athenian 
generals  established  themselves  just  opposite  to  him,  on  the  shore 
of  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  and  waited  for  him  to  make  some 
further  move. 

The  Athenian  vessels  were  moored  off  a  barren  and  uninhabited 
beach,  at  a  spot  called  Aegospotami ;  the  nearest  town  to  it  was 


405  B.C.]  Battle  of  Aegospotami,  403 

Sestos,  two  miles  away,  from  which  all  the  supplies  for  the  fleet 
had  to  be  procured.  When  Lysander  kept  quiet  day  after  day,  the 
Athenian  commanders  grew  careless,  and  sufiered  their  men  to 
disembark  in  the  afternoon  and  to  disperse  to  Sestos  and  other 
neighbouring  places,  in  search  of  provisions.  Alcibiades,  whose 
castle  lay  a  few  miles  away,  marked  this  dangerous  negligence, 
and  came  down  to  warn  the  generals,  and  to  recommend  them  to 
remove  to  Sestos,  a  position  almost  as  convenient  for  observing 
Lysander  as  was  Aegospotami.  But  the  generals  Tydeus  and 
Menander  replied  that  they  commanded  the  fleet  and  not  he,  and 
that  his  presence  was  not  wanted.     Accordingly  he  departed. 

The  very  next  day  Lysander,  waiting  till  the  afternoon  was  far 
spent,  and  the  Athenian  seamen  scattered  all  over  the  Chersonese, 
suddenly  put  out  from  Lamjjsacus  and  rowed  at  full  Ba,ttie  of 
speed  across  the  strait.  When  his  approach  was  Aegospotami, 
observed,  the  Athenians  began  to  rush  on  board ;  but 
long  before  they  were  ready  Lysander  was  upon  them.  Some 
vessels  had  two  banks  of  oars  manned,  some  one,  some  were  still 
moored,  when  the  Peloponnesian  fleet  ran  in  amongst  them. 
There  was  practically  no  fighting ;  Conon,  with  the  few  Athenian 
ships  that  were  ready  for  sea,  fled  southward.  The  rest  were  taken 
with  hardly  any  resistance,  though  the  greater  part  of  the  crews 
escaped  ashore.  A  hundred  and  seventy  vessels  fell  into  Lysander's 
hands,  with  more  than  four  thousand  prisoners,  including  three  or 
four  of  the  Athenian  admirals.  Lysander  had  the  whole  body  of 
prisoners  massacred  on  the  day  after  the  battle,  alleging  in  excuse 
the  cruelty  with  which  some  captured  Corinthian  seamen  had  been 
treated  a  little  w^hile  before. 

Conon,  fearing,  with  good  reason,  the  wrath  of  his  countrymen, 
fled  with  eight  vessels  to  Euagoras,  King  of  Salamis  in  Cyprus, 
with  whom  he  took  service.  But  he  sent  home  the  Paralus,  one 
of  the  state-galleys,  which  had  escaped  in  his  company,  to  bear 
the  tidings  to  Athens. 

The  fatal  news  arrived  at  the  Peiiaeus  as  evening  fell.  "  The 
noise  of  wailing,"  wrote  Xenophon,  who  was  probably  in  Athens 
at  the  time,  "  spread  all  up  the  Long  Walls  into  tlie  city,  as  one 
passed  on  the  tidings  to  another ;  that  night  no  one  slept,  for  not 
ofily  were  they  lamenting  for  their  dead,  but  they  were  tliiukiug 


404  '^^^^  ^^^^  ^f  Athens.  i^osb.c- 

of  what  they  themselves  had  done  to  the  Melians  and  the  Scionaeans 
and  the  Aeginetans,  and  many  others  of  the  Greeks,  and  reflecting 
that  they  must  now  suffer  the  same  fiite." 

The  situation  of  Athens  was  perfectly  desperate.  Her  sole  fleet 
was  destroyed,  her  arsenals  were  stripped  bare,  her  corn-supply 
was  cut  ofif.  Lysander  did  not  delay  a  moment  after  the  battle, 
but  sailed  at  once  to  Byzantium  and  Chalcedon,  which  surrendered 
at  the  first  summons.  After  arranging  for  the  closing  of  the 
Bosphorus  against  Athenian  vessels,  he  went  against  Mitylene  in 
person,  while  he  sent  Eteoulcus  to  Thasos  and  the  other  towns 
which  adhered  to  Athens  in  the  direction  of  Thrace.  Nowhere 
was  any  resistance  made.  Each  city,  when  the  Spartans  appeared, 
threw  open  its  gates  and  gave  up  its  Athenian  garrison  as  prisoners. 
Within  a  few  weeks  after  Aegospotami,  Saraos  was  the  only  place 
which  still  held  out  for  Athens.  The  Samian  democracy,  having 
massacred  so  many  of  their  Philo-Spartan  fellow-citizens  (see  . 
p.  378),  were  prevented  from  surrendering  by  dread  of  the  revenge 
which  they  knew  would  follow. 

When  Asia  Minor  was  cleared  of  Athenian  garrisons,  Lysander 
sailed  with  two  hundred  ships  into  the  gulf  of  Aegina,  and  estab- 
lished the  blockade  of  Peiraeus.  Simultaneously  King  Agis  came 
down  from  Decelea  with  the  full  levy  of  Peloponnesus,  and  en- 
camped over  against  Athens  on  the  land-side,  pitching  his  tent 
in  the  Academeia,  a  celebrated  gymnasium  outside  the  walls. 

Even  at  this  supreme  moment  the  courage  of  the  Athenians  did 
not  fail  them.  Hoping  against  hope,  they  blocked  up  the  mouths  of 
their  harbours,  manned  their  walls,  summoned  every  available  man 
under  arms,  and  proclaimed  an  amnesty  ^  for  all  political  and  civil 
criminals  who  would  jom  in  the  defence  of  the  city.  When  the 
senator  Archestratus  advised  an  immediate  surrender  at  discretion 
to  the  Spartans  as  the  only  available  course,  he  was  promptly 
thrown  into  prison.  But  Athens  was  without  money,  ships,  allies, 
or  corn,  and  the  end  could  not  long  be  delayed.  After  some 
months  of  blockade,  when  many  had  already  died  of  starvation, 
they  sent  ambassadors  to  the  ephors,  offering  to  become  allies  of 
Sparta  and  to  renounce  all  claims  to  their  old  naval  empire,  but 

1  It  was  this  amnesty  which  saved  Callixenus  from  condemnation  (see 
p.  401). 


404  B.C.]  Surrender  of  Athens.  405 

requiring  that  tliej'  should  be  left  with  the  Long  Walls  and  the 
fortification  of  Peiracus  intact.  The  ephor.s  refused  to  see  tho 
envoys,  and  told  them  not  to  come  again  till  they  had  grown 
wiser.  A  little  later  the  Ecclesia  commissioned  Theraraenes  to  go 
on  a  private  mission  to  Lysander,  and  to  ascertain  from  him  what 
terms  the  ephors  were  likely  to  grant.  Theramenes,  who  was 
once  more  intriguing  for  an  oligarchic  revolution  in  the  city, 
remained  no  less  than  three  months  with  Lysander,  waiting  till  the 
famine  had  grown  intolerable.  Then  he  returned,  and  reported 
that  he  could  get  no  definite  information,  but  that  the  ephors 
would  receive  an  enibassy,  if  it  was  invested  with  full  powers  to 
agree  to  any  terms.  Accordingly  the  Ecclesia  despatched  Thera- 
menes and  nine  other  envoys  to  Sparta.  On  their  arrival  the  full 
congress  of  the  Peloponnesian  alliance  was  assembled,  to  debate 
on  the  lot  of  Athens.  The  representatives  of  Corinth  and  Thebes 
urged  that  no  mercy  should  be  shown  to  the  tyrant  city,  now  that 
she  was  brought  low ;  they  would  have  treated  her  as  she  had 
treated  Melos  and  Scione,  and  made  an  end  of  her  altogether.  But 
the  Spartan  government,  with  unexpected  moderation,  announced 
that  it  would  not  consent  to  the  utter  annihilation  of  a  city  -which, 
in  spite  of  all  its  crimes,  had  done  good  service  for  Greece  in 
ancient  days :   Athens  should  be  rendered  harmless 

•'  _  Athens 

fur  ever,  but  not  destroyed.     Accordingly  the  terms      Bubmits, 

404  B  C 

which  were  laid  before  the  Athenian  ambassadors  were 
that  Athens  should  demolish  the  Long  Walls  and  the  fortification  of 
Peiraeus,  become  a  subject-ally  of  Sparta,  swear  to  furnish  her  with  a 
contingent  of  troops  whenever  called  upon,rtcall  her  oligarchic  exiles, 
and  consent  that  her  navy  should  be  restricted  to  twelve  vessels. 

Hard  as  these  conditions  were,  they  were  at  any  rate  better  than 
the  utter  destruction  which  many  of  the  Athenians  had  been 
dreading.  The  war-party  had  been  melting  away  as  the  famine 
grew  more  and  more  dreadful,  and  its  last  leader,  the  demagogue 
Cleophon,  had  been  killed  in  a  riot.  When  Theramenes  reappeared 
in  the  city,  and  announced  that  Sparta  had  consented  to  grant 
terms  of  peace,  a  shout  of  joy  went  up  from  the  famishing  multi- 
tude, and  few  cared  to  ask  for  the  details  of  the  treaty.  Next  day 
the  Ecclesia  ratified  the  agreement,  and  the  gales  were  thrown 
open  to  the  enemy. 


4o6  End  of  the  Peloponnesian   War. 

Lysander  landed  with'  great  pomp  at  Peiraeus,  and  took  posses- 
sion both  of  the  upper  and  the  lower  city.  He  destroyed  the 
arsenal,  took  away  the  few  war-galleys  which  lay  in  the  harbour, 
and  burnt  those  which  were  upon  the  stocks.  Then  the  work  of 
demolishing  the  fortifications  was  taken  in  hand ;  in  presence  of  the 
Peloponnesian  army  and  navy  the  Long  Walls  were  breached,  while 
triumphant  music  and  choric  dances  testified  to  the  exultation 
of  the  conquerors.  A  shout  went  up  from  the  victorious  ranks 
that  Greece  was  freed  of  her  tyrant,  and  that  every  city  could  at 
last  be  sure  of  her  autonomy. 

Thus  ended  the  Peloponnesian  war,  on  the  sixteenth  day  of  the 
month  Munychion,  404  B.C.,  twenty-seven  years  after  the  attempt 
of  the  Thebans  on  Plataea  which  bad  marked  its  commencement. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

tSPAKTA   SUPREME    IN   GKKECE,   40i-39G    B.C. 

From  the  day  of  Salamis  to  the  day  of  Aegospotami  Greek  history 
possesses  a  dramatic  unity  which  it  does  not  display  iu  any  other 
age.  A  great  problem  was  worked  out  in  those  seventy-six  years — 
whether  the  Greeks  were  capable,  under  favourable  circumstances, 
of  subordinating  civic  and  tribal  jealousies  to  the  general  interests 
of  the  Hellenic  race,  and  of  combining  into  a  great  federal  .state. 
All  the  events  of  the  period  group  themselves  around  the  growth, 
culmination,  and  destruction  of  the  Athenian  empire.  No  city  had 
ever  such  an  opportunity  of  forwarding  the  unity  of  Greece  as  had 
Athens  in  the  middle  of  the  fifth  century.  Her  supremacy  was 
established,  not  by  force,  but  by  the  free  and  willing  accession  of 
hundreds  of  states.  The  lonians  and  Islanders,  in  gratitude  for 
their  liberation  from  the  Persian  yoke,  placed  themselves  entirel}'  at 
her  disposal.  Half  the  cities  of  Greece  were  drawn  within  the 
circle  of  her  influence,  and  ere  long  there  were  signs  that  the  rest 
might  follow.  In  457  b.c.  the  union  of  the  whole  Hellenic  race  on 
both  sides  of  the  Aegean  into  a  confederacy  centring  round  Athens 
seemed  quite  possible. 

We  have  seen  that  this  prospect  was  never  to  be  realized ;  the 
states  which  had  once  regarded  Athens  as  their  saviour  and  pro- 
tector, were  found,  after  a  while,  joining  eagerly  with  her  ancient 
enemies,  and  straining  every  nerve  in  the  endeavour  to  cut  them- 
selves loose  from  their  alliance.  They  had  their  wish;  Athens 
succumbed  under  a  series  of  unparalleled  disasters,  and  sank  from 
an  imperial  city  to  a  second-rate  provincial  town. 

Was  the  failure  of  the  great  experiment  in  the  direction  of  the 
unity  of  Greece  due  to  the  crimes  and  blunders  of  Athens,  or  to 
the  inherent  impossibility  of  the  task  she  had  undertaken  ?  On 
the  one  hand,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Athens  did  not  persevere 


4o8  Sparta  Supreme  in  Greece.  i404b.c. 

in  her  original  resolve  to  deal  justly  and  fairly  with  the  cities 
which  had  put  themselves  into  her  hands.  Although  her  rule  was 
not  oppressive  or  severe,  it  was  essentiallj'  selfish ;  she  administered 
the  states  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos  for  her  own  private  benefit, 
involved  them  in  wars  with  which  they  had  no  concern,  and  spent 
their  money  lavishly  on  purely  Athenian  objects.  In  short,  she 
made  herself  a  tyrant  city,  though  her  tyranny  was  after  the  model 
of  Peisistratus  and  not  of  Periander.  Sometimes  she  even  indulged 
in  acts  of  cruelty  and  oppression  of  the  most  flagrant  character,  as 
in  her  dealings  with  Aegina,  Scione,  and  Melos. 

But,  in  spite  of  all  the  faults  and  crimes  of  Athens,  it  is  probable 
that  the  breaking  up  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos  must  be  ascribed 
to  another  cause.  The  really  fatal  obstacle  in  the  way  of  Grecian 
unity  was  the  character  of  the  Greeks.  The  passion  for  local 
autonomy  was  so  deeply  rooted  in  their  breasts,  that  it  dominated 
every  other  feeling.  Neither  glory  nor  gain  could  compensate  them 
for  that  curtailment  of  their  municipal  liberties  which  a  federal 
union  made  necessary.  Even  if  every  state  of  the  Delian  Con- 
federation had  been  allowed  a  fair  share  in  the  management  of  public 
affairs,  we  may  be  certain  that  discontent  and  secession  would  have 
followed.  Much  more  was  this  bound  to  be  the  case  when  "  repre- 
sentation did  not  accompany  taxation,"  and  when  Athens  made  no 
pretence  of  allowing  her  allies  to  participate  in  the  administration 
of  the  League.  The  Sjiartans  had  caught  the  spirit  of  the  times 
when  they  bade  Athens,  at  the  commencement  of  the  Peloponnesian 
war,  "  to  restore  their  liberty  to  the  states  of  Greece,"  and  pro- 
claimed that  the  struggle  was  a  crusade  in  behalf  of  local  autonomj'. 
This  watchword  rallied  to  the  Spartan  cause  every  discontented 
member  of  the  Delian  League,  and  to  it  we  may  fairly  say  that 
Spartan's  final  triumph  was  due,  for  without  the  aid  which  she 
received  from  the  revolted  allies  she  could  never  have  guided  the 
war  to  the  conclusion  at  which  it  actually  arrived. 

It  remained  to  be  seen  how  Sparta,  after  posing  for  so  long  as  the 

enemy  of  tyranny  and  the  protector  of  local  liberties,  would  deal 

with  Greece  in  the  day  of  her  triumph.     A  bitter  dis- 

Xiysander  ''  i     i      n 

supreme  in   appointment  awaited  the  states  which  had  been  so 

reece.       gijjjpie  as  to  believe  that  the  Lacedaemonians  had  laid 

aside  their  ancient  selfishness.     Lysander  soon  showed  them  that 


404 B.C.)  The  Spartan  Harmosts.  409 

they  had  only  changed  a  light  taskmaster  for  a  stern  one,  and  that 
the  empire  of  Athens  was  to  be  replaced  by  the  empire  of  Sparta. 
Some  of  his  first  measm'e?,  indeed,  were  intended  to  conciliate  the 
public  opinion  of  Greece  ;  he  restored  the  few  surviving  Aeginetans 
and  Melians  to  the  homes  from  which  they  had  been  expelled  by 
Athens,  and  gave  back  Naupactus  to  the  Locrians,  driving  out  its 
Messenian  inhabitants,  who  now  took  refuge  in  Libya.  But  such 
acts  were  few  and  far  between  ;  the  greater  part  of  Lysander's 
doings  were  of  a  very  different  character. 

While  the  war  was  still  raging  in  Asia,  and  the  efforts  of  Athens 
were  still  to  be  feared,  it  had  been  most  natural  that  Spartan 
garrisons  should  be  placed  in  the  cities  of  Ionia  and    .    „ 

°  *■  The  Harmosts 

the  Hellespont,  and  Spartan  governors  put  at  the  and  the 
head  of  their  military  forces.  These  governors,  or 
Harmosts}  as  they  were  called,  were  to  be  found  everywhere  at  the 
end  of  the  war.  Their  authority  was  backed  by  the  support  of 
committees  chosen  from  among  the  most  Philo-S[)artan  citizens 
of  each  state — bodies  which  were  known  as  Decarchies,  from  their 
usually  consisting  of  ten  members.  When  the  war  was  ended,  it 
was  generally  expected  that  the  Decarchies  would  be  dissolved,  and 
the  Harmosts  and  their  troops  recalled.  But  Lysander  had  no  snch 
intention;  he  had  taken  great  pains  to  organize  the  system,  had 
selected  Harmosts  from  among  his  ownjiersonal  followers,  and  care- 
fully superintended  the  choice  of  the  Decarchies.  When  Athens 
had  long  fallen,  and  the  months  were  passing  by,  the  Greeks  of  Asia 
found  their  cities  still  occupied  by  foreign  troops,  and  their  consti- 
tutional magistrates  impeded  in  their  functions  by  the  irresponsible 
committees  of  ten.  Gradually  it  began  to  dawn  upon  them  that 
the  system  was  intended  to  be  permanent,  and  that,  instead  of  the 
occasional  visits  of  the  Athenian  tax-gatherer,  they  were  to  ex- 
perience the  continual  presence  of  the  Spartan  Harraost.  The 
Decarchies  and  the  Lacedaemonian  governors  pla^^ed  into  each 
other's  hands  ;  the  former  ruled  the  state  as  a  strict  oligarchy,  and 
if  any  democratic  feeling  manifested  itself,  promptly  put  it  down 
by  the  swords  of  the  garrison ;    the  Harmost,  in  return  for  his 

'  'Apfj.o(TTi)s,  organizer,  had  been  a  name  origiaall}'  applied  to  the 
commissioners  whom  Sparla  kept  resident  among  the  towns  of  the  rcrioeci 
io  I^aconja, 


41  o      .  Sparta  Supreme  hi  Greece.  [403  b.c. 

assistance,  was  allowed  to  peculate  and  plunder  to  his  heart's  con- 
tent— a  gratification  which  most  Spartans  keenly  appreciated. 
Such  a  form  of  government  soon  became  unbearable  to  the  cities 
of  Asia,  most  of  whom  had  long  been  accustomed  to  a  democratic 
constitution,  while  all  contained  a  strong  democratic  element  in 
their  population.  It  was  not  long  before  they  discovered  that 
Sparta's  little  finger  was  thicker  than  Athens'  loins,  and  learnt  to 
curse  the  day  ia  which  they  changed  their  masters. 

But  the  oppression  of  the  Harmost  and  the  Decarchy  was  not 
the  worst  that   the  cities  of  the  Asiatic  mainland  had  to  fear. 
_  .  Sparta  had  only  conquered  by  the  aid  of  Persia,  and 

croachments  was  bouud  by  Stringent  treaties  to  give  her  ally  a  free 
hand  (see  p.  378).  Accordingly,  Cyrus  and  Pharna- 
bazus  proceeded  ere  long  to  encroach  upon  the  Hellenic  cities  of 
the  coast,  while  Lysander  stood  aside  or  tacitly  approved  their 
doings.  Persian  mercenary  troops  had  been  admitted  into  many 
places  while  the  war  was  in  progress,  and  when  it  was  over  held 
the  town  in  behalf  of  the  satrap.  Even  great  cities  like  Ephesus 
and  Miletus  found  themselves  in  danger  ;  the  Milesians  had  to  rise 
in  arms  and  fight  a  battle  in  their  own  streets  before  they  could 
get  quit  of  the  Persian  garrison.  Many  of  the  smaller  towns 
actually  fell  back  into  slavery  to  the  barbarian,  after  seventy  years 
of  liberty  under  the  Athenian  rule.  Sparta  would  do  nothing  to 
preserve  her  allies,  except  where  she  had  a  Harmost  on  the  spot, 
and  was  herself  in  practical  possession. 

Meanwhile  Lysander,  whose  command  had  been  renewed,  was 
administering  the  towns  of  the  Aegean  as  if  he  had  been  an  absolute 
monarch.  His  satellites  and  flatterer's  did  their  best  to  turn  bis 
head  with  their  fulsome  applause.  After  he  had  captured  Samos 
(the  town  held  out  a  few  months  longer  than  Athens)  he  was 
actually  saluted  with  divine  honours ;  altars  were  erected  and 
hymns  addressed  to  him.  He  ruled  despotically,  without  making 
any  reference  to  the  home  government,  and  by  means  of  the 
Harmosts  made  his  influence  felt  in  every  town ;  it  was  the  nearest 
approach  to  a  personal  monarchy  that  Greece  had  seen  for  centuries. 
Lysander  was,  in  fact,  repeating  the  career  of  Pausanias  on  the 
same  stage  where  his  predecessor  had  moved  seventy  years  before. 
His  fate  was  destined  to  be  the  same  as   that  of  the  victor  of 


403  B.C.]        Lysaiider's  Quarrel  with  the  Ephors.  411 

Plataea ;  after  two  years  of  domiuion  he  provoked  the  ephors  to 
desperation  by  his  disregard  for  their  orders.     They 

'  •'  °  •'       Lysandei- 

summoned  him  home,  laid  before  him  countless  charges  ms^aced  by 
of  insubordination  and  misgovernment,  and  bade  him  ^^^ 
defend  himself.  Lysander  made  no  reply,  but  quitted  the  citj'',  and 
betook  himself  for  a  time  to  Libya.  AVhen  he  returned  shortly 
after,  no  further  attempt  was  made  to  molest  him ;  having  become 
a  private  citizen  again,  he  was  no  longer  considered  dangerous. 
But  Lysander  was  skilled  in  intrigue  ;  finding  himself  unmolested, 
he  set  to  work  to  form  a  party  in  the  state  with  a  view  to  the 
reformation  of  the  constitution  and  the  removal  of  the  ephoralty  ; 
he  grounded  his  main  hope  on  the  assistance  of  Agesilaus,  brother 
of  the  reigning  king  Agis,  who  was  his  intimate  personal  friend 
and  admirer. 

The  removal  of  Lysander  made  no  difference  in  the  character  of 
the  Spartan  rule ;  the  ephors  proved  as  unscrupulous  as  the  great 
nauarch  had  been,  while  the  Harmosts  were,  if  anything,  a  tiiflo 
more  oppressive  now  that  they  were  no  longer  working  under  the 
eye  of  a  master. 

How  the  cities  of  Greece  fared  while  Sparta  was  supreme  may 
be  fairly  judged  from  the  single  example  of  the  fate  of  Athens. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  when  she  threw  open  her  gates  to 
Lysander,  one  of  the  conditions  which  she  had  to  accept  was  the 
return  of  her  exiles.  They  were  a  large  body,  the  remains  of  the 
partisans  of  the  Four  Hundred,  who  had  fled  to  the  Spartan  camp 
when  their  conspiracy  failed,  and  had  dwelt  with  the  enemy  ever 
since.  It  was  soon  known  that  the  old  democracy  was  not  to  be 
allowed  to  survive,  and  that  the  Spartans  were  determined  to  put 
the  state  into  the  hands  of  men  whom  they  could  trust.  No  one 
was  surprised  when  an  oligarch  named  Dracontides  rose  in  the 
Ecclesia,  and  proposed  that  a  committee  of  thirty  citizens  should  be 
chosen  to  revise  the  constitution.  When  opposition  was  offered, 
Lysander  himself  appeared  in  the  assembly,  reminded  them  that 
they  were  in  his  power,  and  bade  them  take  counsel  for  their  per- 
sonal safety,  and  not  cavil  upon  points  of  constitutional 
law.  This  threat  silenced  all  opposition,  and  the  list  estabushedat 
of  thirty  names  which  Dracontides  brought  forward 
was  carried  without  demur.      It  included  the  names  of  many  of 


412  Sparta  Supreme  i?i  Greece.  [404b.c. 

the  returned  exiles,  and  was,  of  course,  composed  entirely  of  oligarchs. 
The  most  prominent  members  were  Critias,  an  exile  and  an  old 
member  of  the  Four  Hundred,  and  Theramenes,  who  had  once 
more  swerved  back  to  oligarchy  when  he  saw  that  the  tide  was 
now  running  in  its  favour — a  conversion  quite  in  keeping  with  his 
nickname  of  the  "  Turncoat."  ^ 

The  thirty  commissioners,  on  whom  later  generations  bestowed 
the  name  of  the  "  Thirty  Tyrants,"  were  designed  to  play  at  Athens 
the  part  which  the  Decarchies  carried  out  in  the  states  of  Asia. 
Tliough  nominally  appointed  only  to  revise  the  constitution,  they 
took  possession  of  every  function  of  government,  and  showed  no 
intention  whatever  of  laying  down  their  power.  Tliey  abolished 
the  Dicasteries  and  the  Ecclesia,  and  placed  all  jurisdiction  in 
the  hands  of  the  Boule,  which  they  had  first  purged  of  every 
member  who  was  not  a  declared  oligarch.  Having  thus  prepared 
the  judicial  machinery  for  making  away  with  any  one  who  should 
dare  to  oppose  them,  they  proceeded  to  strengthen  their  position  by 
asking  Lysander  to  grant  them  a  Sjiartan  garrison.  Accordingly 
seven  hundred  Peloponnesians  entered  the  town  under  a  Harmost 
named  Callibius,  and  took  possession  of  the  citadel. 

The  next  step  of  the  Thirty  was  to  commence  a  systematic  per- 
secution of  prominent  citizens  who  were  noted  for  their  democratic 
tendencies.  Several  ofiicers  who  had  served  with  distinction  during 
the  late  war  were  condemned  to  death  on  futile  pretexts.  Others 
— the  most  prominent  of  whom  was  Thrasybulus,  the  general  of 
the  democracy  at  Samos  (see  p.  385) — were  driven  into  exile.  The 
man,  however,  of  whom  the  Thirty  stood  in  the  greatest  fear  was 
Alcibiades,  who  might  at  any  time  return  to  Athens  and  head 
a  democratic  rising.  He  was  out  of  their  own  reach,  but  they 
besought  Lysander  to  see  to  him  ;  the  Spartan  passed  on  the 
request  to  the  satrap  Pharnabazus,  who  caused  Alcibiades  to  bo 
assassinated  as  he  was  travelling  through  Phrygia  on  his  way  to 
visit  the  court  of  Susa, 

The  first  proscriptions  which  the  Thirty  took  in  hand  were  purely 
political,  but  ere  long  they  began  to  extend  the  sphere  of  their 
operations.      Men  who  had  taken  no  prominent  part  in   politics, 

*  K.6dopvos,  from  the  name  of  the  buskin,  which  would  fit  the  right  or 
the  left  foot  equally  well. 


404  B.C.]      Ride  of  the  Thirty  Tyrants  at  Athens.  413 

but  were  personally  objectionable  to  members  of  the  Thirty,  were 
soon  included  in  the  list  of  victims.     Then  followed 

,  ,  .  ,  ,  ,  ,        Misrule  of  the 

many  whose  only  crime  was  that  they  were  wealthy,  Thirty 
and  that  their  lands  or  their  treasure  were  coveted  Tyra^J^t^ 
by  some  prominent  oligarch ;  among  these  the  most  noted  name 
was  that  of  Niceratus,  son  of  the  general  Nicias,  who  was  reputed 
the  richest  man  in  Athens.  After  these  atrocities  many  of  the 
Thirty  felt  that  they  had  gone  far  enough,  and  proposed  to  halt  in 
their  career  of  crime.  Theramenes,  who  perceived  that,  in  spite  of 
the  Spartan  garrison,  the  Athenian  people  would  be  driven  to  a 
rising  in  sheer  despair,  was  especially  urgent  on  the  side  of  modera- 
tion, and  his  colleagues  soon  began  to  suspect  that  he  was  on  the 
eve  of  one  of  his  periodical  conversions. 

Critias,  however,  backed  by  the  more  desperate  members  of  the 
gang,  was  determined  to  persevere.  The  only  precaution  which 
they  took  was  to  disarm  the  populace  before  proceeding  to  further 
extremities.  Having  first  drawn  up  a  list  of  three  thousand 
citizens  whom  they  thought  that  they  could  trust,  they  proclaimed 
that  this  body  alone  should  enjoy  full  civic  rights.  Then  they 
held  a  review  of  the  whole  armed  force  of  the  city,  summoning  the 
three  thousand  to  meet  in  the  market-place,  while  the  rest  of  the 
citizens  were  scattered  in  small  bodies  at  different  posts.  One  after 
another  these  bodies  were  confronted  by  the  Laconian  hoplites  of 
Callibius,  and  bidden  to  lay  down  their  arms.  They  obeyed,  and 
were  sent  away  disarmed  to  their  homes,  while  their  weapons  were 
stored  in  the  Acropolis.  Thus  the  three  thousand  were  the  only 
armed  force  left  in  the  state. 

Having  thus  stripped  the  people  of  their  arms,  Critias  and  his 
faction  launched  out  in  the  wildest  excesses,  and  Athens  experi- 
enced a  perfect  reign  of  terror.  Day  by  day  citizens  were  arrested, 
tried  on  the  most  frivolous  charges,  and  condemned  to  death.  No 
man  of  property  could  call  his  life  his  own,  for  the  appetite  of  the 
Thirty  for  confiscation  and  plunder  seemed  insatiable.  It  was  not 
only  citizens  that  suffered ;  the  wealth  of  the  metics,  or  resident 
aliens,  marked  them  out  as  fair  game,  and  ere  long  they  were  being 
imprisoned  and  slain  by  the  score.  The  legislation  of  the  Thirty 
was  as  despotic  as  their  administration ;  by  one  law  they  even 
forbade  every  one,  except  members  of  the  Three  Thousand,  to  dwell 


414  Sparta  Supreme  in  Greece.  [404B.c. 

in  Athens,  and  directed  all  other  classes  to  disperse  to  the  country 
denies. 

Every  one  except  Critias  and  his  immediate  followers  felt  that 
the  state  of  affairs  was  too  monstrous  to  last.  Theramenes  grew 
more  and  more  energetic  in  his  protests  against  the  policy  of  the 
majority,  till  they  came  to  consider  him  as  utterly  unbearable. 
Critias  then  resolved  to  rid  himself  of  his  over-squeamish  col- 
league ;  he  armed  a  considerable  body  of  his  friends  and  dependents, 
and  brought  them  to  the  doors  of  the  council-chamber  while  the 
senate  was  in  session.  He  then  propounded  two  decrees,  one 
allowing  the  Thirty  to  put  to  death,  without  trial,  any  one  who 
was  not  a  member  of  the  Three  Thousand,  the  other  expelling 
from  the  Three  Thousand  any  one  who  had  opposed  the  Four 
Hundred  in  B.C.  411.  The  decrees  were  obviously  aimed  at 
Theramenes,  who  sprang  to  his  feet  and  began  to  defend  himself. 
(Execution  of  When  he  appeared  to  be  carrying  the  senate  with 
Theramenes.  j^jj^-j^  Critias  ordered  his  armed  men  to  enter  the  house, 
crying  out  that  he  would  not  allow  the  senate  to  be  deceived  by 
specious  words,  and  that  his  friends  were  come  to  see  that  justice 
was  done  on  a  traitor.  "  It  is,"  he  added,  "  now  enacted  that 
no  one  in  the  list  of  the  Three  Thousand  shall  be  put  to  death 
without  a  regular  vote  passed  by  you,  but  I  hereby  strike  out 
the  name  of  Theramenes  from  the  list,  and  thus  we  are  able  to 
condemn  him  to  death." 

Theramenes  sprang  to  the  altar  which  stood  in  the  midst  of  the 
council-chamber,  and  clung  to  it,  adjuring  the  senators  by  every 
plea,  human  and  divine,  to  see  that  he  was  not  made  away  with  in 
this  atrocious  style.  But  the  ministers  of  death  tore  him  from  the 
sanctuary,  dragged  him  straight  to  prison,  and  compelled  him  to 
drink  the  fatal  hemlock.  He  died  with  a  courage  that  surprised 
his  enemies — a  bitter  taunt  at  Critias  on  his  lips.  His  fate  served 
to  show  the  Athenians  that  not  even  the  most  studious  trimming 
and  time-serving  would  enable  a  man  to  be  sure  of  his  life  while 
the  Thirty  were  in  power. 

Even  before  Theramenes  was  dead,  the  storm  was  brewing  which 

Thrasybiiius    '^''T-S  to  sweep  Critias  and  his  satellites  from  the  helm 

and  the  exiles,  ^f  affairs.     So  many  citizens  had  by  this  time  fled 

abroad,  that  Thebes,  Megara,  and   the   other  cities   near  Athens 


403  B.C.]  Thrasyhiilus  seizes  Peiraeus.  415 

were  crowded  with  refugees.  At  Thebes  they  were  so  uumerous 
that  after  a  time  Thrasybulus,  who  had  settled  in  that  town,  was 
able  to  gather  a  hundred  men  resolute  enough  to  make  a  desperate 
attempt  to  free  Athens,  Some  Boeotian  friends  supplied  him  with 
arms  and  provisions  for  this  little  band  ;  and  he  then  crossed  the 
Attic  frontier  and  seized  the  deserted  fort  of  Phyle.  The  Thirty  at 
first  paid  little  attention  to  the  adventurers,  but  presently  sent  an 
expedition  to  storm  the  castle.  Its  first  assault  failed,  and  a  heavy 
fall  of  snow  drove  it  back  to  Athens.  V/hen  a  second  force  was 
sent  out,  Thrasybulus,  whose  band  had  now  swelled  to  seven 
hundred  men,  fell  upon  it  in  the  night  and  put  it  to  the  rout. 

Encouraged  by  this  success,  the  exiles  marched  boldly  on,  and 
threw  themselves  into  Peiraeus.  The  walls  of  the  harbour-city  had 
been  destroyed  by  Lysander,  but  its  streets  offered  Battle  in 
great  facilities  for  defence.  Thrasybulus  ranged  his  I'eiraeus. 
men  on  the  slope  of  the  hill  of  Munychia,  and  waited  to  be 
attacked;  hundreds  of  citizens  had  now  joined  him,  but  they  Avere 
destitute  of  armour,  and  were  forced  to  make  themselves  wicker 
shields,  and  to  turn  to  account  any  miscellaneous  weapons  that 
came  to  hand.  Presently  the  forces  of  the  Thirty  were  seen  coming 
down  from  Athens ;  Critias  himself  led  on  the  Three  Thousand, 
while  Callibius  supported  him  with  the  seven  hundred  Pelopon- 
nesians  of  the  garrison.  They  advanced  in  a  solid  column  along 
the  street  which  leads  up  to  the  hill  of  Munychia,  and  met 
the  exiles  on  the  slope.  But  their  superior  numbers  were  of  no 
avail  in  the  narrow  way,  while  the  missiles  which  were  showered 
upon  them  from  over  the  heads  of  Thrasybulus'  men  told  fatally 
on  their  crowded  ranks.  After  a  few  minutes  of  hand-to-hand 
fighting  the  oligarchs  gave  way,  and  rolled  backwards  toward 
Athens,  leaving  Critias  and  seventy  more  dead  on  the  hillside. 

This  disastrous  failure  led  to  fierce  dissensions  among  the  defeated 
party.  The  surviving  members  of  the  Thirty  and  the  Anarchy  at 
other  partisans  of  Critias,  finding  themselves  in  the  Athens, 
minority,  had  to  fly  to  Eleusis,  which  they  had  already  prepared 
as  a  fortress  in  time  of  need  by  slaying  all  the  Eleusiaians — no  less 
than  three  hundred  in  number — who  were  known  to  be  partisans 
of  democracy.  Here  they  made  ready  to  defend  themselves,  and 
sent  urgent  appeals  for  aid  to  Sparta'.     To  succeed  them  ten  more 


4i6  Sparta  Supreme  in  Greece.  (403 bc 

oligarchs  were  elected,  who  still  refused  to  come  to  terms  with 
Thrasybulus.  Some  desultory  fighting  took  place  outside  the  walls 
of  Athens,  but  it  was  soon  ended  by  the  news  that  a  Spartan  array 
and  fleet  were  approaching.  It  remained  to  be  seen  what  course 
the  Spartan  government  would  adopt,  and  of  this  there  was 
considerable  doubt.  Lysander's  party  were  for  aiding  the  Thirty 
to  reconquer  Athens,  and  Lysander  himself  hurried  to  the  spot 
to  support  his  proteges.  But  the  relations  between  the  nauarch 
and  the  ephors  was  at  that  moment  drawing  towards  their  final 
rupture,  and,  luckily  for  Athens,  any  measure  that  Lysander 
favoured  was  sure  to  be  bitterly  opposed.  Accordingly  the  ephors 
sent  out  King  Pausanias  to  take  over  the  command  of  the  army 
in  Attica,  knowing  that  he  was  a  declared  enemy  of  Lysander's 
policy.  Pausanias  was  a  man  of  generous  sentiments  and  ajiproved 
moderation;  he  had  the  old  Spartan  hatred  for  tyi-anny,  and  was 
determined  to  do  nothing  for  the  detestable  gang  at  Eleusis. 
Instead  of  falling  upon  the  democrats  at  Peiraeus  and  crushing 
_,         .       them,  he  undertook  to  reconcile  them  to  the  party 

Pausanias  '  ^      •' 

pacifies  which  held  the  city  of  Athens.  Even  when  he 
became  involved  in  a  skirmish  with  the  troops  of 
Thrasybulus,  and  saw  several  Spartan  officers  slain,  he  was  not 
to  be  diverted  from  his  pacific  design.  With  some  trouble  he 
induced  both  sides  to  accept  his  good  offices.  The  ten  oligarchs 
in  the  city  were  replaced  by  another  board  who  were  ready  to 
treat  for  peace,  and  then  Pausanias  after  settling  the  terms  of 
reconciliation,  took  his  army  home.  By  the  new  agreement  all 
the  existing  magistrates  in  the  city  were  deposed,  and  superseded 
by  regularly  elected  strategi ;  all  the  exiles  were  restored  to  their 
property  and  civic  rights,  while  the  ohgarchs  and  their  followers 
were  to  be  allowed  to  depart  to  Eleusis  undisturbed.  To  mark  the 
end  of  the  time  of  troubles,  a  solemn  thanksgiving  was  held,  and 
new  archons  chosen.  The  name  of  Pythodorus,  who  had  held  the 
post  of  eponymous  archon  under  the  Thirty,  was  solemnly  expunged 
from  the  official  lists  of  the  state,  and  the  period  during  which  he 
presided  was  denommated  "  the  year  of  anarchy."  Thus  sixteen 
months  after  Lysander  had  captured  Athens  the  old  constitution 
was  restored  to  the  much-tried  city  (September,  403  B.C.). 

The  Thirty  came  to  an  ill  end.     Abandoned  by  Sparta,  they  still 


401  B.C.I       The  Expedition  of  Cynis  the  Younger.  417 

held  out  at  Eleusis  for  a  long  time  ;  but  at  last  they  were  reduced 
to  ask  for  terms.  When  their  leaders  came  into  the  Athenian 
camp  to  endeavour  to  enter  hito  a  negotiation,  they  were  suddenly 
fallen  upon  and  slain  by  the  infuriated  soldiery.  The  rest  escaped 
abroad  and  died  in  exile. 

Athens  was  now  once  more  a  democracy,  but  she  still  remained  a 
humble  vassal  of  Sparta,  bound  to  follow  her  lead  in  all  matters  of 
foreign  policy,  and  to  send  her  contingents  of  men  and  ships  when- 
ever called  upon.  Years  were  to  elapse  before  the  city  that  had 
once  ruled  the  Aegean  was  able  to  exercise  any  influence  on  the 
affairs  of  Greece. 

The  settlement  of  the  nitevnal  quarrels  of  the  Athenians  was  by 
no  means  the  only  task  that  fell  to  the  lot  of  Sparta  in  the  years 
immediately   following   the  Peloponnesian   war.      In       sparta 

402  B.C.  she  fell  upon  Elis,  partly  in  revenge  of  the  coa<i"ers  Eiis. 
old  injury  caused  by  the  disloyal  behaviour  of  the  Eleans  in  the 
Mantinean  war  (see  p.  343),  partly  on  account  of  new  causes  of 
quarrtl  In  two  campaigns  the  troops  of  Elis  were  beaten  out 
of  the  field,  her  territory  ravaged  from  end  to  end,  and  all  her 
subject  districts  taken  from  her  and  restored  to  independence. 

But  events  of  far  greater  importance  were  occurring  in  Asia  Minor. 
In  404  B.C.  King  Darius  II.  of  Persia  died,  and  was  succeeded  by 
his  eldest  son  Artaxerxes  II.  Cyrus,  his  younger  son,  ^^^  expedition 
the  friend  and  ally  of  Lysander,  had  long  been  schem-      of  cyrus. 

401  B  C. 

ing  to  obtain  the  crown,  through  the  influence  of  his 
mother,  the  queen  Parysatis,  who  had  done  her  best  to  induce  her 
husband  to  pass  over  his  first  born,  and  leave  the  throne  to  her 
favourite.  When  his  plans  were  foiled  by  the  death  of  Darius,  the 
ambitious  young  prince  determined  to  obtain  by  force  what  he  could 
not  win  by  intrigue.  lie  made  large  levies  of  native  troops  in  his 
satrapies,  but  rested  his  main  hopes  on  collecting  a  strong  body  of 
Greek  mercenaries.  Cyrus  was  a  man  of  brilliant  talents,  and  had 
learnt,  by  continual  intercourse  with  his  Spartan  friends,  the  best 
ways  of  dealing  with  Hellenes.  His  personality  was  so  attractive 
and  his  service  so  profitable,  that  he  had  no  difficulty  in  getting 
together  as  many  men  as  he  needed.  Over  thirteen  thousand 
boplites,  under  Clearchus,  once  Spartan  llarinost  of  Byzantium,  and 
other  chiefs,  were  at  last  gathered  beneath  his  banner. 


41 8  Sparta  Supretne  in  Greece.  |401bc. 

Knowing  the  dread  with  which  the  Greeks  regarded  the  vast 
distances  of  the  Persian  empire,  Cyrus  did  not  tell  his  merce- 
naries the  real  object  of  his  march,  but  persuaded  them  that  he 
was  about  to  attack  the  predatory  tribes  of  Southern  Asia  Minor. 
Insensibly  he  led  them  eastward  till  they  found  themselves  close 
to  the  Euphrates,  and  so  far  committed  to  the  expedition  that  it 
was  hard  to  turn  back.  A  heavy  increase  of  pay  soon  persuaded 
them  to  pass  on  into  Mesopotamia  and  commence  their  march  on 
Susa.  King  Artaxerxes  and  his  army  did  not  make  their  appear- 
ance till  Cyrus  was  within  a  few  days'  journey  of  Babylon.  But 
„     ,     „     hard  by  Cunaxa  the  Persian  host  came  suddenly  in 

Battle  of         .  •'  -^ 

Cunaxa,  sight,  stretching  for  miles  over  the  plain,  and  out- 
numbering by  tenfold  the  army  of  Cyrus.  A  battle 
immediately  followed,  in  which  the  Greeks  on  the  right  wing  of 
the  rebel  army  routed  all  that  was  opposed  to  them.  But  Cjtus 
himself  was  slain,  as  he  pushed  forward  with  a  handful  of  horse- 
men in  a  foolhardy  attempt  to  pierce  Artaxerxes'  body-guard  and 
end  the  struggle  by  the  death  of  his  brother. 

The  native  troops  of  the  rebel  prince  at  once  dispersed,  and  the 
Greeks  found  themselves  stranded  in  the  midst  of  Mesopotamia, 
T,  .      ..   ^.,     hundreds  of  miles  from  the  sea,  without  a  cause  for 

Retreat  of  the  ' 

Ten  Thousand,  which  to  fight  or  a  guide  to  show  them  the  way  home. 
When  they  attempted  to  negotiate  for  an  inimolested 
retreat,  the  satrap  Tissaphernes  lured  Clearchus  and  their  other 
leaders  to  a  conference  and  massacred  them.  All  that  they  could  do 
was  to  close  their  ranks,  elect  new  officers — among  them  Xenoj^hon, 
the  historian  of  the  expedition — and  attempt  to  force  their  passage 
northward  into  the  Armeniaii  mountains,  where  the  power  of  Persia 
could  hardly  reach  them.  In  spite  of  the  continual  attacks  of  the 
horsemen  of  Tissaphernes,  the  Greeks  contrived  to  make  their  way 
along  the  Tigris  and  past  the  ruins  of  Nineveh,  till  they  were  able 
to  leave  the  plains  and  their  harassing  enemy  behind.  But  when 
they  plunged  into  the  mountains  of  Armenia  their  task  was  no 
easier ;  almost  without  exception  the  tribes  of  the  hill  country 
turned  out  in  arms  against  them.  Passes  were  blocked  and 
villages  burned  at  their  approach,  and  they  had  to  fight  for  every 
inch  of  their  way.  "Wiien  the  winter  fell,  and  they  found  them- 
selves  compelled   to   wade   through   miles   of  snow-drift  in   the 


400B.C.J  Retreat  of  the  Ten  Thousand.  419 

country  of  the  fierce  Carduchians,  their  courage  had  almost  failed 
them.  But  they  hardened  their  hearts,  pushed  steadily  northward, 
and  were  at  last  rewarded  by  the  sight  of  the  Euxine  stretching  at 
their  feet.  A  few  days  more  brought  them  to  Trapezus,  and  put 
them  once  more  in  touch  with  the  Hellenic  world,  after  twelve 
months  of  wandering.  But  even  now  their  troubles  were  not 
ended ;  every  Greek  city  looked  with  suspicion  on  a  band  of 
unemployed  mercenaries  still  ten  thousand  strong,  and  the  army 
was  refused  help,  sent  on  bootless  errands,  and  finally  stranded  in 
Thrace  in  a  desperate  and  starving  condition.  Just  as  it  was 
about  to  disperse,  war  broke  out  between  Persia  and  Sparta,  and 
the  remnant  of  the  much-tried  army  of  Cyrus  was  taken  into  the 
pay  of  the  Lacedaemonian  general  Thibron  (399  B.C.). 

A  graphic  account  of  the  extraordmary  wanderings  of  the  Ten 
Thousand  has  come  down  to  us,  from  the  pen  of  Xenophon  the 
Athenian,  one  of  the  generals  chosen  after  Cunaxa  to  replace  the 
victims  of  the  treachery  of  Tissaphernes.  We  can  judge  from  it 
the  vivid  impression  which  the  adventures  of  the  companions  of 
Cyrus  made  on  the  Greek  mind.  They  had  proved  that  it  was 
possible  to  penetrate,  without  meeting  with  opposition,  into  the 
heart  of  the  dominions  of  the  Great  King,  and  that  a  Greek  army 
of  adequate  size,  under  skilful  generalship,  might  be  trusted  to  go 
anywhere  and  do  anything  in  Asia.  It  was  not  long  before  the 
lesson  was  turned  to  use,  for  war  with  the  Persian  had  just  been 
declared  by  the  Spartan  government.  Before  Cyrus  had  started 
on  his  expedition  he  had  made  application  for  assistance  to  his  old 
friends  at  Sparta ;  his  request  was  granted,  and — although  it  was 
destined  to  bring  him  no  assistance — a  Spartan  fleet  was  sent  to 
the  coast  of  Cilicia.  This  action  had  not  brought  on  any  actual 
collision  with  Persia,  but  it  had  provoked  Artaxerxes,  and  made 
war  inevitable.  After  Cunaxa  had  been  fought,  the  king  desjialched 
Tissaphernes  to  Asia  Minor,  investing  him  with  all  the  power  which 
had  formerly  been  in  the  hands  of  Cyrus.  Immediately  on  his 
arrival  the  satrap  set  to  work  to  subdue  the  Greek  towns  of  the 
Ionian  and  Aeolian  coast,  to  which  he  claimed  a  right  under  the 
terms  of  his  treaty  with  Astyochus  in  412  B.C.  Knowing  that 
they  were  bound  to  come  into  collision  sooner  or  later  with  the 
king,  the  Spartans  resolved  to  declare  war  before  the  cities  fell. 


420  Sparta  Supreme  ifi  Griecd.  [390  b.c. 

Accordingly,  when  Tissaphernes  laid  siege  to  Cyme  ia  the  early 
,„     ^  ^  sprinc;  of  399  B.C.,  the  ephors  sent  to  its  aid  a  small 

War  between    i        o  '  i 

Sparta  and  armycomposed  of  One  thousand  Lacouian  Pel  ioeci,  three 
thousand  I'elopounesians,  and  three  hundred  cavalry 
requisitioned  from  Athens.'  Thibron,  the  officer  placed  in  com- 
mand, was  directed  to  enlist  in  his  army  the  contingents  of  all  the 
states  of  Ionia ;  but  he  found  them  ill  disposed  to  help  him,  on 
account  of  the  way  in  which  they  had  been  treated  since  the  fall 
of  Athens.  The  only  important  reinforcement  which  he  was  able 
to  raise  was  composed  of  the  remains  of  the  Ten  Thousand.  Even 
with  their  aid  he  accomplished  no  more  tlian  the  deliverance  of 
some  of  the  Greek  towns  of  Acolis. 

But  when  the  feeble  Thibron  was  succeeded  by  Dercyllidas,  an 
officer  of  energy  and  merit,  the  tide  of  war  took  a  decided  turn  in 
favour  of  Sparta,  and  place  after  place  in  the  Troad  and  Aeolis  fell 
before  the  new  general.  In  the  next  spring  he  shifted  his  opera- 
tions southward,  having  reduced  Pharnabazus,  the  satrap  of  the 
Hellespont,  to  such  straits  that  he  was  glad  to  conclude  a  truce. 
Dercyllidas  had  now  to  do  with  Tissaphernes  and  the  Persian 
forces  in  Lydia  and  Caria ;  he  found  this  enemy  also  more  inclined 
to  negotiate  than  to  fight.  When  bidden  to  "leave  the  Greek  cities 
free,"  Tissaphernes  did  not  refuse,  but  only  made  conditions  about 
the  simultaneous  withdrawal  of  the  Si>artan  army  and  of  his  own 
from  the  coast-land.  No  permanent  understanding,  however,  had 
been  reached,  when  affairs  suddenly  took  a  new  turn. 

A  new  reign  had  at  this  moment  commenced  in  Sparta.     King 

Agis,  the  commander  of  so  many  expeditions  during  the  Pelopon- 

^  nesian  war,  had  lately  died :  he  left  a  son,  Leotychides, 

Accession  of  j  ^  ■>  i  j  ■• 

Agesiiaus,  to  whom  the  crown  would  naturally  have  passed. 
But  ugly  rumours  prevailed  about  the  parentage  of 
this  prince ;  it  was  asserted  by  many  that  he  was  no  true  son  of  Agis, 
but  the  offspring  of  Alcibiades,  who  was  known  to  have  seduced  the 
king's  young  wife  during  his  stay  at  Sparta  (see  p.  379).  Accord- 
ingly Agesilaus,  the  brother  of  Agis,  put  forward  a  claim  to  the 
throne.     He  was  warmly  supported  by  Lysander,  who  had  long  been 

1  The  knights  at  Athens  had  strongly  supported  the  Thirty,  and  the 
government  punished  them  on  this  occasion  by  selecting  the  whole  three 
hundred  from  among  the  prominent  oligarchs. 


399  B.C.]  Agesilaus,  King  of  Sparta.  421 

liis  guide  and  comi:»anioD,  and  believed  that  he  had  found  in  him  a 
fitting  instrument  for  bringing  about  the  reform  of  the  Spartan 
state-system.  Agesilaus  had  readied  the  age  of  forty,  but  had  never 
yet  held  any  command  or  office  of  importance.  He  was  of  small 
stature  and  insignificant  appearance :  moreover,  he  was  lame  of  one 
foot.  Though  he  had  won  considerable  popularity  from  his  courteous 
and  kindly  disposition,  no  one  looked  upon  him  as  a  man  of  mark  ; 
it  was  universally  believed  that  he  was  a  mere  tool  cf  Lysander. 
The  contest  for  the  throne  was,  therefore,  a  new  trial  of  strength 
between  the  ephors  and  the  victor  of  Aegospotami.  It  was 
decided  before  the  Apella,  less  by  inquiry  into  evidence  than  by 
appeals  to  prophecies  and  oracles.  When  the  supporters  of  Leoty- 
chides  produced  a  venerable  saying  which  warned  Sparta  against 
"a  lame  reign,"  and  referred  it  to  Agesilaus'  personal  deformity, 
Lysander  skilfully  turned  the  argument  against  them  by  declaring 
that  the  words  really  meant  the  reign  of  a  king  of  doubtful  pedi- 
gree. Finally  the  vote  went  in  favour  of  Agesilaus,  who  ascended 
the  throne  late  in  the  year  399  b  c. 

Lysander  had  in  reality  provided  himself  with  a  master  and  not 
with  a  servant,  for  the  new  king  concealed  beneath  his  insignificant 
exterior  more  energy  and  intelligence  than  any  Spartan  ruler  since 
the  unfortunate  Cleomenes,  Agesilaus  had  resolved  to  assert  the 
old  power  of  the  royal  house,  and  had  availed  himself  of  the 
support  of  Lysander  only  for  his  own  purposes.  However,  he  and 
his  councillor  were  entirely  at  one  in  their  views  on  foreign  policy ; 
both  were  eager  to  push  on  the  war  against  Persia,  having  a  fixed 
belief  that  the  expulsion  of  the  Great  King  from  the  whole  of  Asia 
Minor  would  be  a  feasible  task.  Accordingly  they  used  their 
influence  in  the  state  to  secure  the  appointment  of  Agesilaus  as 
the  successor  of  Dercyllidas,  and  in  397  B.C.  carried  their  point. 
The  king  was  authorized  to  take  with  him  thirty  Spartans  as  a 
council  of  war,  with  Lysander  at  their  head,  and  to  raise  two 
thousand  Laconian  perioeci  and  six  thousand  troops  of  the  allies 
for  service  across  the  seas. 

When  the  contingents  for  this  expedition  were  called  in,  the 
first  grave  symptoms  of  discontent  against  the  Spartan  hegemony 
that  had  yet  been  noted  made  themselves  visible.  Thebes,  Corinth, 
and  Athens  all  refused  to  supply  the  force  that  was  demanded  from 


422  Sparta  Supreme  in  Greece.  iseTs.c. 

thcni.  The  Athenians  alleged  poverty  and  weakness ;  the  Corinthians 
unfavourable  omens  from  their  national  gods;  but  the  Thebans 
made  no  excuses,  and  simply  sent  a  blank  refusal.  Nor  was  this 
all ;  Agesilaus  was  anxious  to  commence  his  undertaking — the 
Aeesiiaus  sets  first  important  invasion  of  Asia  by  a  Hellenic  armj 
out  for  Asia  ^l^J^(;  ij^d  occurred  for  ages — with  a  solemn  and  im- 
pressive ceremony.  Before  departing  he  went  to  Aulis  on  the 
Euripus,  the  port  from  which  Agamemnon  had  set  forth  to  the  siege 
of  Troy,  and  offered  sacrifice  to  the  gods  of  the  land  in  imitation 
uf  his  mythical  predecessor.  The  ceremony  was  hardly  completed, 
the  fires  were  still  burning,  and  the  victims  not  wholly  consumed, 
when  a  party  of  Theban  horse  rode  up,  cast  down  the  altars, 
extinguished  the  flames,  and  bade  the  king  in  the  rudest  way  to 
depart  from  their  territory.  Agesilaus  was  constrained  to  go  on 
board  at  once,  and  sailed  away  to  meet  his  troop-sliii)s,  which  were 
lying  oft'  the  southern  cape  of  Euboea.  From  that  day  he  nourished 
a  fierce  and  not  inexcusable  hatred  against  the  whole  Theban  race. 
When  Agesilaus  landed  in  Asia  he  was  at  once  met  by  envoys 
from  Tissaphernes,  who  made  great  protestations  of  their  master's 
desire  to  satisfy  the  Spartan  government.  The  satrap  had  taken 
fright  at  the  arrival  of  such  large  reinforcements  for  the  army  of 
Dercyllidas,  and  was  anxious  to  divert  the  impending  attack.  For 
a  short  time  Agesilaus  listened  to  his  proposals,  and  consented  to 
conclude  a  truce,  but  ere  long  he  discovered  the  hoUowness  of  the 
negotiation  into  which  he  had  been  entrapped,  and  set  to  work  in 
good  earnest  to  subdue  the  Lydiaa  and  Mysian  inland  which  lay 
behind  the  Greek  cities  of  the  coast.  Before  actual  operations 
began,  the  king  was  compelled  to  engage  in  a  trial  of  strength 
with  Lysander.  When  the  victor  of  Aegospotami  arrived  in  Ionia 
he  had  at  once  been  surrounded  by  crowds  of  his  old  dependents, 
who  ignored  the  king  and  paid  court  to  his  councillor  alone. 
Agesilaus  soon  showed  resentment  by  deliberately  refusing  all 
Second  petitions  preferred  in  behalf  of  Lysander's  friends,  and 
disgrace  of  by  rejecting  any  advice  that  came  to  him  from  that 
quarter.  Ere  long  a  stormy  scene  ensued ;  Lysander 
taunted  the  king  with  ingratitude,  and  was  bidden  in  return  to 
remember  that  the  friend  who  presumes  too  much  on  past  services 
becomes  unbearable.    Finding  Agesilaus  quite  _bevond  his  control, 


396 B.C.]  Campaigns  of  Agesilaus  in  Asia.  423 

Lysander  was  driven,  when  he  came  to  a  cahiier  mood,  to  solicit 
employment  in  some  region  where  his  humiliation  might  not  be 
too  evident.  The  king  consented,  and  gave  him  command  of  the 
Spartan  forces  on  the  Hellespont,  where  he  did  good  service  against 
Pharnabazus,  until  he  was  called  home  at  the  end  of  the  year. 

Now  that  he  was  freed  from  the  tutelage  of  Lysander,  Agesilaus 
proceeded  to  conduct  the  war  on  his  own  system.  He  made 
Ephesus  his  head-quarters  and  base  of  operations,  and  from  it 
struck  alternately  north  and  south,  carrying  his  incursions  up  to 
the  gates  of  Sardis,  and  penetrating  far  into  Mysia  and  Caria.  He 
drove  Pharnabazus  out  of  Dascylium,  the  capital  of  his  satrapy,  and 
compelled  him  to  migrate  inland  with  all  his  family  and  treasures. 
A  rapid  pursuit  and  a  fortunate  engagement  enabled  him  to  seize 
the  Persian's  camp  and  all  the  wealth  it  contained — a  sum  which 
sufficed  to  maintain  his  army  for  several  months.  The  troops 
of  Tissaphernes  also  suffered  such  constant  reverses  successes  of 
at  the  hands  of  Agesilaus,  that  King  Artaxerxes  was  "tn  Asia"^ 
fain  to  believe  that  his  representative  was  designedly  396  395  B.C. 
mismanaging  the  war.  Accordingly  he  had  the  old  satrap  beheaded, 
and  appointed  in  his  stead  an  officer  named  Tithraustes.  But  the 
new  governor  fared  no  better  than  his  predecessor;  Agesilaus 
refused  to  listen  to  proposals  fur  an  accommodation,  and  pushed  his 
incursions  further  and  further  inland.  ^loreover,  he  stirred  up  the 
native  tribes,  especially  the  Paphlagonians,  against  their  suzerain, 
and  raised  numerous  auxiliary  troops  from  among  them.  Even 
discontented  Persians  of  rank  began  to  pass  over  to  his  camp,  and 
to  array  their  retainers  among  the  Spartan  auxiliaries.  The  whole 
of  Western  Asia  Minor  seemed  to  be  slipping  out  of  the  hands 
of  the  Great  King.  The  Greeks  of  Ionia,  when  they  saw  how 
the  war  was  going,  were  induced  to  view  the  Spartan  domination 
Avith  kinder  eyes;  they  began  to  make  contributions  of  money 
with  some  approach  to  enthusiasm,  and  even  enlisted  in  considerable 
numbers  in  the  ranks  of  Agesilaus.  A  large  and  efficient  body  of 
cavalry  was  formed  from  among  them,  by  inviting  their  chief  men 
to  serve  in  that  arm ;  some  came  themselves,  but  the  majority 
furnished  and  paid  substitutes,  Avho  proved  much  more  amenable 
to  discipline  than  the  Ionian  oligarchs  would  have  been.  But  the 
chief  use  to  which  Agesilaus  intended  to  turn  the  Asiatic  Greeks 


424  Sparta  Supreme  in  Greece.  [395 b.c, 

was  to  make  them  provide  him  witli  a  fleet.  By  a  special  grant 
from  Sparta  he  was  given  the  authoritj''  of  nauarcli  as  well  as  tliat 
of  general.  Then  he  requisitioned  one  himdred  and  twenty  ships 
from  the  Ionian  and  Cariaa  cities,  and  placed  his  brother-in-law 
Peisander  at  their  head.  This  force  was  intended  to  fall  upon  the 
south  coast  of  Asia  Minor ;  while  the  Spartan  army,  now  more  than 
twenty  thousand  strong,  and  in  high  spirits  and  efficiency,  marched 
eastward  to  conquer  the  central  districts  of  the  peninsula. 

To  all  appearance  the  Persian  power  in  Asia  Minor  was  now 
doomed.  But  Agesilaus  was  not  destined  to  forestall  Alexander 
the  Great.  There  was  one  resource  still  remaining  to  the  Great 
King;  he  might  stir  up  war  in  Europe  to  distract  the  attention  of 
the  Spartans  from  Asia.  This  line  was  now  adopted.  Tithraustes 
sent  across  the  Aegean  a  Ehodian  named  Tiraocrates,  giving  him 
fifty  talents  of  silver,  and  bidding  him  use  it  to  rouse  the  leading 
men  in  the  states  that  were  known  to.  be  discontented  wuth  the 
Spartan  dominion.  The  mission  was  happily  timed,  and  its  success 
effectually  stopped  the  operations  of  Agesilaus,  and  gave  the  Persian 
power  a  new  lease  of  life  for  fifty  years. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

ATTEMPTS   TO   OVERTHROW   THE   SPARTAN   SUPREMACY 

395-387  B.C. 

The  emissary  of  Tithraustcs  found  the  task  of  stirring  up  a 
diversion  in  Europe  an  easy  one.  Tlie  states  wliich  had  used 
Sparta  as  their  instrument  for  the  overthrow  of  Athens  had  long 
been  chafing  against  the  new  ruler  whom  they  had  given  them- 
selves. More  especially  was  feeling  running  high  in  the  larger 
.cities,  which  had  policies  and  ambitions  of  their  own,  but  were 
compelled  to  subordinate  them  to  the  interests  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians. Adhering  in  one  point  at  least  to  the  programme 
which  they  had  published  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Peloponnesian 
war,  the  ephors  had  set  themselves  to  encourage  local  autonomy, 
by  isolating  state  from  state  among  their  allies,  and  by  sui:>porting 
cantonal  independence,  so  long  as  it  was  consistent  with  a  general 
deference  to  the  commands  of  Sparta.  It  resulted  that  the  smaller 
states  throughout  Greece  looked  to  Sparta  for  protection  from  their 
larger  neighbours,  while  the  latter  found  the  Spartan  supremacy 
a  complete  bar  to  any  farther  extension  of  their  power  and 
influence.  In  Boeotia,  for  example,  there  were  always  two  parties ; 
Thebes  was  continually  striving  to  turn  the  loose  league  of  cities 
into  a  centralized  confederation  dependent  on  herself,  but  Orcho- 
menus,  Thespiae,  and  the  other  towns  which  clung  to  their  local 
independence,  could  always  check  her  by  calling  in  the  aid  of 
Sparta.  Roughly  speaking,  the  larger  states  of  Greece  were 
anxious  to  rid  themselves  of  their  new  suzerain,  and  obtain  a  free 
scope  for  their  ambition,  while  the  smaller  were  ready  to  support 
Sparta,  oppressive  though  she  might  be,  in  order  to  guarantee 
themselves  from  the  worse  evils  of  servitude  to  their  immediate 
neighbours. 


426     Attempts  to  overthrow  the  Spartan  Supremacy.     3953.0. 

The  Thebans  had  shown  their  discontent  some  years  before  by 
the  insult  which  they  had  inflicted  on  Agcsilaus  (see  p.  422),  and 

Thebes  pro-   were  now  the  leaders  in  open  revolt  against  Sparta. 

^"^o^war^*^**  Their  most  popular  statesman,  Ismenias,  influenced  by 
395  B.C.  patriotism  and  ambition  even  more  than  by  the  Persian 
gold  of  Timocrates,  determined  to  put  himself  in  communication 
with  the  malcontents  in  other  states,  and  to  bring  about  a  collision. 
Having  assured  himself  of  the  co-operation  of  Argos — who,  now  as 
always,  was  hungering  after  the  lands  of  her  neighbours  of  Epi- 
daurus  and  Phlius — and  of  Corinth,  he  took  the  decisive  step. 
The  Locrians  of  Opus,  old  dependents  of  Thebes,  were  encouraged 
to  raid  upon  the  lauds  of  the  Phocians,  a  tribe  whose  loyalty  to 
Sparta  was  undoubted.  The  injured  Phocians  appealed  to  their 
suzerain,  while  Thebes  at  once  sent  her  army  into  the  field  to 
assist  the  Locrians.  Sparta  then  declared  war,  without  knowing 
that  she  was  thereby  committed  to  a  struggle  not  merely  with 
Thebes,  but  with  Corinth  and  Argos,  whose  governments  had  not 
yet  declared  themselves. 

While  King  Pausanias,  with  the  contingents  of  the  Pelopon- 
nesus, was  directed  to  cross  the  Isthmus  and  invade  Boeotia  from 
the  south,  Lysander  was  once  more  drawn  from  his  retirement  and 
placed  in  command  of  a  second  army.  With  a  small  Laconian 
contingent  he  crossed  the  Corinthian  Gulf  and  threw  himself  into 
Phocis,  where  he  gathered  together  the  mountain  tribes,  the 
Malians,  Phocians,  and  Oetaeans,  for  a  raid  into  the  plain  of  the 
Cephissus.  The  Orchomenians,  too,  broke  away  from  the  Boeotian 
League,  joined  the  Spartan,  and  declared  war  on  their  Theban 
neighbours. 

Before  a  blow  had  been  struck  the  Thebans  succeeded  in  enlisting 
another  ally  in  their  cause.     Athens  had  been  for  the  last  eight 

Athens  since  Y^ars  endeavouring  to  live  down  her  civil  broils  and 
403  B.C.  to  fall  back  into  her  old  manner  of  life.  But  the 
crimes  of  the  Thirty  were  not  easy  to  forget,  and  a  bitterness  per- 
vaded political  life  which  exceeded  anything  that  had  prevailed  in 
the  days  before  the  Pdoponnesian  war.  Prosecutions  which,  what- 
ever their  form,  were  really  inspired  by  political  grudges  were  always 
rife.  The  best  known  among  them  is  that  Avliich  led  to  the  con- 
demnation and  death  of  the  philosopher  Socrates.     Though  per- 


395  B.C.]  Battle  of  Haliarttis.  427 

sonally  blameless,  he  had  been  the  tutor  and  associate  of  Critias, 
Theramenes,  Pythodorus,  and  others  of  the  worst  of  the  oligarchs. 
Moreover,  his  philosophic  inquiries  into  every  sphere  of  morality 
and  politics  shocked  conservative  citizens,  and  his  restless  love  of 
disputation  had  made  him  many  personal  enemies.  When  prose- 
cuted by  the  democratic  leader  Anytus  for  "  corrupting  the  youth 
and  practismg  impiety,"  he  vindicated  his  manner  of  life,  but 
would  make  no  further  defence ;  he  was  condemned  by  the  dicas- 
tery,  and  drank  the  fatal  hemlock  (399  B.C.). 

Many  of  the  best  citizens  of  Athens  thought  that  a  foreign  war 
was  the  best  way  of  rousing  their  fellows  from  civil  bickerings,  and 
Thrasybiilus,  the  hero  of  B.C.  403,  was  zealous  to  repay  Thebes  for 
the  assistance  she  had  given  the  exiled  democracy  in  that  year. 
Accordingly,  though  her  navy  was  non-existent  and  her  Long 
Walls  were  still  in  ruins,  Athens  was  induced  to  join  the  Theban 
alliance  and  declare  war  once  more  on  her  old  enemy. 

The  campaign  of  395  B.C.  began  with  an  inroad  by  Lysander  into 
Boeotia.  Expecting  to  be  joined  on  a  fixed  day  by  King  Pausauias, 
he  led  his  Phociaus  and  Malians  down  into  the  plain,, 

'■  Lysander  slain 

and  attacked  Haliartus.     But  while  he  lay  at  its  gates  at  Haiiartus, 
the  townsmen  made  a  sortie,  a  great  Theban  army  '  ' 

came  up  in  his  rear,  and  in  the  sudden  fray  he  himself  was  slain 
and  his  forces  dispersed.  Pausanias,  who  appeared  next  day,  found 
the  body  of  the  great  general  lying  unburied  by  the  wall,  and 
was  constrained  to  ask  for  a  truce  to  perform  the  last  offices  for 
the  dead,  and  to  consent  to  evacuate  Boeotia  if  that  boon  was 
granted  him.  For  his  lateness  in  arriving,  and  his  tameness  in 
consenting  to  turn  back  without  fighting,  the  king  was  impeached 
the  moment  he  reached  Sparta.  He  fled  from  trial,  and  was 
condemned  in  his  absence,  just  as  his  father  Pleistoanax  had  been 
fifty-one  years  before  (see  p.  266).  His  son  Agesipolis,  a  youth  of 
seventeen  or  eighteen,  succeeded  to  the  kingly  power. 

In  Lysander  Sparta  lost  her  ablest  general,  and  the  only  man 
who  could  have  rescued  her  from  internal  decay.  But  his  personal 
ambition  had  always  been  such  a  disturbing  factor  „       ,         , 

■'  °  Conspiracy  of 

in  Lacedaemonian  politics  that  the  eiihors  felt  more      cinadon, 

398  B  C 

relief  than  regret  at  his  fall.     Saved  from  the  fear  of 

his  genius,  they  could  go  on  in  their  old  narrow  ways,  and  work  out 


428     Attempts  to  overthroio  the  Spartan  Supremacy.   1394  b.c. 

to  the  end  the  doom  which  its  cast-iron  constitution  was  preparing 
for  Sparta.  The  state  was  already  in  great  danger ;  it  was  only 
a  few  years  before  that  a  general  rising  of  the  inferior  citizens  and 
Helots  against  the  government  had  been  frustrated  by  the  slaying 
of  Cinadon,  who  had  organized  the  plot.  But,  unwarned  by  con- 
spiracy within  and  revolt  without,  the  ephors  went  on  in  the  old 
paths,  and  kept  Spartan  policy  in  its  usual  groove  of  selfishness 
and  indifference  to  the  rights  of  others. 

When  the  result  of  the  battle  of  Haliartus  was  know-n,  Argos 
and  Corinth  published  their  declaration  of  war,  in  which  not  long 
after  the  Acarnanians,  the  Euboeans,  and  many  of  the  Thessalian 
cities  joined.  The  Spartans  found  themselves  forced  to  fight  for 
their  hegemony  in  Peloponnesus,  as  well  as  for  their  empire  in 
Greece.  Realizing  the  gravity  of  the  crisis,  they  sent  to  Asia  to 
summon  back  Agesilaus  and  his  army,  for  every  available  man 
would  be  wanted  at  home  When  the  spring  of  394  B.C.  came 
round,  the  forces  of  Laconia  and  of  those  allies  who  remained 
faithful  were  sent,  under  the  regent  Aristodemus,  to  march  on 
Corinth  and  block  the  way  of  invaders  from  the  north.  The 
army,  however,  arrived  too  late;  twelve  thousand  Boeotians  and 
Athenians  had  already  crossed  the  Isthmus,  and  had  been  joined 
by  the  levies  of  Corinth  and  Argos.  The  allied  host,  twenty 
thousand  hoplites  with  a  strong  force  of  cavalry  and  light-anned, 
lay  on  the  Corinthian  border,  and  was  about  to  move  southward. 
They  had  been  planning  a  sudden  raid  into  Laconia,  pursuant  to 
the  advice  of  the  Corinthian  Timolaus,  who  bade  them  "not  to 
strike  at  the  wasps  when  they  are  flying  around,  but  to  run  in  and 
set  fire  to  their  nest."  But  while  they  were  settling  the  details 
Battle  of  °^  their  march,  the  Spartan  army  had  already  reached 
Corinth,      Sicyon,  and  was  offering  them  battle.     Aristodemus 

394  B.C.  ./        '  o 

had  called  up  the  levies  of  Arcadia,  Elis,  Achaia,  aud 
the  small  states  of  the  Argive  penmsula ;  he  had  nearly  as  many 
hoplites  as  the  allies,  and  was  determined  to  fight.  The  armies 
came  into  collision  by  the  brook  Nemea,  four  miles  westward  from 
Corinth.  The  incidents  of  the  fight  were  not  unlike  those  of  the 
last  battle  which  Sparta  had  fought  in  Peloponnesus.  Now,  as 
formerly  at  Mantinea,  the  Lacedaemonians  themselves  broke  and 
trampled   down  the  enemy  opposed  to  them,  while   their  allies 


394B.C.]  Battle  of  Coyinth.  429 

fared  badly  aud  were  driven  off  the  field.  Once  more  llie 
Lacedaemonians  kept  tlaeir  ranks  and  retrieved  the  day,  while 
the  victorious  wing  of  their  opi^onents  scattered  itself  in  reckless 
pursuit.  Thus  it  came  to  pass  that  though  of  (he  Spartans  only 
eight  full,  their  allies  had  lost  eleven  hundred  men,  while  the 
enemy,  slaughtered  up  to  the  very  gates  of  Corinth,  left  nearly 
three  thousand  dead  on  the  field. 

Meanwhile  Agesilaus  had  received  the  orders  of  the  ephors  to 
return  home,  and  had  reluctantly  given  over  his  great  scheme  for 
the  invasion  of  Asia.  Leaving  his  brother-in-law  Peisauder  in 
charge  of  the  fleet,  and  an  officer  named  Euxenus  with  four 
thousand  men  to  maintain  the  war  against  Tithraustcs,  he 
assembled  his  army  on  the  Hellespont,  driven  out  of  Asia,  as  he 
bitterly  complained,  not  by  force  of  arms,  but  by  the  ten  thousand 
golden  bowmen^  which  the  satrap  had  sent  across  to  Thebes  and 
Argos.  Crossing  the  straits,  he  led  his  men  homewards  by  the 
long  coast-road  through  Thrace  and  Macedonia.  The  force  he 
took  with  him  was  strong,  confident,  and  well  disciplined;  the 
veteran  mercenaries  who  had  served  under  Cyrus,  and  the  Pelo- 
ponnesians  who  had  followed  Agesilaus  to  Asia,  were  equally 
■enthusiastic  for  their  leader.  Forcing  his  way  through  hostile 
Thessaly,  in  spite  of  the  hordes  of  cavalry  which  hung  around 
him,  Agesilaus  reached  the  friendly  land  of  Phocis,  about  a  month 
after  the  battle  of  Corinth  had  been  fought.  The  Phocians  and 
the  discontented  Boeotians  of  Orchomenus  joined  him,  and  he 
then  advanced  along  the  valley  of  the  Cephissus.  At  Coronoa, 
where  the  Boeotian  plain  narrows  down  between  the  hills  of  Helicon 
and  the  marshes  of  Copais^  he  found  the  enemy  barring  his  further 
progress.  In  spite  of  their  late  defeat,  the  Thcbans  were  bent  on 
fighting;  they  had  sent  in  haste  for  their  Argive  and  Athenian 
allies,  and  mustered  in  strength  beneath  the  walls  of  CorouGa. 

Here  was  fought  the  most  desperate  action  that  Greece  had  seen 
since  Thermopylae.  The  Theban  troops,  who  charged — as  at 
Delium — in  a  dense  column  on  the  right  of  the  allied     _  ...     , 

"  £attle  or 

army,  broke  the  ranks  of  their  separatist  countrymen      coronea. 

of  Orchomenus ;   but  on  all  other  points  of  the  line 

Agesilaus  won   the  day.     The  king  then  threw  himself  between 

*  The  Persian  gold  Daric  bore  the  figure  of  the  Great  King  holding  a  bow. 


430     Attempts  to  overthroiv  the  Spartan  Supremacy.    [394  b.c. 

the  victorious  Thebans  aud  their  line  ot  retreat ;  but  the  enemy 
merely  closed  their  ranks,  and  pushed  forward  mto  the  midst  of 
the  Spartan  host,  determined  to  force  their  way  through.  Their 
column  wedged  itself  into  the  hostile  line,  but  could  not  break  it. 
The  fight  stood  still ;  the  front  ranks  on  either  side  went  down  to 
a  man,  and  the  press  grew  so  close  that  the  combatants  had  to 
drop  their  spears  and  fight  on  with  their  daggers.  Agesilavis 
himself  was  thrown  down  and  well-nigh  trampled  to  death  before 
his  body-guard  could  draw  him  out  from  among  the  corpses.  At 
last,  after  a  struggle  of  a  length  unprecedented  in  Greek  battles, 
the  survivors  of  the  Theban  column  forced  their  way  through  the 
Spartan  line,  and  reached  the  slopes  of  Helicon.  Agesilaus  had  the 
glory  of  a  victory — as  the  Thebans  confessed  by  demanding  the 
usual  truce  for  the  burial  of  the  dead — but  his  men  had  suffered 
as  severely  as  the  enemy,  and  instead  of  pushing  on  into  Boeotia 
he  turned  back  to  Delphi.  There  he  offered  Apollo  the  tithe  of  his 
Asiastic  spoils,  a  sum  of  no  less  than  a  hundred  talents  (£24,000), 
and  then  crossed  over  to  Peloponnesus  by  sea. 

On  the  evening  before  the  battle  of  Coronea  Agesilaus  had 
received  from  Asia  a  piece  of  intelligence  which  he  carefullj'' 
concealed  from  his  army.  It  was  to  the  effect  that  his  brother-in 
law  Peisander  had  been  defeated  and  slain  in  a  sea-fight  off  Cnidus, 
and  that  the  cities  of  Ionia  and  Caria  were  one  aft«r  another 
revolting  against  Sparta. 

After  Agesilaus  had  left  Asia,  the  Persian  satraps  had  recovered 

their  confidence,  and  determined  to  assume  the  offensive.     They 

ttieof     possessed    a    considerable    squadron    of     Phoenician 

Cnidus,      vessels,    which    the    king    had    placed     under    the 

394  B  C  cj  X 

command  of  the  Athenian  Conon,  who  had  been 
an  exile  in  Cyprus  since  the  disaster  of  Aegospotami  (see  p.  403). 
Pharnabazus  went  on  board  ship — he  was  the  first  satrap  who 
had  taken  to  the  sea  for  fifty  years— and  set  forth  with  Conon 
to  meet  the  Spartan  fleet.  They  came  on  Peisander  off"  Cnidus, 
and  found  him  ready  to  fight,  for  though  an  inexperienced  seaman 
he  had  all  the  courage  of  the  true  Lacedaemonian.  The  Persians 
considerably  outnumbered  the  enemy,  and  obtained  an  easy 
victory,  for  the  Ionian  captains  in  the  Spartan  fleet,  sick  of 
harmosts  and  war-taxes,   made  no  serious  resistance.     They  fled 


394  B.C.]  Ionia  revolts  from  Sparta.  431 

at  the  first  shock,  and  left  their  admiral  to  his  fate.     Peisauder  fell, 
and  half  his  galleys  were  sunk  or  taken. 

Pharnabazus  and  Conon  then  sailed  up  the  coast  of  Caria  and 
Ionia,  summoning  the  Greek  cities  to  cast  off  the  Spartan  yoke 
and  assert  their  autonomy.  Town  after  town — Cos,  j.  ,,  x. 
Ejjhesus,  Saraos,  Chios,  Mitylene — expelled  its  har-spanan  power 
most  and  threw  open  its  gates.  Only  Abydos,  ^^  ^*^' 
where  the  able  Dercyllidas  had  collected  the  wrecks  of  many 
Spartan  garrisons,  held  out  against  the  victorious  admirals.  By 
the  close  of  394  b.c.  it  was  the  sole  remaining  token  of  all  the 
conquests  of  Lysander  and  Agesilaus,  and  the  Spartan  empire  in 
Asia  was  at  an  end. 

The  war  in  Greece  now  resolved  itself  into  a  series  of  bickerings 
for  the  possession  of  the  roads  across  the  Isthmus.  The  Corinthians, 
supported  by  occasional  assistance  from  Athens  and  Argos,  en- 
deavoured to  hold  the  narrow  line — four  miles  broad  from  sea  to 
sea — between  Cenchreae  and  Lechaeum.  The  Lacedaemonians, 
from  their  base  at  Sicyon,  kept  sending  out  expeditions  to  burst 
through  and  to  seize  posts  in  the  rear  of  Corinth,  from  which  a 
blockade  of  the  city  would  be  possible.  But  though  they  broke 
down  the  "Long  Walls"  which  connected  Corinth  with  the  sea, 
harried  the  whole  Corinthian  territory  from  end  to  end,  and 
inflicted  endless  misery  upon  its  inhabitants,  they  made  little 
or  no  progress  towards  bringing  the  war  to  an  end.  The  only 
thoroughly  successful  operation  which  they  carried  out  in  the 
whole  war  was  directed  at  an  outlying  member  of  the  Tiieban 
alliance,  and  had  no  influence  on  the  main  course  of  events.  It 
was  an  expedition  of  Agesilaus  into  Acarnania,  by  which  the  tribes 
of  that  country  were  forced  into  submission,  and  became  allies  of 
Sparta  (391  B.C.). 

Meanwhile  the  pauses  in  the  progress  of  the  war  had  brought 
great  gain  to  at  least  one  power.     lu  the  spring  of  393  B.C.  Conon 
and  Pharnabazus  had  brought  across  the  Aegean  a     conon  re- 
squadron  of  Phoenician  and  Ionian  ships ;  after  harry-  iio^s  waus, 
ing  the  coast  of   Laconia  they  came  into  the  gulf     393  b.c. 
of  Aegina.      As    there  was   no    Spartan   fleet    to    fight,   Conon 
obtained  from  the  satrap  permission  to  employ  the  seamen  of  his 
squadron  and  a  considerable  sum  of  money  in  aiding  the  Athenians 


432     Attempts  to  overthroio  the  Spartan  Supremacy,    (391  b.c. 

to  rebuild  the  fortifications  of  Peiraous  and  the  "Long  Walls," 
which  had  remained  in  ruins  since  Lysander  breached  them  in 
404  B.C.  Three  or  four  months'  hard  labour  sufEced  for  their  re- 
construction, and  when  this  was  accomplished  the  Athenians  set  to 
work  to  build  war-ships  in  the  long-deserted  sli^w  of  their  ruined 
arsenal.  By  the  next  year  we  find  them  able  to  send  out  a  modest 
squadron  of  ten  vessels,  the  first  that  had  sailed  out  of  Peiraeus  for 
twelve  years.  Two  years  later  they  could  put  Thrasybulus  in  com- 
mand of  forty,  a  force  large  enough  to  have  some  influence  on  the 
course  of  the  war. 

It  was  not  destined  that  the  struggle — the  "  Corinthian  war,"  as 
men  called  it,  because  its  operations  centred  around  the  walls  of 
Corinth — should  be  brought  to  an  end  by  any  events  in  Europe. 
Neither  party  showed  any  sign  of  reducing  its  enemy,  and  the 
petty  warfare  might  apparently  have  gone  on  for  ever.  The  only 
incident  worth  recording  in  these  dreary  years  was  one  which  had 
some  importance  in  the  history  of  Greek  military  art,  but  no 
influence  on  the  coiirse  of  Greek  politics.  The  Athenian  general, 
Iphicrates,  had  applied  himself  to  perfect  the  equipment  and  tactics 
of  the  light-troops  called  peltasts.  He  had  endeavoured  to  assi- 
milate them  to  the  hoplite,  without  loading  them  with  the  heavy 
armour  which  made  quick  movement  impossible  to  the  troops  ot 
the  line.  Though  he  furnished  them  with  corselets  of  quilted  Imen, 
and  small  shields,  instead  of  metal  breastplates  and  large  oval 
bucklers,  he  gave  them  a  pike  and  sword  even  longer  and  stronger 
than  those  of  the  hoplite.  After  performing  some  minor  exploits 
with  these  troops  against  the  heavy  infantry  of  Phlius  and  Mantinca, 
Iphicrates  ventured  to  measure  them  against  a  body  of  Spartans. 

Iphicrates  He  caught  a  mora  (battalion),  four  hundred  strong, 
SpartarTmora  '^^^'^^^  ^^^'^  hQQW  Serving  on  escort  duty,  as  it  defiled 
391  B.C.  along  the  shore  below  the  walls  of  Corinth,  and  beset 
it  on  all  sides  with  his  peltasts.  When  the  Spartans  charged,  his 
men  gave  way  ;  but  they  returned  when  the  enemy's  impetus  was 
exhausted,  hung  around  him,  galled  him  with  missiles,  and  finally 
brought  him  to  a  standstill.  Harassed  and  exhausted,  much  as 
their  countrymen  at  Sphacteria  had  been  thirty-five  years  before, 
the  Lacedaemonians  halted  to  defend  themselves  on  an  isolated 
hillock,  where  they  were  first  worried  by  the  peltasts,  and  then 


391  B.C.]  Iphicrates  at  Corinth.  433 

broken  by  a  body  of  Athenian  hoplites  \s-hicli  came  up  from 
Corinth.  Two  hundred  and  fifty  of  them  fell,  the  remainder 
escaped  to  Lechaeum.  Thus  a  whole  Spartan  battalion  had  been 
not  merely  slain  off — such  things  as  that  had  happened  before — 
but  driven  to  headlong  flight  by  the  despised  mercenaries  of  Iphi- 
crates. This  was  a  fact  which  made  the  strongest  impression  on 
the  mind  of  Greece.  It  induced  every  state  to  pay  more  attention 
for  the  future  to  its  light-armed  troops,  who  had  previously  been 
deemed  worthy  of  little  notice ;  it  won  for  Iphicrates  a  reputation 
which  he  hardly  deserved,  and  it  led  to  a  somewhat  undue  deprecia- 
tion of  Spartan  courage.  The  real  moral,  that  hoplites  should  never 
be  sent  out  alone,  but  always  accompanied  by  a  due  joroportion  of 
light-armed  troops,  seems  to  have  escaped  the  notice  of  the  con- 
temporary observer.  Twenty  cases  with  the  same  moral  could  be 
quoted  m  the  fifth  and  fourth  centuries,'  yet  no  general  seems  to 
have  grasped  their  meaning  before  Alexander  the  Great. 

While  the  war  had  come  to  a  standstill  in  Europe,  really  decisive 
events  were  taking  place  across  the  Aegean.     The  Lacedaemonians 
had  lost  all  their  possessions  in  Asia,  except  Abydos,   spartan  in- 
and  were  therefore  in  a  position  to  resume  their  old  t'^i^'^i^s  with 

'■  Persia, 

alliance  with  Persia;  having  none  of  the  Great  King's  390 b.c. 
ancient  possessions  any  longer  in  their  hands,  they  could  approach 
him  without  being  required  to  part  with  anything.  In  392  B.C. 
an  officer  named  Antalcidas  was  despatched  to  Sardis,  and  obtained 
a  hearing  from  Tiribazus,  who  had  succeeded  Tithraustes  as  satrap 
in  Lydia.  He  pointed  out  that  the  war  had  ceased  to  bring  the 
Great  King  profit,  and  that  the  Persian  fleet  under  Conon  was  now 
being  used,  not  to  serve  Persian  interests,  but  merely  to  build  up 
again  the  power  of  Athens,  whose  interests  must  infallibly  bring 
her  ere  long  into  collision  with  the  satraps.  Tiribazus  was  con- 
vinced by  these  arguments ;  tie  recalled  Conon,  threw  him  into 
prison  "^  for  misusing  the  forces  entrusted  to  him,  and  went  up  to 
Susa  to  persuade  King  Artaxerxes  to  make  peace  with  Sparta. 

But  negotiations  with  an  Oriental  power  are  always  lengthy,  and 
while  the  attitude  of  the  Persian  court  was  still  doubtful,  the 
ephors  raised  a  new  army  and  fleet  and  sent   them  across  the 

'  C£.  especially  the  disaster  of  Demosthenes  in  Aetolia  (p.  321). 
*  Conon  escaped  from  prison,  but  died  not  long  after, 

2f 


434  Attempts  to  overthrow  the  Spartan  Supremacy.  i389  b.c. 

Aegean.  This  force  seized  Ephesus,  and  once  more  gave  Sparta 
a  foothold  in  Ionia:  shortly  after  an  insurrection  in  Lesbos  threw 
all  the  cities  of  that  great  island,  save  Mitylene,  into  Lacedaemo- 
nian hands  (390  b.c). 

By  this  time  the  Athenians  had  finished  building  their  new 
navy,  and  forty  ships  under  Thrasybulus  arrived  in  Asiatic  waters 
to  check  the  restoration  of  Spartan  supremacy  east  of  the  Aegean. 
Thrasybidus  performed  no  great  military  service,  but  he  succeeded 
in  uniting  the  Byzantines,  Ehodians,  and  Chalcedouians  in  a  naval 
league  with  Athens — a  union  which  hopeful  men  trusted  might 
prove  the  commencement  of  a  new  Delian  League.  Before  the  year 
was  ended,  however,  he  Avas  slain  by  the  people  of  Aspendus,  on 
whose  land  he  had  been  levying  a  forced  contribution. 

For  more  than  a  year  a  sporadic  naval  warfare  continued  to  rage 
over  the  whole  Aegean,  from  Aegina  to  Ephesus,  and  from  Abydos 

.   ,  ,  .^        to  Ehodes.     But  here,  too,  just  as  in  the  land  war  in 

Antalcidas  '  ■' 

anieSwith  Greece,  the  adversaries  seemed  to  have  come  to  a 
standstill.  At  last,  in  the  spring  of  388  B.C.,  Tiribazus 
returned  from  Susa — he  had  been  absent  no  less  than  three  years 
— with  full  permission  from  the  Great  King  to  carry  out  his  Philo- 
Spartan  policy.  He  at  once  made  an  alliance  with  Antalcidas, 
who  had  been  his  original  adviser,  and  placed  the  Persian  fleet  at 
the  disposition  of  the  Lacedaemonian.  Uniting  it  to  his  own, 
Antalcidas  swept  the  Aegean  from  north  to  south,  chased  the 
Athenian  squadron  back  to  Peiraeus,  and  showed  himself  undisputed 
master  of  the  seas. 

But  Sparta  had  no  longer  any  desire  to  proceed  with  the  war; 

she  was  conscious  that  her  momentary  advantage  had  been  gained 

J      not  by  her  own  strength  but  by  that  of  Persia,  and 

Antalcidas,  was  anxious  to  seize  a  favourable  opportunity  to  put 
an  end  to  hostilities.  In  the  spring  of  387  B.C.  Tiri- 
bazus invited  all  the  belligerents  to  send  deputies  to  a  peace 
congress  at  Sardis.  All  accepted,  for  none  of  them  had  any  great 
wish  to  protract  the  war.  Athens  was  frightened  by  the  prospect 
of  the  loss  of  her  newly  restored  trade  and  the  blockade  of  her 
ports ;  Corinth  had  been  nearly  ruined  by  the  harrying  of  her 
territory ;  Argos  had  gained  nothing  by  a  long-protracted  struggle  ; 
Thebes  thought  that  she  had  made  an  end  of  Spartan  interference 


387 B.C.)  Peace  of  Anialcidas.  435 

ia  Boeotia,  the  main  object  of  her  declaration  of  war.  When  the 
envoys  arrived,  Tiribazus  laid  before  them  a  declaration  which  he 
had  drawn  up  in  conjunction  with  Antalcidas.  The  document  ran 
as  follows  :  "King  Artaxerxes  deems  it  just  that  the  cities  in  Asia 
should  belong  to  him,  and  of  the  islands  Clazomenae^  and  Cyprus; 
the  other  Greek  cities,  both  small  and  great,  are  to  be  independent ; 
only  Lemuos,  Imbros,  and  Scyros  are,  as  of  old,  to  belong  to  the 
Athenians.  Whatsoever  states  shall  not  accept  this  peace,  upon 
them  I  shall,  in  conjunction  with  those  who  accept  it,  make  war 
by  land  and  by  sea,  with  ships  and  with  money," 

By  agreeing  to  these  terms,  Sjjarta  gave  up  all  pretence  of  posing 
as  the  defender  of  Hellas  against  the  barbarian.  She  surrendered 
the  cities  of  Asia  to  the  Great  King,  because  she  could  no  longer 
help  to  keep  them  for  herself.  Resigning  herself  to  the  loss  of 
her  power  east  of  the  Aegean,  she  fell  back  on  the  old  hegemony 
of  Peloponnesus,  which  had  been  hers  from  time  immemorial.  This 
hegemony  she  felt  herself  able  to  maintain,  but  for  its  full  re- 
establishment  an  interval  of  peace  was  necessary.  If  the  peace 
could  be  bought  only  by  sacrificing  the  lonians  to  Persia,  they 
must  be  sacrificed ;  since  their  rebellion  in  394  b.c.  Sparta  felt  no 
atom  of  interest  in  their  fate — a  disinterested  regard  for  the  welfare 
of  Hellas  was  never  her  foible.  The  threat  of  having  to  face 
Persia  and  Sparta  combined  was  too  much  for  the  confederates. 
When  their  envoys  reported  to  them  the  terms  offered  by  Tiribazus, 
one  after  another  consented  to  accept  them.  Thebes  held  out 
longest,  for  her  envoys  refused  for  some  time  to  subscribe  to  the 
treaty,  unless  they  might  sign  in  the  name  of  the  whole  Boeotian 
League.  The  Spartans  refused  to  allow  this,  alleging  the  terms  of 
the  treaty,  which  said  that  "  all  Greek  cities,  both  small  and  great, 
should  be  independent " — a  clause  which  they  read  into  a  prohi- 
bition of  the  hegemony  of  Thebes  in  Boeotia.  But  finding  that  all 
their  allies  had  left  them,  and  frightened  b}''  the  threats  of  Agesi- 
laus,  who  declared  his  intention  of  at  once  invading  Boeotia,  the 
Thebans  signed  the  inglorious  document. 

Thus  ended  the  "  Corinthian  war,"  a  struggle  which  wrought 

'  The  old  towa  of  Clazomenae  was  on  the  mainland,  but  a  citadel  .ind 
new  quarter  had  been  built  on  an  island  connected  by  a  causeway  with  the 
shore.     Hence  Tiribazus  could  call  it  an  ishind. 


ii^'ifi  Attempts  to  oveyihroiu  the  Spartan  Supremacy.  {3aT:B.c. 

damage  to  llcUas  at  large — for  it  ended  in  tiie  loss  of  her  Ionic 

members — without    profiting  any  one   of  the  states 

peace  of      which  had  engaged  in  it.     Sparta  had  lost  her  naval 

Anta  ci  as.   m^p^gj^^jacy  and  her  mastery  of  the  Aegean,  but  her 

adversaries   had   not  gained   by  her  disasters.      The  only  power 

which  had  come  happily  out  of  the  business  was  Persia,  who  had 

at  last  recovered  the  Ionian  cities,  lost  so  long  ago  as  480-470  B.C., 

and  now  found  herself  once  more  mistress  of  the  Aegean.     But 

luckily  for  Greece  King  Artaxerxes  was  a  most   unenterprising 

monarch,  and  never  cared  to  push  to  its  end  the  opportunity  which 

was  now  granted  him. 

Antalcidas  incurred  the  discredit  of  being  held  responsible  for 
the  treaty,  and  from  him  it  took  its  name,  "  the  Peace  of  Antal- 
cidas." Another  but  a  more  inglorious  Lysander,  he  won  the 
approval  of  his  own  countrymen,  and  the  curses  of  all  Greece 
beside,  for  having  yoked  Sparta  to  the  barbarian,  and  secured  her 
triumph  by  sacrificing  Greek  cities  by  the  score.  His  ignominy 
was  shared  by  the  ephors;  Agesilaus  alone,  who  advocated  the 
continuance  of  the  war,  had  no  part  in  it.  But  even  Agesilaus 
looked  upon  the  peace  as  profitable  to  the  country.  When  it  was 
said  in  his  hearing  that  "  the  Lacedaemonians  had  played  into  the 
hands  of  the  Medes,"  he  replied,  "  No ;  say  i-ather  that  the  Medes 
are  playing  into  the  hands  of  the  Lacedaemonians."  But  whether 
the  Medes  Laconized  or  the  Lacedaemonians  Medized,  Ephesus 
and  Miletus  and  all  their  sister-towns  were  struck  out  of  the  list 
of  free  Hellenic  communities,  and  incorporated  once  more  in  a 
Persian  satrapy. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

THE   GREEKS   OF   THE   WEST,   413-338   B.C. 

When  the  great  expedition  of  Nicias  and  Demosthenes  had  been 
shattered  against  the  walls  of  Syracuse,  it  was  universally  believed 
that  a  new  period  of  splendour  and  prosperity  was  opening  for  the 
cities  of  Sicily.  The  unprovoked  attack  of  Athens  on  their  liberties 
had  shown  them  the  danger  of  civil  strife,  had  taught  them  to 
combine,  and  had  proved  that  when  combined  they  were  irresistible. 
Seliuus,  Himera,  Gela,  and  most  of  the  other  Siceliot  towns,  had  con- 
tributed their  contingents  to  theSyracusan  army,  and  shared  in  the 
glory  of  the  great  victory.  Syracuse,  who  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the 
attack,  had  learnt  that,  strong  though  she  was,  she  was  not  strong 
enough  to  save  herself  without  the  aid  of  her  lesser  neighbours. 
Bound  together  by  their  late  comradeship  in  arms,  and  warned  by 
the  dangers  they  had  passed  through,  it  might  have  been  expected 
that  the  Siceliots  would  settle  down  to  a  life  of  peace  and  progress. 

This  was  not  to  be;  within  four  years  after  the  execution  of 
Nicias,  Sicily  was  to  undergo  a  series  of  disasters  which  maimed 
her  strength  and.  cut  short  her  energies  for  ever.  Half  her  cities 
were  to  be  destroyed  by  the  stranger,  the  remainder  stripped  of 
their  liberty,  and  handed  over  to  a  tyrant  whose  deeds  recalled  the 
worst  days  of  the  rule  of  Gelo  and  Hiero. 

When  the  rejoicings  which  followed  the  overthrow  of  the  Athe- 
nian armament  had  ceased,  two  schemes  engrossed  the  attention  of 
the  Syracusans  and  their  allies.  To  punish  Athens  for  her  inter- 
ference in  the  affairs  of  the  West,  a  Siceliot  fleet  should  sail  east- 
ward and  carry  the  war  into  the  waters  of  tlie  Aegean.  Accord- 
ingly two  squadrons  were  sent  forth,  in  412  and  411  B.C.,  under 
Hermocrates,  the  Syracusan  general  who  had  most  distinguished 
himself  during  the  siege.     These  vessels,  as  we  have  already  seen, 


438  The  Greeks  of  the   West,  413-338  r>.c.       1409  b.c. 

shared  in  the  good  and  evil  fortune  of  the  Spartan  armaments  of 

Chalcideus  and  Mindarus  (see  pp.  377,  391). 

Even  stronger   than  the  desire  for  chastising  Athens  was  the 

determination  of  the  Siceliots  to  punish  those  traitor-cities  among 

,^      .        themselves  who   had   espoused  the  Athenian  cause. 
Wars  m  ^ 

SicUy,  Syracuse  undertook  the  chastisement  of  her  old 
enemies  of  Naxos  and  Catana ;  their  fields  were 
ravaged,  and  their  walls  beleaguered,  yet  for  two  years  they  con- 
trived to  hold  out.  Selinus  meanwhile  fell  on  the  Segestans,  and 
endeavoured  to  wreak  her  vengeance  on  the  alien  city  which  had 
so  long  maintained  herself  alone  among  the  Greek  communities. 
But  Segesta  seemed  fated  to  bring  evil  after  evil  upon  Sicily.  With 
ruin  impending  over  her  now  as  in  417  b.c,  she  determined  to  call 
in  another  ally.  Where  the  Athenian  had  failed  the  Carthaginian 
might  succeed.  Accordingly  the  Segestans  sent  message  after 
message  to  Africa,  to  interest  in  their  cause  the  great  Phoenician 
city,  whose  harbour  looks  forth  on  the  western  shore  of  Sicily. 

The  Carthaginians  had  avoided  meddling  with  their  Hellenic 
neighbours  since  the  awful  disaster  which  their  army  had  suffered 

Carthage  before  the  walls  of  Himera  just  seventy  years  ago  (see 
interferes  m  p_  232).  But  now  they  Were  in  a  warlike  mood ;  the 
affairs.  disaster  of  the  Athenians  at  Syracuse  had  roused  in 
them  fear  of  the  growing  might  of  Syracuse,  and  their  counsels  were 
dominated  at  the  moment  by  Hannibal,  an  ambitious  general  who 
had  a  grudge  against  the  Siceliots.  He  was  the  grandson  of  that 
Hamilkar  who  had  fallen  at  Himera  in  480  B.C.,  and  had  sworn  to 
avenge  the  fate  of  his  ancestor.  In  410  B.C.  he  was  one  of  the  two 
suffetes,  or  supreme  magistrates,  of  Carthage,  and  he  easily  per- 
suaded his  countrymen  to  listen  to  the  appeal  of  Segesta,  and  to 
entrust  him  with  an  army  destined  for  the  invasion  of  Sicily. 

Accordingly,  in  the  summer  of  410  B.C.,  a  Carthaginian  auxiliary 

force  landed  at  Segesta  and  drove  off  the  Selinuntines  from  the 

environs  of  the  town.     But  this  was  only  the  prelude 

storm  of  .         TT 

Selinus.      to  the  great  invasion.     In  the  following  spring  Han- 

*     ^"  '      nibal  crossed  over  from  Africa  with  one  of  those  vast 

and  miscellaneous  mercenary  hosts  which  Carthage  was  accustomed 

to  gather  when  she  went  to  war.     Hannibal  was  not  a  general  of 

the  school  of  Nicias  ;  he  did  not  falter  for  a  moment  in  his  opera- 


409  B.C.]  Carthaginian  Invasion  of  Sicily.  439 

tions,  but  marched  straight  on  Selinus  almost  before  his  lauding 

was  known.    The  battering-ram  was  set  to  work  on  a  score  of 

points  at  once,  breaches  were  ere  long  broken  in  the  walls,  and  a 

hundred  thousand  wild  Libyans,  Spaniards,  and  Gauls  mounted  to 

the  assault.     For  nine  days  the  Selinuntines  held  the  breaches,  and 

sent  messenger  after  messenger  to  hurry  on  the  forces  of  Syracuse 

and  Acragas,  whose  aid  had  been  promised  them.     On  the  tenth 

day  the  defence  broke  down,  the  enemy  poured  into  the  town,  and 

a  horrible  massacre  took  place.     The  barbarians  filled  the  streets 

with  sixteen  thousand  corpses,  drove  off  the  rest  of  the  inhabitants 

as  captives,  and  swept  away  everything  in  the  city  that  was  not 

too  hot  or  too  heavy  to  be  moved. 

The  Siceliot  army,  which  had  gathered  at  Acragas  to  march  to 

the  relief  of  Selinus,  was  thunderstruck.     In  ten  days  a  great  and 

well-fortified   city   had   been  struck  out    of  the  roll      _,  ,,    ^ 
•'  Fall  of 

of   Greek  communities.     The  generals  were  scared.      Himera, 

409  B  C 

Instead  of  taking  the  field  to  oppose  Hannibal,  they 
dismissed  their  army  and  sent  to  ask  for  terras  of  peace.  But  the 
Carthaginian  had  not  yet  executed  half  his  purpose.  Before  the 
Siceliots  had  guessed  his  purpose,  he  had  marched  across  the  island 
and  laid  siege  to  Himera.  The  Himeraeans,  seeing  the  fate  of 
Selinus  impending  over  them,  cried  aloud  for  instant  succour.  But 
Hannibal  was  so  prompt  that  no  more  than  four  thousand  Syra- 
cusan  troops  had  time  to  reach  the  city.  The  Greeks  strove  to 
keep  back  the  enemy  by  a  vigorous  sally,  but  it  failed,  and  the 
place  in  a  few  days  became  untenable.  The  non-combatants  were 
hurried  away  by  sea ;  the  Syracusans  escaped  by  land,  but  ere  the 
town  was  half  evacuated  the  besiegers  burst  in.  Hannibal  levelled 
the  whole  place — walls,  temples,  and  houses — to  the  ground,  and 
executed  three  thousand  captive  hoplites  on  the  spot  where  his 
grandfather  had  been  slain  in  480  d.c,  as  a  solemn  offering  to  the 
gods  of  Carthage. 

Within  three  months  after  his  landing  Hannibal  sailed  back  to 
Carthage,  his  ships  laden  deep  with  captives  and  spoil,  leaving 
behind  him  two  heaps  of  ruins  where  once  had  stood  the  two 
westernmost  Hellenic  cities  of  Sicily.  His  return  was  anxiously 
looked  for  in  the  next  spring,  but  for  reasons  to  us  unknown  it  was 
delayed.     The  Siceliots,  free  for  a  short  space  from  the  impending 


440  The  Greeks  of  the   West,  4^3-338  B.C.       t406B.c. 

ruin,  did  not  emi)loy  their  time  in  getting  ready  to  resist  the  next 
wave  of  invasion.     They  fell  to  mutual  recriminations  over  the 

CivUwar  at  causes  of  their  military  failures  in  the  preceding  year. 

Syracuse,  ^t  Syracuse  the  factions  actually  came  to  blows. 
Hermocrates,  the  hero  of  the  Athenian  siege,  had  been  sent  into 
exile,  but  he  had  a  large  following  in  the  city,  and  was  able  to 
make  attempt  after  attempt  to  force  his  way  back,  and  to  over- 
throw the  faction  in  power.  In  the  end  of  408  B.C.  he  was  admitted 
within  the  gates  by  treachery,  but  in  the  street-fight  that  ensued 
he  was  slain,  and  his  followers  were  forced  out  of  the  half-won  city. 

The  mantle  of  Hermocrates  fell  on  one  of  his  partisans,  a  young 
Syracusan  named  Dionysius.  He  was  of  mean  birth,  and  owned 
no  family  wealth  or  influence ;  but  he  was  a  man  of  mark,  not 
merely  a  gallant  soldier,  but  a  ready  speaker,  and  even  a  poet 
of  some  note.  The  defeated  faction  placed  him  at  its  head,  but 
instead  of  continuing  the  open  war,  Dionysius  prevailed  on  them  to 
lay  do\vi  their  arms  and  bide  their  time. 

In  the  spring  of  406  b.c.  the  Siceliots  heard  to  their  dismay  that 
the  impending  storm  was  about  to  break  upon  their  heads.  Han- 
nibal, with  an  even  larger  army  than  he  had  led  in  his 
^aUof  '  ,.111  ,    . 

Acragas,     iirst  campaign,  was  makmg  ready  to  land  upon  their 

shores.  This  time  they  were  somewhat  better  pre- 
pared than  in  409  B.C.,  and  when  the  Carthaginian  marched  against 
Acragas,  the  second  city  of  the  island,  he  found  it  defended  by  a 
large  confederate  army  of  thirty-five  thousand  men  drawn  from 
every  state  in  Sicily.  For  seven  months  the  war  stood  still  beneath 
the  ramparts  of  Acragas,  and  battle  after  battle  was  fought  on  its 
sloping  uplands.  Tlie  Greeks  were  ill  handled  by  their  generals; 
the  Carthaginians  were  held  back  by  a  plague  which  broke  out  ir 
their  foul  and  crowded  camp,  and  carried  off  thousands,  including 
their  commander  Hannibal  himself.  Things  were  at  a  deadlock 
till  the  winter,  when  the  invaders,  now  under  the  command  of  an 
officer  named  Himilco,  succeeded  in  cutting  off  the  food-supply  of 
the  Siceliots.  This  brought  about  the  evacuation  of  the  town :  the 
whole  population,  a  great  crowd  of  two  hundred  thousand  persons, 
stole  away  by  night,  while  the  army  protected  their  retreat.  The 
place,  with  all  its  wealth  that  was  not  portable,  fell  into  the  hands 
of  Himilco.    The  exiled  Acragantines  scattered  themselves  all  over 


405  B.C.]  Dionysi'iis,  Tyrant  of  Syracuse.  441 

Sicily,  the  main  body  settling  down  on  the  deserted  site  of  Leontiui, 
■which  was  made  over  to  them  by  a  vote  of  the  Syracusan  assembly. 

When  the  Syracusan  generals  led  home  their  contingent  from 
Acragas,  they  were  assailed  with  a  storm  of  reproaches  for  their 
mismanagement.  The  attack  was  headed  by  Dionysius  and  the 
other  surviving  chiefs  of  the  faction  of  Herraocrates,  who  now  saw 
that  their  time  was  arrived.  Scared  by  the  near  approach  of  the 
Carthaginians,  the  Syracusan  assembly  deposed  their  officers,  and 
elected  in  their  stead  Dionysius  and  a  wholly  new  board.  The 
one  faction  having  failed  to  conduct  the  war  with  success,  they 
threw  themselves  into  the  hands  of  the  other.  But  Dionysius  had 
in  his  mind  not  so  much  the  repulse  of  Himilco  as  the  seizure  of 
supreme  power  at  Syracuse.  His  conduct  during  the  next  year 
has  many  jjoints  of  similarity  to  that  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte  in  a 
similar  case.  Under  the  pretence  of  strengthening  the  military 
force  of  the  city,  he  hired  many  hundred  mercenaries,  whom  he 
attached  to  his  own  person ;  then  he  induced  the  Dionysius, 
assembly  to  vote  him  full  authority  over  lii.s  colleagues,  s^acusef 
so  that  he  became  practically  dictator.  The  final  405  b.c. 
step  was  taken  soon  after ;  an  alarm  was  raised  that  his  life  was 
in  danger  from  assassins;  an  illegal  and  informal  meeting  of  the 
assembly,  was  held,  far  outside  the  walls  of  the  city,  and  packed 
with  the  partisans  of  Dionysius.  They  voted  their  leader  a  body- 
guard of  a  thousand  men,  and  prolonged  his  power  for  an  indefi- 
nite period.  Syracuse  now  found  herself  in  the  hands  of  a  tyrant, 
though  Dionysius  disclaimed  the  title,  and  made  great  professions 
of  his  attachment  to  the  cause  of  democracy.  The  Syracusan s 
acquiesced  for  the  moment  in  the  loss  of  their  liberty,  because  they 
felt  that  a  strong  hand  was  needed  to  direct  the  war  against  the 
oncoming  Carthaginian  army.  Himilco  was  already  thundering  at 
the  gates  of  Gela,  whose  territory  was  actually  conterminous  with 
that  of  Syracuse,  and  in  a  few  months  might  present  himself  before 
the  walls  of  their  own  city. 

The  tyranny  of  Dionysius  lasted  for  no  less  than   thirty-eight 
years — a  period  of  storm  and  convulsion,  civil  strife  and  foreign  war — ■ 
it  brought  countless  evils  on  Sicily,  but  on  the  whole  character  ot 
it  served  its  purpose.     After  long  struggles  the  tyrant    dionysius. 
brought  the  Carthaginians  to  a  standstill,  and  at  his  death  left 


442  TJie  Greeks  of  the   West,  4i3~338  bc      [4osb.c. 

Acragas  and  all  the  other  towns  which  had  fallen  to  the  enemy,  save 
Selinus  and  Himera,  once  more  in  Hellenic  hands.  Dionysius  was 
neither  to  be  counted  among  the  worst  nor  among  the  best  of 
tyrants.  He  often  showed  unexpected  clemency  to  a  vanquished 
foe ;  he  was  not  personally  violent,  intemperate,  lustful,  or  ava- 
ricious ;  he  took  good  care  of  all  who  served  him  well,  and  wrought 
much  for  Syracuse  as  well  as  for  himself.  He  was  not  insensible  to 
gratitude,  or  incapable  of  personal  affection.  Himself  an  author  of 
some  merit,  the  writer  of  tragedies  which  won  the  first  prize  at  the 
Athenian  Dionysiac  festival,  he  loved  to  surround  himself  with 
literary  men.  As  a  builder,  he  was  almost  equal  to  Pericles ;  as  a 
general,  he  inaugurated  a  new  epoch  in  the  Hellenic  art  of  war. 

But  all  these  qualities  were  spoiled  by  the  countervailing  vices  of 
Dionysius.  His  cool  and  steadfast  determination  to  hold  on  to  his 
tyranny  led  him  again  and  again  through  seas  of  blood.  The 
citizens  of  Syracuse  who  suffered  death  at  his  hands  were  numbered 
by  thousands  rather  than  by  hundreds.  The  financial  exigencies 
of  his  wars  drove  him  to  grinding  extortion  ;  he  is  said  to  have 
taxed  the  Syracusans  every  year  to  th.e  extent  of  one-fifth  of  their 
property,  and  his  confiscations  were  enormous.  He  was  capable  of 
outbursts  of  cruelty  which  shocked  the  Hellenic  mind — flogging 
prisoners  to  death,  crucifying  them,  or  fixing  them  to  his  military 
engines.  His  callousness  to  religious  sentiment  provoked  even 
greater  wrath :  he  never  shrank  from  plundering  or  burning  a 
temple,  and  on  one  occasion  sold  to  his  enemies,  the  Carthaginians, 
the  most  hallowed  treasures  of  the  greatest  shrine  of  Italy.  Above 
all,  his  suspicions  made  him  hated.  Driven  into  a  state  of  appre- 
hension by  continual  plots  and  outbreaks,  he  came  to  trust  no  man. 
His  spies  were  always  at  work,  scenting  out  imaginary  conspiracies; 
his  dungeons  always  full  of  citizens  imprisoned  on  suspicion.  He 
grew  so  wary  that  he  never  stirred  abroad  without  a  mercenary 
guard ;  he  had  every  visitor  to  his  palace  searched  for  concealed 
weapons,  even  to  his  own  nearest  relations,  and — such  is  the  story — 
would  not  even  allow  a  barber  to  approach  his  person  with  a  razor. 
The  well-known  tale  of  Damocles  illustrates  well  enough,  whether 
it  be  true  or  false,  the  state  of  nervous  tension  to  which  the  tyrant 
was  reduced.  That  courtier,  having  expressed  his  envy  of  the 
prosperity  of  Dionysius,  was  invited  to  a  banquet,  placed  in  the  seat 


405  B.C.I         Dionysius  at   War  with  Carthage.  443 

of  honour,  robed  like  a  king,  and  served  with  the  choicest  wines  and 
viands.  But  in  the  midst  of  the  feast  his  host  bade  him  look 
upward.  Damocles  did  so,  and  found  a  heavy  sword  suspended 
over  his  head  by  a  single  hair,  and  threatening  every  moment  to 
fall.     "  Such,"  said  Dionysius,  "  is  the  life  of  a  tyrant." 

The  reign  of  Dionysius  was  one  long  struggle  against  the  power 
of  Carthage.  Four  desperate  wars  with  that  state  occupied 
his  energies.  His  other  achievements,  brilliant  and  _. 
startling  though  they  appeared,  were  but  interludes  first  war  with 
between  the  acts  of  the  greater  drama.  It  is  strange  ^^  ^^ 
to  find  that  the  first  efforts  of  Dionysius  were  the  least  successful ; 
though  he  had  been  allowed  to  seize  sovereign  power  precisely 
because  the  Syracusan  generals  had  failed  to  hold  back  Himilco, 
yet  his  earliest  campaign  (405  B.C.)  was  quite  as  unsuccessful  as 
that  of  his  predecessors.  He  lost  a  battle  before  Gela,  and  was 
compelled  to  evacuate  both  that  town  and  Camarina,  whose  inhabit- 
ants had  to  flee  by  night,  and  to  join  the  exiled  Acragantines  at 
Leontiui.  But  chance  came  to  the  tyrant's  aid  :  the  plague  which 
had  laged  in  the  Carthaginian  camp  in  the  previous  year  broke  out 
again ;  Himilco  saw  half  his  army  stricken  down,  and  in  fear  for 
his  conquests  made  peace  with  Dionysius,  restoring  the  territories 
of  Gela  and  Camarina,  and  only  adding  that  of  Acragas  to  the 
Carthaginian  dominions  in  Sicily. 

For  the  next  five  years  Dionysius  was  occupied  in  a  bitter  struggle 
with  his  unwilling  subjects;  plots  and  insuricctions  broke  out 
again  and  again.  The  whole  city  once  fell  for  a  moment  into  the 
hands  of  the  rebels  in  404  b.c.  The  tyrant  recovered  it ;  but  in 
403  B.C.  a  large  force  from  Rhegium  and  Messene  joined  the  Syra- 
cusan exiles,  got  possession  of  the  mainland  quarters  of  the  town, 
and  besieged  Dionysius  in  the  island-citadel  of  Ortygia.  But  the 
military  skill  and  unscrupulous  energy  of  the  tyrant  brought  him 
out  of  the  struggle  stronger  than  ever.  Not  only  did  he  make  his 
throne  firm,  but  he  fell  upon  his  neighbours,  and  in  a  short  space 
conquered  Naxos,  Catana,  and  the  Sicel  tribes  of  the  interior.     He 

then  felt  himself  strong  enough  to  renew  the  war  with  „  ,,     „ 

°  °  New  'waUs  of 

Carthage,  but,  as  a  measure  of  precaution,  first  en-     Syracuse. 

larged  the  fortifications  of  Syracuse  so  as  to  include 

the  whole  plateau  of  Epipolae,  taking  within  the  new  wall  all 


444  The  Greeks  of  the    IVtst,  413-338  B.C.       (397 B.C. 

the  upland  where  the  fighting  during  the  Athenian  siege  had 
gone  on.  Thus  he  tripled  the  extent  of  the  city;  and  though  the 
new  quarters  were  not  filled  with  houses,  they  were  spacious 
enough  to  serve  as  a  place  of  refuge  for  the  whole  population 
Dionysius*  of  South-eastern  Sicily  in  time  of  war.  Dion3'sius' 
with  Carthage  second  attack  on  Carthage  opened  with  a  series  of 

397  B.C.  victories  (397  b.c),  but  just  as  he  seemed  to  have  the 
whole  island  in  his  grasp,  an  unexpected  fleet  and  army  of  the 
enemy  fell  on  Messene  and  took  it  by  storm.  Dionysius,  attacked 
in  the  rear,  had  to  abandon  his  conquests  in  the  west  of  Sicily,  and 
rush  back  to  defend  Syracuse  from  an  invasion  from  the  north. 
In  front  of  Catana  he  gave  battle  to  Himilco,  who  again,  as  in 
406  B.C.,  headed  the  invaders ;  there  he  was  utterly  defeated,  and 
the  enemy  pushed  on  to  besiege  Syracuse.  But  the  new  walls 
stood  the  city  in  good  stead ;  the  tyrant  had  been  taken  by  sur- 
prise rather  than  crippled,  and  his  resources  were  not  materially 
lessened.  He  stood  firmly  at  bay  behind  his  fortification  for  many 
months,  till  the  plague  that  had  twice  before  smitten  the  Car- 
thaginians again  came  to  his  rescue.  So  fearful  was  its  violence 
that  Himilco  and  his  officers  actually  fled  from  it,  leaving  their 
army  to  perish  wholesale  by  the  ravages  of  the  pest  and  the  sword 
of  Dionysius  (395  B.C.).  The  tyrant  then  marched  out  of  his 
stronghold,  and  took  one  by  one  every  Carthaginian  stronghold  in 
the  island,  except  the  towns  of  Lilybaeum  and  Drepanum  at  its 
western  extremity. 

Freed  from  the  barbarian,  Dionysius  at  once  turned  on  his  neigh- 
bours, and  subdued  every  independent  state  in  the  island.  By 
391  B.C.  he  was  master  of  the  whole  of  Sicily  save  the  two  fortresses 
in  the  west ;  and  his  conquests  were  confirmed  to  him  by  a  solemn 
peace,  in  which  Carthage  formally  resigned  all  she  had  gained  since 
410  B.C. 

Dionysius  now  turned  his  arms  further  afield.  The  Italiot 
Greeks  were  at  this  moment  in  a  state  of  depression,  owing  to  the 
Misfortunes  of  recent  encroachments  of  a  new  enemy  from  the  north, 
theitaiiots.  About  420  B.C.  the  Sabellian  tribes  of  Central  Italy 
iiad  begun  to  quit  their  mountain  vallej's  and  to  press  southward 
and  seaward.  At  the  very  moment  that  Nicias  was  besieging 
Syracuse  they  fell  upon  Cumae,  the  northernmost  Italiot  city,  and 


385  B.C.]  Dioiiysius  in  Magna  Graecia.  445 

destroyed  it  (415  B.C.).  They  reduced  Neapolis  and  otlier  towLS  of 
the  neighbourhood  to  the  status  of  tributaries,  and  then  pushed 
further  south.  A  tribe  who  bore  the  name  of  Lucanians  headed  the 
advance;  they  pressed  into  the  southern  peninsula  of  Italj^,  took 
the  great  city  of  Poseidonia  (circ.  395  b.c),  and  began  to  encroach 
on  the  territories  of  Thurii,  Croton,and  Metapontum.  The  Italiots 
leagued  themselves  together  to  resist  the  oncoming  wave  of  barbar- 
ism, but  with  poor  success.  In  390  b.c.  their  united  forces  experi- 
enced a  crushing  defeat  at  the  battle  of  Lalis,  and  the  bodies  of  ten 
thousand  hoplites  covered  the  field.  It  was  when  the  Hellenic 
cities  of  Italy  were  facing  northward  to  resist  the  Lucanians  that 
Dionysius  fell  upon  their  rear.  His  progress  was  rapid  and  easy ; 
the  distracted  Italiots  were  beaten  in  the  open  field,  Dionysius 
their  cities  wxre  besieged,  and  generally  captured,  '^"it^ij^!  ^^® 
and  the  Syracusan  yoke  was  extended  over  all  the  385  b.c. 
states  as  far  north  as  Croton,  In  some  cases  Dionysius  removed 
the  inhabitants  bodily,  to  people  the  empty  spaces  within  the  new 
walls  of  Syracuse ;  in  others,  where  the  resistance  had  angered  him, 
he  sold  the  whole  population  as  slaves.  Everywhere  he  plundered 
temples  and  private  dwellings  Avith  perfect  impartiality.  Pious 
Greeks  held  that  the  crowning  atrocity  of  his  life  was  committed 
when  he  took  the  precious  robe  of  Hera — a  masterpiece  of  the 
embroiderer'.s  art — which  formed  the  pride  of  her  temple  near 
Croton,  and  sold  it  to  the  Carthaginians  for  120  talents  (£27,000). 

In  483  B.C.  Dionysius  became  involved  in  a  third  war  with  Car- 
thage; it  lasted  but  a  single  year,  and  led  to  no  decisive  results, 
save  that  Selinus  fell  back  into  the  liands  of  the  Dionysius' 
barbarian.  But  the  Carthaginians  could  advance  no  fourth  ^^rs 
further  east,  and  it  was  evident  that  Dionysius'  power  with Carthag-e. 
formed  a  complete  barrier  to  their  making  further  conquests  in 
Sicil}'.  A  fourth  war,  which  broke  out  in  368  B.C.,  w-as  equally 
indecisive  :  the  Syracusans  seized  all  the  Carthaginian  territoiy  up 
to  the  gates  of  Lilybaeum,  but  were  imable  to  take  that  fortress, 
so  that  peace  had  once  more  to  be  concluded  on  the  basis  of  uti 
liossidetls,  in  367  B.c,  just  after  the  decease  of  Dionysius. 

The  last  twenty  years  of  Dionysius'  rule  were  outwardly  full 
of  prosperity.  Syracuse  seemed  the  greatest  and  most  flourish- 
ing city  in  the  Greek  world,  and  formed  the  centre  of  an  empire 


446  The  Greeks  of  the    West,  413-338  B.C.      [sevE.c. 

reaching  from  Croton  to  Acragas.  Twenty  thousand  veteran 
pj.gj.jjy  ^j  mercenaries  served  beneath  the  Syracusan  banner, 
Dionysius.  go  that  Dionysius  was  even  able  to  interfere  with 
events  across  the  Ionian  Sea,  and  is  found  several  times  influencing 
the  course  of  politics  in  old  Greece.  His  magnificent  embassies 
attracted  the  admiration  of  the  lovers  of  pomp  and  the  hatred 
of  the  lovers  of  liberty  when  they  appeared  at  the  Olympic  games. 
He  took  in  hand  schemes  of  extraordinary  scope,  such  as  that  of 
building  a  wall  right  across  the  southern  peninsula  of  Italy  from 
sea  to  sea,  in  order  to  keep  out  the  advancing  Lucanians.  In  the 
midst  of  all  his  toils  of  state  he  found  time  to  compose  poems 
and  tragedies,  and  wrote  with  sufficient  merit  to  win  the  first 
prize  at  Athens,  in  the  Dionysia  of  368  B.C.  But  his  life,  if  brilliant 
and  many-sided,  was  anxious  and  wearing ;  his  suspicions  gave  him 
no  rest,  and  in  367  B.C.  he  died,  aged  not  much  over  sixty,  leaving 
a  secure  throne,  a  full  treasury,  and  a  veteran  army  to  his  son  and 
namesake,  Dionysius  IT. 

Dionysius  the  younger,  though  not  destitute  of  ability,  was  far 
from  possessing  the  restless  energy  and  grim  determination  of  his 
father.  He  cared  little  for  military  matters,  and  thought  more  of 
the  splendour  than  the  power  of  the  tyrant's  position.  Vain,  idle, 
and  capricious,  he  was  ready  to  hand  over  authority  to  others,  pro- 
vided that  he  reaped  the  credit,  and  was  not  troubled  with  the  cares 
of  administration.  But  he  would  not  trust  any  man  for  long.  At 
first  he  put  the  government  in  the  hands  of  his  wife's  father,  Dion 
— a  grave  personage  of  a  philosophic  turn  of  mind,  who  tried  to 
convert  the  Syracusan  tyranny  into  a  model  monarchy,  and  brought 
over  the  philosopher  Plato  to  train  Dionysius  into  an  ideal  king. 
The  young  tyrant  took  keenly  to  philosophy  for  a  short  time,  but 
found  his  teachers  too  tiresome  and  exacting,  and  ere  long  banished 
Dion  and  sent  Plato  home.  For  seven  or  eight  years  Dionysius 
held  his  father's  empire  together  without  any  conspicuous  failures  ; 
for,  although  indolent  and  vain,  he  was  neither  cruel,  reckless,  nor 
stupid.  But  he  was  not  the  man  either  to  win  the  loyalty  or  to 
awe  the  minds  of  his  subjects  ;  and  when  Dion — who  had  been  for 
Dion  invades  several  years  employed  in  gathering  men  and  money 
Sicily,  356 B.C.  jjj  q\^  Greece — suddenly  landed  in  Sicily,  a  general 
insurrection  took  place.    First  the  smaller  Siceliot  towns  threw  open 


356  B.C.]  War  of  Dion  and  Dionysiiis  II.  447 

their  gates  to  Dion,  then  the  Syracusaiis  rose,  and  after  a  sharp  fight 
drove  the  tyrant's  mercenaries  into  the  citadel  of  Ortygia.  Dionysiiis, 
who  had  been  absent  on  an  expedition  to  Italy,  returned  to  find  him- 
self master  of  nothing  more  than  the  island  fortress.  The  siege  of 
Ortygia  lasted  for  many  months,  and  Dion  suffered  several  reverses 
before  he  succeeded  in  starving  out  the  tyrant's  garrison.  Dionysius 
himself  escaped  to  Locri  in  Italy,  the  only  one  of  his  father's  pos- 
sessions which  he  had  succeeded  in  retaining  under  his  power. 

Dion  was  now  master  of  Syracuse,  and  the  insurgents  who  had 
aided  him  to  expel  his  son-in-law  eagerly  waited  for  the  grave 
philosopher  to  proclaim  the  liberty  of  his  native  city.  But  the 
temptations  of  power  proved  too  much  for  Dion  ;  he  installed  him- 
self in  the  citadel,  and  showed  no  signs  of  dismissing  his  troops  or 
re-establishing  the  democratic  form  of  government.  When  a  dema- 
gogue named  Heracleides  proposed  to  cast  down  the  walls  of  Ortygia, 
Dion  had  him  put  to  death.  The  Syracusans  recognized  that  their 
efforts  had  merely  replaced  an  indolent  and  easy-natured  tyrant 
by  an  austere  one.  Tlie  city  was  ripe  for  a  rebellion,  murder  of 
when  the  Athenian  Callippus — a  follower  of  Plato,  ■^*°'^' ^^^■^■°' 
who  had  accompanied  Dion  on  his  return  from  exile — treacherously 
slew  his  friend  and  fellow-philosopher  (353  B.C.). 

Nine  years  of  chaos  followed  in  Sicilj\  A  succession  of  militarv 
adventurers  disputed  with  each  other  for  the  possession  of  Sj^racuse; 
and  so  far  was  liberty  from  being  restored  to  the  state,  that  when, 
in  346  B.C.,  the  exiled  tyrant  Dionysius  presented  himself  before 
the  gates  of  the  city,  a  numerous  faction  hastened  to  admit  him. 
His  rule  had,  at  any  rate,  been  better  than  the  anarchy  which  had 
succeeded  it.  But  Dionysius  had  taken  to  habits  of  drunkenness 
and  debauchery,  and  showed  himself  far  from  being  the  easy-goinc 
prince  that  the  Syracusans  had  expected.  Moreover,  he  was  unable 
to  restore  the  dominion  of  his  father  over  the  other  Sicilian  cities, 
and  his  wars  with  them  cost  his  subjects  much  blood  and  treasure. 
To  add  to  the  woes  of  the  SiceHots,  Carthage,  who  had  kept  quiet  for 
twenty  years,  suddenly  resumed  her  attacks  on  her  Hellenic  neigh- 
bours, and  seemed  likely  to  conquer  them  all,  now  that  no  vigorous 
central  power  bound  the  Sicilian  cities  into  a  single  state. 

In  these  evil  daj's  the  democratic  party  at  Syracuse  secretly  sent 
to  Corinth,  their  mother-city,  to  beg  for  aid  against  both  the  tyrant 


448  The  Greeks  of  the   West,  413-338  b.c.      [343 b.o. 

and  the  Carthaginitms.  There  was  a  momentary  lull  in  Greek 
politics  at  the  time — the  Sacred  war  had  just  ended — and  the 
Corinthians  consented  to  lend  their  help  to  free  their  daughter- 
state.  They  fitted  out  a  small  expedition,  and  gave  the  command 
of  it  to  Timoleon,  a  stern  republican,  who  had  taken  part  in  the 
slaying  of  his  own  brother  when  that  brother  endeavoured  to  make 
himself  tyrant  of  Corinth. 

Timoleon  reached  Sicily  in  safety,  and  in  four  brilliant  campaigns 
completely  liberated  the  island.  He  found  Dionysius  so  hard  pressed 
by  his  enemy  Hiketas,  tyrant  of  Leontini,  that  he  was  glad  to  leave 
Sicily  under  a  safe-conduct,  when  a  new  enemy  came  to  attack 
him.  The  ex-ruler  of  Syracuse  retired  to  Corinth,  where  he  long 
dwelt  as  a  private  citizen,  an  object  of  curiosity  to  the  whole  of 
Greece.  He  seems  to  have  borne  his  fall  with  considerable  equani- 
mity. He  showed  no  vain  regrets  for  his  lost  power ;  and,  when 
not  engaged  in  a  drinking-bout,  employed  his  time  in  giving  lectures 
on  singing  and  recitation,  or  in  instructing  the  boys  of  Corinth  in 
the  art  of  reading  aloud. 

After  he  had  expelled  Dionysius,  Timoleon  was  fiercely  attacked 

both  by  the  tyrant  Hiketas  and  by  the  Carthaginians,  who  joined 

their  forces  to  beleaguer  Syracuse.      Timoleon  held 

Timoleon  Hbe-  ■,,.,,,•      .,i  t  i 

rates  sicUy,  them  m  check  till  their  ill  success  drove  them  to 
340  B.C.  s^gpgct  each  other's  faith.  The  Carthaginians  aban- 
doned Hiketas,  who  was  driven  off,  and  after  a  while  besieged  in 
his  capital  of  Leontini  and  forced  to  capitulate.  Then  Timoleon 
was  able  to  turn  against  the  barbarian  enemy.  He  advanced  into 
the  west  of  the  island  with  a  small  army  of  twelve  thousand  men, 
and  met  the  Carthaginians,  who  outnumbered  him  fivefold,  on  the 
banks  of  the  Crimesus.  Allowing  the  enemy  to  advance  unmolested 
for  some  time,  he  suddenly  fell  upon  them  while  their  forces  were 
divided  by  a  ravine  and  the  flooded  river.  The  victory  was  as 
decisive  as  that  which  Gelo  had  won  a  hundred  and  forty  years 
before  under  the  walls  of  Himera.  For  thirty  years  the  Cartha- 
ginians dared  not  again  assail  their  Hellenic  neighbours 

Timoleon  laid  down  his  power  after  expelling  from  Sicily  the 
remaining  tyrants,  who  had  seized  on  the  smaller  towns  during  the 
years  of  anarchy.  He  spent  an  honoured  old  age  in  the  city  which 
he  had  freed,  and  had  the  happiness  to  die  before  Syracuse  was 


855-335  B.C.]         Lucafiian  Conquests  in  Italy.  449 

again  troubled  by  aspirants  for  tyranny,  or  molested  by  the  enemy 
from  Africa  (336  B.C.). 

While  Sicily  had  been  saved  by  Timoleon,  the  Italiots  had  been 
far  less  fortunate.  When  the  Dionysian  dynasty  fell,  the  cities 
recovered  their  independence,  but  found  themselves  -rrr  g  f  th 
exposed  to  the  inroads  of  the  Lucanians,  whom  the  itaiiots, 
power  of  Dionysius  had  long  kept  in  check.  The 
invaders  gradually  forced  their  way  southward,  took  the  towns  of 
Terina  and  Hipponium  (355  B.C.),  and  established  themselves  firmly 
in  the  southern  peninsula  of  Italy,  where  the  sub-tribe  of  the 
Bruttians,  the  vanguard  of  the  oncoming  host,  formed  themselves 
into  a  powerful  state.  Locri,  Ehegium,  and  Croton  were  barely 
able  to  preserve  for  themselves  a  small  territory  close  around  their 
own  walls.  The  Tarentines,  further  to  the  north,  made  a  better 
fight,  and  beat  off  the  Lucanians  for  some  years  by  calling  in  to 
their  aid  King  Archidamus  of  Sparta,  the  son  of  the  great  Agesilaus. 
When  he  fell  in  battle  (338  n.c.)  he  was  replaced  in  command  of 
the  Tarentine  armies  by  Alexander,  Prince  of  Epirus,  a  brilliant 
warrior,  who  obtained  success  after  success  against  the  Lucanians 
and  Bruttians,  and  so  broke  their  power  that,  though  always 
dangerous,  they  no  longer  appeared  irresistible  to  the  Italiot  states. 

It  was  Rome,  and  not  the  Lucanians,  who  was  destined  to  extin- 
guish the  liberty  of  the  cities  of  Magna  Graecia ;  and  the  arms  of 
Kome  were  still  far  off. 


20 


rji^ 


^y 


CHAPTER  XXXVIIT. 

THE   LAST   YEARS  OF  THE   SPARTAN   HEGEMONY,    387--379   B.C. 

The  peace  of  Antalcidas  proved  quite  as  profitable  to  Sparta  as 
the  most  sanguine  of  her  statesmen  had  ventured  to  hope.  By  it 
she  had  deliberately  sacrificed  the  remnant  of  her  possessions-  in 
Asia,  but  at  that  cost  she  had  broken  up  the  formidable  coalition 
which  menaced  her  supremacy  in  Europe.  The  terms  of  the 
treaty — which  announced  that  "  every  Hellenic  city  w^as  to  be 
free  and  independent " — left  her  own  power  imtouched,  because 
her  relations  with  her  smaller  neighbours  were  based,  not  on  bonds 
of  federation,  but  on  separate  treaties  with  each  individual  state. 
Moreover,  the  allied  cities  were  not  kept  to  their  allegiance  by 
garrisons,  or  forced  to  pay  tributes ;  they  were  held  down  each  by 
the  Laconizing  party  within  its  own  walls.  Ostensibly,  then,  the 
allies  of  Sparta  were  "  free  and  independent,"  and  the  treaty  made 
no  difference  in  their  status. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  bonds  which  had  united  the  enemies 
of  Sparta  were  broken  by  the  provisions  of  the  peace  of  Antalcidas. 
The  Boeotian  League,  which  Thebes  had  tried  to  keep  together 
by  coercing  her  smaller  neighbours,  at  once  flew  to  pieces.  When 
the  peace  was  proclaimed  well-nigh  every  town  in  Boeotia  threw 
over  the  league,  asserted  its  complete  independence,  and  assumed 
all  the  attributes  of  autonomy  ^  in  a  way  which  had  not  been 
seen  since  447  B.C.,  the  year  in  which  Thebes  had  reconstructed  the 
confederacy.  Not  contented  with  seeing  her  enemy  crippled  in 
this  way,  Sparta  induced  the  remnants  of  the  Plataeans,  who  had 
dwelt  in  Attica  ever  since  430  b.c,  to  return  to  the  site  of  their 

*  For  example,  they  all  began  coiniug  money  in  their  own  names,  which 
Thebes  had  not  allowed  since  the  league  was  reformed  after  the  defeat  of 
Athens  in  447  B.C. 


387  B.C.]  The  Chalcidian  League.  451 

ruined  city,  and  to  rebuild  it  in  spite  of  Tliebes.  It  was  not  only 
in  Boeotia  that  the  peace  of  Antalcidas  brought  about  changes ; 
in  Peloponnesus,  Argos  and  Corinth  had  united  during  the  war, 
and  fused  themselves  into  a  federal  state  :  they  were  now  compelled 
to  separate,  and  the  Lacouizing  party  in  Corinth  soon  brought 
back  their  city  to  its  old  dependence  on  Sparta. 

When  affairs  had  settled  down  in  Greece,  and  the  Spartans  once 
more  found  themselves  iirmly  established  in  their  old  position, 
they   soon   showed   how   little   they   cared   for    the 

•'  Siege  of 

wording  of  the  treaty  of  387  B.C.  when  it  affected  Mantinea, 
themselves.  Ere  two  years  had  passed  they  fell  on 
their  Arcadian  neighbours,  razed  the  walls  of  Mantinea,  and  com- 
pelled its  citizens  to  exchange  a  democratic  for  an  oligarchic  form 
of  government.  Not  long  after  they  turned  on  Phlius,  and  restored 
its  exiled  aristocracy  by  force  of  arms.  Such  was  the  way  in 
which  Sparta  left  her  neighbours  "  free  and  independent." 

It  was  Agesilaus  who  now  directed  the  policy  of  his  countrymen. 
He  had  won  unbounded  glory  both  by  his  Asiatic  campaigns  and 
by  his  later  achievements  in  the  Corinthian  war ;  this  made  him  the 
idol  of  the  citizens.  Moreover,  his  ambition  was  not  political,  but 
purely  military ;  he  was  therefore  able  to  avoid  all  conflicts  v.'ith 
the  ephors,  and  lived  on  such  good  terms  with  them  that  they 
continually  lent  themselves  to  his  plans.  Agesilaus  continued  the 
narrow  and  jealous  policy  of  which  Lysander  had  once  been  the 
exponent.  He  cared  nothing  for  the  general  needs  of  Greece,  and 
made  it  the  main  object  of  his  life  that  no  state  should  ever  be 
allowed  to  grow  strong  enough  to  cause  Sparta  a  moment's  uneasiness. 

Ere  long  this  selfish  policy  was  put  into  practice  on  a  large 
scale.     The  Greek  cities  on  the  Macedonian  coast,  since  they  had 
been  liberated  by  Brasidas  in  422  B.C.,  had  preserved         „v  ,  .^. 
their  independence  amid  obscure  wars  with  each  other,        lieag-ue, 

392-382  B  C 

and  with  the  barbarian  kings  of  the  inland.  At  last, 
about  392  b.c,  a  number  of  the  states,  headed  by  Olynthus,  had 
formed  themselves  into  a  confederacy  called  the  Chalcidian  League, 
from  the  fact  that  nearly  all  its  members  lay  within  the  peninsula 
of  Chalcidice.  This  body  was  already  growing  powerful — it  could 
put  into  the  field  eight  thousand  hoplites  and  a  thousand  horse 
— and   appeared  destined   to  absorb   all  the  Greek   states  in  its 


452         The  Last   Years  of  the  Spartan  Hegemony.    [382  b.c. 

neighbourhood.  Frightened  at  its  progress,  the  towns  of  Acanthus 
and  Apollonia,  which  had  no  desire  to  enter  the  league,  sent  an 
embassy  to  Sparta  to  beg  the  ephors  to  assist  them  in  maintaining 
their  independence.  The  Chalcidian  League  had  given  no  cause  of 
offence,  and  was  putting  forth  its  activity  in  a  district  where  Sparta 
had  not  interfered  for  forty  years.  Nevertheless,  Agesilaus  and  his 
followers  were  quite  ready  to  take  up  the  quarrel,  for  the  sole 
reason  that  they  thought  that  the  league  might  some  day  grow 
dangerous. 

There  was  a  party  at  Sparta  which  opposed  this  reckless  inter- 
vention in  so  distant  a  land,  on  grounds  of  expediency  as  well  as 

Sparta  de-  of  public  morality.  It  was  headed  by  the  young 
''^^ife chai-°'^ -^""-^^S  Agesipolis;  for,  as  was  usual,  the  two  royal 
cidiana  houses  had  espoused  different  lines  of  policy.  But 
Agesilaus  and  the  supporters  of  vigorous  action  were  far  the  more 
powerful,  and  carried  a  vote  in  favour  of  war  at  the  next  meeting 
of  the  Apella.  It  was  resolved  to  raise  an  army  of  ten  thousand 
men  from  among  the  allies  of  Sparta,  for  service  against  Olynthus 
and  her  sister-cities  of  the  Chalcidian  League.  The  main  body  was 
not  to  start  till  the  following  spring,  but  two  officers,  named 
Eudilmidas  and  Phoebidas,  were  sent  forward  at  once — the  month 
was  now  September — with  about  two  thousand  men  destined  to 
garrison  Acanthus  and  Apollonia. 

The  march  of  Phoebidas  took  him  through  Bo2otia,  and  he 
pitched  his  camp  for  one  night  not  far  from  the  walls  of  Thebes. 

.    .  ,     AVhile  he  lay  there  he  was  surprised  by  a  visit  from 

Civil  troubles  ''  i.  o 

In  Thebes,     Leontiades,  one  of  the  two  polemarchs  who  were  the 

382  Be 

supreme  magistrates  in  the  Thebau  constitution. 
Leontiades,  who  was  a  violent  partisan  of  oligarchj%  was  engaged 
at  that  moment  in  a  bitter  struggle  with  his  fellow-polemarch 
Ismenias,  the  head  of  the  democratic  and  anti-Laconian  party  in 
Boeotia.  With  the  true  Greek  recklessness  in  matters  of  faction, 
Leontiades  had  resolved  to  crush  his  enemy  at  any  sacrifice,  even 
though  it  involved  the  ruin  of  his  country.  He  came  to  Phoebidas 
by  night,  and  offered  to  place  him  in  possession  of  the  Cadmeia, 
the  citadel  of  Thebes,  in  return  for  aid  against  Ismenias.  The 
Spartan  commander  was  prompt,  daring,  and  utterly  unscrupulous  ; 
he  instantly  closed  with  the  offer  of  Leontiades,  and  undertook  to 


382  B.C.]  PJwcbidas  seizes  Thebes.  453 

carry  out  his  directions.  The  Thebaii  pointed  out  that  the  next 
day  was  the  festival  of  the  Thesmophoria,  during  which  the 
citadel  was  stripped  of  guards  and  handed  over  to  the  women  of 
the  city,  who  there  celebrated  certain  rites  at  which  men  were  not 
allowed  to  be  present.  He  himself,  as  polemarch,  was  in  charge  of 
the  gates,  and  would  see  that  they  were  open  at  the  preconcerted 
hour.  Sparta  and  Thebes  were  at  peace,  no  one  suspected 
treachery,  and  the  town  would  be  taken  completely  unawares. 

The  next  day  Phoebidas  carried  out  this  monstrous  scheme. 
lie  got  his  troops  in  marching  order,  and  started  as  if  he  was  about 
to  proceed  northward  on  his  way  toward  Chalcidice.    „^    ^., 

'■  .  •'  Phoebidas 

But  suddenly  he  swerved  from  his  route,  and  appeared     seizes  the 
at  midday  before  the  gates  of  Thebes.     There  he  met       ^  «ieia. 
Leontiades,  who  admitted  him  into  the  town.     The  streets  were 
empty  in  the  noontide  heat,  no  man  offered  opposition,  and  in  a 
few  minutes  the  Spartans  had  entered  the  citidal,  and  seized  as 
hostages  the  great  crowd  of  women  who  were  celebrating  the  festival. 
Before  any  one  realized  what  had  happened,  Leontiades  rode  down 
to  the  senate-house,  and  announced  to  the  astonished  elders  of 
Thebes   that   their  city  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Spartans.     So 
great  was  the  panic  that  no  one  dared  resist  the  traitor ;  he  was 
allowed  to  seize  and  imprison  his  rival  Ismenias,  and  to  summon 
a  packed  assembly  of  the  people,  which  voted  submission  to  the 
ancient  enemy.     Three  hundred  prominent  members  of  the  demo- 
cratic party  left  the  city  at  once,  and  fled  to  Athens ;    but  the 
bulk  of  the  Thebans  were  so  cowed  that  they  acquiesced  for  the 
moment  in  the  assumption  of  power  by  Leontiades  and  liis  friends. 
Thus  was  planned  and  executed  the  most  flagrant   breach  of 
international  morality  that  Greece  ever  knew — a  crime  even  more 
wanton  than  the  Athenian  capture  of  Melos  (see  p.  „     „ 

^  ^         ^    The  Spartans 

349),  though  it  involved  far  less  bloodshed  than  that  retain  the 
horrid  deed.  Men  hoped  for  a  moment  that  Sparta,  ^  ^^^ 
selfish  though  she  might  be,  would  disown  her  general's  action. 
And,  indeed.  King  Agesipolis  and  his  followers,  when  the  news 
arrived,  clamoured  loudly  for  the  punishment  of  Phoebidas  and 
the  evacuation  of  the  Cadmeia.  But  Agesilaus  promptly  rose  to 
defend  the  general ;  he  stated  his  views  with  the  most  repulsive 
and  cynical  frankness.     "  We  must  examine,"  he  said,  "  the  ten- 


^54         The  Last  Years  of  the  Spartan  Hegemony.   rssiB.c. 

dency  of  the  action  of  Phoebidas.  Let  us  consider  whether  it  is 
advantageous  to  Sparta.  If  it  is  so,  it  was  highly  meritorious  in 
him  to  carry  it  out,  even  though  he  had  no  authority  or  orders 
from  home."  The  Sjmrtans  proved  as  immoral,  though  not  as 
brazen-fazod,  as  their  king ;  they  passed  a  decree  which  censured 
Phoebidas  for  acting  without  orders,  and  imposed  a  fine  on  him ; 
but  after  this  display  of  hyjoocrisy  they  voted  in  favour  of  the 
retention  of  the  Cadmeia,  and  sent  harmosts  to  Thebes  to  take 
command  of  the  garrison.  Ismenias  they  brought  to  Sparta,  and 
put  on  his  trial  for  "  Medism  "  on  account  of  his  conduct  in  395  B.C. 
(see  p.  426).  It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  unfortunate  statesman 
was  condemned  and  executed. 

The  political  extinction  of  the  second  state  in  Greece,  which 
perished  in  a  time  of  peace,  and  without  being  able  to  strike  a  blow 

in  self-defence,  caused  terror  everywhere.     It  seemed 
cidian  war,    as  if  unrighteousncss  was  about  to  prosper,  since  no 

state  dared  take  Sparta  to  task,  and  for  three  years 
everything  went  well  with  her  arms.  The  Chalcidians,  indeed, 
made  a  brave  defence;  they  defeated  and  slew  Teleutias,  the 
brother  of  Agesilaus,  who  led  the  first  army  against  them.  But 
King  Agesipolis  then  took  the  field,  captured  Torone,  and  laid 
siege  to  Olynthus.  He  died  of  a  fever  before  the  city  fell,  but 
Polybiades,  his  successor  in  command,  received  its  surrender.  The 
Chalcidian  League  was  then  dissolved,  and  each  of  its  members 
enrolled  separately  as  a  subject-ally  of  Sparta  (379  B.C.).  The  day 
was  to  come,  ere  that  generation  had  passed  away,  when  Sparta 
and  every  other  state  in  Greece  was  destined  to  lament  bitterly  the 
destruction  of  that  vigorous  confederacy.  It  had  served  to  keep 
back  the  advancing  power  of  the  kings  of  Macedonia — a  power 
which  was  now  left  unchecked,  and  began  first  to  encroach  on  its 
Hellenic  neighbours,  and  then  to  rise  into  a  public  danger  to  the 
whole  of  Greece. 

The  same  year  that  saw  the  fall  of  Olynthus  was  destined  to 
mark  the  end  of  the  good  fortune  of  Sparta.  •  The  city  which  she 

had  most  deeply  wronged  was  fated  to  be  her  bane. 

Conspiracy  i      i  i 

at  Thebes,     Thebes  had  now  been  groaning  for  three  years  beneath 

the  yoke  of  Leontiades  and  his  partisans,  the  pole- 

marchs  Philippus  and  Archias.     Her  citizens  had  hoped  at  first 


379  B.C.]  Thebes  Liberated.  455 

that  some  forlmiate  chance  might  weaken  Sparta,  and  free  them. 
But  when  all  went  well  with  their  oppressor,  sheer  desperation 
drove  the  most  reckless  of  the  Thebans  into  forming  a  conspiraoj'. 
The  exiles  of  the  democratic  party,  who  mostly  resided  at  Athens, 
got  into  communication  with  the  malcontents  at  home,  and 
between  them  a  daring  and  hazardous  plot  was  devised.  It  was 
to  commence  with  the  assassination  of  Leontiades  and  the  two  polc- 
marchs,  and  to  end  with  an  attempt  to  storm  the  citadel  and  expel 
the  Spartan  garrison.  Seven  exiles  from  Athens,  headed  by  two 
young  men  named  Melon  and  Pelopidas,  were  to  undertake  the 
actual  slaying  of  the  tyrants,  while  a  citizen  named  Charon  lent 
them  his  house  as  a  hiding-place.  Phyllidas,  the  secretary  of  the 
polemarchs,  who,  in  spite  of  his  official  position,  had  strong  sympa- 
thies with  the  exiles,  undertook  to  forward  the  scheme.  For  this 
purpose  he  invited  his  employers  to  a  supper,  promising  that  they 
should  not  only  drink  deep,  but  enjoy  the  company  of  the  most 
beautiful  women  in  Thebes.  He  undertook  to  introduce  the  exiles 
into  his  house,  muffled  in  female  apparel,  and  left  the  rest  of  the 
business  to  their  hands. 

On  an  appointed  day  the  seven  exiles  passed  into  Thebes  at 
dusk,  disguised  as  country-folk ;  they  stole  one  by  one  into  the 
house  of  Charon,  and  remained  there  till  the  ncxt^^  ^^  ^ 
evening,   when  Phyllidas    was   to   give   his    supper,  of  the  Theban 

.r.    .  ,        ,  n      ,  .       -1      ,  1  polemarclas. 

Before  the  hour  had  arrived,  however,  they  were 
startled  by  hearing  their  host  receive  a  summons  to  appear  before 
the  polemarchs.  Charon  set  out  in  much  trei)idation,  for  he  feared 
that  the  conspiracy  had  been  discovered.  But  the  magistrates  had 
received  no  definite  information;  they  merely  warned  him  that 
they  had  news  from  Athens  that  a  plot  was  on  foot,  and  cautioned 
him  against  engaging  in  it.  At  nightfall  the  unsuspecting  pole- 
marchs entered  the  house  of  Phyllidas,  and  gave  themselves  up  to 
the  pleasures  of  the  table.  In  the  midst  of  the  feast,  it  is  said,  a 
courier  arrived  from  Athens,  bearing  a  despatch  for  Archias  which 
revealed  the  whole  plot.  But  the  doomed  man  thrust  the  paper 
unopened  beneath  the  pillow  of  his  couch,  exclaiming,  "  Business 
to-morrow  " — an  expression  which  became  proverbial.  When  his 
guests  were  heavy  with  wine,  Phyllidas  introduced  the  conspirators, 
who  entered  the  house  shrouded  in  ample  robes,  and  v/ith  their 


456         The  Last  Years  of  the  Spartan  Hegemony.  [379  B.d. 

faces  veiled.  They  reached  the  supper-room  unsuspected,  and 
were  greeted  by  the  half-drimken  guests  as  the  women  whom 
Phyllidas  had  promised  to  introduce.  Then,  casting  aside  their 
disguise,  they  rushed,  dagger  in  hand,  on  the  polemarchs  and  slew 
them  with  repeated  blows.  But  the  leader  of  the  oligarchs  still 
remained.  Leontiades  had  not  been  bidden  to  the  banquet  of 
Phyllidas,  and  was  spending  the  evening  at  home.  Pelopidas  and 
three  more  rushed  to  his  house  the  moment  that  the  polemarchs 
were  despatched,  and  knocked  at  the  door.  When  it  was  opened 
they  burst  in,  and  found  him  just  about  to  retire  to  rest.  Leon- 
tiades was  prompt  and  active  ;  snatching  down  his  sword  from  the 
wall,  he  leapt  to  the  threshold  of  his  bedroom  and  slew  the  first 
conspirator  as  he  entered.  He  fought  hand  to  hand  with  the 
others,  and  was  only  cut  down  by  Pelopidas  after  a  des[)erate 
struggle. 

The  tyrannicides  now  ran  to  the  public  prison,  where  they  con- 
trived to  kill  the  jailor,  and  to  liberate  a  hundred  and  fifty  political 
Thebes  freed,  prisoners  who  were   lying  in  bonds  awaiting  their 

379  B.C.  \,ix^.  These  men  they  furnished  with  weapons,  and 
then  sallied  out  into  the  streets,  proclaiming  that  the  tyrants  were 
slain,  and  inviting  all  true  Thebans  to  take  up  arms  and 
join  them.  So  great  was  the  detestation  which  the  rule  of  Leon- 
tiades had  inspired,  that  the  citizens  came  out  in  hundreds  to 
join  the  conspirators.  But  all  might  yet  have  gone  wrong  if  tlie 
Spartan  officers  in  the  citadel  had  kept  their  heads,  for  the  dis- 
orderly mob  of  Thebans  might  easily  have  been  dispersed  by  the 
fifteen  hundred  men  of  whom  the  garrison  consisted.  But  the 
harmosts,  instead  of  sallying  forth,  shut  the  gates  of  the  Cadmeia, 
and  contented  themselves  with  giving  shelter  to  the  fugitives  of 
the  oligarchic  party  who  ran  to  seek  their  succour. 

When  the  morning  dawned  the  whole  city  was  in  the  hands  of 
the  insurgents,  and  several  thousand  men  were  already  mustering 
for  an  attack  on  the  citadel.  An  informal  public  assembly  had 
elected  Pelopidas,  Charon,  and  Melon  as  Boeotarchs,  and  voted  its 
approval  of  the  slaughter  of  the  previous  night.  Assistance  soon 
came  to  the  Thebans — the  exiles  from  Athens  joined  them,  volun- 
teers arrived  from  several  of  the  Boeotian  towns  of  the  anti- 
Laconian  party,  and  two  of  the  Athenian  strategi  led  an  Attic  force 


S'j^ofi.c.i  TJic  Cadi/ieia  Recapiured.  457 

across  Mount  Citbaerou  to  aid  in  the  siege  of  the  citadel.  These 
officers  had  not  obtained  any  formal  authorization  from  the 
Ecclesia,  but  they  knew  that  the  bent  of  Athenian  public  opinion 
was  strongly  in  favour  of  Thebes,  and  trusted  to  win  approval  by 
the  success  of  their  actions.  The  Spartan  forces  in  the  Cadmeia 
were  now  closely  beset ;  an  attempt  of  the  Plataeans  to  bring  aid 
to  them  was  defeated,  and  several  assaults  were  delivered  upon 
the  wall.  The  stormers  were  beaten  back,  but  their  fierceness 
seemed  to  increase  after  each  repulse,  and  the  harmosts,  who  were 
men  of  utter  incapacity,  lost  all  hojje  of  ultimate  success.  After 
three  or  four  days  they  made  overtures  for  surrender,  which  were 
gladly  accepted.  Accordingly  the  garrison  marched  out  of  the 
citadel,  leaving  their  friends  the  Theban  oligarchs  to  be  massacred 
by  the  mob,  and  took  the  road  for  the  Isthmus.  At  Megara  they 
met  a  large  Peloponnesian  army  under  King  Cleombrotus,  which 
was  hastening  to  their  succour.  The  Spartans  were  wildly  enraged 
with  the  officers,  who  had  made  such  a  feeble  defence  in  such  a 
strong  fortress  as  the  Cadmeia.  AVitli  a  severity  which  can  hardly 
be  blamed,  they  put  to  death  two  of  the  harmosts,  and  sent  the 
third  into  exile. 


^^y  i^*cJt/u^ 


CHAPTER  XXXIX. 

THE   UPRISING   OF   THEBES,    379-371  B.C. 

Although  Thebes  had  freed  herself  for  the  moment,  there  was 
no  great  expectation  in  Greece  of  her  proving  able  to  defend  the 
liberty  she  had  regained.  Sparta  was  at  the  height  of  her  strength, 
and  unvexed  by  any  other  enemy;  if  Thebes,  with  Corintli  Athens 
and  Argos  to  back  her,  had  proved  unable  to  overthrow  the 
Lacedaemonian  power  in  the  struggle  of  395-387  B.C.,  what  chance 
was  there  of  her  success  when  she  plunged  into  war  without  the  aid 
of  even  her  own  Boeotian  neighbours  ? 

But  however  dark  their  prospects  might  appear,  the  Thebans 
were  resolved  to  fight  to  the  bitter  end ;  even  destruction  was 
preferable  to  submission  to  an  enemy  so  treacherous  and  hypo- 
critical as  Sparta.  Nor  was  tlie  war  so  desperate  as  it  seemed ; 
at  this  moment  there  was  no  Lacedaemonian  general  who  possessed 
an  atom  of  military  genius  save  Agesilaus,  and  Agesilaus  was  now 
verging  on  old  age — he  had  reached  his  fiftj'-ninth  year — and  was 
no  longer  always  in  the  field.  Thebes,  on  the  other  hand,  happened 
to  have  at  her  disposal  the  two  most  brilliant  men  that  she  ever 
reared — a  happy  chance,  for  great  names  were  always  rare  in 
Boeotia.  The  first  of  these  was  Pelopidas,  one  of  the 
leaders  of  the  late  conspiracy — a  fiery  young  man, 
possessing  more  than  an  ordinary  share  of  military  talent.  He  was 
a  brilliant  leader  of  cavalry,  quick  to  seize  an  opportunity  and 
prompt  at  delivering  a  sudden  blow.  From  his  first  campaign  he 
won  the  hearts  of  his  soldiers,  and  never  failed  to  make  them 
follow  wherever  he  might  lead.  But  first  among  his  merits  was 
the  fact  that,  unlike  most  Greek  generals,  he  was  as  unselfish  as 
he  was  brave,  and  never  refused  to  co-operate  zealously  with  a 
colleague,  or  to  cany  out  plans  which  were  not  his  own. 


379  B.C.]  Epaminondas.  459 

Wheu  Athens  had  owned  Aiisteides  and  Tliemistocles,  and  in 

another  generation  Cimon  and  Pericles,  those  great  citizens  had 

put  themselves  at  the  head  of  opposing  factions,  and  done  much  to 

neutralize  each  other's  powers ;  but,  to  the  singular  good  fortune 

of  Thebes,  it  chanced  that  Pelopidas  was  the  bosom-friend  of  the 

warrior-statesman   Epaminondas,  the  best  man  that 

Epaminondds. 
Boeotia  ever  reared.     If  Pelopidas  was  the  right  hand 

of  Thebes,  Epaminondas  was  her  brain.  He  combined  intellectual 
with  moral  excellence  to  a  degree  higher  than  was  reached  by  any 
other  Greek  statesman  in  any  age.  Pericles  only  can  fairly  be 
compared  with  him,  and  the  great  Athenian  was  decidedly  in- 
ferior to  the  Theban  in  the  breadth  of  his  sympathies ;  for  while 
Pericles  worked  for  Athens  alone,  and  showed  no  great  regard 
for  Greece,  Epaminondas  was  as  zealous  in  what  he  wrought  for 
the  general  good  of  the  Hellenic  race  as  in  his  service  to  his  own 
native  city.  Moreover,  Pericles  was  at  the  best  an  average  general, 
while  Epaminondas  showed  the  highest  military  skill,  and  revolu- 
tionized the  whole  art  of  war  among  his  countrymen,  Epami- 
nondas came  of  an  ancient  but  impoverished  family,  and  through 
all  his  brilliant  career  lived  a  life  of  honourable  poverty.  But 
though  poor,  he  had  acquired  the  best  culture  of  the  age ;  he  had 
studied  music,  rhetoric  and  philosophy,  without  becoming  vain, 
affected  or  unpractical.  No  Greek  was  ever  more  free  from  the 
vices  which  beset  the  statesman  ;  ambition  and  self-interest  never 
exercised  the  slightest  influence  on  his  actions.  His  sense  of  honour 
was  so  strong  that  he  even  refused  to  take  an  active  part  in  the 
plot  which  freed  his  native  city,  because  it  involved  violence, 
treachery  and  assassination.  When,  however,  the  oligarchs  had 
been  slain,  he  was  the  first  citizen  of  Thebes  that  came  out  in  aims 
to  join  the  insurgents,  and  his  eloquent  pleading  drew  over  many 
adherents  to  the  cause  of  liberty.  But  Epaminondas  was  not 
merely  just,  patriotic,  and  unselfish ;  he  possessed  the  broadest 
political  ideas  of  any  Greek  statesman  that  ever  lived.  It  was  his 
aim  to  induce  all  the  Hellenic  cities  to  live  together  ia  unity,  with- 
out that  continual  strife  for  pre-eminence  and  domination  which 
had  hitherto  been  the  curse  of  the  race.  He  did  not  light  in  order 
to  destroy  Sparta,  or  to  make  Thebes  mistress  of  an  empire;  he 
only  desired  to  curb  the  former's  power  of  doing  harm,  and  to  place 


460  The   Uprising  of  Thebes.  [378  b  c. 

his  own  city  first  among  the  band  of  her  equals.  Indeed,  his  want 
of  that  selfish  and  aggressive  local  patriotism  which  characterized 
the  average  Greek  was  the  one  thing  which  hampered  his  influence 
at  home.  The  Thebans  sometimes  complained  that  he  loved 
Hellas  more  than  his  native  town;  and  though  the  taunt  was 
untrue,  it  serves  to  indicate  the  bent  of  his  character.  In  379  B.C. 
Epaminondas  was  merely  known  as  a  man  of  mark  and  a  friend  of 
freedom ;  that  he  was  also  a  great  general  and  a  great  statesman 
the  history  of  the  succeeding  years  will  show. 

Thebes  had  been  liberated  late  in  the  year,  and  it  was  in  the 
very  depth  of  winter  that  King  Cleombrotus  led  into  Boeotia  a 
Peloponnesian  army  hastily  raised  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  the 
garrison  of  the  Cadmeia.  When  the  king  found  that  the  citadel 
Lad  fallen,  he  displayed  great  irresolution.  After  penetrating  into 
the  Theban  territory  and  stopping  there  sixteen  days  without 
offering  battle,  he  suddenly  disbanded  his  army  and  returned  home, 
leaving,  however,  a  force  of  several  thousand  men  to  protect 
Thespiae — the  most  friendly  to  Sparta  of  all  the  to^viis  of  Boeotia. 
This  detachment  was  commanded  by  a  rash  and  reckless  officer 
named  Sphodrias,  who  now  did  his  best  to  bring  trouble  on 
Sparta. 

The  Athenians  were,  on  mature  reflection,  much  frightened  at 
their  own  boldness  in  having  unofiicially  aided  in  the  liberation 
Sphodrias"  ^^  Thebes.  To  disarm  the  wrath  of  Sparta  they 
attempt  on  punished  the  two  strategi  who  joined  the  Boeotians, 
and  endeavoured  to  clear  the  state  of  all  complicity 
in  their  actions.  Sphodrias  chose  this  moment,  when  Athens 
was  anxious  for  peace,  to  mflict  on  her  the  worst  of  insults. 
He  formed  a  wild  scheme  for  surprising  the  city  by  night,  and 
seizing  it  in  the  same  way  that  Phoebidas  had  seized  Thebes  five 
years  before.  Accordingly,  he  secretly  drew  his  men  down  to  the 
Attic  frontier,  and  made  a  forced  march  on  Athens.  But  his  manage- 
ment was  as  bad  as  his  intentions ;  daylight  surprised  him  when  he 
was  in  the  middle  of  the  Thriasian  plain,  ten  miles  from  the  city, 
and  he  then  turned  ignominiously  and  retreated  to  Megara.  But 
his  plan  stood  revealed,  and  roused  the  Athenians  to  the  wildest 
wrath.  They  reflected  that  there  was  no  use  in  endeavouring  to 
conciliate  a  city  whose   generals  were  capable  of  such  acts,  and 


377  B.C.]  Agcsilaus  in  Boeotia.  461 

boldly  declared  war  on  Sparta.^    'J'hus  Thebes  was  provided  with 
a  powerful  ally  in  her  hour  of  need. 

lu    the  early   summer  of   378  b.c,   the  ephors    prevailed   on 
Agesilaus  to  take  the  field.     The  old  king  gathered  a  large  army 
and  marched  to  crush  Thebes.     He  found  the  passes     Abortive 
of  Cithaeron  guarded  bv  a  mixed  force  of  Athenians  '^^i^^^JP'^  °^ 

o  "  Agesilaus, 

and  Thebans,  but  forced  a  way  through  with  his  usual  378-377  b.c. 
skill.  Descending  into  the  plain,  he  found  that  the  Thebans  had 
drawn  a  strong  line  of  entrenchments  along  their  frontier;  but 
this  hindrance,  too,  he  succeeded  in  passing,  and  so  penetrated  close 
to  Thebes.  But  theenemj^,  though  they  would  not  give  him  battle, 
hung  so  closely  on  his  heels  that  he  could  not  form  the  siege 
of  the  city,  and  finally  had  to  retire  with  nothing  accomplished. 
To  the  Thebans  this  year's  fighting  brought  one  cause  of  exultation  : 
in  the  autumn  they  surprised  and  slew  their  old  enemy  Phoebidas. 
Next  year  Agesilaus  reappeared  with  a  larger  army,  and  again 
forced  his  way  into  the  Theban  territory;  he  laid  it  waste  with 
the  utmost  barbaritj',  felling  fruit-trees,  blocking  wells,  and  burning 
every  building  in  the  district ;  but  once  more  he  was  unable  either 
to  make  the  Thebans  fight  or  to  besiege  their  city.  In  short,  as  a 
contemporary  remarked,  the  king  had  only  given  his  enemies  an 
instructive  lesson  in  the  art  of  war,  and  done  them  no  material 
harm.  These  two  campaigns  lowered  the  prestige  of  Sparta  to  a 
vast  degree ;  her  best  general,  with  the  whole  force  of  Peloponnesus 
at  his  back,  had  proved  himself  unable  to  make  any  impression 
on  a  foe  whom  he  had  expected  to  crush  at  the  first  encounter. 
Moreover,  on  his  return,  Agesilaus  met  with  an  accident  at  Megara 
which  confined  him  to  his  bed  for  many  mouths,  and  so  shook  his 
health  that  for  several  years  he  was  not  able  to  take  the  field.^ 
Cleombrotus  replaced  him  at  the  head  of  the  army  of  invasion  in 
376  B.C.,  but,  having  little  or  no  military  skilly  was  not  even  able 

1  SjAodrias  was  prosecuted  at  Sparta  for  his  action,  but  acquitted  on 
the  recommendation  of  Agesilaus,  who  now  (as  previously  in  the  case  of 
Phoebidas)  pleaded  that  the  offender  had  striven  to  do  his  best  for 
Lacedaemon. 

"  A  vein  in  his  leg  causing  trouble,  the  surgeons  opened  it ;  a  flow  of 
blood  followed,  and  was  not  staunched  till  he  fainted  with  weakness  and 
■was  at  the  very  point  of  death. 


462  The   Uprising  of  Thebes.  [376  b.c. 

to  force  the  passes  across  Cithaeron,  and  returned  without  having 
set  foot  in  Boeotia, 

Meanwhile  the  Athenians  had  been  prosecuting  a  naval  war 
against  the  allies  of  Sparta  with  some  success.     They  had  renewed 

The  naval  the  maritime  league  with  Byzantium  and  Rhodes 
league.  which  Thrasybulus  had  formed  in  390  B.C.,  and  had 
induced  several  other  states,  including  Chios  and  Mitylene,  to  join 
it.  The  members  of  this  alliance  agreed  to  furnish  ships  and 
money  for  an  attack  on  Peloponnesu-5,  and  aj^pointed  a  joint  board 
to  sit  at  Athens  and  direct  the  war.  In  order  to  avoid  recalling 
the  odious  memories  of  tlie  Confederacy  of  Delos,  the  name  of  the 
war  fund  was  changed  from  "  tribute  "  {(^6fos)  to  "  contribution " 
((Twrafis),  and  the  Athenians  solemnly  swore  never  to  send  out 
cleruchies  to  any  part  of  the  Aegean.  The  confederacy  ultimately 
came  to  number  seventy  cities,  but  it  was  never  a  very  vigorous 
body ;  the  allies  had  a  lurking  fear  of  the  ambition  of  Athens, 
which  made  them  slack  in  providing  ships,  and  still  more  unwilling 
to  put  money  into  the  common  treasury.     Their  caution  grew  yet 

Battle  of  iiiore  marked  when,  in  the  year  376  B.C.,  the  Athenian 
Naxos.       admiral  Chabrias  completely  defeated  the  Spartan  fleet 

376  B  C  1  «/  i- 

off  Naxos,  and  swept  the  enemy  out  of  the  Aegean. 
After  this,  the  danger  from  Sparta  having  passed  away,  it  was 
exceedingly  difficult  to  extract  either  ships  or  contributions  from 
the  confederates.  When  Timotheus,  the  son  of  Conon,  rounded 
Cape  Malea  and  carried  the  war  into  the  Ionian  Sea,  he  was 
presently  brought  to  a  standstill  for  sheer  want  of  monej'.  Yet  he 
had  secured  some  brilliant  successes,  having  beaten  a  Corinthian 
fleet  off  the  Acarnanian  coast,  and  enlisted  Corcyra  and  Cephallenia 
in  the  maritime  league.  The  campaign,  however,  was  very  costly  ; 
tlie  Athenian  treasury  had  run  dry — even  after  the  unpopular 
expedient  of  a  stringent  income-tax  had  been  adopted — and  hardly 
an  obol  could  be  squeezed  out  of  the  allies.  Athens  now  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  she  had  done  enough  to  punish  Sparta  for 
the  misdeed  of  Sphodrias,  and  began  to  think  of  concluding  peace. 
Thebes,  it  was  urged,  had  shown  herself  quite  capable  of  defending 
her  own  borders,  and  there  was  no  use  in  protracting  the  war  for 
her  benefit.  Indeed,  the  Thebans  were  growing  quite  unpopular 
at  Athens,  owing  to  the  rigour  with  which  they  were  treating  their 


374  B.C.J  Successes  of  the  Thehans.  463 

neighbours  of  the  smaller  Boeotian  towns.  After  the  retreat  of 
Cleombrotus  in  376  B.C.,  they  had  fallen  upon  the  TheThebans 
various  places  which  still  adhered  to  the  Spartan  BoeoUa! 
alliance.  After  Pelopidas  had  gained  a  battle  at  Tegyra,  374  8.0. 
and  beaten  the  Laconizers  and  their  Peloponnesian  allies  in  the 
open  field,  the  separatist  towns  had  fallen  one  by  one.  Thespiac 
and  Tanagra  had  their  walls  destroj^ed,  while  Plataea  was  razed  to 
the  ground,  and  its  inhabitants  driven  into  exile.  This  maltreat- 
ment of  the  Plataeans  roused  much  indignation  at  Athens,  where 
a  friendly  feeling  for  the  small  state  on  their  frontier  had  never 
ceased  since  the  daj''  of  Marathon.  Having  reduced  all  the  neigh- 
bouring towns  save  Orchomenus,  the  Thebans  now  formally 
reconstituted  the  Boeotian  League,  which  had  been  in  abeyance 
for  the  thirteen  years  since  the  peace  of  Autalcidas,  and  assumed 
their  old  presidency  in  it.^ 

The  Spartans  were  by  this  time  disgusted  at  their  ill  success 
both  by  sea  and  land,  and  frightened  by  signs  of  growing  discontent 
among  their  allies  in  Peloponnesus.  Accordingly  Abortive 
they  professed  themselves  ready  to  treat  for  peace.  A^®^°®'  374B.C. 
congress  was  held  at  Athens,  and  terms  of  accommodation  drawn  up, 
based  on  those  of  the  peace  of  Autalcidas,  and  providing  that  "  all 
slates  should  be  free  and  independent."  This  formula  satisfied 
every  one  except  the  Thebans,  who  wished  to  have  some  security 
against  the  secession  of  the  cities  they  had  coerced  into  joining  the 
Boeotian  League.  Epaminondas,  who  was  acting  in  behalf  of  his 
native  city,  would  not  sign  the  treaty ;  but  Athens  and  the  other 
allied  powers  refused  to  back  up  his  demands :  they  left  him  in 
the  lurch,  and  ratified  the  terms  of  peace,  thereby  leaving  Thebes 
alone  at  war  with  Sparta. 

But  the  treaty  was  destined  to  prove  not  partly  but  wholly 
abortive.  The  Athenian  admiral  Timotheus,  being  recalled  on  the 
conclusion  of  peace  from  his  station  in  the  Ionian  Sea,  committed 
on  his  return  voyage  some  acts  of  hostility  against  Zacynthus, 
a  Spartan  ally.  This  the  Spartans  highly  resented,  and  the 
Apella^  voted  "that  the  Athenians  had  done  injustice,  and  that 

*  It  is  not  quite  certain  whether  Plataea  and  the  other  places  fell  in 
374  B.C.,  just  before  the  treaty,  or  in  37.3  B.C.,  just  after  IL 
2  The  Spartan  public  assembly  (see  p.  6G). 


464  The   Uprising  of  Thebes.  1371  b.o. 

war  should  again  be  declared  on  them."  This  new  conflict,  how- 
ever, was  not  carried  on  with  any  great  vigour  ;  it  lasted  for  three 
years  without  bringing  about  a  single  engagement  of  importance 

by  laud  or  sea.     Its  chief  incident  was  the  siege  of 
siege  or  "'  ° 

Corcyra.      Corcyra  by  a  large  Spartan  armament,  which  failed  to 

3*73-372  B  C 

take  the  city,  and  sailed  away  in  great  disorder  just 
in  lime  to  escape  an  Athenian  fleet  under  Iphicrates  which  was 
sailing  up  to  relieve  the  place  (373  B.C.).  Iphicrates,  though  he 
did  not  catch  the  hostile  fleet,  showed  himself  in  this  campaign  as 
good  a  commander  by  sea  as  he  had  been  by  land  in  the  Corinthian 
war  (see  p.  432).  He  laid  waste  the  western  coast  of  Peloponnesus, 
and  annihilated  a  small  squadron  of  ships  which  Dionysius  of 
Syracuse  had  sent  to  the  assistance  of  Sparta, 
f  At  last,  in  372  B.C.,  the  negotiations  which  bad  failed  two  years 
before  were  once  more  renewed.    A  congress  met  at  Sparta,  and 

Athens  makes  drew  up  terms  very  similar  to  those  which  had  been 
''s'parte?''  formerly  agreed  upon.  But  again  the  old  difficulty 
371  B.C.  arose.  The  Thebans  claimed  to  treat  and  sign  as 
representing  the  Boeotian  League,  while  Sparta  refused  to  recognize 
its  reconstruction,  and  held  by  the  provisions  of  the  peace  of 
Antalcidas.  A  stormy  scene  took  place  at  the  council  board. 
King  Agesilaus  taunted  Epaminondas  with  refusing  to  leave  the 
cities  of  Boeotia  their  rightful  liberty  ;  the  Theban  answered  by 
sarcastically  inquiring  when  Sparta  intended  to  grant  similar 
rights  to  the  townships  of  Laconia.  Agesilaus  then  lost  his 
temper,  and  exclaiming  that  if  the  Thebans  wanted  war  they 
should  have  it,  snatched  up  the  treaty  and  erased  their  name  from 
the  list  of  signatories.  Athens  and  the  other  allies  of  Thebes, 
however,  accepted  the  terms  offered  them,  ratified  the  agreement, 
and  sent  home  their  fleet  (summer,  371  e.g.). 

The  war  had  now  once  more  become  a  duel  between  Thebes 
and  Sparta,  and,  the  issues  being  simplified,  the  conflict  soon  came 

cieombrotus  to  a  head.     A  few  weeks  after  the  treaty  had  been 
invades      gig-ned,  King  Cieombrotus  set  out  to  invade  Boeotia. 

Boeotia,  &        '  '^ 

371B.C.  at  the  head  of  an  army  which  had  been  gathered 
in  Phocis  before  the  late  negociations.  He  chose  to  advance 
into  Boeotia,  not  by  the  valley  of  the  Cephissus,  the  natural  route, 
but  by  the  rough  hill-paths  along  Mount  Helicon,  close  to  the 


871  B.C.]  Tactics  of  Epamiiiondas.  465 

sea-shore.  Thus  he  was  able  to  reach  Leuctra  in  the  Thespian 
territory,  only  eight  miles  from  Thebes,  without  having  been 
molested  by  the  enemy.  Epaminondas,  who  commanded  the 
Boeotians,  had  been  expecting  him  to  appear  further  north,  and 
had  only  just  time  to  throw  himself  between  the  invaders  and 
Thebes.  The  armies  encamped  over  against  each  other  on  the 
slope  of  Helicon,  and  a  battle  was  obviously  imminent ;  the  best 
chance  of  success  seemed  to  lie  with  the  Spartans,  for  they  con- 
siderably outnumbered  the  enemy,i  and  knew  that  many  of  the 
troops  in  the  Boeotian  ranks  were  ill-affected  towards  Thebes. 

Epaminondas,  indeed,  found  some  difficulty  in  inducing  his 
colleagues  the  Boeotarchs  to  consent  to  give  battle.  They  mis- 
trusted their  army,  and  brought  forward  numerous  prophecies  and 
omens  which  jjortended  ill  success  to  their  arms.  Epaminondas 
was  obliged,  like  Themistocles  before  Salamis,  to  turn  oracle- 
monger  himself.  A  divine  saying  promised  that  "  the  Spartans 
should  be  defeated  at  the  tombs  of  the  maidens ;"  and  he  bade  his 
colleagues  observe  that  they  were  drawn  up  near  the  graves  of 
two  Boeotian  damsels  who  had  once  slain  themselves,  after  having 
suffered  outrage  at  the  hands  of  certain  Lacedaemonians.  This 
convinced  the  Boeotarchs ;  but  EiDaminondas'  own  confidence  lay 
not  in  prophecies,  but  in  his  own  military  skill.  He  had  grasped  a 
new  principle  in  the  art  of  war,  and  was  anxious  to  apply  it ;  it 
had  occurred  to  him  that  there  were  other  manners  of  bringing  an 
army  into  action  beside  the  orthodox  method,  which  had  prevailed 
in  Greece  from  time  immemorial.  All  generals  had  been  wont  to 
arrange  their  hoplites  in  a  single  straight  line— generally  of 
uniform  depth  from  end  to  end — to  place  what  cavalry  they 
possessed  on  the  flanks,  and  then  to  fling  the  whole  at  the  enemy's 
line,  aiming  at  striking  him  with  a  level  front  and  bringing  every 
man  into  action  at  the  same  moment.  Epaminondas  had  deter- 
mined to  try  a  new  system — modern  military  authors  would  call 
it  the  attack  tn  echelon — which  he  had  himself  devised.  He 
would  strengthen  one  of  his  wings,  place  his  best  troops  in  it,  and 
launch  it  at  the  opposite  wing  of  the  enemy  before  he  set  his 
centre  in  motion ;  the  centre  again  would  start  a  little  before  the 

1  Plutarch  gives  Cleombrotiis  11,000  men  ;  Diodorus  gives  6000  to  Epami- 
nondas.   But  these  figures  must  be  understated. 

2h 


466  The   Uprising  of  Thebes.  [371  b.c. 

remaining  wiug,  so  that  battle  would  be  joined  on  the  point  where 
he  was  strongest  long  before  the  weaker  part  of  his  army  had 
come  into  action.  If  the  leading  wing  were  victorious,  the  enemy 
would  have  no  opportunity  of  retrieving  the  battle  in  any  other 
part  of  the  field,  and  would  be  in  a  hopeless  case,  even  although 
two-thirds  of  his  army  were  still  intact. 

This  was  the  principle  which  Epaminondas  was  about  to  put 
into  practice.  He  therefore  determined  to  strike  hard  at  the  right 
wing  of  the  hostile  line, — in  which  he  Ivnew  the  native  Spartans 
would  be  placed,  according  to  the  ancient  usage  which  gave  them 
the  post  of  honour.  If  they  were  once  routed,  he  was  confident 
that  their  allies  would  not  stand  firm,  and  that  the  battle  would 
be  gained.  Accordingly  he  formed  his  own  left  wing  out  of  his 
Theban  troops,  the  only  part  of  his  army  which  he  could  thoroughly 
trust.  They  were  ranged  in  a  massive  column,  no  less  than  fifty 
men  deep,  instead  of  the  usual  eight  or  twelve.  The  Boeotian  allies, 
who  were  not  to  be  relied  upon  for  any  very  zealous  service,  were 
drawn  up  in  the  ordinary  line  formation,  and  formed  his  centre 
and  right  wing.  His  cavalry,  which  was  good  and  numerous, 
advanced  parallel  with,  but  in  advance  of  the  left  wing. 

King  Cleombrotus  was  as  anxious  to  fight  as  his  adversary, 
though  for  a  very  different  reason.  He  had  been  often  taunted 
for  mismanaging  his  camj^aigns  in  378  and  376  b.c,  and  wished 
to  prove  that  want  of  fortune  and  not  want  of  courage  had  brought 
about  his  failure.  He  drew  up  his  army  in  the  usual  Greek  fasliion, 
the  line  twelve  deep  from  end  to  end,  with  the  Laconian  cavalry 
on  the  right  wiug,  and  the  allied  cavalry  on  the  left.  He  himself 
took  his  post  in  the  middle  of  the  right  wing,  surrounded  by  the 
seven  hundred  native  Spartans  who  served  with  him,  and  flanked 
by  the  Laconian  Perioeci.  His  line  of  battle  stretched  out  at  each 
end  beyond  the  shorter  front  of  the  Boeotian  army,  and  seemed 
likely  to  surround  it  when  the  encounter  came. 

In  the  early  afternoon  the  Spartan  commanders,  flushed,  it  is 

said,  with  wine  after  their  midday  meal,  led  down  their  army  into 

T,  .»,     ^     the  plain.      The  Thebans  moved  out  to  meet  them 
Battle  of  '■ 

Leuctra,     at  a  rapid    pace,   their   left   wing    far   in   advance, 

according  to  Epaminondas'  new  order  of  battle.     The 

fighting  opened  by  a  cavalry  charge  on  the  extreme  left  flank, 


371  B.C.] 


Battle  of  Leudra. 


467 


by  which  the  Boeotian  horsemen  drove  the  Laconian  off  the  field. 
Then  the  heavy  column  of  Theban  hoplites  came  into  action :  it 
bore  down  with  perfect  accuracj''  on  the  point  where  the  king  and 
his  native  Spartans  were  stationed.  The  first  shock  of  the  charge 
thrust  it  deep  into  the  line  of  the  enemy.  Cleombrotus  himself 
fell,  and  was  borne  off  the  field  by  his  body-guard,  but  for  a 
moment  the  battle  stood  still.  The  Spartan  line  held  together 
like  iron,  and  would  not  give  back  a  foot,  while  the  Perioeci  beside 
them  began  to  close  in  on  the  flank  of  the  Theban  column.  This 
movement  was  checked  by  Pelopidas,  Vvho  had  been  stationed  in 


the  rc-ar  of  the  Thebans,  in  command  of  three  hundred  chosen 
hoplites,  known  as  "  the  Sacred  Band,"  with  special  orders  to 
move  out  and  protect  the  main  body  in  case  of  any  such  attempt. 
Meanwhile  the  critical  moment  of  the  fight  had  come;  the 
Spartans,  though  they  fought  and  fell  every  man  in  his  place, 
could  no  longer  resist  the  pressure  of  the  massive  Theban  column. 
"Give  me  a  step  more,"  cried  Epaminondas  to  his  men,  "and  the 
day  is  ours!"  AVith  one  final  heave  the  Thebans  burst  through 
the  enemy's  line,  and  rolled  it  up  to  riglit  and  left.  Tlie  day  was 
won.    In  the  few  minutes  of  desperate  fighting  four  hundred  out- 


468  TJie   Uprising  of  Thebes.  [37i  b.c. 

of  the  seven  hundred  Spartans  had  fallen,  including  nearly  every 
officer  in  the  field.  Over  a  thousand  Laconian  Perioeci  lay  dead 
beside  them,  and  the  remnants  of  the  right  wing  rushed  back  in 
confusion  towards  the  Spartan  camp.  The  result  which  Epami- 
nondas  had  foreseen  immediately  came  to  pass :  the  Peloponnesians 
in  the  centre  and  left  wing  of  Cleombrotus'  array  would  not  stand 
firm,  when  they  saw  their  dreaded  masters  beaten  from  the  field. 
Although  the  Boeotian  centre  had  hardly  come  into  touch  with 
them,  and  the  right  wing  was  still  some  way  off,  tliey  gave  ground 
and  retreated  in  good  order  to  the  camp.  The  few  surviving 
Sj^artan  officers  tried  to  make  them  return  to  the  fight,  pointing 
out  that  they  still  outnumbered  the  Boeotians ;  but  they  utterly 
refused  to  face  the  enemy  in  a  second  struggle.  Then  it  became 
necessary  to  acknowledge  the  defeat,  and  the  heralds  went  forth  to 
ask  from  Epaminondas  a  truce  to  bury  the  dead. 

So  ended  the  day  of  Leuctra,  the  first  battle  in  which  a  Spartan 
king  and  army  had  been  worsted  in  fair  fight  by  inferior  numbers 
in  the  open  field.  It  gave  the  death-blow  to  the  military  system 
which  had  ruled  in  Greece  down  to  that  day,  and  cast  the  whole 
fabric  of  the  Spartan  domination  in  ruins  to  the  ground.  Never 
again  was  the  Peloponnesian  confederacy  to  muster  in  force  at  the 
command  of  its  suzerain  for  a  campaign  beyond  the  Isthmus,  nor 
a  king  of  the  race  of  the  Heraclidae  to  set  a  host  in  battle  array 
on  the  plain  of  Boeotia. 


CHAPTER  XL. 

THEBES   TREDOMIXANT   IN   GKEECE,   371-362   R.C. 

The  news  of  the  battle  of  Leuctra  set  all  Greece  in  commotion  ; 
every  city  in  the  land  began  at  once  to  cast  about  and  reA'ise  its 
policy  in  view  of  the  altered  aspect  of  affairs.  Sparta  sparta  after 
alone  affected  to  treat  her  defeat  as  one  of  the  ordi-  Leuctra. 
nary  chances  of  war:  when  the  fatal  tidings  reached  the  city,  the 
ephors  prohibited  all  public  signs  of  grief.  The  festival  of  the 
Gymnopaidia  was  at  its  height,  but  they  refused  to  allow  it  to  bo 
interrupted.  When  they  sent  to  each  home  the  names  of  those 
who  had  fallen,  they  added  an  order  that  the  women  were  to 
refrain  from  open  lamentations.  Next  day  the  relatives  of  those 
who  had  been  slain  were  to  be  seen  in  the  streets  with  calm  and 
serene  countenances;  while  those  whose  sons  and  brothers  sur- 
vived hid  themselves  in  shame,  because  their  kinsmen  had  trans- 
gressed Spartan  custom,  by  escaping  with  their  lives  from  a  lost 
field.  A  few  days  later  the  ephors  called  out  an  army  to  march  to 
the  relief  of  the  force  in  Boeotia,  which  was  now  blockaded  in  its 
entrenched  camp.  To  provide  an  adequate  corps  of  Spartans  they 
were  obliged  to  send  into  the  field  every  citizen  up  to  fifty-eight 
years  of  age.  But  this  last  levy  of  Lacedaemon  was  not  fated  to 
fight,  for  they  met  their  friends  already  on  their  march  home,  and 
returned  with  them. 

Epamitioudas  had  refused  to  allow  his  troops  to  storm  the 
camp  of  the  defeated  army.  Knowing  the  profound  discourage- 
ment which  pervaded  the  Peloponnesian  host,  he  preferred  to  allow 
it  to  break  up,  without  wasting  any  lives  in  further  fighting. 
Many  of  the  demoralized  allies  deserted  their  comrades  without 


47©  Thebes  FredovnnaJit  in  Greece.  [371  b.c. 

delay;  the  remainder  were  so  ill  disposed  that  the  Spartan  officers 
humbled  themselves  to  ask  for  a  free  departure.  The  moment  that 
it  was  conceded  they  slunk  off  by  night,  and  retreated  by  forced 
marches  till  they  met  the  force  that  had  been  sent  out  to  succour 
them. 

The  leniency  with  which  the  Theban  general  treated  the  enemy 
seems  to  have  been  caused  in  a  large  measure  by  the  flict  that,  just 
Jason  of  after  Leuctra  had  been  fought,  a  new  army  had 
Pherae.  appeared  in  Boeotia.  This  force  belonged  to  Jason 
of  Pherae,  a  personage  whose  movements  had  of  late  grown  impor- 
tant. The  great  but  faction-ridden  race  of  the  Thessalians  was 
for  the  moment  united  under  his  band,  and  constituted  a  power 
whose  attitude  Thebes  was  bound  to  watch  with  the  keenest  vigi- 
lance. Jason  was  the  son-in-law  and  successor  of  a  citizen  of 
Pherae,  named  Lycophron,  who  had  made  himself  tyrant  of  his 
native  town  about  405  B.C.  When  he  died  he  left  his  principality 
and  his  large  army  of  mercenaries  to  Jason,  who,  in  a  chequered 
and  eventful  reign  of  about  twenty  years,  gradually  reduced  all 
Thessaly  under  his  sceptre.  In  373  B.C.  Pharsalus,  the  last  inde- 
pendent city  in  the  land,  fell  into  his  hands ;  he  then  reorganized 
the  Thessalian  League,  which  had  long  been  a  mere  name,  and  had 
himself  formally  created  Tdgus,  or  generalissimo  of  the  confedera- 
tion. By  his  firm  but  just  rule  he  bound  together  thirty  bickering 
cities  into  a  powerful  federal  state.  When  united,  the  Thessalians 
were  the  most  numerous  race  in  Greece,  so  ere  long  Jason  could 
take  the  field  with  eight  thousand  horse,  twenty  thousand  hoplites, 
and  a  great  multitude  of  light  troops.  His  strength  was  very 
threatening  to  his  neighbours,  and  it  was  all-important  to  Thebes 
to  know  what  his  intentions  were  with  regard  to  the  war  with 
Sparta.  He  finally  declared  himself  on  the  Theban  side,  and  when 
the  campaign  of  371  B.C.  opened,  set  out  southward,  announcing 
that  he  was  about  to  join  Epaminondas  ;  but,  whether  intentionally 
or  not,  he  came  just  too  late  for  the  battle  of  Leuctra.  When  he 
arrived  he  refrained  from  attacking  the  Spartans,  and  advised  their 
free  dismissal.  His  army  was  so  large  and  his  intentions  so 
doubtful  that  the  Thebans  did  not  breathe  freely  till  he  had 
departed.  It  did  not  reassure  them  to  learn  that  on  his  return- 
march  he  had  sacked  the  Phocian  town  of  Hyampalis,  and  seized 


370  B.C.]  Jasoii  of  Pherae.  471 

the  strong  fortress  of  Heraclea-Trachis,  the  outwork  of  the  pass  of 
Thermopylae. 

Uncertainty  as  to  the  future  conduct  of  Jason  kept  the  Theban 
government  from  committing  itself  too  incautiously  to  the  prose- 
cution of  the  war  with  Sparta.  For  the  present  they  did  notliing 
more  than  make  things  sure  at  home.  Epaminondas  marched 
against  Orchomenus,  which  had  clung  to  Sparta  to  the  last,  and 
then  against  Thespiae,  whose  contingent  had  been  withheld  from 
the  array  that  fought  at  Leuctra.  Both  places  submitted  ;  then 
the  Thebaos,  incensed  at  the  disloyalty  to  Boeotia  wliich  each  of 
them  had  displayed,  talked  of  putting  their  inhabitants  to  the 
sword.  But  Epaminondas  brought  his  countrymen  to  a  better 
mind;  Orchomenus  was  merely  deprived  of  its  walls,  and  the 
Thespians  were  banished  instead  of  slain.  Meanwhile,  the  states 
whicli  bordered  on  Boeotia  had  taken  the  results  of  Leuctra  to 
heart;  the  Phocians,  Locrians,  Euboeans,  Aetolians  and  Acarna- 
nians  all  concluded  treaties  of  friendship  and  alliance  with  Thebes, 
and  promised  the  aid  of  their  troops  in  the  next  campaign  against 
Sparta. 

At  one  city  only  were  the  Theban  ambassadors  received  with 
coldness,  and  denied  a  friendly  hearing.  The  Athenians,  though 
they  had  so  lately  been  leagued  with  Thebes,  showed  marked  dis- 
gust at  the  complete  triumph  achieved  by  their  former  allies. 
They  would  have  preferred  a  balance  of  power  to  the  complete 
triumph  of  either  party. 

The  next  year  (370  B.C.)  was  crowded  with  important  events 
both  in  the  Peloponnesus  and  in  Northern  Greece.  When  the 
spring  came  round,  Jason  of  Pherae  announced  his     _,     , 

i        o  '  Murder  of 

intention  of  appearing  at  Delphi  during  the  approach-  Jason, 
iug  Pythian  festival.  Ostensibly  he  was  merely 
about  to  do  sacrifice  to  Apollo  in  honour  of  the  union  of  Thessaly, 
and  countless  victims  were  collected  for  the  hecatombs  which  were 
to  mark  his  gratitude  to  Heaven.  But  he  was  also  to  be  accom- 
panied by  a  large  army,  and  the  states  of  Central  Greece  were 
much  alarmed  at  the  prospect  of  his  arrival.  The  Delphians  them- 
selves are  said  to  have  inquired  of  their  oracle  "  what  they  w'ere  to  do 
if  Jason  touched  the  temple-treasure;"  the  answer  came  that  "the 
god  himself  would  see  to  the  matter."     And,  indeed,  Jason  never 


472  Thebes  Predominant  in  Greece.  rsTOB.c. 

reached  Delphi.  As  he  sat  in  state  at  Pherae  giving  audience  to 
petitioners,  seven  young  men  approached  him  in  the  guise  of  liti- 
gants, and  while  he  listened  to  them  sprang  upon  him  and  slew 
him  with  dagger-thrusts.  His  throne  fell  to  his  brothers,  Poly- 
dorus  and  Polyphron,  men  of  little  merit  or  distinction,  who  showed 
no  signs  of  carrying  out  his  ambitious  schemes. 

Meanwhile  the  Peloponnesus  was  full  of  stir  and  change,  for  the 
ancient  state-system  of  the  peninsula  had  at  last  broken  up,  and 
Anarchy  in  in  many  districts  at  once  local  autonomy  was  asserted. 
Peloponnesus,  r^.^^  Mantineans  rebuilt  the  walls  which  had  been 
cast  down  in  385  B.C.  (see  p.  451).  In  Tegea  civil  war  broke  out, 
and  the  Laconizing  party  were  massacred  by  their  opponents. 
The  Eleians  took  the  field  to  conquer  the  small  neighbouring  states 
whom  Sparta  had  jDrevented  from  falling  into  their  hands.  In 
Argos  the  confusion  was  at  its  worst.  The  rival  factions,  how- 
ever, instead  of  combining  to  declare  war  on  Sparta,  fell  to  blows 
with  each  other;  the  oligarchic  party  was  crushed,  and  the  demo- 
crats began  a  series  of  massacres,  in  which  no  less  than  twelve 
hundred  citizens  were  slain  without  any  pretence  of  trial  or 
judgment.  This  slaughter,  known  as  "the  reign  of  Club-law" 
(<TKVTa\t(rfi6s),  was  the  worst  outbreak  of  mob-violence  ever  known 
in  Greece,  and  cost  more  lives  than  even  the  great  Corcyrean 
sedition. 

For  the  first  time  in  their  history  the  Spartans  made  no  vigorous 
attempt  to  strike  down  their  revolted  allies,  before  help  from  the 
north  should  reach  them.  The  ephors  found  themselves  reduced 
to  the  resources  of  Laconia  alone,  and  were  unable  to  put  more  than 
a  few  thousand  troops  into  the  field,  for  many  of  the  Perioeci  were 
discovered  to  be  disaffected  and  untrustworthy.  So  great  was  the 
want  of  men,  that  the  survivors  of  Leuctra  were  allowed  to  retain 
their  full  rights  of  citizenship,  which  they  had  forfeited  by  their 
flight  from  the  field ;  but,  as  King  Agesilaus  observed,  "  on  this  one 
occasion  the  laws  must  be  allowed  to  sleep."  Only  one  stroke  was 
attempted  against  the  rebel  states.  Agesilaus,  though  now  sixty- 
seven  years  of  age,  led  a  small  army  against  Mantinea.  So  low 
were  the  spirits  of  the  Spartans  fallen,  that  he  was  considered  to 
have  done  well  when  he  drove  the  Mantineans  within  their  newly 
built  walls,  and  ravaged  their  territory. 


370 B.C.]  Foundation  of  Megalopolis.  473 

Isulated  revolts  of  Peloponnesian  towns  had  been  common 
enough,  and  if  the  rising  of  370  B.C.  had  been  Hke  those  of  421 
and  395  B.C.,  Sparta  might  have  hoped  for  tetter  p^^j^^g^^j^jj^^j 
days.  But  the  rebel  towns  of  Arcadia  now  showed  Megalopolis. 
a  disposition  which  they  had  never  before  exhibited ; 
instead  of  striking  for  local  independence,  they  began  to  federate 
themselves.  Mantinea  and  Tegea,  acting  for  once  in  union,  joined 
with  weli-nigh  all  the  smaller  states  in  the  land  to  revive  the 
ancient  Arcadian  League,  which  had  practically  ceased  to  exist 
ever  since  Sparta  became  the  ruler  of  Peloponnesus.^  Nor  was  the 
union  merely  formal ;  the  tribes  and  cities  resolved  to  sacrifice 
their  local  ties,  and  to  join  in  building  a  federal  capital,  which  all 
should  acknowledge  as  the  centre  and  pledge  of  Arcadian  unity. 
A  spot  was  chosen  in  the  valley  of  the  Helisson,  a  tributary  of  the 
Alplieus,  in  the  largest  and  most  fertile  plain  of  the  land,  and 
there  the  ground- plan  of  a  spacious  city  was  marked  out,  by  a 
body  of  commissioners  chosen  equally  from  the  various  states. 
They  named  it  Megalopolis,  "  the  great  city,"  as  an  augury  of  its 
future  strength  and  power.  Within  it  place  was  assigned  for 
settlers  from  various  parts  of  Arcadia,  while  the  Parrhasian  tribe — 
within  whose  boundaries  it  was  built — were  invited  to  remove 
thither  en  masse.  For  the  future  government  of  the  country,  it 
was  provided  that  a  numerous  delegation  from  each  city  should 
assemble  from  time  to  time  at  Llegalopolis,  to  settle  all  federal 
business :  this  body  was — unhappily  for  the  future  of  the  league — 
made  of  unwieldy  size,  no  less  than  ten  thousand  in  number.  In 
addition,  a  federal  army  and  revenue  was  established ;  the  states 
agreeing  to  tax  themselves  in  order  to  maintain  five  thousand 
hoplites,  called  the  Epanti,  as  a  standing  force.  Two  onlj'  of  the 
Arcadian  states  adhered  to  Sparta  and  refused  to  come  into  the 
league — Heraea,  whose  former  prominence  in  Western  Arcadia  was 
overshadowed  by  the  new  capital ;  and  Orchomenus,  who  cherished 
an  ancestral  hatred  for  the  Mantineans.  Isolated  in  the  midst  of 
their  federalist  neighbours,  these  states  had  much  ado  to  preserve 
their  independence. 

>  It  must  have  existed  in  some  purely  formal  fashion  till  ahout  ■iPiO  B.C., 
as  coins  are  found  bearing  its  title  down  to  that  date,  though  it  is  never 
mentioned  in  history  after  the  second  Messe^ian  war,  G4-1  b.<?.  (sec  p.  78). 


474  Thebes  Predominant  in  Greece.  [370  b.c. 

la  the  late  summer  of  370  B.C.,  wlien  Central  Greece  head  been 
freed  from  all  danger  of  disturbance  by  the  death  of  Jason  of 
„       .       ,       Pherae,  Epaminoudas  led  down  into  the  Peloponnese 

Epammondas  '      ^  _  *•      _ 

inPeiopon-  a  great  arm}',  where  Locrians,  Euboeans,  Phocians, 
nesus,  .^.  ^^^  ^  ^^  other  new  allies  of  Thebes  served  side  by 

side  with  his  Boeotian  troops.  His  arrival  served  to  show  which. 
states  had  finally  broken  with  Sparta,  and  which  were  still  resolved 
to  hold  with  their  old  suzerain.  The  Arcadians,  Eleians,  and 
Argives  at  once  joined  him  in  arms ;  the  Achaians  preserved  an 
impassive  neutrality  :  only  the  people  of  Corinth,  Sicyon,  Epidaurus, 
Hermionoj  and  Phlius  shut  their  gates,  and  maintained  their 
loyalty  to  Sparta. 

Epaminondas  had  resolved  not  to  waste  time  in  reducing  the 
allies  of  Sparta,  but  to  march  straight  on  the  enemy's  stronghold 
in  the  valley  of  the  Eurotas,  and  bring  the  war  to  a  close  by 
crushing  the  Lacedaemonians  or  forcing  them  to  accept  terms 
of  peace.  The  Argives  Eleians  and  Arcadians  joined  him  at 
Mantinea,  and  the  invasion  of  Laconia  was  at  once  taken  in  hand. 
Not  less  than  seventy  thousand  men  set  out  on  the  expedition; 
it  was  the  largest  army  that  Greece  had  seen  since  the  muster 
at  Plataea  in  479  B.C.  The  season  was  late,  and  Epammondas' 
legal  term  of  office  as  Boeotarch  was  just  at  its  end ;  but  his 
colleagues,  persuaded  by  Pelopidas,  agreed  to  continue  the  campaign 
under  his  leadership,  and  to  allow  him  the  glory  of  endmg  the 
work  which  he  had  begun  at  Leuctra. 

The  situation  of  the  Lacedaemonians  was  now  apparently  hope- 
less.    Sparta  was  a  long  straggling  town,  unprotected  by  wall  or 

Fighting  at  ditch  ;  she  was  cat  off  from  her  few  remaining  allies, 
Sparta.  unable  to  put  two  thousand  citizens  into  the  field — 
so  low  had  the  number  of  the  Spartiates  sunk — uncertain  even 
how  far  she  might  depend  on  her  own  Perioeci,  and  assailed  by 
foes  who  had  the  grudges  of  many  generations  to  satisfy.  Never- 
theless the  ephors  showed  no  signs  of  yielding;  once  more  they 
gave  the  conduct  of  the  war  to  Agesilaus,  and  bade  him  do  his 
best.  Amid  the  wailing  of  the  women,  "  who  had  never  before  seen 
the  smoke  of  an  enemy's  camp  fire,"  the  last  army  of  Lacedaemon 
was  put  into  the  field.  The  old  king,  in  spite  of  the  risk  of 
rebellion,  promised  freedom  to  every  Helot  who  should  take  up 


370  B.C.]  Epaviinondas  attacks  Sparta.  475 

arms — this  gave  him  six  thousand  troops ;  he  called  out  such  of 
the  Perioeci  as  were  faithful,  contrived  to  gather  round  him  some 
scanty  reinforcements  sent  from  Corinth  and  Orchomenus,  and 
stood  at  bay  behind  barricades  thrown  across  the  outlets  of  the 
town.  Resisting  with  equal  firmness  the  counsels  of  the  timid, 
who  bade  him  make  peace,  and  of  the  desperate,  who  wished  to  sally 
out  and  end  the  Spartan  race  in  a  new  Thermopylae,  he  maintained 
a  cautious  defensive  position.  Epaminondas  circled  round  the 
town,  looking  for  an  unguarded  entry,  but  every  street  bristled 
with  spears,  and  when  he  attempted  to  force  his  way  in,  near  the 
temple  of  the  Dioscuri,  he  met  with  a  bloody  repulse.  Impressed 
by  the  courage  of  the  enemy,  or  perhaps  unwilling  to  "  put  out  one 
of  the  eyes  of  Greece,"  the  Theban  passed  on  down  the  Eurotas 
valley  without  delivering  a  general  assault  on  the  town.  Burning 
village  after  village  of  the  Perioeci,  he  finally  came  to  the  sea,  and 
destroyed  Gytheum,  the  naval  arsenal  of  the  Spartans.  Then 
turning  north-westward,  he  crossed  Mount  Taygetus  and  passed 
on  into  Messenia. 

Here  he  had  a  long-projected  task  to  execute.  Before  the 
invasion  began,  he  had  proclaimed  his  intention  of  rescuing 
Messenia  from  the  Spartan  yoke  and  re-establishing  foundation  of 
its  ancient  independence.  He  had  summoned  to  his  Miessene. 
side  the  descendants  of  the  Messenians  who  had  been  driven  by 
Lysander  from  Naupactus  (see  p.  409),  and  even  those  of  the 
earlier  exiles  who  had  settled  in  Sicily  (see  p.  231).  Now  he  was 
able  to  fulfil  his  promise :  marching  to  Mount  Ithome,  the  ancient 
sanctuary  and  citadel  of  the  land,  where  Aristodemus  had  fortified 
himself  in  the  first  Messenian  war,  he  laid  the  foundations  of  a 
city  on  its  southern  slope,  and  marked  out  the  walls  of  an 
Acropolis  on  its  summit.  The  Helots  rose  in  arms  to  join  their 
exiled  brethren  who  had  returned  from  the  west,  and  all  united 
to  hail  Epaminondas  as  the  founder  of  a  new  nation.  Messene 
became  the  sister-town  of  Megalopolis,  and  exhibited  a  strength  and 
vigour  to  which  the  Arcadian  city  never  attained.  From  the  first 
the  new  foundation  completely  served  its  purpose ;  the  power  ,of 
Sparta  now  stopped  short  at  Mount  Taygetus,  and  the  old  masters 
of  Messenia  were  never  able  even  for  a  moment  to  reconquer  the 
lands  of  their  revolted  serfs. 


476  Thebes  Fredo?/iinani  in  Greece.  [369 b.o. 

The  spring  of  369  B.C.  was  already  at  hand  when  Epaminondas 
returned  from  his  Peloponuesian  expedition.  He  had  thus  out- 
stayed the  legal  term  of  his  office  by  nearly  four  months — an 
informality  for  which  his  political  opponents  in  Thebes  endeavoured 
to  impeach  him  on  his  arrival ;  but  they  Avere  hooted  down  by  the 
voice  of  public  approval,  and  Epaminondas  was  re-elected  Boeotarch 
for  the  current  year. 

Athens,  as  we  have  already  mentioned,  had  received  with 
marked  disfavour  the  news  of  the  battle  of  Leuctra ;  but  sullen 
.  .  though  she  might  appear  at  the  success  of  her  late 
Sparta,  allies,  it  was  Bot  expected  that  her  envy  would  lead 
her  into  breaking  off  all  her  recent  ties,  and  joining 
herself  to  the  waning  cause  of  Sparta.  Such,  nevertheless,  was  to 
be  the  case ;  after  endeavouring  in  vain  to  induce  the  Peloponnesian 
cities  to  form  a  league  of  neutrals,  instead  of  joining  the  Theban 
alliance,  she  finally  took  the  decisive  step  of  receiving  a  Spartan 
embassy  which  came  to  pray  for  help.  All  the  old  pleas  that  Cimon 
had  cited  in  a  similar  crisis  just  a  hundred  years  before  (see  j).  253) 
were  adduced  to  move  the  pity  of  the  Athenians,  and  fell  upon  not 
unwilling  ears.  The  Ecclesia  by  a  large  majority  voted  an  alliance 
with  Sparta,  and  Iphicrales — now  well  advanced  in  years,  but  still 
able  to  take  the  field — was  commissioned  to  lead  an  Athenian  con- 
tingent into  the  Peloponnesus.  The  terms  of  accommodation  with 
Sparta,  in  order  to  mark  the  absolute  equality  of  the  two  contract- 
ing powers,  contained  the  absurd  provision  that  the  command  of  the 
allied  forces,  both  by  sea  and  laud,  should  be  entrusted  alternately 
to  Spartan  and  Athenian  officers  at  intervals  of  five  daj-s. 

The  strength  of  the  new  treaty  was  put  to  the  test  when 
Epaminondas  set  out  for  a  second  invasion  of  Peloponnesus  in  the 
Epaminondas  Summer  of  369  B.C.,  about  three  months  after  the 

Isthmus      conclusion  of  his  first  raid.     The  allies  resolved  to 

3QaB.c.  endeavour  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Isthmus  against 
him.  Accordingly  they  hastily  repaired  the  old  rampart  which 
ran  from  sea  to  sea,  and  set  themselves  to  guard  the  two  roads 
which  led  to  it,  the  Athenians  holding  the  eastern  path  along 
the  gulf  of  Aegina,  the  Lacedaemonians  the  western  one  on  the 
shore  of  the  gulf  of  Corinth.  But  Epaminondas,  by  a  skilful  attack 
made  in  the  dusk  of  dawn,  completely  broke  through  the  line  on 


sea  B.C.]  Pclopidas  in  TJicssaly.  477 

the  Spartan  side,  and  made  his  way  into  the  iJcninsula.  The 
Arcadians  Argives  and  Eleians  marched  up  to  join  him,  and  their 
united  army  laid  siege  to  Sicyon,  one  of  Sparta's  few  remaining 
allies.  That  city  ere  long  opened  its  gates  to  them  ;  but  they  were 
less  successful  in  an  attempt  on  Epidaurus,  and  suffered  a  decided 
reverse  when  they  attempted  to  take  by  surprise  the  great  and 
strong  city  of  Corinth.  Here  Epaminondas  was  brought  to  a 
standstill;  the  enemy  refused  to  give  battle,  but  were  yet  so 
strong — they  had  just  been  reinforced  by  some  mercenary  troops 
sent  by  Dionysius  of  Syracuse — and  so  firmly  based  on  the  fortress 
in  their  rear,  that  they  could  not  be  neglected.  Hence  the  summer 
went  by  without  any  decisive  event,  and  all  that  Epaminondas 
had  gained  was  the  possession  of  Sicyon,  and  the  security  that 
Messene  and  Megalopolis  might  finish  their  walls  unmolested, 
while  the  Lacedaemonian  army  was  employed  in  the  north.  On  his 
return  home  he  was  coldly  received,  and  not  re-elected  Boeotarch.* 
The  next  year  saw  Thebes  engaged  in  a  new  series  of  complica- 
tions, which  distracted  her  attention  from  the  affairs  of  Peloponnesus, 
and  caused  her  to  strike  less  vigorous  blows  against  .„  ,    .^     . 

°  °  Pelopidas  in 

Sparta  than  she  would  otherwise  have  done.   Polyphron     Thessaiy. 

368  B  C 

and  Polydorus,  the  brothers  of  Jason  of  Pherae,  had 
met  with  violent  deaths,  and  their  place  was  now  held  by  tlieir 
kinsman  Alexander.*  The  new  tyrant  was  not  destitute  of  ability, 
but  he  was  so  reckless  and  savage  that  he  soon  shattered  the  con- 
federacy which  Jason  had  taken  so  many  years  to  organize.  The 
nobles  of  Larissa  broke  out  into  rebellion,  and  called  in  the  King  of 
Macedonia  to  their  help,  so  that  for  the  first  time  in  history  Mace- 
donian troops  were  seen  within  the  borders  of  Hellas.  Other 
towns  summoned  Thebes  to  their  aid.  Disregarding  their  old 
alliance  with  Jason,  the  Thebans  sent  an  army  across  Mount 
Othrys,  to  settle  the  affairs  of  Thessaly.  Pelopidas,  who  was  in 
command,  drove  the  Macedonians  from  Larissa,  and  compelled  the 
tyrant  of  Pherae  to  acknowledge  the  independence  of  the  cities 
which  had  revolted  from  him  (368  B.C.).     But  this  interference  was 

-  His  enemies  accused  him  of  having  spared  the  flying  Spartans  in  the 
fight  at  the  Isthmus,  when  he  might  have  shain  them  all— a  charge  rather 
to  his  credit  than  otherwise. 
>     *  Son-in-law  of  Jason  and  also  a  distant  relative. 


47 S  Tlu'bes  Predominant  in  Greece.  isesB.c. 

to  be  the  beginning  of  many  troubles  for  Thebes.  Alexander 
never  forgave  it,  and  waited  his  ojiportunity  for  revenge.  Wlien 
Thessaly  was  quiet,  Pelopidas  marched  on  into  Macedonia,  and 
compelled  its  monarch  to  conclude  peace,  and  to  give  as  hostages 
for  his  fidelity  thirty  noble  youths,  including  his  own  brother 
Philip,  destined  just  thirty  years  after  to  enter  Thebes  as  a  con- 
queror instead  of  a  captive. 

While  the  Theban  arras  were  occupied  in  the  north,  the  war  in 
Peloponnesus  had  not  slackened.  But  its  incidents  had  not  been 
such  as  Epaminondas  would  have  desired.  The  two  chief  allies  of 
Thebes — Arcadia  and  Elis — fell  to  strife  over  the  allegiance  of  the 
Triphylians,  whom  the  former  acknowledged  as  members  of  their 
league,  while  the  latter  claimed  them  as  ancient  subjects.  The 
Arcadians  were  thus  left  unaided,  when  their  general,  Lycoraedes 
of  Mantinea,  took  the  field  against  the  Spartans.  After  obtaining 
two  considerable  successes,  Lycomedes  found  himself  faced  at 
Mitlea  by  a  Laconian  army  under  Archidamus,  the  son  of  King 
Agesilaus,  a  young  man  who  possessed  all  the  vigour  and  some  of 
the  genius  of  his  father.  The  Arcadians  sufi'ered  a  complete  defeat, 
which  was  rendered  very  bloody  by  a  body  of  Celts,  lent 

"The  Tearless  ■'  j      j  j 

Battle."      to  the  enemy  by  Dionysius  of  Syracuse,  who  gave  no 
quarter  to  the  flying  masses.     Of  the  native  Spartans 
not  one  man  fell,  hence  they  named  their  victory  "  The  Tearless 
Battle  "  (368  e.g.). 

The  Thebans  did  not  appear  to  avenge  the  slaughter  of  their 
allies,  because  they  had  other  work  in  hand  in  the  north.  Alex- 
E  aminondas  ^'^'^^''  °^  Pbcrae  had  just  kidnapped  Pelopidas,  and 
in  Thessaly,  thrown  him  into  prison,  as  he  was  passing  through 
Thessaly  on  state  business.  To  rescue  their  favourite 
general,  the  Thebans  sent  seven  thousand  men  against  the  tyrant ; 
but  this  force  suffered  a  check,  and  only  escaped  destruction  because 
its  leaders  besought  Epaminondas,  who  was  serving  in  the  ranks 
as  a  mere  hoplite,  to  take  the  command  out  of  their  hands,  and 
rescue  the  army.  That  great  general  extricated  the  troops,  and 
got  them  safely  back  through  the  passes  of  Othrys.  On  hearing 
of  this  mismanaged  business,  the  Theban  assembly  deposed  the 
incompetent  generals,  fined  each  of  them  ten  thousand  drachmae, 
and  gave  the  command  to  Epaminondas.     After  receiving   rein- 


367  B.C.]  Pelopidas  at  Siisa.  479 

forcements  he  marched  again  into  Thessaly^  and  in  a  few  days 
reduced  Alexander  to  such  straits  that  he  surrendered  Pelopidas 
and  asked  for  terms  of  peace  (winter  of  3G8-7). 

The  result  of  the  "Tearless  Battle"  raised  the  Spartans  from 
the  hopeless  dejection  into  which  they  had  fallen  since  Leuctra, 
and  encouraged  them  to  persevere  Avith  the  war.  peiopidasat 
They  were  also  buoyed  up  by  hopes  of  aid  from  susa,  367B.c. 
Persia,  for  Ariobarzanes,  satrap  of  the  Hellespont,  had  just  sent 
them  a  sum  of  money  and  two  thousand  mercenary  troops.  But 
their  expectations  from  this  quarter  were  not  fulfilled ;  in  the 
next  year  the  Thebans  sent  Pelopidas  as  ambassador  to  Susa,  and 
induced  the  Great  King  to  withdraw  his  patronage  from  Sparta 
and  transfer  it  to  themselves.  The  sending  of  this  embassy  was 
one  of  the  few  unworthy  steps  taken  by  Thebes  during  her 
hegemony ;  for  she  utilized  the  favour  of  king  Artaxerxes  11.  by 
getting  him  to  issue  a  rescript,  in  which,  as  guarantor  of  the 
terras  of  the  peace  of  Antalcidas,  he  presumed  to  dictate  to 
the  Greeks,  and  commanded  the  Arcadians  to  relinquish  their 
pretensions  against  Elis,  the  Lacedaemonians  to  acknowledge  the 
independence  of  Messene,  and  the  Athenians  to  lay  up  their  war- 
navy.  Naturally  the  states  concerned  disregarded  these  commands ; 
for,  as  Antiochus  the  Arcadian  indignantly  remarked,  "  the  Great 
King  has  an  infinite  number  of  bakers,  cooks,  cup-bearers,  and 
door-keepers,  but  of  men  fit  to  foce  Greek  hoplites  not  one."  But 
though  Artaxerxes  was  A\eak  and  far  awaj',  the  Thebans  were 
strong  and  near  at  hand,  and  their  arms  were  ready  to  support  the 
terms  of  the  rescript. 

In  3G7  B.C.  Epaminondas,  now  again  Boeotarch,  made  his  third 
inroad  into  Peloponnesus.  Concerting  measures  with  the  Argives, 
he  forced  the  lines  of  Corinth  by  a  joint  attack  from  Epaminondas 
outside  and  from  within.  Then  marching  into  Achaia  mAchaia, 
he  induced  its  cities — who  had  hitherto  been  neutral 
— to  join  the  Theban  alliance,  on  the  understanding  that  their 
internal  constitution  should  not  be  meddled  with.  The  Theban 
government,  however,  broke  these  terms,  and  sent  garrisons  and 
harmosts  into  the  towns,  in  spite  of  the  remonstrances  of  Epami- 
nondas. This  ill-faith  had  its  deserts,  for  the  Achaians  soon  rose 
in  arms,  drove  out  their  garrisons,  and  joined  the  Spartans  as 


480  Thebes  Predominant  in   Greece.  [ssgb.c. 

zealous  allies ;  thus  the  results  of  the  campaign  of  3G7  B.C.  were 
entirely  wasted.  But  the  Thebans  were  perhaps  consoled  by  a 
fortunate  chance,  which  enabled  them  in  the  same  autumn  to  seize 
Oropus,  the  frontier  town  of  Attica,  on  the  Euboic  strait — a  pLice 
over  which  Boeotian  and  Athenian  had  waged  countless  conflicts. 

This  loss  greatly  Irritated  the  Athenians,  who  called  on  their 

Peloponnesian  allies  to  aid  them   to  recover  Oropus ;    but   the 

Spartans  and  Corinthians  had  too  much  to  occupy 

Corinth,      them  at   home,  and  refused   to  stir.      Their  apathy 

866  B.C.  1      1      1  «    1        .  . 

provoked  the  Athenians  mto  a  treacJierous  attempt 
to  seize  the  Acropolis  of  Corinth,  which  met  with  a  well-deserved 
failure.  The  incident,  however,  so  frightened  the  Corinthians  that 
they  retired  from  the  war,  obtaining  from  Thebes  terms  which 
allowed  them  to  preserve  neutrality.  Their  neighbours  of  Phlius 
and  Epidaurus  at  once  followed  their  example. 

Sparta  would  have  felt  the  defection  of  Corinth  very  deeply,  if 

she  had  not  succeeded  in  replacing  her  by  El  is,  a  yet  more  powerful 

^„,.     ally.     The  Eleians  and  Arcadians,  after  four  years' 

WarofElis  •'  '  '' 

and  Arcadia  bicliering  about  their  frontiers,  had  at  last  broken 
into  open  war.  As  Arcadia  was  violently  hostile  to 
Sparta,  the  Eleians  immediately  made  peace  and  alliance  with  that 
power.  This  somewhat  changed  the  aspect  of  affairs  in  Pelopon- 
nesus ;  the  friends  of  Thebes — Argos,  Arcadia,  and  Messene — being 
no  longer  much  more  powerful  than  her  enemies — Achaia,  Elis, 
Lacedaemon.  The  first  conflicts  of  the  new  war,  however,  were 
decidedly  in  favour  of  the  Arcadians,  and  next  year  they  felt  them- 
selves so  strong,  that  they  ventured  on  an  action  which  had  not 
been  attempted  since  the  days  of  Pheidon  of  Argos,  three  hundred 
years  ago.  It  v/as  the  year  of  the  Olympic  festival,  and  the 
usual  multitude  had  gathered  from  every  part  of  the  Greek  world 
to  attend  the  great  celebration.  When  the  opening  day  drew 
near,  the  Arcadians  marched  down  the  Alpheus  valley,  and 
seized  Olympia,  proclaiming  that  they,  and  not  the  Eleians, 
should  for  the  future  preside  over  the  games.     This  roused  Elis 

„  ^  ,     ^      to  fury;  the  whole  force  of  the  state,  strengthened 
Battle  of  "^  /-v 

Olympia,      by   volunteers    from    Achaia,   moved    on    Olympia, 

364  B  c.      -^yijere  they  found  a  large  Arcadian  and  Argive  army 

waiting  to  oppose   them.      In   the  midst  of  the  festival — "  the 


364  B.C.]  Battle  of  Olympia.  481 

chariot-race  was  over,  and  the  wrestlers  were  coatending  between 
the  stadium  and  the  altar" — the  Eleians  burst  into  the  sacred  pre- 
cincts, driving  the  routed  Arcadians  before  them.  But  the  latter 
rallied  among  the  buildings,  casting  missiles  from  the  porticoes  and 
from  the  roof  of  the  great  temple  of  Zeus,  and  at  last  brought  the 
Eleians  to  a  standstill.  Next  day  the  conflict  was  renewed,  the 
Arcadians  defending  themselves  behind  barricades  composed  of 
the  costly  tents  and  booths  which  the  holiday-making  public  had 
erected.  They  finally  drove  off  the  enemy,  and  completed  the 
interrupted  festival ;  but  no  blessing  rested  on  a  triumph  which  the 
majority  of  the  Hellenes  regarded  as  sacrilegious,  since  the  Eleians 
were  the  rightful  guardians  of  the  sanctuary-. 

To  maintain  their  hold  on  Olympia,  and  protect  the  subjects  of 
Elis  whom  they  had  taken  into  their  league,  the  Arcadians  found 
themselves  compelled  to  keep  their  standing  army,  the  five 
thousand  Epaviti,  continually  in  the  field.  This  cost  so  much 
money  that  the  finances  of  the  confederacy  gave  out,  and  in  a 
moment  of  need  the  generals  laid  hands  on  the  temple  treasure  at 
Olympia,  and  expended  much  of  it  on  pay  and  warlike  stores.  The 
majority  of  the  federal  council  voted  approval  of  the  measure,  but 
several  states— chief  among  them  the  great  town  of  Mantinea — 
refused  to  condone  the  sacrilege.  Thus  strife  aroso  in  Arcadia.  The 
council  ordered  the  imprisonment  of  the  magistrates  of  Mantinea, 
on  which  that  city  shut  its  gates  against  the  troops  of  the  league. 
Public  opinion,  however,  was  so  much  on  the  side  of  the  ^lan- 
tineans,  that  the  majority  submitted,  and  not  only  acknowledged 
their  fault,  but  actually  made  peace  with  Elis,  restoring  Olympia 
nnd  relinquishing  all  claims  to  its  guardianship  (363  B.C.). 

The  Arcadians  concluded  this  peace  without  asking  or  obtaining 
'fhe  consent  of  their  allies  of  Thebes,  although  they  had  Boeotian 
.troops  serving  in  their  midst.  This  slight  was  deeply  felt  by  the 
Thebans  ;  even  the  equably-minded  Epaminondas  denounced  it  as 
little  better  than  treachery.  But  their  indignation  carried  them 
into  unjustifiable  lengths;  a  Theban  officer,  conspiring  with  the 
magistrates  of  Tegea,  seized  and  threw  into  prison  a  number  of  the 
notables  of  Mantinea  and  other  places,  who  were  visiting  Tegea  for 
a  feast  in  commemoration  of  the  peace  with  Elis.  The  prisoners 
were  soon  released,  but  the  mischief  was  done,  and  the  reparation 

2  I 


482  Thebes  Predominant  in  Greece.  [362  b.c. 

came  too  late,  for  Mantinea  made  peace  with  Sparta  and  broke 
away  from  the  Arcadian  League. 

"  This  crisis  startled  the  Thebans,  and  roused  them  into  sending  a 
great  army  into  Peloponnesus  in  the  next  spring.  Epaminondas 
once  more  headed  it,  but  his  old  colleague  was  no  longer  at  his 
side :  Pelopidas  had  fallen  in  battle  a  few  months  before.  For  the 
third  time  Alexander  of  Pherae  had  come  into  conflict  with  Thebes, 
and  Pelopidas,  burning  to  avenge  the  personal  insults  the  tyrant 
had  put  upon  him  in  368  b.c,  had  obtained  permission  to  lead  the 
attack  upon  him.  As  his  army  left  the  gates  of  Thebes  an  eclipse 
occurred,  and  the  soothsayers  forbade  the  expedition  to  proceed. 
Unable  to  get  the  men  to  follow,  Pelopidas  rode  off  almost  alone 
to  Thessaly,  and  summoned  the  subjects  of  Alexander  to  revolt 
against  their  master.  The  moment  that  he  Lad  been  joined  by  a 
few  thousand  men  he  marched  to  attack  Pherae.  The  tyrant  met 
him  at  Cynoscephalae,  with  a  great  army  of  mercenaries  which 
doubled  the  force  of  the  insurgents.  But  the  vigour  of  Pelopidas 
carried  all  before  it ;  he  broke  the  enemy,  and  was  pressing  them 
hard  when  he  caught  sight  of  Alexander  endeavouring  to  rally  his 
guards.  Forgetting  the  duty  of  a  general,  Pelopidas  sprang  for- 
ward to  cut  the  tyrant  down,  but  he  was  encom- 

Death  of  -^  ' 

Pelopidas,     passed  and  slain  before  his  followers  could  force  their 

■  ■  way  to  his  help.  The  Thessalians  mourned  him  as 
the  founder  of  their  liberty,  and  buried  him  with  great  pomp  on  the 
scene  of  his  last  victory.  Alexander  was  stripped  of  all  his  pos- 
sessions save  Pherae,  and  reduced  to  impotence ;  shortly  after- 
wards he  was  murdered  by  his  wife  and  his  brothers-in-law. 

For  the  Peloponnesian  campaign  of  362  B.C.  both  sides  mustered 
in  great  strength.     Epaminondas  crossed  the  Isthmus  with  a  great 

Epaminondas'host  of  Boeotians,  Thessalians,  and   Euboeans,  and 
invask)*n  of    ^^^^  P™^*^  '^^  Nemea  by  the  full  force  of  Argos.    Then 

Peloponnesus,  turning  Avest,  he  picked  up  the  contingents  of  the 
Arcadian  League  and  Messene,  and  advanced  with  thirty  thou- 
sand men  to  Tegea.  In  that  position  he  lay  between  Sparta  and 
her  new  allies  the  Mantineans,  and  forced  them  to  communicate 
with  each  other  by  circuitous  and  difficult  mountain  ways.  How- 
ever, the  Lacedaemonians  resolved  to  succour  Mantinea ;  they 
placed  the  aged  Agesilaus  once  more  in  command,  and  despatched 


3S2B.C.]  Second  Attack  on  Sparta.  483 

Lim  with  their  whole  available  force  to  join  their  allies.  On  this 
movement  Epamiuoudas  had  calculated.  When  he  heard  that 
Agesilaus  was  well  started  on  his  long  march,  he  broke  up  his 
camp  at  Tegea  and  pounced  upon  Sparta.  He  was  within  an  ace 
of  taking  the  city  without  a  blow,  "  like  a  nest  when  the  parent- 
birds  are  away,"^  but  his  clever  combination  was  frustrated  by 
treachery.  A  deserter  left  the  Theban  camp  by  night  and  reached 
Agesilaus,  to  whom  he  revealed  the  whole  scheme.  The  old  king 
hurried  back  at  full  speed,  and  by  superhuman  exertions  reached 
Sparta  just  before  the  enemy  arrived.  Now,  as  in  ^  ond  attack 
370  B.C.,  he  occupied  the  main  outlets  with  troops,  onSparta, 
and  stood  on  the  defensive.  Epaminondas,  attacking 
several  points  at  once,  succeeded  in  thrusting  one  column  as  far  as 
the  market-place ;  but  as  the  others  were  repelled,  he  was  forced  to 
withdraw,  and  to  give  up  all  hopes  of  taking  the  town  by  assault. 

Hastily  changing  his  plan  of  operations,  the  Theban  now 
resolved  to  make  a  dash  at  Mantinea,  before  the  Spartans  had  time 
to  reinforce  it.  Accordingly  his  army  slipped  away  by  night,  and 
marched  on  the  unsuspecting  city.  But  chance  again  intervened ; 
the  Athenians  had  despatched  a  considerable  contingent,  some 
six  thousand  men,  to  join  the  Spartans,  and  the  cavalry  at  the 
head  of  this  army  had  entered  Mantinea  just  before  the  Theban 
horse  appeared  before  its  gates.  Iliough  weary  with  their  march 
— they  had  come  forty  miles  by  mountain  roads  that  day — the 
Athenians  sallied  out,  and  fell  upon  the  enemy  with  such  vigour 
that  they  drove  them  back  on  Tegea. 

The  Spartans  had  followed  Epaminondas,  and  now  slipped  past 
him  and  joined  the  Mantineans  and  Athenians.  A  force  from 
Elis  and  Achaia  also  arrived,  so  that  the  allies  mustered  twenty 
thousand  foot  and  two  thousand  horse — an  army  less  by  one-third 
than  that  of  the  Theban,  yet  capable,  under  cautious  management, 
of  keeping  him  in  check.  But  rash  counsels  prevailed  in  the  camp, 
for  the  Mantinean  generals  wished  to  fight,  to  preserve  their  terri- 
tory from  plunder.  Accordingly,  when  Epaminondas  advanced 
from  Tegea,  the  allied  host  drew  itself  up  and  offered  him  battle, 
their  right  wing  resting  on  Mantinea,  their  left  on  a  wooded  height 
to  the  soutlnvard.  The  Mantineans  and  Spartans  held  the  right, 
*  Xenophon,  Ildlen^  vii,  5.  8. 


484 


Thebes  Predominant  in  Greece. 


[362  B.O. 


the  place  of  honour,  the  Athenians  the  left,  while  the  Eleians 
and  Achaians  formed  the  centre ;  they  were  drawn  out  in  a 
continuous  line  with  a  thousand  cavalry  on  each  flank. 

Epaminondas  had  advanced  from  Tegea  somewhat  late  in  the 
day,  and  when  the  enemy  saw  him  holding  back  and  halting  his 
men  beneath  the  hills  which  face  Mantinea,  they  made  the  erro- 


ibiiB  A.  Mantineans  and  Spartans  B.  Eleians  and  Achaians  C.  Atlienians  . 
0CD^-  Boeotians  E.  Areadiaos, Messenians etc.  F.Argiues  G. Euboeans^ 

neous  but  natural  deduction  that  he  was  not  about  to  fight  till  the 
morrow.  Accordingly  the  ranks  of  the  hoplites  were  broken,  and 
the  horsemen  began  to  unbridle  their  horses.  The  Thebaa  had 
expected  something  of  the  kind,  and  when  he  saw  the  enemy  about 
to  retire,  suddenly  flung  his  army  upon  them  at  a  run. 

His  order  of  battle  was  the  same  which  had  given  him  victory  at 


36P.B.C.]  Battle  of  Afanthiea.  485 

Leuctra,     The  bulk  of  the  cavalry  were  massed  on  his  left ;  next 
came  a  heavy  column  of  Boeotians,  many  shields  deep,     3a.ttie  of 
which  advanced  parallel  with  the  cavalry :  while  the    Mantmea, 

362  B  C 

centre  and  right  wing,  composed  of  the  Arcadians, 
Argives,   and   Messenians,  hung  back,  and  moved   more  slowly. 
The  Euboeans,  formed  in  a  detached  body,  climbed  the  hill  on  the 
enemy's  right,  and  threatened  the  flank  of  the  Athenians. 

All  went  as  Epaminondas  had  wished.  His  cavalry  on  the  left 
drove  the  Spartan  horse  out  of  the  field ;  next  the  Boeotian 
column,  which  he  himself  headed,  ploughed  through  the  jMantinean 
and  Spartan  ranks  "as  a  war-galley  ploughs  through  tlie  waves 
with  its  beak."^  But  a  desperate  Spartan  named  Anticrates, 
standing  firm  among  his  flying  comrades,  singled  out  the  great 
general,  and  thrust  him  through  the  breast  with  his  pike.  When 
the  news  ran  down  the  line  that  Epaminondas  had  fallen,  his 
victorious  troops  halted  in  their  career  and  made  no  attempt  to 
complete  the  victory.  Indeed,  they  allowed  the  Athenians  to  gain 
some  advantage  on  the  extreme  right,  a  success  on  which  the  allies 
afterwards  grounded  a  preposterous  claim  of  victory  in  the  main 
battle. 

Epaminondas  was  carried  out  of  the  fight  with  the  broken  spear 
still  fast  in  his  wound.  His  attendants  bore  him  to  a  rising 
ground  in  the  rear,  which  commanded  the  whole  battle-  Death  of 
field.  When  he  recovered  consciousness  he  asked  if  Epammondaa, 
his  shield  was  safe,  and  cast  his  dying  eyes  over  the  scene.  He 
sent  in  haste  for  lolai'das  and  Daiphantus,  his  destined  successors 
in  command ;  the  answer  came  that  both  had  been  slain.  "  Then," 
said  the  dying  hero,  "  you  had  better  make  peace."  So  saying, 
he  bade  the  spear-head  be  drawn  from  his  wound  ;  a  flow  of  blood 
followed,  and  he  breathed  his  last. 

So  died  Epaminondas,  and  with  him  the  greatness  of  Tiiebes; 
never  were  the  fortunes  of  a  city  and  its  leading  statesman  more 
closely  bound  together.  The  Thebans  themselves  seem  to  have 
looked  to  the  future  with  dread,  for  they  obeyed  their  general's 
dying  words,  and  concluded  a  peace  with  their  enemies  ere  the 
summer  was  over.     Athens,  Elis,  Achaia,  and  Mautinea  signed  on 

'  Xenophon,  Ilellcn,  vij.  5.  23. 


486  Thebes  Predominant  in  Greece.  [362  b.c. 

the  one  side;  Thebes,  Argos,  and  the  Arcadian  League  on  the 
other.  Sparta  had  to  be  left  out  of  the  agreement,  for  the  ephors 
obstinately  refused  to  acknowledge  the  independence  of  Messene. 
The  great  war,  however,  was  at  an  end,  and  the  noise  of  arms 
which  had  sounded  all  over  Greece  died  away  into  a  petty  bickering 
for  border-forts  on  the  slopes  of  Taygetus. 


C/ 


CHAPTER  XLI. 


FROM   THE   PEACE   OF  362   B.C.   TO   PHILIP'S    FIRST   INVASIOX 
OF   GRKECE,   362-352   B.C. 

The  predominance  which  Thebes  had  enjoyed  in  Greece  for  the 
ninej'ears  which  followed  the  battle  of  Leuctrahad  never  amounted 
to  a  formal  hegemony,  like  that  which  Sparta  had  once  exercised. 
Nor  had  it  involved  the  organization  of  a  large  body  of  strictly 
dependent  allies,  such  as  Athens  had  gathered  around  her  in  the 
days  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos.  Thebes  had  taken  the  lead 
merely  because  she  was  the  strongest  state  among  the  enemies  of 
Sparta,  the  central  power  on  which  the  others  leant  for  support. 
Epaminondas,  the  guiding  spirit  of  the  time,  had  deliberately 
accepted  this  position,  and  laboured  to  make  his  native  city  not  a 
"  tyrant  state,"  but  the  first  among  many  equals. 

When,  therefore,  the  war  came  to  an  end,  after  the  battle  of 
Mantinca,  the  Greek  states  found  themselves  lacking  an  acknow- 
ledged leader,  and  went  each  upon  its  own  way,  without  having  to 
pay  regard  to  the  wishes  of  any  suzerain  or  superior.  The  history 
of  the  succeeding  period,  therefore,  was  singularly  destitute  of  unity 
and  cohesion. 

In  Peloponnesus  the  annals  of  the  next  few  years  are  almost 

a  blank.     Since  Sparta  had  ceased  to  be  the  centre  of  Greece,  the 

tale  of  her  petty  wars  with  her  neighbours  seems  to      „ 

^       -^  _  °  Death  of 

have  ceased  to  interest  the  historians  of  the  ancient  Agesiiaus 
world.  Especially  was  this  so  after  the  death  of  the 
aged  Agesilaus,  the  last  link  who  connected  her  with  the  glorious 
past.  That  great  warrior  died  not  in  the  valley  of  the  Eurotas,  but 
on  the  sands  of  Libya.  Sparta  was  in  dire  need  of  money  for  her 
war  with  Messene,  and  when  Tachos — an  Egyptian  2:)rince  who 
had  rebelled  against  Persia — offered  her  subsidies  in  return  for  a 


488  The  Social   War  and  the  Sacred   War.       [36ib.c. 

force  of  Greek  hoplites,  Agesilaus  counselled  the  acceptance  of  the 
tender.  He  went  to  Egypt  himself  with  the  promised  succours, 
and  at  the  age  of  eighty-four  conducted  his  last  campaign  on  the 
banks  of  the  Nile.  Having  quarrelled  with  Tachos,  he  deposed  him 
in  favour  of  his  cousin  Nectanebis,  who  thereupon  presented  him 
with  two  hundred  and  thirty  talents  for  his  services.  Agesilaus 
set  out  to  take  the  money  home,  but  died  on  the  way  in  a  desert 
haven  on  the  Libyan  coast.  In  spite  of  all  his  courage  and  skill, 
he  had  been  the  evil  genius  of  his  country,  and  had  brought  upon 
her  all  the  woes  that  the  oracle  had  foretold '  for  the  "  lame  reign  " 
("winter  of  361-60). 

Among  the  other  Peloponnesian  states  the  Arcadian  League 
should  have  taken  the  first  place.  But  that  body  practically  went 
to  pieces  within  twenty  years  of  its  foundation,  owing  to  the  jealousy 
which  the  older  towns  felt  for  Megalopolis,  the  new  federal  capital. 
That  city  was  so  left  to  itself  that  in  353  B.C.  it  succumbed  to  an 
attack  of  the  Spartans,  and  was  only  restored  to  freedom  by  the 
aid  of  a  Theban  army.  The  elder  states  so  systematically  sapped 
the  strength  of  their  younger  rival,  that  at  last,  as  a  sarcastic  poet 
observed,  "the  great  city  became  a  great  desert "  (fprj/xia  /xfydK-n 
'ariv  71  MeyaXoiroAis)-  With  no  leader  or  suzerain  to  check  their 
bickerings,  the  Arcadians  soon  reduced  themselves  to  a  state  of 
complete  insignificance. 

A  new  evil  began  to  appear  in  Peloponnesus  about  this  time,  in 
the  form  of  desperate  attempts  at  the  establishment  of  tyrannies. 
The  success  of  Dionysius  of  Syracuse  on  one  side  of  the  sea,  and  of 
Jason  of  Pherae  on  the  other,  set  many  ambitious  men  on  the  old 
tack,  though  tyrants  had  practically  ceased  out  of  the  land  for  two 
hundred  years.  Euphron  of  Sicyon  was  the  first  who  attempted 
to  enslave  his  country  by  force  of  arms ;  he  failed  and  was  assassi- 
nated (367  B.C.).  Timophanes  of  Corinth  (circ.  360  B.C.)  won  a 
greater  celebrity  from  the  circumstances  of  his  death.  After  he 
had  safely  established  himself  in  power,  his  brother  Timoleon  and 
two  of  his  friends  obtained  an  interview  with  him.  "When  they 
were  in  private,  they  solemnly  summoned  him  to  give  up  the 
tyranny;  when  he  refused,  Timoleon  stepped  aside  and  wrapped 
his  face  in  his  rflaiitle,  while  the  other  two  cut  his  brother  down. 
»  See  p.  421, 


357  B.C.]  The  Social  War.  4S9 

Thus  Corinth  recovered  her  liberty.  Other  cities  in  other  parts  of 
Greece  were  not  so  fortunate ;  Euboea,  in  particular,  fell  almost 
2ntirely  into  the  hands  of  tyrants. 

*  Of  the  various  states  which  had  engaged  in  the  war  of  371-362 
B.C.,  Athens  had,  with  the  exception  of  Thebes,  fared  the  best. 
Although  she  had  lost  Oropus,  she  had  made  conquests 
of  far  greater  worth  ;  in  365  B.C.  she  had  succeeded  the  social  war. 
in  conquering  Samos^  which  had  fallen  into  the  hands 
of  Persia,  but,  instead  of  freeing  her  old  allies,  established  in  the 
island  a  large  cleruchy  of  her  poorer  citizens.  She  had  also  picked 
up  a  good  many  outlying  possessions  on  the  north  coast  of  the  Aegean, 
including  part  of  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  the  Macedonian  towns 
of  Pydna  and  Methone,  and  the  more  important  city  of  Potidaea. 
Since  the  final  ruin  of  Sparla,  Athens  remained  the  only  naval 
power  in  Greece;  for  Thebes,  though  so  powerful  on  land,  only 
once  sent  a  fleet  to  sea  (363  B.C.).  If  the  Athenians  had  been  wise, 
they  would  have  admitted  the  towns  thej'  had  lately  conquered  into 
the  maritime  league  which  they  had  founded  in  378  b.c.  But  the 
old  memories  of  the  Confederacy  of  Delos  were  their  bane ;  they 
were  never  able  to  get  out  of  their  heads  the  idea  of  re-establishing 
an  empire,  and  preferred  ruling  unwilling  subjects  to  obtaining 
willing  allies.  The  Asiatic  towns  which  had  joined  with  Athens 
to  form  the  league  of  378  b.c.  looked  on  in  disapproval  as  the 
actions  of  their  great  ally  became  more  and  more  arbitrary.  The 
planting  of  a  cleruchy  at  Samos,  a  gross  violation  of  one  of  the 
fundamental  clauses  in  the  treaty  of  confederation  (see  p.  462),  was 
particularly  ofiensive  to  them.  But  they  did  not  break  out  into 
open  strife  with  Athens  till  357  B.C.,  Vvhen  all  the  chief  cities  of 
the  league — Chios,  Byzantium,  Rhodes,  and  Cos  among  them — 
simultaneously  declared  war  upon  her.  Hoping  to  cow  the  con- 
federates by  a  vigorous  attack  on  the  strongest  of  them,  the 
Athenians  opened  the  war  by  an  attempt  to  seize  Chios.  The 
veteran  general  Chabrias,  the  victor  of  Naxos,  led  sixty  vessels 
into  the  harbour  of  that  city,  and  endeavoured  to  effect  a  landing. 
But,  pushing  too  far  ahead  of  the  main  body,  he  was  slain,  and  his 
armament  retired  with  loss.  The  victorious  allies  then  laid  siege 
to  Samos,  in  order  to  expel  the  Athenian  cleruchs ;  to  relieve  the 
place,  the  old  generals  Iphicrates  and  Timotheus — the  former  must 


490  The  Social  War  and  the  Sacred  War       [355  b.c. 

have  been  seventy  years  of  age — led  out  a  second  fleet ;  but  on 
arriving  at  Samos  they  found  the  enemy  too  strong,  and  retired. 
For  this  cautious  action  they  were  impeached  by  their  colleague 
Chares,  and  tried  by  the  Ecclesia,  which,  unmindful  of  old  services, 
treated  them  both  harshly.  Iphicrates,  though  acquitted,  was 
deprived  of  his  command,  and  Timotheus  sentenced  to  a  ruinous 
fine  of  a  hundred  talents.  Having  thus  got  rid  of  the  generals 
of  the  elder  generation,  the  Athenians  put  the  conduct  of  the  war 
into  the  hands  of  their  accuser  Chares,  an  able  but  volatile  and 
untrustworthy  man,  whose  character  somewhat  recalled  that  of 
Alcibiades.  The  new  commander  made  no  progress  with  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  allied  towns,  and,  finding  money  run  short,  sold  the 
services  of  his  army  to  Artabazus,  satrap  of  the  Hellespont,  who 
had  just  revolted  against  his  master.  King  Ochus.  By  successful 
expeditions  against  the  Persians  he  filled  his  military  chest,  but 
meanwhile  the  war  against  the  allies  stood  still. 

Presently  the  Athenians  heard  that  the  Great  King,  in  wrath  at 
the  aid  given  to  the  rebel  satrap,  was  fitting  out  three  hundred 

■^  ^   ^x^      Phoenician  galleys  destined  to  aid  the  allies.     Struck 

End  of  the  °        •' 

Social  war.    with  fear  at  the  news,  they  dismissed  Chares,  asked 

355  B  C.  '  •!  ' 

the  pardon  of  the  king,  and  made  jieace  with  their 
enemies.  Rhodes,  Chios,  and  all  the  other  revolted  allies  were 
allowed  to  withdraw  from  the  league,  but  Athens  retained  Samos 
and  the  cities  along  the  Thracian  and  Macedonian  coasts,  which 
were  reckoned  her  subjects  and  not  her  confederates  (353  B.C.). 
The  newly  gained  independence  of  the  states,  which  now  threw  off 
their  connection  with  Athens,  was  not  long  enjoyed  by  two  of  the 
chief  cities ;  Rhodes  and  Cos  were  conquered  within  two  years  by 
Mausolus,  prince-satrap  of  Caria,  and  thus  passed  into  the  vassalage 
of  Persia. 

While  Athens  was  engaged  in  the  Social  war,  another  set  of 
troubles  had  been  distracting  her  attention.  She  had  fallen  to 
blows  with  Philip,  King  of  Macedonia,  and  was  rapidly  losing 
to  him  her  scattered  possessions  along  the  north  coast  of  the 
Aegean. 

It  is  strange  that  the  Macedonian  kingdom  had  not  commenced 
at  an  earlier  date  to  interfere  with  effect  in  the  concerns  of  the 
Greek  states,  which  lay  in  a  straggling  line  along  its  coast.     But 


355BC]  Macedonia.  491 

though  king  after  king  had  endeavoured  to  turn  the  wars  and 
civil  strifes  of  the  Hellenic  cities  to  account,  not  one  had  as  yet  made 
any  permanent  conquests.  It  was  not  from  want  of  resources  in 
the  kingdom  nor  of  ambition  in  the  kings,  but  from  the  various 
evils  which  beset  a  semi-barbarous  state  at  the  jieriod  of  its 
development  towards  a  higher  civilization. 

The  Macedonians,  though  they  seem  to  have  been  not  very  dis- 
tant kinsmen  of  the  Greeks,' had  always  been  considered  foreigners. 
Yet  they  were  not  savages  like  their  neighbours  to  The 
east  and  west,  the  Thracians  and  Iliyrians,  but  lived  Macedonians, 
in  the  fourth  century  much  the  same  sort  of  life  that  the  Hellenic 
tribes  had  lived  in  the  tenth.  They  formed  a  limited  monarchy 
of  the  ancient  sort,  where  the  king  sought  the  counsel  of  the 
nobles,  and  laid  his  resolves  for  ratification  before  the  assembly 
of  the  people.  Though  some  of  the  Macedonian  tribes  were  rough 
highlanders,  yet  those  who  dwelt  in  the  plains  of  the  Axius  and 
Haliacmon  were  not  unacquainted  with  city  life,  and  had  founded 
the  considerable  towns  of  Aegae  and  Pella.  Three  hundred  years 
of  contact  with  the  Hellenic  colonies  on  the  coast  had  profoundly 
influenced  the  Macedonians,  more  especially  their  upper  classes; 
they  had  caught  from  their  neighbours  some  tincture  of  Greek 
manners,  and  learnt  to  appreciate  the  amenities  of  civilization.  The 
majority  of  the  nobility  had  adopted  Greek  names,  such  as  Archc- 
laus,  Pausanias,  Lysimachus,  Ptolemaeus.  They  had  begun  to  call 
their  national  gods  by  Greek  titles,  and  were  usually  acquainted 
with  the  Greek  language. 

The  royal  family  were  the  leaders  in  the  Hellenization  of  Mace- 
donia; they  laid  claim  to  a  remote  descent  from  the  Dorian 
princes  of  Argos.  King  Alexander  (see  pp.  195,  221),  The  Mace- 
who  served  in  the  army  of  Xerxes,  so  far  vindicated  '^o'^ian  kings, 
his  Greek  pedigree  that  he  was  permitted  to  take  part  in  the 
Olympic  games,  a  privilege  never  granted  to  a  barbarian.  Arche- 
laus,  the  grandson  of  Alexander,  was  even  more  distinguished 
as  a  lover  of  things  Greek ;  he  entertained  in  his  court  the  poets 
Agathon,  Choerilus,  and  Euripides,  employed  Zeuxis  to  cover  the 
walls  of  his  palace  with  frescoes,  and  invited — though  in  vain — the 

'  The  few  fragments  remaining  o£  the  IMacedonian  dialect  show  that  it 
resembled  Aeolic  Greek,  but  the  race  must  have  been  very  mixed. 


492  The  Social  War  and  the  Sacred  War.        339 bc. 

philosopher  Socrates  to  come  to  Pella  and  instruct  the  youth  of 
Macedon.  After  the  death  of  Archelaus  (399  B.C.),  the  kingdom 
was  for  many  years  distracted  by  civil  wars,  and  during  the  reign  of 
Amyntas,  the  father  of  the  great  Philip,  it  seemed  likely  that  the 
Illyrians  from  the  inland  and  the  Chalcidian  League  from  the  coast 
would  actually  divide  Macedonia  between  them.  Sparta  saved  the 
kingdom  of  Amyntas  by  destroying  the  Chalcidian  League,  and 
within  a  few  years  Macedonia  had  so  far  recovered  her  strength  that 
she  actually  made  an  attempt  to  conquer  Northern  Thessaly  (see 
p.  477),  which  was  only  repulsed  by  the  arms  of  Pelopidas, 

The  weakness  of  Macedonia  np  to  this  time  had  been  caused  by 
the  proneness  of  her  people  to  civil  wars.  The  succession  to  the 
crown  had  been  settled  by  the  sword  quite  as  frequently  as  by 
hereditary  right ;  any  member  of  the  royal  house,  if  he  could 
find  a  powerful  body  of  followers,  might  hope  to  tear  the  sceptre 
from  the  last  king's  heir.  The  numerous  and  warlike  nobility  of 
the  land  were  as  proud  and  captious  as  the  baronage  of  the  Middle 
Ages,  and  any  slight  might  cause  them  to  take  up  arms  in  the 
cause  of  a  pretender.  Hence  the  throne  of  Macedonia  was  a  thorny 
seat,  and  happy  was  that  king  who  died  in  his  bed. 

We  have  already  mentioned  that  Philip,  the  third  son  of  Amyn- 
tas, was  given  as  a  hostage  to  Pelopidas  while  yet  a  boy,  and  taken 

Youth  of     ^°  Thebes.     He  spent  several  years  there  in  honour- 

Phiiip  of  able  captivity,  allowed  to  turn  the  time  to  account  as 
he  might  choose,  but  debarred  from  returning  home. 
Philip  was  a  lad  of  extraordinary  parts ;  not  only  did  he  become 
versed  in  Greek  literature  and  philosophy,  and  master  the  Greek 
tongue  so  thoroughly  as  to  be  reckoned  one  of  the  first  orators  of 
his  age,  but  he  gained  an  insight  into  Greek  statecraft  and  a 
knowledge  of  the  art  of  war  such  as  none  of  his  contemporaries 
attained.  Thebes  was  in  these  years  the  centre  of  Hellenic 
l^olitics,  and  Epaminondas  the  first  general  of  the  age,  but  it  was 
not  every  lad  of  sixteen  who  could  have  turned  his  opportunities 
of  observation  to  such  use  as  did  the  young  Macedonian  exile. 

After  spending  some  three  or  four  years  in  Thebes,  Philip  was 
called  back  to  Macedon  by  the  misfortunes  of  his  house.  His 
eldest  brother.  King  Alexander  IL,  had  been  murdered,  and  Alex- 
ander's successor,  bis  second  brother  Periliccas,  was,  after  a  short 


359  B.C.]  Philip  of  MacedoTU  493 

reign,  skiu  in  battle  with  the  lUyriaus.  Perdiccas  left  a  gon,  but 
the  boy  was  very  young,  and  Philip  was  appointed  his  guardian 
and  regent  of  the  kingdom  (359  B.C.). 

It  was  no  easy  task  which  Philip  had  to  take  up,  at  the  early 
age  of  twenty-three.  Two  pretenders  of  the  royal  blood  disputed  his 
nephew's  crown,  w'hile  the  Illyrians,  who  had  just  slain  character  of 
his  brother  Perdiccas,  were  breaking  in  on  the  north-  Pbiiip. 
west  frontier  of  the  kingdom.  But  the  young  regent  was  quite  able 
to  cope  with  the  difSculties  which  beset  him.  Nature  had  endowed 
him  with  every  quality  which  a  ruler  of  Macedon  needed.  The 
rudest  of  his  subjects  could  not  but  admire  the  prince  who  always  led 
his  army  in  person,  and  was  the  best  horseman,  the  boldest  swimmei', 
the  keenest  hunter,  in  the  land ;  nor  was  he  liked  any  the  worse 
for  loving  the  wine-cup  over  well — a  national  foible.  But  Philip 
was  not  a  mere  soldier;  from  his  youth  up  he  preferred  dissimula- 
tion to  force.  He  had  studied  the  subtleties  of  Greek  state  craft 
and  took  a  keen  intellectual  pleasure  in  outwitting  an  adversary, 
especially  when  that  adversary  was  a  Greek  politician.  All  methods 
of  arriving  at  an  end  were  equally  good  to  him ;  he  disowned  a 
treaty  or  broke  an  oath  with  a  frank  levity  which  astonished  even 
the  most  callous  of  the  statesmen  of  Greece.  Corruption  was  his 
favourite  weapon ;  he  had  fathomed  the  depths  of  Greek  venality, 
and  always  commenced  a  war  by  hiring  some  faction-leader  among 
his  enemies  to  lend  him  aid.  "  No  town  is  impregnable,"  he  said, 
"  if  once  I  can  get  a  mule-load  of  silver  passed  within  its  gate." 
Philip's  deep  cunning  was  long  unsuspected  by  his  contemporaries, 
on  account  of  the  free,  courteous  and  open  deportment  which  he 
displayed ;  it  was  hard  to  believe  that  a  man  could  look  so  honest 
and  mean  so  ill.  Nor  were  his  good  qualities  all  assumed.  He  was 
never  crael  for  cruelty's  sake ;  he  was  a  firm  friend  and  a  liberal 
master ;  his  courtesy  and  good-nature  were  genuine  and  not 
assumed ;  and  if  he  despised  Greek  factiousness  and  venality,  he 
had  a  real  admiration  for  Greek  culture  and  civilization. 

Within  two  years   after   Philip   had   assumed   the  regency  of 

Macedonia,  he  had  cleared  away  both  the  pretenders 

in  Philip  in 

who  claimed  the  crown,  and  inflicted  a  crushing  de-       power, 

feat  on  the  Illyrians.     Having  thus  won  unbounded      ^  " 

populai'ity,    he    quietly   dsposed    his    nephew    and    had    himself 


494  ^/'^  Social   War  and  the  Sacred  War.       [357  b.c. 

proclaimed   king   (358   B.C.).      His   next   step  was   to   reorganize 

the  national  army,  wLicli  had  hitherto  been  a  mere  tumultuous 

tribal  gathering.     The  numerous  and  fiery  nobles  were  encouraged 

to  join  the  king's  horse-guard,  and  honoured  with  the  title  of  his 

*'  companions  "  (eVaiooj),  while  the  picked  men  of  the  tribal  levies 

were  enregimented  into  light  and  heavy  corps  of  infantry.     Taking 

to  heart  the  system  of  Epaminondas,  the  king  formed  the  core  of 

his  army  out  of  regiments  trained  to  fight  in  deei)  columns,  and 

armed  with  a  ponderous  pike  treble  the  length  of  the  Greek  lance 

• — so  long,  in  fact,  that  the  spear-heads  of  the  third  and  fourth  rank 

projected  in  front  of  the  charging  column  as  well  as  those  of  the 

first.     This  heavy  phalanx  never  failed  to  bear  down  the  ordinary 

Greek  line  of  hoplites  by  sheer  weight  of  impact. 

Philip's  ambition,  when  he  had   firmly  seated   himself  on   the 

throne,  was  first  directed  towards  securing  Macedonia  a  harbour, 

„  .  ^    the  aim  which  so  many  of  his  predecessors  had  vainly 

Seizure  of  j  tr  j 

Amphipoiis,  sought  to  attain.  He  determined  not  to  molest  at 
first  the  Chalcidian  cities,  which  lay  in  a  compact 
body  in  the  centre,  but  to  make  an  attempt  either  on  one  of  the  scat- 
tered Athenian  possessions,  or  at  some  isolated  autonomous  town. 
Chance  enabled  him  to  do  both  ;  he  found  the  Athenians  plotting 
an  expedition  against  the  city  of  Amphipoiis,  on  which  they  had 
never  ceased  to  nourish  designs  since  it  revolted  to  Brasidas  sixty- 
five  years  ago.  Philip  at  once  opened  negotiations  with  them,  and 
offered  to  put  Amphipoiis  into  their  hands,  if  they  would  give  him 
in  exchange  their  port  of  Pydna  on  the  Thermaic  Gulf.  The 
Athenians  agreed,  for  the  exchange  was  manifestly  in  their  favour, 
and  looked  on  while  Philip  laid  siege  to  Amphipoiis,  which  fell 
into  his  hands  in  a  few  weeks.  He  then  presented  himself  before 
the  gates  of  Pydna,  which  was  surrendered  to  him ;  when  this  was 
done  he  promptly  disavowed  his  agreement,  and  kept  both  places 
in  his  own  hands.  Knowing  that  this  meant  instant  war  with 
Athens,  he  fell  on  Potidaea,  the  most  important  Athenian  posses- 
sion in  those  parts,  and  seized  it  before  any  succour  could  arrive. 
Instead,  however,  of  keeping  it  himself,  he  Landed  Potidaea  over 
to  the  Olynthians,  the  leading  Chalcidian  state,  and  thus  embroiled 
them  with  Athens. 

Just  at  this  moment  the  Social  war  broke  out,  and  while  the 


356 EC]  Origbi  of  the  Sacred  War.  495 

Athenians  were  engaged  in  it  they  had  no  leisure  to  punish  Philip 
or  his  accomplices  of  Olynthus.  Thus  the  Macedonian  j-oy^jj^tion  of 
king  was  able  for  three  vears  to  prosecute  his  designs      Phiiippi, 

*'  356  S  C 

without  molestation  :  he  soon  showed  that  they  were 
likely  to  lead  him  far  afield.  Now  that  he  possessed  Amphipolis 
and  its  all-important  bridge  over  the  Strymon,  the  road  to  Thrace 
was  in  his  hands.  Crossing  the  river,  he  plunged  into  the  hills, 
and  conquered  one  by  one  the  Thracian  tribes  as  far  east  as  the 
Nestus.  The  main  purpose  of  this  expedition  was  to  gain  possession 
of  the  mines  of  Mount  Pangaeus,  the  richest  gold-producing  region 
known  to  the  ancient  world.  When  the  district  was  subdueJ,  the 
king  built  in  its  midst  a  new  town,  named  after  himself,  Piulippi, 
Avhich  served  at  once  as  a  centre  for  the  mining,  and  as  a  fortress 
to  keep  down  the  Thracians.  Within  a  few  years  the  gold  was 
coming  forth  so  rapidly  that  the  king  derived  from  the  mines  no 
less  than  a  thousand  talents  per  annum  (£244,000).  Hence  came 
the  abundant  coinage  of  staters,  which  first  accustomed  the  Greeks 
to  a  national  gold  currency,  and  unlocked  for  Philip  the  gates  of  so 
many  hostile  towns. 

While  Philip  Avas  conquering  the  Thracians,  and  Athens  was 
contending  with  her  recalcitrant  allies,  Thebes,  the  power  which 
had  lately  been  predominant  in  Greece,  was  involving 
herself  in  a  maze  of  troubles  from  which  she  had  now  Phocisand 
no  Epaminondas  to  deliver  her.  Thebes  and  Phocis 
had  been  bitter  enemies  of  old,  and  though  the  Phocians  joined 
the  Theban  alliance  after  Leuctra,  they  did  so  from  necessity  and 
not  from  choice.  In  362  B.C.  they  had  so  far  let  their  real  feelings 
appear  that  tliey  had  neglected  to  send  a  contingent  to  the  allied 
anny  which  fought  at  Mantinea.  The  Thebans  bore  them  a  grudge 
for  this,  and  waited  for  an  opportunity  of  repaying  it.  The  chance 
came  in  a  few  years ;  the  Delphians  accused  certain  Phocian  land- 
holders of  having  trespassed  upon  and  tilled  waste  ground  dedicated 
to  Ai^oUo,  and  brought  the  case  before  that  venerable  but  effete 
body  the  Amphictyonic  Assembly,  which  still  sat  from  year  to 
year,  and  sometimes  interfered  in  politics.  The  Amphictyons, 
being  wholly  under  the  control  of  Thebes  and  Thessaly,  voted  that 
a  heinous  sacrilege  had  been  committed,  and  inflicted  a  heavy  fine 
on  the  Phocians.     The  fine  was   left   unpaid ;   whereupon  it  was 


49^  The  Social   War  and  the  Sacred   War.       [365  e.g. 

doubled,  and  the  Amphictyons  threatened  the  recalcitrant  state 
that,  unless  instant  satisfaction  was  made,  its  lands  should  be  de- 
clared escheated  to  the  god,  and  become  the  property  of  the  temple. 

This  brought  matters  to  a  crisis ;  the  I'hocians  were  a  vigorous 

and  high-spirited  people,  who  would  not  endure  to  be  bullied  by 

Phocian   ^^^"^  enemies  under  this  hypocritical  pretext  of  religion. 

seize  Delphi,  Led  by  two  ambitious  chiefs  named  Philomelus  and 

Onomarchus,  they  quietly  armed,  and  when  all  was 

ready  for  war,  seized  Delphi  and  its  temple  by  a  night  surprise. 

Philomelus  sought  out  and  slew  the  Delphians  who  had  been  the 

accusers  of  Phocis,  and  then  compelled  the  priests  to  set  the  oracle 

working  at  his  dictation,  so  that  Apollo  pronounced  a  blessing  on 

the  captors  of  his  sanctuary.     It  seemed  efficacious,  for  when  the 

Locrians  of  Amphissa,  the  next  neighbours  of  Delphi,  came  to  drive 

out  Philomelus,  they  suffered  a  bloody  defeat. 

The  Phocian  leaders  were  quite  aware  that  their  action  involved 

a  war  with  Thebes  and  Thessaly,  and  knew  that  their  own  levies 

Outbreak  f  ^^^^  quite  insufficient  to  cope  with  those  formidable 

the  "Sacred  powers.  But  the  seizure  of  Delphi  put  the  enormous 
'temple-treasures  in  their  hands,  and  the  men  who 
had  £2,500,000  ^  in  hard  bullion  at  their  disposal  were  not  likely 
to  want  mercenaries.  Accordingly  when  the  Amphictyons  met, 
and  put  Phocis  under  the  ban  for  sacrilege,  Philomelus  retorted  by 
a  manifesto  in  which  he  justified  his  action,  and  promised  high  pay 
to  every  hoplite  in  Greece  who  would  join  the  Phocian  ranks. 
Then  began  the  "  Sacred  War,"  which,  in  spite  of  its  name,  was 
not  a  crusade  of  all  Greece  against  Phocis,  but  merely  an  attempt 
of  the  Thebans,  Thessalians,  and  Locrians  to  crush  their  neighbour 
state.  The  Phocians,  indeed,  got  quite  as  much  sympathy  from 
the  outside  world  as  their  enemies.  Sparta  would  have  helped 
them  had  she  been  able ;  and  Athens,  when  free  from  troubles  ci 
her  own,  was  not  indisposed  to  co-operate. 

When  actual  hostilities  commenced,  the  Phocians  proved  quite 
able  to  hold  their  own.  Philomelus,  indeed,  fell  in  battle  in  the 
first  year  of  the  war,  but  his  successor  Onomarchus  kept  the  field 
with  ten  thousand  mercenaries  at  his  back,  and  not  only  protected 

1  It  is  extraordinary  that,  out  of  the  enormous  coinage  struck  from  the 
temple-monej',  only  a  few  triobols  and  copper  pieces  survive. 


353  B.C.]  Successes  of  the  PJwcians.  497 

Phocis,   but  carried  the  war   far  iato  the  enemy's  couutry.      In 
Thessaly  he  bribed  the  tyrants  of  Pherae,  the  sue-  successes  of 
cessors  of  Alexander,  to  desert  their  national  league,  Onomarchus, 
and   take   his   part;    aided   by  liberal    supplies    of 
Delphic  temple-treasure,  they  proved  strong  enough  to  hold  the 
Thcssalians  in  check.     Meanwhile   Onomarchus    fell  on   Boeotia, 
and — to  the  great  surprise  of  those  who  remembered  the  days  of 
Epaminondas — beat  the  Thebans  in  the  open  field.     Then,  turning 
on  the  smaller  members  of  the  Thessalo-Theban  confederacy,  he 
harried  the  lands  of  the  Locrians,  Dorians,  and  Oetaeans,  till  not 
a  farmstead  was  left  unburnt  in  all  their  valleys. 

Thus  utterly  discomfited,  the  enemies  of  Phocis  took  a  fatal 
step :  they  asked  the  assistance  of  Philip  of  Macedon.  It  was 
Thcssalians,  the  nobility  of  Larissa,  who  actually  invited  him  to 
Cioss  Mount  Olympus  and  trespass  on  the  soil  of  Hellas ;  but  the 
Thebans,  who  did  not  disown  the  invitation,  must  take  their  share 
of  the  blame. 

Of  late  Philip  had  been  flourishing  exceedingly.  Athens  had 
been  brought  so  low  by  her  defeat  in  the  Social  war  that  she  was 
unable  to  protect  her  outlying  possessions,  and  saw  Methone — her 
last  port  in  Macedonia — taken  in  354  B.C.,  after  a  long  siege,  in 
which  the  king  lost  one  of  his  eyes  by  an  arrow.  Philii^s  plans 
enlarged  as  his  power  grew  greater ;  he  increased  his  army,  com- 
menced to  build  a  fleet,  and  strengthened  his  frontier  against  the 
barbarian  tribes  of  the  inland ;  not  least  among  his  successes  he 
counted  the  fact  that  his  chariot  had  been  victorious  at  the 
Olympic  games.  Now  he  was  ready  to  take  any  chance  that 
came  up  for  obtaining  a  foothold  in  Greece. 

When  Philip  advanced  against  Pherae,  he  found  himself  opposed 
by  Phayllus,  the  brother  of  Onomarchus,  who  had  marched  north 
in  order  to  join  the  Pheraeans.     This  general  Philip 
drove  back,  but  presently  Onomarchus  himself  came     Thessaly. 
on  the  scene,  with  the  main  army  of  the  Phocians.      ^^^  ^'^' 
He  met  the  Macedonians,  routed  them  in  two  engagements,  and 
drove   Philip  home   across   the  mountains.     Then   turning  back 
to  Boeotia,  he  stormed  Coroneia,  and  induced  Orchomenus  to  desert 
the  Thebans  and  declare  itself  independent.    Tiiis  was  the  high-water 
mark  of  Phocian  success  during  the  ten  years  of  the  Sacred  war. 

2  K 


498  Tlie  Social   ]Var  and  the  Sacred   War.      [352  b.c. 

Within  a  few  months  of  his  first  check,  Philip  agaiu  appeared  in 

Thtssaly  with  a  new  army  of  twenty  thousand  men.     Onotnarchns 

marched  acfainst  him,  and  met  him  hard  by  the  port 

Battle  of  c3  '  J  i. 

Pagasae.      of  Pagasae.     The  fortune  of  war  had  changed ;  the 

352  B.C.      Macedonian    phalanx    broke   through    the    Phocian 

mercenaries ;  Onomarchus  himself  fell  with  six  thousand  of  his 

men,  and  Philip  then  expelled  the  tyrants  of  Phcrae,  and  declared 

their  city  free  and  autonomous ;  but,  under  the  pretence  of  military 

necessity,  he  occupied  with  Macedonian  garrisons  the  city  of  Pagasae 

and  several  places  more  on  the  Magncsian  Peninsula,  thus  making 

himself  master  of  the  keys  of  Thessaly. 

Meanwhile  Philip's  success  had  frightened  all  those  states   in 

Greece  who  were  not  committed  to  the  Theban  alliance.     That 

a  barbarian  king  should  march  far  into  Hellenic  soil, 

Pliihp  at  '^  ' 

Thermopylae,  and  plant  his  garrisons  almost  on  the  Euboean  Strait, 

appeared  intolerable  to  all  who  were  not  blinded  by 
hatred  of  the  Phocians.  Accordingly,  when  Philip  moved  south- 
ward to  complete  his  victory  by  occupying  Phocis,  he  found  Ther- 
mopylae held  by  an  Athenian  army  and  fleet,  while  troops  from 
Achaia  and  Sparta  joined  the  wrecks  of  the  Phocian  army,  which 
had  rallied  round  Phayllus,  who  had  been  appointed  general  of  the 
Phocian  League  in  place  of  his  deceased  brother.  There  were  still 
plenty  of  cups  and  tripods  unmelted  in  the  temple-store  at  Delphi, 
so  Phayllus  could  ere  long  hire  and  send  into  the  field  as  large  a 
mercenary  host  as  that  which  had  perished  with  Onomarchus  at 
Pagasae. 

Finding  Thermopylae  impregnable,  Philip  turned  back,  foiled  for 
the  first  and  almost  the  last  occasion  in  his  life  by  an  Athenian 
armament.  Seeing  that  the  times  were  not  yet  ripe  in  Central 
Greece,  he  let  the  Sacred  war  shift  for  itself,  and  went  off  on  quite 
another  quest.  His  campaign  had  brought  him  the  possession  of 
the  Thessalian  fortresses,  and  with  that  result  he  was,  for  the 
present,  satisfied.  ]\reanwhile  there  was  work  for  him  to  do  further 
north. 


CHAPTER  XLII. 

PHILIP   AXD   DEMOSTHENES,   352-341   B.C. 

Foil  five  years  after  his  check  at  Thermopylae,  King  Philip  refrained 
from  carrying  his  arms  into  Greece,  and  allowed  the  Sacred  Avar  to 
drag  out  its  weary  length  withont  his  interference.  Although  the 
Phocians  had  lost  their  foothold  in  Thessaly,  yet  in  the  south  their 
strength  was  little  diminished  ;  Phayllus,  and  after  his  death  his 
nephew  Phalaecus,  the  son  of  Onomarchus,  still  contrived  to  hold 
Thebes  in  check,  and  even  to  maintain  a  hold  on  the  captured 
Boeotian  towns  of  Coroneia  and  Orchomenus.  As  long  as  the 
temple-treasure  lasted,  it  seemed  that  the  Phocian  leaders  and  their 
mercenaries  were  likely  to  hold  their  own ;  but  after  five  or  six 
years  of  war  the  great  hoard  was  appreciably  diminished,  and  men 
began  to  reflect  that  some  day  it  would  run  dry.  This  reflection 
encouraged  the  Thebans  to  persist,  although  meanwhile  they  were 
beariiig  all  the  brunt  of  the  war,  while  the  Thessalians  and  King 
Philip  had  slackened  in  their  first  zeal  when  their  own  immediate 
objects  were  attained. 

The  Macedonian  monarch  had  turned  his  restless  mind  once  more 
to  schemes  of  Thracian  conquest.  Ere  the  j^ear  which  saw  liis 
Thessaliau  campaign  had  reached  its  end,  we  find  him  pushing 
his  border  eastward  along  the  north  coast  of  the  Aegean,  and  seizing 
now  the  territories  of  some  native  kinglet,  now  those  of  an  isolated 
Greek  city,  now  an  outlying  Athenian  fortress.  His  furthest  raid 
took  him  as  far  as  the  shore  of  the  Euxine,  but  his  power  was 
not  actually  established  beyond  the  neighbourhood  of  the  city  of 
Aenus.  The  Athenian  possessions  in  the  Thracian  Chersonese  and 
the  independent  cities  on  the  Propontis  were  still  untouched.  la 
the  following  years  Philip  pushed  far  westward ;  be  beat  the 
Illyrians  in  battle,  built  forts  among  them,  compelled  many  of  their 


goo  Philip  and  Demosthenes,  [352  b.o. 

tribes  to  do  Lim  homage,  and  then  forced  the  piiuces  of  Epirus  to 
acknowledge  bis  supremacy. 

Tbis  rapid  development  of  Philip's  power  to  east  and  west  left 
the  Greek  cities  of  Chalcidice — Ol^'ntbus  and  ber  sister  towns — in 
a  perfectly  isolated  condition,  occupying  a  precarious  position  of 
independence  in  a  slip  of  territory  enclosed  between  the  sea  and  the 
Macedonian  border.  Philip  had  treated  them  with  scrupulous 
politeness  ever  since  Olyntbus  bad  joined  bim  against  Athens,  and 
committed  herself  to  bis  side  by  accepting  the  gift  of  tbe  Athenian 
town  of  Potidaea.  But  as  the  king  became  more  and  more  powerful, 
tbe  Cbalcidians  began  to  grow  uneasy ;  they  saw  bim  annex  city 
after  city  of  their  Hellenic  neighbours,  and  began  to  suspect  that 
all  they  had  gained  by  allying  themselves  to  Philip  was  tbe  privilege 
of  being  devoured  a  little  later  than  tbe  rest.  It  was  not  likely 
that  the  sovereign  who  had  so  readily  laid  bands  on  Amphipolis 
and  Pydna,  Maronea  and  Pagasae,  would  refrain  for  ever  from 
designs  on  Olyntbus.  Accordingly  the  Cbalcidians  began  to  retire 
from  their  friendship  with  Philip;  they  concluded  a  peace  with 
Athens  in  352  B.C.,  and  a  little  later  gave' harbourage  to  a  rebel 
Macedonian  prince — the  king's  step-brother — who  fled  to  them  for 
Philip  refuge.  These  steps  showed  Philip  that  he  could  no 
'^'oiynS*^  longer  rely  on  tbe  friendship  or  neutrality  of  Olyn- 
352  B.C.  thus  and  her  confederates  when  be  made  his  next 
attack  on  Greece.  While  bis  Thracian  and  Illyrian  campaigns 
were  in  progress  he  left  them  alone,  but  after  all  had  been  made 
secure  to  east  and  west,  his  armies  began  to  gather  in  a  menacing 
fashion  on  tbe  borders  of  Chalcidice. 

Seeing  the  end  at  band,  tbe  Olynthians  sent  an  embassy  to 
Athens,  to  beg  their  former  enemy  to  lend  them  instant  assistance. 
The  Athenians  had  of  late  been  conducting  the  war  against  Philip 
in  the  most  careless  and  half-hearted  way  ;  they  sent  a  small  force 
of  mercenaries  now  and  again  to  harass  bis  army  in  Thrace,  but 
seemed  to  care  little  what  successes  he  gained  so  long  as  tbe  war 
lay  far  from  the  gates  of  Athens.  While  he  was  seizing  their 
northern  possessions  they  had  given  their  whole  attention  to  an 
unnecessary  and  futile  expedition  to  Euboea,  destined  to  drive  out 
the  tyrants  who  occupied  Chalcis  and  Oreus.  Although  their 
general  Phocion  won  a  brilliant  victory  at  Tamynae  over  tbe  con- 


350  B.C.]  Demosthenes.  501 

federate  Euboeans,  tlie  general  result  of  the  campaign  was  utter 
failure  and  useless  expense  (350  b.c). 

When  the  Olynthian  envoys  reached  Athens  the  question  came 
before  the  Ecclesia  whether  things  should  he  allowed  to  drift  on,  as 
they  had  done  for  the  last  ten  years,  or  whether  a  vigorous  offensive 
war  should  be  begun  against  Philip.  In  favour  of  the  latter 
alternative  were  made  the  three  great  orations  of  Demosthenes, 
whose  name  begins  from  this  moment  to  be  more  and  more  closely 
identified  with  all  the  phases  of  Athenian  politics, 

Demosthenes  was  a  member  of  the  wealthy  middle  class ;  his 
father,  who  had  been  the  owner  of  a  shield  factory,  died,  leaving 
him  in  the  hands  of  guardians  who  mismanaged  and  Early  life  of 
dissipated  his  inheritance.  When  he  came  to  years  Demosthenes, 
of  discretion,  Demosthenes  plunged  into  a  series  of  lawsuits  with 
the  fraudulent  trustees,  and  acquired,  while  urging  his  private 
wrongs,  the  taste  for  public  speaking  which  was  to  make  him  the 
greatest  political  orator  of  the  age.  But  at  first  his  success  was 
not  equal  to  his  energy  ;  his  awkward  bearing,  over-rapid  delivery, 
and  imperfect  articulation  spoiled  the  effect  of  excellent  discourses, 
and  he  came  down  from  the  Bema  lamenting  that  "  while  any 
drunken  sea-captain  could  get  a  hearing,  he,  who  had  really  some- 
thing to  tell  the  Athenians,  was  hooted  down  in  a  moment."  His 
friends  encouraged  him  to  persist,  assuring  him  that  however  bad 
his  manner  might  be,  yet  the  matter  of  his  speeches  was  worthy 
of  Pericles,  Accordingly  Demosthenes  set  himself  to  acquire  the 
arts  of  the  public  speaker;  he  did  not  disdain  hints  on  elocution 
from  his  friend  the  actor  Satyrus,  and  practised  declamation  under 
the  most  unfavourable  circumstances.  A  tradition  says  that  ho 
would  go  down  to  the  sea-shore  during  storms,  and  strive  to  make 
his  voice  heard  above  the  roar  of  wind  and  waves,  in  order  to  learn 
the  pitch  necessary  for  addressing  the  boisterous  assembly  of  his 
fellow-citizens.  When  he  was  able  to  set  forth  his  views  with  a 
suitable  delivery,  the  intrinsic  merit  of  his  speeches  made  itself  felt 
at  once,  and  he  soon  became  the  leading  orator  of  the  war-party  at 
Athens. 

Demosthenes  had  fed  his  imagination  on  the  great  deeds  of  Athens 
in  the  previous  generation;  his  favourite  reading  was  the  history 
of  Thucydides,  and  the  aim  which  underlay  all  his  politicil  action 


502  FJiUip  and  DeinostJienes.  i348b,c. 

was  the  restoratioa  of  his  native  city  to  the  leading  place  among 
Hellenic  states.  His  first  important  political  harangues  were 
devoted  to  advocating  the  reorganization  of  the  fleet,  which  had 
fallen  into  a  deplorable  condition  of  inefficiency  in  the  Social  war 
(354  B.C.).  A  little  later  he  is  found  encouraging  the  Athenians 
to  send  help  first  to  Megalopolis  (352  B.C.),  and  then  to  Rhodes 
(351  B.C.),  in  order  to  vindicate  the  old  claim  of  Athens  to  be  the 
friend  and  helper  of  all  oppressed  cities.  Indeed,  the  chief  fault  of- 
his  policy  was  that  he  often  strove  to  induce  the  impoverished  and 
languid  city  of  his  own  day  to  carry  out  the  schemes  that  would- 
have  suited  the  Athens  of  420  b.c.  Not  beinj,  as  the  statesmen 
of  the  elder  generation  had  been,  a  soldier  as  well  as  a  politicianj  he 
was  prone  to  lose  sight  of  military  necessities  in  his  zeal  for  attain- 
ing some  cherished  political  end. 

As  the  character  and  designs  of  King  Philip  gradually  grew 
plainer,  the  policy  of  Demosthenes  tended  more  and  more  to  resolve 
itself  into  an  anti-Macedonian  crusade.  His  oration  on  the  state 
navy  has  received  the  name  of  the  "  First  Philippic,"  because  of  the 
drift  of  its  contents  ;  and  in  his  later  speeches  the  name  of  Philip 
is  mentioned  with  ever-increasing  frequency,  till  his  misdoings 
became  the  sole  burden  of  the  orator's  discourse. 

"When  the  Olynthian  ambassadors  begged  for  the  assistance  of 
Athens,  Demosthenes  urged  not  only  that  previous  grudges  should 

^,     ^,  be  forgiven,  and  an  alliance  concluded  with  them,  but 

destroyed,  that  a  large  Athenian  army,  not  mere  mercenaries, 
but  citizen  hoplites,  should  be  sent  to  attack  Mace- 
donia. He  only  succeeded  in  half  his  project;  the  alliance  Avas 
made,  but  the  succour  sent  was  hopelessly  inadequate — first  a 
small  fleet  of  thirty-eight  ships  under  the  erratic  Chares,  then  four 
thousand  mercenary  peltasts  headed  by  Charideraus,  a  Euboean 
general  taken  into  Attic  pay,  who  was  more  than  once  suspected 
of  playing  his  employers  false.  Thus  insufficiently  aided,  the 
Chalcidian  towns  fell  one  by  one  into  the  hands  of  Philip.  The 
Olynthians  alone  dared  to  face  the  king's  army  in  the  open  field, 
but  they  were  twice  routed,  and  after  the  second  battle  two 
traitors,  bought  with  Macedonian  gold,  opened  the  gates  to  the 
victor.  Philip  burnt  Olynthus,  and  sold  many  of  its  citizens  into 
slavery,  in  return  for  the  ingratitude  which  he  alleged  that  tlie 


348 B.C.]  Fall  of  Olynthits.  503 

state  had  shown  him.      Some  of  the  smaller  Chalcidiaa   towDS 
shared  its  fate. 

The  Athenians  seem  to  have  been  more  surprised  than  vexed 
at  the  fall  of  Olynthus ;  in  spite  of  the  harangues  of  Demosthenes 
it  was  hard  to  interest  them  in  a  war  so  far  from  home.  A  large 
party  in  the  state  only  thought  of  the  material  interests  of  Athens, 
and  were  ready  to  sacrifice  everything  else,  if  only  her  trade  and 
commerce  were  left  mitouched,  and  these  could  best  be  secured  by 
making  peace  with  Philip  on  such  terms  as  he  chose  to  give. 
Another  section,  though  not  influenced  by  such  sordid  motives  as 
the  first,  thought  that  Athens  was  too  weak  and  exhausted  to  go 
crusading  against  Philip  for  the  public  good  of  Greece,  and  dis- 
couraged all  vigorous  action  as  profitless  and  doomed  to  failure. 
This  party  was  headed  by  Phocion,  the  last  Athenian  who  com- 
bined successfully  the  functions  of  orator  and  gqneral.  Though 
brave  and  honest,  he  was  a  hopeless  pessimist ;  he  was  too  much 
of  a  philosopher  to  be  in  harmony  with  the  multitude,  and  more- 
over held  democracy  in  such  contempt  that  he  believed  that  no 
good  thing  could  ever  come  from  the  Athenian  Ecclesia.  He 
particularly  detested  the  fiery  and  emotional  harangues  of  Demos- 
thenes, and  opposed  him  so  bluntly,  yet  so  efficiently,  that  the 
orator  was  wont  to  say,  whenever  his  adversary  mounted  the  Bema, 
"  Here  comes  the  cleaver  that  will  hack  my  periods  to  pieces." 

The  Athenians  had  expected,  when  Olynthus  fell,  that  Philip 
would  turn  his  arms  against  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  the  last  of 
their  northern  possessions.  They  were  afraid  too  that,  now  that 
so  many  seaports  were  in  his  hands,  the  king  would  endeavour  to 
send  out  ships  to  molest  their  commerce ;  on  one  occasion,  indeed, 
some  Macedonian  privateers  had  actually  made  a  descent  on  Attica, 
and  carried  away  the  Paralus,  one  of  the  two  state-galleys,  as  it 
lay  anchored  off  Marathon,  But  they  were  agreeably  surpiised 
when  Philip,  instead  of  urging  on  the  war,  showed  an  unmistakable 
inclination  to  make  peace.  Though  unable  to  discover  the  king's 
naotive,  the  majority  of  the  Athenians  were  eager  to  humour  his 
bent,  and,  on  the  motion  of  a  speaker  named  Philocrates,  an  em- 
bassy of  ten  members  was  sent  to  Pella,  to  learn  the  terms  on 
which  he  wished  to  treat.  Among  the  envoys  were  Philocrates, 
the  mover  of  the  motion,  Demosthenes,  and  his  rival  the  orator 


504  PJiilip  and  Demosthenei.  [346  b.c, 

Aesclnnes.  Philip  received  them  with  great  courtesy,  dazzled 
them  with  the  splendour  of  his  court  and  the  strength  of  his 
resources,  and  seems  to  have  secured  the  enthusiastic  admiration 
of  several  of  their  number  by  the  simple  expedient  of  bribing  them 
heavily.  The  embassy  returned  to  Athens  full  of  the  king's 
j)raises,  but  unable  to  report  that  they  had  agreed  on  terms  of 
peace.  Before  coming  to  an  agreement,  Philip  had  determined  to 
extract  all  the  benefit  he  could  from  the  war;  knowing  that 
Athens  would  no  longer  molest  him  on  the  eve  of  peace,  he  rushed 
off  to  Thrace,  and  in  a  hurried  campaign  completed  the  subjection 
of  the  princes  of  that  country.  Meanwhile  he  had  sent  ambas- 
sadors to  Athens,  who  kept  his  enemies  amused  by  protracted 
haggling  over  the  terms  of  pacification.  When  Thrace  was  con- 
quered his  conditions  were  at  last  formulated ;  they  amounted  to 
a  recognition  of  the  status  quo.  He  was  to  retain  all  his  conquests, 
new  and  old ;  Athens  was  to  give  up  all  claim  to  her  lost  posses- 

_  ^     sions,  and  keep  only  what  was  still  in  her  hands. 

Peace  of  '  i  j 

Phiiocrates,   Moreover,  the  pacification,  though  it  was  to  extend 

to  all  other  allies  of  Athens,  was  not  to  include  the 
Phocians.  The  Athenians  only  assented  to  this  last  clause  because 
Phiiocrates  and  Aeschines,  who  had  fingered  Philip's  money, 
solemnly  assured  them  that  the  stipulation  was  merely  formal, 
the  king  having  no  intention  of  injuring  Phocis,  but  being  much 
more  likely  to  turn  his  arms  against  Thebes.  Under  this  impres- 
sion the  Ecclesia  ratified  the  terms  of  peace,  and  sent  off  the  ten 
envoys  to  Pella  for  the  second  time,  to  administer  the  corresponding 
oath  of  alliance  to  Philip.  The  majority  of  the  ambassadors,  in 
spite  of  the  remonstrances  of  Demosthenes,  lingered  so  long  on  their 
voyage  that  they  took  three  weeks  in  reaching  the  Macedonian 
capital;  there  they  waited  a  month  more,  because  Philip  was 
still  absent  in  Thrace.  Finally,  when  he  appeared,  they  did  not 
insist  on  his  ratifying  the  treaty  at  once,  as  Demosthenes  urged 
them  to  do,  but  accompanied  him  into  Thessaly,  and  only  adminis- 
tered the  oath  to  him  at  Pherae.  For  this  dilatory  action  the 
ambassadors  had  the  best  of  reasons ;  they  were  carrying  out  their 
corrupt  agreement  with  Philip,  w'ho  had  paid  them  to  keep  his 
intentions  hidden  from  the  Athenian  iDcople  till  it  was  too  late  to 
oppose  him. 


S46  B.C.J  Philip  cotiquen  Phoch.  505 

The  object  of  the  king's  advance  to  Pherae  was  demonstrated 
the  momeut  that  the  peace  had  been  signed.     Within  a  few  days 
he  was  at  Thermopylae,  and  had  seized   the  pass,    guT^mission 
which  the  Phocians  were  unable  to  defend  now  that     ofPhocis. 

.  346  B.C. 

no  Athenian  force  came  to  their  aid.  Ihe  mountain- 
barrier  once  pierced,  the  resistance  of  Phocis  suddenly  collapsed. 
Phalaecus,  finding  himself  at  close  quarters  with  the  Macedonians, 
determined  to  surrender  without  a  blow.  lie  obtained  permission 
to  depart  with  his  eight  thousand  mercenaries,  and  such  of  the 
Phocians  as  thought  it  wise  to  follow  him.  Taking  ship  he  passed 
away,  first  to  Peloponnesus,  then  to  Crete,  where  he  fell  at  the 
siege  of  Cydouia. 

The  Phocians,  thus  basely  deserted  by  their  leader,  threw  them- 
selves on  the  mercy  of  Philip;  twenty-two  cities  one  after  another 
opened  their  gates  to  him  when  he  presented  himself  before  their 
walls.  Piemembering  the  fate  of  Olynthus,  they  awaited  with  no 
small  apprehension  the  doom  that  might  be  meted  out  to  them  as 
the  plunderers  of  Delphi. 

The  king's  intentions  proved  to  be  less  harsh  than  might  have 
heen  expected ;  it  was  not  his  detestation  of  Phocian  impiety,  but 
his  desire  to  hold  the  gates  of  Greece,  that  had  brought  him  to 
Thermopylae.  Advancing  to  Delphi,  he  summoned  the  Amphic- 
tyonic  assembly  to  meet  in  its  old  seat,  which  it  had  not  seen  for 
ten  years.  The  delegates  came,  burning  to  avenge  themselves  on 
the  Phocians,  and  proposed  the  most  savage  measures  against  their 
conquered  foes ;  the  Oetaean  delegates,  for  example,  wished  to  cast 
all  Phocian  males  of  military  age  over  the  precipices  of  Parnassus. 
But  Philip  restrained  their  fury,  and  toned  down  the  sentence  to 
a  comparatively  mild  shape.  The  towns  of  Phocis,  except  Abae, 
were  to  be  dismantled,  and  their  inhabitants  forced  to  dwell  apart 
in  villages  of  not  more  than  fifty  hearths.  The  whole  race  was 
disarmed,  a  strip  of  their  frontier-land  was  made  over  to  the 
Boeotians,  and  they  were  commanded  to  pay  fifty  talents  a  year 
to  Apollo,  till  they  should  have  restored  the  entire  sum  which  they 
had  taken  from  the  Delphian  treasure — a  consummation  which 
would  arrive  in  about  two  hundred  years. 

The  other  resolves  of  the  Amphictyons  were  far  more  important 
than  their  decrees  against  the  conquered  enemy.     They  transferred 


5o6  Philip  and  Demosthenes.  [346  b.c. 

the  two  PLociaii  votes  in  their  assembly  to  King  Philip,  thereby 
making  him  a  recognized  member  of  the  Hellenic  state  system, 
and  gave  him  a  share  in  the  presidencj'^  of  the  Pythian  games,  a 
distinction  which  he  was  Greek  enough  to  value  as  not  much  less 
important  than  a  great  political  success.^  For  the  future  the  king 
was  theoretically  acknowledged  as  the  equal  of  his  Hellenic  neigh- 
bours, and  might  claim  a  right  to  aspire  to  the  same  hegemony 
among  them  that  Sparta,  Athens,  or  Thebes  had  once  enjoyed. 

Delphi  was  soon  full  of  festal  pomp,  when  the  Thebans  and 
Thessalians  joined  the  king  in  celebrating  the  Pythian  games. 
But  at  Athens  there  was  wrath  and  dismay,  for  the  people  had  now 
discovered  why  Philip  had  been  so  anxious  to  make  peace,  and 
were  cursing  their  own  stupidity  and  the  treachery  of  the  envoys 
who  had  aided  the  king  to  hoodwink  them.  For  a  moment  there 
was  actually  some  prospect  of  their  renewing  the  war  with  Macedon, 
so  bitter  was  their  impotent  rage.  But  Demosthenes,  who  was 
now  in  greater  credit  than  ever,  because  he  had  opposed  the  policy 
of  his  colleagues  in  the  embassy,  set  his  face  against  a  war  which 
must  be  entered  into  without  allies  and  without  preparation, 
and  succeeded  in  diverting  the  auger  of  his  fellow-countrymen  on 
to  their  treacherous  ambassadors.  Philocrates,  the  head  of  the 
embassy,  fled  from  Athens  the  moment  that  he  was  impeached. 
Aeschines  stood  his  trial,  and  by  a  most  skilful  defence  just 
succeeded  in  escaping  an  adverse  verdict;  the  dicastery  was  so 
evenly  divided  that  a  transference  of  sixteen  votes  would  have 
entailed  his  condemnation. 

Philip  was  now  free  to  extend  the  scope  of  his  ambition ;  the 
conquest  of  Phocis  and  the  peace  with  Athens  enabled  him  to  turn 
his  arms  in  new  directions.  His  first  operations  tended  to  dis- 
illusionize his  old  friends  the  Thessalians,  who  had  fondly  imagined 
that  they  would  be  quit  of  him  now  that  the  Sacred  war  was  over. 
Instead  of  withdrawing  his  garrisons  from  the  places  near  Thermo- 
pylae and  on  the  Pagasaean  Gulf,  the  king  took  advantage  of  some 
slight  civil  disturbance,  and  occupied  the  citadels  of  Pherae  and 
other  cities.  Then  "  Decarchies,"  after  the  pattern  of  those  of 
Lysander  (see  p.  409),  were  i^ut  in   power,  and  Thessaly  found 

'  Philip  was  so  proud  of  the  victory  of  his  chariot  at  the  01\-mpic  games, 
that  he  commemorated  its  success  on  the  whole  of  his  gold  coinage. 


344 B.C.]  Intrigues  in  Peloponessus.  507 

itself  practically  incorporated  with  the  kingdom  of  Macedon.  The 
free  access  iuto  Southern  Greece  wliicli  Philij)  had  gained  by  seizing 
Thermopylae  was  next  turned  to  account,  and  the  Macedonian 
arms  were  ere  long  seen  in  the  Peloponnesus. 

The  Peloponnesians  had  only  themselves  to  thank  for  the  intro- 
duction of  the  stranger  into  their  well-guarded  peninsula.  It  was 
their  own  appeal   which    gave   him   the   chance   of  „      ,     . 

'■  '^  '^  Macedonian 

entering.  The  first  offenders  were  the  oligarchic  influence  in 
jiarty  at  Elis ;  finding  themselves  beset  by  an  exiled  ^  opo^ieEsus. 
democratic  faction,  who  had  bought  the  services  of  the  mercenary 
bands  that  had  once  followed  Phalaecus,  they  recklessly  sought 
aid  from  the  king,  and  concluded  an  offensive  and  defensive 
allixnce  with  him.  The  Macedonian  auxiliaries  who  came  to  their 
aid  were  soon  employed  elsewhere:  Argos  and  Messene  were  at 
war  with  Sparta,  whose  able  king  Archidamus  (the  son  of  the 
great  Agesilaus)  was  pressing  them  hard.  They  proffered  them- 
selves as  allies  to  Philip,  borrowed  his  troops,  and  by  their  aid 
drove  the  Spartans  back  into  the  valley  of  the  Eurotas  (34-i  e.g.). 
It  was  in  vain  that  Demosthenes  crossed  into  Peloponnesus  and 
visited  Argos  and  Messene,  to  wain  their  statesmen  against 
alliance  with  the  Macedonian,  and  to  remind  them  what  had  been 
the  fate  of  Philip's  friends  of  the  Olynthian  League.  Content 
with  their  momentary  triumph  over  Sparta,  they  refused  to  look 
forward,  and  paid  no  heed  to  the  Athenian  orator.  They  thought 
that  they  had  utilized  for  their  own  purposes  the  aid  of  the  Mace- 
donian, and  had  no  conception  that  they  had  bound  themselves 
perpetually  to  the  service  of  a  master. 


4^    ^/UaA, 


CHAPTER  XLIII. 

THE   END   or   GRECIAN   FREEDOM,   344-338  B.C. 

The  embassy  of  Demosthenes  to  Peloponnesus  marks  the  beginning 

of  a  new  struggle  between  Piiilip  and  the  Athenians.     It  did  not 

suit  Pliilip  to  precipitate  a  rupture,  till  he  had  established  a  firm 

footing  in  Central  and  Southern  Greece.     The  Athenians,  on  the 

other  hand,  had  made  up  their  minds  not  to  fight  unless  they  could 

enlist  powerful  allies;   but  although  each  party  avoided  an  open 

declaration  of  war,  they  spent  five  years  in  constant  bickerings,  and 

endeavours  to  raise  up  troubles  for  each  other.     It  cannot  be  said 

that  the  Athenians  showed  themselves  a  whit  more  scrupulous 

than  the  king ;    they  had  learnt  to  meet  Philip  with  his  own 

weapons,  and  Demosthenes  was  always  stirring  them  up  to  counter- 

•act  every  move  of  their  enemy.     His  expedition  to  Peloponnesus, 

though  it  proved  fruitless,  was  very  offensive  to  Philip,  who  sent 

an  envoy  to  complain  that  it  was  hard  tliat  the  ambassadors  of  a 

friendly  power  should   go   about  endeavouring   to  form  alliances 

against  him.     The  Athenian  Ecclesia  made  no  further  reply  than 

to  send  a  commission  to  Pella,  charged  with  the  duty  of  demanding 

back  some  places  of  which  they  claimed  to  have  been  wrongfully 

deprived  in  the  peace  of  346  B.C.     The   king   treated   the   com- 

Inissioners  with  studied  rudeness,  but  took  no  further  notice  of  his 

quarrel  with  Athens. 

Philip  was  too  much  engaged  on  the  western  side  of  Greece  to 

be  ready  for  a  new  war  on  the  Aegean.     He  was  just  about  to 

-,^.,.    .       invade  Epirus,  where  he  had  determined  to  overthrow 
Philip  m  ^         ' 

Epirus.       King  Arybbas,  and  to  place  on  his  throne  a  rival 

claimant,  Alexander,  the  brother  of  his  own  Epirot 

wife  Olympias.      Having  accompli'^hed  this,  he  pushed  his  arms 


343  B.C.]  Troubles  on  the  Hellespont.  509 

as  far  southward  as  the  Ambracian  Gulf.  Meanwhile  the  Athe- 
nians were  not  idle ;  they  harboured  the  expelled  king  of  Epirus, 
sent  troops  to  the  aid  of  the  Acarnanians,  who  were  threatened 
with  invasion,  and  despatched  emissaries  into  Thessaly  to  foment  a 
revolt  against  Philip  in  that  country.  This  last  move  brought 
the  king  home  in  haste ;  he  crossed  Mount  Pindua,  appeared 
suddenly  in  the  plain  and  overawed  all  the  malcontent  towns, 
whom  he  punished  by  placing  over  them  as  "  tetrarchs "  four 
Thcssalian  nobles  of  his  own  party,  whose  rule  was  nothing  more 
than  a  tyranny  in  disguise. 

It  is  strange  that  the  king  was  not  even  yet  provoked  into 
declaring  war  on  Athens ;  he  bore  patiently  with  her  intrigues, 
and  even  offered  to  surrender   Halonesus,  an   island- 

'  Troubles  on  the 

off  Thessaly  which  the  Athenians  claimed  as  their  HeUespont, 
own.  The  only  reward  for  his  prudence  was  that 
in  the  next  year  he  had  to  submit  to  an  even  more  flagrant 
violation  of  neutrality.  News  was  brought  him  that  Diopeitlics, 
the  Athenian  general  in  command  in  the  Thracian  Chersonese, 
had  not  only  been  molesting  his  merchant  vessels,  but  had  actually 
invaded  IMacedonian  territory,  pillaged  the  country,  and  sold  his 
prisoners  as  slaves.  This  could  not  be  jiassed  over ;  the  king  at 
once  sent  a  peremptory  demand  for  satisfaction  to  Athens,  and 
simultaneously  began  moving  his  main  army  in  the  direction  of 
Thrace. 

'J'he  moment  had  now  arrived  at  which  the  Athenians  were 
forced  to  choose  between  peace  and  war.  If  they  recalled  and 
punished  Uiopeithes,  the  present  troubled  and  insincere  peace  might 
be  protracted;  if  they  refused,  they  must  face  the  consequences 
and  arm  for  a  long  and  bitter  struggle.  The  party  of  material 
interests,  and  the  followers  of  Phocion,  who  opposed  the  war  on 
principle,  joined  with  the  corrupt  friends  of  Philip  in  urging  the 
Ecclesia  to  appease  the  king.  But  Demosthenes  came  forward,  and 
in  his  tvro  great  speeches,  the  first  "  Concerning  the  ^ 

"  -^  '^  Demosthenes' 

Chersonese,"  the  other  known  as  the  "Third  Phi- "Third Phnip- 
lippic,"  bore  down  all  opposition.  He  recapitulated  ^^^'  ^  '  ' 
Philip's  aggressions  for  the  last  fifteen  years,  recounted  his  broken 
oaths  and  agreements,  and  boldly  bade  the  Athenians  pay  him 
back   in  his  own  coin.      "  Philip,"  he  said,    "  pretends   to   keep 


5io  The  End  of  Grecian  Freedom.  r340E.c. 

tbo  peace  while  his  armies  are  seizing  or  destroying  Hellenic 
cities  one  after  the  otlier.  Let  Athens  too  keei^  the  peace  in 
name,  but  imitate  the  king  by  prosecuting  a  vigorous  war  in 
reality."  Then  he  proceeded  to  expound  plans  for  concluding 
alliances  with  Philip's  enemies,  for  raising  a  permanent  force  for 
foreign  service,  and  for  providing  funds  by  a  stringent  property 
tax. 

The  orator  carried  the  Ecclesia  away  with  him.  Diopeithes  was 
thanked  instead  of  being  recalled,  and  Philip  was  left  to  do  his 
worst.  Hostilities  at  once  broke  out  in  Thrace,  though  war  was 
not  formally  declared  by  either  party.  Demosthenes,  whose  activity 
during  the  next  three  years  was  untiring,  sailed  at  once  to  Byzan- 
tium, and  succeeded  in  enlisting  in  the  Athenian  alliance  that 
important  city,  now  threatened  by  Philip's  Thracian  conquests.  His 
next  move  was  to  cross  into  Euboea  and  conclude  an  alliance  with 
the  Chalcidians,  who  had  taken  alarm  at  the  extension  of  Philip's 
influence  in  their  island  through  his  partisans  the  tyrants  of  Oreus 
and  Eretria.  In  the  end  of  the  year  Demosthenes  sailed,  in  company 
with  Callias  of  Chalcis,  to  Western  Greece,  and  obtained  the 
promise  of  aid  from  Achaia,  Acarnania  and  Leucas,  while  the  more 
important  cities  of  Corinth  and  Megara  gave  in  their  adherence  a 
little  later  (winter  of  3il-340  B.C.). 

Meanwhile  Philip  had  turned  from  the  conquest  of  Inner  Thrace,^ 
where  he  had  been  engaged  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  and 
sieges  of  marched  against  the  Hellenic  cities  of  the  Propontis, 
^g^^^^f^^_<^  Perinthus  and  Byzantium.  He  intended  to  seize 
340  B.C.  them,  and  then  to  block  the  passage  of  the  straits  to 
the  Athenian  corn-ships  from  the  Euxine,  as  Lysander  had  done 
seventy  years  before.  He  first  laid  siege  to  Perinthus,  a  strong 
town  seated  on  a  rocky  peninsula  jutting  out  into  the  sea. 
Phis  siege  occupied  him  for  many  months ;  he  met  with  a  most 
obstinate  resistance,  for,  even  after  the  walls  had  been  stormed, 
the  citizens  resisted  behind  barricades  built  across  their  steep 
and  narrow  streets.  Reinforcements  flowed  into  the  town  from 
Byzantium;    the  Persian  satraps  of  Asia   Minor,  jealous  of  the 

'  He  had  founded  in  342  B.C.  the  town  of  Philippolis,  on  the  Upper 
Strymon,  as  his  outpost  in  this  direction,  and  seems  to  have  been  in  those 
parts  for  most  of  the  year  341  n.c. 


339 B.C.]  Siege  of  Byzantium.  511 

appearance  of  a  uew  power  in  thdr  neighbourhoofl,  sent  men  and 
money  across  the  water,  and  an  Athenian  general  took  charge 
of  the  defence.  Foiled  in  many  attempts  to  break  into  the  town, 
Philip  suddenly  raised  the  siege  and  marched  on  Byzantium, 
which  he  trusted  to  find  unguarded,  for  its  citizens  had  sent  a 
large  contingent  to  the  aid  of  Porinthus.  The  Byzantines,  how- 
ever, were  on  their  guard ;  the  king  found  the  walls  manned,  and 
discovered  that  he  had  only  exchanged  one  siege  for  another.  He 
persisted,  however,  in  his  enterprise,  fixed  his  engines  before  the 
ramparts,  threw  a  boom  across  the  Golden  Horn  to  prevent  the 
ships  of  the  besieged  from  getting  out,  and  brought  up  his  own 
fleet  from  the  yEgean  to  form  the  blockade  on  the  side  of  the  sea. 
One  desperate  attempt  to  escalade  the  laud-wall  on  a  dark  night 
failed,  it  is  said,  owing  to  the  sudden  appearance  of  a  light  in 
heaven  (perhaps  the  Aurora  Borealis),  which  the  Byzantines  took 
as  a  special  token  of  divine  aid. 

Meanwhile  the  Athenians,  unceasingly  stirred  up  to  action  by 
Demosthenes,  were  carrying  all  before  them  in  the  south.  With 
the  aid  of  the  Chalcidians,  they  swept  the  troops  of  phocion 
Philip  and  of  the  tyrants  of  Oreus  and  Eretria  out  of  Bylantium 
Euboea.  Then  landing  in  Thessaly,  they  stormed  339  b.c, 
the  fortress  of  Pagasae,  and  made  prize  of  a  great  number  of 
the  king's  merchant  vessels.  When  the  news  of  the  siege  of 
Byzantium  arrived,  they  at  last  declared  open  war  on  Philip,  and 
preparations  were  made  for  an  expedition  to  the  Bosphorus.  A 
squadron  sent  ahead  under  Chares  drove  off  the  Macedonian 
fleet,  but  did  not  raise  the  siege.  A  larger  force  was  then  placed 
under  Phocion,  who,  though  he  had  opposed  the  declaration  of 
war,  was  far  too  patriotic  to  refuse  his  best  help  to  his  native 
city  in  her  hour  of  danger.  With  a  hundred  and  twenty  triremes 
behind  him,  Phocion  passed  up  the  Hellespont  and  sought  out 
the  Macedonians.  Philip  then  gave  up  the  siege  in  despair — 
his  ranks  were  thinned  and  his  men  demoralized — and  plunged 
inland  out  of  the  reach  of  the  enemy.  Probably  he  was  forced  in 
the  hour  of  disaster  to  take  every  precaution  to  hold  down  his  wild 
subjects  in  Inner  Thrace. 

Philip  for  the  second  time  in  his  career  had  suffered  a  humiliating 
check,  and  the  joy  at  Athens  over  the  defeat  of  the  ancient  enemy 


512  The  End  of  Grecian  Freedom.  [339  b.c. 

was  correspondingly  great.  Demosthenrs,  wlio  had  so  constantly 
predicted  the  possibility  of  a  victory  which  most  men  considered 
unlikely,  was  at  the  summit  of  his  career.  After  the  victories  in 
Euboea,  his  joyful  fellow-citizens  had  voted  him  a  golden  crown 
for  civic  virtue,  and  no  one  for  the  future  ventured  to  dispute  his 
ascendency  with  the  Ecclesia.  All  the  decrees  he  proposed  passed 
without  a  question,  even  one  which  devoted  to  the  war-chest  the 
Theoric  fund,  or  sum  annually  set  apart  by  the  state  for  public 
festivals  and  ceremonies.  Perhaps  the  most  useful  of  Demosthenes' 
measures  was  a  reform  in  the  machinery  for  providing  the  state 
navy,  which  worked  so  well  that  not  a  ship  was  lost  or  disabled 
during  the  whole  course  of  the  war. 

For  nine  months  Philip  was  lost  to  sight  after  his  repulse  from 
Byzantium.  Posted  in  the  Thracian  inland,  he  was  fighting  hard 
to  jireserve  his  dominions  from  the  wild  Scythians  and  Tribalii, 
who  lay  along  his  northern  frontier.  It  was  not  till  late  in  the 
summer  of  339  B.C.  that  he  emerged  from  the  northern  darkness, 
victorious  but  well-nigh  disabled  for  active  service  by  a  wound 
received  in  battle  with  the  Tribalii.  Meanwhile  the  Athenians 
had  been  harassing  the  coast-line  of  his  wide  possessions,  but  had 
taken  no  decisive  measures  to  attack  him  at  home.  Some  of  their 
allies,  among  them  the  ungrateful  Byzantines,  had  grown  con- 
vinced that  the  war  was  practically  over,  and  had  actually  sent 
home  their  contingents  after  making  a  declaration  of  neutralitj'. 
Unfortunately  the  triumph  of  the  Athenians  was  destined  to  be 
short-lived,  and  events  were  rijoening  for  an  unforeseen  disaster. 

The  new  troubles  sprang   from  an  unexpected   quarter.     The 

orator  Aeschines,  in  spite  of  his  narrow  escape  from  a  condemna- 

^  tion  for  treason  in  343  b.c.  (see  p.  506),  had  retained 

Aeschmes  at  _  _  \         i  /' 

Delphi.       credit  enough  in  the  city  to  be  named  as  one  of  the 

339  B  C  *" 

Athenian  delegates  at  the  Amphictyonic  meeting 
of  339  B.C.  While  acting  in  this  capacity  at  Delphi,  he  had  a 
violent  altercation  with  the  deputies  of  the  Locrians  of  Amphissa. 
Whether  carried  away  by  the  unhappy  inspiration  of  the  moment, 
or  suborned  —  as  his  enemies  declared  —  by  Macedonian  gold, 
Aeschines  suddenly  accused  the  Locrians  of  having  committed 
sacrilege  against  Apollo.  They  had,  so  he  declared,  imitated  the 
evil  deeds  of  the  Phocians,  by  trespassing  on  waste  land  sacred  to 


'339B.C.]  Philip  at  Elateia,  513 

the  god,  and  building  houses,  barns  and  potters'  kilns  upon  it. 
Stirred  \\\i  by  the  orator's  fiery  periods,  a  great  mob  of  Delphians, 
accompanied  by  most  of  the  Araphictyonic  deputies,  went  down  to 
the  debatable  ground,  and  burnt  or  cast  down  all  the  buildings 
upon  it.  While  they  were  thus  engaged,  the  Locrians,  armed 
and  in  great  wrath,  came  up  from  their  city  of  Amphissa,  fell 
upon  the  mob,  wounded  some,  captured  many,  and  drove  the  rest 
in  rout  back  to  Delphi.  Next  day  the  Amphictyons  prorogued 
their  ordinary  meeting,  and  called  a  special  assembly  to  take 
mto  consideration  the  sacrilege  and  violence  of  the  Locrians. 
The  special  assembly  was  of  a  most  unrepresentative  kind ; 
Demosthenes  had  persuaded  the  Athenians  to  withdraw  their 
delegates,  while  the  Thebans  stayed  away  because  they  were  old 
friends  of  the  Amphissians.  The  main  part  of  the  delegates  who 
appeared  were  from  the  Thessalian,  Oetaean,  and  Malian  states, 
who  Avere  all  more  or  less  under  Macedonian  influence.  They  put 
the  Locrians  under  the  ban,  declared  war  on  them,  and  soon  after- 
wards appointed  King  Philip  their  commander-in-chief,  and  begged 
him  to  take  charge  of  the  business.  It  seems  likely  that  the 
whole  of  this  comedy  had  been  arranged  beforehand,  that  Aeschines 
had  been  paid  to  stir  up  a  disturbance,  and  that  the  Amphictyons 
had  from  the  first  no  other  purpose  than  to  find  an  excuse  for 
bringing  Philip's  army  down  into  Central  Greece. 

The  king  was  quite  ready  to  take  up  the  game ;  the  heads  of 
his  columns  were  soon  passing  the  defiles  of  Othrys,  and  he  himself 
— the  moment  that  his  wound  was  healed— came 

Philip  seizes 
southward    to    assume    the    command.      When    he      Eiateia. 

reached  Thermopylae  the  anxiety  of  the  Athenians  '  ' 

became  painful ;  it  was  quite  impossible  to  know  whether  Philip 

would  really  move  against  Amphissa,  or  whether  he  was  aiming 

at  Athens,  having  secured  by  an  agreement  with  the  Thebans 

the  permission  to  pass  through  the  neutral  territory  of  Boeotia. 

The    doubt   was   soon   solved ;    one    autumn    evening  a   courier 

reached  Athens  with   the   news   that   the  king's   vanguard   had 

seized  and  was  fortifying  Elateia,  the  dismantled  Phocian   city 

on  the  Boeotian  frontier  which  commanded  the  road  down  the 

valley  of  the  Cephissus.    Demosthenes  has  left  us  a  vivid  picture 

of  the  consternation  which  the  tidings  caused.    Some  ran  to  drive 

2ii 


514  The  End  of  Grecian  Freedom.  [339  b.c. 

the  buyers  and  sellers  out  of  the  market-place,  some  burnt  the 
wicker  booths  which  encumbered  it,  others  caused  the  trumpeters 
to  sound  the  alarm  round  the  city,  others  rushed  to  the  houses  ol 
the  strategi  to  bid  them  assemble.  The  Ecclesia  met  almost 
before  daybreak,  but  when  it  was  gathered  no  man  dared  face  the 
crisis,  till  Demosthenes  stood  forward  and  comforted  the  desponding 
crowd  by  a  vigorous  harangue.  While  bidding  them  take  all 
possible  measures  for  the  defence  of  the  city,  he  pointed  out  that 
the  danger  was  perhaps  not  so  close  as  they  imagined.  Everything 
depended  on  the  Thebans ;  if  they  were  secretly  allied  with  Philip 
the  war  must  come  into  Attica,  but  if  they  were  not,  it  might  still 
be  kept  far  off.  He  himself  volunteered  to  set  out  at  once,  to 
implore  the  Thebans  not  to  grant  the  king  a  free  passage,  or,  if 
possible,  to  induce  them  to  join  the  Athenian  alliance.  It  is  the 
greatest  testimony  to  the  power  of  his  oratory  that  he  actually 
succeeded  in  carrying  out  the  more  difficult  of  the  two  alternatives. 
Macedonian  ambassadors  stood  forward  in  the  Theban  assembly 
promising  all  manner  of  bribes,  the  Boeotians  and  the  Athenians 
had  been  ill  neighbours  to  each  other  for  the  last  thirty  years,  and 
a  powerful  army  hung  on  the  frontier  ready  to  cross  it  the  moment 
that  Philip's  requests  were  refused.  Yet  the  orator  induced  the 
Thebans  to  send  away  the  king's  ambassadors  and  conclude  an 
offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  Athens. 

Fighting  at  once  began  on  the  Boeotian  frontier,  and  for  several 

months  an  indecisive  struggle  was  carried  on  upon  each  of  the  two 

main  routes  which  lead  from  the  Phocian  hills  towards 

Boeotia.  Thebes.  The  Locrians  of  Amphissa,  supported  by 
ten  thousand  mercenaries  hired  by  Athens,  watched 
the  southern  route  near  the  Gulf  of  Corinth — that  which  Cleom- 
brotus  the  Spartan  had  used  in  the  campaign  of  Leuctra  (see 
p.  464).  The  whole  home-levy  of  Athens  and  Thebes  held  the 
narrow  front  in  the  valley  of  the  Cephissus  between  the  spurs 
of  Cnemis  and  Parnassus,  where  so  many  battles  had  already 
taken  place  in  Greek  history.  Ere  long  they  were  joined  by 
large  contingents  from  the  states  which  Demosthjenes  a  year 
before  had  drawn  into  the  Athenian  alliance^Corinth,  Megara, 
Achaia,  and  the  rest;  the  whole  army  would  seem  to  have 
numbered  somevyhat  oyer   thirty  thousand  men.     Philip's  force 


338  B.C.]  Battle  of  Chaeroneia.  515 

was  about  the  same ;  he  had  calculated  on  assistance  from  Pelo- 
ponnesus, but  his  allies  the  Eleians  and  Argives  preferred  to  wait 
till  the  fortune  of  war  ran  definitely  in  his  favour  before  committing 
themselves.  In  two  partial  engagements  the  confederate  army- 
had  the  best  of  the  fight,  and  it  was  with  good  hopes  of  victory 
that  its  generals  —  the  Athenians  Chares  and  Lysicles  and  the 
Theban  Theagenes — drew  up  their  forces  in  front  of  Chaeroneia  for 
a  decisive  battle,  on  the  2ad  of  August,  338  b.c. 

The  details  of  the  struggle  are  not  so  well  known  to  us  as  those 
of  many  less  decisive  conflicts  in  Grecian  history.     We  gather 

that  in  the  confederate  host  the  Thebans  held  the 

Battle  of 
right    wing,    the    Athenians     the    left,    while    the   chaeroneia, 

Corinthians    and    other  smaller   contingents   formed  '  " 

the  centre.  In  the  Macedonian  army  the  king  faced  the  Athe- 
nians, and  his  son  Alexander — a  youth  of  eighteen  who  now  saw 
his  first  field — had  the  Thebans  opposite  him.  It  would  seem 
that  Philip  had  resolved  to  throw  the  main  weight  of  his  army 
upon  the  enemy's  right;  he  dreaded  the  Boeotian  phalanx  which 
had  wrought  such  wonders  at  Coroneia,  Leuctra,  and  Mantinea, 
While  the  king  fought  cautiously  with  the  Athenians,  and  even 
gave  ground  before  their  first  attack,  his  son  delivered  a  series  of 
furious  charges  upon  the  Thebans.  The  memories  of  Epaminondas 
and  Pelopidas  were  not  dead,  and  the  Boeotians  made  a  gallant 
fight ;  but  their  short  spears  were  unable  to  cope  with  the 
enormously  long  pikes  of  the  Macedonian  phalanx,  while  their 
cavalry  was  outnumbered  and  driven  off  the  field.  Theagenes 
the  Theban  general  was  slain,  the  three  hundred  chosen  hoplites 
of  the  "  Sacred  Band  "  fell  to  a  man,  and  then  the  Boeotians  broke 
before  the  cavalry  of  Alexander.  The  rout  of  the  confederate 
right  left  the  centre  exposed,  and  ere  long  it  was  driven  off  the 
field.  Finally  the  Athenians,  who  had  been  waging  a  not  unsuc- 
cessful fight  with  Philip,  were  almost  surrounded,  so  that  to 
escape  capture  they  had  to  disperse  and  fly.  A  thousand  of  them 
were  slain,  two  thousand  taken  prisoners ;  the  Thebans'  loss,  mainly 
in  dead,  was  even  greater,  and  the  allies  In  the  centre  also  suffered 
heavily.  So  ended  this  well-fought  battle,  for  which  Greece  had 
no  cause  to  blame  her  soldiers ;  but  she  might  well  ask  herself  in 
shame  whj  Athens,  Thebes,  and  Corinth  were  left  almost  alone  to 


5 1 6  The  End  of  Grecian  Freedom.  [338 bo. 

fight  the  battle  of  Hellenic  liberty.  Elis  and  Argos,  Arcadia  and 
Messene,  were  standing  apart  in  selfish  prudence;  Thessaly  sent 
her  horsemen  to  help  the  Macedonian  stranger.  Once  more  the 
narrow  spirit  of  local  ambition  had  proved  the  evil  genius  of  Greece; 
but  now  it  was  no  passing  trouble  which  it  had  brought  upon  the 
Hellenes,  but  the  doom  of  permanent  subjection  to  the  half-barbarian 
kingdom  in  the  north. 

Philip  had  now  achieved  the  ambition  of  his  lifetime;  Athens 
and  Greece  were  at  his  feet,  and  his  exultation  burst  forth  for  the 
Athens  sub-  moment  in  the  most  unseemly  guise.  The  evening 
mits.  338  B.C.  after  the  victory  he  spent  in  a  royal  drinking  bout, 
and  at  night  he  is  said  to  have  reeled  off  to  the  battle-field  and  to 
have  danced  among  the  corpses,  while  he  trolled  out  as  a  song  the 
preamble  of  a  decree  of  Demosthenes  which  happened  to  have 
the  rhythm  of  a  verse.  A  bystander  recalled  him  to  his  better 
self  by  reminding  him  that  "  the  gods  had  given  him  the  part 
of  Agamemnon  to  play,  though  he  seemed  to  prefer  to  take  up  that 
of  Thersites."  But  when  the  king  had  sobered  down,  he  showed 
an  even  greater  moderation  in  the  hour  of  victory  than  he  had 
displayed  in  345  B.C.  after  the  conquest  of  Phocis.  When  Thebes 
surrendered  to  him,  a  few  days  after  the  battle,  he  only  claimed 
from  her  a  treaty  of  alliance,  the  recognition  of  the  autonomy  of 
the  smaller  Boeotian  cities,  and  the  right  to  place  a  Macedonian 
garrison  in  the  Cadmeia.  Athens  fared  even  better ;  the  citizens, 
buoyed  up  by  the  hopeful  energy  of  Demosthenes,  who  would 
not  despair  even  in  the  hour  of  disaster,  had  prepared  for  a 
fierce  resistance  behind  their  walls.  But  when  Philip  sent  back 
their  prisoners  without  a  ransom,  and  let  it  be  known  that  the 
only  thing  he  required  was  the  cession  of  the  Thracian  Chersonese 
and  the  signature  of  a  treaty  acknowledging  his  hegemony,  the 
desire  to  resist  died  away.  When  the  peace  had  been  signed 
Philip  gave  to  Athens,  as  a  pledge  of  his  good  will,  the  town  of 
Oropus,  which  the  Boeotians  had  taken  from  her  thirty  years  ago 
(see  p.  480). 

Megara  and  Corinth  followed  the  example  of  Athens  in  promptly 
submitting  to  the  king,  and  he  was  soon  able  to  summon  within 
the  walls  of  the  latter  town  a  congress  of  all  the  states  of  Greece. 
Not  a  single  city  refused  to  send  her  delegates  to  do  homage  to 


338  B.C.]  Congress  at  Corinth.  517 

the  king  save  Sparta  alone,  who  retained  all  her  ancient  pride, 
though  she  had  now  become  a  small  and  decayed  state,  oppressed 
by  wars  with  her  Argive  and  Messenian  neighbours.  There  was 
something  grand  in  the  struggle  of  the  Spartans  against  the  over- 
whelming odds  that  Philip  brought  against  them.  Though  all 
Greece  followed  the  Macedonian  banner,  King  Agis  III.  led  out 
his  little  army  with  as  much  confidence,  and  fought  with  as 
dogged  a  courage,  as  had  Leonidas  or  Agesilaus  in  the  days  of  old.^ 
Sparta  paid  for  her  obstinacy  by  seeing  Thyrea  and  the  Scirltis, 
the  prizes  of  her  ancient  victories  in  the  sixth  and  seventh  cen- 
turies (see  p.  79),  torn  from  her  grasp  and  given  to  her  Argive  and 
Arcadian  enemies. 

The  congress  which  met  at  Corinth  under  King  Plulip's  presi- 
dency, in  the  autumn  of  338  b.c,  was  the  most  representative 
body  which  Greece  had  ever  seen.     Even  the  great    _ 

''  °  Congrress  at 

assembly  of  481  b.c,  which  had   gathered  on   the      corinth, 

338  B  C 

news  of  the  approach  of  Xerxes,  had  counted  less 
members.  It  was  only  the  strong  hand  of  the  master  that  could 
gather  together  the  delegates  of  every  Hellenic  state  for  a  common 
end;  of  their  own  accord  the  blind  and  selfish  cities  would  never 
have  combined  for  any  purpose,  however  great  and  good.  The  king 
laid  before  the  deputies  the  draft  of  a  document  which  practically 
formed  Greece  into  one  great  federal  state,  under  Macedonian 
presidency.  Every  city  was  to  be  "  free  and  autonomous,"  but 
in  the  same  sense  that  Antalcidas  had  used  the  word  fifty  years 
before  (see  p.  450).  Each  was  bound  to  Macedon  by  a  stringent 
treaty  of  alliance,  but  a  very  considerable  degree  of  local  freedom 
was  allowed ;  for  example,  Philip  did  not  call  for  the  banishment 
of  Demosthenes  or  any  other  statesman  who  had  opposed  his 
plans,  or  impose  new  constitutions  on  unwilling  states.  A  federal 
council  was  established  to  aid  the  king  in  administering  the  land, 
and  the  Amphictyons — who  had  twice  served  Philip  so  well — were 
constituted  the  supreme  legal  arbiters  between  state  and  state. 
All  this  seemed  fair  and  wise ;  but  the  other  aspect  of  affairs  was 
marked  by  the  establishment  of  permanent  Macedonian  garrisons 
at   Thebes,  Corinth,  Chalcis,  and  Ambracia,  and   by  the  clause 

'  Archidanuis,  the  father  of  Agis,  was  slain  in  Italy  on  the  same  day  as 
the  battle  of  Chaeroneia  (see  p.  449). 


5i8  The  End  of  Grecian  Freedom.  [337  b.c. 

which  declared  Philip  supreme  commander  of  the  warlike  forces 
of  the  whole  confederacy,  and  made  disobedience  to  him  into 
treason. 

Thus  Greece  received  a  formal  constitution — a  thing  which 
neither  Sparta,  Athens,  nor  Thebes  had  ever  been  able  to  force 
upon  her.  It  was  a  far  better  one  than  might  have  been  expected 
from  the  antecedents  of  the  man  who  drafted  it,  but  Philip's 
versatile  mind  was  capable  of  unexpected  acts  of  moderation  and 
even  of  generosity.  In  spite  of  occasional  outbursts  of  Macedonian 
barbarism,  he  had  become  very  Hellenic  in  bis  methods  of  thought, 
and — so  far  as  was  compatible  with  his  own  ends — paid  a  sincere 
attention  to  Greek  prejudice  in  drawing  up  the  treaty  of  Corinth. 
If  fairly  worked  by  a  conscientious  ruler,  it  would  have  been  a  far 
more  just  and  promising  basis  for  the  union  of  Greece  than  were 
any  of  the  arrangements  which  Sparta  and  Athens  had  tried  to 
force  on  their  reluctant  neighbours. 

To  j)rovide  the  new  Greek  federation  with  a  common  end,  likely 
to  stir  up  national  enthusiasm  but  not  to  prove  dangerous  to  his 
own  hegemony,  Philip  gave  out  that  he  was  about  to  take  up  the 
old  plans  of  Cimon  and  Agesilaus,  and  to  lead  the  whole  force  of 
Greece  eastward  for  a  grand  attack  on  the  old  national  enemy,  the 
Persian  king.  How  far  the  project  excited  genuine  zeal  in  Greece 
we  cannot  exactly  tell,  but  sea  and  land  contingents  were  voted 
with  alacrity  by  the  congress,  and  it  was  calculated  that,  if  every 
state  did  its  best,  two  hundred  thousand  men  could  be  collected  to 
overrun  Asia.  The  scheme  was  to  take  effect  in  336  b.c,  the 
intervening  year  being  devoted  to  the  necessary  preparations. 

But  Philip  was  never  destined  to  cross  the  Hellespont.  He  was 
to  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  victory  for  less  than  two  years,  and  to 
die  without  having  accomplished  any  of  his  new  plans.  The 
summer  of  336  b.c.  was  come ;  a  Macedonian  force  under  the 
generals  Attalus  and  Parmenio  had  actually  crossed  into  Mysia, 
and  all  Greece  was  filled  with  the  preparations  for  the  invasion, 
when  the  news  suddenly  arrived  that  Philip  had  been  assassinated. 
It  was  not  the  outraged  patriotism  of  any  of  the  Greeks  that  had 
inspired  the  deed,  but  the  private  grudge  of  one  of  the  king's  own 
subjects. 

Philip,  in  violation  of  Hellenic  usage,  had  married  several  wives, 


336  B.O.]  Murder  of  Philip.  5 1 9 

both  Greek  aud  foreign ;  but  his  recognized  consort  was  the  Epirot 
princess  Olympias,  mother  of  his  heir,  Alexander  the  Great.  This 
lady  the  king  had  just  divorced  and  sent  back  to  Epirus,  to  the 
great  wrath  of  her  fiery  son.  In  her  stead  he  had  taken  as  his 
chief  wife  Cleopatra,  the  niece  of  his  general  Attains.  The  friends 
of  Olympias  and  Alexander  were  much  enraged  with  Philip,  for 
wrecking  the  hopes  which  they  had  built  on  their  favour  with 
the  late  queen,  and  cast  about  for  a  means  of  revenge.  They  found 
a  young  Macedonian  noble  named  Pausanias,  who  had  just  suffered 
an  outrage  at  the  hands  of  Attains,  the  new  queen's  uncle.  The 
young  man  had  sought  justice  from  Philip,  but  it  had  been  denied 
him,  and  he  was  filled  with  ungovernable  resentment  against  both 
king  and  general.  It  required  small  persuasion  to  turn  his  anger 
into  action.'  Philip  was  celebrating  at  Aegae  the  marriage  of  one 
of  his  daughters.  On  the  second  day  of  the  festival  there  was  a 
splendid  procession,  in  which,  as  men  noted  with  disapproval,  the 
king's  image  was  j)resumptuously  borne  along  in  company  with 
those  of  the  twelve  great  gods  of  Olympus.  He  himself  walked  in 
the  procession  crowned  and  robed  in  white,  but  quite  unprotected, 
for  he  had  bidden  his  guards  to  keep  apart,  "because  he  had 
sufficient  security  in  the  good  will  of  all  Greece."  Murder  of 
As  he  entered  the  theatre,  Pausanias  sprang  out  from  ^^^^P'  336  b.c. 
among  the  spectators  and  thrust  him  through  with  a  short  sword 
which  he  had  hidden  under  his  cloak.  The  king  fell  dead;  the 
assassin  tried  to  make  off,  but  stumbled  in  his  flight,  and  was  cut 
down  before  he  got  to  his  feet. 

So  died  King  Philip,  in  the  forty-seventh  year  of  his  age  and 
the  twenty-fourth  of  "his  reign,  when  all  the  world  was  expecting 
from  him  even  greater  exploits  than  he  had  already  performed. 
Greece  thought  for  the  moment  that  she  was  once  more  free; 
Athenian  patriots,  forgetting  the  mercy  that  had  been  shown  them 
two  years  before,  began  to  get  ready  their  sacrifices  and  libations. 
But  a  man  who  had  grasped  the  real  lesson  of  the  times  rebuked 
them.  "  Nothing,"  said  Phocion,  "  shows  greater  meanness  of  spirit 
than  expressions  of  joy  on  the  death  of  an  enemy.  Eemember 
that  the  army  you  fought  at  Chaeroneia  is  lessened  by  only  one 
man." 

He  was  right.     Philip  was  dead,  but  Philip's  army  and  Philip'a 


520  The  End  of  Grecian  Freedom.  [336  b.c. 

system  were  alive,  and,  what  was  more,  the  Greeks  were  perfectly 
imchanged.  Their  petty  jealousies  were  as  lively  as  ever,  their 
border-feuds  as  venomous,  their  statesmen  as  venal  and  short- 
sighted. In  spite  of  all  our  sympathy  for  individuals  such  as 
Demosthenes,  we  cannot  feel  that  the  chaotic  state-system  which 
had  prevailed  since  the  death  of  Epaminondas  deserved  to  survive. 
Greece  under  Philip  would  have  been  happier,  richer,  and  better 
governed,  than  that  Greece, — split  up  into  twenty  bickering  states, 
which  combined  with  kaleidoscopic  variety  into  new  political 
forms  every  three  or  four  years, — whose  history  we  have  been 
investigating. 


.y 


A 


\ 


CHAPTER  XLIV. 

ALEXANDER  THE   GREAT,  336-323  B.C. 

The  Greek  world  knew  little  of  the  young  man  whom  the  sudden 
death  of  Phihp  had  called  to  the  throne  of  Macedonia.  That  he 
was  fiery  and  headstrong  no  one  who  had  seen  him  charge  the 
Theban  phalanx  at  Chaeroneia,  or  heard  him  wTangle  with  his 
imperious  father,  could  doubt.  But  nothing  more  was  known  of 
him  :  he  was  believed  to  be  a  rash  conceited  boy,  fit  perhaps  to  lead 
a  squadron  of  horse  but  for  nothing  more.  Demosthenes  congratu- 
lated the  Athenians  that  "  Margites "  had  come  to  the  throne  of 
Macedon,  applying  to  the  new  king  the  name  of  a  stupid  quarrelsome 
boaster  in  a  well-kno\vn  comic  poem  ascribed  to  Homer. 

But  the  power  of  PhOip  had  in  reality  fallen  into  the  hands  of  a 
man  even  greater  than  Philip  himself — one  of  the  most  extra- 
ordinary characters  that  Europe  has  ever  known,  a  man  whose 
personality  was  to  be  impressed  on  the  history  of  the  world  for  a 
thousand  j^ears, '  and  whose  biogi-aphy  forms  an  epic  poem  in 
real  life.  Alexander  had  been  brought  up  under  influences  that 
would  have  fired  even  a  less  enthusiastic  soul  than  his.  His  mother. 
Olympias,  a  princess  of  Epirus,  was  a  fiery  ambitious  woman  with  a 
dash  of  superstition  in  her  mind.  She  taught  Alexander  that  he 
was  through  the  Epirot  kings  descended  from  Achilles,  the  hero  of 
the  tale  of  Troy,  and  bade  him  rival  the  great  deeds  of  his  ancestor. 
His  first  tutor  is  said  to  have  won  his  heart  by  always  calling  him 
by  the  name  of  the  prince  in  the  Ihad,  and  styhng  PhUip  Peleus, 
and    himself    Phoenix — the    traditionary    preceptor    of    Achilles. 

'  The  permanent  effect  of  Alexander's  work  in  the  Hellenization  of 
Syria,  Asia  Minor,  and  Egypt,  endured  till  the  Mahometan  conquest  of 
those  countries  in  the  seventh  century  a.d. 


522  Alexander  the  Great.  t338B.o. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Alexander  had  the  tale  of  Achilles  on  his 
brain :  more  than  once  in  his  life  wc  shall  mark  the  effect  of  this 
ancestor-worship  on  his  behaviour.  He  knew  the  Iliad  by  heart, 
always  carried  a  copy  of  it  with  him  on  his  campaigns,  and  modelled 
his  own  character  on  that  of  the  fiery  Homeric  chiefs.  But  there 
were  other  strains  in  his  character  beside  that  of  the  generous  knight 
errant  of  the  old  romances :  he  had  a  strong  infusion  of  the  un- 
scrupulous energy  of  Philip :  those  who  crossed  his  path  or  merely 
incurred  his  suspicion  he  swept  away  without  pity  or  remorse.  As 
he  grew  older  he  grew  as  conscienceless  as  his  father,  and  far  more 
cruel  than  Philip  had  ever  been.  Alexander,  however,  was  more  than 
adventurous  and  unscrupulous — as  fifty  conquering  kings  beside  him 
have  been, — he  was  also  imbued  with  a  broad  desire  for  knowledge 
of  all  sorts ;  there  was  a  taste  for  discovery  and  research  in  him :  he 
sought  information  of  all  sorts  for  its  own  sake,  and  loved  to  organize 
almost  as  much  as  to  conquer.  This  side  of  his  disposition  must 
have  developed  freely  under  the  teaching  of  Aristotle,  the  great 
philosopher  whom  Philip  made  his  tutor  when  he  reached  the  age  of 
thirteen.  The  omnivorous  appetite  for  knowledge  which  inspired 
Aristotle,  and  ranged  over  every  subject  from  botany  to  metaphysics 
and  from  constitutional  history  to  morals,  seems  to  have  influenced 
Alexander  also  to  no  small  extent.  The  clever,  inquisitive,  restless 
Greek  mind  was  developed  in  the  pupil  as  in  the  teacher. 

But  the  quality  which  enabled  Alexander  to  leave  his  mark  on 
history  was  his  military  talent.  He  was  a  heaven-born  general,  and 
was  besides  brought  up  with  every  advantage  that  he  could  have  de- 
sired. He  learnt  from  his  father  how  to  deal  both  with  Greek  and  bar- 
barian enemies,  and  how  to  handle  with  perfection  the  great  military 
machine  which  Philip  had  organized  for  him.  Alexander  was  one 
of  the  generals  who  win  by  rapid  strokes  and  daring  expedients.  His 
long  marches  were  perhaps  the  most  characteristic  part  of  his 
career :  urged  on  by  him  his  armies  appeared  to  be  able  to  anni- 
hilate time  and  space  :  the  rapidity  of  their  motion  was  almost 
incredible  :  he  was  on  the  spot  when  his  enemies  believed  him  to  be 
hundreds  of  miles  away.  And  when  once  arrived,  Alexander  had 
an  eagle  eye  for  seizing  the  moment  to  strike  :  he  hardly  ever  made 
a  mistake :  his  attacks,  however  reckless,  succeeded  to  a  miracle. 
He  was  above  all  things  a  cavalry  general ;  it  was  the  in^esistible 


836  B.C.]  Accession  of  Alexander.  523 

charge  of  his  heavy  life-guards,  with  himself  in  the  van  leading  them 
on,  that  always  won  his  battles.  The  steady  Macedonian  phalanx, 
with  its  impenetrable  hedge  of  spears,  was  only  the  secondary  tool 
in  the  hewing  out  of  his  victories.  While  the  great  mass  of  infantry 
rolled  like  a  hedgehog  into  the  midst  of  the  enemy,  occupied  their 
attention,  beat  off  their  attacks,  and  exhausted  their  energy,  it  was 
always  the  wild  onset  of  the  king  and  his  "  Companions  "  of  the 
Macedonian  horse  that  settled  the  day. 

But  the  Greeks  had  as  yet  no  knowledge  of  the  man  with  whom 
they  had  to  deal.  That  he  was  determined  and  unscrupulous  they 
soon  realized,  when  the  news  came  that  at  the  moment  of  his 
accession  he  had  executed  every  one  likely  to  be  a  rival  to  him  ;  his 
father's  infant  son  by  Cleopatra,  Attalus  the  uncle  of  Cleopatra, 
Amyntas  the  heir  of  his  father's  elder  brother,  ^  and  several  more. 
But  murders  were  common  in  the  Macedonian  royal  house,  and 
Alexander's  conduct  was  as  yet  nothing  exceptional.  It  was  his 
next  step  that  made  men  speak  of  him  -with  respect. 

The  moment  that  Philip  was  dead  all  Greece  gave  a  sigh  of  relief, 
and  prepared  to  forget  the  Macedonian  and  recommence  its  usual 
intrigues  and  wars.  Sparta  began  to  stir ;  Argos  and  Elis  armed 
themselves ;  the  Ambraciots  expelled  their  Macedonian  garrison ; 
the  Athenians  burst  out  into  patriotic  oratory,  and  commenced  an 
intrigue  with  Persia  to  get  money  to  raise  a  fleet.  But  before 
anything  more  serious  was  done,  Alexander  swooped  down  among 
them  with  thirty  thousand  men  at  his  back.  Caught  unprepared, 
the  Greek  states  were  compelled  to  renew  with  him  the  treaties 
they  had  made  with  his  father,  and  to  elect  him  to  the  position  of 
supreme  commander  of  the  Hellenic  confederacy.  After  a  short 
stay  at  Corinth  to  meet  the  congress  of  allies,  and  a  rapid  march 
round  Peloponnesus,  he  hastened  home  again.  The  barbarians  on 
the  northern  frontier  of  Macedon  had  broken  loose  and  required 
his  curbing  hand.     (Autumn  of  336  B.C.) 

In  six  months  Alexander  accomplished  almost  as  much  against 
his  wild  northern  neighbours  as  Philip  had  done  in  ten  years.  One 
short  campaign  crushed  the  Thracians  and  Triballi,  and  carried  the 
Macedonian  arms  even  beyond  the  Danube.  Another  subdued  the 
warlike  Illyrians,  and  compelled  them  to  do  homage  as  vassals  of 

»  See  page  493. 


524  Alexander  the  Great.  [335  b.o. 

the  Macedonian  crown.  But  while  Alexander  was  absent  in  the 
northern  wilds,  a  false  rumour  of  his  death  reached  Greece :  the 
Thebans  at  once  broke  out  into  revolt  and  besieged  the  Macedonian 
garrison  in  their  citadel.  They  sent  for  aid  to  their  neighbours  of 
Athens.  Demosthenes,  now  as  always,  urged  on  war  with  ]\Iacedon, 
and  the  temper  of  the  Ecclesia  was  not  unfavourable.  But  Athens 
was  cautious  and  dilatory ;  nothing  positive  was  done,  save  that 
Demosthenes  crossed  into  Peloponnesus,  and  persuaded  the  Arcadian 
League  and  Elis  to  declare  in  favour  of  Thebes.  But  while 
Demosthenes  was  talking  Alexander  acted.  Before  it  was  known 
that  he  was  not  dead  he  suddenly  appeared  in  Boeotia.  He  had 
marched  riglit  through  from  Illyria,  over  countless  passes  and 
valleys,  covering  in  thirteen  days  two  hundred  and  fifty  miles  of 
indifferent  road.  The  Thebans,  unaided  by  any  ally,  boldly  faced 
the  king :  they  fortified  an  entrenched  position  in  front  of  their  city 
and  fought  a  decisive  battle  outside  the  gates. 

Outnumbered  and  outgeneralled  the  Thebans  were  doomed  to 
fail.  They  were  beaten,  and  the  Macedonians  entered  the  gates 
with  the  flying  enemy.  A  desperate  street-fight  followed,  but 
Alexander  at  last  cut  his  way  to  the  market  place.  Sis  thousand 
Thebans  fell,  and  the  whole  city  was  in  the  hands  of  the  conqueror. 
The  king  was  determined  to  make  an  example  of  the  place :  he 
bade  his  Greek  allies,  the  Phocians  and  other  neighbours  and 
enemies  of  Thebes,  sit  in  judgment  on  the  vanquished.  They 
voted — as  the  king  intended — that  Thebes  should  be  destroyed. 
Thirty  thousand  Thebans  were  ruthlessly  sold  into  slavery;  the 
walls  and  houses  were  cast  down,  and  the  territory  divided  among  the 
smaller  Boeotian  towns.  Thus  perished  the  city  of  Epaminondas, 
the  victim  of  its  own  rashness  and  of  tlie  procrastination  of  its  allies. 
Alexander  spared  only  the  temples  and  the  house  of  the  poet 
Pindar:  long  after,  however,  he  repented  of  his  cruelty,  and 
attributed  to  the  anger  of  Bacchus,  the  tutelary  god  of  Thebes,  the 
drunken  frenzy  which  sometimes  disfigured  his  later  years. 

The  Athenians  and  the  other  Greek  states  of  the  Theban  party 
had  done  nothing  more  than  pass  decrees  against  Alexander,  and 
the  king  declared  that  he  should  require  nothing  more  than  the 
punishment  of  the  leaders  of  the  anti-Macedonian  party.  His 
demand  for  the  instant  surrender  of  eight  leading  citizens  of  Athens, 


335 B.C.]  The  Asiatic  Expedition.  525 

including  Demosthenes,  was  soon  softened  down  by  the  intercession 
of  Phocion  into  a  consent  that  two  Athenians  only  should  be 
banished.  The  same  was  the  case  with  Elis  and  Arcadia,  who  had 
committed  themselves  in  much  the  same  way  as  Athens;  a  few 
leaders  were  punished,  and  the  states  left  unharmed.  By  the  use 
of  one  severe  example,  followed  by  a  display  of  clemency,  Alexander 
brought  the  Greeks  into  the  frame  of  mind  in  which  he  desired  to 
see  them — they  were  now  convinced  that  they  had  to  deal  with  a 
master-mind,  and  would  be  loth  to  recommence  their  intrigues 
while  the  ruins  of  Thebes  lay  before  their  eyes. 

The  autumn  of  .335  B.C.  was  now  far  spent ;  and  the  king 
announced  that  he  should  not  till  the  next  year  take  up  the  great 
scheme  for  the  invasion  of  Asia  which  his  father  had  begun  to  carry 
out.  The  Macedonian  force  which  Philip  had  sent  across  the 
Hellespont  in  337  B.C.,  was  still  holding  on  to  some  of  the  coast 
towns  of  Mysia  :  Alexander  now  began  to  reinforce  it,  but  deferred 
the  departure  of  his  main  army  till  the  spring  of  the  oncoming  year. 
Nothing  could  be  more  inspiring  to  the  enthusiastic  mind  of 
Alexander  than  the  idea  of  an  attack  on  the  realm  of  the  Great 
King.  Such  a  scheme  at  once  brought  him  on  to  the  ground  where 
his  hero-ancestor,  Achilles,  had  fought  and  died.  It  gave  him  the 
opportunity  of  surpassing  the  successful  Asiatic  campaigns  of  Agesi- 
laiis,  who  was  still  reckoned  the  greatest  general  that  Greece  had 
known.  It  also  furnished  him  with  a  plausible  excuse  for  calling 
upon  the  states  of  Greece  for  their  hearty  aid :  was  he  not  about 
to  avenge  on  their  behalf  the  invasion  which  Xerxes  just  a  hundred 
and  fifty  years  before  had  launched  against  the  Hellenic  fatherland  ? 
The  war  was  to  be  at  once  a  crusade  of  Hellenism  against  Barbarism, 
a  buccaneering  adventure  into  the  golden  realm  ot  the  fabulously 
wealthy  "  Great  King,"  and — what  was  not  %vithout  an  attraction 
for  Alexander — a  plunge  into  the  unknown — for  beyond  the  coast 
land  Asia  was  still  untrodden  ground  to  the  Greeks. 

The  prince  who  sat  on  the  Persian  throne  was  now  Darius  III. 
There  had  been  much  murder  of  late  in  the  palace  of  Susa,  and 
Darius,  who  was  only  the  third  cousin  of  his  predecessor,  had  been 
suddenly  called  from  a  private  station  to  occupy  the  throne,  owmg 
to  the  extinction  of  the  elder  branch  of  the  royal  house.^  He  had 
'  See  Genealogy  on  page  548. 


526  Alexander  the  Great.  [334 b.c. 

now  been  reigning  for  two  j'ears,  and  had  given  no  sign  of  capacity, 
either  for  good  or  evil ;  but  tried  in  the  balance,  he  was  found  to  be 
entirely  destitute  both  of  military  ability  and  of  moral  courage. 
Though  not  absolutely  a  coward,  he  was  so  wanting  in  decision  and 
initiative,  that  no  one  could  have  been  more  fitted  to  lose  an  empu'e. 

In  the  spring  of  334  b.c.  Alexander  marched  to  the  Hellespont 
with  the  veteran  army  which  his  father  had  organized.  Some  30,000 
foot  and  4500  horse  followed  his  banner,  of  whom  about  half  were 
Macedonians,  the  rest  consisted  of  twelve  thousand  Greeks  and  seven 
thousand  barbarian  auxiliaries — Thracians,  Illyrians,  and  other  wild 
tribes  from  the  Balkans.  They  formed  about  two-thirds  of  the 
strength  of  the  Macedonian  monarchy ;  the  remaining  third,  12,000 
foot  and  1500  horse,  under  Antipater,  were  left  behind  to  guard 
the  capital  and  overawe  the  unruly  Greeks. 

For  two  years  Persia  and  Macedon  had  already  been  at  war,  but 
Darius  had  made  no  adequate  preparation  to  repel  invasion ;  indeed, 
he  hardly  expected  it :  no  Asiatic  could  have  foreseen  that  a  young 
man  of  twenty-two,  whose  name  he  had  but  just  learnt,  was  about  to 
revolutionize  the  whole  East.  The  Phoenician  fleet  was  not  called 
up  to  block  the  Hellespont,  nor  were  the  satraps  of  Asia  Minor 
strengthened  with  aid  from  the  Inland.  They  had  to  bear  the  storm 
as  best  they  could  on  their  own  resources.  To  meet  Alexander, 
Arsites  of  Phrygia,  Mitrobarzanes  of  Cappadocia,  and  Spithridates 
of  Lydia,  had  collected  twenty  thousand  native  horse,  and  about 
ten  thousand  Greek  mercenary  foot,  to  defend  their  borders. 

Meanwhile,  Alexander  crossed  the  Hellespont  with  his  army,  and 
landed  near  Troy,  at  the  spot  where  tradition  placed  the  harbour  of 
the  host  of  Agamemnon.  He  honoured  the  supposed  tomb  of  his 
ancestor  Achilles  with  solemn  rites ;  hanging  a  garland  on  it,  and 
running,  thrice,  naked  round  the  barrow  in  accordance  with  an 
ancient  local  custom.  At  Ilium  he  did  solemn  sacrifice  to  Athene, 
and  hung  up  his  arms  in  her  temple,  taking  down  instead  some 
ancient  armour  that  was  said  to  have  been  dedicated  by  the  heroes 
of  the  Trojan  war.  Then,  full  of  memories  of  Homeric  battles,  he 
went  forth  to  meet  the  hosts  of  Asia.  The  satraps  were  waiting 
for  him  in  a  position  they  had  chosen  on  the  river  Granlcus,  ten 
miles  inland  from  the  Propontis,  near  the  town  of  Zeleia.  Mentor, 
the  leader  of  the  Greek  mercenaries,  had  besought  the  Persians  to 


334  B.C.)  Battle  of  the  Granicus.  527 

retire  before  Alexander  without  a  battle,  wasting  the  country  around 
them  and  declining  to  engage  till  they  should  have  mustered  greater 
strength.  But  the  stupid  satraps  were  bent  on  fighting  at  a  dis- 
advantage. Instead  of  choosing  a  plain  where  their  cavalry  could 
act,  they  placed  themselves  on  the  rugged  bank  of  a  fordable  river, 
and  prepared  to  dispute  its  passage.  Their  infantry  was  in  the 
second  line  ;  their  masses  of  cavalry,  which  were  almost  useless  for 
defending  a  position,  lined  the  steep  slope  at  the  water's  edge. 

The  eye  of  Alexander  caught  at  once  the  defect  in  the  enemy's 
array  :  his  infantry  advanced  to  the  river's  edge  and  began  to  cross 
in  face  of  the  Persian  horse  ;  they  were  charged  when  they  reached 
the  further  bank,  but  their  long  sarissas  beat  off  the  cavalry  with 
heavy  loss.  Then  Alexander  himself  plunged  into  the  water  with 
his  horse-guards  and  scrambled  up  the  steep  slope  in  front  of  him. 
Their  assault  was  irresistible :  though  the  Persian  nobles  swarmed 
round  him,  fighting  their  best,  and  dying  manfully  upon  the  lances 
of  the  horse-guards,  they  could  make  no  long  stand.  But  for  a 
moment  the  melee  was  hot ;  one  Persian  noble  lopped  off  the  king's 
white  plume ;  another,  the  satrap  Spithridates,  had  forced  himself 
behind  Alexander  and  was  raising  his  sabre  to  stab  him  in  the  back, 
when  Cleitus,  a  Macedonian  officer,  cut  off  his  hand.  The  Persian 
leaders  soon  fell ;  their  horsemen  fled  in  disorder,  and  then  the 
Macedonians  were  able  to  surround  the  unfortunate  Greek  mercenary 
infantry  in  the  rear.  Alexander  gave  them  no  quarter,  alleging 
that  they  were  traitors  in  arms  against  the  Hellenic  confederacy  of 
which  he  was  general,  and  only  two  thousand  escaped  death. 

The  whole  loss  of  the  Macedonians  in  the  fight  at  the  Granlcu3 
was  only  one  hundred  and  twenty  men  :  on  the  Persian  side  about 
two  thousand  horsemen  had  fallen,  and  the  whole  body  of  infantry 
had  been  cut  to  pieces.  But  the  most  important  item  in  their  loss 
was  that  well  nigh  every  Persian  officer  of  rank  had  been  slain ; 
two  of  the  three  satraps  had  fallen  in  the  battle  ;  the  third,  Arsites, 
escaped  alive  but  committed  suicide  next  day  rather  than  face  his 
master.  There  was  no  one  left  to  command  in  Asia  ]\Iinor,  and  the 
defence  of  the  whole  peninsula  was  completely  disorganized.; 
Town  after  to-^Ti  surrendered  to  Alexander  when  he  proceeded  to 
march  south  from  the  Hellespont — first  Sardis,  then  Ephesus,  then 
all  the  other  cities  of  Ionia.    The  king  needed  to  do  nothing  but. 


528  Alexander  the  Great.  [384  b.o, 

accept  the  submission  of  their  inhabitants  and  nominate  new 
governors.  In  one  quarter  only  was  there  opposition :  Memnon, 
the  captain  of  the  Greek  mercenaries  of  Darius,  had  escaped  from 
the  Granlcus  and  thrown  himself  into  Miletus.  He  maintained 
himself  there  for  some  weeks,  and  had  to  be  besieged  in  due  form 
ere  he  would  evacuate  the  place.  Meanwhile  a  Phoenician  fleet  had 
come  up,  two  months  late :  it  should  have  arrived  in  the  spring  and 
blocked  the  Hellespont.  Aided  by  this  fleet  Memnon  held  first 
Miletus  and  then  Halicarnassus,  and  gave  Alexander  much  trouble. 
Halicarnassus  had  to  be  stormed  after  a  desperate  defence — the  first 
real  trouble  that  the  Macedonians  had  met  in  Asia — and  even  when 
it  fell  Memnon  and  his  garrison  escaped  on  shipboard,  to  give  farther 
trouble  in  the  Aegean.     (Autumn  of  334  B.C.) 

Alexander  employed  the  last  months  of  334  B.C.  in  completing 
the  subjection  of  western  Asia  Minor.  Leaving  his  main  body  to 
winter  at  Ephesus,  he  marched  with  a  chosen  corps  through  Caria 
and  received  the  homage  of  its  native  rulers  :  then  he  pushed  in  the 
depth  of  winter  along  the  Lycian  and  Pamphylian  shore,  meeting 
hardly  any  hindrance  save  from  the  inclemency  of  the  season.  One 
most  hazardous  march  took  him  round  the  sea-swept  path  that  winds 
along  the  cliffs  of  Mount  Climax  :  the  road  was  covered,  but  the  king 
refused  to  turn  back,  and  made  his  way  through  water  that  reached 
to  the  waist,  despising  the  waves  that  threatened  to  sweep  away  his 
whole  host.  He  thus  reached  the  cities  of  the  Pamphylian  coast. 
Perga  and  Side  promptly  submitted,  and  the  tribes  of  the  neigh- 
bouring highlands  soon  followed  their  example.  The  king  then 
turned  north,  and  crossing  the  snow-clad  passes  of  the  Pisidian 
mountain  in  early  March,  came  out  on  to  the  great  Phrygian 
plateau  just  as  spring  began. 

At  Gordium,  the  old  capital  of  Phrygia,  Alexander  was  joined  by 
his  main  army,  which  the  veteran  general  Parmenio  led  up  from 
Ephesus.  It  had  been  largely  recruited  by  drafts  from  Macedon  and 
Greece,  and  was  now  even  stronger  than  when  it  crossed  the 
Hellespont  a  year  before  :  the  marvellous  success  of  the  king  had 
made  recruiting  easy,  and  volunteers  were  numerous.  Alexander's 
stay  at  Gordium  is  mainly  notable  for  the  incident  of  the  "  Gordian 
knot."  In  the  town  there  was  preserved  an  ancient  chariot,  said  to 
have  been  constructed  by  Gordius,  the  first  king  of  Phrygia.    Its 


333B.C.]  The  Gordicm  Knot.  529 

pole  was  fastened  to  its  yoke  by  a  strand  of  cornel  bark,  twisted  in 
a  complex  knot.  Local  tradition  held  that  the  man  who  should 
untie  the  knot  was  destined  to  be  king  of  all  Asia.  Alexander  heard 
the  tale,  gazed  for  a  moment  at  the  puzzle,  and  promptly  solved  it 
by  drawing  his  sword  and  cutting  the  knot  asunder.  The  bystanders, 
both  Phrj'gian  and  Greek,  raised  a  cry  that  the  prophecy  was  now 
fulfilled,  and  were  confirmed  in  their  idea  when  a  heavy  thunderstorm 
followed — denoting,  as  they  supposed,  the  assent  of  Zeus. 

It  seemed  for  a  short  time  as  if  Alexander  might  be  detained  in 
Asia  Minor  by  the  operations  of  Memnon  and  the  Persian  fleet  in 
the  Aegean.  That  enterprising  chief  conquered  in  the  spring  the 
islands  of  Chios  and  Lesbos,  expelling  their  Macedonian  garrisons. 
He  then  proposed  to  sail  across  to  Greece  and  raise  rebellion  against 
Alexander,  with  the  help  of  Agis,  king  of  Sparta ;  but  just  at  this 
moment  he  died.  With  his  death  all  energy  seemed  to  abandon  the 
Persian  fleet,  and  Alexander,  freed  from  this  danger  at  the  critical 
moment,  was  free  to  plunge  further  into  Asia. 

King  Darius  had  done  nothing  all  the  winter,  while  his  restless 
adversary  had  been  conquering  western  Asia  Minor.  But  he  had 
summoned  the  full  muster  of  the  host  of  all  the  satrapies  to  meet  at 
Babjdon  in  the  spring  of  333  B.C.  He  was  now  on  his  march  up 
the  Euphrates  with  an  armament  almost  as  large  as  that  of  Xerxes. 
Rumour  gave  him  six  hundred  thousand  men,  and  some  of  the 
troops  were  good  fighting  material,  more  especially  a  body  of  nearly 
thirty  thousand  Greek  mercenaries,  hired  from  every  quarter  where 
hoplites  could  be  found. 

While  Darius  was  coming  westward  Alexander  was  hurrying  to 
meet  him.  A  rapid  march  from  Gordium  across  the  central  plateau 
of  Asia  Minor  brought  him  to  the  foot  of  the  passes  of  Mount 
Taurus.  It  was  expected  that  the  governor  of  Cihcia  would  have 
manned  them  with  all  the  forces  of  his  satrapy ;  but  the  cowardly 
wretch — his  name  was  Arsames — fled  at  Alexander's  approach,  and 
abandoned  the  rugged  defile  of  the  Cilician  Gates  ^nthout  a  blow. 
The  Macedonian  army  at  once  poured  down  from  the  hills  into  the 
fertile  Cilician  plain  and  seized  Tarsus. 

Here  Alexander  was  detained  by  a  sharp  fit  of  illness.  He  had 
plunged,  at  the  end  of  a  hot  march,  into  the  icy-cold  mountain 
Btream  of  the  Cydnus ;  a  chill  seized  him  and  fever  followed.    He 

2  M 


53©  Alexander  the  Great.  [333 bc. 

was  treated  by  a  physician  named  Philippus,  but  was  long  in 
rallying.  A  secret  letter  informed  him  that  his  doctor  had  been 
hired  by  Persian  gold  to  poison  him.  But  so  great  was  Alexander's, 
confidence  in  Philippus  that  he  drank  off  the  next  potion  he  pre- 
scribed, and  then  handed  him  the  letter  to  read.  After  this  the 
king  rapidly  recovered  his  strength,  and  was  soon  in  the  field  again. 

Meanwhile  Darius  was  at  hand  with  all  his  host,  and  only  Mount 
Amanus,  the  range  which  separates  Syria  from  Cilicia,  lay  between 
the  armies.  Two  main  passes  pierce  the  chain,  the  "  Syrian 
Gates"  to  the  south,  leading  from  Myriandrus  to  Sochi,  and  the 
"  Amanic  Gates "  to  the  north,  leading  from  Issus  to  Sochi. 
Alexander  was  convinced  that  his  enemy  intended  to  fight  in  the 
great  plain  of  northern  SjTia,  where  his  masses  of  cavalry  could 
act  freely.  It  never  entered  his  head  that  Darius  would  enter  the 
mountains  and  engage  on  ground  so  unfavourable  to  his  unwieldy 
numbers.  Accordingly,  Alexander  marched  down  the  narrow 
coast-plain  between  the  Amanus  and  the  sea,  and  made  for  the 
"  SjTian  Gates "  in  order  to  cross  into  Syria.  But,  meanwhile, 
Darius  also  had  set  out  to  meet  his  enemy,  and  passing  the 
moimtains  by  the  "Amanic  Gates,"  came  down  on  Issus  in  Alexan- 
der's rear,  captured  the  depots  and  sick  of  the  Macedonian  army,  and 
threw  himself  across  their  line  of  communication  with  Asia  Minor. 

This  mattered  little  to  Alexander ;  he  only  rejoiced  that  his 
enemy  had  consented  to  pen  up  his  multitudes  between  the  sea  and 
the  hills,  on  the  narrow  shore  between  Issus  and  M^'riandrus. 
Abandoning  the  "  Syrian  Gates,"  the  king  faced  about,  and  retraced 
his  route  back  towards  Issus.  Behind  the  river  Pinarus,  ten  miles 
south  of  Issus,  he  came  upon  the  Persian  host,  ranged  line  behind 
line  with  a  front  of  only  ninety  thousand  men.  The  Greek  merce- 
naries and  the  native  Persians,  both  horse  and  foot,  were  in  the  fight- 
ing line ;  the  troops  of  the  subject  nations  blocked  the  roads  for  mile 
on  mile  to  the  rear,  quite  out  of  the  game.  Alexander's  army  was 
numerous  enough  to  fill  the  space  of  two  miles  between  the  sea 
and  the  hills  without  overcrowding.  Placing  the  phalanx  in  the 
centre,  leading  the  right  wing  of  cavalry  himself,  and  giving  the 
left,  on  the  sea-flank,  in  charge  to  the  old  Parmenio,  Alexander 
advanced  to  attack  the  enemy. 

The  battle  of  Lssus,  though  more  toughly  contested  than  that  at  the 


333  B.C.]  Battle  of  Issus.  531 

Granlcus,  was  not  less  decisive.  The  phalanx  pushed  into  the  midst 
of  the  Persian  line,  and  engaged  in  a  fierce  strife  with  the  Greek 
mercenaries  of  Darius.  Parmenio  by  the  sea-shore  waged  an  up-hill 
fight  against  the  main  bodj'  of  the  Persian  horse,  and  was  forced  to 
give  ground.  But  Alexander  himself  in  a  series  of  fierce  charges 
broke  through  the  left  wing  of  the  enemy,  and  then  turned  to  attack 
his  centre  from  the  flank  and  rear.  When  King  Darius  saw  the 
Macedonian  lancers  pressing  nearer  and  nearer  to  the  lofty  chariot 
wherein  he  sat,  his  presence  of  mind  deserted  him ;  he  leapt  down 
and  mounted  a  horse.  Seeing  the  chariot  empty  the  Persians 
imagined  the  king  slain  ;  a  cry  ran  down  the  ranks  that  all  was  lost, 
and  the  fighting  line  broke  up  in  confusion.  The  subject  nations 
in  the  rear  did  not  stop  to  strike  a  blow,  but  promptly  fled  to  the 
hills.  Darius  himself,  almost  the  first  among  the  fugitives,  aban- 
doned his  camp,  his  treasures,  and  his  harem,  and  fled  to  Thapsacus 
on  the  Euphrates.  There  was  a  great  slaughter  of  the  fugitives, 
and  of  the  native  Persians  and  Greek  mercenaries  in  the  front  line 
nearly  half  must  have  fallen.  A  moderate  estimate  placed  the  loss 
in  Darius'  army  at  tJiirty  thousand  men.  Of  the  ]\Iacedonians  not 
more  than  four  hundred  and  fifty  were  left  on  the  field. 

In  the  Persian  camp  were  found  three  thousand  -^  talents 
(£700,000),  the  first  large  spoil  of  money  that  had  fallen  into  Alex- 
ander's hands,  great  stores  of  plate  and  jewels,  and — a  capture  of  far 
gi'eater  importance — the  harem  of  Darius,  including  his  mother 
Sisj'gambis  and  his  queen-consort  Statlra.  Alexander  treated  these 
ladies  with  great  courtesy  and  consideration:  not  only  did  their 
forlorn  situation  appeal  to  his  natural  magnanimity,  but  he  might 
also  reflect  that  they  would  be  most  valuable  hostages  in  any  future 
dealings  with  Darius. 

When  he  stood  victorious  at  the  head  of  the  Gulf  of  Issus 
Alexander  had  two  paths  open  to  him.  He  might  strike  eastward 
and  pursue  Darius  to  Babylon,  leaving  Syria  unsubdued  on  his 
flank,  or  he  might  turn  south  and  subdue  Syria  and  Egj'pt  before 
proceeding  to  attack  the  heart  of  the  Persian  empire.  Alexander 
chose  the  latter  alternative :  the  character  of  Darius  was  now 
known  to  him,  and  he  thought  that  he  might  safely  neglect  hira  for 
many  months  after  the  crushing  defeat  he  had  just  undergone. 
His  conjecture  was  correct;  within  a  short  time  Darius  was  humbly 


53^  Alexander  the  Great.  iss2B.e. 

asking  for  peace,  offering  ten  thousand  talents  as  a  ransom  for  his 
family,  and  the  hand  of  his  daughter  Barsine,  with  all  the  provinces 
west  of  Euphrates  as  her  dower.  Alexander  told  his  officers  of  the 
Persian's  proposition.  "  I  should  accept,  were  I  Alexander," 
exclaimed  the  veteran  Parmenio.  "  And  so  should  I,  if  I  were 
Parmenio,"  answered  the  king.  The  Macedonian  generals  were 
already  dazzled  with  the  vastness  of  their  conquests  but  their 
young  master  looked  upon  what  he  had  obtained  as  a  mere  earnest 
of  greater  things  to  come.  He  sent  away  the  Persian  ambassadors, 
and  prepared  to  go  on  with  the  war. 

It  was  in  front  of  Tyre  that  the  envoj's  had  found  Alexander. 
All  northern  Syria  had  submitted  to  him  without  a  blow,  and  of  the 
Phoenician  cities,  Sidon,  Byblus,  and  Aradus  had  opened  their 
gates.  But  Tyre,  jealous  of  the  semi-independence  it  enjoyed  under 
the  Persian  rule,  had  proffered  homage,  but  refused  to  admit  a 
Macedonian  garrison  within  its  walls.  The  king  answered  that  he 
must  enter  the  city,  as  he  intended  to  sacrifice  to  Melcarth — whom 
the  Greeks  indentified  with  their  own  Heracles — in  his  ancient 
temple  on  the  Tyrian  island.  To  this  the  Tyrians  replied  that  no 
foreigner  could  come  within  the  walls,  but  that  a  shrine  of  Melcarth, 
yet  more  ancient  and  venerable  than  their  own,  could  be  found  in 
the  ruins  of  old  Tyre  on  the  mainland.  Alexander  was  in  no  mood 
to  brook  such  a  reply,  and  announced  that  he  would  enter  by  force 
of  arms. 

Tyi-e  was  a  strong  place — renowned  for  the  long  sieges  it  had 
undergone — one  Assyrian  king  had  blockaded  it  in  vain  for  more 
than  twenty  years.  It  lay  on  an  island  seven  hundred  yards  out 
in  the  sea,  and  was  girt  by  walls  coming  down  to  the  water's  edge 
and  rising  a  hundred  and  fifty  feet  above  the  waves.  The  Tyrians 
possessed  a  well-equipped  fleet  of  a  hundred  ships,  which  had  just 
returned  from  the  Aegean,  for  the  news  of  Issus  had  caused  the 
Persian  armament  in  the  western  waters  to  break  up. 

Alexander  had  as  yet  no  fleet  with  him,  and  strove  to  take  Tyre 
by  running  a  mole  out  from  the  mainland  across  the  shallow  strait 
which  protected  the  island-city.  At  first  the  work  was  easy,  but 
presently  the  mole  reached  deeper  water,  and  began  also  to  come 
within  range  of  the  military  engines  planted  on  the  walls.  The 
workmen  were  swept  off  in  such  numbers,  that  Alexander  had  to 


332  B.o.)  Siege  of  Tyre.  533 

construct  wooden  towers  to  protect  the  head  of  the  mole ;  but  when 
these  were  constructed  tlic  Tyrians  set  them  ablaze  by  means  of 
a  fire-ship,  and  then  pushed  out  in  boats,  and  destroyed  the  greater 
part  of  the  causeway.  Convinced  that  he  must  command  the  sea 
if  he  wished  to  conquer  Tyre,  Alexander  compelled  the  Sidonians 
and  Cj'priots  to  send  him  their  fleets,  and  presently  sent  two 
hundred  and  ten  vessels  to  drive  the  Tyrians  within  their  harbour. 
After  this  the  work  was  simplified ;  the  mole  was  renewed  on  a 
larger  scale,  and  driven  forward  to  the  very  foot  of  the  walls.  The 
Tyrians  fought  Avith  the  frantic  courage  of  which  Semitic  races 
have  often  shown  themselves  capable, — as  bravely  as  the  Cartha- 
ginans  withstood  Scipio,  or  the  Jews  the  Romans  of  Titus.  But 
the  end  was  inevitable  :  a  breach  was  made  and  the  city  was 
stormed  after  a  siege  of  less  than  seven  months.  The  Mace- 
donians lost  foiu'  hundred  men,  but  eight  thousand  Tyrians  were 
cut  down  in  the  streets.  Two  thousand  prisoners  were  hung  by 
the  ruthless  conqueror,  and  the  rest  of  the  population  sold  into 
slavery.     (July?  332  B.C.) 

When  Tyre  fell,  all  the  lands  to  its  south  were  struck  with  terror. 
The  Jews  in  Palestine  did  homage  to  the  king,  and  with  them  all 
the  cities  of  the  Philistines,  save  Gaza  alone,  the  southern  fortress 
which  blocked  the  road  to  Egypt.  A  faithful  governor  named 
Batis  held  this  town  for  Darius  ;  he  resisted  for  three  months,  and 
sorely  angered  Alexander.  When  the  place  fell  the  king  determined 
to  imitate  his  ancestor  Achilles  in  the  least  praiseworthy  of  his 
actions :  he  had  Batis  bound  to  the  tail  of  his  chariot  and  dragged 
him  along  till  he  died,  because  Achilles  had  dealt  in  the  same  way 
with  the  corpse  of  Hector.  Cruelty  from  this  moment  seems  to 
have  grown  upon  Alexander  more  and  more. 

Egypt  fell  without  a  blow:  its  inhabitants  regarded  the  Mace- 
donians as  deliverers  from  the  Persian  yoke,  against  which  they  had  so 
long  striven,  and  welcomed  them  as  friends.  Alexander  made  a 
triumphal  entry  into  Memphis,  and  then  sailed  down  the  Nile  to  its 
western  mouth,  where,  struck  with  the  capacities  of  the  spot,  he 
drew  out  a  plan  for  the  foundation  of  a  great  maritime  city,  and 
christened  it  by  his  own  name.  Thus  came  into  being  the  seaport 
of  Alexandria,  by  far  most  enduring  of  all  the  monuments  which 
Alexander  reared  for  himself, 


534 


Alexander  the  Great.  [331  b.c. 


While  staying  at  Alexandria,  the  king  resolved  to  visit  the  famous 
oracle  of  Zeus  Amnion  in  the  Libyan  desert.  With  a  picked  corps 
of  troops  he  marched  for  five  days  across  the  sands,  and  came  in 
safety  to  the  palm  groves  of  the  fertile  oasis  which  sheltered  the 
temple  of  the  god.  The  oracle  hailed  him  as  the  son  of  Zeus,  and 
bade  him  go  forth  and  conquer  all  the  world,  for  none  should  be 
able  to  withstand  him  till  the  day  when  he  should  be  taken  up  to 
the  gods.  His  companions  were  bidden  to  salute  him  as  more  than 
mortal,  and  to  offer  him  sacrifice.  This  hyperbolical  flattery  seems 
to  have  been  the  first  thing  which  turned  the  head  of  Alexander :  it 
was  noted  that  he  took  the  greeting  of  the  oracle  in  all  seriousness, 
and  was  in  future  much  pleased  when  any  one  saluted  him  as  the 
son  of  Ammon. 

In  the  spring  of  331  B.C.  Alexander  retraced  his  steps  from  Egypt 
through  Palestine  and  Syria,  back  to  the  Euphrates.  He  crossed 
the  great  river  at  Thapsacus,  and  then,  pushing  yet  further  east, 
passed  the  Tigris  also.  This  he  did  in  order  to  avoid  the  Mesopo- 
tamian  desert,  and  to  be  able  to  march  on  Babylon  by  a  route 
where  provisions  should  never  fail. 

Darius  had  been  granted  nearly  two  years  to  assemble  a  new 
army,  and  had  now  gathered  a  force  even  greater  than  that  which 
fought  at  Issus.  He  was  determined  this  time  to  fight  on  the  level 
plains,  where  his  hordes  would  not  be  cramped  for  want  of  space  to 
deploy,  and  awaited  Alexander  in  the  flat  sandy  country  in  front  of 
the  town  of  Arbela,  at  a  spot  known  as  Gaugamela  (the  house  of 
the  camel).  There  the  whole  force  of  the  East  was  found  drawn  out 
in  battle  array— the  king  in  the  midst  in  his  war-chariot,  surrounded 
by  his  body-guard,  and  with  the  remnant  of  his  Greek  mercenaries 
on  either  side :  to  the  north  and  south  of  him  stretched  long  lines 
of  Median,  Bactrian,  Persian,  and  Indian  cavalry,  while  behind  him 
were  drawn  up  the  infantry  of  the  eastern  satrapies,  in  numbers 
numberless.  War-chariots  and  elephants  were  stationed  at  inter- 
vals in  front  of  the  army,  and  it  was  hoped  that  their  onset  might 
breakup  the  close  array  which  was  the  strength  of  the  Macedonians. 

To  meet  this  great  host  Alexander  had  only  forty  thousand  foot 
and  seven  thousand  cavalry.  It  was  evident  that  he  must  be  out- 
flanked to  right  and  left  by  the  enormous  numbers  opposed  to  him. 
Accordingly  be  advanced  in  an  order  which  somewhat  resembled  a 


331  B.C.]  Battle  of  Arbela.  535 

hollow  square.  The  phalanx  made  the  front  line,  flanked  on  the  right 
by  Alexander  and  his  chosen  Macedonian  horse,  on  the  left  by  Par- 
menioand  the  cavalry  of  the  allied  Greeks.  The  sides  of  the  square 
were  formed  by  bodies  of  Greek,  Thracian,  and  lllyrlan  infantry  and 
horse :  their  orders  were  to  beat  off  all  flank  attacks,  and  to  see 
that  the  king  was  not  assailed  from  the  rear.  The  hinder  side  of  the 
square  was  formed  by  a  thin  line  of  Thracian  infantry 

In  this  array  the  Macedonians  plunged  into  the  nu'dst  of  the 
Persian  host,  aiming  the  chief  point  of  their  impact  at  the  king 
himself.  The  elephants  and  chariots  gave  no  trouble,  but  when 
the  enemy's  cavalry  closed  in  on  either  flank,  there  was  very  sharp 
fighting  all  over  the  field.  Parmenio  was  encompassed  and  almost 
beaten  by  the  Persian  right  wing.  One  great  body  of  Parthian  and 
Indian  horse  burst  through  between  two  brigades  of  the  phalanx, 
and  would  have  done  much  harm  had  it  not  fallen  to  plundering  the 
Greek  camp.  But  in  the  centre  Alexander  himself  won  his  way 
forward,  with  the  same  irresistible  impetus  that  he  had  displayed  at 
Granlcus  and  Issus.  With  his  body-guard  and  the  right  brigades 
of  the  phalanx,  he  pierced  into  the  Persian  ranks  till  he  drew  near 
to  the  chariot  of  Darius.  Once  more  the  imbecile  Persian  concluded 
that  it  was  better  to  survive  and  fight  another  day.  Though  his 
men  were  still  doing  their  best,  he  left  his  chariot,  mounted  his 
charger,  and  fled  away.  His  host  fled  after  him,  and  Alexander 
was  once  more  the  victor.  He  had  conquered  a  host  of  a  million 
men,  and  slain  forty  thousand  of  them,  with  no  greater  loss  than  five 
hundred  killed  and  four  or  five  thousand  wounded ! 

When  Alexander  won  his  third  and  crowning  victory  over  the 
Great  King,  the  spell  which  had  held  the  Persian  empire  together 
for  two  hundred  years  seemed  suddenly  dissolved.  The  rumour  ran 
far  and  wide  over  all  the  eastern  satrapies  that  the  house  of  the 
Achaemenidae  was  doomed,  and  everywhere  the  native  princes 
declared  themselves  independent,  and  the  satraps  strove  to  turn 
their  provinces  into  petty  kingdoms.  It  was  no  more  with  the 
Persian  empire  that  Alexander  had  to  deal;  such  an  entity  no 
longer  existed.  He  had  now  to  deal  with  a  bewildering  chaos  of 
tribes  and  cities,  defending,  or  refusing  to  defend,  their  newly 
acquired  freedom.  Darius  fled  to  Ecbatana  in  Media,  but  he  could 
Eot  collect  a  new  army :  only  a  few  thousand  personal  retainers  of 


536  Alexander  the  Great.  I83ib.c. 

his  own  and  of  the  satraps  who  still  clung  to  him,  mustered  around 
his  person.  Moreover  his  life  and  his  crown  were  alike  in  danger : 
his  cousin  Bessus,  satrap  of  Bactria,  had  determined  to  dethrone  him 
— as  he  richly  deserved, — and  to  see  whether  a  new  sovereign  could 
not  save  the  heritage  of  the  Achaemenidae. 

Meanwhile,  Alexander  marched  on  Babylon,  where  the  Chaldaeans 
opened  the  gates  of  the  city,  and  received  him  with  garlands,  sacri- 
fices, and  hymns  of  honour.  Babylon  had  never  forgiven  the  two 
sacks  it  had  undergone  at  the  hands  of  the  Persians  in  the  sixth 
century,  and  looked  upon  Alexander  as  a  liberator.  It  might  have 
been  expected  that  Susa,  the  home  of  Cyrus  and  the  chosen  abode 
of  his  successors,  would  have  shown  a  different  spirit.  But  the  spell 
of  Arbela  was  on  the  Susians ;  they  yielded  without  resistance,  and 
placed  in  Alexander's  hands  the  immense  royal  hoard  stored  in  the 
palace  of  Darius— a  sum  amounting  to  no  less  than  fifty  thousand 
talents,  or  £11,500,000,  the  savings  of  nine  generations  of  the  house 
of  Achaemenes. 

Alexander  now  halted  for  a  short  time  to  reorganize  the  empire 
he  had  won,  for  no  one  now  doubted  that  he  was  the  "  Great 
King,"  and  Darius  a  luckless  pretender  to  a  cro-wn  that  was  no 
longer  his  own.  The  principle  which  the  conquei'or  adopted  was 
to  confirm  in  their  civil  authority  all  the  satraps  who  submitted  to 
him,  but  to  join  with  the  native  ruler  a  Greek  officer,  who  took  over 
military  charge  of  the  district."  Thus  at  Babylon  and  Susa  the 
satraps,  Mazaeus  and  Abulites,  were  left  in  power,  but  were 
watched  by  the  two  generals,  ApoUodorus  and  Archelaus.  The  Mace- 
donians did  not  wholly  approve  of  this  arrangement ;  they  thought 
that  all  places  of  emolument  should  be  reserved  for  themselves, 
and  grudged  to  see  their  ruler  taking  upon  him  the  pomp  of  the 
Great  King,  and  acknowledging  Asiatics  as  faithful  and  deserving 
subjects. 

Persia  proper  yet  remained  to  be  conquered:  it  was  defended, 
not  by  the  wretched  Darius,  who  was  hiding  at  Ecbatana,  but  by 
Ariobarzanes,  the  last  hero  that  the  Persian  realm  produced. 
Fighting  for  his  own  hand  rather  than  for  any  master,  Ariobarzanes 
summoned  the  last  levy  of  the  old  royal  race  into  the  field.  The 
remnants  of  the  native  Persian  host  manned  the  passes  that  lead 
from  Sus^  to  Persepolis,  and  for  five  days  held  Alexander  in  check 


330 B. CI  Sack  of  Persepolis.  537 

at  a  defile  called  the  "  Susian  Gates."  But  this  Persian  Thermopylae 

ended  as  disastrously  as  its  Hellenic  prototype.  Alexander  found 
a  circuitous  track  which  turned  the  pass,  and  came  out  unexpectedly 
in  the  defenders'  rear.  The  Persian  host  was  cut  to  pieces  after  a 
brave  defence  :  only  Ariobarzanes  himself  forced  his  way  through 
with  a  few  companions  and  strove  to  defend  the  gates  of  Persepolis. 
There  he  died  as  the  last  leader  of  a  lost  cause  should  die,  overborne 
by  numbers  and  fighting  to  the  last.  If  Darius  had  been  a  man, 
he,  and  not  the  satrap,  should  have  had  this  glorious  end.  (February? 
330  B.C.) 

Alexander  deliberately  gave  up  Persepolis  to  fire  and  sword,  not 
because  it  had  resisted,  but  for  cold-blooded  reasons  of  state  policy. 
Nothing,  he  deliberately  wrote  home,  could  show  so  well  that  the 
Persian  domination  was  over,  as  the  sack  of  the  Persian  ccpital  and 
the  massacre  of  its  inhabitants.  Probably  in  his  heart  Alexander 
rejoiced  that,  unlike  his  model  Achilles,  he  had  survived  to  gloat 
over  the  sack  of  his  own  Troy.  To  the  Greek  world  he  vouchsafed 
to  represent  the  atrocity  as  the  long-delayed  retribution  for  the 
destruction  of  Athens  by  Xerxes  a  hundred  and  fifty  years  before. 
So  Persepolis  became  even  as  Nineveh,  and  the  Persian  empire 
disappeared  as  completely  as  the  Assyrian.  An  even  greater  treasure 
than  had  been  captured  at  Susa,  no  less  than  one  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand  talents,  was  borne  off  in  triumph  from  the  ruined  city. 

King  Darius  had  survived  his  kingdom,  but  it  was  now  the 
keenest  desire  of  Alexander  to  see  his  rival  at  his  feet  begging  for 
mercy.  After  the  sack  of  Persepolis  he  started  northward  to  seek 
Darius  at  Ecbatana :  the  Persian  fled  at  his  approach,  and  sought 
to  hide  himself  in  the  lands  beyond  the  Oxus.  Disgusted  at  his 
cowardice,  his  few  surviving  followers  cast  him  into  chains,  and 
resolved  to  proclaim  his  ambitious  cousin,  Bessus,  King  of  the  East. 
But  Alexander  followed  hard  on  their  heels,  overtook  them  and 
almost  captured  the  dethroned  king.  Bessus,  however,  seeing  him 
at  hand,  stabbed  his  captive  and  fled.  Alexander  came  up  just  in 
time  to  see  his  rival  expire,  and  was  careful  to  deal  with  him  as 
Achilles  had  with  Hector,  surrendering  his  body  for  honourable 
burial  to  his  aged  parent.  Queen  Sisj'gambis. 

Alexander  was  destined  to  survive  his  rival  for  just  seven  years,  a 
period  spent,  save  its  last  fifteen  months,  in  one  long  series  of  carH' 


538  Alexander  the  Great.  [329 b.c. 

paigns  among  the  hills  and  plains  of  Tartary,  Afghanistan,  and  tho 
Punjaub.  Tlie  man  could  never  rest  while  there  were  landsto  conquer : 
we  cannot  speculate  how  far  to  the  east  he  might  not  have  penetrated 
had  not  his  own  army  at  last  mutinied,  and  refused  to  proceed  any 
further.  The  first  four  years  were  spent  in  reducing  to  submission 
the  eastern  provinces  of  the  Persian  empire.  Bessus  had  to  be 
dealt  with  first :  he  had  now  assumed  the  crown,  taken  the  royal 
name  of  Artaxerxes,  and  established  himself  as  king  in  Bactria.  It 
took  Alexander  just  a  year  to  destroy  the  usurper  and  conquer  his 
kingdom,  which  extended  from  Artacoana  (Herat)  to  Maracanda 
(Samarcand).  In  May,  329  B.C.  the  murderer  of  Darius  was 
surrendered  to  Alexander  by  his  own  dispirited  adherents.  The 
king  placed  a  wooden  collar  on  his  neck,  flogged  him  in  public  at 
Bactra  (Balkli),  his  late  capital,  and  then  executed  him.  Bessus  had 
not  been  subdued  without  some  hard  fighting  and  yet  harder  march- 
ing ;  one  winter  march  across  the  snow-clad  Paropamisus  range, 
which  divides  Bactria  from  Aria,  was  long  remembered  for  its  terrors, 
and  has  been  compared  not  unaptly  to  Hannibal's  famous  passage 
of  the  Alps. 

Ere  yet  Bessus  had  been  slain,  Alexander  had  wrought  a  deed 
more  cruel  and  unjustifiable  than  any  he  had  yet  committed. 
Among  his  chief  generals  was  Philotas,  son  of  the  veteran  Parmenio 
who  had  served  so  well  at  Issus  and  Arbela.  This  officer  was  a  man 
of  a  very  free  and  outspoken  disposition :  he  had  ventured  many 
times  to  cai-p  at  Alexander's  growing  vanity  and  recklessness,  and 
had  given  great  offence  by  saying  that  but  for  his  father  and  himself 
Asia  would  not  have  been  conquered.  Alexander  suddenly  accused 
him  of  having  been  privy  to  a  conspiracy  against  his  life,  and  put 
liim  to  the  torture.  Placed  on  the  rack  Philotas  broke  down,  and 
confessed  that  he  and  his  father  Parmenio  had  indeed  been  plotting 
against  the  king.  He  was  then  tried  and  executed,  while  a  mes- 
senger was  sent  off"  to  Ecbatana  to  slay  the  aged  Parmenio,  who  had 
been  left  behind  as  governor  of  Media.  The  old  man  was  stabbed 
in  the  back  while  reading  a  despatch  handed  to  him  by  the 
messenger.  It  is  certain  that  he  had  never  plotted  against  his 
master,  and  probable  that  his  son  was  equally  innocent.  Alexander 
seems  to  have  slain  the  son  from  offended  vanity,  and  then  to  have 
murdered  the  father  lest  he  might  resent  his  son's  cruel  end. 


329  RC]  Death  of  Cleitns.  539 

Tiie  conquest  of  Bactria  had  taken  place  in  329  b.c.  :  in  the 
following  year  Alexander  subdued  Sogdiaua,  the  last  Persian 
Batrapy  to  the  north-east,  and  carried  his  arms  beyond  the  old 
Persian  border  into  the  land  of  the  nomad  Scythians.  Having 
forced  their  king  to  do  homage,  he  built  the  new  city  of  Alexandro- 
eschata  ("  Alexander's  furthest  ")  to  cover  the:frontier,  and  turned 
south.     His  next  expedition  was  to  be  directed  against  India. 

Ever  since  his  visit  to  the  oracle  of  Amnion,  Alexander's  pride 
and  vanity  had  been  increasing.  Of  late  he  had  taken  to  assuming 
divine  honours  as  his  right,  dressed  himself,  to  the  deep  disgust  of 
his  comrades,  in  the  purple  robe  and  tiara  of  an  eastern  king,  and 
surrounded  his  person  with  oriental  courtiers.  He  married,  too,  as 
his  chief  wife — for  he  had  started  a  harem — not  a  Greek  but  the 
beautiful  daughter  of  a  Bactrian  nobleman :  the  heir  to  his  throne, 
men  murmured,  would  be  a  half-bred  Asiatic.  At  the  same  time 
he  began  to  levy  oriental  troops  in  large  numbers,  and  not  only 
formed  auxiliary  regiments  of  them,  but  drafted  them  into  the  ranks 
of  the  phalanx  and  the  horse-guard.  This  drove  the  ^Macedonian 
veterans  to  madness.  One  strange  scene  marks  the  character  of 
this  discontent.  The  king  and  his  generals  drank  deep  one  night, 
celebrating  the  festival  of  the  Dioscuri.  Flatterers,  made  fluent  by 
the  wine-cup,  began  to  beslaver  the  king  with  the  fulsome  praises 
that  he  loved.  At  last  Cleitus,  commander  of  the  hoi-se-guard,  could 
stand  it  no  longer ;  he  told  Alexander  to  the  face  that  he  owed  his 
victories  to  the  army  that  his  father  Philip  had  created,  and  to  the 
generals  he  had  trained,  that  Parmenio  and  Philotas  whom  he  had 
slain  had  enabled  him  to  conquer  Asia,  and  that  he  would  not  be 
alive  that  day  if  his  own  arm  had  not  saved  him  from  the  sabre  of 
Spithridates  at  the  Granlcus.  The  king  and  Cleitus  were  both 
flushed  with  drink,  and  the  wrangle  ended  in  a  tragedy.  Alexander 
sprang  from  his  seat  and  seized  a  sword ;  his  friends  dragged  him 
back  and  hurried  Cleitus  from  the  room.  But  the  angry  general 
rushed  back  again  with  a  fresh  taunt  in  his  mouth,  and  Alexander, 
seizing  a  pike,  struck  him  dead.  The  king's  transport  of  murderous 
frenzy  was  followed  by  a  violent  revulsion  of  feeling :  he  flung 
himself  in  tears  on  his  couch,  and  refused  to  eat  for  three  days — 
but  he  did  not  give  up  liis  oriental  habits  or  his  drinking  bouts. 

Alexander's  Indian  expedition  added  the  fertile  province  of  the 


24©  Alexander  the  Great.  [327  bc. 

Punjaub  to  his  dominions.  It  was  won  by  force  of  arms  from 
several  chiefs,  of  whom  the  most  noteworthy  was  Porus,  the  brave 
king  of  the  land  to  the  east  of  the  Hydaspes  (Jhelum).  Confiding  in 
his  fifty  thousand  foot,  his  three  hundred  chariots,  and  his  hundred 
and  thirty  war-elephants,  the  Indian  king  advanced  to  defend  the  line 
of  the  Hydaspes  against  the  Macedonians.  He  was  conquered,  but 
his  defeat  cost  a  thousand  men  to  Alexander,  a  greater  loss  than  he 
had  suffered  when  fighting  the  myriads  of  Darius  at  Issus  and 
Arbela.  Porus  was  wounded  and  taken  prisoner,  but  Alexander, 
in  whom  generous  instincts  were  still  strong,  not  only  pardoned 
him  but  gave  him  back  his  kingdom  with  a  new  province 
added  to  it  (327  B.C.). 

There  were  other  realms  to  conquer  beyond  the  eastern  bounds 
of  the  dominions  of  Porus.  Accordingly  we  find  Alexander  urging 
on  his  weary  battalions  towards  the  unknown  lands  of  the  sunrising, 
of  which  no  Greek  had  hitherto  so  much  as  heard  the  names.  The 
Indian  princes  in  the  valley  of  the  Ganges  would  soon  have  felt 
the  weight  of  his  arm,  if  an  unexpected  obstacle  had  not  intervened. 
On  the  banks  of  the  Hyphasis,  easternmost  of  the  five  rivers  of  the 
Punjaub,  the  Macedonians  broke  out  at  last  into  open  mutiny. 
For  seven  years  the  king  had  been  dragging  them  further  and 
further  from  their  homes,  and  now  they  would  go  not  one  step 
more,  despite  his  threats  and  promises.  Unlike  their  master,  they 
did  hot  thirst  for  more  worlds  to  conquer,  but  yearned  to  rest  and 
enjoy  what  they  had  already  won.  Their  resolve  was  inflexible,  and 
Alexander  had  to  turn  back,  cloaking  his  disgust  with  a  seasonable 
announcement  that  the  omens  for  further  advance  had  become 
unfavourable  (326  B.C.). 

The  king  was  far  too  restless  and  adventurous  to  return  by  the 
way  he  had  come.  He  resolved  to  reach  Babylon  by  a  new  route, 
following  the  Indus  to  its  mouth,  and  then  striking  westward 
through  Gedrosia  (Beluchistan).  He  prepared  a  fleet  on  the  Indus 
and  then  made  his  army  escort  it  down  the  river.  On  their  way 
fleet  and  army  co-operated  in  subduing  the  independent  tribes  of  the 
lower  Punjaub  and  Scinde.  In  storming  the  citadel  of  the  Malli 
(Mooltan)  the  king  ran  a  greater  personal  risk  than  he  had  ever 
before  incurred.  Leading  the  forlorn  hope  of  the  stormers,  as  was 
often  his  wont,  he  had  reached  the  top  of  the  wall  with  only  three 


3&6B.C.J  The  Cedrosian  Desef't  541 

companions,  when  the  ladder  broke  behind  him.  He  leapt  down 
among  the  enemy,  and  was  received  with  a  hail  of  arrows  at 
short  range:  one  pierced  his  corselet  and  penetrated  into  the 
region  of  the  lungs;  another  slew  one  of  his  three  followers.  The 
two  survivors,  Peucestes  and  Leonnatus,  fought  desperately  over  his 
body  against  a  crowd  of  Indians,  till  the  storraers  reared  new 
ladders  and  burst  in  to  rescue  their  unconscious  leader,  and  massacre 
the  whole  garrison.  The  king's  life  was  at  first  despaired  of,  but 
his  wonderful  constitution  enabled  him  to  recover,  and  in  a  few 
weeks  he  was  on  foot  again.     (November  ?  326  B.C.) 

Alexander  reached  the  mouth  of  the  Indus  after  subduing  all 
the  princes  of  Scinde.  He  built  a  town,  which  he  named  Alexandria, 
at  a  well-chosen  spot  in  the  Delta,  and  destined  it  to  be  a  great 
military  and  commercial  port  to  command  the  Indian  Ocean.  From 
thence  he  despatched  his  fleet  under  his  admiral  Nearchus  to  explore 
the  Erythraean  Sea  and  the  Persian  Gulf,  as  far  as  the  mouths  of  the 
Euphrates,  for  he  was  filled  with  ideas  of  opening  up  a  sea  route 
between  India  and  Babylon.  He  himself  determined  to  make  a 
similar  tour  of  exploration,  but  on  land.  He  took  a  chosen  body  of 
troops,  and  endeavoured  to  pick  out  a  road  between  the  mountains 
of  Gedrosia  and  the  sea.  The  main  body  of  his  army  marched 
under  Craterus  by  the  ordinary  road  further  inland,  which  leads 
from  India  to  Persia,  by  Arachosia  (Candahar)  and  Drangiana 
(Seistan). 

Some  of  Alexander's  luck  seems  to  have  deserted  him,  when  once 
he  turned  back  and  set  his  face  homewards.  At  the  outset  of  his 
return  journey  he  had  received  the  only  serious  wound  he  ever 
knew,  and  now,  in  the  midst  of  it,  he  made  a  march  which  was  one 
continued  disaster.  He  lost  himself  in  the  unexplored  deserts  of 
Beluchistan,  and  marched  for  sixty  days  over  sterile  valleys  and 
still  more  sterile  hills  where  neither  food  nor  water  were  to  be  had. 
We  hear  of  marches  of  forty  miles  between  well  and  well,  and  of 
whole  companies  left  stricken  down  by  sunstroke  at  the  roadside. 
All  the  baggage  animals  died,  the  sick  and  wounded  were  abandoned 
for  want  of  transport,  and  the  stragglers,  all  of  whom  perished,  were 
numbered  by  the  thousand.  Before  Alexander  struggled  through 
to  Carraania,  the  border-province  of  Persia,  he  is  said  to  have  lost 
three-fourths  of  the  corps  which  had  marched  with  him.    This  was 


542  Alexander  the  Great  (325B.0. 

almost  the  first  warning  tliat  he  had  ever  received  of  the  dangers  of 
reckless  exploration  :  it  was  hopeless  to  expect  to  feed  an  army  in  a 
desert  where  even  a  small  caravan  coiild  only  have  passed  with 
difficulty. 

When  once  the  Gedrosian  desert  had  been  crossed,  the  march 
to  Persepolis  and  Susa  presented  no  difficulties,  and  by  the  spring 
of  325  B.C.  the  king  was  once  more  in  the  heart  of  his  empire.  His 
advent  was  followed  by  a  strict  investigation  of  the  conduct  of  the 
native  satraps  and  Greek  generals,  who  had  been  governing  Asia  in 
his  absence.  !Many  of  both  classes  were  dismissed  for  peculation 
and  cruelty,  and  several,  both  Greeks  and  Asiatics,  were  actually 
put  to  death  for  their  misconduct. 

Alexander  survived  two  years  only  to  enjoy  the  fmition  of  the 
empire  he  had  created.  But  he  lived  long  enough  to  give  an 
earnest  of  what  his  intentions  had  been.  He  never  desired  to 
return  to  Pella,  to  dwell  as  a  patriarchal  king  among  the  free-spoken 
Macedonians.  It  was  his  ambition  to  build  up  a  iiewGraeco-Asiatic 
state,  wherein  the  barbarians  would  have  their  share  as  well  as  the 
Hellenes.  He  set  himself  to  be  the  civilizer  and  protector  of  his 
Oiiental  subjects,  and  framed  his  whole  demeanour  so  as  to  appeal 
to  their  imagination  and  sympathy.  Nor  did  he  fail  :  in  Persian 
legends  of  a  later  age  the  "  two-horned  Iskender  "  as  he  was  called 
(because  he  loved  to  be  represented  wearing  the  horns  of  his 
"father"  Zeus  Amnion)  became  a  native  hero,  and  was  claimed  as 
one  of  the  glories  of  Persia !  One  of  the  chief  schemes  which 
Alexander  framed  for  teaching  Greek  and  Asiatic  to  dwell  peaceably 
together  was  the  encouragement  of  mixed  marriages.  He  gave 
Persian  princesses  with  gi'eat  dowries  to  his  chief  officers,  and 
bestowed  a  handsome  gift  on  each  one  of  ten  thousand  soldiers  who 
had  taken  Asiatic  wives.  He  himself  had  already  wedded  the 
Bactrian  Koxana,  and  now  added  to  his  harem  Statira,  the  eldest 
daughter  of  Darius  IH.,  and  Parysatis,  the  daughter  of  Ochus,  Darius' 
predecessor  on  the  throne.  Another  method  which  he  devised  for 
welding  Greek  and  Oriental  was  to  found  new  cities  all  over  his 
empire,  in  which  a  nucleus  of  disbanded  Greek  soldiery  and  adven- 
turous Greek  merchants  were  encouraged  to  settle  far  afield,  and 
mix  with  the  native  inhabitants.  Some  twenty  of  such  towns,  mostly 
called  Alexandria,  rose  all  over  the  eastern  provinces,  and  many  of 


324  B.C.]  The  Mutiny  at  Opis.  543 

them  have  survived  as  great  centres  to  our  own  day,  such  as  the 
Egyptian  Alexandria,  Candahar  (Alexandria  Arachotiae),  and 
Herat  (Alexandria  Areion).  The  results  of  Alexander's  work  in  this 
scheme  were  rapid  and  striking :  a  half-Hellenic  race  was  developed 
all  through  his  wide  dominions,  and  for  a  century  it  looked  as  if 
Hellenistic  civilization  was  destined  to  dominate  the  whole  East. 
But  this  was  not  to  be ;  the  Greeks  were  not  numerous  enough  to 
raise  the  permanent  level  of  oriental  civilization,  or  to  incorporate 
the  Asiatics  with  themselves.  Asia  Minor  and  S3'ria  only  were 
permanently  Hellenized  :  everywhere  else  the  native  element  slowly 
worked  out  the  Greek  intermixture,  and  fell  back  into  its  old  ways. 
But  the  strength  of  the  work  of  Alexander,  even  in  the  furthest 
East,  may  be  gauged  by  the  fact  that  Greek  kings  survived  in  India 
down  to  25  b.c,  and  that  among  the  Parthians  Greek  was  still 
the  official  language  in  the  second  century  after  Christ. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  soldiers  of  Alexander  appreciated 
his  schemes,  or  were  pleased  to  see  the  Orientals  treated  as  their 
equals.  Their  discontent  found  vent  in  a  great  mutiny  at  Opis, 
near  Babylon,  in  the  summer  of  324  B.C.  When,  after  raising 
many  new  regiments  of  Asiatics,  the  king  proposed  to  send  home  the 
bulk  of  his  veterans  to  Greece,  loaded  with  gifts  and  pensions, 
the  soldiery  took  his  conduct  as  a  sign  that  he  wished  in  future  to 
do  without  Hellenic  troops,  and  rule  his  Greek  subjects  by  means 
of  an  Oriental  army.  The  mutineers  sarcastically  bade  him  send 
away  all  his  Macedonians  and  prosecute  his  wars  with  a  following 
of  Persians — and  the  invaluable  aid  of  his  father  Zeus  Ammon. 
Alexander's  speech  to  the  mutineers  was  long  remembered  as  a 
masterpiece  of  fiery  eloquence.  He  bade  them  go  if  they  pleased, 
for  he  could  do  without  them.  He  reminded  them  that  his  father 
Philip  had  found  them  poor  skin-clad  shepherds  on  the  Macedonian 
hills,  and  had  raised  them  to  be  rulers  of  Greece,  while  he  himself 
had  done  four  times  as  much,  made  them  the  kings  of  the  earth, 
and  placed  all  the  wealth  of  the  East  at  their  disposal.  All  he  had 
won  was  divided  with  them,  and  he  had  kept  nought  for  himself 
but  his  purple  robe  and  diadem — and  his  glory,  a  glory  in  which  they 
appeared  to  have  no  wish  to  share.  The  king's  eloquence  triumphed, 
the  mutineers  were  quelled,  and  allowed  him  to  execute  their 
ringleaders  without  a  murmur. 


544  Alexander  the  Great.  tsssB.e. 

After  the  rdutlny  was  over  Alexander  planned  to  visit  and  regulate 
all  his  newly  conquered  provinces.  He  sailed  down  the  Euphrates 
to  the  mouth,  to  meet  the  fleet  of  Nearchus  on  its  arrival  from  India. 
He  then  marched  to  Ecbatana,  where  his  favourite  comrade 
Hephaestion  died,  and  was  honoured  with  the  most  magnificent 
funeral  that  the  world  has  ever  seen — it  is  said  to  have  cost 
twelve  thousand  talents.  Next  he  subdued  the  robber  tribes  in 
the  hills  between  Susiana  and  Media,  and  returned  to  winter  at 
Babylon.  At  the  gates  he  was  met — we  are  told — by  the  chief 
prophets  of  Chaldaea,  who  besought  him  not  to  enter  their  cit}'', 
as  they  had  read  in  the  stars  that  evil  would  follow  him  if  he  came 
to  Babylon  at  that  conjuncture.  He  disregarded  the  prophecy  and 
spent  some  time  in  the  city  which  he  had  chosen  as  his  capital. 
But  in  the  spring  he  Avent  down  to  explore  the  water-ways  of  the 
marshy  delta  of  the  Euphrates,  where  he  was  planning  new  harbours 
and  canals.  In  the  marshes  he  caught  a  malarious  fever,  which 
was  destined  to  be  fatal.  He  despised  it  at  first,  overestimated  his 
strength,  and  endeavoured  to  fight  down  the  disease  by  hard 
drinking,  to  which  he  had  grown  all  too  prone.  This  was  too 
much  for  a  constitution  tried  by  thirteen  years  of  incessant  cam- 
paigning. A  collapse  followed,  and  only  eleven  days  after  his  first 
seizure  the  conqueror  of  the  East  expired,  leaving  his  kingdom  to 
an  infant  son  and  a  crowd  of  ambitious  and  unscrupulous  generals. 
(June,  323  B.C.) 

Alexander  was  taken  away  in  the  midst  of  his  activity  ;  he  was 
only  thirty-two,  and  had  been  looking  forward  to  many  another  year 
of  conquest  and  adventure.  At  the  moment  of  his  death,  he  was 
planning  an  expedition  against  Arabia,  and  much  wider  schemes  were 
running  in  his  brain.  If  one  of  them,  an  expedition  against  Italy, 
had  been  carried  into  eSect,  the  history  of  the  world  might  have 
been  altered  to  an  inconceivable  extent.  It  has  always  been  a 
favourite  speculation  with  historians,  both  ancient  and  modern,  to 
imagine  what  would  have  happened  if  Alexander  had  been  brought 
into  contact  with  the  rising  power  of  Rome,  then  in  the  midst  of  her 
Samnite  wars. 


Meanwhile  the  outlook  or  (ireece  tiad  been  completely  changed. 
The  Macedonian  conquest  of  the  East  had  revolutionized   the 


423  B.C.]  Fi'tiis.  545 

relations  of  the  little  Hellenic  states  both  with  each  other  and  with 
the  outer  world.  The  old  system  of  local  autonomy,  and  constant 
wars  to  maintain  the  balance  of  power,  had  now  become  impossible. 
Civic  patriotism  had  received  a  blow,  but,  in  return,  the  ]\Iacedo- 
nian  conquest  offered  many  compensations,  both  to  the  state  and  to 
the  individual.  If  a  man  consented  to  forget  that  he  was  an 
Athenian  or  a  Corinthian,  and  merely  to  remember  that  he  was  a 
Hellene,  what  could  afford  him  greater  pride  than  to  watch  the 
great  empire  of  the  East  overrun  by  an  army  which,  if  guided  by  a 
Macedonian  prince,  was  largely  officered  by  Greek  generals,  and 
composed  in  two-thirds  of  its  strength  of  Greek  hoplites  and  pel- 
tasts?  What  could  be  more  inspiring  than  to  see  that  tlie  old 
Hellenic  genius  for  colonizing  was  not  extinct ;  to  behold  the  con- 
querors laying  hands  on  every  province  from  the  Aegean  to  the 
Indus,  and  covering  them  with  Greek  cities  as  great  and  as  vigorous 
as  any  that  had  ever  existed  in  the  Hellenic  fatherland  ?  For  the 
individual  who  consented  to  enter  the  service  of  the  Macedonian 
the  prizes  were  unnumbered  and  unlimited.  For  soldier  and 
general,  for  poet  or  painter,  for  scribe  or  rhetorician,  for  merchant 
or  seaman,  there  was  instant,  honourable,  and  lucrative  employment. 

Those  who  threw  themselves  into  the  new  life  of  the  days  of 
the  conquest  of  Asia  looked  back  on  the  old  times  of  the  "  balance 
of  power"  and  its  endless  wars  as  something  petty  and  absurd. 
Shortly  after  Alexander  had  won  his  crowning  victory  at  Arbela, 
news  came  to  him  of  a  battle  in  Greece.  Agis,  king  of  Sparta,  nad 
fallen,  and  with  him  five  thousand  brave  men  more ;  but  Alexander 
turned  to  his  generals  and  said,  "  It  seems  that  while  xoe  have  been 
conquering  the  Great  King,  there  has  been  some  '  battle  of  mice  '  in 
Arcadia."  When  the  empire  of  the  world  was  being  won  in  the 
East,  fights  between  Greek  and  Greek  at  home,  for  a  border  fort 
or  a  strip  of  meadow-land,  seemed  mere  ebullitions  of  jealous  folly. 

In  telhng  the  tale  of  Alexander  we  have  already  almost  lost 
sight  of  Greece.  From  his  time  onward  its  history  no  longer 
stands  alone,  but  becomes  part  of  a  larger  whole.  The  causes 
which  set  the  course  of  events  working  are  no  longer  to  be  found 
in  Greece  herself,  but  must  be  sought  far  afield.  A  siege  of 
Athens  or  a  sack  of  Corinth  follows  in  strict  consequence  of 
some  political  change  in  Asia  or  Egypt.    The  history  of  Greece,  in 

2n 


546  Alexander  the  Great  1323  b.c- 

yhort,  cannot  be  written  except  as  a  part  of  that  of  the  whole 
Hellenized  world  from  the  Tyrrhenian  Sea  to  the  Indus.  The 
style  of  Polybius  must  replace  that  of  Thucydides,  The  subject  is 
no  longer  the  simple  chronicle  of  events  around  the  Aegean  that 
we  have  recorded  hitherto,  and  needs  another  method  and  a 
separate  volume. 


THE  BNB. 


(     547     ) 


KINGS  OF   SPARTA. 

(N.B. — Those  whose  names  are  not  in  capitals  never  reigned.; 

The  first  seven  or  eight  generations  are  legendary  rather  than  historic. 


Elder,  or 
Aeid  Line. 


1.  Aristodenius. 


Younger,  or  Eury- 
poiitid  Line. 


I 
1 

2.    EUUYSTUENES. 
8.  Agis  I. 

4.  echestiiatus. 

5.  IjAbotas. 
g.  dokyssus. 

7.  AoEsiLArs  I. 

8.  Arohelaus. 

9.  Teleclu-s. 
10.  Alcamenes. 
]  i.  polydorus. 

12.    ErUYCR.VTES   I. 
]:>.    AXAXANDEU. 
H.    EUUYCRATES    II. 

l.j.  Leon. 

IG.    AXAXAXUKIDAS, 

B.C.  560-519. 


2.  Procles. 

3.  Sous. 

4.  ECRYPON. 

5.  PUYTANIS, 

6.  E0NOML.S. 


I 

7.  POLYDECTES. 

8.  CUAKILAVS. 

9.  NiCANDEU. 

10.  Theopompus. 


Lycurgus  (The 
Lawgiver). 


1 7.  Cleomenes  I.,  18.  Leonidas,  Cleom- 
B.c.  519-490.       B.C.  490-480,    brotus. 


11.  Zeuxidajivs.  Aiiaxandridas. 

12.  AxAXiDAMLS.  Archidamus. 

13.  AncHiDAMis  I.  Aiiuxilaiis. 

14.  Agesicles.  Ijfotycliidea. 

15.  Aristox.  Ilippocratides, 

I  Agesilaiis. 

IG.  Demaratis,  Menarc-8. 
B.C.  5 10-19  L  I 


19.  P1.EISTAUCHU.S, 
B  c.  480-458. 


Pausaiiias, 
(Victor  of  Platao 


a). 


20.  Pleistoanax, 

B.C.  458-44G,  and  B.C.  42G-408. 

I 

21.  Pausanias, 

B.C.  44G-42G,  and  B.C.  408-395 


17.  Leotychides, 
B.C.  491-4G9. 

I 
Zcuxidamiis. 

18.  Archidamus  II., 
B.C.  469-427. 

I 


j                                j  19.  Agis  IT.,  20.  Agesii.aus  11., 

22.  Agf-SIPous  I.,     23.  Cleombrotus,  b.c.  427-399.  b.c.  399-3G0. 

B.C.  395-380.  •         B.C.  380-371.                      I  I 

I  Tieotychides.  21.  Archidamus  III., 

I ■ i  B.C.  360-338. 


24.  Agesipolis  II.,    25.  Cleomenes  II., 
B.C.  371-370.  B.C.  370-309. 


22.  Agis  III., 
B.C.  338-330. 


(     548     ) 


KINGS  OF  PERSIA. 

(Ouly  those  whose  names  are  in  capitals  were  rulers  of  the  Persian 
Empire.) 

Achaemenes. 

I 
Tei'spes. 


Cyrus. 

■  I 
Cambyses. 

Cyrus  the  Great, 
B.C.  549-529. 


Cambyses, 
B.C.  529-521. 


Bardes. 


Ariaramues. 

I 
Arsames. 

I 
Hystaspes. 


Dauius  I., 
B.C.  521-486. 

I 
Xerxes  I., 

B.C.  486-465. 

I 

Artaxerxes  I., 

B.C.  465-425. 


Xerxes  IL,       Sogdianus,      Darius  II., 
B.C.  425.  B.C.  425.         B.C.  425-404. 

l__ 

Artaxerxes  II.,        Cyrus  the  Younger.  Ostanes. 

B.C.  404-359.  I 

OcHUS,  Arsames. 

B.C.  359-338. 


Arses,  Darius  III., 

B.C.  338-336.  B.C.  336-330. 


INDEX. 


Abdera  founded,  85 

Abydos,  battle  of,  390 

Aciirnania,  geography  of,  8 ;  campaigns 
of  Demosthenes  in,  321,  322;  conquered 
by  Agesilaus,  431 

Achaia,  geography  of,  17 

Achaians  predominant  in  Heroic  age, 
23,  32  ;  Conquered  by  Dorians,  49,  50  ; 
send  colonies  to  Italy,  87 ;  allied  to 
Athens,  263 ;  conquered  by  Epaminon- 
das,  479;  join  Sparta,  480 

Acheloiis,  river,  3,  8 

Achilles,  28 

Acragas  founded,  88  ;  tyrants  of,  230 ; 
taken  by  Carthaginians,  440 

Adeimantus,  213 

Aegean  sea,  18 

Aegina,  15  ;  conquered  by  Dorians,  50 

Aeginetans,  wars  with  Athens,  163,  184  ; 
at  battle  of  Salamis,  216;  third  war 
witli  Athens,  256  ;  conquered,  262  ;  ex- 
pelled from  their  island,  3ul ;  restored 
by  I^ysander,  409 

Aegospotami,  battle  of,  403 

Aeolian  migration  to  Asia,  51 

Aeolians,  23 

Afschines,  ambassador  to  Philip,  504; 
impeached,  506;  stirs  up  the  Locrian 
war,  512 

Aetolia,  geography  of,  8 

Aetolian  campaign  of  Demosthenes,  321 

Agamemnon,  2S,  29 

Agesandridas,  Spartan  admiral,  387,  389 

Agesilaus  made  Ivinjf  of  Sparta,  420  ;  at 
Aiilis,  422  ;  his  successes  in  Asia,  423; 
returns  to  Europe,  429 ;  at  battle  of 
Curonea,  430 ;  campaigns  of,  round 
Corinth,  431  ;  supports  Phoebidas,  453  ; 
invades  Boeotia,  461  ;  defemls  Sparta, 
474;  last  campaign  of,  against  Epami- 
nondas,  483  ;  expedition  to  Egypt  and 
death,  488 

Agesipolis,  King  of  Sparta,  427  ;  death  of, 
454 

Agis  II.,  King  of  Sparta,  invades  Argol is, 
346;  wins  battle  of  Mantinea,  348; 
besieges  Athens,  404  ;  dies,  420 

Agls  III.,  King  of  Sparta,  defeated  by 


Philip,  5l7;  in  arms  against  Alex- 
ander, 529  ;  slain  in  battle,  545 

Alalia,  the  Pliocacans  colonize,  131 

Alcibiades,  his  character,  344 ;  tricks 
the  Spartan  ambassadors,  345  ;  advo- 
cates the  Sicilian  expedition,  352,  353  ; 
accused  of  sacrilege,  355 ;  flies  to 
Sparta,  358  ;  goes  to  Asia,  377  ;  joins 
Tissaphernes,  379  ;  conspires  with  the 
Athenian  oligarchs,  330 :  recalled  from 
exile,  385  ;  his  naval  victories,  390 ; 
391,  393;  enters  Athens  in  triumph, 
394  ;  banished,  396  ;  murdered,  412 

Alcidas,  Spartan  admiral,  313,  314,  321 

Alcmaeonidae  banished  from  Athens, 
105 

Aleuadae  call  the  Slacedonians  into 
Thessaly,  477 

Alexander  I.  of  Macedon,  196  ;  at  Athens, 
221 

Alexander  III.,  the  Great,  at  Chaeroneia, 
514;  quarrels  with  his  father,  517; 
his  character,  521  ;  campaigns  in  the 
north,  523  ;  conquers  Tliebes,  524  ;  wins 
battle  of  the  Granicus,  527 ;  conquers 
Asia  Minor.  528 ;  wins  Issus,  531 ; 
besieges  Tyre,  532;  in  Egypt,  533; 
wins  Arbela,  535  ;  conquers  fJabylon, 
536  ;  burns  Persepolis,  537  ;  invades 
the  Eastern  Satrapies,  538;  slays 
Philotas  and  Cleitus,  538,  539;  in 
India,  540;  his  return  march,  541; 
plans  of,  542  ;  dies,  543 

Ahxander  of  Pherae,  his  wars  with 
Thebes,  477,  478  ;  murdered,  482 

Alexandria,  in  Egypt,  founded,  533 

Ale.xandro-cschata  founded,  539 

Alphabet,  tlie  Phoenician,  25 

Alpheus,  river,  4,  17 

Alyattes  of  Lydia.  122 

Atnbracia  founded,  90 ;  at  war  with 
Athens,  521,322;  garrisoned  by  I'hilip, 
517  ;  rebels  against  Alexander,  523 

Ameinias,  217 

Amnion,  oracle  of,  visited  by  Alexander, 
534 

Amphictyonic  Council,  23;  declares  war 
on  Phocis,  4S6;  on  the  Amphi3sians,613 


550 


Ifukx. 


Ampliipolis  founded,  277  ;  revolts  from 
Athens,  336 ;  battle  of,  338  ;  taken  by 
Philip  of  Macedon,  494 

Anipbissian  Locrians,  the,  496,  512 

Amj-ntas,  King  of  Macedon,  140 

Aniyntas  III.,  492 ;  invades  Thessaly, 
477 

Anactorium  founded,  90 

Anaxagcras  accused  of  impiety,  201 

Andocides,  35S 

Androcles  assassinated,  332 

Antalcidas  in  Asia,  433  ;  peace  of,  431 

Antiochus,  Athenian  admiral,  396 

Antipater,  general  of  Alexander,  526 

Antiphon,  381,  332;  executed,  338 

Apollo,  the  god,  42-45 

Arbela,  battle  of,  535 

Arcadia,  geogriiphy  of,  1 7 

Arcadian  League  founded,  473 

Arcadians,  at  war  with  Sparta,  78  ;  con- 
quered by  Sparta,  79  ;  revolts  of,  252; 
join  Epaminondas,  474  ;  found  Mega- 
lopolis, 473;  at  war  with  Elis,  480; 
fall  into  disunion,  488  ;  oppose  Alex- 
ander, 524 

Archias  of  Thebes  murdered,  455 

Archidamus,  King  of  Sparta,  289  ;  in- 
vades Attica,  298,  301 ;  besieges  Pla- 
taea,  308 

Archons  of  Athens,  102,  103,  110;  office 
made  subject  to  the  lot,  185  ;  opened  to 
Zeugitae,  209 

Ardys  of  Lydia,  121 

Areopagus,  court  of,  103,  111,  255  ; 
humbled  by  Pericles  and  Ephialtes,  255 

Arginusi'e,  battle  of,  399 

Argolis,  geography  of,  15 

Argos,  Danaus  at,  23 ;  kingdom  of  Dio- 
mcdes,  34  ;  conquered  by  the  Dorians, 
49  ;  supreme  in  Peloponnesus,  60,  61 ; 
wars  with  Sparta,  77,  79,  165,  252,  346, 
428;  allied  to  Epaminondas,  474;  allied 
with  Philip  of  Macedon,  507 

Ariobarzanes,  defends  Persia,  536 ;  slain, 
537 

Aristagoras,  tyrant  of  Jliletus,  1 11 ; 
slain,  143 

Aristeides,  his  character,  169,  170  ;  ostra- 
cized, 187;  atSalamis,  215;  in  command 
at  sea,  238 ;  starts  the  Confederacy  of 
Uelos,  241 ;  his  political  reforms,  245 

Aristeus  at  Potidaea,  288  ;  slain,  303 

Aristocrates  of  Arcadia,  73 

Aristodemus  of  Messenia,  76 

Aristogeiton,  his  conspiracy,  117 

Aristomenes  of  Messenia,  77,  78 

Aristoteles  of  Cj-rene,  91 

Aristotle,  tutor  of  Alexander,  523 

Arsames,  Persian  satrap,  529 

Arsites  Persian  satrap,  commands  against 
Alexander,  526,  527 

Artabazus,  satrap,  219,  225 

Artaphernes,  satrap,  140,  162 

Artaphernes  the  younger,  174-176 

Artaxerxes  I.,  246,  267 

Artaxerses  II.,  417,  435 


Artemisia,  queen,  215 

Artemisium,  battle  of,  202 

Asia  jMinor,  Greek  colonies  in,  52-58 

Aspasia,  291 

AssjTia,  fall  of,  125 

Astyochus,  Spartan  admiral,  378 

Athena,  the  goddess,  her  characteristics, 
42 

Athens,  legend  of  its  foundation,  24 ; 
early  history  of,  101-105 ;  wars  with 
Megara,  106,  107  ;  Solon's  reforms  at, 
107-112;  factions  at,  113;  seized  by 
Peisistratus,  114;  freed  from  the  Ij-- 
rants,  117;  aids  the  lonians,  142;  re- 
forms of  Cleisthenes  at,  153-161;  wars 
with  Cleomenes,  149-151 ;  with  Aegina 
and  Thebes,  151 ;  defeats  the  Persians 
atMarathon,  173-180;  second  war  with 
Aegina,  185 ;  occupied  by  Xerxes,  210 ; 
evacuated  by  the  Persians,  219;  second 
capture  by  the  Persians,  221 ;  heads 
the  Ciinfederacj'  of  Delos,  238-241 ;  re- 
forms of  Aristeides,  245 ;  building  up 
of  her  empire,  247-256  ;  at  war  with 
Corinth  and  Aegina,  259 ;  with  Boeotia, 
260,  261;  her  successes,  261,  262; 
loses  Boeotia  and  Euboea,  264,  265 ; 
at  war  with  Sparta,  265  ;  makes  the 
Thirty  Years'  peace,  266;  political 
changes  of  Pericles,  268-271;  build- 
ings of,  272,  273;  colonies  of,  277; 
assists  Corcyra,  286  ;  engages  in  Pelo- 
ponnesian  war,  291 ;  her  resources  at 
that  time,  295 ;  plague  at,  302 ;  in- 
ternal politics  at,  315;  unsuccessful 
negotiation  with  Sparta,  325,  326,  337; 
peace  with  Sparta,  339  ;  allied  to  Argos 
and  Elis,  313,  344;  sends  out  the  Si- 
cilian expedition,  351 ;  dismay  at,  after 
Syracusan  disaster,  374 ;  continues  the 
war,  376 ;  oligarchic  conspiracy  at, 
380,  382 ;  conspiracj'  of  the  Four  Hun- 
dred at,  334  ;  their  fall,  388  ;  fruitless 
negotiation  with  Sparta,  392 ;  distress 
at,  in  406  B.C.,  398  ;  trial  of  the  gene- 
rals at,  401  ;  besieged  by  Agis  and 
Lysander,  404 ;  surrenders,  406  ;  causes 
of  her  downfall,  407,  408  ;  government 
of  the  thirty  tyrants  at,  411,  414  ;  de- 
livered by  'Thrasybulus,  415  ;  allied  to 
Thebes  and  Argos,  426,  427  ;  her  walls 
rebuilt  by  Conon,  431 ;  naval  efforts  of, 
434 ;  joins  in  the  peace  of  Antalcidas, 
435  ;  again  allied  to  Thebes,  460  ;  forms 
a  second  naval  league  against  Sparta, 
402;  her  successes,  464;  makes  peace 
with  Sparta,  464;  joins  Sparta  against 
Thebes,476  ;  designs  of,  on  Corinth,  480; 
joins  in  the  peace  of  462  B.C.,  485 ;  her 
early  troubles  with  Philip  of  Jlacedon, 
494  ;  engages  in  the  Social  war,  489 ;  her 
possessions  taken  by  Philip,  497  ;  allied 
to  the  Phocians,  498  ;  makes  peace  with 
Philip,504;  second  struggle  with  Philip. 
510;  war  declared  on  him,  511;  allied 
with  Thebes,  513 ;  beaten  at  Chaeroneia, 


hidex. 


551 


514;  submits  to  Philip,  516;  submits 

to  Alexander,  521 
Atlios,    Mount,    Xerxes    cuts    a    canal 

through,  191 
Attalus,  general   of  Philip,   519  ;   slain, 

523 
Attica,  geography  of,  13  ;   early  history 

of,  101-104 

Babtlox  revolts  from  the  Assyrians, 
125;  tal^en  by  Cyrus.  132;  revolts 
against  Darius,  135  ;  taken  by  Alex- 
ander, 536 

Bacchiadao,  oligarchy  of,  at  Corinth,  96, 
97 

Bactria  conquered  by  Alexauder,  53S 

Barca,  foundation  of,  91 

Bardes  niuniered  by  Cambyses,  134 

P.atis  slain  by  Alexauder,  y33 

Battus  of  Gyrene,  91 

Bessus,  slays  Darius  III.,  537  ;  executed, 
538 

Boeotia,  geography  of,  11,  12;  conquered 
by  the  Aniaeans,  48 ;  sends  colonies  to 
Asia,  54  ;  makes  war  on  Athens,  116- 
151  ;  submits  to  Xerxes,  209  ;  campaign 
against  the  Persians  in,  221-226  ;  con- 
quered by  Athens,  261 ;  revolts  against 
Athens,  264  ;  Joins  Sparta  in  Pelopon- 
nesian  war,  231  ;  unsuccessfully  in- 
vaded by  the  Athenians,  333  ;  invaded 
by  Lysaudcr,  427  ;  by  Agesilaus,  429  ; 
league  of,  dissolved,  450  ;  league  recon- 
stituted by  Thebes,  471  ;  invaded  by 
Phocians,  497 ;  invaded  by  Philip  of 
Macedon,  514 

Boges,  242 

Bosphorus,  colonies  on  the,  8.) 

Boule,  the  Athenian,  created  by  Solon, 
111;  recast  by  Cleisthenes,  155;  ex- 
pelled by  the  Four  Hundred,  384  ;  re- 
stored, 388 

Brasidas  at  Salamis,  310 ;  wounded  at 
Pylos,  324 ;  saves  Jlegara,  332 ;  in- 
vades Chalcidice,  335 ;  captures  Am- 
phipolis  and  other  places,  336 ;  killed 
in  battle,  339 

Pruttians,  conquests  of  the,  449 

Byzantium  founded,  85 ;  taken  by  Pau- 
sanias,  237 ;  revolts  against  Athens, 
and  is  retaken,  278, 279 ;  revolts  again, 
390 ;  retiken  again,  393 ;  joins  the 
Athenian  League,  462;  engages  in  the 
social  war,  489 ;  besieged  by  Philip, 
510;  relieved  by  Phocion,  511 

CADMEiA.the  citadel  of  Thebes,  seized  by 
Phoebidas,  453  ;  recovered,  457 

Cadmus,  legend  of,  22 

Calliasof  Chalcis,  510 

Callias,  peace  of,  266,  267 

Callibius,  412^15 

Callicratidas  at  Sardis,  397  ;  killed  at 
Arginusae,  399 

Callimachus  at  Marathon,  177,  178 

Callippus  murders  Dion,  447 


Callixenus  impeaches  the  strategi,  401 

Camarina  founded,  88  ;  taken  by  Gelo, 
231 ;  restored,  234;  taken  by  the  Car- 
thaginians, 443 

Cambunian  Mountains,  6 

Canibvses  conquers  Kgypt,  133 ;  death 
of,  134 

Carduchi,  418 

Carians  in  early  Greece,  22;  mix  with 
lonians,  56;  conquered  by  Persia,  131; 
join  Ionian  revolt,  142 

Carthaginians  invade  Sicily,  232;  de- 
feated by  Gclo,  233  ;  second  invasion 
under  Hannibal,  438 ;  wars  with  Dio- 
nysius,  443-445  ;  war  with  Timoleon, 
448 

Catana  founded,  87 ;  destroyed  by  Gelo, 
234  ;  joins  the  Athenians,  357  ;  besieged 
by  Syracusans,  438  ;  battle  of,  444 

Cscrops,  legend  of,  2 1 

Cephallenia,  9  ;  allied  to  Athens,  299 

Cephissus,  river,  11 

Chabrias  wins  battle  of  Naxos,  462 ;  slain 
at  Chios,  489 

Chaereas,  385 

Chaeroneia,  battle  of,  515 

Chalcedon  founded,  85;  taken  by  Alei- 
biades,  393 

Chalcideus,  Spartan  admiral,  377,  378 

Chalcidice  colonized,  s2  ;  revolts  to  Bra- 
sidas, 332 ;  league  of,  451 ;  league  dis- 
solved by  Sparta,  454 ;  conquered  by 
Philip,  500 

Chalcis,  its  colonies,  82-86 ;  at  war  with 
Athens,  163 ;  taken  by  Athenians,  164 ; 
revolts  to  Sparta,  387 ;  allied  with 
Athens,  510 

Chares,  campaigns  of,  490,  511;  com- 
mands at  Chaeroneia,  515 

Ciiaridemus,  502 

Charilails,  King  of  Sparta,  64,  73 

Charminus  slain  at  Samos,  383 

Charon  the  Theban,  455,  456 

Chios  colonized,  56;  llistiacus  at,  144; 
fleet  of,  at  Lade,  145 ;  revolts  from 
Persia,  227 ;  revolts  from  Athens,  377  ; 
beset  by  the  Athenians,  3S2 ;  revolts 
from  Sparta,  431  ;  joins  Athenian  naval 
alliance,  462 ;  engiges  in  the  Social 
war,  489 ;  taken  bj'  Memuon,  529 

Cimmerians,  their  wars  with  LyJia,  121 

Cimon,  Athenian  general,  233  ;  his  vic- 
tories, 2 12 ;  his  character  and  policj', 
247,  248 ;  victorious  at  the  Eurymedoii, 
2,49;  aids  Sparta,  253;  ostracized,  256  ; 
refilled,  261;  last  victories  of,  264 

Cinadon,  conspiracy  of,  423 

Cirrha  destroyed  in  the  first  Sacred  war, 
107 

Ciihaeron,  Mount,  12 

Clazomenae  taken  by  the  Persians,  143  ; 
revolts  from  Athens,  377 

Clearchus,  417  ;  slain,  418 

Clearidas,  Spartan  general,  540 

Cleippides,  Athenian  general,  312 

Cleisthenes  of  Athens,  bribes  the  Delphic 


552 


Lidex. 


Oracle,  117;  Ipade.  of  democrats  at 
Athens,  148, 149;  exiled,  149;  recalled, 
150 ;  his  constitutional  refurms,  153-161 

Cleisthenes  of  Sicyon,  107 

Cleitus,  eaves  Alexander's  life,  527 ; 
murdered  by  Alexander,  539 

Cleombrotus,  King  of  Sparta,  invades 
Boeotia,  460  ;  slain  at  Leuctra,  467 

Cleomenes  I.,  King  of  Sparta,  at  Athens, 
149;  invades  Attica,  151  ;  defeats  the 
Argives,  165;  at  Aegina,  172;  death 
of,  184 

Cleon  accuses  Pericles,  303  ;  his  character, 

315  ;  advocates  massacre  of  Lesbians, 

316  ;  opposes  peace,  326  ;  at  Sphacteria, 
328,  329;  killed  at  Amphipolis,  339 

Cleopatra,  wife  of  Philip  of  Jlacedon,  519 ; 
slain  by  Alexander,  523 

Cleophon  opposes  peace,  392,  402  ;  killed, 
405 

Cleruchles,  Athenian,  152,  266,  277 

Climax,  Alexander  at  ]\Iount,  52a 

Cnemus,  Spartan  general,  309 

Cnldus,  battle  of,  430 

Codrus,  King  of  Athens,  102 

Colonies,  Greek,  in  Asia  Jlinor,  52-59; 
colonies  in  the  nortli  and  west,  81-93  ; 
of  Alexander  the  Great,  533,  542 

Colophon  taken  by  Gyges,  121 ;  taken  by 
the  Athenians,  393 

Commerce  in  early  Greece.  25-27  ;  in  the 
age  of  colonization,  81-93 

Conin,  Athenian  admiral,  397;  besieged 
in  Jlitylene,  398  ;  flies  to  Cyprus,  403  ; 
takes  service  with  Persia,  430;  re- 
builds the  walls  of  Athens,  431 ;  cast 
into  prison,  433 

Copais  lake,  12 

Corcyra  colonized,  86 ;  at  war  with  Co- 
rinth, 90,  98,  282  ;  asks  aid  of  Athens, 
284 ;  sedition  at,  320,  331  ;  Spartan 
attack  on,  464 

Corinth,  15 ;  conquered  by  Dorians,  50 ; 
colonies  of,  89,  90 ;  tyrants  of,  96-98  ; 
aids  Athens,  184;  congress  at,  189  ;  at 
war  with  Athens,  259  ;  at  war  with 
Corcyra,  282,  288  ;  advocates  Pelopon- 
nesian  war,  288  ;  battle  near,  330  ;  aids 
Sparta,  346 ;  sends  help  to  Syracuse, 
363  ;  advocates  destruction  of  Athens, 
405  ;  makes  war  on  Sparta,  428  ;  com- 
paigns  around,  432,  43J ;  faithful  to 
Sparta,  474  ;  makes  peace  with  Thebes, 
480  ;  sends  Timoleon  to  Sicily,  448  ; 
tyranny  at,  483  ;  allied  to  Athens,  510 ; 
submits  to  Philip,  516;  congress  at, 
517 

Coroneia,  first  battle  of,  264 ;  second 
battle  of,  429 

Cranao-Pelasgi,  24 

Crete,  geography  of,  18 ;  colonized  by 
Dorians,  57 

Crimcsus,  battle  of  the,  448 

Crissa  destroyed  in  Sacred  war,  107 

Critias,  leader  of  the  thirty  tyrants,  412  ; 
bis  misrule,  413;  slain,  415 


Croesus,  his  reign,  122, 123 ;  conquered  by 

Cyrus,  130 
Croton   founded,   87 ;    Pythagoreans    at, 
229  ;  conquers  Sybaris,  230 ;  taken  by 
Diony^ius  of  Syracuse,  445 
Crypteia,  74,  331 

Cumae  founded,  86  ;  battle  of,  233  ;  taken 
by  Sabellians,  444 
1    Cunaxa,  battle  of,  418 

Cyaxares,  the  Mede,  122,  125 
j    Cyclades,  geographj'  of  the,  18 
Cyclic  poets,  31 
Cydnus,  Alexander  at  the,  529 
Cylon,  conspirac}-  of,  104 
I    Cyme  founded,  54 ;   taken  by  Persians, 
j        143  ;  besieged  by  Tissaphernes,  420 
I    Cynuria  conquered  by  Sparta,  79 
I    Cyprus  colonized,  58  ;  submits  to  Persia, 
133  ;  joins  the  Ionian  revolt,  142  ;  sub- 
I       dued,    143;    invaded  by  Cimon,   264; 
I        submits  to  Alexander,  532 
Cj'pselus  of  Corinth,  96,  97 
Cyrene  founded,  91 ;  submits  to  Persia, 

134 
Cyrus  the  Great,  King  of  Elam,  127  ;  con- 
quers Lydia  and  Ionia,  129,  130;  con- 
quers Bahylon,  132  ;  death  of,  133 
Cyrus  the    younger,   governor  of   Asia 
Jlinor,  395  ;  aias  Lysander,  395  ;  rebels 
against  his  brother,  417  ;  killed,  418 
Cytliera  conquered  by  the   Athenians, 

381 
Cyzicus  founded,  83 ;  battle  of,  391 

Damocles,  story  of,  442 

Danai,  early  name  of  Greeks,  33  ;  invade 
Egypt,  27 

Dauaus,  legend  of,  23 

Dardanians  in  Asia  Minor,  55 

Darius  I.  becomes  king,  135  ;  reorganizes 
his  empire,  136  ;  invades  Scythia,  13?  ; 
incensed  with  Athens,  147;  sends  out 
Datis  and  Artaphernes,  176  ;  dies,  183 

Darius  II.,  his  treaty  with  Sparta,  373; 
sends  Cyrus  to  Asia  Minor,  395;  dies, 
417 

Darius  TIT.,  ascends  the  throne,  525;  at 
Issus,  531 ;  makes  proposals  to  Alex- 
ander, 532 ;  at  Arbela,  535,  murdered 
by  Bessus,  537 

Datis,  commander  at  Marathon,  176-180 

Decarchies  in  Asia  Minor,  409 

Decelea  seized  bj'  Spartans,  366 

Delium,  battle  of,  333 

Delos,  13  ;  Confederacy  of,  241 ;  synod 
and  treasury  of,  removed  to  Athens, 
257  ;  organization  of,  276 

Delphi,  situation  of,  11,  45  ;  oracle  cf, 
45  ;  encourages  colonization,  93;  bribed 
by  Cleisthenes,  117;  by  Cleomenes, 
172 ;  prophecies  of,  before  Persian  war, 
190,  191;  attacked  by  Xerxes,  211; 
seized  by  the  Phocians,  496  ;  delivered 
by  Philip,  505 
}    Deniaratus,  King  of  Sparta,  152,  172,  203 

Denies  of  Attica,  154 


Index. 


553 


DemiuvRi,  Attic  class,  103 

Demosthenes  (.general),  campaign  of,  in 
iEtolia,  321 ;  victories  in  Acarnania, 
322 ;  fortifies  Pylos,  323  ;  takes  Spliac- 
teria,  329  ;  sent  to  Sicily,  366  ;  captured, 
371 ;  slain,  372 

Demosthenes  (orator),  his  character,  501 ; 
Olynthiac  orations  of,  502;  sent  on 
emba:^sy  to  Pella,  504;  political  activity 
of,  506 ;  travels  in  Peloponnesus,  507  ; 
urges  the  Athenians  to  war,  509:  per- 
suades the  Thebans  to  war,  514;  stirs 
up  Greece  against  Alexander,  524 

Dercyllidas,  Spartan  general,  420,  431 

Diacria,  faction  of,  103 

Dicasteries,  the  Athenian,  158,  269 

Diodotus  opposes  Cleon,  316 

Dion  banished,  446 ;  expels  Dionysius 
II.,  447;  killed,  447 

Dionysius  the  elder,  his  rise,  441 ;  his 
reign,  440-445;  dies,  446 

Dionysius  the  younger,  his  reign,  446 ; 
exiled,  447  ;  returns,  447  ;  at  Corinth, 
448 

Diopeithes,  Athenian  genera!,  509 

Dodona,  oracle  of,  6,  45 

Dorcis,  Spartan  admiral,  233 

Dorians  invade  I'eloponnesus,  48,  49 ; 
colonies  of,  in  Asia  Minor,  57,  58; 
kingdoms  of,  in  Peloponnesus,  60,  64 

Doris,  geography  of,  11 ;  conquered  by 
Phocians,  260 

Draco,  legislation  of,  104 

EccLEsiA,  the  Athenian,  104;  after  the 
reforms  of  Cleisthenes,  156 

Edonian  Thracians  slay  Aristagoras, 
143;  defeat  the  Athenians,  251 

Eetionea,  fort  of,  387 

Egypt,  early  raids  of  the  Greeks  on,  27  ; 
commercial  intercourse  with,  91 ;  con- 
quered by  Cambyses,  134  ;  Athenian 
campaigns  in,  255.  263;  Agesilaus  in, 
487, 488  ;  conquered  by  Alexander,  533 

Eion  conquered  by  Athenians,  242 ; 
Thucydides  at,  336 

Eleusinian  mysteries  profaned  by  Alcl- 
biades,  355-358 

Eleusis  seized  by  Thirty  Tyrants,  415 

Elis,  geography  of,  16;  wars  of,  77; 
makes  war  on  Sparta,  343-340,  474; 
wars  of,  with  the  Arcadians,  480,  481 ; 
civil  war  in,  leads  to  alliance  with 
Philip  of  Macedon,  507 

Endius  the  Spartan,  376  ;  goes  to  propose 
peace  at  Athcn.-,  392 

Ennea  Hodoi,  251 

Epaminondas,  character  of,  459 ;  at  the 
congress  of,  371  B.C.,  464  ;  commands 
at  Leuctra,  4  05  ;  invades  Poloponnesus, 
474,  476,  479  ;  inviides  Thcssaly,  478  ; 
attempts  to  take  .Sparta,  4  83  ;  com- 
mands at  Mantiiiea,  48  4 ;  killed,  485 

Eparili  in  Arcadia,  47,3-481 

Ephesus  founded,  56 ;  taken  by  the 
liydians,  122 ;  taken  by  the  Persians, 


132 ;  recaptured  after  Ionian  revolt, 
145  ;  Athenians  defeated  at,  393; 
Lysander  at,  396  ;  Agesilaus  at,  423, 
submits  to  Alexander,  528 

Ephialtes  the  Athenian,  254  ;  murdered, 
256 

Ephialtes  the  Ulalian,  204 

Ephors  of  .Sparta,  their  power,  71,72 

Epidamnus  founded,  90  ;  civil  war  at,  283 

Epidaurus,  15  ;  taken  by  Dorians,  50  ; 
conquered  by  Periander,  98  ;  at  war 
with  Athens,  256;  allied  to  Sparta, 
293,  346-349,  474  ;  beseiged  by  Epami- 
nondas, 477 

Epipolae,  plateau  at  Sj-racuse,  360 

Epirus,  geography  of,  6  ;  colonies  of 
Corinth  in,  90  ;  tribes  of,  attack  the 
Acarnanians,  309  ;  conquered  by 
Philip,  508 

Epistates,  office  of  the,  157 

Epitadas,  Spartan  general,  329 

Erechtheum  temple  at  Athens,  273 

Eretria,  colonies  of,  82 ;  war  with  Chalcis, 
120;  aids  the  lonians,  142;  taken  by 
the  Persians,  176  ;  revolts  against 
Athens,  265  ;  battle  of,  387  ;  tyrants 
of,  510 

Etruscans,  87,  113;  defeated  at  Cumae, 
233  ;  aid  Athens,  363 

Euagoras  of  Cyprus,  403 

Euboea,  geography  of,  13;  revolts  from 
Athens,  265,  387  ;  joins  the  Thebans, 
471;  wars  in,  500,  511 

Eudamidas,  Spartan  general,  452 

Eupatridue  at  Athens,  102-104 

Euphron,  tyrant  of  Sicyon,  483 

Eupompidas  of  Plataea,  317 

Euripides  at  the  court  of  Archelaus,  491 

Eurotas,  river,  16 

Kury blades.  Spartan  admiral,  198,  213 

Eurj'medon,  battle  of  the,  249 

Eurymedon  the  Athenian,  at  Corcyra, 
331  ;  at  Pylos,  325-327  ;  tried  and  con- 
demned, 335  ;  killed  at  Syracuse,  368 

Eurj-pontidae,  kings  of  .Sparta,  63 

"Five  Thousand,"  the,  at  Athens,  384- 

387 

Foreign  influence  on  early  Greece,  23-28 
Forests  of  Greece,  3 

"  Four  Hundred,"  conspiracy  of  the,  at 
Athens,  384-388 

Gargapiita,  fountain  of,  224 

(Jaza  taken  by  Alexander,  533 

Gedrosia,  Alexander  in,  541 

Gela     founded,     88;    its    tyrants,    231; 

taken  by  Carthaginians,  443 
Gelo  of  Syracuse,  231,  232 
Geomori,  cl.iss  at  Athens,  103 
Gercneian  IMoun  tains,  yi 
Gerousia  at  Sparta,  66 
Glaucus,  legend  of,  4G 
Gordium,  Alexander  cuts  the  knot  at, 

529 
Granicus,  battle  of  the,  527 


554 


Index. 


Greece,  geography  of,  1-18  ;  early  history 

of,  19-28. 
Gyges  of  Lydia,  121 
Uylippus    ill    Sicily,    3G3;    defeats    the 

Athenians,  3G8  ;  captures  the  Athenian 

army,  371 
Gytheum    taken    by   Athenians,    263; 

burnt  by  Thcbans,  475 

H.vLiARTUS,  deitroj'ed  by  Xerxes,  209 ; 

battle  of,  427 
Helicarnassus,  siege  of,  523 
Hamilcar  invades  Sicily,  232  ;  killed,  233 
Hannibal  ta1«s  Selinus,  438;    takes  lli- 

mera,  439 ;  dies,  440 
llarruodius  and  Aristoseiton,  conspiracy 

of,  117 
Haimosts,  the  Spartan  system  of,  409 
Ilarpagus  the  Mode,  131 
Helen,  the  legend  of,  29 
Heliaea  at  Athens,  158, 
Helicon,  Mount,  10 
HcUas,  the  name,  5 
Mellen,  the  mythical  hero,  22,  23 
Hellenes,  tha  name,  22,  23 
Hellenotamiae,  242,  27G 
Hellespont,  colonies  on  the,  S3  ;  bridged 

by  Uarius,  138;  by  Xerxes,  194;  war 

on  the,  236,  390 
Helots,  origin  of  the,  73 ;  their  status,  74  ; 

conspiio  with  Pausanias,  243 ;    great 

rising  of',  253  ;  subdued,  262 
Heracles,  a  Phoenician  god,  26 ;  temple 

of,  at  Tyre,  532 
Heraclidae,  conquests  of  the,  50 
Hermae,  mutilation  of  the,  351,  355 
Hermioue,  15;    in  the  Spartan  alliance, 

292,  474 
Hermocrates  of  Syracuse,  372;  in  Asia, 

377  ;  siain,  4(0 
Herodotus  at  Thurii,  277 
Heroic  age,  the,  and  its  characteristics, 

29-38 
Hesiod,  37 
Hicetas,  443 

Hicro,  tyrant  of  Syracuse,  233,  23 1 
Himera  founded,  8S  ;  victory  of  Gelo  at, 

232  ;  destroyed  by  Hannibal,  439 
Hipparchus,  assassination  of,  117 
Hippias,  tyrant  of  Athens,  116  ;  expelled, 

118  ;  at  Sparta,  164 ;  joins  the  Persians, 

175  ;  at  Marathon,  176 
Hippocrates  defeated  at  Delium,  333,  331 
Histiaeus  at  the   Danube    bridge,    139 ; 

fosters  the  Ionian  revolt,  141  ;  slain, 

146 
Homer,  poems  of,  29 
Homeric  question,  the,  30,  31 
Hyperbolus,  the  Athenian    demagogue, 

383 

ICTiNUS,  architect  of  the  Parthenon,  273 
Iliad,  subject  of  the,  28 
Ilium,  Alexander  at,  526 
Inarus,  Egyptian  prince,  263 
India,  Alexander  in,  540 


Ion,  mythical  hero,  23 

Ionia,  colonization  of,  55,  50 ;  conquered 

by    Persia,   131;    revolt  of,   141-145; 

freed  by  the  Athenians,  227  ;  submits 

to  Alexander,  523 
lonians,    the    race,    23 ;    expelled    from 

Peloponnesus  by  the  Achaians,  49,  50  ; 

settle  in  Asia  Minor,  55 ;  colonies  of, 

in  the  Euxine,  83 
Iphicrates  at  Corinth,  432;  relieves  Cor- 

cyra,  4G4;   in  Peloponnesus,  476;    in 

the  Social  war,  490 
Isagoras  the  Athenian,  148, 160,  161 
Ismenias  the  Theban,  warlike  poliey  of, 

426  ;  executed  by  tlie  Spartans,  451 
Issus,  battle  of,  531 
Isthmian  games,  43 
Italiots,  history  of  the,  223-230,  235,  444, 

445,  449 
Italy,  colonization  of,  by  the  Greeks,  87-89 
Ithaca,  9 
Ithome,    fortress    of    Aristodcmus,    76; 

stronghold  of  the  revolted  Helots,  253  ; 

taken   by  Sparta,  262 ;  site  of  city  of 

Messene,  475 

Jason  of  Pherae,  career  of,  470,  472 

KiNGSHrr,  the  Homeric,  34 
Knights,  the  Athenian,  109 

Lacedaemon  and  Lacedaemonians.    Sea 

Sparta  and  Spartans 
Lacedaemonius,  Alheuian.admiral,  237 
Laches,  Athenian  admiral,  320 
Lacunia,  geography  of,  16  ;  conq\iered  by 

the  Dorians,  49  ;  early  liistory  of,  63  ; 

invaded  by  the  Thebans,  474,  483 
Laconians  (Ferioeci),  73,  74 
Lade,  battle  of,  144 
Lamachus,  Athenian  general,  353;   hi3 

plans  in  Sicily,  357  ;  killed  at  Syracuse, 

362 
Lampsacus  founded,   S3 ;    Lysander  at, 

402 
Larissa  in    Thessaly,    7 ;    calls    in    the 

JMacedonians,  477  ;  taken  by  Pelopidas, 

477  ;  appeals  to  Philip,  497 
Laurium,  silver  mines  of,  186 
Lelantiue  war,  120 
Leleges,  22 
Leonidas  of  Sparta,  199,  203  ;    slain   at 

Thermopylae,  206 
Leontiades  of  Thebes,  his  treachery,  452 

453 ;  murdered,  456 
Leontiui  founded,  87  ;   taken  by  Hiero, 

234  ;  appeals  to  Athens,  321 ;  captured 

by  Syracusans,  352 ;  resettled  by  Syra- 

cusans,  441 ;  in  the  hands  of  Hiketas, 
■      448 

Leotychides  of  Sparta  made  king,  172  ; 

at  Mycale,  227 
Leotychides  the  younger,  420 
Lepreum,  attacked  by  Elis,  343-348 
Lesbos,  colonization    of,   54 ;    poets    of, 

120;   submits  to  Persia,  132;   revolts 


Index. 


555 


from  Athens,  311;  subdued,  314;  con- 
quered by  Meranon,  529 

Leucas  colonized,  90;  makes  war  on  the 
Acarnanian.-,  309 

Leuctra,  battle  of,  466,  467 

Libya,  colonies  of  the  Greeks  in,  91 

Jvilybaeuin,  siege  of,  445 

Locri  Epizephyrii  founded,  83 ;  in  hands 
of  Dionysius  II.,  447 

Locrians  subdued  by  Xerxes,  209;  by 
Athens,  262 ;  make  war  on  Plioci.-i, 
426;  join  Thebes,  471;  beaten  by 
Philomelus,  496;  at  Delphi,  512 

Locris,  peography  of,  10 

Long  Walls  of  Athens,  253;  destroyid, 
400;  rebuilt  by  Conon,  431,  432 

I/ycians  conquered  by  Persia,  132 

Lycomedos  the  Arcadian,  47S 

Lycurgus,  legend  of,  64 ;  his  legislation, 
65-70 

Lydian  monarchy,  121-123 ;  conquered 
by  Persia,  129,  130 

Lygdamis  of  Naxos,  115 

Lysander  made  nauarchos,  395 ;  wins 
battle  of  Notium,  39G ;  allied  with 
Cyrus,  402 ;  wins  battle  of  Aegospo- 
tarai,  403;  takes  Athens,  406;  his  in- 
flueuce  in  Greece,  409;  disgraced  by 
the  ephors,  411;  goes  with  Agesilaus 
to  Asia,  422  ;  slain  at  Haliartus,  427 

Lysicles,  Athenian  general,  514 

Macedoxia  submits  to  Persia,  140  ;  allied 
to  Brasidas,  336  ;  invaded  by  Pelopidas, 
477 

Macedonians,  the,  491,  492 

Magi,  the,  127 

JIagna  Graeci,  colonization  of,  88 

MaiianGulf,  9 

Malis,  9 

Malli  oppose  Alexander,  541 

Mantinea,  17  ;  allied  to  Sparta,  252  ;  at 
war  with  .Sp.irta,  313;  first  battle  of, 
318;  walls  of,  cast  down  by  Sparta, 
451;  rebuilt,  472;  joins  Spaita,  482: 
second  battle  of,  485 

Marathon,  Peisistratus  lands  at,  115; 
battle  of,  179,  180 

Mardonius,  governor  of  Ionia,  147  ;  per- 
suades Xerxes  to  retire  home,  219; 
occupies  Athens,  221 ;  fights  battle  of 
Plataea,  224  ;  killed,  225 

Masistius,  224 

Massagetae  slay  Cyrus,  133 

JIassilia  founded,  S9 

Mausolus  takes  Rhodes,  490 

]\Iedes,  rise  of  the,  126  ;  conquered  by 
Cyrus,  129 ;  rebellion  of,  135 

Megabazus  in  Thrace,  140 

Megabyzus  conquers  Eiypt,  263 

Megacles  the  Alcmaeonid,  105 

Megacles  the  younger,  113  ;  his  dealings 
with  Peisistratus,  114,  115 

Megalopolis  founded,  473 ;  its  wars  with 
Sparta,  483,  502 

Megara,  13 ;  conquered  by  the  Dorians, 


50 ;  its  colonies,  85 ;  early  wars  with 
Athens,  106,  107  ;  tyrants  of,  104  ; 
allied  to  Athens,  258  ;  at  war  with 
Athens,  265 ;  foments  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war,  281  ;  its  lauils  ravaged, 
330;  saved  by  Brasidas,  332;  at  war 
with  Philip,  510 ;  submits  to  him, 
517 

Jlegara  Ilyblaea  founded,  87  ;  destroyed 
by  Gelo,  231 

Melcavth,  Phoenician  god,  26,  27,  532 

Melos  colonized  by  Dorians,  57  ;  con- 
quered by  Athens,  349 

Memnon,  general  against  Alexander, 
527-529 

Mende  founded,  82  ;  revolts  from  Athens, 
337 

Mcnelaus,  29 

JNIessene,  founded  by  Epaminond:<s,  475  ; 
wars  of,  with  Sparta,  507 ;  allied  to 
Philip,  507 

Jlcssone  in  Sicily  founded,  87  ;  taken  by 
Anaxilaus,  231 ;  talcen  by  Cartha- 
ginians, 444 

Messenia,  geography  of,  16;  early  wars 
with  Sparta,  74-78  ;  third  Messenian 
war,  253;  freed  by  Epaminondas,  475 

Methone,  taken  by  Philip,  497 

Miletus  founded,  56 ;  its  colonies,  83,  84 ; 
at  war  with  Lydia,  122,  123;  revolts 
from  Persia,  141;  destruction  of,  by 
Persians,  145 ;  joins  the  Athenians, 
227  ;  revolts  from  Athens,  377  ;  battle 
of,  379;  at  war  with  Persians,  410; 
taken  by  Alexander,  528 

Miltiades,  168;  at  the  Danube  bridge, 
139  ;  commands  at  Marathon,  176-179  ; 
his  Parian  expedition,  181  ;  dies,  182 

Jlindarus  in  the  Hellespont,  390 ;  slain, 
391 

Minos,  empire  of,  57 

Munychiri,  fighting  in,  415 

]\l3'cale,  battle  of,  227 

Mycenae,  early  greatness  of,  32 ;  talccn 
by  Argives,  252 

Myronides  defeats  Corinthians,  259  ;  con- 
quers Boeotia,  261 

Slytilene  founded,  54  ;  joins  Ionic  revolt, 
145;  revolts  from  Athens,  312;  re- 
taken, 314  ;  besieged  by  Spartans,  398  ; 
joins  naval  league,  462 

Nabon'adius  conquered  by  Cyrus,  132 
Nabopolassar  destroys  Nineveh,  125 
Nauarch,  otUce  of  the,  395,  424 
Kaucratis  founded,  92 
Naupactus  taken  by  the  Athenians,  262  ; 

sea-fight  off,  310  ;  taken  by  Lysander, 

409 
Naxos,  Persian  expedition  against,  140; 

conquered    by    Persia,    175;    revolts 

against    Athens,    250  ;    sea-fight    off, 

462 
Naxos  in  Sicily  founded,  87  ;  at  war  with 

Syracuse,  321 ;  joins  Athens,  357  ;  beset 

by  Syracusans,  438 


556 


Index. 


Kearchus,  Alexander's  admiral,  541,  544 

Nectanebis,  King  of  Egypt,  488 

Niceratus  put  to  death,  413 

Nicias  opposes  Cleon,  328 ;  captures 
Cythera,  331 ;  concludes  peace  of  Nicias, 
340;  opposes  Alcibiades,  345;  opposes 
the  Sicilian  expedition,  352,  353  ;  sent 
to  Sicily,  •■356  ;  his  plans,  357  ;  besieges 
Syracuse,  361  ;  his  dilatoriness,  362  ; 
sends  for  aid,  364  ;  refuses  to  raise  the 
siege,  368;  captured,  371  ;  slain,  372 

Nicodromus  of  TKgina,  185 

Nineveh  destroyed,  125 

Nomopbylaces,  the,  255 

OcHUS,  King  of  Persia,  490 

Odeum,  the,  272 

Odysseus,  legend  of,  30 

Oenophyta,  battle  of,  261 

Oeta,  Mount,  9 

Oetaeans  join  Lysander,  426;  at  war  with 
Phocis,  497  ;  proposals  of  the,  505 

Olbia  founded,  85 

Olynipia,  games  of,  43 ;  seized  by  Phei- 
don,  61  ;  buttle  of,  480 

Olympias,  mother  of  Alexander  the 
Great,  519,  521 

Olympus,  Mount,  6 

Olynthus  rebels  against  Athens,  288  ;  its 
freedom  acknowledged,  340 ;  forms 
C'halcidian  League,  451 ;  conquered  by 
Sparta,  454  ;  at  war  with  Athens,  494  ; 
attacked  and  conquered  by  Philip,  5u2 

Onomarchus  the  Phocian,  496 ;  his  suc- 
cesses, 497  ;  slain,  498 

Opuntian  Locrians,  10;  submit  to  Athens, 
262  ;  revolt,  265  ;  at  war  w  ith  Phocis, 
426  ;  submit  to  Thebes,  471 ;  oppressed 
by  Phocians,  497 

Oracles,  the  Greek,  44,  45 

Orchomenus  in  Arcardia,  adheres  to 
Sparta,  473 

Orcliomenus  in  Bocotia,  IMinyae  expelled 
from,  48  ;  seized  by  Boeotian  oligarchs, 
264 ;  joins  the  Spartans,  426 ;  aids 
Agesilaus,  429;  holds  out  agains-t 
,  Thebes,  463  ;  taken  by  Epaminondas, 
471  ;  taken  by  Onomarchus,  497 

Ormuzd,  the  Persian  god,  127 

Oroetes,  satrap,  135 

Oropus  taken  by  the  Tlipbans,  480 ;  given 
to  the  Athenians  by  Philip,  516 

Orthagoras  of  Sicyon,  80,  99 

Ortygia,  359 

Ossa,  Mount,  6 

Ostracism,  use  of,  at  Athens,  157 

Othryades  the  Spartan,  79,  80 

Othrys,  Mount,  7 

Ozolian  Locrians,  10;  beaten  by  Philo- 
melus,  496 

Paches  takes  Mitylene,  314  ;  slays  him- 
self, 317 
Pactyas  the  Lydian,  131 
Pagondas,  commands  at  Dclium,  333 
Pamisus,  river,  16 


Pan,  legend  of,  177 

Pangaeus,  Mount,  gold-mines  of,   251  ; 

worked  by  Philip  of  Macedon,  495 
Panionium,  the,  57 
Parali,  Attic  faction,  103,  113,  115 
Paralus,  the  galley,  353,  403,  503 
Parmenio,  general  of  Alexander,  528  ;  at 

Issus,  531 ;  at  Arbela,  535  ;  murdered, 

538 

Parnassus,  Afount,  10 

Pames,  Mount,  12 

Pamon,  Mount,  16 

Paros  attacked  by  Miltiades,  181 

Partheuiae,  the,  found  Tarentum,  76,  88 

Parthenon,  the,  273 

Parysatis,  queen,  417 

Pausanias,  King  of  Sparta,  pacifies 
Athens,  416;  invades  Boeotia,  427 

Pausanias,  Regent  of  Sparta,  in  command 
at  Plataea,  222-225 ;  his  doings  at  By- 
zantium, 237  ;  deposed,  238 ;  conspires 
with  the  Helots,  243 ;  starved,  244 

Pausanias,  the  Macedonian,  slays  Philip, 
519 

Pedieis,  Attic  faction,  103,  113,  115 

Peiraeus  founded  by  Theniistocles,  171; 
fortified,  240;  its  walls  destroyed  by 
Lysander,  406 ;   rebuilt  by  Conon,  431 

Peisander  at  Samos,  381 ;  organizes  con- 
spiracy at  Athens,  383,  384  ;  flies  to  the 
Spartans,  388 

Peisistratus,  his  rise,  114  ;  seizes  the 
tyranny  of  Athens,  115;  reign  of, 
115,  116 

Pelasgi,  early  legends  of  the,  20-22 ; 
driven  from  Scyros,  243 

Pella,  491,  503 

Pelopidas  slays  the  polemarchs,  455  ;  his 
character,  453  ;  at  Leuctra,  467 ;  in 
Peloponnesus,  474  ;  conquers  Thessaly, 
477 ;  imprisoned  by  Alexander  of 
Pherae,  478;  slain,  482 

Peloponnesian  war,  293-106 

Peloponnesus,  geography  of,  14-17  (see 
under  names  of  its  divisions) 

Pelops,  legend  of,  28 

Peneus,  river,  6,  8 

Pentacosiomedimni,  109 

Perdiccas  of  Macedon,  288,  336 

Periander,  tj'rant  of  Corinth,  conquers 
Corcyra,  90 ;  his  reign,  97  ;  dies,  98 

Pericles,  rise  of,  254 ;  conquers  Euboea, 
265;  bribes  the  Spartans,  266;  his 
power,  269 ;  his  democratic  reforms, 
269-271  ;  his  great  buildings,  272,  273  ; 
his  system  of  cleruchies,  277  ;  conquers 
Samos,  278 ;  advocates  alliance  with 
Corcyra,  286  ;  unpopularity  of,  in  432 
B.C.,  291  ;  his  policy  in  tlie  Peloponne- 
sian war,  298  ;  ravages  I^Icgaris,  300  ; 
prosecuted  by  Cleon,  303 ;  death  of,  305 

Pericles  the  younger  enfranchised,  305 ; 
made  stratcgus,  397  ;  executed,  401 

Perinthus  captured  by  Athenians,  393; 
besieged  by  Philip,  510 

Perioeci  of  Laconia,  73,  74 


Index, 


557 


Persepolis  sacked  by  Alexander,  537 

Persians,  the  nation,  I'JB ;  tlieir  rise  under 
Cyrus  and  Darius,  127-130  ;  conquered 
by  Alexander,  536,  537  (see  under 
names  of  Kings  —  Cyrus,  Cambyses, 
Darius,  Xerxes,  Artaxerxes,  Ocbus) 

rUalanx,  the  Macedonian,  494 

Pbalaris  of  Acragas,  99,  230 

Phalerum,  172 

Pharnabazus  asks  aid  at  Sparta,  377 ; 
assists  Slindarus,  390,  391;  equips  the 
fleet,  392 ;  defeated  by  Dercyllidas, 
420 ;  chased  by  Agesilaus,  423 ;  at 
battle  of  Cnidus,  430 

Phayllus  the  Phocian  defeated  by  Philip, 
497  ;  dies,  499 

Pheidias  decorates  the  Parthenon,  273 ; 
prosecuted  for  impiety,  291 

Pheidon  of  Argos,  61 ;  at  war  with  Sparta, 
77 

Philip  of  Macedon  taken  to  Thebes  as  a 
hostage,  478,  492  ;  his  character,  493 ; 
becomes  king,  494  ;  takes  Amphipolis 
and  Pydna,  494 ;  founds  Philippi,  495  ; 
invades  Thessaly,  497 ;  checked  at 
Thermopylae,  498;  quarrels  with  and 
takes  Olynthus,  502  ;  makes  peace  with 
Athens,  504;  subdues  Phocis,  505;  his 
influence  in  Peloponnesus,  507 ;  sub- 
dues Epirus,  509  ;  besieges  Perinthus 
and  Byzantium,  510  :  retires  into 
Thrace,  511;  invades  Central  Greece, 
513  ;  wins  battle  of  Chaeroneia,  515; 
subdues  Tliebes  and  Athens,  5IG  ;  calls 
congress  at  Corinth,  517  ;  his  plans,  518  ; 
assassinated,  519 

Philippi  founded,  495 

Philippics  of  Demosthenes,  502,  509 

Philippides,  the  legend  of,  176 

Philippopolis  founded,  510 

Philippus,  Alexander's  physician,  529 

Philippus  the  Tliebau  slain,  455,  456 

Philocrates,  pjace  of,  504 ;  banished, 
606 

Philomelus  seizes  Delphi,  496 ;  slain, 
497 

Philosophers,  the  early  Ionic,  120 

Philotas  slain  by  Alexander,  538 

Phocaea  founded,  50 ;  its  colonies,  89 ; 
destroyed  by  Persians,  131;  founds 
Alalia,  131 

Phocion  opposes  Demosthenes,  503 ;  cam- 
paign of,  in  Euboea,  500 ;  relieves 
Byzantium,  511 ;  rebukes  Demosthenes, 
519 

Phocis,  geography  of,  11;  invaded  by 
Xerxes,  2u9  ;  at  war  with  Sparta,  260  ; 
allied  to  Athens,  262 ;  attacked  by 
Thebes,  426  ;  aids  Lysander,  427  ;  sub- 
dued by  Thebans,  471 ;  at  strife  with 
Boeotia,  495  ;  fortunes  of,  in  the  sacred 
war,  496-504  ;  subdued  by  Philip,  505 

Phoebidas  seizes  the  Cadmeia,  453 ;  tried, 
454;  slain,  461 

Phoenicians,  their  influence  on  early 
Greece,  25,  26  ;  in  Cyprus,  53 ;  struggle 


with  Greeks  for  commerce  of  the  Eux- 
ine,  83;  in  Egypt,  91  ;  submit  to 
Cambyses,  133  ;  fleets  of,  employed  by 
the  Persians,  144,  194,  249,  386,  390  ; 
submit  to  Alexander,  532  (see  also 
under  Carthage) 

Phormio,  naval  victories  of,  310 

Phoros,  the,  of  the  Delian  League,  241 

Phrynichus  (politician)  conspires  with 
the  Four  Hundred,  383 ;  his coi(j?  dVtaf, 
3S4 ;  murdered,  386 

Phrynichus  (writer),  bis  play  of  "The 
Fall  of  Miletus,"  145 

Phyllidas  tlie  Theban,  455,  456 

Pindus,  Mount,  6 

Pinocutheca,  the,  at  Athens,  272 

Pisa  conquered  by  Elis,  78,  79 

Plague  of  Athens,  302 

Plain,  Attic  faction  of  the,  103 

Plataea  allied  to  Athens,  116  ;  its  troops 
at  Marathon,  177  ;  destroyed  by  Xerxes, 
209 ;  battle  of,  225 ;  attacked  by  The- 
bans, 296  ;  siege  and  capture  of,  317; 
restored  by  Spartans,  450 ;  again  de- 
stroyed by  Thebans,  463 

Plato  visits  Syracuse,  446 

Pleistoanax  bribed  by  Pericles  and 
exiled,  265,  266;  restored  from  exile, 
340 

Pnyx,  the,  154 

Polemarch,  the  Athenian,  103, 117 

Polycrates  of  Samos,  132,  135 

Poms,  King  of  India,  opposes  Alexand3r, 
540 

Potidaeafounded, 83 ;  revoltsfrom  A  thens, 
288  ;  recaptured,  304  ;  taken  by  Philip 
of  JIacedon,  494 

Probouleumata  at  Athens,  157 

Propylaea,  the,  built  by  Pericles,  272 

Prytanies,  the,  152 

Psammetichus  I.  of  Egypt,  91 

Psammetichus  II.  of  Egypt,  134 

Psammetichus,  tyrant  of  Corinth,  98 

Psyltaleia,  215 

Pydna  taken  by  Philip,  494 

Pylos,  ancient  kingdom  of,  34,  49 

Pylos  in  Messenia,  Athenians  at,  322  ; 
fighting  at,  323-330 

Pythagoreans,  the,  in  Italy,  229 

Pythian  games,  tlie,  43 

Pythonicus  accuses  Alcibades,  355 

Religion  of  the  Greeks,  39-42 

Rhapsodists,  the,  30 

Rhegium  founded,  88 ;  tyrants  of,  231  ; 
at  war  with  Syracuse,  320  ;  Athenians 
at,  357 

Rhetra  of  Lycurgus,  65 

Rhianus  and  the  INIessenian  war,  75 

Rhodes  colonized,  57  ;  sends  emigrants 
to  Sicily,  88 ;  revolts  from  Athens, 
379  ;  joins  the  naval  league,  462  ;  en- 
gages in  the  Social  war,  489  ;  conquered 
by  Mausolus,  490 

Rivers  of  Greece,  the,  3 

Roxana,  wife  of  Alexander,  539 


558 


Index. 


Sacred  war,  the  first,  107 

Sacred  war,  the  second,  breaks  r.iit,  496  ; 
progress  of,  497,  49S  ;  ended  by 
Philip,  505 

Sacred  war,  the  third,  512, 513 

Salaethus  at  Jlitylene,  313  ;  slain,  314 

Salaminia,  the  fralley,  356 

Salamis  in  Cyprus  founded,  58 ;  battle 
of,  264 

Salamis  (island)  taken  by  Athenians, 
lOG;  battle  of,  217;  ravaged  by  Spar- 
tans, 310 

Samos  colonized  by  lonians,  5G ;  Poly- 
crates  tjTant  at,  132-135 ;  fleet  of,  at 
Lade,  145  ;  reconqucrod  by  Persians, 
145 ;  revolts  from  Persia,  227  ;  revolts 
from  Athens,  278 ;  loyalty  of,  in  Pelo- 
ponnesian  war,  378  ;  Athenian  fleet  at, 
381-385 ;  sedition  at,  383 ;  taken  by 
Lysander,  410 ;  taken  by  the  Athenians, 
489 

S.ippho,  120 

Sardanapalus,  legend  of,  125 

Sardis  taken  by  Cyrus,  130 ;  burnt  by  the 
lonians,  142;  submits  to  Alexander, 
523 

Scione  revolts  from  Athens,  337 ;  retaken, 
340 

Scjdax,  138 

Scyros  captured  by  Ciraon,  243 

Scythia,  Greek  colonies  in,  85  ;  invaded 
by  Darius,  133 ;  invaded  by  Alexander, 
539 

Selinus  founded,  83;  at  war  with  Segesta, 
352  ;  aids  Syracuse,  363  ;  destroyed  by 
Carthaginians,  433 

Selymbria  taken  by  Athenians,  393 

Sepeia,  battle  of,  167 

Sestos  taken  by  the  Athenians,  236 ; 
Athenian  fleet  at,  390,  403 

Sicels,  the,  86,  87  ;  aid  the  Athenians, 
361 

Sicily  colonized  by  the  Greeks,  86-88  ; 
early  history  of,  230-235 ;  wars  in, 
322,  333;  invaded  by  the  Atlienians, 
351-371;  renewed  wars  iu,  43^;  in- 
vaded by  Carthaginians,  439 ;  in  the 
power  of  Dionysius  I.,  443 ;  freed  by 
Timoleon,  443 

Sic3'on,  15  ;  taken  by  the  Dorians,  50 ; 
tyrants  of,  99  ;  sends  ships  tn  Salamis, 
212  ;  attacked  by  the  Athenians,  263  ; 
taken  by  Epaminondas,  477 

Sinope  founded,  84  ;  destroyed  by  Cim- 
merians, 121 

Sisygambis,  mother  of  Darius  IU.,  531, 
537 

SiUiIces  of  Thrace,  303,311 

Smyrna  founded,  55 

Social  war,  outbreak  of,  489  ;  ends,  190 

Socrates  opposes  the  decrees  of  Callixenus, 
401 ;  executed,  427 

SoUium,  510 

Solon,  early  life^of,  106;  his  legislation, 
103-111;  his  travels,  113;  his  last 
years,  114 


Sophocles,  the  tragedian,  commands  at 
Samos,  273 

Sparta,  ancient  kingdom  of,  3t ;  conquered 
by  the  Dorians,  49  ;  early  history  of, 
63 ;  legislation  of  Lycurgus,  65-69  ; 
engages  in  Messenian  wars,  74-77 ; 
defeats  Argives  and  Arcadians,  79 ; 
supreme  in  Peloponnesus,  80  ;  colonizes 
Tarentum,  88;  allii;d  to  Croesus,  129  ; 
refuses  aid  to  Ionia,  141 ;  expels  Hip- 
pias,  118  ;  expels  Cleisthenes,  149  ;  at 
war  with  Argos,  165  ;  sends  troops  too 
late  for  Marathon,  181 ;  sends  Leonidas 
to  Thermopylae,  198 ;  troops  of,  at 
Plataea,  225;  attacked  by  revolted 
Helots,  253  ;  at  war  with  Athens,  263  ; 
subdues  lielots,  262 ;  renewed  war 
with  Athens,  265  ;  makes  peace,  266  : 
supports  the  Corinthians  against 
Athens,  290 ;  resources  of,  at  outbreak 
of  Peloponnesian  war,  293 ;  in  Pelo- 
ponnesian  war,  293-405 ;  supremacy 
of,  in  Greece,  407-163  (s«e  under  names 
of  Spartan  generals  and  statesmen) ; 
feeling  in,  alter  Leuctra,  469 ;  attacked 
by  Epaminondas,  474 ;  wars  of,  with 
the  Arcadians,  473 ;  second  attack  on, 
by  Epaminondas,  483  ;  continued  war 
of,  with  Messene,  436  ;  wars  of,  with 
^Megalopolis,  483  ;  aids  the  Phocians, 
498  ;  attacked  by  troops  of  Philip,  507  j 
refuses  to  submit  to  Philip,  517 ;  opposes 
Alexander,  523,  529,  545 

Spartan  institutions,  65-72 

Sphacteria  blockaded,  325  ;  captured,  330 

Sphodrias  attempts  to  seize  Athens,  460 

Spithridates,  satrap,  at  the  Granlcus,  527 

Sporades,  the,  18 

Statira,  married  to  Alexander,  514 

Sthenela'idas  the  Ephor,  239 

Strategi,  the  Athenian,  159,  186 

Susa,  capital  of  Cyrus,  129 ;  Themistocles 
at,  240  ;  Pelopidas  at,  479 ;  taken  by 
Alexander,  536 

Sybaris  founded,  87 ;  destroyed  by  Croton, 
230 ;  its  inhabitants  settle  Thurii,  277 

Sybuta,  sea-fight  off,  286 

S'jntaxis,  the,  462 

Syracuse  founded,  87  ;  tj'rants  of,  231- 
233 ;  freed  from  tyrants,  234 ;  at  war 
with  Catana,  etc.,  320 ;  designs  of  the 
Athenians  against,  353 ;  siege  of,  361- 
368 ;  victory  of,  over  Athens,  370 ; 
sends  ships  to  the  Aegean,  377;  wars 
with  its  neighbours,  438  ;  and  with 
Carthage,  439  ;  subject  to  Dionysius  \. 
and  II.,  441-446;  freed  by  Dion,  447; 
anarchy  at,  447 ;  freed  by  Timoleon, 
448 

Syssitia  at  Sparta,  70 

Tactics  Greek.  See  under  Alexander, 
jSIarathon,  ilantinaa  (first  battle  of), 
Iphicrates,  and  Epaminondas 

Tanagra,  battle  of,  261 

Tarentum  founded,  77,  83  ;  wars  of,  with 


Index. 


559 


the  lapygians,  235 ;  latter  wars  with 
tbe  Lucanians,  449 

Taygetus,  Mount,  16 

"  Tearless  Battle,"  the,  473 

Tegea,  wars  of,  with  Sparta,  79  ;  its 
troops  at  Plataea,  225 ;  battle  at,  252  ; 
its  troops  at  Mautiaea,  3iS ;  massacre 
at,  472  ;  troubles  at,  481 

Teleclus  of  Sparta,  72;  slain,  74 

Temenus,  49 

Tempe,  pass  of,  7  ;  Xerxes  at,  196 

"  Ten  Thoasaad,"  expaJitioii  of  the,  417, 
418 

"  Teu  Thousand"  of  Arcadia,  473 

Teos  talcen  by  Persians,  131 ;  revolts 
from  Athens,  377 

Thales  of  Miletus,  his  philosophy,  120 

Thasos,  Phoenicians  at,  25  ;  contiuercd  by 
Greeks,  85  ;  revolts  from  Athens,  251; 
revolts  a  second  time  and  is  recovered, 
393 ;  taken  by  Etonicus,  404 

Theagenes  of  ilegara,  99  ;  his  war  with 
Athens,  104-lOG 

Tliebes  founded  by  Cadmus,  25 ;  con- 
quered by  Boeotians,  43  ;  at  war  with 
Athens,  116,  151  ;  joins  Xerxes,  209  ; 
its  troops  at  Plataea,  226  ;' taken  by  the 
Greeks,  226;  at  war  with'Athens,  260  ; 
subdued  by  Athens,  261;  freed,  265; 
foments  Pe  lopoi  in  esian  war,  23 1 ;  makes 
attempt  on  Plataea,  296  ;  its  troops  at 
Delium,  324  ;  sends  aid  to  Sparta,  316  ; 
advocates  destruction  of  Athens,  405  ; 
insults  Agesilaus,  422 ;  declares  war  on 
Sparta,  42d  ;  war  of,  with  Sparta,  427- 
434 ;  suffers  by  peace  of  Antalcidas, 
451  ;  seized  by  Plioebidas,  453 ;  freed 
bj'  the  exiles,  455 ;  war  of,  with  Sparta, 
460-466;  supremacy  of,  in  Greece, 
469-435;  strife  of,  with  Phocis,  495- 
497  ;  joins  Athens  against  Philip,  512 ; 
troops  of,  at  Chaeroueia,  514;  taken  by 
Philip,  516 ;  destroyed  by  Alexander, 
524 

Themistocles,  character  of,  170;  founds 
Peiraeus,  172;  fosters  the  navy,  186; 
at  congress  of  Corinth,  189 ;  in  com- 
mand in  Thessaly,  196 ;  in  command 
at  Artemisium,  201;  advocates  evacua- 
tion of  Athens,  209  ;  his  disputes  with 
the  admirals,  213;  secret  dealings  of, 
with  Xerxes,  214-219;  his  embassy  to 
Sparta,  239,  240;  his  exile,  244,  245; 
dies  in  Asia,  216 

Theoclos,  oekist  of  Xaxos,  87 

Theopompus,  King  of  Sparta,  76 

Theramenes  joins  the  Four  Hundred, 
384 ;  at  variance  w.th  his  colleagues, 
386 ;  accuses  the  generals  after  Argi- 
nusae,  400 ;  his  embassy  to  Sparta, 
405;  joins  the  Thirty  Tyrants,  412; 
slain  by  Critias,  414 

Thermopylae,  pass  of.  9 ;  Leonidas  at, 
199 ;  battle  of,  203-205  ;  the  Athenians 
seize  it,  493 ;  Philip  passes  it,  613 

Theron  of  Acragas,  232 


Theseus,  legend  of,  24;  finding  of  bis 
bones,  243 

Tbesmothetae,  103 

Thespiae,  troops  of,  at  Thermopylae,  2?5 ; 
burnt  by  Xerxes,  209 ;  aids  Sparta, 
460  ;  taken  by  Thebans,  463 ;  destroyed, 
471 

Thessaly,  geography  of,  9  ;  conquTed  by 
the  Thessalians,  48  ;  submits  to  Xerxes, 
197;  troops  of,  desert  Athenians  at 
Tanagra,  261  ;  to;\"ns  of,  allied  to 
Athens  in  433  B.C.,  295;  IJrasidas  in, 
335  ;  Agesilaus  crosses,  429  ;  Jason  of 
Pherae  subdues  it,  470  ;  anarchy  in,  at 
Jason's  de.ith,  471 ;  Pelopidas^  in,  477  ; 
wars  of  Alexander  of  Pherae  in,  473, 
431;  joins  Thebes  against  Phocians, 
496;  Philip  in,  49S ;  bscomes  subject 
to  Philip,  509 

Thetes,  class  at  Athens,  109;  archonship 
opened  to,  209 

Thibron,  general  in  Asia,  419,  420 

"  Tliirty  Tyrants  "  at  Athens,  career  of 
the,  412-415 

"  Thirty  Years'  Peace,"  the,  266 

Thrasybulus  of  Athens,  general  at  Samos, 
335  ;  at  Cyzicus,  390,  391 ;  exiled,  412  ; 
leads  the  attack  on  the  tyrants,  415  ; 
his  victory,  416;  killed  in  Asia,  434 

Thrasybulus  of  .Aliletus,  93  ;  fall  of,  122 

Thrasydaeus,  tyrant  of  Acragas,  233 

Thrasyllus,  general  at  Samos,  335  ;  at 
Cyzicus,  3'JO,  391  ;  takes  Colophon, 
393 

Thucydides,  son  of  ^ilelesias,  opposes 
Pericles,  274  ;  exiled,  275 

Thucydides,  son  of  Olorus,  at  Eion,  336  ; 
banished,  336 

Thurii  founded,  277 ;  aids  Athens,  360  ; 
at  war  with  the  Lucanians,  445 

Thyreatis,  conquered  by  Sparta,  79 ; 
given  to  the  Aeginetans,  301 ;  taken 
from  Sparta  by  Philip  of  Macedon, 
517 

Timocrates  of  Rhodes,  421 

Timolaiis  of  Corinth,  42-S 

Timoleon  slays  his  brother,  4SS  ;  liberates 
Sicily,  448,  449 

Timophancs,  tyrant  of  Corinth,  slain, 
488 

Timotheus  at  Corcyra,  462 ;  fails  at  Chios, 
490 

Tiribazus,  satrap,  433,  434 

Tiryns  founded,  2t 

Tissaphernes  aids  the  Spartans,  373  ;  in- 
trigues with  Alcibiades,  379-331;  im. 
prisons  Alcibiades,  391 ;  superseded  by 
Cyrus,  395;  returns  to  Asia  Minor, 
419  ;  besieges  Cj'me,  420  ;  executed,  423 

Tithraustes,  satrap,  423,  424 

Tolmides  harries  Messenia,  262 ;  slain  at 
Coroneia,  265 

Torone  founded,  8J;  revolts  from  Atheus, 
336;  retaken  by  Cleon,  333 

Trapezus  founded,  84 ;  the  "  Ten  Thou- 
sand" at,  419 


56o 


Index. 


Triphylia,  IG  disputed  by  Eleians  and 
Arcadians,  478 

Troezen,  15 ;  talcen  by  Dorians,  50 ;  re- 
ceives exiled  Atlienians,  210;  allied  to 
Athens,  263  ;  aids  Sparta,  292 

Troy,  legend  of  tlie  fall  of,  28 

Tyrants,  the  age  of  the,  94-100 

Tyre  stormed  by  Alexander,  532,  533 

Tyrians.    See  under  Phoenicia. 

Tyrrheno-Pelasgi,  in  Aegean,  21  ;  hany 
Egypt,  37  ;  driven  from  Scyros,  248 

Tyrtaeus,  75 

Xanthippus  accuses  Miltiades,  182;  com- 
mander at  Mycale,  227 


Xenopbon,  his  expedition  with  the  "  Ten 
Thousand,"  418,  419 

Xerxes  comes  to  the  throne,  18  2;  his 
character,  188;  determines  to  invade 
Greece,  188 ;  bis  Grecian  expedition, 
192-218  ;  returns  to  Asia,  219  ;  assassi- 
nated, 246 

Zacynthds,  17  ;  ravaged  by  Corinthians, 
303;  allied  to  Athens,  321;  ravaged 
by  Iphicrates,  463 

Zeugitae,  class  at  Athens,  109,  209 

Zeus,  cliaracter  of  the  god,  41 

iCoroaster,  religion  of,  126,  127 


\ 


T5!S^!S.  ii  Lj,.  ,♦_  K.1 1  h_J".. 


CENTRAL  r- 
University  ot 


p  r 


^" 


c 


^ 


r\- 


^  \. 


i-  J 


C 


UC  SOUTHERN  RLGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


AA    000  921395    0 


iJ^'* 


^jQ^v^^^  "^^^ 


I 


'/^xv^ 


^. 


^pi^lytiyl^*"-^^^ 


)J^aJJ-''A 


J^^- 


)j> 


IV 


